Chapter 11

Politics in Russia
—Thomas F. Remington

Learning Objectives
11.1 Discuss the challenges of Russia’s “resource 11.6 Describe avenues of direct and indirect
curse” and of the country’s changing participation in Russian politics.
demographics, along with the three main 11.7 Discuss the formation and activities of interest
obstacles to their resolution. groups in post-Soviet Russia, with specific
11.2 Briefly describe Russia’s political history, examples.
from its tsarist roots to the transitions of the 11.8 Examine the rise of the “party of power” in
twentieth century. recent elections.
11.3 Describe the powers of the Russian president in 11.9 Describe the interplay between political and
relation to the other branches of government. economic restructuring in contemporary
11.4 Discuss the contradictions within Russia’s current Russia.
political culture, focusing on the conflict between 11.10 Briefly describe the route and obstacles to the
democratic and traditional Soviet values. rule of law in Russia.
11.5 Explain the roles of propaganda, the 11.11 Discuss Russia’s conflicted international
educational system, the church, and the media relations.
in political socialization in Russia.

On May 7, 2012, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin took the oath typical, however, of “competitive authoritarian regimes.”1 These
of office as president of the Russian Federation. Putin had al- are regimes in which the rulers hold elections that allow opposi-
ready served two terms as president from 2000 to 2008 (see tion forces to run candidates but not to defeat the incumbents.
Box 11.1) He had then stepped aside—formally complying From the standpoint of the Putin team, a controlled election serves
with the constitutional prohibition against serving more than several purposes: It lets the authorities keep an eye on the op-
two terms in succession—to serve a four-year term as prime position, it gives the public some opportunity to vote for alternative
minister while Dmitry Anatolyevich Medvedev occupied the parties, and it leaves the power of the ruling elite intact. An uncon-
presidency. The farcical nature of the proceedings was rein- trolled election creates the risk of an internal split within the political
forced by the fact that upon reassuming the presidency, he elite, as has happened in some other post-Soviet states.2 Putin
immediately named Medvedev as his prime minister. Cynical was intent on preserving political stability in the transfer of power
Russians recognized that Putin and Medvedev were simply in Russia while presenting the facade of a free election. Although
trading offices (they called it a “castling move,” as in chess). In Putin probably won an outright majority on the first ballot, con-
the meantime, everyone understood that the real location of siderable fraud was used to pad his total. The Central Electoral
power had never changed—Putin had been the top leader the Commission reported that Putin won with 63.6 percent of the
whole time. The country went through the formal motions of an vote; the true total was probably in the range of 50 to 55 percent.3
election each time, but the elections were closely controlled, During the four-year interim period when Medvedev was
and considerable fraud was used to guarantee the outcomes. president and Putin was prime minister, Putin remained in charge.
Why would the Putin regime go to the trouble of pretending Some expected some rivalry between the two, but none arose.
to hold a competitive election only to manipulate the outcome Medvedev loyally played the part assigned to him, although he
so visibly? The logic seems puzzling to many outsiders. It is did attempt to launch policy initiatives of his own. That Putin

299
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Box 11.1
Vladimir Putin
Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin was born on October 7, 1952, Yeltsin resigned, making Putin acting president. Putin ran for
in Leningrad (called St. Petersburg since 1991). In 1970, he the presidency and, on March 26, 2000, won with an outright
entered Leningrad State University and specialized in civil law. majority of the votes. He ran again in 2004 and won, stepped
Upon graduation in 1975, Putin worked for the KGB and was down from the presidency and served as prime minister with
first assigned to counterintelligence and then to the foreign Dmitry Medvedev as president from 2008 to 2012, and then
intelligence division. Proficient in the German language, he was returned to the presidency in 2012.
sent to East Germany in 1985. In 1990, after the Berlin Wall fell, Putin cultivates the image of a tough, decisive, down-to-
Putin went back to Leningrad, working at the university but in earth leader. Generally unemotional and mild-mannered, he
the employ of the KGB. When a former professor of his, Anatolii occasionally allows himself to indulge in sarcastic or profane
Sobchak, became mayor of Leningrad in 1991, he went to work language to make a point. At other times, he projects an affable,
for Sobchak. relaxed demeanor. He is often shown in active, outdoors settings.
In 1996, Putin took a position in Boris Yeltsin’s presidential Putin is self-possessed and guarded in dealing with others.
administration. He rose rapidly. In 1998, Yeltsin named Putin Although he appears uncomfortable with the give and take of
head of the FSB (the Federal Security Service—successor to public politics, he is adept at handling live call-in programs where
the KGB) and, in March 1999, secretary of the Security Council. ordinary citizens can pose their questions and complaints. He is
In August 1999, Yeltsin appointed Putin prime minister. Thanks skillful at explaining complex issues in clear and plain language.
to his decisive handling of the military operation in Chechnya, Foreign business and political leaders who have met with him
Putin’s popularity ratings soared. On December 31, 1999, come away impressed at his mastery of policy detail.

was still superior to Medvedev in fact, while formally subordinate Russia’s fortunes rise and fall with world oil prices.
to him, vividly illustrates the gap between formal and informal During the first two terms of Putin’s presidency, Russia
power in Russia. Formally, the president has enormous power. enjoyed high and steady economic growth rates. Part of
In Medvedev’s case, however, he could not exercise it because this was due to confidence in Putin’s leadership. A more
of the solid grip Putin retained over the informal centers of po- important reason, however, was that world oil prices
litical power in the country—security and law enforcement agen- started increasing significantly and stayed high until
cies, major state business firms, regional governments, and the 2008. As a major exporter of oil, gas, and other natural
media. Medvedev might conceivably have tried to use his formal resources, Russia benefited from this trend: Real incomes
powers as president to build up an independent power base, but tripled from 2000 to 2008. The decade of recovery in the
he chose not to try. Putin was justified in trusting that Medvedev 2000s followed a harsh decade of economic contraction
would remain loyal. The regime remained stable, therefore, and social dislocation in the 1990s following the painful
across the succession from Putin to Medvedev, and then from transition from the socialist economic system to a market-
Medvedev to Putin. The tight control over leadership succes- oriented capitalist system. Russia benefited from open-
sion, however, deprived the regime of the benefits of leadership ing its economy up to the world, as capital investment
accountability and renewal that democratic systems enjoy. This entered the country and raw materials exports brought in
deep preoccupation with stability therefore reinforces the tenden- immense incomes.
cies toward rigidity and stagnation in the political system. Russia’s dependence on revenues from natural resource
exports had a steep downside, however, when the world-
wide financial crash struck in 2008. Capital fled the coun-

Current Policy Challenges try (the stock market lost two-thirds of its value in less than
one year), and highly indebted Russian firms struggled to
11.1 Discuss the challenges of Russia’s “resource meet their obligations. As world oil and gas prices tumbled
to one-third of their peak level, Russian budget revenues
curse” and of the country’s changing
plummeted, and the federal budget fell into a deep deficit.
demographics, along with the three main
Consumer demand dropped, hurting Russian manufac-
obstacles to their resolution. turers. Russia’s economy contracted more than that of any
The greatest policy challenge for Russia is the need to re- other major power—its gross domestic product (GDP) fell
duce its dependence on natural resource exports. Even almost 8 percent in 2009 alone and only began to recover
President Putin himself repeatedly makes this point. slowly in 2010. Financial reserves that the government had
 Politics in Russia 301

set aside during the boom years of the 2000s spared the seen a substantial outflow of population to regions with
country many of the worst effects of the recession. The gov- warmer climates, jeopardizing the sustainability of some
ernment pumped hundreds of billions of rubles into failing of the remote cities built in Soviet times. High barriers to
banks, industrial enterprises, unemployment benefits, and geographic mobility, such as large distances, high trans-
pensions. As a result, many Russians were shielded from portation costs, and an illiquid housing market, reinforce
poverty, and the country was spared massive financial in- the enormous differences in living standards across re-
stability. However, following a brief recovery in 2010–2012, gions. Some regions are thriving, while others are mired
growth again fell in 2013 and turned negative in 2015. The in deep poverty and stagnation.
drop in world oil and gas prices coupled with Western eco- But while Russian leaders have acknowledged the
nomic sanctions over the annexation of Crimea have hit the gravity of the problems facing the country, they have
economy hard. been unable to break through the obstacles standing in
Russian leaders and experts are well aware of the the way of solving them. Three in particular have proven
dangers of the “resource curse” for Russia. This is the to be stumbling blocks: the resistance by state officials
idea that in countries relying on windfall revenues from to any reforms that weaken their power; the vast physi-
natural resources, the leaders avoid investing in the skills cal size of the country, which impedes efforts to control
and knowledge of the population. As a result, such soci- and coordinate bureaucratic activity; and the legacy of
eties wind up with lower levels of economic and politi- the Soviet development model, which concentrated re-
cal development than in resource-poor countries. Oil-rich sources in giant state-owned enterprises—often located
states in the Middle East are often cited as examples. in remote, harsh regions—that are nearly impossible to
Yet although President Putin and his government fre- convert into competitive capitalist firms viable in a global
quently call for more diversification and innovation in marketplace. Taken together, these factors stack the deck
the economy, it is apparent that they lack effective policy against political and economic reform.
instruments to bring it about. This illustrates a recurring
dilemma in Russian history: Major reform requires an
enormous and sustained exercise of power by the coun-
try’s political leaders to overcome the resistance of ad- Historical Legacies
ministrative and social groups to change. To accomplish
11.2 Briefly describe Russia’s political history, from
their goals, modernizing rulers have commonly resorted
to centralizing power in their own hands, undermining its tsarist roots to the transitions of the twentieth
the incentives for entrepreneurial initiatives outside the century.
state that could drive sustained growth. Despite the radical changes in the form of Russia’s politi-
In a widely discussed article published in September cal regime at the beginning of the 20th century, when the
2009, then-President Medvedev denounced Russia’s Russian Revolution brought the communists to power,
current economic structure as “primitive” for its de- and again at the end of the 20th century, when the com-
pendence on natural resource production, its “chronic munist regime fell and gave way to the present one, there
corruption, the outdated habit of relying on the state to are some deeper continuities in the patterns and methods
solve our problems, on foreign countries, on some sort of rule.
of ‘all-powerful doctrine,’ on anything and everything
except on ourselves.” He noted that “the energy effi-
ciency and labor productivity of most of our enterprises The Tsarist Regime
are shamefully low” and added that the real tragedy was The Russian state traces its origins to the princely state
that most owners, managers, and state officials do not that arose around Kiev (today the capital of indepen-
appear to be particularly worried about the situation.4 dent Ukraine) in the ninth century. For nearly a thou-
As tough as his words were, though, Medvedev found sand years, the Russian state was autocratic. That is, it
himself powerless to do anything more than to deplore was ruled by a hereditary monarch whose power was
these problems. unlimited by any constitutional constraints. Only in the
Another serious policy challenge lies in the demo- first decade of the twentieth century did the Russian
graphic crisis facing Russia. In most years since the end tsar agree to grant a constitution calling for an elected
of the Soviet regime, deaths have outnumbered births. legislature—and even then, the tsar soon dissolved the
In-migration (especially from Central Asia) partly offsets legislature and clawed back most of the constitutional
natural population loss, but has brought other difficul- concessions he had made.
ties. Life expectancy at birth is very low, particularly for In addition to autocracy, the historical legacy of
males, although it has risen in the past ten years (male Russian statehood includes lasting strains of absolutism,
life expectancy is sixty-five, about the same as in India patrimonialism, and Orthodox Christianity. Absolutism
or Pakistan). Regions in the Far North and Far East have means that the tsar aspired to wield absolute power over
302 Chapter 11

the subjects of the realm. Patrimonialism refers to the source of authority. The doctrines that rulers should be
idea that the ruler treated his realm as property that he accountable to the ruled and that sovereignty resides in
owned, rather than as an autonomous community with the will of the people were alien to Russian state tradi-
its own legitimate rights and interests.5 This concept of tion. Throughout Russian history, state and society have
power continues to influence state rulers today. Finally, been more distant from each other than they have been
the tsarist state identified itself with the Russian Orthodox in Western societies. Rulers and populace regarded one
Church. In Russia, as in other countries where it is a dom- another with mistrust. This gap has been overcome at
inant religious tradition, the Orthodox Church ties itself times of great national trials, such as the war against
closely to the state, considering itself a national church. Napoleon and later World War II. Russia celebrated vic-
Traditionally, it has exhorted its adherents to show loy- tory in those wars as a triumphant demonstration of the
alty to the state in worldly matters, in return for which unity of state and people. But Russia’s political traditions
it has sought a monopoly of spiritual power. This legacy also include a yearning for equality, solidarity, and com-
is still manifest in the present-day rulers’ efforts to call munity, as well as for moral purity and sympathy for the
upon the church to bless their rule and reinforce the so- downtrodden. And throughout the Russian heritage runs
cial fabric, as well as in many Russians’ impulse to iden- a deep strain of pride in the greatness of the country and
tify their state with a higher spiritual mission. the endurance of its people.
Absolutism, patrimonialism, and orthodoxy have
been recurring elements of Russian political culture, The Communist Revolution and
tending to reinforce deeply conservative and col-
lectivist patterns of behavior in state and society. But the Soviet Order
alternative patterns have been influential as well. At The tsarist regime proved unable to cope with the over-
particular points in Russian history, the country’s rul- whelming demands of national mobilization during
ers have sought to modernize its economy and society. World War I. Tsar Nicholas II abdicated in February
Russia imported Western practices in technology, law, 1917 (March 1917, by the Western calendar). He was re-
state organization, and education in order to make the placed by a short-lived provisional government, which,
state competitive with other great powers. Modernizing in turn, fell when the Russian Communists—Bolsheviks,
rulers—such as Peter the Great (who ruled from 1682 to as they called themselves—took power in October 1917
1725) and Catherine the Great (from 1762 to 1796)—had (November, by the Western calendar). Their aim was
a powerful impact on Russian society, bringing it closer to create a socialist society in Russia and, eventually, to
to Western European models. The imperative of build- spread revolutionary socialism throughout the world.
ing Russia’s military and economic potential was all Socialism, the Russian Communist Party believed, meant
the more pressing because of Russia’s constant expan- a society without private ownership of the means of pro-
sion through conquest and annexation of neighboring duction, one where the state owned and controlled all im-
territories and its ever-present need to defend its bor- portant economic assets and where political power was
ders. The state’s role in controlling and mobilizing soci- exercised in the name of the working people. Vladimir
ety rose with the need to govern a vast territory. By the Ilyich Lenin was the leader of the Russian Communist
end of the seventeenth century, Russia was territorially Party and the first head of the Soviet Russian govern-
the largest state in the world. But for most of its history, ment. (Figure 11.1 lists the Soviet and post-Soviet leaders
Russia’s imperial reach exceeded its actual grasp. since 1917.)
Compared with other major powers of Europe, Under Lenin’s rule, the Communist Party controlled
Russia’s economic institutions remained backward well all levels of government. At each level of the territorial
into the twentieth century. However, the trajectory of its hierarchy of the country, full-time Communist Party
development, especially in the nineteenth century, was officials supervised government. At the top, final power
toward that of a modern industrial society. By the time to decide policy rested in the Communist Party of the
the tsarist order fell in 1917, Russia had a large industrial Soviet Union (CPSU) Politburo. Under Joseph Stalin,
sector, although it was concentrated in a few cities. The who took power after Lenin’s death in 1924, power was
middle class was greatly outnumbered by the vast and even further centralized. Stalin instituted a totalitarian
impoverished peasantry and the radicalized industrial regime intent on building up Russia’s industrial and
working class. As a result, the social basis for a peace- military might. His regime used mass terror to intimi-
ful democratic transition was too weak to prevent the date and control the country. The state survived the ter-
Communists from seizing power in 1917. rible test of World War II, ultimately pushing back the
The thousand-year tsarist era left a contradictory invading German army all the way to Berlin. The USSR
legacy. The tsars attempted to legitimate their absolute imposed communist rule on all the Eastern European re-
power by appealing to tradition, empire, and divine right. gimes its army occupied. The combined cost of war and
They treated law as an instrument of rule, rather than a terror under Stalin was staggering. The institutions of
 Politics in Russia 303

