Ensuring Continuity of leadership

In 2012, Vladimir Putin took the oath of office as president of the Russian
Federation, having served two terms from 2000 to 2008. He then stepped
aside to serve a four-year term as prime minister while Dmitrii Anatol’evich
Medvedev occupied the presidency. The farcical nature of the proceedings
was reinforced by the fact that upon taking the oath of office, he
immediately named Medvedev as his prime minister. Cynical Russians
recognized that Putin and Medvedev were simply trading offices, while
everyone understood that the real location of power had never changed.

The Putin regime went to the trouble of pretending to hold a competitive

election only to manipulate the outcome so visibly. This logic seems puzzling
to many outsiders, but it is typical of "competitive authoritarian regimes." A
controlled election serves several purposes: keeping an eye on the
opposition, giving the public some opportunity to vote for alternative parties,
and leaving the power of the ruling elite intact. An uncontrolled election
creates the risk of an internal split within the political elite.

During the four-year interim period when Medvedev was president and Putin
was prime minister, Putin remained in charge. Some expected some rivalry
between the two, but none arose. Medvedev loyally played the part assigned
to him, although he did attempt to launch policy initiatives of his own. That
Putin was still superior to Medvedev in fact, while formally subordinate to
him, vividly illustrates the gap between formal and informal power in Russia.

Medvedev could have tried to use his formal powers as president to build up
an independent power base, but he chose not to try. Putin was justified in
trusting that Medvedev would remain loyal. The regime remained stable
across the succession from Putin to Medvedev, and then from Medvedev to
Putin. However, the tight control over leadership succession deprived the
regime of the benefits of leadership accountability and renewal that
democratic systems enjoy.
Current Policy Challenges

Policy Challenges and Challenges for Russia

Reducing Dependence on Natural Resource Exports

• Russia's economic growth rates have been influenced by world oil prices,
leading to a tripled real income from 2000 to 2008.

• The financial crash in 2008 led to a significant drop in Russian budget

revenues and a deep deficit, causing a drop in consumer demand and a
contraction in Russia's economy.

• The government's financial reserves from the 2000s have helped shield
Russia from poverty and financial instability.

The "Resource Curse"

• Russia's leaders are aware of the dangers of the "resource curse," where
leaders avoid investing in the skills and knowledge of the population, leading
to lower levels of economic and political development.

• Despite calls for more diversification and innovation, Russia lacks effective
policy instruments to bring about these changes.

President Medvedev's Criticism of Russia's Economic Structure

• President Medvedev denounced Russia's current economic structure as

"primitive" due to its dependence on natural resource production and chronic
corruption.

• He noted low energy efficiency and labor productivity of most enterprises

and the lack of concern from most owners, managers, and state officials.

Demographic Crisis

• Since the end of the Soviet regime, deaths have outnumbered births, with
in-migration offseting natural population loss but bringing other difficulties.
• High barriers to geographic mobility and high barriers to geographic
mobility reinforce the disparities in living standards across regions.

Obstacles to Reform

• State officials' resistance to reforms, the country's vast size, and the legacy
of the Soviet development model have hindered political and economic
reform.

The Tsarist Regime

Russian State History and Legacy

Origins and Autocracy

• Originated from the princely state around Kiev in the ninth century.

• For nearly a thousand years, the Russian state was autocratic, ruled by a
hereditary monarch.

• The tsar agreed to grant a constitution for an elected legislature in the first
decade of the 20th century, but the tsar soon dissolved the legislature and
clawed back most of the constitutional concessions.

Legacy of Absolutism, Patriotism, and Orthodox Christianity

• Absolutism refers to the tsar's aspired power over the subjects of the
realm.

• Patrimonialism refers to the ruler treating his realm as property, not an

autonomous community with its own legitimate rights and interests.

• Orthodox Christianity, a dominant religious tradition, ties itself closely to

the state and seeks a monopoly of spiritual power.
Modernization and Modernization

• Russian rulers sought to modernize its economy and society, importing

Western practices in technology, law, state organization, and education.

• The imperative of building Russia’s military and economic potential was

more pressing due to Russia’s constant expansion and need to defend its
borders.

• By the end of the 17th century, Russia was territorially the largest state in
the world, but for most of its history, Russia’s imperial reach exceeded its
actual grasp.

Economic Institutions and Industrial Society

• Compared to other major powers of Europe, Russia’s economic institutions

remained backward well into the twentieth century.

• By the time the tsarist order fell in 1917, Russia had a large industrial
sector, but the middle class was greatly outnumbered by the vast and
impoverished peasantry and the radicalized industrial working class.

Contradicting Legacy

• The thousand-year tsarist era left a contradictory legacy, with the tsars
attempting to legitimate their absolute power by appealing to tradition,
empire, and divine right.

• Despite the gap between state and society, Russia's political traditions
include a yearning for equality, solidarity, community, moral purity, and
pride in the greatness of the country and the endurance of its people.

The Communist Revolution and the Soviet Order

The Soviet Union's Political System and its Challenges

The Tsarist Regime and the Bolsheviks

• Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in 1917, replaced by a provisional government.

• The Russian Communists took power in October 1917, aiming to create a

socialist society in Russia and spread revolutionary socialism worldwide.

• Vladimir Ilyich Lenin was the leader of the Russian Communist Party and
the first head of the Soviet Russian government.

The Communist Party's Control and Power

• Under Lenin's rule, the Communist Party controlled all levels of

government.

