GODFATHERISM AND ITS INFLUENCE ON NIGERIA POLITICS AND

POLITICIAN

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Table of contents Page(s)

Abstract

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

1.2 Statement of the Problem

1.3 Objectives of the study

1.4 Research questions

1.5 Hypothesis

1.6 Significance of the study

1.7 Scope of the study

1.8 Limitation of study

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.1 Godfather

2.1.2 Godfatherism
2.1.3 Politics
2.1.4 Administration
2.2 Theoretical framework
2.2.1 Coalition theory
2.2.2 Party System Theory
2.2.3 Meritocratic Theory
2.2.4 Elite theory

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CHAPTER THREE: GOD-FATHERISM IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

3.1 Reasons for Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration

3.2 Negative acts of Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration

3.2.1 Borno State Experience

CHAPTER FOUR: IMPACT OF GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIAN POLITICS

AND ADMINISTRATION

4.1 Impacts of Godfatherism on Nigerian politics and administration

4.2 Implications of the impacts of Godfatherism on Nigerian politics and

administration

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

5.2 Recommendations

References

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 ABSTRACT

This study was carried out to examine the god-fatherism and its influence on
Nigeria politics and politician. There has been a lot of crises in Nigerian politics
and Administration - a crisis of confidence in our elected officials, a lost of faith in
our democratic government and an increasing frustration at government, and
more also, an increasing frustration at the irrelevance of individual’s vote in our
political process. All these crises are crises caused by the unholy alliance of
godfatherism (Ikejiani, 2006). This study is an appraisal of godfatherism in
Nigerian politics and administration with reference to the problems which
includes – creating a political process in which vested interest predominate, and
the public interest is forgotten and influencing the outcome of public policies to the
interest of few (godfathers) and to the detriment of the Nigerian populace. This
study recommends that if godfatherism must be stamped out of our political and
administrative systems, corruptive tendencies which increases the financial base of
the godfathers by creating a wide range of problems in our politics and
administration must be tackled head-on because they use such moneys to place
their godsons and protégés in various positions of government. The study
concluded that there is the need for an increased confidence in the duly elected
officials and also increase faith in the democratization process. Electorates
should be allowed to vote for their preferred candidates during elections without
intimidation by political thugs who are part of the instruments of godfatherism.

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 CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the study

In Nigeria today, the activities of godfathers have been on the increase and it is a
very sad irony that a country like Nigeria through which trillions of petroleum
dollars have passed since the 70’s have the most miserable infrastructures, medical
services, educational system and standards. The worst are unemployment,
deplorable roads and non-existent transportation system. The living standard of
the average Nigerians does not reflect the oil wealth of the country. The country is
quite below in the world’s poverty marginal index because as at 2005, 70.8 percent
of the population was estimated to be living below poverty line of $1 per day. (UN
Human Development Report, 1990-2005).

The godfatherism is firmly establishing itself as a guiding principle in

contemporary Nigerian politics. Godfathers are generally defined as men who have
the power personally to determine both who gets nominated to participate in
elections and who wins the election. In the past, Nigerian society had less crime
that the judicial systems have attempted to deal with. Lately, our legal systems
cannot deal with that because Nigerian society built criminals fast in the late 20th
and early 21st centuries by practices of democratization and militarization, where
the governing systems failed to deliver the other takes over. In democracy, one
way that the government is breeding criminals is by sponsoring godfatherism.
Godfathers in Nigeria is a subject that has not been given sufficient attention until
recent coup that exposed Babagana Zulum and, former head of the political
godfather, Kashim Shettima, Ali Modu Shariff among political criminals is behind
the election or selection of most of our state governors and other legislators.

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 The above-mentioned crises and the problems of confidence in our political
system offer an opportunity for advocates of new ideas. The barriers to true
democratic participation in the political process are serious, landscaping and
deeply ingrained. To the extent that our system of political democracy “works” in
most instances it works, only for a very small group of the citizenry the
“godfathers” (Ikejiani: 2006). Godfather in this sense means, that man who has
enormous resources at his disposal with little or no credibility, while godfatherism
is the process by which an individual establishes links with a given institutional
hierarchy in the expectation of favoured treatment.

In Nigeria today, money has become the medium of political participation.

A group of wealthy individuals (otherwise known as godfathers) has taken hold of
our politics and administration and as a result, we are faced with what can be
described as money-based politics and administration, thereby resulting to money -
biased policies. It is the individuals and interest groups with money that invest in
political office holders and use their money to gain access to elected officials who
wield so much power in our politics and administration today.
Over the years, while attention was diverted to the power and influence of
the elected officials, the role played by individuals, group sponsors, and godfathers
have received insufficient attention until recently.