rule that Stalin left behind when he died in 1953 eventu-

Figure 11.1 Timeline of Russian Rulers ally crippled the Soviet state. They included personalistic
Since 1917
rule, insecurity for rulers and ruled alike, heavy reliance
Gorbachev was the last Soviet leader; on the secret police, and a militarized economy. Stalin’s
Yeltsin was the first leader of post-Soviet successors could not reform the system without under-
Russia.
mining Communist rule itself. Stalin’s successor, Nikita
Khrushchev, loosened some of the harsh controls and re-
duced the level of political repression, but was unable to
accomplish fundamental reform. His successor, Leonid
1917–1924 Vladimir Lenin
Brezhnev, abandoned the impulse for reform and instead
concentrated on consolidating power. As a result, the po-
litical system and economy stagnated and the fundamen-
tal weaknesses of the system mounted.
The problem of the late Soviet system was that, as
1924–1953 Joseph Stalin vast as the state’s powers were, their use was frustrated
by bureaucratic immobilism. Overcentralization un-
dermined the leaders’ actual power to enact significant
policy change—or even to recognize when serious policy
change was needed. The center’s ability to coordinate
1953–1964 Nikita Khrushchev bureaucratic agencies in order to execute its initiatives
was frequently undermined by tacit resistance to the
center’s orders by officials at lower levels, distortions in
the flow of information up and down the hierarchy, and
the force of inertia. Bureaucratic officials were generally
Leonid Brezhnev
more devoted to protecting and advancing their own
1964–1982
personal and career interests than to serving the public
interest. The political system of the Soviet Union was
top-heavy, unresponsive, and corrupt. The regime had
1982–1984 Yuri Andropov more than enough power to crush any political opposi-
tion. However, it was unable to modernize the economy
1984–1985 Konstantin Chernenko or improve living standards for the population. By the
early 1980s, the economy had stopped growing, and the
country was unable to compete militarily or economi-
cally with the West.
1985–1991 Mikhail Gorbachev
After the deaths of three elderly leaders—Brezhnev,
Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko—in quick
succession in 1982, 1984, and 1985, respectively, the rul-
ing party Politburo turned to a vigorous young (54-year-
old) reformer named Mikhail Gorbachev to lead the
1991–1999 Boris Yeltsin country. Gorbachev quickly grasped the levers of power
that the system granted him as general secretary of the
CPSU. He moved both to strengthen his own political
base and to carry out a program of reform.6 Emphasizing
the need for greater openness—glasnost—in society,
2000–2008 Vladimir Putin Gorbachev stressed that the ultimate test of the party’s
effectiveness lay in improving the economic well-being
of the country and its people. Gorbachev not only called
for political democratization but also legalized private
enterprise for individual and cooperative businesses and
2008–2012 Dmitrii Medvedev
encouraged them to fill the many gaps in the economy
left by the inefficiency of the state sector. He welcomed
2012– Vladimir Putin the explosion of new informal social and political asso-
ciations. He made major concessions to the United States
in the sphere of arms control, which resulted in a treaty
304 Chapter 11

that, for the first time in history, called for the destruction Gorbachev had underestimated the strength of his
of entire classes of nuclear missiles. opposition. On August 19, 1991, a conspiracy of senior
Gorbachev railroaded his proposals for democ- officials placed Gorbachev under house arrest and seized
ratization through the legislature. In 1989 and 1990, power. In response, thousands of citizens in Moscow
Gorbachev’s plan for free elections and a working parlia- and St. Petersburg rallied to protest the coup attempt.
ment was realized as elections were held and new depu- The coup collapsed on the third day, but Gorbachev’s
ties were elected at the center and in every region and power had been fatally weakened. Neither the union
locality. When nearly half a million coal miners went on nor the Russian power structures heeded his commands.
strike in the summer of 1989, Gorbachev declared him- Through the fall of 1991, the Russian government took
self sympathetic to their demands. over the union government, ministry by ministry. In
Gorbachev’s radicalism received its most dramatic November 1991, President Yeltsin issued a decree for-
confirmation through the astonishing developments of mally outlawing the CPSU. In December, Yeltsin and
1989 in Eastern Europe. All the regimes making up the the leaders of Ukraine and Belarus formally declared
Communist bloc collapsed and gave way to multiparty the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics dissolved. On
parliamentary regimes in virtually bloodless popular December 25, 1991, Gorbachev resigned as president and
revolutions. The Soviet Union stood by and supported turned the powers of his office over to Boris Yeltsin. On
the revolutions. The overnight dismantling of commu- New Year’s Day, 1992, the Soviet flag was hauled down
nism in Eastern Europe meant that the elaborate struc- over the Kremlin, and the white, blue, and red flag of
ture of party ties, police cooperation, economic trade, independent Russia was raised in its place.
and military alliance that had developed in Eastern
Europe after World War II vanished. Divided Germany
was allowed to reunite. Political Institutions of the
In the Soviet Union itself, the Communist Party Transition Period: Russia 1990–1993
faced a critical loss of authority. The newly elected gov-
ernments of the national republics making up the Soviet Boris Yeltsin was elected president of the Russian
state one by one declared that they were sovereign. The Federation in June 1991. Unlike Gorbachev, Yeltsin was
three Baltic republics declared their intention to secede elected in a direct, competitive election, which gave him
from the union. Between 1989 and 1990, throughout the a considerable advantage in mobilizing public support
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Communist Party rule against Gorbachev and the central Soviet Union govern-
crumbled. ment (see Box 11.2).
Like Gorbachev before him, Yeltsin demanded ex-
traordinary powers from parliament to cope with the
Political Institutions of the country’s economic problems. Following the August 1991
Transition Period: Demise coup attempt, parliament granted him emergency decree
powers to cope with the economic crisis. Yeltsin formed
of the Soviet Union a government led by a group of young, Western-oriented
Gorbachev’s reforms had consequences he did not intend. reformers determined to carry out a decisive economic
The 1990 elections of deputies to the supreme soviets in transformation. The new government’s economic pro-
all fifteen republics and to local soviets stimulated popu- gram took effect on January 2, 1992. Their first results
lar nationalist and democratic movements in most re- were felt immediately, as prices skyrocketed. Quickly,
publics. In the core republic of Russia itself, Gorbachev’s many politicians began to distance themselves from the
rival, Boris Yeltsin, was elected chairman of the Russian program: Even Yeltsin’s vice president denounced the
Supreme Soviet in June 1990. As chief of state in the program as “economic genocide.” Throughout 1992,
Russian Republic, Yeltsin was well positioned to challenge opposition to the reforms grew stronger and more intran-
Gorbachev for preeminence. sigent. Increasingly, the political confrontation between
Yeltsin’s rise forced Gorbachev to alter his strat- Yeltsin and the reformers on the one side and the oppo-
egy. Beginning in March 1991, Gorbachev sought terms sition to radical economic reform on the other became
for a new federal or confederal union that would be centered in the two branches of government. President
acceptable to Yeltsin and the Russian leadership, as Yeltsin demanded broad powers to carry out the reforms,
well as to the leaders of the other republics. In April but parliament refused to go along. In March 1993, an
1991, he reached an agreement on the outlines of a opposition motion to remove the president through
new treaty of union with nine of the fifteen republics, impeachment nearly passed in the parliament.
including Russia. A weak central government would On September 21, 1993, Yeltsin dissolved the parlia-
manage basic coordinating functions. But the republics ment by decree and called for elections for a new par-
would gain the power to control the economies of their liament. Yeltsin’s enemies barricaded themselves inside
territories. the parliament building. After a ten-day standoff, the
 Politics in Russia 305

Box 11.2
Boris Yeltsin: Russia’s First President
Boris Yeltsin, born in 1931, graduated from the Urals Polytechnic Yeltsin’s last years in office were notable for his lengthy spells
Institute in 1955 with a diploma in civil engineering, and worked of illness and for the carousel of prime ministerial appointments.
for a long time in construction. From 1976 to 1985, he served The entourage of family members and advisors around him
as first secretary of the Sverdlovsk oblast (provincial) Communist seemed to exercise undue influence over him. Yet, infirm as he
Party organization. was, he judged that Russia’s interests and his own would be safe
Early in 1986, Yeltsin became first secretary of the in Vladimir Putin’s hands. Yeltsin’s resignation speech expressed
Moscow city party organization, but he was removed in contrition for his failure to bring a better life to Russians. After
1987 for speaking out against Mikhail Gorbachev. Positioning retiring, Yeltsin stayed out of the public eye. He died of heart failure
himself as a victim of the party establishment, Yeltsin made a on April 23, 2007, and was buried in Moscow with full honors.
remarkable political comeback. In the 1989 elections to the Yeltsin’s legacy is mixed. He was most effective when
Congress of People’s Deputies, he won a Moscow at-large engaged in political battle, whether he was fighting for supremacy
seat, with almost 90 percent of the vote. The following year, against Gorbachev or fighting against the Communists. He was
he was elected to the Russian Republic’s parliament, with gifted with exceptionally keen political intuition. He regarded
over 80!percent of the vote. He was then elected its chairman economic reform as an instrument in his political war with
in June 1990. In 1991, he was elected president of Russia, the Communist opposition and used privatization to make it
receiving 57 percent of the vote. Thus he won three major impossible for any future rulers to return to state socialism.
races in three successive years. He was reelected as president Imperious and willful, he also regarded the adoption of the 1993
in 1996 in a dramatic, come-from-behind race against the constitution as a major achievement and accepted the limits on
leader of the Communist Party. his presidential power that it imposed.

dissidents joined with some loosely organized para- understandings as by the explicit provisions of the con-
military units outside the building and attacked the stitution, it is important to understand the formal struc-
Moscow mayor’s offices adjacent to the Russian White tures of government. The constitution embodies some
House. They even called on their followers to “seize the formally democratic principles together with a good deal
Kremlin.” Finally, the army agreed to back Yeltsin and of ambiguity about how they are to operate in practice.
suppress the uprising by force, shelling the parliament
building in the process.
The violence of October 1993 cast a shadow over The Presidency
subsequent events. Yeltsin’s decree meant that national Yeltsin’s constitution combined elements of presiden-
elections were to be held for a legislature that, constitu- tialism and parliamentarism. (See Figure 11.2 for a sche-
tionally speaking, did not exist, since the new constitu- matic overview of the Russian constitutional structure.)
tion establishing these institutions was to be voted on Although it provided for the separation of the executive,
in a referendum held in parallel with the parliamentary legislative, and judicial branches and for a federal divi-
elections. Yet for all the turmoil, the constitution ap- sion of power between the central and regional levels of
proved in the December 1993 referendum has remained government, it made the presidency by far the strongest
in force ever since.7 institution in the state. The president is directly elected
for a six-year term and may not serve more than two con-
secutive terms. The president names the prime minister
to head the government. The government must have the
The Contemporary confidence of parliament to remain in power. Although
the constitution does not call the president the head of
Constitutional Order the executive branch, he is so, in fact, by virtue of his
power to appoint the prime minister and the rest of the
11.3 Describe the powers of the Russian president in
government and his right to issue presidential decrees
relation to the other branches of government.
that have the force of law. (The decree power is some-
Although the exercise of political power in Russia what limited in that decrees may not violate existing law
is guided at least as much by unwritten norms and and can be superseded by legislation.)
306 Chapter 11

Figure 11.2 Structure of Russian Government

The three branches of government and the three tiers of the state make up the Russian government.

President appoints judges to higher courts;

Federation Council confirms appointments
President
President
supervises
Federal Constitutional
Supreme Court
Presidential Assembly Court
Government
administration (State Duma
and
President appoints Federation
prime minister and Council)
President Lower-level
appoints government; State federal courts
Duma confirms
Presidential appointment Commercial
representatives to (arbitrazh)
8 federal districts courts
Presidential
President appoints
representatives
governors Supreme Court adjudicates
supervise
disputes referred from lower federal
governors
and commercial courts
Regional
Regional governors
legislatures

Voters elect Voters elect deputies to State Duma

regional legislatures Voters elect president (lower house of Federal Assembly;
regional governors and legislatures
select members of Federation Council)
VOTERS

Since the 1993 constitution was approved, some in- independent action. Its ability to exercise its rights,
formal practices have come to govern the exercise of cen- however, depends on the composition of political forces
tral power. For example, the president and government represented in parliament and the cohesiveness of the
divide executive responsibility. The government, headed majority. Parliament’s approval is required for any bill
by the prime minister, is primarily responsible for eco- to become law. The State Duma (the lower house of
nomic and social policy. The president directly oversees parliament) must confirm the president’s nominee for
the ministries and agencies concerned with the armed prime minister. If, after three successive votes, the Duma
forces, law enforcement, and state security—the “force refuses to confirm the nomination, the president must
ministries.” These include the Foreign Ministry, Defense dissolve the Duma and call new elections. Likewise, the
Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs (which controls Duma may vote to deny confidence in the government.
the regular police and security troops), Federal Security If a motion of no confidence carries twice, the president
Service (FSB—formerly the KGB), and several other secu- must either dissolve parliament or dismiss the govern-
rity and intelligence agencies. The president and his staff ment. During Yeltsin’s tenure as president, the Duma
set overall policy in the foreign and domestic domains, was able to block some of Yeltsin’s legislative initiatives.
and the government develops the specific proposals and Since 2003, however, it has largely been a rubber stamp.
rules carrying out this policy. In practice, the government The constitution allows for a variety of types of relation-
answers to the president, not to parliament. The usual ships among the president, government, and parliament,
pattern is for the government’s base of support to be the depending on the degree to which the president domi-
president, rather than a particular coalition of parties in nates the political system.
parliament. In addition to these powers, the president has a
Despite the pronounced presidential tilt to the number of other formal and informal powers in his con-
system, the parliament does have some potential for stitutional capacity as “head of state,” “guarantor of the
 Politics in Russia 307

constitution,” and commander-in-chief of the armed forces. government is not directly determined by the party com-
He oversees a large presidential administration, which su- position of the parliament. Indeed, there is scarcely any
pervises the federal government and keeps tabs on regional relationship between the distribution of party forces in
governments. Informally, the administration also manages the Duma and the political balance of the government.
relations with the parliament, the courts, big business, the Nearly all members of the government are career man-
media, political parties, and major interest groups. agers and administrators, rather than party politicians.
The president also oversees many official and quasi- Overall, the government is not a party government, but
official supervisory and advisory commissions, which reflects the president’s calculations about how to weigh
he creates and directs using his decree power. One is considerations such as personal loyalty, professional
the Security Council, which is chaired by the president. competence, and the relative strength of major bureau-
Besides the president, the Security Council consists of a cratic factions in selecting Cabinet ministers. Although
permanent secretary, the heads of the power ministries there is recurrent discussion of the idea that the party that
and other security-related agencies, the prime minister, forms the majority in the Duma should have the right to
and the chairs of the two chambers of parliament. Its name the head of the government, no president has been
powers are broad, but shadowy. Putin has selectively willing to agree to institute this arrangement—no doubt
used it to formulate policy proposals not only in matters out of fear that it would reduce his freedom of action in
of foreign and defense policy but also on issues having governing. Under President Putin, the head of govern-
to do with the organization of the executive branch, and ment is distinctly subordinate to the president.
even to speak out on issues of public morality.8
Another prominent advisory body is the State The Parliament
Council, which comprises the heads of the regional gov-
ernments and thus parallels the Federation Council. Still The parliament—called the Federal Assembly—is bicam-
another is the Public Chamber, which is made up of 168 eral. The lower house is called the State Duma, and the
members from selected civic, professional, artistic, and upper house, the Federation Council. Legislation origi-
other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Its pur- nates in the Duma. As Figure 11.3 shows, upon passage
pose is to deliberate on matters of public policy, make in the State Duma, a bill goes to the Federation Council
recommendations to parliament and the government for consideration. The Federation Council can only pass
on pending policy issues, and link civil society with the it, reject it, or propose the formation of an agreement
state. Like the State Council, it is a quasi-parliamentary commission (consisting of members of both houses)
deliberative body that the president can consult at will. to iron out differences. If the Duma rejects the upper
All three bodies duplicate some of the deliberative and house’s proposed changes, it can override the Federation
representative functions of parliament—and therefore Council by a two-thirds vote and send the bill directly to
weaken parliament’s role. They illustrate the tendency, the president for his signature.
under both Yeltsin and Putin, for the president to create When the bill has cleared parliament, it goes to the
and dissolve new structures answering directly to the president. If the president refuses to sign the bill, it returns
president. These improvised structures can be politically to the Duma. The Duma may pass an amended version
useful for the president as counterweights to constitu- that incorporates the president’s objections by a simple
tionally mandated bodies (such as parliament), as well as absolute majority. Alternatively, it may try to override the
providing policy advice and feedback. They help ensure president’s veto, for which a two-thirds vote is required.
that the president is always the dominant institution in The Federation Council must then also approve the bill by
the political system, but they undermine the authority of a simple majority if the president’s amendments are ac-
other constitutional structures, such as parliament. cepted or by a two-thirds vote if it chooses to override the
president. On rare occasions—and never since 2000—the
Duma has overridden the president’s veto; it has over-
The Government ridden the Federation Council more frequently. In other
The government refers to the senior echelon of policy lead- cases, the Duma has passed bills rejected by the president
ership in the executive branch and consists of the prime after accepting the president’s proposed amendments.
minister, a number of deputy prime ministers, and the The president’s control over the Duma has been so firm
heads of ministries and state agencies. It is charged with since 2003 that disagreements between president and par-
formulating the main lines of national policy (especially liament are rare and minor.
in the economic and social realms) and overseeing their Before 2007 and again since 2016, the Duma’s 450
implementation. (The president oversees the formulation members were equally divided between deputies elected
and execution of foreign and national security policy.) In by plurality vote in 225 single-member districts and 225
this respect, the government corresponds to the Cabinet deputies elected through proportional representation
in Western parliamentary systems. But in contrast to (PR) in a single national electoral district. A party receiv-
most parliamentary systems, the makeup of the Russian ing at least 5 percent of the vote on the party-list ballot
308 Chapter 11

