Global Discourse • vol 13 • no 1 • 20–38

© Author 2023 • Online ISSN 2043-7897

https://doi.org/10.1332/204378921X16585144068826
Accepted for publication 22 July 2022 • First published online 12 August 2022
This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/).

Special Issue: South Asia and the Gulf:

Transregional relations, order, human rights and migration

RESEARCH ARTICLE

The Pakistan–Iran relationship and the changing

nature of regional and domestic security and
strategic interests
Umer Karim, umaringlow@gmail.com
University of Birmingham, UK

The Pakistan–Iran relationship has been evolving over time. Ties between the two neighbours
have been shaped by bilateral security concerns and strategic interests, as well as flux in the
political identities of the two states. Pakistan and Iran were strong allies during the time of
the Shah regime, as they had a harmonious political outlook and shared membership in the
American-led political block during the Cold War. With the Islamic revolution, Iranian national
identity underwent a radical change and gave birth to a political vision that was confrontational
in essence. Diverging geopolitical interests and alignments in the region moved the two nations
further apart. After the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, both sides backed different
groups, and the bilateral relationship became further estranged owing to Pakistan’s support for
the Taliban regime, which persecuted Afghan Shi’ites and was also involved in the killing of
Iranian diplomats. The Iranian security accord with India, as well as Pakistan’s strong ties with
Saudi Arabia, further contributed to making the relationship complex and uneasy. Burgeoning
security threats across the border from anti-Pakistan insurgents of the Balochistan Liberation
Army and anti-Iran insurgents of Jundullah and Jaish Al-Adl have complicated the relationship
between the security establishments on both sides. Furthermore, attempts to politicise Pakistan’s
Shi’ite community and instances of sectarian violence inside Pakistan have made both states
wary of each other. These developments have been critical in impeding efforts to enhance ties
in the economic and energy fields. Yet, these differences have not led both states to increasingly
confront each other, as both sides fully realise the near-disastrous consequences of such a
conflict. Nonetheless, they have also failed to develop a mechanism to address bilateral issues;
thus, a tense competition epitomises the state of bilateral affairs. However, as the Pakistani
institutions and government have started to change their strategic outlook towards the region,
new opportunities are emerging for the improvement of the bilateral relationship.

Key words Pakistan–Iran relationship • Putnam two-game theory • regional security complex
theory • sectarian politics • cross-border security • Indian and Saudi variables in relationship •
Shi’ite militia recruitment

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 The Pakistan–Iran relationship

Key message
• This paper discusses the nature of Pakistan–Iran Relationship and the impact of regional and
domestic security issues on this relationship.

To cite this article: Karim, U. (2023) The Pakistan–Iran relationship and the changing
nature of regional and domestic security and strategic interests, Global Discourse, 13(1):
20–38, DOI: 10.1332/204378921X16585144068826

Introduction
The Pakistan–Iran relationship has revolved around the pivot of security and respective
strategic interests. Political and economic engagement between the two countries
has always proceeded under the shadow of this security paradigm. Before the Islamic
Revolution of 1979, there existed an atmosphere of trust between the decision-making
circles and state establishments of both countries. However, this equation radically
changed after 1979, giving birth to entirely new political realities in both Iran and
Pakistan, and further making the relationship security centred. The eminence of the
security establishments of both countries within the decision-making apparatuses
gave further credence to national security in determining the nature of bilateral
ties. Pakistan’s strategic interests in the region clashed with those of Iran, whether
in the case of Afghanistan or the broader outlook of Middle Eastern politics. In the
past couple of decades, the foreign policy outlook of both states towards the region
has been shaped by their respective national security perspectives. This makes it a
difficult task for both states to develop strong political ties with regional actors that
fundamentally differ in their strategic outlook and, by extension, do not understand
the security concerns of others. The trust deficit between both neighbours has been
the ultimate outcome, amplified only by assumptions that the ‘other’ is harbouring
and facilitating elements detrimental to their respective national security. In such a
state of affairs, proponents of stronger political and economic engagement within
both states have had to take a back seat, as the main concern of decision makers
remains to maximise national security. A structural change in regional politics that
can recalibrate the security notions of both states, as well as an alteration in decision-
making processes and actors within both Iran and Pakistan, can ultimately affect the
security-oriented nature of this relationship.
This article will analyse how the relationship between both states is shaped by
the intersection of the regional political configuration with national security and
domestic politics. Conflicting security interests of the two nations will be analysed,
and key issues concerning the national security of both states that contribute towards
complicating bilateral ties will also be evaluated.

Historical context and political trends

The literature on Pakistan–Iran relations is replete with the notion that both countries
are bonded by strong religious, political and cultural ties. The bilateral relationship
blossomed while Iran was ruled by the regime of Reza Shah Pehlavi. Iran was the
first country to formally accept Pakistan. Both nations also shared a common outlook
in their foreign and security policies, as they remained members of the US-aligned