According to Omatseye:

Kashim Shettima, Ali Modu Shariff are not the only

godfathers staining the firmament of Nigerian politics.
The perversions in Borno States may have hold our
imagination hostage in more profound ways than we
realize, but we should not forget that these men are

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 symptoms of larger tendrils of evil in the land
(http://hrw.org/reports:2007).
Furthermore, Omatseye tells us that:

In fact, like the thugs, the godfather is the main artery of

Nigerian politics. He breeds in every local government
area, traffics in lies and duplicity, intimidates, maims and
murder (htt://hw.or/reports:2007). It should be noted that,
the main tragedy of these godfathers is that they not only
preside over fellow illiterates and semi-illiterates, but also
many university graduates and the “so called sophisticated
persons” in our society are all under their thrall. Hence
“the metaphor for folly” is that the godfathers in Nigerian
politics and administration determines whether we get the
right person or not in various positions.
(http://hrw.org/reports:2007)

It should be noted that the primary aim of godfathers is the development of self and
not the electorate, community or nation. The godfather maintains a parasitic and
selfish relationship with his godson and community, not only is the interests of the
godson and community abandoned in fulfillment of those of the godfather but the
godson and community are coerced to work and make sacrifices toward the
realization of the supreme interest of the godfather. (Onwuzuruigbo: 2007). This
form of godfatherism is oppressive malevolent and has found expression in the
realm of modern politics, governance and administration in Nigeria. Thus, the
emergent notion of godfatherism in politics, administration and elections portrayed
the political godfather as a mercenary politician who is willing to provide
mentorship to his godson to the extent that the latter could be used to expand and

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consolidate the power base of the godfather as well as entrench the parasitic
relationship the godfather maintains with the state (Odivwri: p.1).

The above category of godfathers are the likes of Kashim Shettima, Ali Modu
Shariff, the caucus leader in Borno State All Progressive Congress (APC), the man
who has reduced godfatherism to an metaphor for capital investment in Borno
State. In his words “it is not just the governor and his deputy, there are also three
senators, 10 members of House of Representatives and 30 members of the House
of Assembly of the State, I sponsored them, I put them there”. This is the first
time in the history of Borno State that one single individual would be putting every
political office holder in the state in power. (Odivwri: p.2).

The experiences of godfatherism in both states have resulted in wanton

destruction of goods and properties worth millions of Naira. In Borno in
particular, Kashim Shettima hired and mobilized thugs and some members of the
National Association of Road Transport Owners (NAURTO) to cause
pandemonium and insecurity in the state. In the process, government buildings
and properties in Awka and Onitsha were destroyed. The Government House,
Deputy Governor’s Office, Anambra State Independent Electoral Commission’s
office etc were all looted and burnt by thugs (Odivwri:p2).

1.2 Statement of the Problem

There is a crisis of confidence in our elected officials, a loss of faith in our
democratic government, an increasing frustration at government and an increasing
frustration at the irrelevance of individual voters in our political process and
administration due to the activities of “godfatherism”. Godfathers in Nigerian
politics and administration determine at all elections who competes and who wins
the elections and also who gets nominated or appointed to positions in government.

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 Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration has skewed our
national priorities and the outcome of legislative decisions, and more also, it has
made the National Assembly less representative and less responsive to the
yearnings and aspirations of Nigerians. The ordinary voters with ballots to give
rather than money, are powerless and most times disenfranchised due to the
activities of godfatherism. Another problem is that godfatherism, controls the
outcome of our public elections, thereby otiosifying the entire democratization
process. All these have resulted in the huge looting and wastage of the financial
resource of Nigeria and Nigerians

Consequently, it is postulated that for Nigeria to move towards the

realization of the Millennium Development Goals, the activities of godfatherism
must be eliminated from our political system.

1.3 Objectives of the study

The main objective of this study is to examine the God-fatherism and its influence
on Nigeria Politics and Politician while the following are the specific objectives:

1. To examine the influence of godfatherism on Nigerian politics.

2. To determine the factors that promotes godfatherism in the Nigerian politics.
3. To examine the effect of godfatherism on Nigerian politicians.

1.4 Research questions

1. What is the influence of godfatherism on Nigerian politics?

2. What are the factors that promotes godfatherism in the Nigerian politics?
3. What is the effect of godfatherism on Nigerian politicians?

1.5 Hypothesis

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HO: There is no significant relationship between godfatherism and development in
the Nigeria politics

HA: There is significant relationship between godfatherism and development in the

Nigeria politics.