• Joseph Stalin instituted a totalitarian regime to build up Russia's industrial

and military might.

• Stalin's institutions of rule crippled the Soviet state, including personalistic

rule, insecurity for rulers and ruled alike, heavy reliance on the secret police,
and a militarized economy.

• The system's weaknesses were not addressed by Stalin's successors, Nikita

Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, or Leonid Brezhnev.

Bureaucratic Immobilism and the Soviet Union's Political System

• The Soviet Union's political system was top-heavy, unresponsive, and

corrupt.
• The regime had more power to crush any political opposition but was
unable to modernize the economy or improve living standards for the
population.

Michail Gorbachev's Leadership and Reform

• After the deaths of three elderly leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev was elected
general secretary of the CPSU in 1985.

• Gorbachev called for political democratization, legalized private enterprise,

and made major concessions to the United States in arms control.

• Gorbachev's proposals for democratization were realized in 1989 and 1990,

leading to free elections and a working parliament.

The 1989 Revolutions and the Soviet Union's Loss of Authority

• The collapse of communism in Eastern Europe led to the reunification of

divided Germany.

• The Communist Party faced a critical loss of authority in the Soviet Union
itself, with newly elected governments declaring their sovereignty and the
Baltic republics intending to secede from the union.

Political Institutions of the Transition Period: Demise of

the Soviet Union

Gorbachev's Reforms and Consequences

• Gorbachev's reforms led to popular nationalist and democratic movements

in most republics.
• Boris Yeltsin, Gorbachev's rival, was elected chairman of the Russian
Supreme Soviet in June 1990.

• Yeltsin challenged Gorbachev for preeminence, forcing Gorbachev to alter

his strategy.

• Gorbachev sought terms for a new federal or confederal union in March

1991.

• In April 1991, he reached an agreement on a treaty of union with nine of

the fifteen republics, including Russia.

• On August 19, 1991, a conspiracy led to Gorbachev's house arrest and

seized power.

• The coup collapsed on the third day, but Gorbachev's power was
weakened.

• The Russian government took over the union government, ministry by

ministry.

• In November 1991, President Yeltsin outlawed the CPSU.

• On December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned and turned over his powers to
Yeltsin.

• On New Year's Day, 1992, the Soviet flag was replaced by the flag of
independent Russia.

Political Institutions of the Transition Period: Russia 1990–

1993

Boris Yeltsin's Presidency and Economic Reforms

• Boris Yeltsin was elected president of Russia in June 1991, gaining public
support against Gorbachev and the central Soviet Union government.
• Yeltsin demanded extraordinary powers from parliament to address the
country's economic problems.

• Following the August 1991 coup attempt, Yeltsin was granted emergency
decree powers to manage the economic crisis.

• Yeltsin formed a government led by Western-oriented reformers to

implement an economic program.

• The program led to immediate price increases and opposition from

politicians, leading to a political confrontation.

• In March 1993, an opposition motion to remove Yeltsin through

impeachment nearly passed in parliament.

• On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin decreed the parliament dissolved and

called for elections for a new parliament.

• After a ten-day standoff, the army agreed to support Yeltsin and suppress
the uprising by force.

• Yeltsin's decree led to national elections for a legislature that did not exist
constitutionally, but the constitution approved in the referendum remains in
force.

The Contemporary Constitutional Order

Russian Presidency Structure and Power Dynamics

Yeltsin's Constitution

• Combines elements of presidentialism and parliamentarism.

• Separates executive, legislative, and judicial branches.

• Divides power between central and regional levels of government.

• President is directly elected for a six-year term and can not serve more
than two consecutive terms.

• President names the prime minister to head the government.

• The government must have the confidence of parliament to remain in

power.

Informal Practices

• President and government divide executive responsibility.

• The government, headed by the prime minister, is primarily responsible for

economic and social policy.

• The president oversees the "force ministries" of the armed forces, law
enforcement, and state security.

• The government answers to the president, not parliament.

President's Other Powers

• Oversees a large presidential administration, which supervises the federal

government and regional governments.

• Manages relations with parliament, courts, big business, media, political

parties, and major interest groups.

• Oversees many official and quasi-official supervisory and advisory

commissions.
Security Council

• Chaired by the president, it consists of a permanent secretary, heads of

power ministries and other security-related agencies, the prime minister, and
the chairs of the two chambers of parliament.

• Putin has selectively used it to formulate policy proposals in matters of

foreign and defense policy, organization of the executive branch, and public
morality.

State Council

• Comprises the heads of the regional governments.

• Similar to the Federation Council.

Public Chamber

• A quasi-parliamentary deliberative body that the president can consult at

will.

• Duplicates some of the deliberative and representative functions of

parliament, weakening parliament’s role.

The Government

Russian Government Overview

• Comprises the prime minister, deputy prime ministers, and heads of

ministries and state agencies.

• Formulates national policy lines and oversees their implementation.

• Unlike Western parliamentary systems, the government's makeup is not

directly determined by the party composition of the parliament.
• Most government members are career managers and administrators, not
party politicians.

• The government reflects the president's decisions on Cabinet minister

selection based on personal loyalty, professional competence, and
bureaucratic strength.

• The majority party in the Duma should have the right to name the head of
the government, but this has not been agreed upon due to fear of reducing
the president's governing freedom.

The Parliament

The Federal Assembly in Russia: Legislation, Elections, and Power Structure

The Federal Assembly:

• Legislation originates in the State Duma, which then passes to the

Federation Council for consideration.