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political camp. This partnership was further strengthened as they became members
of the Baghdad Pact, later known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO),
and the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) platform, alongside Turkey.
Both sides have also harboured security concerns vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. With
regards to threats faced by Pakistan from its eastern neighbour, India, the regime of
Reza Shah always emphasised its support for Pakistan. During the 1965 Indo-Pakistan
war, Iran expressed its concern about Indian aggression against Pakistan and, alongside
Turkey, supported Pakistan by sending military aid and two lakh tonnes of oil. Iran
also vehemently supported Pakistan during the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971 and, in a
veiled threat to India, even went to the extent of saying that Iran would not tolerate
any attempt to liquidate Pakistan (Choudhary, 1974).
The nature of this bilateral relationship started to transform after 1971. Iran
emerged as a regional power, owing to oil revenues and British departure from east
of Suez, while Pakistan became politically weak after the creation of Bangladesh
(Tahir Kheli, 1977). Nonetheless, a cooperative and cordial relationship remained
between both nations until the fundamentals changed with the Islamic Revolution
in Iran. After 1979, both nations followed their opposite routes to Islamisation, and
their differing ideological bases increasingly influenced their political outlook towards
each other (Waghmar, 2013). The Islamic Revolution changed Iranian foreign policy,
and exporting the revolution became its fulcrum, which was highly problematic
for its Arab neighbours along the Persian Gulf. Pakistan, on the other hand, shared
strategic interests with these Arab kingdoms, especially in Afghanistan (Steinberg and
Woermer, 2013). This diffraction on the Afghan issue and support of opposite camps
by both countries had a negative impact on their bilateral relations (Khan, 2010).
During the 1990s, only one attempt was made by then Premier Benazir Bhutto to
mend the relationship by importing gas from Iran, but political uncertainty within
Pakistan and heightened levels of sectarian violence did not bring any thaw in the
relationship (Haroon, 2016). In 1998, the killing of Iranian diplomats during the
Taliban takeover of the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif pushed Iran to the brink
of war with the Taliban regime but had also put Pakistan in a difficult spot, raising
tensions between Tehran and Islamabad. At that time, Pakistan, alongside Saudi
Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), remained the primary patron of the
Taliban regime (Jahanpour, 1999).
After 11 September 2001 (9/11), Pakistan’s close cooperation with the US in the
war on terror and US presence in Afghanistan did not have a positive impact on the
nature of Pakistan–Iran relations. During the time of President Musharraf, Pakistan’s
relations with Iran remained essentially uneasy due to this US factor (Kumar, 2008).
President Musharraf continued his engagement with Iran, and at one time, Pakistan
played the role of a messenger not only between the US and Iran, but also between
Sunni powers in the Middle East and Iran; however, all of this did not amount to
anything substantial politically, and the Iranian state continued to view Pakistan with
suspicion (Dawn.com, 2019). The democratically elected government of the Pakistan
People’s Party (PPP) was never on cordial terms with the Saudi leadership, which
viewed new President Asif Ali Zardari – a Shi’ite Muslim – with a considerable
degree of concern as a possible partner in an Iranian-led Shi’ite triangle, alongside
the Maliki government in Iraq (The Guardian, 2009). The government of the PPP
was also more politically inclined towards Iran and started proactively engaging with
its western neighbour in the trade and energy sectors. This approach of Pakistan was

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 The Pakistan–Iran relationship

a break from the traditionally cold policy towards Iran and perturbed the Saudis, who
pressured the Pakistani military to remove the government (Walsh, 2010). The most
important development during the PPP governmental tenure was the approval of
the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline project (Dawn.com, 2013). This activism ended with
the departure of the PPP government, as the new Pakistani government of Nawaz
Sharif – an old ally of Saudi Arabia – took a rather cautious approach towards Iran.
Saudi aid of USD1.5 billion to Pakistan eased the economic concerns by providing
much-needed money for energy and infrastructure projects, as well as raising the
foreign exchange reserves of the country (Zahra-Malik, 2014). This development,
alongside the imposition of international sanctions on Iran, further hampered the
planned construction of the Iran–Pakistan gas pipeline project (APP, 2017).
The arrival of Imran Khan into power did not initially result into any significant
change in the bilateral relationship with Iran, and during the initial days of Khan’s
government, the relationship soured as Pakistan increasingly courted Saudi Arabia. In
October 2019, Imran Khan embarked upon a mission to mediate between Iran and
Saudi Arabia, and although the mission was not successful, it did suggest a change in
the Khan government’s more pronounced pro-Saudi outlook (Panda, 2019).

Conceptualising the relationship

Putnam’s theoretical construct of ‘two-level games’ is helpful in understanding the
approach of the two countries towards each other. In addition to the systemic variables
that influence the outlook of nations towards each other, typically in a neo-realist
way, multiple domestic variables, such as local politics, the influence of social groups,
public perception, civil society, the political system of a state and the perceptions of
decision makers, all determine the foreign policies of states (Putnam, 1988: 432). The
systemic or regional political aspect has been the dominant variable in the case of the
foreign policymaking of both Pakistan and Iran. Decision making at this level, which
is increasingly security oriented and influenced by diverging strategic interests, dictates
the trajectory of bilateral ties. Both states’ foreign and security policies also remain
hostage to the imperatives of their respective regional security complexes (RSCs). This
baggage has increasingly connected the security environments of the two states, while
negatively impacting upon the historical cordiality of the bilateral ties and making it
difficult for the leaderships on both sides to manage the relationship (Calabrese, 1997).
Pakistan’s security fixation with India and Iran’s endemic rivalry with Saudi Arabia
constitute their respective security prisms, which eventually interpret systemic signals
emanating from other regional actors and subsequently respond to them. As will be
discussed in detail in the following sections, Pakistan’s foreign and security policies
towards Iran cannot be viewed independently of the Indian variable, while Iran’s
relationship with Pakistan is similarly impacted by the Saudi variable. Buzan and
Waever’s regional security complex theory (RSCT) may seem to be a relatively more
plausible model to explain the evolution of the Pakistan–Iran relationship (Buzan and
Waever, 2003: 100–13). RSCT remains helpful in explaining the systemic inferences
shaping the nature of bilateral ties, while also contextualising the India and Saudi
variables. However, even though Buzan and Waever have tried to temper the state-
centric nature of their theorisation and to develop an all-inclusive idea of units to
factor in regional non-state actors, transnational ideological and cultural drivers, and
economic linkages, their theoretical model still maintains a state-centric outlook.