Figure 11.3 The Legislative Process: How a Bill Becomes a Law

The Legislative Process:

Three Readings

Council of the Duma

Committee prepares
First Reading schedules bill for second
bill for second reading
reading on the floor

The Duma debates the draft law After a bill has passed first reading, After the committee has completed
and considers whether to adopt it it returns to the responsible committee, its work, it reports the bill back to
as a basis for further consideration. which receives and debates amendments. the Council of the Duma, which
Passage in the first reading moves It prepares lists of amendments schedules it for the second reading
the item to the next step. recommended for adoption and for rejection. before the full Duma.

Federation Council
Second reading Third reading

President
The Duma debates the bill Normally, the vote on the bill in
and amendments and votes. third reading is a formality. After passage,
If it passes, the committee If the Federation Council passes the
the bill goes to the Federation Council.
prepares it for the third reading. bill, it goes to the president for his
If it is defeated, the committee signature.
reworks it for a new vote in
second reading.

was entitled to a share of the party-list seats in the Duma Since United Russia deputies vote with iron discipline,
equal to its share of the party-list vote. Votes cast for the Duma gives President Putin unquestioning support
parties that fail to clear the barrier are redistributed to even on unpopular legislation. Other factions have very
the winning parties. The 2007 and 2011 Duma elections little opportunity to influence the agenda, let alone affect
were run under an all-PR system—all 450 deputies were the outcomes of legislative deliberation. United Russia’s
elected proportionally from party lists in a single nation- control over the agenda and floor voting has turned the
wide district, with the threshold for winning seats set at Duma into a rubber stamp for the executive branch. But
7 percent.9 In 2013, at Putin’s urging, the Duma voted to if there are divisions within the government over a piece
return to the old half-and-half system, with a 5 percent of legislation, these are often carried over into the Duma
threshold for party representation starting with the 2016 as different branches of the government haggle over the
election. The frequent tinkering with the electoral law re- final version of a bill. Thus, the Duma is an extension of
flects the authorities’ habit of manipulating institutions intragovernmental bureaucratic politics.10
for short-term political gain. Each deputy is assigned to one of the standing legisla-
The parties clearing the electoral threshold form fac- tive committees. Bills submitted to the Duma are assigned
tions (fraktsii) in the Duma. According to Duma rules, to committees according to their subject matter. The com-
deputies may not switch faction membership (those who mittees collect and review proposed amendments before
are expelled from their faction lose their seats). Faction reporting out the bills for votes by the full chamber with
leaders are represented in the governing body of the the committee’s recommendations. Bills pass through
Duma, the Council of the Duma. Factions are the main three voting stages, with the third a formal ratification of
vehicle of political discussion in the Duma and give the amendments adopted at the second reading.
members a channel for influencing legislation. The Federation Council is designed as an instrument
The September 2016 Duma election gave the United of federalism in that (as in the U.S. Senate) every constitu-
Russia party a commanding three-quarters majority ent unit of the federation is served by two representatives.
in the Duma (see Figure 11.6), which is enough to pass Thus, the populations of small ethnic-national territories
constitutional legislation as well as ordinary legislation. are greatly overrepresented compared with more populous
 Politics in Russia 309

regions. The Federation Council has important formal a Duma in which the United Russia party faction holds
powers. Besides acting on bills passed by the lower house, over three-quarters of the seats.
it approves presidential nominees for high courts, such as Although the level of voting discipline within the
the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court. It must majority party is similar to that in a Westminster-style
approve presidential decrees declaring martial law or a parliament, as is the practice of reliably supporting
state of emergency and any acts altering the boundaries the government’s initiatives, the relationship between
of territorial units. It must consider any legislation dealing the Duma and the government is quite different. In a
with taxes, budget, financial policy, treaties, customs, and Westminster-type setting, parliament and government
declarations of war. The constitution also stipulates, how- have mutually offsetting powers. If a government loses
ever, that one of the two Federation Council members in its majority in parliament, it must face the voters in a new
each region must represent the legislative branch, and the election. Majority members of parliament would prefer
other must represent the executive branch. Finding a way to hold onto their seats as long as possible, and thus will
to reconcile this requirement with the principle of electing vote for the government’s proposals so as to avoid a par-
representatives directly has proven difficult. liamentary dissolution and new election. By the same
The procedure for choosing members of the token, the government is usually unwilling to face a re-
Federation Council has been changed a number of times. volt on the floor of parliament and the possible loss of its
President Putin pushed through a reform in the spring majority. Thus, the government and the members of the
of 2000 under which the Federation Council’s members majority party need each other. In Russia, the parliamen-
were formally named by the governor and regional leg- tary deputies have almost no political resources outside
islature of each territorial subject. In 2012, the procedure the dominant party, United Russia, which is controlled
was changed again, so that each regional legislature by the presidential administration and government. The
would elect one of its members to serve as a member of parliamentary deputies in the party cannot counterbal-
the Federation Council from the legislative branch while ance the executive. A deputy who defies party disci-
the executive branch’s representative would be chosen pline can be expelled (and lose his or her seat), and so
by the governor from candidates that he or she identified has very few alternatives. If, in the future, a major shift
before being elected. In addition, the president gained in the alignment of political forces in society occurred,
the right to name a small number of members directly. In however, it could lead to a different relationship between
practice, regardless of the formal procedure, since Putin executive and legislative power.
took power, the president has had the final say over all
decisions on who would hold seats in the chamber.
The Judiciary and Law Enforcement
Executive–Legislative Relations The major institutional actors in the legal system are the
procuracy, the courts (judiciary), and the bar. Each has un-
Relations between the president and parliament during
dergone substantial change in the postcommunist period.
the 1990s were often stormy. The first two Dumas, elected
in 1993 and in 1995, were dominated by the Communist THE PROCURACY Russia’s legal system traditionally
Party and other leftist factions hostile to President Yeltsin vested a great deal of power in the procuracy, which
and the policies of his government. This was particularly is considered to be the most prestigious branch of the
true in areas of economic policy and privatization. On legal system. The procuracy is comparable to the system
other issues, such as matters concerning federal relations, of federal and state prosecuting attorneys in the United
the Duma and president often reached agreement— States, but has more wide-ranging responsibilities and is
sometimes over the opposition of the Federation Council, organized as a centralized hierarchy headed by the proc-
whose members fought to protect regional prerogatives. urator-general. The procuracy is charged with fighting
The 1999 election produced a Duma with a pro- crime, corruption, and abuses of power in the bureau-
government majority. President Putin and his govern- cracy. It seeks to ensure that all state officials and public
ment built a reliable base of support in the Duma from organizations observe the law. It investigates criminal
a coalition of four centrist political factions. The 2003 charges and prosecutes cases in court. The procuracy
election gave the president a still wider margin of sup- has traditionally been the principal check on abuses of
port in the Duma and an overwhelming majority for the power by state officials. But it is inadequately equipped
United Russia party—which meant that the president to meet the sweeping responsibilities assigned to it,
no longer had to expend much effort in bargaining with because of the difficulty of effectively supervising the
the Duma to win its support for his policies. Likewise, vast state bureaucracy. Although the procuracy is nomi-
the Fifth Duma, elected in December 2007, and the Sixth, nally independent of the executive, the president names
elected in December 2011, were also dominated by the the procurator-general (subject to confirmation by the
United Russia party and gave loyal support to the Federation Council) and informally supervises any po-
Putin–Medvedev team. And the 2016 elections returned litically significant cases.
310 Chapter 11

THE JUDICIARY In contrast to the influence that THE BAR Attorneys who represent individual citizens
the procuracy has traditionally wielded in Russia, the and organizations in both criminal and civil matters are
bench has been relatively weak. Trial judges are usu- called advocates (advokaty). They are comparable to bar-
ally the least experienced and lowest-paid members of risters in Great Britain and litigating attorneys in the
the legal profession—and the most vulnerable to ex- United States. Their role has expanded considerably
ternal political and administrative pressure. Although with the spread of the market economy. They enjoy some
state officials pay lip service to the principle of judi- autonomy through their self-governing associations,
cial independence, they often violate it in practice by through which they elect officers and govern admission
instructing judges how to rule in politically sensitive of new practitioners. In recent years, the stature and vis-
cases, a practice known as telephone justice. At the ibility of advocates have risen significantly. Private law
same time, many reforms since the end of communism firms are proliferating. The profession is attractive for the
are intended to make the administration of justice opportunities it provides to earn high incomes. A number
more effective, and some increase the rights of defen- of lawyers have become celebrities by taking on high-
dants in criminal cases. For example, in the 1990s, trial profile cases.
by jury in major criminal cases was introduced in sev-
eral regions on an experimental basis and since then THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT One of the most
has spread throughout the country in serious crimi- important reforms in postcommunist Russia’s legal
nal cases. The goal of adopting the jury system was to system has been the establishment of a court for consti-
make the judicial system more adversarial, so that the tutional review of the official acts of government. The
prosecution and the defense have equal status in the Constitutional Court has the authority to interpret the
courtroom and the judge becomes a neutral arbiter be- constitution in a variety of areas. It has ruled on several
tween them.11 In several high-profile cases, juries have ambiguous questions relating to parliamentary proce-
acquitted defendants when they found the procuracy’s dure. It has overturned some laws passed by national
case unconvincing. republics within Russia and has struck down several
The Russian judiciary is a unitary hierarchy. All provisions of the Russian Criminal Code that limited
courts of general jurisdiction are federal courts. There individual rights. In 2013, it issued a significant ruling
are also other specialized types of courts in addition to allowing individual voters to protest abuses of election
federal courts of general jurisdiction—among them, the law in their precincts (previously, the courts had held
commercial courts (arbitrazhnye sudy), the constitu- that only candidates and parties had the right to appeal
tional courts of the ethnic republics, the local municipal in the case of alleged election fraud). Often, in disputes
courts (equivalent to justices of the peace), and the mili- between individuals and state authorities, the court
tary courts. Most criminal trials are held in district and finds in favor of individuals, thus reaffirming the sphere
city courts of general jurisdiction, which have original of individual legal rights. It has consistently upheld the
jurisdiction in most criminal proceedings. Higher-level sovereignty of the federal constitution over regional
courts, including regional and republic-level courts, governments.
hear appeals from lower courts and have original juris- However, in cases concerning the vast domain of
diction in certain cases. At the pinnacle of the hierarchy presidential authority, the court usually defers to the
of courts of general jurisdiction is the Russian Supreme president. One of its first and most important decisions
Court, which hears cases referred from lower courts and in the 1990s concerned a challenge brought by a group
also issues instructions to lower courts on judicial mat- of Communist parliamentarians to President Yeltsin’s
ters. The Supreme Court does not have the power to decrees launching the war in Chechnya. The court
challenge the constitutionality of laws and other official ruled that the president had the authority to wage
actions of legislative and executive bodies. The consti- the war through the use of his constitutional power to
tution assigns that power to the Constitutional Court. issue decrees with the force of law. In other, less highly
Under the constitution, the judges of the Supreme Court charged issues, the court has established legal limits to
are nominated by the president and confirmed by the the president’s authority. For instance, the court ruled
Federation Council. that Yeltsin could not refuse to sign a law after par-
The commercial (arbitrazh) courts form a separate hier- liament had overridden his veto. Since Putin took of-
archy for civil disputes between firms or between firms and fice in 2000, however, the court has taken care to avoid
the government. The Supreme Court oversees both the com- crossing the president. Nevertheless, even the possibil-
mercial courts and the system of ordinary federal courts. ity that it might exert a measure of independent politi-
The Ministry of Justice oversees the entire court sys- cal influence led Putin to move the seat of the court to
tem and provides for its material and administrative needs. St. Petersburg in 2008. This was probably intended as a
Its influence over the legal system is limited, however, be- means to marginalize it politically by removing it from
cause it lacks any direct authority over the procuracy. the network of powerful elites in Moscow.
 Politics in Russia 311

Central Government and the The mergers also reduced the patronage rights and political
voice that came with an ethnic district’s status as a constitu-
Regions ent unit of the federation.15 Since the initial wave of mergers
Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, many Russians in the mid-2000s, however, no more have followed.
feared that Russia would also dissolve into a patchwork The ethnic republics jealously guard their special
of independent fiefdoms. Certainly, Russia’s territorial in- status. From 1990 to 1992, all the republics adopted dec-
tegrity was subjected to serious strains. Under President larations of sovereignty, and two made attempts to de-
Yeltsin, the central government granted wide autonomy clare full or partial independence from Russia. Only one,
to regional governments in return for political support. however, Chechnya (the Chechen Republic), resorted to
Yeltsin went so far as to sign a series of bilateral treaties arms to back up its claim. Chechnya is one of a belt of
with individual regions to codify the respective rights and predominantly Muslim ethnic republics in the mountain-
responsibilities of the federal government and the given re- ous region of the North Caucasus, between the Black and
gional governments. Under Putin, however, the pendulum Caspian seas. Chechnya’s president declared indepen-
of federal policy swung back sharply toward centralization. dence from Russia in 1991, an act Russia refused to rec-
The demographic factor is one reason Russia did not ognize but did not initially attempt to overturn by force.
break up. Eighty percent of Russia’s population is ethnically When negotiations failed, however, in December 1994,
Russian. None of its ethnic minorities accounts for more Russian forces attacked the republic directly, subjecting
than 4 percent of the total (the Tatars form the largest of the its capital city, Grozny, to devastating bombardment.
ethnic minorities, constituting about 5.3 million of Russia’s This forced tens of thousands of Chechen and Russian
total population of 146 million). Rebuilding national com- residents to flee and led to a protracted, destructive war.
munity in post-Soviet Russia has been helped by Russia’s Fighting ceased in the summer of 1996, but resumed in
thousand-year history of statehood. Yet, until 1991, Russia 1999. Federal forces had established control over most
was never constituted as a nation-state: Under the tsars, it
was a multinational empire, and under Soviet rule, it was
nominally a federal union of socialist republics. State policy
toward nationality has also varied over the centuries. In
some periods, Russia recognized a variety of self-governing
ethnic-national communities and tolerated cultural differ-
ences among them. In other periods, the state pressured
non-Russian groups to assimilate to Russian culture.
Russia was formally established as a federal republic
under the Soviet regime. In contrast to the Soviet Union, of
which it was the largest component, only some of Russia’s
constituent units were ethnic-national territories formally
recognizing and representing particular nationalities.12
The rest were pure administrative subdivisions, populated
mainly by Russians. The non-Russian ethnic-national ter-
ritories were classified by size and status into autonomous
republics, autonomous provinces, and national districts.
In many of them, the indigenous ethnic group constituted
a minority of the population. As of 2016, Russia comprises
eighty-five constituent territorial units, officially termed Vasily Deryugin/ZUMA Press/Newscom
“subjects of the federation.” They represent six different
types of units. Republics, autonomous districts (all but one
of them located within other units), and the one autono-
mous oblast give formal political representation to ethnic
minorities; oblasts (provinces), krais (territories), and three
cities of federal status (Moscow, St. Petersburg and, since
2014, Sevastopol13) are treated as ordinary administrative
subdivisions with no special constitutional status.
One of the centralizing measures President Putin pur-
sued is the merger of smaller ethnic territories into larger
surrounding units. In most of these cases, the smaller ethnic RAMZAN KADYROV, PRESIDENT OF THE CHECHEN
district was impoverished and hoped to attain better living REPUBLIC Kadyrov has established an autocratic, personalistic
standards by becoming part of a consolidated territory.14 form of rule in Chechnya.
312 Chapter 11