1.6 Significance of the study

The following are the significance of this study:

The results from this study will educate the political stakeholders in Nigeria and
the general public on the influence of godfatherism on the politics, politicians and
general development. It will also enlightens on the factors that promotes
godfatherism.

This research will be a contribution to the body of literature in the area of the effect
of personality trait on student’s academic performance, thereby constituting the
empirical literature for future research in the subject area.

1.7 Scope of the study

This study will cover the extent of God-fatherism and its influence on Nigeria
Politics and Politician. The selected case study of the research were Borno state.

1.8 Limitation of study

Financial constraint- Insufficient fund tends to impede the efficiency of the

researcher in sourcing for the relevant materials, literature or information and in
the process of data collection.

Time constraint- The researcher will simultaneously engage in this study with
other academic work. This consequently will cut down on the time devoted for the
research work

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 CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

2.1 Conceptual Clarifications

2.1.1 Godfather

(a) Godfather is that man who has enormous resources at his disposal with little
or no credibility, he wants the rostrum of social leadership, wielding the
weapon of wealth with his awesome financial influence, and he assumes
some vapor-coated charisma. The type that nudges the larger majority of
society to him, not because of so much belief in his person or ideas, but
more because of the immediate pecuniary benefits that rewards such
fellowship. Persons in this category of godfathers in Nigeria include:
Kashim Shettima, Ali Modu Shariff Muhammad Goni, Babagana Zulum,
Olusola Saraki, Olusegun Obasanjo, amongst others.

(b) On the other hand, godfather is that man who has enormous goodwill and
respect of the people, so much that his belief system represents those of his
people. Wherever he points, people follow. His leadership attribute endears
him to his people (Odivwri p1). Persons in this category of godfathers in
Nigeria includes; Late Chief Obafemi Awolowo, Late Mallam Aminu Kano,
Late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, Dr. Samuel Ogbemudia (before he expired), Jim
Nwobodo (before he expired) amongst others.

2.1.2 Godfatherism
Richard Joseph defines godfatherism as the process by which an individual
establishes links with a given institutional hierarchy in the expectation of favoured
treatment (Onwuzuruigbo).

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 The godfatherism is synonymous to intermediary, mentoring, benevolence,
and support and sponsoring. In a political setting, the concept is an ideology that is
championed on the belief that certain individuals possess considerable means to
unilaterally determine who get a party‟s ticket to run for an election and who wins
in the electoral contest (Chukwuemaka, Oji, & Chukwurah, 2013). Godfathers are
men who have the „power‟ and influence to decide both who get nominated to
context elections and who wins in the election. In this sense, Godfatherism means
office seekers getting connected to an individual who is believed to have the ability
to deliver a desired outcome in an electoral contest. It is the tradition for looking
for a political father to help promote one‟s political aspiration.

Bassey and Enetak (2008) conceptualized godfatherism to connote the

power and influence of people who are politically relevant in deciding who gets
nominated to contest elections and who eventually wins the election. Godfathers
are highly politically mobile and can sway political support to the political party
and/or candidate behind which they throw their political weight. Those that play
godfatherism are known as godfathers while those who benefit from their
benevolence are known as godsons.

The advent of godfatherism in the Nigerian partisan politics dates back to

the First Republic when leaders of the three major political parties (Northern
People Congress (NPC), Action Group (AG) and National Congress of Nigerian
Citizens (NCNC) carefully and meticulously cultivated godsons that they were
convinced would advance the wellbeing of the citizens. According to Bassey and
Enetak (2008), Ahmadu Bello of NPC, Nnamdi Azikiwe of the NCNC and
Obafemi Awolowo of the AG were motivated to do so not to use godsons as
surrogates to promote parochial interests, but to promote the developmental
aspirations of the people. Unlike the present crop of political godfathers, the first

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generation godfathers were essentially benevolent and progressive because they did
not abuse their status as godfathers by imposing frivolous demands on their
godsons as it is the case today. Literally godfathers are seen in Nigeria to be men
who have the power personally to determine both who get nominated to contest
elections and who wins in a state.