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The writers have also argued that the inter-regional security relationship between
South Asia and the Gulf region (including Iran) remains basic and has not impacted
upon security environs across regions.
Furthermore, Pakistan’s refusal to join a Saudi-led military intervention in Yemen
was particularly interesting, as such an approach could have brought economic
dividends for the country and also helped the country in its balancing act against
India (Roberson, 1986). On the one hand, this development weakened the notion
that Pakistan’s relationship with Gulf states had an India variable, especially when this
downward trend in the country’s relationship with the Gulf did not lead to a significant
breakthrough with Iran. On the other hand, it highlighted the importance of domestic
political, social and religious factors, as well as the limitations of the RSCT in terms
of incorporating such variables. Therefore, the role played by domestic political
actors and political systems in both states, as well as their impact on the trajectory
of the bilateral relationship, cannot be explained by solely applying an RSCT-based
theoretical model. It can be argued that RSCT remains a more suitable theoretical
disposition to explain the intra-regional security environment, rather than this sort
of bilateral relationship, which is a case of inter-regional connection. This makes
Putnam’s approach better suited for explaining such an inter-regional bilateral security
relationship and the impact of domestic variables on bilateral ties.
On the domestic level, the nature of power structures in Pakistan and Iran is different
from the ones in Western democracies, where state’s security infrastructures are
firmly under the control and command of their civilian rulers. Thus, both Iran and
Pakistan have a unique form of hybrid governance structure, where the state’s security
establishment (Rizvi, 1998) and religious quarters either dominate or are in a power-
sharing relationship with the civilian leadership (Abdolmohammadi and Cama, 2015).
The office of the Iranian Supreme Leader and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), and Pakistan’s army, are the major stakeholders in matters of national security
and foreign policy decision making in both nations, respectively (Hunter, 2010).
In a way, this regime hybridisation problematises Putnam’s concept, which points
to political contestation and manoeuvring both between nations, on one level, and
internally between domestic actors, on the other level, and suggests that the ultimate
outcome is an agreement between the two levels (Putnam, 1988: 434). The domestic fold
in both countries considers the monopoly of their security establishments over foreign
policymaking as nearly normative, and this results in rather neo-realist policymaking
focused on maximising security. Yet, in the case of Pakistan, democratisation has
brought a change within this calculus and makes Putnam’s assertions more amenable.
The Pakistan Parliament’s refusal to send troops for the Saudi-led military campaign
in Yemen is one of the examples where the debate at the second level (Parliament)
essentially set the terms on the first level (Mukashaf, 2015). This happened even when
the security interests of the country as envisaged by its military were greatly damaged.
Similarly, it was this second-level contestation between civil and military elites that
blocked attempts at a political breakthrough between Iran and Pakistan.

Evolution of relations with changing patterns of

regional security
Pakistan–Iran ties were extremely cordial as the Pakistani state gained independence
from British India, and the elites of both countries forged strong relationships between

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each other. A shared foreign policy orientation also helped the bilateral relationship.
It was the Islamic Revolution in Iran that changed the character and ideology of
the state, and Iran emerged as a major anti-American force in the region (Milani,
2018). On the other hand, Pakistan continued to play a pivotal role in the American
regional security order against the Soviet Union and developed a strong strategic
partnership with Saudi Arabia, with the Pakistani military assuming the role of a
security guarantor for Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, supported
Pakistan financially in times of economic turbulence (Weinbaum and Khurram, 2014).
Post-Islamic Revolution Iran always had its concerns regarding the Pakistani–Saudi
special relationship. Both Iran and Saudi Arabia backed opposite religious groups
within Pakistan. This resulted in the sectarian confrontation between these groups,
which reached its peak in the 1990s (Waseem et al, 2010).
It is interesting to note that starting from the late 1990s, Saudi Arabia and Iran
were involved in a process of political dialogue that eventually resulted in a political
rapprochement between them (Altoraifi, 2012). Yet, on Pakistani soil, their respective
proxy elements were actively targeting each other. Pakistan and Iran also found
themselves at loggerheads in the Afghan theatre, where both sides backed different
factions and sectarian orientations (Ahmed and Akbarzadeh, 2020). Regional politics
became even more complex when Iranian President Khatami visited India. The
trip was consequential, as both countries agreed that their strategic outlook was in
harmony with each other and needed to be further boosted through strong economic
engagement and defence ties (Alam, 2004). This proximity between India and Iran was
built upon a similar strategic viewpoint over Afghanistan. India had always been averse
to Pakistani influence within Kabul and built strong connections within elements
of the Northern Alliance, which were, in turn, also close to Iran (Ramana, 2012).
These fundamental differences between Pakistan and Iran over Afghanistan made it
imperative for India to have a strategic foothold within Iran. Energy and infrastructure
projects were initiated that involved the construction of a gas pipeline between
Iran, Pakistan and India, the Chahbahar Port in Iran, and the Zaranj–Delaram road
between Afghanistan and Iran (Christensen, 2011). This formally introduced the
Indian factor into Pakistan–Iran relations, which contributed towards an increase
in the mutual distrust between the two neighbours. The disordering of the Afghan
political environment in the post-Taliban era and subsequent involvement of different
regional actors, with their respective strategic concerns, as well as shared security
considerations, further connected the geopolitics of the Middle East with South
Asia. The fact that the nature of Pakistani and Iranian interests in Afghanistan have
historically been conflicting opens the field for both countries to vie for a closer
partnership with other regional actors that have a more harmonious strategic outlook.
This has been a reason for the traditional Indo-Iranian cooperation vis-a-vis
Afghanistan, as well as Pakistan’s relative proximity to Saudi Arabia. However, this
cooperation is also due to the fact that Iran remains the only viable route for Indian
connectivity with Central Asia and for trade with Afghanistan (Fair, 2014). The US
invasion of Iraq and the Arab Spring created a political vacuum in the region, which
intensified Saudi–Iran rivalry, putting Pakistan in a difficult position and increasing
pressure on its leadership to substantially pick a side in the Middle Eastern power
game. However, Pakistan has constantly tried to maintain a balance in its foreign
policy towards the region. The Pakistan Parliament’s decision to decline a Saudi
request to send troops as part of the Saudi military intervention in Yemen was part