parts of Chechnya by early 2000, but Chechen guerrillas power. All twenty-two ethnic republics formally have the
have continued to carry out sporadic ambushes and sui- constitutional right to determine their own form of state
cide attacks against federal units. power so long as their decisions do not contradict federal
In the mid-1990s, a radical fundamentalist form of law. In many cases, the republic leaders have constructed
Islam replaced national independence as the guiding personal power bases around appeals to ethnic solidarity
ideology of the Chechen rebel movement. The guerril- and the cultural autonomy of the indigenous nationality.
las have resorted to terrorist attacks, including suicide Often, they have used this power to establish personalis-
terrorism, against civilian targets both in the North tic dictatorships in their regions. Moscow tolerates such
Caucasus region and in Moscow. One of the most shock- political machines so long as the leaders are loyal and
ing of these incidents was the seizure of a school in the maintain stability.
town of Beslan, near Chechnya, in September 2004 (see President Putin made clear his intention to reassert
Box 11.3). The brutal methods used by federal forces to the federal government’s authority over the regions. The
suppress the uprising have fueled continuing hatred of reform of the Federation Council in 2000 was one step
the federal government on the part of many Chechens, in this direction. Another was Putin’s decree of May 13,
which, in turn, has facilitated recruitment by the ter- 2000, which created seven (later expanded to eight) “fed-
rorists. With time, order in Chechnya has been restored eral districts.” He appointed a special presidential rep-
under the rule of its authoritarian president, Ramzan resentative to each district to monitor the actions of the
Kadyrov. Much of Grozny has been rebuilt. Attacks regional governments within that district. This reform
and reprisals continue to occur occasionally, however, sought to strengthen central control over the activity of
especially in ethnic republics neighboring Chechnya. federal bodies in the regions. Often, in the past, local
And throughout the North Caucasus region, unemploy- branches of federal agencies had fallen under the influ-
ment and social dislocation are severe, creating a favor- ence of powerful governors.
able milieu for religiously inspired violence, which has Still another important centralizing measure was the
sometimes spilled out beyond the borders of the North abolition of direct popular election of governors, includ-
Caucasus and of Russia itself.16 ing the presidents of the ethnic republics. Before 2005,
Chechnya, fortunately, was an exceptional case. For regional chief executives were chosen by direct popular
the other ethnic republics, Moscow reached an accom- election. From 2005 through 2012, however, the president
modation granting the republics a certain amount of appointed governors. Putin clearly hoped that appointed
autonomy in return for acceptance of Russia’s sovereign governors would be more accountable and effective, but

Box 11.3
Beslan
September 1 is the first day of school each year throughout Many of the bombs planted by the terrorists exploded. Ultimately,
Russia. Children, accompanied by their parents, often come about 350 of the hostages died, along with most of the terrorists.
to school bearing flowers for their teachers. A group organized The media covered the events extensively. The Beslan
by the Chechen warlord Shamil Basaev chose September 1, tragedy had an impact on Russian national consciousness
2004, to carry out a horrific attack. A group of heavily armed comparable to that of September 11, 2001, in the United States.
militants stormed a school in the town of Beslan, located in the While there had been a number of previous attacks tied to
republic of North Ossetia, next door to Chechnya. They took Chechen terrorists, none had cost so many innocent lives.
over 1,000 schoolchildren, parents, and teachers hostage. The Putin claimed that the terrorists were part of an international
terrorists crowded the captives into the school gymnasium, movement aimed ultimately at the dismemberment of Russia itself
which they filled with explosives to prevent any rescue attempt. and avoided linking the incident to Russian policy in Chechnya.
The terrorists refused to allow water and food to be brought In response to the crisis, Putin called for measures to reinforce
into the school. Negotiations over the release of the hostages national security. He also demanded increased centralization
failed. of executive power, including an end to the direct election of
On the third day of the siege, something triggered the governors. Most observers assumed that Putin had wanted to
detonation of one of the bombs inside the school. In the chaos make these changes anyway and that the Beslan tragedy simply
that followed, many of the children and adults rushed to escape. gave him a political opening to enact them. Beslan was a tragic
The terrorists fired at them. Federal forces stormed the school, indication that the insurgency that began in Chechnya has spread
trying to rescue the escaping hostages and kill the terrorists. throughout the North Caucasus region.
 Politics in Russia 313

the reform turned out to have disadvantages because the political opposition but tolerates a limited amount of au-
appointed governors often had less political authority in tonomous civic activity so long as it does not interfere
the region than elected ones. As a result, in 2012, Putin with his power. Consistent with the pattern of “competi-
returned the country to a system of direct elections of tive authoritarianism,” Putin’s regime includes elements
governors, but with features ensuring that the president of democracy within a largely authoritarian framework.
can control the outcome of elections and can dismiss an In this system, elections are held regularly, and a tame op-
elected governor. As is so often the case, constitutional position is allowed a small, marginal role, while “extra-
arrangements are adjusted and readjusted by the leaders systemic” (i.e., uncontrolled) opposition is suppressed.
in order to solve short-term political problems. The ruling authorities exercise substantial control over
Below the tier of regional governments are units that television and radio, although they allow greater free-
are supposed to enjoy the right of self-government—munic- dom to the print and Internet media. Business is given
ipalities and other local government units. The right of local wide sway to pursue its economic interests but may not
self-government has been given to a large set of units—such finance a political challenge to the authorities. Civil soci-
as urban and rural districts and small settlements—raising ety organizations can offer policy proposals for debate.
the total number of local self-governing units to 22,000. In But elections are not a means for deciding who governs
principle, local self-government is supposed to permit sub- or what policies government will pursue: The ruling
stantial policymaking autonomy in the spheres of housing, authorities rarely allow elections to produce unplanned
utilities, and social services (and to reduce the federal gov- results. Moreover, corruption is rampant, and the state
ernment’s burden in providing such services). However, bureaucracy remains inefficient and poorly controlled.
the law provides no fixed, independent sources of revenue The centralization of power in the 2000s was more effec-
for these local entities. They thus depend for the great tive at pushing political opposition to the sidelines than
majority of their budget revenues on the regional govern- at giving the authorities an effective way to control the
ments. For their part, the regional governments resist allow- bureaucracy.
ing local governments to exercise any significant powers of Yeltsin and Putin used presidential power very dif-
their own. In many cases, the mayors of the capital cities of ferently without changing the formal rules of the consti-
regions are political rivals of the governors of the regions. tution. Yeltsin ruled erratically and impulsively, but he
Moscow and St. Petersburg are exceptional cases because respected certain limits on his power: He did not sup-
they have the status of federal territorial subjects, like re- press media criticism, and he tolerated political opposi-
publics and regions. Elsewhere, city governments must tion.17 Faced with an opposition-led parliament, Yeltsin
bargain with their superior regional governments for shares was willing to compromise with his opponents to enact
of power. Moreover, the centralizing trend of the 2000s has legislation. However, Yeltsin grew dependent on a small
extended to local government as more and more localities group of favored oligarchs (business magnates with
have replaced elected mayors with appointed mayors or strong connections to government) for support and al-
city managers. lowed them to accumulate massive fortunes and insider
Russia’s postcommunist constitutional arrange- influence. Likewise, Yeltsin allowed regional bosses to
ments allow considerable room for the arbitrary exercise flout federal authority with impunity because he found
of power. Both Yeltsin and Putin interpreted their presi- it less costly to accommodate them than to fight them.
dential mandates broadly, and although President Putin The loss of state capacity under Yeltsin illustrates one
repeatedly calls for adherence to the rule of law, he has danger of an overcentralized political system: When the
also continued the practice of relying heavily on informal president does not effectively command the office, power
powers. Executives at lower levels, particularly in the re- drifts to other centers of power.
gions, take similarly expansive views of their powers. But Putin’s presidency illustrates the opposite danger.
while Russia remains a long way from the ideal of the rule When Putin took over, he undertook to reverse the
of law, the postcommunist regime has allowed far more breakdown of political control and responsibility in the
open competition and consultation among organized so- state. Although publicly he called for a system based
cial groups than did the communist regime. The limits of on respect for the rule of law, he restored authoritarian
allowable debate and criticism are wider than in the Soviet methods. And especially since his return to the presi-
era, and there is far more open articulation and aggrega- dency in 2012, he has cracked down harshly on political
tion of interests. At the same time, any organized political opposition. For example, in spring 2013, the procuracy
opposition to the regime is likely to meet with political re- and tax authorities conducted a sweeping inspection of
pression. Moreover, since Putin returned to the presidency NGOs. Some organizations receiving foreign funding—
in 2012, repression of opposition groups has increased. including human rights groups as well as respected
The actual operation of the constitutional arrange- public opinion research organizations—were accused
ments originally established after the end of the com- of engaging in unauthorized political activity and re-
munist regime depends on the balance of power in state quired to reregister as “foreign agents” under the new
and society. President Putin has eviscerated organized and more repressive law on NGOs. Citing vague laws
314 Chapter 11

prohibiting extremist activity and violations of admin- important; freedoms such as the right to vote for compet-
istrative requirements, the government periodically ing political parties or to participate in political demon-
harasses, prosecutes, or closes down civic organizations strations were named by only 13 percent and 10 percent,
it considers threatening. respectively.20 Forty-six percent named the freedom to
choose their job as being important to them personally,
but only 30 percent named freedom of religion as per-

Russian Political Culture sonally important, while 38 percent named the free-
dom to acquire property, such as real estate and a car, as

in the Post-Soviet Period important.

This pragmatic view of democracy helps explain
why many Russians praise Putin for strengthening
11.4 Discuss the contradictions within Russia’s
democracy. Far from seeing “freedom” and “order”
current political culture, focusing on the conflict
as necessary enemies, many recognize that freedom
between democratic and traditional Soviet
is only possible in an ordered society. But if forced to
values. choose between freedom and order, Russians divide
Russian political culture is the product of centuries of rather evenly. Based on extensive public opinion sur-
autocratic rule, war and terror in the twentieth cen- veys, political scientist Henry Hale says that Russians
tury, rapid but uneven improvement of educational support “delegative democracy.” That is, they want a
and living standards, exposure to Western standards strong leader who has a great deal of power to deal
of political life, and regime control over education and with the country’s problems, but who can be removed,
communications. The resulting contemporary political is elected, and respects the rights of the opposition.21
culture is a contradictory bundle of values: A persis- But as Hale points out, Russians do not have such a
tent core belief in democratic principles in the abstract leader, because Putin has systematically eliminated
is accompanied by a firm belief in the importance of a constraints on his power.
strong state and a deep mistrust of most actual state We can understand these competing influences on
institutions. Around three-quarters of the population Russian political culture when we consider the long-
think that Russia should be a democratic country.18 term forces shaping it, as well as the impact of recent
Majorities also say that party competition and elections history.
are beneficial in theory. At the same time, most accept The reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990s raised
that the state requires firm guidance by a capable pres- expectations that Russia would enjoy a significant rise in
ident and give Putin credit for restoring order to the living standards once it got rid of communism. The sharp
state. About as many people think Western-style de- fall in living standards that followed the collapse of the old
mocracy would be best for Russia as think that return- regime dispelled any notion that changing that political
ing to a Soviet-style system would be best (28 percent and economic system could turn the country around over-
vs. 27 percent).19 Both short-term and long-term influ- night. Russians also widely hold that Russia must adopt a
ences shape Russians’ views about politics. distinctive form of government in view of its history.
Generally, Russians judge political regimes accord- Russians also tend to believe that political order is
ing to their ability to provide stability, prosperity, and fragile and that the outside world is hostile, a view that
security. Many Russians cannot forgive Gorbachev and the authorities have worked hard to promote. Russians
Yeltsin for pursuing policies that led to the breakup have long been taught that a weakening of the internal
of the Soviet state, widespread poverty, the amassing cohesion of the state invites predation from outside pow-
of great wealth by a few individuals using unscrupu- ers, and many episodes of Russian history bear out this
lous methods, and the loss of status as a great world belief. The Putin leadership regards popular uprisings
power. Some even believe that the ideals of democracy against dictatorships as invitations to disorder, violence,
and the market economy represent misguided or mali- and even civil war. Many Russians agree. Asked in 2015
cious efforts to remold Russia along Western lines. The what they fear most for the country, Russians most often
restoration of the Russian state’s power and prestige, cited war, civil war, and inter-ethnic conflict as the top
therefore, is a criterion for judging the worth of the po- three threats after inflation.22
litical regime. Surveys also show that citizens have little faith in
Democracy is also assessed by its ability to benefit most present-day political institutions, although, as
individuals materially. Asked in a recent survey what Figure 11.4 shows, they have a good deal of confidence in
freedoms were most important to them personally, over the president and churches. Confidence in elective bod-
half the respondents named the “freedom to be protected ies such as the parliament is low, and lowest of all is con-
by the state in case of illness, loss of work, or poverty” fidence in political parties. The great majority of Russians
and the “freedom to purchase what I want” as the most believe that they are not protected from arbitrary
 Politics in Russia 315

Figure 11.4 Political Trust

President Putin and the Russian Orthodox Church are the most highly trusted institutions.

Russia: Trust in Institutions, September 2013

President
Church, religious organizations
Army
State Security Organs
Regional government
Federal government
Local government
Procuracy
State Duma
Mass media
Council of the Federation
Courts
Trade Unions
Police
Political parties

0 20 40 60
Percent expressing full trust

Source: Data from Levada Center, http://archive.is/tsYcV#selection-353.0-2538.0, accessed August 23, 2016.

treatment by the state: Only a quarter of the population because it has improved economic well-being, and, in
say that they feel any sense of protection from abuse at any case, they see little prospect for changing it.24
the hands of the police, courts, tax authorities, and other Surveys also reveal considerable continuity with the
state structures.23 past in support of the idea that the state should ensure
The concern with the strength of the state is also re- society’s prosperity and the citizens’ material security.
flected in popular perceptions of Putin’s achievements as About half the population would prefer an economy
president. Asked what Vladimir Putin has accomplished based on state planning and distribution, whereas only
as president, the respondents gave highest marks to his 36 percent would prefer one based on private property.25
efforts to restore the country’s international stature and More so than citizens of Western Europe or the United
internal order (see Figure 11.5). States, Russians believe that the state is responsible for
The political culture thus combines contradictory providing a just moral and social order, with justice
elements. Russians do value democratic rights, but being understood more as social equality than as equal-
experience has taught them that under the banner of ity before the law. This pattern reflects the lasting influ-
democracy, politicians can abuse their power to the ence of traditional conceptions of state and society on
detriment of the integrity of the state and the well- Russian political culture. Still, few would support the
being of society. Russians also feel powerless to affect reestablishment of Soviet rule or a reversion to a military
state policy. Little wonder that a leader such as Putin dictatorship.
can command such widespread support despite the Political culture is also shaped by slower-acting but
general mistrust Russians have for the post-Soviet po- more lasting influences, including the succession of gener-
litical institutions. Russians see him as restoring order ations, rising educational levels, digital communications
following a protracted period of social and political technologies, and exposure to the outside world. These
breakdown. As Richard Rose and his colleagues argue, changes are mutually reinforcing, as new generations of
the reason Russians generally approve of the Putin re- young people are exposed to fundamentally different in-
gime is not because they consider it to be ideal, but fluences than those shaping their parents’ generation.
316 Chapter 11

Figure 11.5 Putin’s Achievements

The public associates Putin’s presidency with strengthening the military, improving Russia’s status in the world
as a great power, and developing the economy.