2.1.3 Politics
Nwabuzor and Mueller define politics as:
All social interactions and dispositions which are
directly or indirectly aimed at or actually succeed
in obtaining binding decisions about who has
desired resources (or who do not), and when and
how these are obtained (Nwabuzor and Mueller,
1985, p. 4)
In the same vein, Robert Dahl defined politics as:

Any persistent pattern of human relationships that

involves, to a significant extent, control, influence
and authority. (Dahl, 19776, p. 3)
Harold Laswell defined politics as:

Who gets what, when and how (Laswell, 1936, as

cited by S. O. J. Ojo, “The Nature and Scope of
Political Science in I B. Bello Imam and F. E.
Iyoha (eds) Politics and Administration in Nigeria,
1997, p. 3)
David Easton sees politics as:

The authoritative allocation of values for a society

(Easton, 1960, p. 113)
In the context of this study, politics is defined as:

The placement and manipulation of persons in

public offices by godfathers, who then use these
offices to amass wealth inordinately for

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 themselves and their godfathers at the expense of
the citizens.
2.1.4 Administration
The English word ‘administration’ is derived from two Latin words ‘ad’ and
‘ministiare’ which means ‘to serve’ or ‘to manage’ (Tonwe, 1994:11). The Oxford
Advanced Learner’s Dictionary of Current English defines administration as
“management of affairs, especially public affairs” (Hornby, 1974:12). The
emphasis on public affairs here is largely because administration is often equated
with the act of governing. This accounts for why we talk of Clinton’s, Thatcher’s,
Reagan’s, Shagari’s or Obasanjo’s administration. Though in common usage,
administration may often be equated to the act of governing, administration is
essentially the management of affairs and as such could be public or private.

Administration, like every other concept is bedeviled with a plethora of

definitions, but for the purpose of this study, we give the following:

According to Tead:

Administration involves the necessary activities of

those individuals (executive) in an organization who
are charged with ordering, forwarding, facilitating
the associated efforts of a group of individuals
brought together to realize a certain defined
purpose. (Tead, 1974)
In the words of Urwick:

Administration has to do with getting things done;

with the accomplishment of defined objectives.
(Urwick, 1943, pp. 35-36)
Furthermore, Pfiffner and Presthus see:

Administration as the organization and direction of

human and material resources to achieve desired
ends (Pfiffner and Presthus, 1967).

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2.2 Theoretical framework
In explaining God fathering and political patronage in Nigeria, the following
theoretical paradigm was to be considered:

2.2.1 Coalition theory

This theory focuses on government formation, which simply means on how
governing political party or parties enter and construct and consolidate their own
government identity (Wood, 1998; Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997). According to this
theory, one way to do exactly that is through dispensing patronage politics via state
jobs whereby political principals distribute and manage state institutions‟ jobs in
order to bargain over policy output. For this school of thought, political patronage
or rather political appointment system is an „inherent‟ feature of all governing
political parties in government worldwide and there is no problem in dispensing the
system at all.

However, there are variations between countries on the quality and integrity of
bureaucrats appointed based on political patronage rather than merit. It is argued
that all governing political parties widely apply this political tool to tame, control
and regulate the behaviour of the state agents as they may not be entirely trusted,
especially as they deal daily with public monies and other state resources. Even
countries castigated as developmental states such as Malaysia, Brazil, China,
Japan, South Korea, etc., apply the system at varying degree (Wood, 1998;
Furlong, 1989; Scott, 1997).

In similar tone, Du Gay (2000) argues that political principals dispense political
patronage via state jobs to tame the power of agency officials and to enhance their
(politicians) own positions within government. According to this theory, political
patronage via state jobs is not only about controlling but also about ensuring that

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the state agents achieve the principals‟ policy objectives particularly given the
danger of the opposition political parties‟ agents to derail and sabotage the
governing political party’s policy vision and objectives.

2.2.2 Party System Theory

The party system theory also agrees that the conduct of political parties influences
the performance of the state institutions including the legislatures since government
is constructed by political parties. They can either limit or enhance the powers and
operations of the state institutions. According to this theory, certain party systems
are able to limit the extent or level of political principals or political parties
dispensing political patronage.

This theory distinguishes between „fragile party system‟ and „competitive party
system‟. One basic difference is on the level of competitiveness, meaning the
likelihood that the incumbent governing political party or parties can be defeated.
GrzymanA-Busse (2003) argues that lack of robust competition between
programmatic political parties in the state results into ineffective and inefficient
state institutions evident in poor institutional quality or performance thus allowing
a governing party or parties to dispense political patronage via state jobs.

This in turn leads to corruption and poor governance, which are used widely by the
World Bank, Transparency International, etc., as indices for measuring the quality
or performance of the state institutions worldwide. In such situation where the state
is inefficient due to poor governance systems and or corruption, the governing
political party or parties legitimizes itself or themselves based on their ability to
reward supporters through selective incentives rather than their ability to generate
the kinds of public goods necessary for human and economic development as well
as growth.

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2.2.3 Meritocratic Theory
This theory literally rejects political patronage via state jobs as enhancing the
performance or quality of state institutions. Proponents of this theory (Weber,
1948; 1968; Evans & Rauch, 1999; Henderson et al, 2007, Miller, 2000; Ritzer,
1975; Dahlstrom, Lapuente & Teorell, 2011; Andreski, 1983, Johnson & Libecap,
1994) argue that political patronage leads to politicization rather than
professionalization of state institutions. Politicization of the state institutions
eventually culminates into poor institutional capacity and lack of accountability on
public goods provision as the system is immoral and a democratic pathology.