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of this policy, even though it resulted in creating a wedge between Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan (Siddiqi, 2019). However, this development did not result in any significant
strategic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan. On the contrary, bilateral ties with
Iran remained uneasy owing to such factors as border security, the Indian use of
Iranian soil against Pakistan and the recruitment of Shi’ite militants from Pakistan.
Pakistan’s joining of the Islamic Alliance to Fight Terrorism (IMAFT), as well as the
appointment of its former army chief, General Raheel Sharif, as its head, were not
received positively by Iran either (Dorsey, 2017).
This relative tension between the two sides has gradually started to ease since the
middle of 2019, owing to regional geopolitical developments and changes within
Pakistan’s domestic politics. The lack of any specific security-oriented role for the
IMAFT in Saudi regional security considerably reduced the threat posed by this
military entity vis-a-vis Iran (Alam, 2018). With regards to the former Pakistani
army chief and commander of this military alliance, there have been veiled attempts
within Pakistan’s security infrastructure to lessen his clout over the Pakistan–Saudi
relationship, rendering him only a symbolic figure (author interview with a security
official, September 2020). Pakistan’s adherence to strict neutrality over the Yemen
issue and the Saudi Kingdom’s friction with Sunni regional actors, namely, Qatar and
Turkey, also made Pakistan a relatively less threatening regional stakeholder for Iran.
Furthermore, Pakistan has constantly avoided getting kinetically involved in any
theatre of Saudi–Iran tension and has, at least on its own part, focused more on its
attempts at mediation between the two sides. Pakistan’s military continues to enjoy
close ties with Saudi Arabia, but the traditional bonds of security dependence have
weakened owing to this posture by Pakistan (Zweiri and Bonnie James, 2021).
Pakistan’s military leadership under General Qamar Javed Bajwa decided to initiate
engagement with Iran’s security infrastructure. Since the time of President General
Musharaf, who also visited the country as head of state, no army chief has officially
visited Pakistan’s neighbour and bilateral engagement has happened mainly on the
level of civil government, revealing a degree of unease and distrust within Pakistan’s
security cadres (Alam, 2017).
This made General Bajwa the first Pakistan army chief to visit Iran in an official
capacity since the Islamic Revolution. During his two trips and the reciprocal visits
by the chief of staff of Iran’s armed forces, Major General Mohammad Bagheri,
to Pakistan, a new line of communication was established between the security
establishments of the two countries. In this manner, a new bilateral channel to discuss
and resolve border security issues has opened up between the two sides (Tribune.
com, 2019). As COVID-19 started to spread across Iran, the Pakistani government
was quite vocal in its appeals to the international community to end the sanctions
regime against Iran (Siddiqui, 2020). These steps do appear to have improved the
coefficient of trust between Iran and Pakistan. This improvement on the Iranian front
has invariably dampened the Pakistan–Saudi relationship, which no longer maintains
its traditional strength and strategic depth. Pakistan’s increased security and defence
cooperation with Turkey, which constitutes the third pole of the Middle Eastern
political triad, has further hampered the state of the country’s relationship with Saudi
Arabia (Karim, 2020b).
Pakistan’s growing dependence upon China under the auspices of the China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and India’s political proximity to the US and
the subsequent impact on India–Iran ties (Haidar, 2020), have invariably also driven

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a change in Pakistan–Iran ties in a positive manner. Although the Iran–Pakistan gas

pipeline project remains stalled owing to the presence of US sanctions on Iran, the
negativity that has clouded the bilateral relationship after the Kulbhushan Yadav Affair
has still been considerably reduced. Additionally, the prominence of certain political
figures in Pakistan’s politics has further helped the state of the relationship with Iran.
A group of federal ministers and advisors in the cabinet of Prime Minister Imran
Khan were known for their extensive ties with Iran and have played an important
part in bridging the gap between the two sides. A key person in this regard has
been the Federal Minister for Human Rights and former academic Dr Shireen
Mazari (Riedel, 2018). The other key individuals who have accompanied the prime
minister on his visits to Iran included the Special Advisor to the Prime Minister
(SAPM) for Overseas Pakistanis and the Federal Minister for Maritime Affairs Syed
Ali Haider Zaidi (Tehrantimes.com, 2019). These developments show that there
remains a civil–military synergy on this aspect of foreign policy as well. Although
the reasons to push for this policy framework can be entirely different on both sides
of the power divide. An element of concern for Pakistan’s security establishment
has been the appointment of Ismail Ghani as the head of the IRGC/Quds Force
after the assassination of Quds Force former Commander Qassem Soleimani. Ghani
has remained in charge of IRGC operations within Central Asia and particularly
Afghanistan and could use his grasp of the region to create problems for Pakistan’s
strategic objectives (Karim, 2020a).