Putin’s main achievement in Russian public opinion

July 2016

Improving combat readiness

and reform of armed forces
Strengthening Russia’s international positions

Economic development of the country

Bringing order to the country,
supporting political calm
I don’t see any achievements

Hard to say
Higher standard of living of citizens,
growth of pay and pensions
Solving the Chechen problem
Raising hopes for a fast improvement of
conditions in the country
Fighting corruption, bribery

Eliminating the danger of terrorism in the country

Cracking down on the “oligarchs,”
limiting their influence
Other

Improving relations of Russia with the West

Fighting crime

Cooperation with countries of the CIS

Improving relations among people of different
nationalities in Russia
Improving morality and ethics in the country

Defending democracy and political freedoms of citizens

Creatings favorable conditions for the development
of private business

0 5 10 15
Percent citing achievement

Source: Data from Levada Center, http://www.levada.ru/2016/08/08/vladimir-putin-vospriyatie-i-doverie/, accessed August 24, 2016.

Political Socialization production—feudalism, capitalism, socialism, and so

forth—determines the structure of values and beliefs
prevalent in the society. The idea was that the ruling class
11.5 Explain the roles of propaganda, the educational
in each society determines the basic ideology of the so-
system, the church, and the media in political
ciety. Therefore, Soviet propaganda and indoctrination
socialization in Russia. emphasized that Soviet citizens were part of a world-
The Soviet regime devoted enormous effort to political wide working-class movement to overthrow capitalism
indoctrination and propaganda. The regime controlled and replace it with socialism, in which there would be
the content of school curricula, mass media, popu- no private property. Needing to knit together a highly di-
lar culture, political education, and nearly every other verse multinational state, the Soviet regime downplayed
channel by which values and attitudes were formed. national feeling and replaced it with a sense of patriotic
The heart of Soviet doctrine was the Marxist belief loyalty to the Soviet state and to the working class’s in-
that the way in which a society organizes economic terests in the worldwide class struggle.
 Politics in Russia 317

Today, the ideological content of Russian education For example, the regime’s leaders and church leaders
has changed significantly, and there is much less overt regularly denounce the West for tolerating same-sex rela-
political control over the formation of attitudes and val- tions. A law prohibiting “propaganda of nontraditional
ues. In place of the idea of the class struggle and the inter- sexual relations” was enacted in 2013 and another aimed
national solidarity of the working class, textbooks stress at prohibiting “any public expression of nontraditional
love for the Russian national heritage and patriotic loy- sexual relations” was introduced to the Duma in 2015.
alty to the state. Historical figures who in the Communist Such laws are widely supported by the public and allow
era were honored as heroes of the struggle of ordinary the Putin regime to associate itself with traditional social
people against feudal or capitalist masters are now held values and to attack liberalism and the West.
up as great representatives of Russia’s national culture.26 In the 1990s, the regime generally respected media
Patriotism and national pride are the key elements of the freedom. Under Putin, the authorities moved to set limits
regime’s effort to create a new sense of national commu- on the media (particularly television), but did not insti-
nity within the country’s post-Soviet state boundaries. tute an elaborate political socialization system such as
The authorities are trying to impose a more consis- that employed by the Soviet state. Nevertheless, the au-
tent and uniform understanding of Russia’s past in the thorities have used the media to build support for their
schools. Putin has urged development of a single, agreed- foreign and domestic policies. The overall political line
upon history textbook for schools that would present a under Putin has been that Russia is rejecting both totali-
coherent conception of the tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet tarian communism and unbridled oligarchic capitalism,
periods. It would emphasize the importance of the state and is restoring the best traditions of Russia’s political
in defending Russia from its enemies outside and inside history. They praise democracy in general terms but in-
and, rather than repudiating the Soviet past, build pride sist that Russia must implement it in its own way.
in the achievements of the Russian people in every era. Control over the media system is stratified. Television
Liberals object that the textbook will foster authoritarian reaches almost everyone and is by far the most important
values. source of news for the population.28 Accordingly, it is
The authorities have also turned to the Orthodox subjected to the tightest political control by the authori-
Church as an aid in political socialization. They regard ties, who give the editors of the main broadcast programs
the church as a valuable ally in building patriotism, na- regular guidance on what to cover and what not to cover.
tional pride, and ethical values. The church, in turn, seeks Print media are allowed much more freedom, but they
to protect its traditional status as Russia’s state church, reach a far smaller audience, so they are of less immedi-
enabling it to block other Christian denominations from ate concern to the authorities. Nationally oriented busi-
proselytizing in Russia. The church would like a wider ness newspapers, such as Kommersant and Vedomosti,
role, but the regime has been careful to acknowledge the carry in-depth articles on public affairs, often publishing
rights of other religions that have had long-established editorials quite critical of the government. For the most
followings in Russia (Muslims, Buddhists, and Jews) part, regional newspapers are closely controlled by the
and not to turn the Orthodox Church into a state church. regional governments.
Recently, a new course was introduced into the fourth- The Internet has remained relatively free of direct
and fifth-grade curricula of schools, called “fundamen- control, but increasingly, the authorities are imposing
tals of religious culture and ethics.” Parents may choose restrictions on service providers.29 Internet use has risen
among six different versions of the course, depending very rapidly. Over half the adult population goes online
on which textbook is used: Orthodox Christian, Muslim, daily. Social media sites, including platforms that com-
Buddhist, or Jewish, or one on world religions, or one on bine blogging with social networking, are extremely pop-
secular ethics. According to the Ministry of Education, by ular, especially among younger urbanites. Social media
far the largest number of requests were for the secular played a crucial role in enabling activists to mobilize
ethics book, and only 20 percent of families requested the large-scale demonstrations against election fraud in late
Orthodox Christian version.27 2011 and early 2012.
The church’s rising influence has prompted a back- The impact of the social media can be seen in the sud-
lash among many intellectuals, who criticize its hostility den fame of particular bloggers. An example is a lawyer
to liberal values (church leaders are deeply opposed to named Aleksei Naval’nyi, who has gained a large online
doctrines of liberal democracy and of human rights). But following by blogging about corruption in government.
many people, whether they are religious or not, also de- When he called the dominant United Russia party “a!party
plore the decay of traditional morals in society and the of thieves and swindlers,” the phrase quickly caught
relentless rise of consumerism and materialism as Russia on. Online searches for the phrase “party of thieves and
opens itself to the global capitalist system. They see the swindlers” immediately returned United Russia’s name.
church, with its long history of partnership with the state, By April 2013, over half the respondents in a national
as a way of restoring traditional moral values in society. survey agreed with the statement that United Russia was
318 Chapter 11

“a party of thieves and swindlers.”30 Naval’nyi ran for differentials in political voice between rich and poor,
mayor of Moscow in 2013 and won a sizable share of the democracy itself is at risk.
vote. The regime has responded by launching a series of
prosecutions against him.31 The regime has also forced
some online publications to close down or censor them- The Importance of Social Capital
selves. Often the regime arranges for a friendly business- A healthy fabric of voluntary associations has long been
person to purchase a major media property in order to recognized as an important component of democracy.
align its editorial policy with the regime. Participation in civic life builds social capital—recipro-
Although the authorities want to set limits on media cal bonds of trust and obligation that facilitate collective
freedom, they have not gone to the lengths of imposing a action among citizens. Where social capital is abundant,
comprehensive system of censorship coupled with politi- people treat one another as equals, rather than as members
cal indoctrination, as the Soviet regime did. Aware of the of social hierarchies. They are more willing to cooperate in
stultifying effects of the old Soviet system of ideological ways that benefit society and improve the quality of gov-
control, the authorities’ strategy is defensive, in that they ernment by sharing the burden of making government ac-
want to limit access to the media by opposition forces. At countable and effective.32 For example, when people feel
the same time, they have sponsored an army of Internet less distance from and mistrust toward government, gov-
“trolls” to respond to any articles or posts critical of Putin ernment and citizens can cooperate in improving the qual-
or the regime. They also instruct the major media out- ity of governance. People are more willing to pay their
lets on how to cover political news and have organized a taxes, so that government has more revenue to spend on
large-scale international propaganda machine to promote public goods—and less ability and less incentive to divert
a favorable image of Russia overseas. Mainstream media it into politicians’ pockets. The success of capitalism and
coverage of domestic and international news is heavily democratic government rests on citizens’ ability to cooper-
slanted in support of the regime’s policy positions. ate for the common good.
Thus, although Russian political socialization is In Russia, however, social capital has historically
much less subject to direct state control than it was in the been sparse compared with Western European societies,
Soviet era, the authorities continue to use schools and and participation in civic activity has been extremely
communications media to build loyalty to the state and limited. Moreover, state and society have generally been
its leaders, confidence in the future, and support for the separated by mutual mistrust and suspicion. State au-
regime’s domestic and foreign policies. At the same time, thorities have usually stood outside and above society, ex-
they work to prevent the media from playing the role of tracting what resources they needed from society but not
an independent watchdog. cultivating ties of obligation to it. The Communist regime
further depleted the stock of social capital by co-opting
associations useful for the state and repressing those that
threatened its interests. Therefore, social capital not only
Political Participation in Russia but also throughout the former Communist bloc
is significantly lower than in other parts of the world.33
11.6 Describe avenues of direct and indirect
The weakness of intermediate associations linking
participation in Russian politics. political elites to ordinary citizens widens the perceived
In a democracy, citizens take part in public life both distance between state and society. Thus, although
through direct forms of political participation (such as Russians turn out to vote in elections in relatively high
voting, canvassing for a candidate, collecting signatures numbers, participation in organized forms of political
for a petition, demonstrating, and talking to officials) and activity is low. Opinion polls show that most people be-
through indirect forms of participation (such as holding lieve that their involvement in political activity is futile,
membership in civic groups and in voluntary associa- and they have little confidence that they can influence
tions). Both kinds of participation influence the quality of government policy through their participation. Although
government. By means of collective action, citizens sig- there was an intense surge in political involvement in the
nal to policymakers what they want government to do. late 1980s and early 1990s when controls over political
Through these channels of participation, activists take on expression and association were lifted, it ebbed substan-
leadership roles. But, despite the legal equality of citizens tially over the 1990s.
in democracies, levels of participation in the population Membership in voluntary associations in contempo-
vary with differences across groups in resources, oppor- rary Russia is extremely low. Only a small proportion of
tunities, and motivations. The better off and the better people—fewer than 8 percent—participate in voluntary
educated are disproportionately involved in political organized public activity.34 Many are purely nominal
life everywhere, but the disproportion is much greater members of associations. For example, the great major-
in some societies than others. And where deep inequal- ity of Russian Orthodox believers are not members of a
ity in the distribution of wealth and income reinforces congregation; they go to church only occasionally. The
 Politics in Russia 319

same is true of trade union members. Most workers adapted themselves to the new circumstances and stayed
are enrolled in trade unions but tend to be inactive as on in various official capacities, the wave of new infor-
members. mal organizations and popular elections brought many
One of the effects of the Putin era has been a de- new people into elite positions. Today, the contemporary
mobilization of large sections of the population from Russian political elite consists of a mixture of career types:
public life. Although a sizable minority of the popula- those who worked their way up through the state bureau-
tion—mainly educated urban groups—is actively in- cracy and those who entered politics through other chan-
terested in politics, most Russians report that they are nels, such as elective politics or business. Occasionally, a
“totally uninterested” in politics (20 percent) or “more local activist will enter politics after working in an NGO,
uninterested than interested” (39 percent).35 Turnout for but such instances are rare.36
the elections to the State Duma has been steadily fall- Some of the old Soviet institutional mechanisms for
ing (from 63.7 in 2007 to 60.1% percent in 2011 to 47.8 recruitment are being restored. In the Communist regime,
percent in 2016). the party maintained schools to train political leaders,
Moreover, Russians prize their right not to participate where rising officials received a combination of manage-
in politics. Today’s low levels of political participation are a ment education and political indoctrination. Today, most
reflection of the low level of confidence in political institu- of those schools serve a similar function as academies for
tions and the widespread view that ordinary people have training civil servants and are overseen by the presidential
little say in government. In the 2003 Duma elections, 4.7 administration. The authorities are working to systematize
percent of the voters expressed their dissatisfaction with the selection and training of officials in order to ensure
the array of choices offered by checking the box marked that a competent and politically reliable cadre is available
“against all” on the party-list ballot. But the authorities for recruitment not only to state bureaucratic positions but
worried that this was too attractive a means of expressing even for management positions in major firms.
disaffection and eliminated the option from later elections. There are two major differences between elite re-
cruitment in the Communist regime and that in the
present. The nomenklatura system of the Soviet regime
Elite Recruitment ensured that in every walk of life, those who held po-
Elite recruitment refers to the institutional processes in a sitions of power and responsibility were approved by
society by which people gain access to positions of influ- the party. They thus formed different sections of a single
ence and responsibility. Elite recruitment is closely tied political elite and owed their positions to their political
to political participation, because it is through participa- loyalty and usefulness. Today, however, there are mul-
tion in community activity that people take on leadership tiple elites (political, business, professional, cultural,
roles, learn civic skills (such as organization and persua- etc.), reflecting the greater degree of pluralism in post-
sion), develop networks of friends and supporters, and Soviet society.
become interested in pursuing political careers. Second, there are multiple channels for recruitment
In the Soviet regime, the link between participa- to today’s political elite. Many of its members come from
tion and elite recruitment was highly formalized. The positions in the federal and regional executive agencies.
Communist Party recruited the population into a vari- Putin has relied heavily on the police (the regular police
ety of officially sponsored organizations—such as the and the security services) and the military as sources of
Communist Party, youth leagues, trade unions, and personnel for his senior-level appointments.37 He also
women’s associations. Through such organizations, the turned to colleagues he had worked with closely in St.
regime identified potential leaders and gave them expe- Petersburg in the 1990s; an example is prime minister
rience in organizing group activity. The party reserved Dmitry Medvedev. Medvedev has worked closely with
the right to approve appointments to any positions that Putin since 1990, when he became an advisor to Putin,
carried high administrative responsibility or were likely who was serving as a deputy to the mayor. Medvedev
to affect the formation of public attitudes. The system for then moved with Putin to Moscow in 1999, when Putin
recruiting, training, and appointing individuals for posi- was made deputy head of the presidential administration
tions of leadership and responsibility in the regime was under Yeltsin. Putin gave him ever broader responsibili-
called the nomenklatura. Those individuals who were ties, first as head of the presidential administration and
approved for the positions on nomenklatura lists were then as first deputy chairman of the government. This
informally called “the nomenklatura.” Many citizens re- pattern of close patron–client relations, where a rising
garded them as the ruling class in Soviet society. politician brings members of his “team” with him each
The democratizing reforms of the late 1980s and early time he moves up the career ladder, is a common feature
1990s made two important changes to the process of elite of elite recruitment in Russia. One effect is to generate
recruitment. First, the old nomenklatura system crumbled competition between rival groups of clients, sometimes
along with other Communist Party controls over society. called “clans.” In Russia’s case, there has been persistent
Second, although most members of the old ruling elites behind-the-scenes rivalry between two such clans, both
320 Chapter 11