• The Federation Council can pass, reject, or propose an agreement

commission to resolve differences.

• If the Duma rejects the upper house’s proposed changes, it can override
the Federation Council and send the bill directly to the president.

The President's Control:

• The president's control over the Duma has been so firm since 2003 that
disagreements between president and parliament are rare and minor.
• The Duma may pass an amended version that incorporates the president’s
objections by a simple absolute majority or try to override the president’s
veto.

• The Duma must also approve the bill by a simple majority if the president’s
amendments are accepted or by a two-thirds vote if it chooses to override
the president.

The Duma's Election System:

• Until 2007, the Duma’s 450 members were equally divided between
deputies elected by plurality vote in 225 single-member districts and 225
deputies elected through proportional representation (PR) in a single national
electoral district.

• In 2013, at Putin’s urging, the Duma voted to return to the old half-and-half
system.

Factions in the Duma:

• The United Russia party holds an absolute majority of the seats and half of
the thirty committee chairmanships and seven of the twelve seats of the
Council of the Duma.

Legal Committees:

• Each deputy is a member of one of the thirty standing legislative

committees.

• The Federation Council is designed as an instrument of federalism, serving

every constituent unit of the federation by two representatives.
• The procedure for choosing members of the Federation Council has been
changed several times, with the final say being held by his advisors since
Putin took power.

Executive–Legislative Relations

Russia's President-Parliament Relations in the 1990s

• The first two Dumas, elected in 1993 and 1995, were dominated by leftist
faction’s hostile to President Yeltsin and his government.

• On federal relations, the Duma and president often reached agreement,

sometimes over opposition from the Federation Council.

• The 1999 election resulted in a pro-government Duma, with President Putin

and his government gaining support from a coalition of four centrist political
factions.

• The 2003 election gave the president a wider margin of support and an
overwhelming majority for the United Russia party, reducing the need for
negotiation with the Duma.

• The Fifth and Sixth Dumas, elected in 2007, and 2011, were dominated by
the United Russia party, providing loyal support to the Putin-Medvedev team.

• The relationship between the Duma and the government differs from a
Westminster-style setting, with mutual offsetting powers.

• In Russia, parliamentary deputies have limited political resources, and

defying party discipline can lead to expulsion.

• A shift in political forces alignment could lead to a different relationship

between executive and legislative power.
The Judiciary and Law Enforcement

The major institutional actors in the legal system are the procuracy, the
courts (judiciary), and the bar. Each has undergone substantial change in the
postcommunist period.

Procuracy in Russia's Legal System

• Procuracy is Russia's most prestigious legal branch, comparable to the US

system of federal and state prosecuting attorneys.

• Organized as a centralized hierarchy, headed by the procurator general.

• Charged with fighting crime, corruption, and power abuses in the

bureaucracy.

• Investigates criminal charges and prosecutes cases in court.

• Traditionally the principal check on power abuses by state officials.

• Inadequately equipped to effectively supervise the vast state bureaucracy.

• President names procuratorgeneral and informally supervises politically

significant cases.

Russian Judiciary Overview

• The Russian judiciary is a unitary hierarchy, with federal courts as the

primary jurisdiction.

• Other specialized types include commercial courts, constitutional courts of

ethnic republics, local municipal courts, and military courts.

• Most criminal trials are held in district and city courts of general
jurisdiction.

• The Russian Supreme Court is the highest court in the hierarchy, hearing
cases referred from lower courts and issuing instructions to lower courts on
judicial matters.
• The Supreme Commercial Court is the highest appellate court for its
system of courts and the source of instruction and direction to lower
commercial courts.

• The Ministry of Justice oversees the court system and provides for its
material and administrative needs but lacks direct authority over the
procuracy.

Advocates in Bar Law

• Advocates represent individuals and organizations in criminal and civil

matters.

• Similar to barristers in Great Britain and litigating attorneys in the US.

• Role expanded with market economy spread.

• Autonomy through self-governing associations.

• Rising stature and visibility of advocates.

• Proliferation of private law firms.

• Attractive profession for high income opportunities.

• Many lawyers become celebrities by taking on high-profile cases.

Post-Communist Russia's Constitutional Court

• Established for constitutional review of government acts.

• Interprets the constitution in various areas.

• Rulings on parliamentary procedure, overturning laws passed by national

republics.
• Strikes down provisions of the Russian Criminal Code that limit individual
rights.

• In 2013, allowed individual voters to protest election law abuses.

• Upholds federal constitution's sovereignty over regional governments.

• Defers to president in cases concerning presidential authority.

• Established legal limits to president's authority in less charged issues.

• Moved seat of the court to St. Petersburg in 2008 to marginalize it

politically.

Central Government and the Regions

Russia's Territorial Integrity and the Role of Demographic Factors

Post-Soviet Russia's Territorial Integrity

• Post-Soviet Russia faced fears of dissolution into independent fiefdoms due

to territorial integrity strains.

• Under President Yeltsin, the central government granted autonomy to

regional governments in return for political support.

• Under President Putin, the federal policy shifted sharply towards

centralization.

Ethnicity and State Policy

• 80% of Russia's population is ethnically Russian, with none of its ethnic

minorities accounting for more than 4% of the total.
• Russia's history of statehood has helped rebuild national community in
post-Soviet Russia.

• State policy toward nationality has varied over the centuries, with some
periods recognizing self-governing ethnic-national communities and
tolerating cultural differences, while others pressured non-Russian groups to
assimilate to Russian culture.