Cross-border security and bilateral distrust

The law-and-order situation on both sides of the Pakistan–Iran border has remained
a major point of contention between the two nations. The activities of Baloch
insurgents, whether on the Pakistani or Iranian side, have impacted upon the
security situation of the Pakistani Balochistan province and the Iranian Sistan and
Baluchestan provinces. This dynamic has been problematising neighbourly relations
and a source of mutual distrust. In the case of Iran, the major concern has been the
activities of Jundullah a Baloch – a separatist organisation – and its offshoot Jaish
al-Adl. Both militant groups have been involved in a plethora of terrorist attacks on
IRGC members, as well as civilians. Time and again, Iran has accused these groups
of having sanctuaries across the border in Pakistani Balochistan, with the members of
these outfits slipping back into Pakistan after every attack (Sial, 2015). The response
of Pakistani authorities to this problem of militant attacks inside Iran has been varied,
and the broader geopolitical situation of the region and Pakistan’s relationship with
the US have often indirectly affected Pakistan’s approach towards this issue.
Under President Musharraf ’s watch, both sides communicated regularly on political
matters, but the Iranian side had concerns regarding the presence of US forces in
military installations within Pakistani Balochistan and was also dissatisfied when it
came to the issue of border security. After the February 2007 attack in Zahedan,
Pakistan’s ambassador was summoned by Iranian authorities and a formal protest was
launched (AFP, 2007). It appears that Pakistan never actively supported the militants
acting against Iran in any official capacity, but the insurgents did take advantage of
the large swathes of relatively ungoverned Iranian–Pakistani border territory, which
also happened to be smuggling havens (Tharoor, 2010). In the last days of General
Musharaf ’s government, Pakistan did cooperate with Iran and handed over to Iranian

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authorities Abdul Hamid Regi, allegedly the brother of Abdul Malek Regi and chief
of Jundullah – a Baloch Sunni outfit that has been involved in attacks on Iranian
security personnel (Dawn.com, 2008).
On the Iranian side, a rather aggressive strategy was adopted to counter this
insurgency and the security for the province of Sistan and Baluchestan was handed
over to the IRGC, which waged a military campaign against the insurgents. However,
the insurgency also gathered steam, and in a suicide attack on an IRGC-sponsored
conference in a border city, dozens of people died, including the deputy head of the
IRGC ground forces and the de facto security tsar for the province. This was a big
blow to the security infrastructure of the Iranian government, and Iranian security
officials reacted strongly, openly blaming Pakistan and Western intelligence agencies
for involvement. In addition to verbal attacks, other tactics were also adopted by the
Iranian government to pressurise the Pakistani side, such as conducting hot pursuits
across the border and firing and shelling on Pakistani territory. Other strategies
involved building up a wall on the Iranian side of the border to limit any unauthorised
movement and an increase in the sudden closures of border crossings (Basit, 2018).
These measures negatively impacted the economy on the Pakistani side of border
and were meant to create pressure on the Pakistani government.
It seemed that the PPP government was more receptive to the border security issue
and actively engaged with Iranian authorities to devise mechanisms to enhance border
security. This resulted in a meeting of security officials from both countries in 2009
in Quetta, Pakistani Balochistan’s capital, which paved the way for cooperation on the
border security issue. In 2010, Iran finally arrested the leader of Jundallah, Abdul Malek
Regi, which the Pakistani envoy in Tehran claimed Pakistan had played an important
role in (MacDonald, 2010). There were several other such incidents that endangered
border security, but such instances were politically managed by both sides and showed
that the Pakistani leadership was willing to work alongside Iran on this issue. As the
government changed and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N) government
took charge, there was a general feeling within Pakistan that a government strongly
connected with Saudi Arabia had come into power at the expense of one that was
more in the Iranian camp. Tensions started to mount when Iranian border guards were
abducted by militants in March 2014 and Iran alleged that the guards were being kept
inside Pakistan. This deteriorated the border management system and transformed
the border zone into one that can be described as hot and violent (Bokhari, 2014).
Eventually, the bilateral relationship entered a tense period, as Iranian security forces
resorted to the shelling of the Pakistani border area, killing a Pakistani security guard.
Pakistan protested the incident but also asked Iran not to externalise its problems (Dawn.
com, 2014). The political goodwill between the two sides further evaporated after the
failure of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s first trip to Pakistan, which is explained
in detail later. This means that border security will become even more contentious
between the two countries if a major attack was to take place.
The next major security incident happened in 2017, when Jaish al-Adl killed and
kidnapped Iranian border guards. In response, the Iranian army chief threatened to
strike militant safe havens inside Pakistan (Reuters.com, 2017). This threat from Iran
came at a moment when Pakistan was engaged in a low-intensity border conflict
along the line of control (LOC) in Kashmir, with Indian and Pakistani troops targeting
each other. On the other hand, Pakistani security personnel clashed with the Afghan
national army in Northern Balochistan near the Pakistani border town of Chaman,