composed of associates of Putin. One is rooted in the secu- over society, as well as the sharp disparities in wealth and
rity services, while members of the other, with a slightly power that formed during the transition period. A few or-
more liberal bent, have backgrounds in law or academe. ganizations have considerable influence in policymaking,
In the early years of the transition, many old-guard while other groups have little. The system of interest groups
bureaucrats discovered ways to cash in on their political in Russia reflects elements of all three of the major types
contacts and get rich quickly. Money from the Communist of interest group systems—controlled, neocorporatist, and
Party found its way into the establishment of many new pluralist. However, under Putin, state control has become
business ventures, including several of the first commer- the dominant pattern in regime relations with social groups.
cial banks. Insiders took advantage of their contacts to The Communist regime did not tolerate the open
obtain business licenses, office space, and exclusive con- pursuit of any interests except those authorized by the
tracts with little difficulty. Some bought (at bargain base- state. Interest organizations—such as trade unions, youth
ment prices) controlling interests in state firms that were groups, and professional societies—were closely super-
undergoing privatization—and a few years later, those vised by the Communist Party. Glasnost upset this state-
investors became millionaires. controlled model of interest articulation by setting off an
Today’s business elite still is closely tied to the state, explosion of free expression. This, in turn, prompted new
both because state officials keep business on a short leash groups to form and to make political demands. It is hard
and because business provides material and political ben- today to imagine how profound the impact of glasnost was
efits to officials. In some cases, bureaucratic factions form on Soviet society. Almost overnight, it opened the flood-
around particular enterprises and industries, such as the gates to a growing stream of startling facts, ideas, disclo-
oil and gas industry. Businesses need licenses, permits, sures, reappraisals, scandals, and sensations. In loosening
contracts, exemptions, and other benefits from govern- the party’s controls over communication sufficiently to en-
ment. Political officials, in turn, need financial contribu- courage people to speak and write freely and openly, the
tions to their campaigns, political support, favorable media regime also relinquished the controls that would have en-
coverage, and other benefits that business can provide. The abled it to rein in political expression when it went too far.
close and collusive relations between many businesses and As people voiced their deeply felt demands and griev-
government officials nurture widespread corruption. In ances, others recognized that they shared the same beliefs
the 1990s, a small group of ultrawealthy entrepreneurs— and values and made common cause with them, sometimes
“oligarchs”—took advantage of their links to Yeltsin’s ad- forming new, unofficial organizations. Therefore, one result
ministration to acquire control of some of Russia’s most of glasnost was a wave of participation in “informal”—that
valuable companies. Their rapacity fueled a public back- is, unlicensed and uncontrolled—public associations. When
lash that made it politically viable for Putin to suppress the authorities tried to limit or prohibit such groups, they
some of them and destroy their business empires. In the generated still more frustration and protest. Associations of
meantime, under Putin, a different set of tycoons—some- all sorts formed, including groups dedicated to remembering
times known as “friends of Putin”—benefitted from their the victims of Stalin’s terror, ultranationalists who wanted to
association with Putin to acquire control of important state restore tsarism, and nationalist movements in many repub-
or commercial assets. Typically, they use their insider posi- lics. The explosion of the nuclear reactor at Chernobyl in 1986
tions to accumulate wealth and block competition rather had a tremendous impact in stimulating the formation of en-
than to increase the productivity of their companies.38 vironmental protest, linked closely to nationalist sentiment in
Belarus and Ukraine.39 The late 1980s and early 1990s were
the heyday of interest group pluralism, as Communist Party

Interest Articulation: control over interest articulation crumbled.

The end of the state’s monopoly on productive

Statism, Corporatism, property resulted in the formation of new interests,

among them, those with a stake in the market econ-

and Pluralism omy. Now groups can form to represent a diversity

of interests, compete for access to influence and re-
sources, and define their own agendas. Currently,
11.7 Discuss the formation and activities of interest
there are over 300,000 NGOs on the books, although
groups in post-Soviet Russia, with specific
fewer than 40 percent of these are active.40 However,
examples.
the number of citizens who take part in the activity of
The political and economic changes of the past two decades NGOs is very small; those few who do typically are ac-
in Russia have had a powerful impact on the way social tive in multiple organizations.
interests are organized. A diverse spectrum of interest as- Some NGOs are the successors of recognized associa-
sociations has developed. The pattern of interest articula- tions of the old regime, such as official trade unions. Often,
tion, however, reflects the powerful impact of state control these groups cling to their inherited organizational assets
 Politics in Russia 321

and continue to seek “insider” access to the state. Other globalized economic environment. Under the socialist re-
groups sprang up during the glasnost period or later, but gime, managers were told to fulfill the plan regardless of
must cooperate with local authorities in order to gain ac- cost or quality. Profit was not a relevant consideration.42
cess to meeting places and media attention. All face an in- Now most managers seek to maximize profits and in-
creasingly restrictive political climate under Putin. crease the value of their firms. Although many still de-
Putin’s approach to NGOs has been to combine repres- mand subsidies and protection from the state, more and
sion and co-optation. That is, groups willing to accept politi- more want an environment where laws and contracts are
cal limits on their autonomy have been allowed to operate. enforced by the state, regulation is reasonable and hon-
Groups that seek to preserve their independence from the est, taxes are fair (and low), and barriers to foreign trade
regime find it difficult to survive, especially if their activity are minimized. These changes are visible in the political
involves defending human rights, free elections, and other interests of the association that represents the interests of
causes that the regime considers to be political. New legisla- big business in Russia, the Russian Union of Industrialists
tion requires that groups that accept foreign funding must and Entrepreneurs (RUIE). The RUIE is the single most
register as “foreign agents,” a term that is as pejorative in powerful organized interest group in Russia. Its member-
Russian as it is in English. Several groups that had worked ship comprises both the old state industrial firms (now
to defend human rights and to monitor elections, and mostly private or quasi-private) and new private firms
had received foreign funding, have been threatened with and conglomerates.
prosecution for refusing to declare themselves to be “for- In the early 1990s, the RUIE’s lobbying efforts were
eign agents.” Even the reputable and independent Levada aimed at winning continued state support of industrial
Center for public opinion research—the source of most of firms, but with time, it has become the leading voice of
the survey figures cited in this chapter—has been told to big business in the market system. The RUIE helps broker
reregister as a “foreign agent” because it has done survey agreements between business and labor and is a source
research on contract to foreign companies. of policy advice for government and parliament. All the
The regime has also sought to reward those NGOs major industrial firms belong to the RUIE and do much of
that are willing to play by its rules. The Public Chamber their lobbying through it. Of course, on matters that con-
is a case in point. This is a state-run advisory body whose cern individual firms, firms still seek to influence policy on
members are representatives of regime-friendly NGOs. their own.
The Public Chamber has been careful not to challenge Over time, the RUIE’s role has changed accord-
the regime head-on, but does serve to some extent as a ing to the opportunities and limits set by the state
channel of communication between the public and the authorities. It has expanded its in-house capacity for
authorities. Similar chambers have been created in many working with the government in drafting legislation.
regions. Another clear illustration of co-optation is the On a number of policy issues, such as tax law, pen-
use of “presidential grants” (totaling about $70 million sion policy, bankruptcy legislation, regulation of the
in 2016) for NGOs awarded through an application pro- securities market, and the terms of Russia’s entry to
cess. However, the selection process is not transparent, the World Trade Organization, the RUIE has been ac-
and the bulk of the funds wind up going to Moscow- tive and influential. For the most part, it works behind
based organizations that are close to the Kremlin.41 the scenes to lobby for its interests, but occasionally, if
The system of interest group relations with the it feels its voice has been ignored, it applies pressure
government is not fully corporatist and not fully con- more publicly.
trolled. Elements of pluralism remain. But under Putin, Yet the limits of RUIE’s power as the collective
interest articulation has grown more controlled as the voice of big business are clear. When the Putin regime
regime narrows the limits of autonomous activity. began its campaign to destroy the Yukos oil firm start-
Let us consider three examples of associational groups: ing in July 2003 (see Box 11.4), the RUIE confined itself
the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs to mild expressions of concern. Its members, evidently
(RUIE), the League of Committees of Soldiers’ Mothers, fearful of crossing Putin, chose not to defend Yukos’
and the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia head, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, or to protest the use of
(FITUR). They illustrate different strategies for organization police methods to destroy one of Russia’s largest oil
and influence and different relationships to the state. companies. Instead, they promised to meet their tax
obligations and to do more to help the country fight
The Russian Union of Industrialists poverty. Perhaps if big business had taken a strong and
united stand, it could have influenced state policy. But
and Entrepreneurs the desire of each individual firm to maintain friendly
Most formerly state-owned industrial firms are now relations with the government and the fear of govern-
wholly or partly privately owned. Most industrial firms ment reprisals undercut big business’s capacity for
participate in a competitive market and an increasingly collective action.
322 Chapter 11

Box 11.4
Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the Yukos Affair
One of the most widely publicized episodes of the Putin era several Duma deputies. Critics accused him of wanting to control
thus far has been the state takeover of Yukos, a powerful parliament and even of wanting to change the constitution to turn
private oil company, and the criminal prosecution of its head, it into a parliamentary system. There was talk that he intended to
Mikhail Khodorkovsky. At the time of his arrest in October seek the presidency.
2003, Khodorkovsky was the wealthiest of Russia’s new By spring 2003, the Putin administration decided that
postcommunist magnates. His career began in the late 1980s Khodorkovsky and Yukos had grown too independent. In a series of
when he started a bank. Later, he acquired—at a bargain- actions, Khodorkovsky and several of his associates were arrested
basement price—80 percent of the shares of the Yukos and charged with fraud, embezzlement, and tax evasion. In December
oil company when the government privatized it. At first, 2003, the government sued the company for billions of dollars in
Khodorkovsky sought to squeeze maximum profit from the firm back taxes and froze the company’s bank accounts. When Yukos
by stripping its assets. Soon his business strategy changed, failed to pay the full tax bill, the government seized its main assets
and he began to invest in the firm’s productive capacity. He and auctioned them off to a firm that, three days later, sold them to
made Yukos the most dynamic of Russia’s oil companies. As he the state-owned oil company, Rosneft. In May 2004, Khodorkovsky
improved the efficiency and transparency of the firm, the share was sentenced to nine years’ imprisonment and was sent to a
prices rose and, with them, Khodorkovsky’s own net worth. At prison camp in Siberia. In 2006, the last remnants of the company
its peak in 2002, the company’s assets were estimated at about were forced into bankruptcy. In 2010, Khodorkovsky’s jail term was
$20 billion, of which Khodorkovsky owned nearly $8 billion. extended until 2017 after he was convicted on new charges.
Looking to improve his public image, Khodorkovsky created On December 20, 2013, shortly before the Sochi Olympics,
a foundation and launched several charitable initiatives. He President Putin freed Khodorkovsky from prison as part of a
recruited distinguished international figures to his foundation’s broad amnesty to honor the twentieth anniversary of the 1993
board. He became active in Russian politics, helping to fund constitution. The case underscored the authorities’ willingness to
political parties and sponsoring the election campaigns of manipulate the law for political purposes.

MIKHAIL KHODORKOVSKY
AFTER HIS RELEASE FROM
PRISON, DECEMBER 2013
Immediately after his release,
Khodorkovsky flew to Germany
and held a press conference.
Ole Spata/picture-alliance/dpa/AP Images
 Politics in Russia 323

The Committee of Soldiers’ hostility and repression on the part of the authorities.
Over time, fewer and fewer of its local branches have
Mothers remained active.
The Soviet regime sponsored several official women’s
organizations, but these mainly served propaganda pur- The Federation of Independent
poses. During the glasnost period, a number of unoffi-
cial women’s organizations sprang up. One such group Trade Unions of Russia
was the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers. It formed in the The Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia
spring of 1989 when some 300 women in Moscow ral- (FITUR) is the successor of the official trade union
lied to protest the end of student deferments from mili- federation under the Soviet regime. Unlike the RUIE,
tary conscription. Their protest came hard on the heels however, it has poorly adapted itself to the postcommu-
of Gorbachev’s withdrawal of Soviet forces from the de- nist environment, even though it inherited substantial
cade-long war in Afghanistan, where over 13,000 Soviet organizational resources from the old Soviet trade union
troops were killed in bitter and demoralizing fighting. organization. In the Soviet era, virtually every employed
In response to the Soldiers’ Mothers’ actions, Gorbachev person belonged to a trade union. All branch and re-
agreed to restore student deferments. Since then, the gional trade union organizations were part of a single
Soldiers’ Mothers’ movement has grown, with local labor federation, called the All-Union Central Council
branches forming in hundreds of cities. Their focus has of Trade Unions. With the breakdown of the old regime,
expanded somewhat but remains centered on the prob- some of the member unions became independent, while
lems of military service. The league presses the military other unions sprang up as independent bodies repre-
to end the brutal hazing of recruits, which results in the senting the interests of particular groups of workers.
deaths (in many cases by suicide) of hundreds of soldiers Nonetheless, the nucleus of the old official trade union
each year. The league also advises young men on how to organization survived in the form of the FITUR. It re-
avoid being conscripted.43 mains by far the largest trade union federation in Russia.
The onset of large-scale hostilities in Chechnya in Around 95 percent of all organized workers belong to
1994–1996 and 1999–2000 stimulated a new burst of ac- unions that are, at least formally, members of the FITUR.
tivity by the league. It helped families locate soldiers The independent unions are much smaller. By compari-
who were missing in action or captured by the Chechen son with big business, however, the labor movement is
rebel forces. It sent missions to Chechnya to negotiate fragmented and poorly equipped to mobilize workers
for the release of prisoners and to provide proper burial for collective action. The workers of as many as half of
for the dead. It collected information about the actual all enterprises do not belong to any union at all.45
scale of the war and of its casualties. It also continued The FITUR inherited valuable real estate assets
to lobby for decent treatment of recruits. Through the from its Soviet-era predecessor organization, including
1990s, it became one of the most sizeable and respected thousands of office buildings, hotels, rest homes, hos-
civic groups in Russia. It can call on a network of thou- pitals, and children’s camps. It also inherited the right
sands of active volunteers for its work. These volunteers to collect workers’ contributions for the state social in-
visit wounded soldiers in hospitals and help military surance fund. Control of this fund enabled the official
authorities identify casualties. One of the movement’s trade unions to acquire enormous amounts of income-
greatest assets is its members’ moral authority as moth- generating property over the years. These assets and
ers defending the interests of their children. This stance income streams give leaders of the official unions con-
makes it hard for their opponents to paint them as siderable advantages in competing for members. But the
unpatriotic. FITUR no longer has centralized control over its regional
The Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers plays both a and branch members. Thus, internal disunity is another
public political role (for instance, it lobbied to liberal- major reason for the relative weakness of the FITUR as an
ize the law on alternative civil service for conscientious organization. Much of its effort is expended in fighting
objectors, and it fights for an end to the brutality in the independent unions to win a monopoly on representing
treatment of servicemen44) and a role as service provider. workers in collective bargaining with employers, rather
Much of its effort is spent on helping soldiers and their than in joining with other unions to defend the interests
families deal with their problems. It cooperates willingly of workers generally. Officially, FITUR supports a con-
with the Defense Ministry to help improve the lives of cept of “social partnership” and participates in tripartite
people serving in the armed forces. It has been careful bargaining with employers’ associations and the gov-
not to oppose military service or advocate pacifism. ernment over wages and social benefits. However, the
Although the group enjoys a stable base of pub- tripartite commissions are largely pro forma, and actual
lic support in Russia as well as widespread interna- social policy is set by the government with some input
tional recognition, it has increasingly encountered from business.46
324 Chapter 11