Russia's Federal Republic and Ethnic Territories

• Russia was formally established as a federal republic under the Soviet

regime.

• As of 2013, Russia comprises 83 constituent territorial units, officially

termed “subjects of the federation.”

• President Putin pursued the merger of smaller ethnic territories into larger
surrounding units, which reduced the patronage rights and political voice of
an ethnic district’s status as a constituent unit of the federation.

Ethnic Republics and Their Special Status

• From 1990 to 1992, all the republics adopted declarations of sovereignty,

and two attempted to declare full or partial independence from Russia.

• Chechnia, one of the twenty ethnic republics, resorted to arms to back up

its claim.

• The Chechen rebel movement replaced national independence as the

guiding ideology in the mid-1990s, leading to guerrillas carrying out sporadic
ambushes and suicide attacks against federal units.

President Putin's Intention to Reassert Federal Government's Authority

• President Putin reasserted the federal government’s authority over the
regions through the reform of the Federation Council in 2000 and the
creation of seven new “federal districts.”

Centralizing Measures in Russia's Political System

Abolition of Direct Popular Election of Governors

• Before 2005, regional chief executives were chosen by direct popular

election.

• Since 2005, the president nominates a candidate, who must then be

approved by the regional legislature.

• Critics argue this change has disadvantages as appointed governors often

have less political authority in the region than elected ones.

Return to an Electoral Model

• Putin proposes returning to an elected model with features ensuring the

president can control the outcome.

• Constitutional arrangements are adjusted and readjusted by the leaders to

solve short-term political problems.

Local Self-Government Units

• Local self-governing units are given the right of self-government, raising

the total number to 24,000.

• These units are supposed to permit substantial policymaking autonomy in

spheres of housing, utilities, and social services.
• However, the law provides no fixed, independent sources of revenue for
these local entities, relying for the majority of their budget revenues on the
regional governments.

Power Arbitrary Exercise

• Russia's postcommunist constitutional arrangements allow considerable

room for the arbitrary exercise of power.

• President Putin has eviscerated organized political opposition but tolerates

a good deal of autonomous civic activity so long as it does not interfere with
his power.

• Elections are held regularly, and a tame opposition is allowed a small,

marginal role, while “extrasystemic” opposition is suppressed.

• The ruling authorities exercise substantial control over television and radio,
although allowing much greater freedom to the print and Internet media.

Presidential Power Use

• Yeltsin and Putin used presidential power very differently without changing
the formal rules of the constitution.

• Yeltsin ruled erratically and impulsively, but respected certain limits on his
power.

• Putin's presidency illustrates the opposite danger of an overcentralized

political system.

• Since his return to the presidency in 2012, he has cracked down harshly on
political opposition.

Russian Political Culture in the Post-Soviet Period

Russian Political Culture and Its Influences

Concept of Russian Political Culture

• Russian political culture is a result of centuries of autocratic rule, war, and

exposure to Western political life.

• It combines democratic values with a strong state and deep mistrust of

state institutions.

• Around three-quarters of the population believe Russia should be a

democratic country, and party competition and elections are beneficial.

• Most accept the state requires firm guidance by a capable president and
credit Putin for restoring order.

Short-term and Long-term Influences on Russian Views

• Russians judge political regimes based on their ability to provide stability,

prosperity, and security.

• Freedoms such as protection from illness, loss of work, or poverty, and the
right to purchase what one wants are important to them personally.

• Many Russians support "delegative democracy," which requires a strong

leader who can be removed, is elected, and respects the rights of the
opposition.

Impact of Recent History

• The reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s raised expectations that
Russia would enjoy a significant rise in living standards once it got rid of
communism.

• The sharp fall in living standards following the collapse of the old regime
dispelled any notion that changing the political and economic system could
turn the country around overnight.
• The widespread view that political order is fragile, and a weakening of the
state's internal cohesion invites predation from outside powers, is a
conditional view of democratic rights.

• Fears expressed include political instability connected with political

succession, struggle among competing factions in power, loss of control by
the central government over regions, separatism in the North Caucasus, and
loss of control over the regions in the Far East located near China.

Political Socialization

Soviet Regime's Influence on Russian Education and Values

Soviet Regime's Political Indoctrination and Propaganda

• The Soviet regime controlled the content of school curricula, mass media,
popular culture, and political education.

• The doctrine was Marxist, emphasizing the working-class movement to

overthrow capitalism and replace it with socialism.

• The regime replaced national feeling with patriotic loyalty to the Soviet
state and the working class's interests in the worldwide class struggle.

Modern Russian Education

• The ideological content of Russian education has changed significantly,

with less overt political control over attitudes and values.

• Textbooks stress love for the Russian national heritage and patriotic loyalty
to the state.
• Historical figures honored as heroes of the struggle against feudal or
capitalist masters are now seen as representatives of Russia’s national
culture.

Putin's Demand for a Uniform Understanding of Russia’s Past

• Putin has urged for a single, agreed-upon history textbook that presents a
coherent conception of the tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet periods.

• Liberals object to the textbook fostering authoritarian values.

Orthodox Church's Role in Political Socialization

• The authorities have turned to the Orthodox Church as an aid in political

socialization.

• The Church seeks to protect its traditional status as Russia’s state church,
allowing it to block other Christian denominations from proselytizing in
Russia.

• A new course, “fundamentals of religious culture and ethics,” was

introduced into the fourth- and fifth-grade curriculums of schools.