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which resulted in civilian casualties (Sheerani, 2017). The Iranian ultimatum infuriated
Pakistani public opinion, as it was perceived that Iran was not acting on its own,
but had become part of the Indian-orchestrated effort to isolate Pakistan and create
tension on all of its borders. The Pakistani government expressed its displeasure and
protested over the remarks of the Iranian army chief. The Iranian army chief statement
undermined the agreement reached during negotiations between the Iranian foreign
minister and Pakistani officials to boost border security through the formulation of
a joint security committee (Aljazeera.com, 2017).
By taking a tougher line with regard to the attack on the border guards, the Iranian
army chief showed that the Iranian military wanted to send a clear message to Pakistan
that such actions executed by cross-border elements would not be tolerated in future
and that Iran could not only pursue the course of confrontation taken by Pakistan’s
other two neighbours, but also use asymmetrical means to respond. Border tensions
remained high on the agenda, even as a new government under Imran Khan at the
helm was established in Islamabad (Gul, 2019).
The unease grew again when 27 IRGC personnel were killed in a bombing near
the Pakistan border in February this year. In the Iranian media and government circles,
a comprehensive campaign against Pakistan got under way, castigating Islamabad for
inaction against these factions. Meanwhile, the statement from the IRGC chief blamed
Saudi Arabia and the UAE for sponsoring these attacks. It also accused Pakistan’s
security circles of supporting and harbouring terrorists and threatened Pakistan with
grave consequences (Almanar.com, 2019). This attack in Iran was followed by an
attack in April 2019 on Pakistani naval personnel near the coastal town of Ormara
in Pakistani Balochistan that resulted in 14 deaths. Responsibility for the attack was
accepted by Baloch Raji Aajoi Saangar (BRAS), a newly formed umbrella group
of Baloch insurgent organisations. Pakistan alleged that the militants involved in the
attack had entered from Iran and demanded action from Iran against these terror
outfits based inside the Iranian border region (Shams, 2019). These developments
increased bilateral tensions, but Prime Minister Khan’s trip to Iran reduced this
political temperature considerably. Imran Khan became the first Pakistani leader to
give considerable concessions to Iran, at least on the verbal front, when he admitted
within Tehran that Pakistan’s territory had been used against Iran in the past. The
comments of the prime minister drew severe criticism from opposition parties, but
they appeared to have struck a positive chord in Iran (Alam, 2019).
Bilateral coordination has improved since then, and it can be expected that border
security issues will not cloud the bilateral relationship, at least under this government.
However, security forces on the Pakistani side of the border have continued to face
attacks by Baloch insurgent groups, which have allegedly found safe havens in Iran. These
cross-border attacks have been on the rise since the political changes in Afghanistan
resulting in the Taliban takeover of the country in 2021. In a spate of attacks at the start
of this year, more than two-dozen Pakistani security personnel have been killed, and
some Pakistani observers have pointed out that Pakistan has lost more than a hundred
troops from 2020 to 2022 in these attacks by Baloch insurgents (Karim, 2022). This
has resulted in multiple counter-insurgency operations near the border and a realisation
on the Pakistani side that the border with Iran needs to be militarily secured through
fencing, as political engagement is not bearing any results (Nazhar, 2022). This is a
variable that is bound to create negativity between the two sides, and only comprehensive
action by Iran in this regard can improve matters (Mohmand, 2020).

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Research and Analysis Wing activities and the involvement of

Iranian intelligence: a security threat for Pakistan

Within Pakistani Balochistan, in addition to the attacks by Baloch insurgents,

sectarian organisations have also remained active and have targeted the Shi’ite
Hazara community. Pakistani authorities view all these happenings as a deliberate
campaign allegedly orchestrated by an Indian intelligence agency, the Research and
Analysis Wing (RAW), to destabilise Balochistan and the law-and-order situation
in the province (Iqbal, 2012). The geostrategic significance of Balochistan has been
heightened by the initiation of the CPEC, which aims to position Gwadar as a regional
trade hub and also to develop industry and infrastructure in Balochistan. The CPEC
could generate enormous economic activity in Balochistan (Hussain and Hussain,
2017). Meanwhile, the Indians have been involved in developing the Iranian port
of Chahbahar, which is seen as an Indian attempt to counter Chinese influence in
the region, particularly in Gwadar (Daniels, 2013). Apparently the RAW has used
Chahbahar as a ploy to move its operatives to Iran and then as a base for sabotage
and terrorist activities, specifically within Balochistan. These apprehensions of the
Pakistani security institutions were proven right when they managed to arrest a senior
Indian intelligence operative, Kulbhushan Yadav, while he was entering Pakistan from
Iran in 2014 (Ahmed, 2016).
Later, he confessed his involvement in terrorist activities and links with Baloch
insurgent groups intended to deteriorate the law-and-order situation in the province,
as well as orchestrating terror incidents in the coastal metropolis of Karachi. Yadav
also admitted that he was based in the Iranian city of Chahbahar and had run his
network from there (APP, 2019). This raised alarms within Pakistani security circles
as to the fact that Indians were using Iranian soil to carry out anti-Pakistan activities.
Interestingly, Yadav was ‘caught’ on the eve of Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s
visit to Pakistan in 2014. This made the Yadav issue a focus of the whole tour and
frustrated Rouhani’s attempt to reach any significant breakthrough with Pakistan
(Dushuki, 2016). When the Pakistani press asked the Iranian president about the
matter, he rejected the assertion that it was discussed in his meeting with the Pakistani
leadership. However, after his departure from Pakistan, a spokesperson for the Pakistan
military revealed that the matter was indeed discussed in the president’s meeting with
the Pakistani army chief (APP, 2016).
The dust of the Yadav affair had not settled when Pakistani security agencies
arrested Uzair Baloch, who headed a crime syndicate in Karachi. He admitted his
links not only with the Kulbhushan network, but also with the Iranian intelligence
agency (Thenews.com, 2017). Afterwards, Uzair Baloch, who had also been a close
affiliate of the ruling PPP party in Sindh Province, was tried in a military court and
sentenced to 12 years in prison in April 2020. During his trial, Baloch had admitted
that he remained in contact with Iranian intelligence officials and had provided
them with secret information and sketches regarding army installations and officials
(Khan, 2020b). These arrests and subsequent prosecutions happened under the watch
of former Pakistani army chief General Raheel Sharif, who, as noted earlier, heads
the Saudi-led IMAFT. This strengthens the perception that Pakistan’s establishment
under General Raheel is sceptical of Iran’s approach to Pakistan and has aggressively
countered Iranian proxies within Pakistan. The recent acquittal of Uzair Baloch in
multiple cases suggests a change in this approach on the part of Pakistan’s establishment