The ineffectiveness of the FITUR is also illustrated

by the tepid response of organized labor to the severe The Dominant Party
deterioration in labor and social conditions in the 1990s.
Unemployment rose to 13 percent (very high given that it Regime
was essentially unknown under the Communist regime), 11.8 Examine the rise of the “party of power” in
and even among employed workers, wage arrears were recent elections.
widespread. Surveys found that in any given year in the
1990s, three-quarters of all workers received their wages In most countries, political parties are the most impor-
late at least once.47 There were strikes—particularly among tant structure performing the vital task of interest ag-
teachers—but far fewer than might have been expected gregation—the process by which the infinite number
given how dire the economic situation was. But even when of demands arising from society are pooled and sifted
there were labor protests, in many cases, they were actually into a smaller number of policy choices. In a democracy,
organized not by the unions but by governors seeking to how well parties aggregate interests, define choices, and
pressure the central government for more money.48 hold politicians accountable is of critical importance. In
Why are unions so weak? One reason is that many Russia, the party system has largely ceased to play the
workers depend on the enterprises where they work for role of interest aggregation. Instead, it serves to mobilize
social benefits and guaranteed employment.49 Another is support on the part of the public and the political elite
the close relationship between the leadership of the FITUR for the incumbent rulers. As a result, the party system
and government authorities. As a result, it is very difficult neither gives the voters meaningful choices over policy
for unions to mount protests. Workers generally feel un- nor holds political officials accountable.
represented by their unions. While this situation would Although Russia’s party system in the 1990s was fluid
seem to favor the interests of business and the state, in and fragmented, a clear structure emerged in the 2000s in
fact, senior state leaders express some disquiet at how which the United Russia party dominates and other parties
poorly organized the FITUR is; this means that neither are marginal. The reason that a dominant party regime arose
business nor the state has a credible negotiating partner in is twofold. In the 1990s, parties were not anchored to defined
dealing with issues concerning labor. As a result, the state social interests or associations, so voters had little sense of
fears the prospect that in a crisis, labor grievances could attachment to parties. Second, the Putin regime suppressed
spread and become explosive, destabilizing the state. political competition and built up a single dominant party to
represent its interests in elections and legislation.
Russians term a party that reflects the interests of the
New Sectors of Interest ruling elite and exercises a near-monopoly on power a
“party of power.” For politicians, the party is a vehicle
Since the transition, many new associations have formed
for career advancement, while for the voters, it is the
around the interests of new categories of actors. Bankers,
electoral face of the state. In the 1990s, there were several
political consultants, realtors, mayors of small cities,
short-lived attempts to form parties of power, but in the
mayors of large cities, judges, attorneys, auditors, televi-
2000s, United Russia has become the unquestioned party
sion broadcasters, political consultants, and numerous
of power. At the same time, the Kremlin exercises influ-
other professional and occupational groups have formed
ence over other parties in varying degrees, determining
associations to seek favorable policies or set professional
what political role each may play. Parties that refuse to
standards. Environmental groups, women’s organiza-
play by the Kremlin’s rules find it virtually impossible
tions, human rights activists, and many other cause-
to operate. The Kremlin uses United Russia and other
oriented groups have organized. Most of these operate in
parties to secure its control over the State Duma and re-
a particular locality, but a few have national scope. One
gional legislatures, to channel political competition into
of the most publicized movements is that of automobile
safe outlets, and to manage the careers of ambitious
owners, who have formed organizations in several cities
politicians—but not to subject itself to free elections.
to protest the abuse of privileges by VIPs (such as using
flashing blue lights on top of their cars to cut through
traffic jams).50 Elections and Party Development
The rise of social media and the diversity of social Table 11.1 indicates the official results of the party-list
interests have made it possible for many organizations voting since 2003. United Russia dominates the party
to form. Some have been able to mount protests, and system, while other within-system “opposition” parties
many more have lobbied through the political process to remain marginal. The same four parties have maintained
defend their interests. As in other countries, interest or- their presence in each of the past four convocations of
ganizations tend to favor the better educated and better the Duma, while no outsider parties have managed to
connected. The Putin regime declares that it is in favor cross the electoral threshold. In the Duma elected in 2016,
of a strong civil society. In fact, however, it has made it United Russia won three-quarters of the seats thanks to
increasingly difficult for associations to operate freely. its strong showing in single-member district elections.
 Politics in Russia 325

Table 11.1 Party-List Vote in Duma Elections Since From a Multiparty System to a
1993 Dominant Party Regime
NB: After 2003, the “against all” option was not available.
A multiparty system began to develop with the elec-
Party 2003 2007 2011 2016 tions, under Gorbachev, for the reformed Soviet and
Russian Republic parliaments. Democratically oriented
Unity/United Russia 38.2 64.3 49.3 54.19
politicians coalesced to defeat Communist Party offi-
A Just Russia — 7.7 13.25 6.23 cials in the 1989 and 1990 elections and, once elected,
Liberal Democratic Party
11.6 8.1 11.68 13.14 formed legislative caucuses in parliament. There, they
of Russia (LDPR)
fought with Communist, nationalist, and agrarian
Motherland (Rodina) 9.2 — — 1.51 groups. These parliamentary factions became the nu-
Patriots of Russia — — .97 .59 clei of political parties in the parliamentary election of
Communist Party of December 1993.
the Russian Federation 12.8 11.5 19.2 13.34
(CPRF) DEPOLARIZATION AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
Agrarian Party 3.6 2.3 — — Electoral contests in the late 1980s and early 1990s were
Other parties failing to aligned around two poles, one associated with Yeltsin and
11.1 2.1 5.6 11
meet 5% threshold the forces pushing for democracy and a market economy,
Against all 4.7 — — — the other fighting to preserve the old system based on state
ownership and control of the economy. Other parties posi-
Source: Compiled by author from reports of Central Electoral Commission.
See http://cikrf.ru. tioned themselves in relation to these poles. For instance,
Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s nationalistic Liberal Democratic
Party of Russia (LDPR) claimed to offer an alternative to
Figure 11.6 shows how the election results translated both the democrats and the Communists, appealing to xe-
into the distribution of seats in the Duma to various party nophobia, authoritarianism, and the nostalgia for empire.
factions following the 2011 and 2016 elections. Although The party’s unexpectedly strong showing in the 1993 elec-
a handful of deputies affiliated with minor parties won tion was a signal of widespread popular discontent with
Duma seats in 2016, their parties will not be able to form the Yeltsin economic reforms. Zhirinovsky has remained a
parliamentary factions. Over the past 25 years, the party durable figure in the political landscape ever since.
system has evolved from being one with many weakly The main anchor of the left (statist and social-
supported parties to become an authoritarian dominant ist) pole of the spectrum has been the Communists
party system.51 (Communist Party of the Russian Federation [CPRF]),

Figure 11.6 Duma Party Seat Shares

In the Seventh Duma, elected in 2016, United Russia’s seat share expanded to over three-quarters of the total.
More than half of its seats were won in single-member districts.

Russian Duma, 2011: Major Party Seat Shares Russian Duma, 2016: Major Party Seat Shares

CPRF
9.091% LDPR
CPRF
20.42% 9.091%
SR
5.051%

United Russia LDPR

52.95% 12.41%

United Russia
SR 76.77%
14.21%

Source: Compiled by author from reports of State Duma.

326 Chapter 11

who are the heirs of the old ruling CPSU and who for Putin, within days of Unity’s formation and Putin’s
espouse a mixture of communist and nationalist appointment, Chechen rebels launched raids into the
principles. neighboring region of Dagestan. Bombings of apart-
On the pro-market and pro-democracy side of the ment buildings—officially blamed on Chechen terror-
spectrum have been several parties whose fortunes ists—also occurred in Moscow and other cities. Putin’s
have fallen dramatically since the 1990s. One of these is decisive handling of the military operations against the
Yabloko. Yabloko has consistently defended democratic Chechen guerrillas gave him and the Unity movement
principles and a social democratic policy in the economy a major boost in popularity. Unity, which had not even
and has opposed some of the policies pursued by Yeltsin existed until late August, won 23 percent of the party-
and Putin that have sought to dismantle most of the old list vote in December.
state supports and controls in the economy. It is no lon- The presidential election of 2000 occurred ahead of
ger represented in the Duma and struggles to win a few schedule, due to President Yeltsin’s early resignation.
seats in regional legislatures. Under the constitution, the prime minister automatically
Elections in the early to mid-1990s reflected the succeeds the president if the president leaves office early,
polarization between democrats and Communists, but but new elections must be held within three months.
also tended to produce a fragmented field of parties. Accordingly, the presidential election was scheduled for
In the 1993 and 1995 Duma elections, neither prode- March 26, 2000. The early election gave the front-runner
mocracy parties nor Communists won a clear major- and incumbent, Putin, an advantage, because he could
ity, although democrats were in the minority, while capitalize on his popularity and the country’s desire for
Communists, nationalists, and their allies had a ma- continuity. Putin counted on the support of officeholders
jority of seats. Except for a few parties (the CPRF, the at all levels, a media campaign that presented a “presi-
LDPR, and Yabloko), most parties had shallow roots dential” image to the voters, and the voters’ fear that
and tended to spring up shortly before elections. Many change would only make life worse. His rivals, more-
sought to avoid taking a clear programmatic stance, in- over, were weak. Several prominent politicians prudently
stead claiming to be “centrists” and pragmatists who chose not to run against him. Putin’s strategy worked
would steer between the opposing poles of the demo- brilliantly: He won an outright majority in the first round
crats and Communists. (see Table 11.2 for the results of the presidential elections
Presidential elections have not tended to stimulate from 2000 to 2012).
party development as much as parliamentary elections
THE 2003 AND 2004 ELECTIONS Under Putin, the ide-
have, because they have revolved more around the per-
ological divide between Communists and democrats that
sonalities of the candidates. When Boris Yeltsin ran for
had marked the transition era nearly vanished. The po-
reelection in 1996, he started out with an approval rating
litical arena was dominated by the president and his sup-
in the single digits (at one point he even considered can-
porters. The loyal pro-Putin party, Unity, was renamed
celing the election), but ultimately he rallied his strength
United Russia after it absorbed a rival party, Fatherland.
and succeeded in persuading voters that the election was
United Russia soon acquired a near monopoly in the
about a choice between him and a return to communism.
party spectrum, squeezing other parties to the margins.
Yeltsin’s displays of vigor during the campaign, his lav-
A series of changes in the electoral law made it difficult
ish promises to voters, and his domination of the media
for all but a few parties to compete in elections, while the
all contributed to a surge in popularity and a victory over
Kremlin mounted a major effort to pressure regional gov-
Gennady Ziuganov, his Communist rival.52 The cam-
ernors and big business to back United Russia.
paign took its toll on Yeltsin, however. Soon afterward
United Russia came to operate as a giant political ma-
he had major heart surgery, and for much of his second
chine, distributing political favors and material benefits
term, he was in poor health.
to supporters, monopolizing decision making, and deliv-
BUILDING THE PARTY OF POWER The 1999 election ering reliable majorities in legislative assemblies. Nearly
was dominated by the question of who would succeed every regional legislature has a United Russia majority,
Yeltsin as president. Many federal and regional office- and the vast majority of governors belong to the party.
holders wanted to rally around a new party of power Opposition parties control some seats in some regional
in order to protect their jobs. A group of backroom and local assemblies and occasionally win a mayoral race.
Kremlin strategists formed a movement called Unity But, thanks to its close relationship to the presidential
in the late summer of 1999. They wanted to create an administration and seemingly unlimited access to media
electoral bloc that government officials throughout the and organizational resources, United Russia occupies
country could rally around in the race for the Duma. a place in the political system analogous to that of the
They also intended it to serve as a political vehicle for Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico during
Vladimir Putin, whom Yeltsin had just named prime its long tenure in power, or that of other dominant parties
minister and anointed as his successor. Conveniently in competitive authoritarian regimes.
 Politics in Russia 327

drive to eliminate any meaningful political opposition.

Table 11.2 Russian Presidential Elections in the 2000s Such an impressive showing for United Russia assured
Putin or Medvedev won in the first round by wide margins in each Putin’s reelection as president. The March 2004 race
race. was a landslide. Putin won easily, with 71.3 percent
CPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation; LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of of the vote, while his Communist rival received less
Russia; DPR: Democratic Party of Russia.
than 14 percent of the vote. European observers com-
2000 2004 2008 2012 mented that the elections were “well administered”
Vladimir Putin 52.9 71.3 — 63.6
but hardly constituted “a genuine democratic contest”
in view of the president’s overwhelming control of
Gennady Ziuganov (CPRF) 29.2 — 17.7 17.8
media coverage of the race and the absence of genuine
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (LDPR) 2.7 — 9.3 6.2
competition.53
Grigory Yavlinsky (Yabloko) 5.8 — — — United Russia’s dominance was confirmed in the
Nikolai Kharitonov (CPRF) — 13.7 — — 2007 Duma election. Shortly before the election, Putin
Dmitry Medvedev — — 70.2 — declared that he would head the party’s list (though he
Andrei Bogdanov (DPR) — — 1.3 — said he would not join the party and he did not intend
Mikhail Prokhorov to take his Duma seat).54 This indicated that Putin in-
— — — 7.89
(independent) tended to use the party as a basis for his power even
Sergei Mironov (Just after he left the presidency. Even though the Kremlin
— — — 3.85
Russia) created a second party of power (called A Just Russia)
Other 6.5 10.7 — — as a mechanism to siphon off some votes on the left
Against all candidates 1.8 3.4 — — side of the spectrum and to offer an alternative outlet
for some politicians who could not be accommodated in
Note: The “Against all candidates” option was not available on the 2008 or 2012 ballot.
United Russia, United Russia’s overwhelming success
was never in doubt, and it went on to win 64.3 percent
of the vote. The authorities used a variety of methods to
The Kremlin’s success in making United Russia the manipulate the election, ranging from grossly unequal
dominant party was demonstrated vividly in the 2003 access to the media for the parties to outright falsifica-
parliamentary election. United Russia won 38 percent tion of results in many regions (in some districts, the
of the party-list vote and wound up with two-thirds of reported vote for United Russia was greater than 100
the seats in the Duma. The Communists lost almost half percent of the registered voters).55
their vote share, and the democrats did even worse. For Similarly, the authorities took no chances in the
the first time, none of the democratic parties won seats 2008 presidential election. They violated numer-
on the party-list vote. The result underscored Putin’s ous election laws in order to guarantee the desired

VLADIMIR PUTIN INAUGURA-

TION, 2012 Vladimir Putin’s
inauguration as president for
a third time was attended by
many dignitaries, including the
Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox
Church.
Vladimir Rodionov/POOL/EPA/Newscom
328 Chapter 11

outcomes—for example, by disqualifying potentially end, he won almost 8 percent of the vote, according
serious opposition candidates, pouring money from to!the official results. Putin was declared to have won
the state budget into Medvedev’s campaign, giving 63.6 percent.
Medvedev disproportionate media coverage, and ig- In the 2011–2012 election cycle, the authorities
noring legal challenges over violations of the election again resorted to large-scale fraud to guarantee the
law. Medvedev would probably have won in any case, outcome. This time, however, civic activists were pre-
but the large-scale manipulation of the election sig- pared. They were able to document—sometimes even
naled that the authorities were in complete control of to record using smartphone cameras—numerous cases
the succession. The authorities managed the outcome of election fraud. For example, in a technique called the
so successfully that Medvedev officially won over 70 “carousel,” the authorities would drive a busload of
percent of the vote—about 1 percentage point below people around from one polling station to another to
Putin’s reported margin in 2004. cast absentee ballots. (Independent election observers
were often removed beforehand.) Another method was
THE 2011–2012 ELECTION CYCLE AND THE 2016 DUMA to set up special “temporary” polling stations that in-
ELECTION The December 2011 parliamentary elec- dependent observers were not informed of beforehand.
tion saw the same four parties enter parliament. United In some cases, someone would surreptitiously stuff
Russia’s official vote share fell somewhat, while that of large numbers of premarked ballots into a voting urn.
the other parties rose somewhat. Overall, however, its Sometimes the fraud was even more direct: In tallying
dominant position—and that of the presidential team the numbers, election officials would systematically re-
that controlled it—remained secure. And as in 2007–2008, duce vote totals for rival candidates and add them to
widespread election fraud was used to produce the United Russia or Putin’s totals. And of course, as usual,
desired result. media coverage and ballot access were highly skewed
In the 2012 presidential race the following March, during the campaign. Independent estimates calcu-
Putin was back on the ballot, as were perennials lated that Putin’s actual vote was probably 10 percent
Ziuganov (CPRF) and Zhirinovsky (LDPR). This time, or more lower than the official total (but that he still
the leader of the A Just Russia party, Sergei Mironov, probably won an outright majority in the first round),
also ran. There was also a newcomer, billionaire and that United Russia’s actual total in December was
Mikhail Prokhorov (owner of, among other things, the closer to 34 percent nationally than to the officially
New Jersey Nets). He offered a broadly pro-business reported 49 percent.56
platform but never directly criticized Putin, raising The widespread procedural abuses prompted un-
suspicions that the authorities were allowing him to precedentedly large protests around the country after
run to draw off support from other candidates. In the both the December 2011 Duma election and March 2012