• The Church’s rising influence has prompted a backlash among many

intellectuals, but many see it as a way of restoring traditional moral values in
society.

Media Control in Russia: A Historical Perspective

• Media freedom was generally respected in the 1990s.

• Under Putin, authorities set limits on media, particularly television, but did
not implement an elaborate political socialization system.

• The media system is stratified, with television being the most important
source of news.

• Print media have more freedom but reach a smaller audience, making
them less immediate concern to authorities.

• Regional newspapers are closely controlled by regional governments.

• The internet has remained relatively free of direct control, but authorities
are imposing restrictions on service providers.

• Social media, including blogging and social networking platforms, have

played a crucial role in mobilizing large-scale demonstrations against
election fraud.

• The impact of social media can be seen in the sudden fame of bloggers,
such as Aleksei Naval’nyi, who gained a large online following by blogging
about corruption in government.

• The authorities aim to limit access to the media by opposition forces, a

defensive strategy akin to the Soviet system of ideological control.

• Russian political socialization is less subject to direct state control than in

the Soviet era.

• Authorities use schools and communications media to build loyalty to the

state, confidence in the future, and acceptance of a centralized regime.

Political Participation

Democracy and Citizenship

• Citizens participate in public life through direct and indirect forms of

participation.
• Direct participation includes voting, canvassing, petition collection,
demonstrating, and talking to officials.

• Indirect participation includes membership in civic groups and voluntary

associations.

• Collective action signals citizens' preferences to policymakers.

• Activists take on leadership roles through participation.

• Participation levels vary based on resources, opportunities, and

motivations.

• The better off and educated are disproportionately involved in politics.

• Deep wealth and income inequality can lead to political voice differentials,
threatening democracy.

The Importance of Social Capital

Social Capital and Civic Participation in Russia

• Social capital, or reciprocal bonds of trust and obligation, is crucial for

democracy and collective action.

• In Russia, social capital is sparse compared to West European societies,

and civic participation is limited.

• State authorities often extract resources from society without cultivating

ties of obligation.

• The Communist regime depleted social capital by coopting useful

associations and repressing those that threatened its interests.

• The weak link between political elites and ordinary citizens widens the felt
distance between state and society.

• Despite high voter turnout in elections, participation in organized political

activity is low.
• Voter membership in voluntary associations is extremely low, with only a
small proportion of people participating in voluntary public activity.

• The Putin era has demobilized large sections of the population from public
life, with most Russians reporting being "totally uninterested" or "more
uninterested than interested."

• Russians value their right not to participate in politics, reflecting low

confidence in political institutions and the view that ordinary people have
little say in government.

Elite Recruitment

Elite Recruitment in Russia: A Historical and Contemporary Perspective

Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Regime

• Elite recruitment was a formalized process by the Communist Party,

involving recruitment into officially sponsored organizations.

• The nomenklatura system was used to recruit, train, and appoint

individuals for leadership and responsibility positions.

• The nomenklatura system was viewed as the ruling class in Soviet society.

Democratizing Reforms in the 1980s and 1990s

• The old nomenklatura system crumbled along with other Communist Party
controls over society.

• New informal organizations and popular elections brought many new

people into elite positions.
• The contemporary Russian political elite consists of a mixture of career
types: those who worked their way up through the state bureaucracy and
those who entered politics through other channels.

Restoration of Soviet Institutional Mechanisms for Recruitment

• The party-maintained schools to train political leaders, providing a

combination of management education and political indoctrination.

• Most of these schools serve as academy for training civil servants and are
overseen by the presidential administration.

Differences Between Elite Recruitment in the Soviet Regime and the Present

• The nomenklatura system of the Soviet regime ensured that those holding
positions of power and responsibility were approved by the party.

• Today, there are multiple elites (political, business, professional, cultural,

etc.), reflecting the greater degree of pluralism in post-Soviet society.

Multiple Channels for Recruitment

• Many members of the political elite come from positions in federal and
regional executive agencies.

• There are multiple channels for recruitment to today’s political elite,

generating competition between rival groups of clients, sometimes called
“clans.”

Influence of Business on Elite Recruitment

• Money from the Communist Party found its way into the establishment of
many new business ventures.

• Insiders took advantage of their contacts to obtain business licenses, office

space, and exclusive contracts.

• Today’s business elite still is closely tied to the state, providing material
and political benefits to officials.

• The close and collusive relations between many businesses and

government officials nurture widespread corruption.

Interest Articulation: Statism, Corporatism and Pluralism

Russia's Political and Economic Changes and the Impact of Interest Groups

• The political and economic changes in Russia have significantly influenced

the organization of social interests.

• A diverse spectrum of interest associations has developed, reflecting the

state's control over society and disparities in wealth and power.

• The system of interest groups in Russia reflects elements of controlled,

neocorporatist, and pluralist systems.

• Under Putin, state control has become the dominant pattern in regime
relations with social groups.

• The Communist regime did not tolerate the open pursuit of any interests
except those authorized by the state.

• The Glasnost’ period disrupted this state-controlled model of interest

articulation, triggering an explosion of free expression and new groups to
form and make political demands.

• The end of the state’s monopoly on productive property resulted in the

formation of new interests, including those with a stake in the market
economy.
• Currently, there are over 300,000 NGOs on the books, with fewer than 40%
of these being active.

• Some NGOs are successors of recognized associations of the old regime,

while others sprang up during the glasnost’ period or later but must
cooperate with local authorities to gain access to meeting places and media
attention.