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and supports the argument made earlier that the new military leadership in Pakistan
is ready to open a new chapter with Iran (Sahoutara, 2022). However, it must be
mentioned here that this change has not ended the doubts harboured by Pakistan’s
intelligence community vis-a-vis Iran. Rather, this part of Pakistan’s security
infrastructure remains deeply sceptical of Iran’s approach and workings in Pakistan, and
considers Iran as being involved in attempts to create a fifth column in the country.

Shi’ite militia recruitment from Pakistan: sectarian

objectification of the Pakistani state
Another issue complicating Pakistan–Iran ties has been the recruitment of Pakistani
Shi’ites in the Syrian civil war to fight for the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-
Assad. These fighters have been recruited under the banner of Liwa Al-Zeinabiyoun
by the IRGC. This recruitment has primarily been done from Parachinar, the
headquarters of the former Kurram tribal agency and now a district of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan, which is part of Pakistan’s federally administered
tribal area (FATA) along the Afghan border (Alfoneh, 2017). Parachinar is a unique
case, as it is a Shi’ite-majority area surrounded by Sunni tribal areas that remained
a hotbed of Taliban insurgency until the cleansing of the group in 2011. Parachinar
has witnessed a large number of terrorist attacks in which hundreds of locals have
been killed. Sectarian differences may lie at the heart of this conflict, but there have
been other local issues related to water management that have fuelled the conflict
(Zahab, 2009). Pakistan’s government has been occupied in other theatres and could
not devote significant resources to improving the security situation in the Parachinar
area (Vatanka, 2012). Although the Pakistani state had launched multiple military
offensives against Taliban insurgents and cleared their major strongholds in the tribal
areas, a narrative developed among the Shi’ites of Parachinar that the state had not
done enough to protect them (Shams, 2017). These grievances were exploited
by Iran in connection with the narrative of the ‘threat to Shi’ite shrines’ in Syria,
resulting in the recruitment of these Shi’ites to the Syrian conflict. Pakistani security
circles were not happy with these developments, as this kind of recruitment could
have triggered a reactionary recruitment of Sunni militants and further exacerbated
sectarian strife in the country. This compelled Pakistani authorities to ban Ansar-
ul-Hussain – an organisation that was allegedly involved in this recruitment drive
in tribal areas (Azam and Iqbal, 2017). From an Iranian perspective, this served not
only the Iranian narrative of being the protector of Shi’ites all over the world, but
also an attempt to create elements that could further be utilised as an Iranian proxy
within Pakistan, as had been the case in many other countries.
The security situation in Parachinar quickly deteriorated in 2017 when the city
was targeted by several terror attacks. After the death of 72 people in twin bombings
in Parachinar, a demonstration of local residents was allegedly fired upon by the
paramilitary force Frontier Corps (FC) on the orders of its local commandant, Colonel
Umar. It is pertinent to explain here that the officer cadres of FC are deputed from
the Pakistan army. A sit-in by locals continued for eight days until the Pakistani army
chief arrived and accepted the demands to beef up security and remove Colonel
Umar. One of the demands was to change the security plan for the area, as it was
alleged that FC conduct had been discriminatory (Hashim, 2017). This was the first
time that a serving officer of the Pakistan army had been portrayed in sectarian terms