Dahlstromet al (2012) gives an example of the mayor of Spain between 2001 and
2003 who replaced „merit-recruited‟ state agents with political appointees.
According to these scholars, the Spanish mayor was able to coordinate his
corruption intensions with appointees he had himself selected based on political
patronage. Conspicuously, the theory of meritocracy argues that poor performance
by state agents appointed on political patronage is often blamed on others or
covered up by their political principals.

Empirical evidence indicates that officials appointed based on political patronage

may be recalled at any time once they have lost favour with their political
principals. As noted by Kanyane (2006), with a culture of patronage politics an
atmosphere of playing safe is often created, which is not conducive for responsible
and accountable bureaucratic institutions. Proponents of this theory strongly
maintain that people in the state should be appointed on merit because such
officials see office holding as a vocation.

For this theory, office holding is not considered a source to be exploited for rents or
emoluments nor is considered a usual exchange of services for equivalents (Weber,
1948). In the study of bureaucracy, Max Weber, for example, advocated for „career
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personnel‟ with specialized training and expertise, among others, as the
prerequisite for employment in any bureaucratic institutions. Of course, Weber‟s
work on bureaucracy has a profound impact on our theoretical understanding of
how principal-agent relationship within institutions plays out and how the
bureaucratic institution developed. Therefore, the theory of meritocracy has
intellectual roots from the Max Weber‟s study of a bureaucracy.

Moreover, Woodrow Wilsons (1887 in Rosenbloom, 2008) in his study of

administration also argued for an administration apparatus that is devoid of politics
and meddling after he was concerned about the bureaucratic system in America
that operated as a bastion for political patronage. Proponents of this theory suggest
that democratic states all over the world should shun away from political patronage
via state jobs and embrace a culture of meritocratic recruitment and promotion.
They argue that access to institutions of government as an employee should be
conditioned on the bases of possession of relevant knowledge, skills and
qualification credentials, what Max Weber (1968) refers to as „expert-
officialdom‟.

This is due to the fact that partly qualified officials in terms of specialized training
and examination always enter the state as employees with an understanding that
office holding is a vocation. The executive office is separated from the households
much as business assets are separated from private fortunes. Proponents of this
school of thought give examples of some countries such as Australia, Brazil,
Malaysia, China, Japan, UK, etc., that have also introduced a system of tough
public civil service examination to select the best potential candidates for the state
institutions as agents. The civil service examination system in China, for example,
has a created a unique class of „scholar-bureaucrats‟ irrespective of family or party
pedigree (Fukai & Fukui, 1992) even if cadre deployment is applied.

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Throughout the period of military rule and in the Nigeria‟s fourth republic (1999-
2013), emergence of political patronage posed a great threat not only to good
governance but also to the socio-economic development and stability of democratic
governance. Perhaps, one of the most disturbing and damaging influence of
political patronage in Nigeria‟s fourth republic was in domain of making nonsense
of a truly free, fair and credible electoral process in which the electorates by right
are expected to freely elect people of their choice into public office to represent
their interests.

Indeed, the privilege of electing people of their choice into public office was
denied given the situations in which patrons foisted candidates of their preference
on the generality of the people. This is to say the least very inimical to the tenets of
democratic rule (Chukwuma, 2008). When public office holders would not be
accountable to the people, who at any rate did not count in their elections into
public office, invariably, the loyalty of such public office holder would be tilted
towards their godfathers and this in itself negates one of the critical attributes of
governance and democracy which is responsive and transparent government. This
scenario is also inimical to good governance and political stability which are
predicated on the rule of law, due process, accountability and transparency in the
management of public business.

The emergence of political patronage has also robbed the citizens of the privilege
of enjoying the dividends of democratic governance in the sense that government
has become reluctant to initiate and implement policies that would advance the
well-being of the generality of the citizens. This was a result of the fact that
political patronage in Nigeria was basically predatory in nature. The primary
motive of venturing into politics was born out of the need to acquire wealth
(money) from the coffers of government to which their „godsons‟ held sways

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(Chukwumeka, 2012). Therefore, the lean financial resource accruable to the state
from the federation account which was meant for the improvement of living
standards of the citizens was paramount interest to them.

Saraki and Mohammed Lawal (2003-2007), and Kashim Shettima, Ali Modu
Shariff (2003-2006) were awful and devastating. The end point and consequences
of these „godfatherism‟ in our politic is that economic activities are brought to a
halt, especially education sectors, health, security (political wrangling), agriculture,
housing and infrastructural developments etc.