• Putin’s approach to NGOs has been to combine repression and cooptation,

allowing groups willing to accept political limits on their autonomy to
operate.

• New legislation requires groups that accept foreign funding to register as

“foreign agents,” a term that is as pejorative in Russian as in English.

• The regime has also sought to reward those NGOs that are willing to play
by its rules, such as the Public Chamber.

• The system of interest group relations with the government is not fully
corporatist and not fully controlled, but under Putin, interest articulation has
grown more controlled as the regime narrows the limits of autonomous
activity.

The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs

Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs (RUIE): A Shift in Big

Business Interests

• Previously state-owned industrial firms are now privately owned,

participating in a competitive market and globalized economic environment.

• Managers now aim to maximize profits and increase the value of their
firms.
• Despite demand for state subsidies and protection, many want an
environment where laws and contracts are enforced, regulation is reasonable
and honest, taxes are fair, and barriers to foreign trade are minimized.

• RUIE, the single most powerful organized interest group in Russia,

represents the interests of big business in the market system.

• RUIE helps broker agreements between business and labor and provides
policy advice for government and parliament.

• RUIE has expanded its in-house capacity for working with the government
in drafting legislation on various policy issues.

• Despite its influence, RUIE's power as the collective voice of big business is
limited.

• The RUIE's members chose to maintain friendly relations with the

government and avoid protesting the destruction of Yukos oil firm, limiting
their capacity for collective action.

The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers

The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers: A Historical Overview

• The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers was formed in 1989 in Moscow to

protest the end of student deferments from military conscription.

• The movement grew during the glasnost’ period, with local branches
forming in hundreds of cities.

• The organization focuses on the problems of military service, pressuring

the military to end brutal hazing of recruits and advising young men on how
to avoid being conscripted.

• The onset of large-scale hostilities in Chechnia in 1994–1996 and 1999–

2000 stimulated the league's activity, helping families locate missing soldiers
and negotiating for the release of prisoners.
• The organization became one of the most respected civic groups in Russia,
with a network of thousands of active volunteers.

• The Committee plays both a public political role and a service provider,
helping soldiers and their families deal with their problems.

• Despite its stable public support and international recognition, the group
sometimes faces hostility from authorities.

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia

The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FITUR): A

Postcommunist Organization

• FITUR is the successor of the official trade union federation under the
Soviet regime.

• Despite inheriting substantial resources from the old Soviet trade union
organization, it has struggled to adapt to the postcommunist environment.

• FITUR remains the largest trade union federation in Russia, with 95% of all
organized workers belonging to unions that are formally members.

• The labor movement is fragmented and poorly equipped to mobilize

workers for collective action.

• The FITUR inherited valuable real estate assets from its predecessor
organization, including thousands of office buildings, hotels, rest homes,
hospitals, and children’s camps.

• However, the FITUR no longer has centralized control over its regional and
branch members, leading to internal disunity.
• The organization's efforts are primarily focused on fighting independent
unions to gain a monopoly on representing workers in collective bargaining
with employers.

• The organization's ineffectiveness is exemplified by the tepid response of

organized labor to the severe deterioration in labor and social conditions in
the 1990s.

• Unions are weak due to workers' dependency on enterprises for social

benefits and guaranteed employment, and the close relationship between
the leadership of FITUR and government authorities.

• State leaders express disquiet at the poorly organized FITUR, fearing that
labor grievances could spread and destabilize the state in a crisis.New
Sectors of Interest

New Associations in Russia's Civil Society

• Professional and occupational groups like bankers, political consultants,

realtors, and mayors have formed associations to seek favorable policies or
set professional standards.

• Environmental groups, women’s organizations, human rights activists, and

cause-oriented groups have also formed.

• Automobile owners have formed organizations to protest the abuse of

privileges by VIPs.

• The rise of social media and diversity of social interests have enabled
organizations to arise.

• Interest organizations tend to favor the better educated and connected.

• The Putin regime's support for a strong civil society has made it
increasingly difficult for associations to operate freely.
The Dominant Party Regime

Political Parties and Interest Aggregation in Russia

• Political parties are crucial for interest aggregation, pooling societal

demands into policy choices.

• In Russia, the party system has shifted from aggregating interests to

mobilizing public and political elite support for incumbent rulers.

• The party system lacks meaningful policy choices and accountability for
political officials.

• A dominant party regime emerged in the 2000s, with the United Russia
party dominating.

• The Putin regime suppressed political competition and built a single

dominant party to represent its interests.

• A party reflecting the interests of the ruling elite is a "party of power."

• The Kremlin controls other parties, determining their political roles.

• The Kremlin uses United Russia and other parties to secure control over the
State Duma and regional legislatures, channel political competition, and
manage politicians' careers.

Elections and Party Development

Partylist Voting Results Since 1993

• Parties categorized into five: democratic, leftist, centrist, nationalist, and

parties of power.

• Distribution of seats in the Duma following 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011
elections.
• United Russia's dominant position due to strategic electoral engineering.

• Tightened party registration rules, increased representation threshold, all-

PR Duma, and deputies' faction-free exits.

• Increased use of electoral fraud for United Russia's victory.

• Evolution from weakly supported to authoritarian dominant party system.

From a Multiparty System to a Dominant Party Regime

Multiparty System Development in Soviet and Russian Republic

• Democratically oriented politicians defeated Communist Party officials in

the 1989 and 1990 elections.