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 Umer Karim

and also as a facilitator of terrorists by a Shi’ite news outlet (Shiite.news, 2017). On

the other hand, FC – an important security organ of the Pakistani state, which was
essentially monitored and run by the military – was branded as an organisation that
had been compromised. The notable factor was the propagation of this rhetoric
by the leaders of Majlis Wahdatul Muslimeen (MWM), which had its roots in the
Imamia Students Organization (ISO). ISO was one of the first Shi’ite organisations
that had deep linkages with Iran, and MWM later emerged as its political extension
(Jaffrelot, 2014).
This politicisation of the sectarian question in Pakistan has remained a recurring
theme within national politics in one manner or another. It went into relative
political obscurity as the overall law-and-order situation improved in the country
and violence, including that of a sectarian nature, also decreased. With the conflict
in Syria gradually settling down in terms of its intensity, the question of Pakistani
Shi’ite fighters in Syria and their status also took a back seat. At the start of 2020,
two developments brought this issue back into the limelight as it again became a
focus of debate. The first was the death of scores of pro-Iran Pakistani militants from
the Zainabiyoun Brigade in Northern Syria when their bases and installations came
under attack by Turkish drones (Khan, 2020a). This created an interesting situation,
as Pakistan had fully backed the Turkish offensive in a rare departure from its policy
of silent neutrality on the Syrian conflict. The Pakistani authorities remained silent on
the whole incident in order to limit not only any diplomatic misunderstanding with
Turkey, but also any demands within Pakistan for further inquiry into the matter. Yet,
alongside the arrest of some former members of this militia in Karachi, this incident
highlighted that this militia activity and its presence in Syria might create problems for
Pakistan on the foreign policy front, particularly vis-a-vis Turkey. Although Turkish
authorities realise that these militants are not in any manner backed by Pakistan’s
state apparatus, the Pakistani state is also not seen as taking concrete measures to abet
their activities (Ahmed, 2020). The other dimension of this problem is the domestic
one. Since some militants are now returning to Pakistan, with some of them having
also been arrested, they may become perpetrators of sectarian violence within the
country and thus a new security threat for the state. The attitude of Pakistani state
institutions in this regard has been a rather complacent one, and it appears that they
just want to sweep this issue under the carpet and do not want to acknowledge the
seriousness of this particular problem (Guven, 2020). This approach chimes well
with the general approach of power holders within Pakistan towards Iran and their
attempts to keep their western neighbour out of the Indian orbit.
The second incident that brought sectarianism back into the discourse of Pakistani
political debates was the return of Pakistani pilgrims from Iran as COVID-19 swept
through the country. Initially, the government decided to close the border with
Iran and to stop the movement of pilgrims possibly infected with COVID-19 back
to Pakistan (Wintour, 2020). This decision was then overturned by the federal
government. Although the Balochistan government had conveyed to the federal
government that it lacked the proper resources to enact a strict screening and
quarantine set-up in the border area for thousands of pilgrims returning from Iran,
these issues were still not considered. Consequently, the authorities at the border
were not able to hold all the pilgrims in a strict quarantine arrangement and they
started slipping away, hence becoming carriers of the virus (Atyani and Khan, 2020).
This became a hot political topic within the country, and the opposition blamed

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 The Pakistan–Iran relationship

the SAPM for Overseas Pakistanis, Zulfiqar Bukhari, as having used his influence
with the Balochistan government to open the border. SAPM Bukhari denied these
allegations but nonetheless became controversial in public eyes. Since he remained
extremely close to the prime minister, it could be argued that Bukhari had become an
overarching influence over the prime minister, particularly with regards to Pakistan’s
foreign policy approach towards Iran, even more than Dr Mazari. Pakistan’s security
cadres felt unease at the rise of Bukhari and were not entirely comfortable with his
involvement in foreign policy affairs (author interview with a former official, March
2020). Iranian manoeuvrings in Pakistan remain multifaceted and are meant to achieve
different goals. Invariably, the key purpose of these machinations remains to build a
strong bond with Pakistani Shi’ites and to use them as a constituency more amenable
to Iranian interests within Pakistani political and social life.

Conclusion
The problem at the core of the Pakistan–Iran relationship has been a lack of politico-
economic engagement between the two countries that can bypass their national
security concerns and the sectarian connection between the two sides. Both states
also approach each other in the broader geopolitical context. Pakistan’s proximity
with Saudi Arabia and Iran’s engagement with India have remained troublesome for
the bilateral relationship. A possible revision of the strategic outlook and alignment of
Pakistan within the region, as well as evolution of Iran’s competing relationships with
China and India, are likely to shape the future of the bilateral relationship. As Pakistan’s
relationship enters a rather rough patch with Saudi Arabia and its dependence upon
China increases, it can be expected that the outlook of Pakistan–Iran ties will also
improve. The synergy between the civil and military leaderships on the issue will also
remain a key variable. The bilateral relationship between the two countries needs
to move beyond personal whims, as only then can any changes in the nature of ties
have a more long-lasting impact.
However, the fallout of the sectarianised conflict, particularly in Syria, and the
involvement of Pakistani Shi’ite militiamen as members of pro-Iran foreign fighter
brigades complicate bilateral ties and continue to instil distrust between the two sides.
Pakistan’s security cadres have remained wary of this recruitment and consider this
to be an attempt to create a fifth column within the country. It remains imperative
that Iran engages with the Pakistani state on this particular issue, uses its influence
within the Pakistani Shi’ite community in a positive manner and end practices that
give the impression of Iran using the community as a political deterrence against the
Pakistani state. Similarly, the impact of the alleged presence of Indian intelligence
operatives within Iran and their activities against Pakistan that often result in cross-
border attacks on security forces in Balochistan Province do not bode well for the
bilateral relationship. From an Iranian perspective, Pakistan still has to initiate structural
reforms in the domain of border security to curb the activities of Baloch insurgents,
which have regularly attacked Iranian forces. The only way forward for both sides
would be to enhance ongoing bilateral political and security deliberation in order to
understand the respective bilateral security concerns and to alleviate them.

Conflict of interest
The author declares that there is no conflict of interest.

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