The political patrons or godfathers in Nigeria see governance and political power
as the cheapest and surest method of amassing wealth to the detriment of the
governed. Sponsoring a weak and poor candidate to win election by appointment is
seen as a lucrative business whereby the sponsor will invest heavily in imposing
his candidate on the people as their leader, with all intent and protégé, called
chairmen, and governors.

Political patronage is a dangerous development in Nigeria politics. The electorates

are impoverished the more, and the corrupt rich godfathers are corruptly enriching
themselves the more. The circle is endless, as the solution to this menaces is the
serious problem facing Nigeria until a morally sound, committed and patriotic
leader emerge to lead the people honestly with the attribute of transparency,
openness, people oriented policies and programmes, Nigeria economic
development will be a mirage. The susceptibility of the political structures and
institutions to the influence and control of forces operating outside the government
but within the political system is a great and potential threat to growth and
economic development of the country.

2.2.4 Elite theory

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The major assumptions of elite theory is that in every society there is, and must be
a minority which rules over the rest of society, and this minority forms the political
class or governing elite composed of those who occupy the posts of political
command and more regularly those who can directly influence political decision.
They undergo changes in its membership over a period of time, ordinarily by the
recruitment of new individual members from the lower strata of the society,
sometimes by the incorporation of new social groups, and occasionally by the
complete replacement of the established elite by counter-elite. Vilfred (1935)
opined that in every branch of human activity each individual is given an index
which stands as a sign of his capacity, very much the way grades are given in the
various subjects in examinations in school (Suenu, 2004, Nkwede, 2014).

According to Suenu (2004), an elitist correlation to the understanding of political

patronage is very apt. He sees political patrons as being synonymous with the
elites. For him, elites in the political spheres are known in Nigerian context as
godfathers. They are the ones who govern, and are known as the kingmakers, the
notables and often seen as strongmen who control politics in their different
domains. Apparently, in a political environment where political patronage is in
vogue, individuals are „colonized‟ by the political patrons. In order words, patrons
rule by proxies. The relevance of this theory to the current study cannot be
overemphasized. This is because of its interconnectivity to the explanation of
political patronage in a democratic dispensation and its implication on economic
development in Nigeria.

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 CHAPTER THREE

GOD-FATHERISM IN NIGERIAN POLITICS

3.1 Reasons for Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration

A lot of reasons have been advanced for the emergence of godfatherism in

Nigerian politics and administration. They include:

1. The Nigerian political and administrative aspirants on their own cannot

attain their political objectives, either because of weak financial standing
or insufficient political charisma.
2. Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration is inevitable
because they oil the wheel of the system and helps to give advantage to
favoured protégés.
3. They have all the capabilities anchored on creating confusion and
insecurity prior to, during and after elections, so as to ensure the
enthronement of their godsons.
4. They can make the state ungovernable through the use of thugs, thereby
bringing everybody, especially the politicians to their control or
manipulation.
5. It should be noted that these godfathers are not mere-financiers of
political campaigns, rather they are individuals whose power stems not
just from wealth, but from their ability to deploy violence and corruption
to manipulate national, state or local political system in support of the
politicians they sponsor (http//hrw.org/reports/2007).

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3.2 Negative acts of Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and
administration

3.2.1 Borno State Experience

Borno State is a state in the North-East geopolitical zone of Nigeria,

bordered by Yobe to the west for about 421 km, Gombe to the southwest for 93
km, and Adamawa to the south while its eastern border forms part of the national
border with Cameroon for about 426 km (265 miles, partly across the Ebedi and
Kalia Rivers), its northern border forms part of the national border with Niger, for
about 223 km mostly across the Komadougou-Yobe River, and its northeastern
border forms all of the national border with Chad for 85 km (53 miles), being the
only Nigerian state to border three foreign countries. It takes its name from the
historic emirate of Borno, with the emirate's old capital of Maiduguri serving as the
capital city of Borno State. The state was formed in 1976 when the former North-
Eastern State was broken up. It originally included the area that is now Yobe State,
which became a distinct state in 1991.