• These factions formed legislative caucuses in parliament, fighting with

Communist, nationalist, and agrarian groups.

• These factions became the nuclei of political parties in the December 1993
parliamentary election.

Polarization and the Party System

• Electoral contests in the late 1980s and early 1990s were aligned around
two poles: one associated with Yeltsin and the forces pushing for democracy
and a market economy, and the other fighting to preserve the old system
based on state ownership and control of the economy.

• Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s nationalistic Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

(LDPR) offered an alternative to both the democrats and the Communists.

• The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) is the main anchor
of the left (statist and socialist) pole of the spectrum.
Potential Fragmentation of Parties

• Several parties, including Yabloko, have had their fortunes dramatically fall
since the 1990s.

• Most parties had shallow roots and tended to spring up shortly before
elections.

Building the Party of Power

• In the 1999 election, a group of Kremlin strategists formed a movement

called Unity to create an electoral bloc for government officials throughout
the country.

• The movement won 23 percent of the partylist vote in December.

The Presidential Election of 2000

• The presidential election of 2000 occurred ahead of schedule due to

President Yeltsin’s early resignation.

• Putin capitalized on his popularity and the country’s desire for continuity.

• His strategy worked brilliantly, winning an outright majority in the first

round.

Under Putin's Rule: The 2003 and 2004 Elections

Under Putin's Rule

• The ideological divide between Communists and Democrats nearly

vanished, with the political arena dominated by the president and his
supporters.

• The pro-Putin party, Unity, was renamed United Russia after absorbing a
rival party, Fatherland.

• United Russia monopolized the party spectrum, squeezing other parties to

the margins.

• The Kremlin pressured regional governors and big business to support

United Russia.

United Russia's Dominance

• United Russia won 38% of the party-list vote and two-thirds of the seats in
the Duma in the 2003 parliamentary election.

• The Communists lost almost half their vote share, and the democrats did
even worse.

• For the first time, none of the democratic parties won seats on the party-
list vote.

United Russia's Reelection

• In the March 2004 election, Putin won easily with 71.3 percent of the vote,
while his Communist rival received less than 14%.

• The 2007 Duma election confirmed United Russia's dominance, with Putin
declaring he would head the party's list.
• The authorities used various methods to manipulate the election, including
unequal media access and outright falsification of results.

Violations in the 2008 Presidential Election

• The authorities violated numerous election laws to guarantee the desired

outcomes, disqualifying opposition candidates, pouring money from the state
budget into Medvedev’s campaign, giving Medvedev disproportionate media
coverage, and ignoring legal challenges over election law violations.

2011–2012 Election Cycle in Russia

• The December 2011 parliamentary election saw the same four parties
enter parliament, with United Russia's official vote share falling slightly.

• The presidential team that controlled it remained secure, with widespread

election fraud used to achieve their desired results.

• In the 2012 presidential race, Putin, Ziuganov, Zhirinovsky, Sergei Mironov,

and billionaire Mikhail Prokhorov were on the ballot.

• The authorities used large-scale fraud to ensure the outcome, with civic
activists documenting and recording numerous cases of election fraud.

• Protests were held around the country after both the December 2011
Duma election and the March 2012 presidential election, with the largest
demonstration in Moscow in early February 2012 drawing close to 100,000
participants.

• Since the first half of 2012, the protest movement has subsided, with
authorities stepping up pressure on opposition forces and rallying
conservative support for the regime.
• Members of the Putin team hold the party in low esteem, with some
building up an alternative movement called the "All-Russian Popular Front."

• The authorities appear to be wedded to the model of a dominant party

regime, with the goal of making United Russia broadly appealing to all social
strata.

• United Russia does especially well among more conservative elements of

the population, such as older people, less educated people, those with lower
incomes, and women.

• The party's support comes from its identification with Putin and the desire
for stability, with relatively shallow roots in society.

Russia and the Resource Curse

Post-Communist Transition in Russia: Economic Reforms and

Privatization

Transition from Planned Economy

• Post-communist Russia had to restructure its political and economic

institutions.

• The transition to a market economy created opportunities and hardships

for many.

• Democratization exposed the political system to groups seeking exclusive

economic benefits.

• Many people lost their modest livelihoods due to inflation and

unemployment.
• Some exploited opportunities for entrepreneurship or government
connections to amass fortunes.

Stabilization and Privatization

• Russia pursued two major economic reforms in the early 1990s:

macroeconomic stabilization and privatization.

• Stabilization, or shock therapy, aimed to stop the country's financial

meltdown by slashing government spending and squeezing the money
supply.

• These reforms were not fully implemented due to exploitative practices by

those who benefited from the early steps to open the economy and privatize
state assets.

From Communism to Capitalism

• Communist systems made economic transitions more difficult due to the

economic growth model followed by Stalin and his successors.

• The Soviet Union's heavy commitment to military production and the

country's vast size made the task of reform in Russia more complicated.

Economic Stabilization Program

• The program began on January 2, 1992, with the government abolishing

most controls on prices, raising taxes, and cutting government spending.

• Opposition to the program began, with economists and politicians taking

sides.
• The program led to a sharp loss in purchasing power, hunger, bank
savings, and a protracted slump in the economy.

Privatization

• The program transferred legal title of state firms to private owners, with
every Russian citizen receiving a voucher with a face value of 10,000 rubles.

• By June 30, 1994, some 40 million citizens had become share owners, but
these shares were often of no value.

• The next phase of privatization auctioned off most remaining shares of

state enterprises for cash, leading to scandalous deals and defaults on loans.

Russian Social Conditions and Economic Impact

Living Standards and Income Inequality

• Living standards in Russia fell sharply in the 1990s due to unemployment,

lagging income, and nonpayment of wages and pensions.

• Income inequality grew sharply during the economic decline in the 1990s
and during the economic recovery in the 2000s.

• Factors contributing to income inequality include lag of wage increases

behind price inflation, sharp rise in unemployment, deterioration of pension
and social assistance systems, and concentration of wealth in a small
number of people.

• In the 2000s, poverty has decreased, unemployment, and pension levels

have risen, but inequality continues due to large wage disparities, high
earnings of managers in industries like energy and finance, different growth
rates of different regions, the shift to a flat income tax, and abolition of
estate taxes.
Concerns and Concerns

• The current level of income inequality and the absence of a growing middle
class are concerning to Russian leaders.

• President Putin declared the current level of income inequality as

“absolutely unacceptable” and called for measures to expand the middle
class.

• The demographic crisis poses a grave threat to national security due to the
growing shortage of labor in some regions and the army’s inability to recruit
enough healthy young men.

Requirements for Self-Sustainable Economic Growth

• A complete overhaul of the relationship of the state to the economy is

required to stimulate growth.

• The postcommunist state must set clear rules for economic activity,
regulate markets, enforce the law, supply public goods and services, and
promote competition.

• The state budget structure reflects the legacy of the communist system,
with a significant portion of the budget going to social programs and
supporting other economic interests.

• Russia has created a “stabilization fund” to cover deficits as revenues

dropped and social spending obligations rose during the 2008 financial crisis.

Toward the Rule of law?

Gorbachev's Law-Governed State Reforms

• Aimed to make the Soviet Union a law-governed state.

• Since 1991, Russian leaders assert the state must respect law over politics,
even when violating the constitution.

• The struggle for rule of law began before Gorbachev, with Stalin's
successors ending mass terror and reducing law use for political repression.

• Despite reforms in the 1990s, the Communist Party and KGB still used legal
procedures for political repression.

• In the 2000s, political control over the legal system has increased.

Obstacles to the Rule of Law in Russia

• The rule of law is hindered by political abuse of the law, corruption in the
courts and law enforcement system, and the wide discretion granted to the
security police.

• The post-Soviet state's security police operate autonomously, with the

Federal Security Service (FSB) being the main domestic security agency.
Despite changes, no personnel purge has been conducted, and no member
or collaborator with the Soviet-era security services has been prosecuted for
violating citizens’ rights.

• The security police still demonstrate a Soviet-style preoccupation with

policing the country’s political life, such as shutting down Internet providers
and media outlets for publishing “extremist” content.

• President Putin resumed the practice of using the legal system to suppress
potential political opposition, such as legal maneuvers against independent
media owners in the early 2000s.

• State companies use civil and criminal laws to force private companies to
sell out at a bargain price to be taken over and their assets stripped.
• Endemic corruption has increased substantially after the Soviet period,
affecting both everyday life and dealings with the state.

• Law enforcement, healthcare, education, and government registration

offices are considered the worst offenders.

• Legislation requiring officials to publish declarations of their income and

property has had little effect in reducing corruption.

• Corruption imposes a severe drag on economic development and is tied to

organized crime, which bribes government officials for protection and drives
out legal businesses.

• The key is for the political leadership to make a serious effort to combat
corruption and to back up this commitment with institutional reform and
sustained attention to the problem.

• Reforms such as the adoption of trial by jury and the creation of the
Constitutional Court have the potential to strengthen the judiciary’s
independence from political pressure and corruption.

Russia and the International Community

Russia’s thousand-year history of expansion, war, and state domination of

society has left behind a legacy of Russia's history of expansion, war, and
state domination has left a legacy of autocratic rule and a preoccupation
with defending national borders. The collapse of the Soviet regime required
Russia to rebuild its political institutions, economic system, national identity,
and relations with the outside world. State propaganda used the image of an
international struggle between capitalism and socialism to justify its
repressive control over society and its enormous military establishment.
Now, the country's leaders recognize that only through strong ties with the
world economy can Russia hope to prosper, while also wanting to maintain
strong controls over the political system to preserve stability and prevent
threats to their power.
Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin all asserted that the integration of Russia into
the community of developed democracies is strategically important for
Russia. They agreed to allow Communist regimes to fall throughout Eastern
Europe for improved relations with the West, accept the admission of East
European states into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a necessary
condition for close relations with the United States and Europe, and
emphasize Russia's admission to the World Trade Organization as critical for
Russia's long-term economic success.

However, Russia has not accepted the constraints of international law and
has expanded its military presence in several former Soviet republics,
pressuring them to become satellites of Russia. In 2008, Russia launched a
well-prepared military invasion of independent, pro-Western Georgia, aiming
to subjugate Georgia to Russia's interest in preserving a buffer of
subordinate states in the territory of the former Soviet Union.

Russia's vast territory, weak government capacity, and tradition of state

domination over society make it likely that the primary objective of its
leaders for the foreseeable future will be to strengthen the state, both in its
internal and international dimensions. The end of the Communist regime and
the dissolution of the Soviet Union damaged the state's capacity to enforce
laws, protect citizens, and provide basic social services. In the long run, self-
sustaining economic development will require the rule of law and effective
institutions for articulating and aggregating social interests.