Eastern periphery of Borno State became a part of the Northern Cameroons

within the British Cameroons until 1961, when a referendum led to merger with
Nigeria. Originally, modern-day Borno State was a part of the post-independence
Northern Region until 1967 when the region was split and the area became part of
the North-Eastern State. After the North-Eastern State was split, Borno State was
formed on 3 February 1976 alongside ten other states. Fifteen years after
statehood, a group of LGAs in the state's west was broken off to form the new
Yobe State. Years later, in the early 2000s, the state became the epicentre of the
Islamist group Boko Haram since it began its insurgency in 2009. From 2012 to
2015, the insurgency escalated dramatically with much of the state falling under
the control of the group, which soon become the world's deadliest terror group in

24
2015 and forced millions from their homes.[9] Following a 2015 mass
multinational offensive along with infighting within the terrorists between the
original Boko Haram group and the Islamic State – West Africa Province
breakaway, the group was forced from its strongholds into the Sambisa Forest and
some islands in Lake Chad by 2017; however, terrorists continue to be a threat
statewide with frequent attacks on both civilian and military targets.

Babagana Zulum (full name Babagana Umara Zulum) is a Nigerian

academic and politician. He was born on August 26, 1969. After elementary

schooling in Mafa primary school (1975 to 1980) and secondary education at

Government Secondary School, Monguno (1980 to 1985), he went to Ramat

Polytechnic, Maiduguri, where he obtained a National Diploma in Irrigation

Engineering in 1998. Then from 1990 to 1994, he studied at the University of

Maiduguri, where he obtained a degree in Agriculture Engineering after which he

served as a youth corps member with Katsina State Polytechnic.

Babagana Zulum then proceeded to the University of Ibadan from 1997 to 1998,

where he obtained a masters degree in Agriculture Engineering. In 2005, he

enrolled for a PhD in Soil and Water Engineering at the University of Maiduguri

which he completed in 2009. Babagana Zulum’s first appointment was in 1989

with the Borno state civil service as an Assistant Technical Officer at the Ministry

of Agriculture. In 1990, he moved into the Borno state Unified Local Government

service as a senior Field Overseer and later as a principal water engineer.

25
In 2000, he took up an appointment with the University of Maiduguri as an

assistant Lecturer where he rose to the rank of professor. Babagana Zulum was

Deputy Dean and Acting Dean, Faculty of Engineering in 2010 and 2011,

respectively.

In 2011, he was appointed Rector of Ramat Polytechnic. Meanwhile, he retained

teaching position in the University of Maiduguri.

In 2015, Babagana Zulum was made commissioner of reconstruction, rehabilitation

and resettlement by the then Borno Governor, Kashim Shettima, a position he held

till 2018.

He was elected governor of Borno State on March 9, 2019, succeeding Kashim

Shettima who governed the state for eight years. In that election, Babagana Zulum

polled 1,175, 440 votes to beat his closest opponent, Muhammad Imam of the

Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), who scored 66, 115 votes. INEC had registered

2,316,218 voters in the state, out of which 1,292,138 voters were accredited for the

election.

26
 CHAPTER FOUR

IMPACT OF GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIAN POLITICS AND

ADMINISTRATION

4.1 Impacts of Godfatherism on Nigerian politics and administration

The activities associated with godfatherism in Nigeria have brought and

resulted in a wide range variety of problems, having serious negative impacts on
our elections, politics, administration and our nascent democracy. For the purpose
of brevity and contextual relevance, let us look at some inherent problems brought
about by the activities of “godfatherism”.

1. Godfatherism is the collaborating relationship and tendencies of both the

godfather and the godson in looting and siphoning resources met for the
development of the state into their private pockets.
2. Godfatherism has lead to placing people in various governmental
positions whom themselves do not have the required leadership qualities
to bring about good governance and development, and as a result, the
godfather sits at home dictating the pace of development and influencing
decisions of government on who gets what, when and how.
3. Another major problem of godfatherism is the attitude of developing self
and his immediate family members, neglecting the electorates,
communities and the nation. In most cases, the electorates are coerced to
work and make sacrifices towards achieving the ultimate interest of the
godfather.
4. Many of our unemployed youths are being lured through the activities of
godfatherism into committing acts of political violence and thugery

27
 through promises of employment or other forms of illegal government
patronage that never come to reality at the end.
5. Godfatherism in all ramifications over the years has resulted in the
disenfranchisement of eligible voters through the use of thugs. It has
always been instrumental in the final determination of most of our public
policies, thereby challenging our idea of “one citizen”, one vote”.
6. Godfatherism has virtually succeeded in denying Nigerian citizens the
opportunity to shape the decisions that affect them. It has totally
fractured our nascent democratic ideas and principles, and the ordinary
voters with their ballots to give rather than money are rendered
powerless.
7. Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and administration determines in all
elections who competes, who wins, who get nominated to positions or
who gets appointments. Godfatherism has also resulted in the turning
around of our national priorities to favour their own personal interest and
thereby making the National Assembly less representative and less
responsive to the yearnings of the citizens.
8. Nigeria today has the worst unemployment problem, deplorable roads,
and transportation problem, miserable infrastructures, medical services,
educational system and standards, epileptic power outage, the living
standard of the average Nigerian does not reflect the oil wealth of the
nation. All these are as a result of the activities of godfathers who
collaborate with their godsons to siphoned resources met for the overall
infrastructural development of the country.
4.2 Implications of the impacts of Godfatherism on Nigerian politics and
administration

28
 In view of the foregoing, the implications of the impacts of godfatherism on
Nigerian Politics

and Administration are listed hereunder, but however, not exhaustive:

i. The study discovered that the unholy alliance of godfathers and their
godsons has brought untold hardships on the totality of the Nigerian
populace.

ii Also, the study found that the rate of unemployment in the country has
resulted in the youths taking up to violence with or without any monetary
reward, especially when there is flamboyant promises by the godfathers.

iii The study also discovered that, most of the policies and decisions made by
the government are met to meet the interest of their godfathers.

iv Electioneering violence, the use of thugs, disenfranchisement of voters are

all associated with godfatherism in Nigeria.

v The study also discovered that most of our super-imposed leaders do not
have the needed abilities to deliver quality leaderships and good governance,
thereby resulting to misappropriation of scarce available resources in our
nation.

29
 CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

5.1 Conclusion

There is the need for an increased confidence in our elected officials, and our faith
in the democratic governance of Nigeria should also increase. People should be
allowed to vote for their preferred candidates during elections without fear caused
by thugs who are instrument of godfatherism. This can be achieved through the
elimination of godfathers. A good example of this is the case of Comrade Adams
Oshiomole of Action Congress Party of Nigeria who contested the governorship
election in Edo State of Nigeria without any godfather backing him.
Unfortunately, godfathers in the opposing party in collaboration with the
Independent Electoral Commission (INEC), declared Prof. O. Osunbor as the
winner of the April 14, 2007 governorship election in the State. Comrade
Oshiomole took the matter to the Election Tribunal that found him to be the
legitimate winner of the election. Prof. Osunbor appealed against the judgment of
the Election Tribunal. The Court of Appeal on the 11 th November, 2008 upheld the
judgment of the Election Tribunal by declaring Comrade Oshiomole as the winner
of the governorship election. The people rejoiced overwhelmingly because, for
once, their votes counted. Consequently, Comrade Oshiomole was sworn in as the
Executive Governor of Edo State on the 12 th November, 2008 as the Peoples’
Governor and the godfathers in the opposing party were put to shame. However, it
is pertinent to state that this is one case out of 36 cases.

Finally, there should be reform of the electoral system in Nigeria to allow

for the genuine use of the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM), as well as allowing

30
private candidates who are patriotic, selfless and credible to contest elections in
Nigeria.

5.2 Recommendations

As a forward and out of the present grip of the Nigerian Politics and
Administration by the godfathers, the following recommendations are
proffered:

1. A legislation is needed to aid the setting up of a regulatory body, which will

be in charge of administration and enforcement of reforms against
godfatherism and private money contributions to elections in the country.

2. A stable environment should be established and maintained in order to

provide political recruitment, promotion, nomination, election and
appointment systems that will provide men and women the same options and
opportunities.

3. Since it is the duty of political sociologists and political scientists to proffer

explanations to political phenomena, it is the duty of politicians and political
leaders to apply the explanations in responding to political issues. It is,
therefore, incumbent on Nigerian political leaders to device mechanism of
making political godfatherism much less attractive and discouraging to
intending political aspirants from subjecting their political ambitions and
fortunes to the dictates of political godfathers.

4. Political parties as a matter of urgency should henceforth stop the

discrimination against women in their nomination process, recruitment and
appointment into contestable positions.

31
5. The social, economic, social-structural position of women, financial
dependency or limited financial means should be urgently addressed in other
to create a smooth sail for women to effectively participate in electioneering
process.

6. Development has eluded Nigerians for so long, political party reforms and
electoral financing have not been tackled head-on, and for any change to be
achieved in the fight against godfatherism, these issues must be looked at
from the perspective of creating a political system that would truly be fair
and equitable in its dispositions.

7. Political Parties should be made to perform their functions of: (1) political
recruitment, (2) interest articulation; (3) interest aggregation; (4) political
socialization, and (5) political education of Nigerians in order to create room
for democratic consolidation in Nigeria.

8. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent

Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC), which are presently instruments of
selective justice, should be strengthened legislatively to totally eradicate and
prosecute individuals indulging in corrupt practices who through these
various corrupt practices enrich themselves, thereby assuming the position
of godfathers, because they will now have the resources to do and un-do

32
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