MIKHAIL PROKHOROV
CAMPAIGNS FOR PRESIDENT,
2012 Billionaire Mikhail
Prokhorov came in third, winning
almost 8 percent of the vote.
Jiang Kehong/Sipa Press/Newscom
 Politics in Russia 329

presidential election. Three massive protests in late 2011

and early 2012 over election fraud revealed how wide- Russia and the Resource
spread opposition was: The biggest demonstration in
Moscow in early February 2012, in subzero tempera- Curse
tures, drew close to 100,000 participants. The protesters’ 11.9 Describe the interplay between political and
demands focused on two main issues: fair elections and
economic restructuring in contemporary Russia.
Putin’s departure. Surprisingly, the authorities did not ha-
rass the demonstrators. Some observers spoke hopefully Russia’s economy remains heavily subject to state con-
of a change to a freer and more open political system. trol, but also features large elements of market competi-
Since the first half of 2012, however, the protest tion. It is much more integrated into the global economy
movement has subsided. The authorities stepped up than in the Soviet era, but the legacy of state socialism
pressure on opposition forces, concocting criminal and central planning continues to exert a strong influ-
charges against leaders. Upon his return to power, Putin ence. Russia also remains heavily dependent on the
made it clear that he had no interest in dialogue with the export of raw materials, particularly oil and gas.
opposition. The authorities also rallied conservative sup-
port for the regime by linking the opposition to foreign
interests (a widely watched TV documentary accused The Transition from the Planned
opposition leaders of being paid agents of foreign secu- Economy
rity services) and by mobilizing popular resentment of
Russia’s postcommunist transition was wrenching be-
urban intellectuals.57
cause the country had to remake both its political and its
The authorities took care to ensure that the embar-
economic institutions following the end of communism.
rassing protest movement of 2011–2012 would not recur
The move to a market economy created opportunities
after the 2016 Duma election. They pursued a two-
for some and hardships for many more. Democratization
pronged strategy to ensure that United Russia would
opened the political system to the influence of groups
win the election but without provoking any protests.
that could organize to press for exclusive economic bene-
They instructed local authorities to refrain from overt
fits for themselves. Many people who had modest but se-
vote fraud on election day but to control access to the bal-
cure livelihoods under the Soviet regime were ruined by
lot and the media beforehand so as to ensure that United
inflation and unemployment when the planned economy
Russia dominated the campaign. They also worked hard
broke down. A smaller number took advantage of oppor-
to mobilize United Russia supporters, for example, by
tunities for entrepreneurship or exploited their connec-
pressuring factory workers, government employees, stu-
tions with government to amass sizeable fortunes. One
dents, and other controllable groups to vote for United
reason Vladimir Putin was initially so popular was that
Russia and by busing them en masse to polling places.58
people gave him credit for restoring economic prosper-
The strategy succeeded. Even though turnout fell below
ity and cracking down on some of the tycoons who had
50 percent, and United Russia won 4 million fewer votes
amassed great fortunes by dubious means.
than in 2011, United Russia’s vote share rose, as did its
total share of Duma seats. STABILIZATION Russia pursued two major sets of
The authorities appear wedded to the model of economic reforms in the early 1990s: macroeconomic sta-
a dominant party regime and have continued to use bilization and privatization. Stabilization, which came to
United Russia to ensure their support in the Duma and be called shock therapy, was intended to stop the coun-
regional legislatures. So long as United Russia remains try’s financial meltdown. This required a painful dose of
the dominant party, the authorities’ goal is to make it fiscal and monetary discipline by slashing government
broadly appealing to all social strata rather than to a spending and squeezing the money supply. Such struc-
particular segment of society. As a result, social structure tural reform always lowers the standard of living in the
has become less and less significant as an influence on short term for most of the population.
voting, while voters’ attitudes toward the authorities in These reforms were not fully carried out. One rea-
general and toward Putin in particular have become the son was that those who benefited from the early steps to
most important predictor of voting preferences. open the economy and privatize state assets exploited
United Russia draws support broadly from all parts their privileged access to the authorities to lock in their
of society and presents a non-programmatic image. Its own gains and to oppose any subsequent measures to ex-
main appeal is its close association with Putin. The party pand competition. For example, some officials acquired
has relatively shallow roots in society. Putin and other ownership rights to monopoly enterprises, then worked
Kremlin officials keep the party at a distance, expecting it to shut out potential competitors from their markets. So
to support the regime but not giving it much opportunity did some state officials who benefited from collecting
to influence policy. It is telling that Putin has never joined “fees” to issue licenses to importers and exporters or per-
the party. mits for doing business, and entrepreneurs whose firms
330 Chapter 11

dominated the market in their industry.59 A fully com- transfers legal title of state firms to private owners.
petitive market system, with a level playing field for all, Under the right conditions, private ownership of produc-
would have jeopardized their ability to profit from their tive assets is efficient for society because, in a competi-
privileged positions. tive environment, owners are motivated by an incentive
to maximize their property’s ability to produce a return.
FROM COMMUNISM TO CAPITALISM Communist
Under the privatization program, every Russian citizen
systems differed from other authoritarian regimes in ways
received a voucher with a face value of 10,000 rubles
that made their economic transitions more difficult. This
(around $30 at the time). People were free to buy and sell
was particularly true for the Soviet Union and its succes-
vouchers, but they could be used only to acquire shares
sor states. For one, the economic growth model followed
of stock in privatized enterprises or shares of mutual
by Stalin and his successors concentrated much produc-
funds investing in privatized enterprises. The program
tion in large enterprises. This meant that many local
sought to ensure that everyone became a property owner
governments were entirely dependent on the economic
instantly. Politically, the program aimed to build support
health of a single employer. The heavy commitment of re-
for the economic reforms by giving citizens a stake in
sources to military production in the Soviet Union further
the outcome of the market transition. Economically, the
complicated the task of reform in Russia, as did the coun-
government hoped that privatization would eventually
try’s vast size, since many industries were established in
spur increases in productivity by creating meaningful
regions remote from major population and transportation
property rights. Beginning in October 1992, the program
hubs. Rebuilding the decaying infrastructure of a country
distributed 148 million privatization vouchers to citizens.
as large as Russia is staggeringly expensive.
By June 30, 1994, when the program ended, some 40 mil-
The economic stabilization program began on
lion citizens had become, in theory, share owners. But
January 2, 1992, when the government abolished most
these shares were often of no value, because they paid no
controls on prices, raised taxes, and cut government
dividends and shareholders exercised no voting rights in
spending sharply. Almost immediately, opposition to
the companies.
the new program began to form. Economists and politi-
The next phase of privatization auctioned off most
cians took sides. The shock therapy program was an easy
remaining shares of state enterprises for cash. This phase
target for criticism, even though there was no consensus
was marked by a series of scandalous sweetheart deals
among critics about what the alternative should be. It
in which banks owned by a small number of Russia’s
became commonplace to say that the program was “all
wealthiest tycoons wound up with the titles to some of
shock and no therapy.”
Russia’s most lucrative oil, gas, and metallurgy firms for
By cutting government spending, letting prices rise,
bargain-basement prices. The most notorious of these
and raising taxes, the stabilization program sought to cre-
arrangements became known as the loans for shares
ate incentives for producers to increase output and find
scheme. It was devised in 1995 by a small group of busi-
new niches in the marketplaces. But Russian producers
ness magnates with strong connections to government
did not initially respond by raising productivity. As a re-
who persuaded Yeltsin to auction off management rights
sult, the population suffered from a sharp, sudden loss
to controlling packages of shares in several major state-
in purchasing power. People went hungry, bank savings
owned companies in return for loans to the government.
vanished, and the economy fell into a protracted slump.
If the government failed to repay the loans in a year’s
Firms that were politically connected were able to survive
time, the shares would revert to the banks that made the
by winning cheap credits and production orders from the
loans. The government, as expected, defaulted on the
government, which dampened any incentive for improv-
loans, letting a small number of oligarchs acquire own-
ing productivity. Desperate to raise operating revenues,
ership of some of Russia’s most valuable companies.60
the government borrowed heavily from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and issued treasury bonds at ru-
CONSEQUENCES OF PRIVATIZATION On paper,
inously high interest rates. IMF loans came with strings
privatization was a huge success. By 1996, privatized
attached—the government pledged to cut spending fur-
firms produced about 90 percent of industrial output,
ther and step up tax collections as a condition of accept-
and about two-thirds of all large and medium-size en-
ing IMF assistance, which fueled the depression further.
terprises had been privatized.61 In reality, however, the
Communists and nationalists got a rise out of audiences
actual transfer of ownership rights was far less impres-
by depicting the government as the puppet of a malevo-
sive than it appeared. For one thing, the dominant pat-
lent, imperialist West.
tern was for managers to acquire large shareholdings
PRIVATIZATION Stabilization was followed shortly of the firms they ran. As a result, management of many
afterward by the mass privatization of state firms. In con- firms did not change. Moreover, many nominally private
trast to the shock therapy program, privatization enjoyed firms continued to be closely tied to state support, such
considerable public support, at least at first. Privatization as cheap state-subsidized loans and credits.62
 Politics in Russia 331

The program allowed a great many unscrupulous

wheeler-dealers to prey on the public through a variety Table 11.4 Annual Growth of GDP and Price Inflation
of financial schemes. Many people lost all their savings
Inflation Rate (annual
by investing in investment funds that went bankrupt or GDP Growth % growth of con-
turned out to be simple pyramid schemes. Privatization Year (annual %) sumer price index)
was carried out before the institutional framework of a 1991 -5.05
market economy was in place. Markets for stocks, bonds,
1992 -14.53
and commodities were small in scale and weakly regu-
1993 -8.67 874.62
lated. The legal foundation for a market economy has
gradually emerged, but only after much of the economy 1994 -12.57 307.63
was already privatized. For much of the 1990s, the lack 1995 -4.14 197.47
of liquidity in the economy meant that enterprises failed 1996 -3.60 47.74
to pay their wages and taxes on time, trading with one 1997 1.40 14.77
another using barter. 1998 -5.30 27.67
The government fell into a debt trap. Unable to
1999 6.40 85.74
meet its obligations, it grew dependent on loans. As
2000 10.00 20.78
lenders saw that the government could not make good
on its obligations, they demanded ever higher interest 2001 5.09 21.46

rates, deepening the trap. Ultimately, the bubble burst. 2002 4.74 15.79
In August 1998, the government declared a moratorium 2003 7.30 13.68
on its debts and let the ruble’s value collapse against the 2004 7.18 10.86
dollar. Overnight, the ruble lost two-thirds of its value, 2005 6.38 12.68
and credit dried up.63 The government bonds held by in- 2006 8.15 9.69
vestors were almost worthless. The effects of the crash
2007 8.54 8.99
rippled through the economy. The sharp devaluation of
2008 5.25 14.11
the ruble made exports more competitive and gave an
impetus to domestic producers, but also significantly 2009 -7.82 11.67

lowered people’s living standards. 2010 4.50 6.84

As Table 11.4 shows, economic output in Russia fell 2011 4.26 8.43
for a decade before beginning to recover in 1999. The rise 2012 3.52 5.08
in the world prices for oil and gas in the 2000s brought 2013 1.28 6.78
a decade of steady growth from 1999 to 2008. As the
2014 0.71 7.81
economy revived, enterprises were able to pay off arrears
2015 -3.73 15.53
in back wages and taxes. In turn, these taxes allowed
government to meet its own obligations, thus allowing Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, http://databank.worldbank.org
/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators.
consumer demand for industry’s products to rise, and so
on. Living standards rose for all sections of the popula-
tion and in most parts of the country until 2009. Then the economic growth to remain very low for the foreseeable
world financial crisis struck Russia with particular force, future. In addition, the sanctions on Russia imposed by
as its economy shrank by nearly 8 percent. The economy the United States and the European Union following
began shrinking again in 2014–2015, when world oil, gas, Russia’s annexation of Crimea have made it extremely
and other commodity prices fell sharply. difficult for Russian banks and companies to borrow
Russia’s deep vulnerability to international eco- money abroad.
nomic conditions owes to the fact that there has been no SOCIAL CONDITIONS Living standards fell sharply
substantial overhaul of the banking system, the structure during the 1990s. A small minority became wealthy, and
of industry, or the institutional environment for entre- some households improved their lot modestly. Most peo-
preneurship. The economy was vulnerable to the 2008 ple, however, suffered a net decline in living standards as
worldwide financial and economic crisis because of its a result of unemployment, lagging income, and nonpay-
dependence on exports of natural resources, which has ment of wages and pensions. Wages and incomes recov-
only deepened under Putin: As of 2015, oil and gas gen- ered during the 2000s but have fallen again as a result of
erated over half the central government’s revenues and the recession starting in 2013. Real incomes in 2016 were
two-thirds of the value of Russia’s exports.64 Falling at their 2006 level.
world energy prices therefore hit the economy hard. Income inequality grew sharply both during the
Russia has allowed the value of the ruble to fall, which period of economic decline in the 1990s and during
helps domestic industries, but most exporters expect the period of economic recovery in the 2000s. Rising
332 Chapter 11

inequality is caused by many factors. In the 1990s, it was because of the growing shortage of labor in some regions
the result of the lag of wage increases behind price infla- (experts believe that there are 8 million to 10 million il-
tion, the sharp rise in unemployment, the deterioration legal immigrants in Russia) and because of the army’s
of the pension and other social assistance systems, and inability to recruit enough healthy young men. Since
the concentration of vast wealth in the hands of a small 1991, Russia’s population has fallen by 2 million people
number of people. Since 2000, poverty has decreased sig- due to an excess of deaths over births that is not offset
nificantly, along with unemployment, and pension levels by immigration. Immigration from other former Soviet
have risen. Yet inequality continues to rise as a result of states has eased the decline. Demographers estimate that
large disparities in wage levels (two workers in the same Russia’s population could fall by over one-third by 2050.
occupation and in the same region might have widely President Putin has called for a series of measures to raise
different wages depending on the company), the ex- birth rates, reduce mortality, and stimulate immigration.
tremely high earnings of managers in industries such as These have helped to raise birth rates modestly.
energy and finance, the different growth rates of differ- Setting the country on a path of self-sustaining eco-
ent regions, the Putin regime’s shift to a flat (13 percent) nomic growth, where workers and investors are confident
income tax, and abolition of estate taxes. in their legal rights, would require a complete overhaul
As a result of both government policy and current of the relationship of the state to the economy. The Soviet
economic trends, therefore, economic prosperity is ben- state used central planning to direct enterprises on what
efiting those at the upper end of the income distribution to produce and how to use resources. Much of the econ-
much more than it is those at the lower end. Moreover, omy was geared to heavy industry and defense produc-
inequality in wealth is far greater than in income. tion, and government ministries directly administered
According to the Credit Suisse Global Wealth Report, the each branch of the economy. The postcommunist state
concentration of wealth in Russia is by far the highest in must have an entirely different relationship to the econ-
the world: the wealthiest 1 percent own over 70 percent omy in order to stimulate growth. It must set clear rules
of all wealth in the country.65 for economic activity, regulate markets, enforce the law,
The continuing rise in inequality and the absence of a supply public goods and services, and promote competi-
growing middle class constitute a matter of some concern tion. Shifting the structure of the state bureaucracy and
to Russian leaders. In his address to the State Council on the attitudes of state officials is a Herculean task.
February 8, 2008, President Putin declared that the cur- The government recognizes that the revenues from
rent level of income inequality was “absolutely unaccept- oil and gas exports pose a serious danger of creating in-
able” and should be reduced to more moderate levels; flationary pressures in the economy. For this reason, like
he called for measures that would bring about an expan- some other oil-rich states, Russia has created a “stabiliza-
sion of the middle class. Its share of the population, he tion fund” that removes some of the revenues generated
declared, should reach 60 percent or even 70 percent by by high world energy prices from circulation when oil
2020.66 However, the regime has not pursued policies prices rise above a set threshold. This financial cushion
that would expand the size of the private sector, and the allowed the government to cover its deficits as its rev-
regime’s interest in building the middle class waned con- enues dropped and its social spending obligations rose
siderably after the wave of political protest in 2011–2012. when the 2008 financial crisis struck. The government
An especially disturbing dimension of the social drew down the fund heavily to subsidize big enterprises
effects of transition has been the erosion of public health. and banks then, and has been doing so again since 2013.
Although public health had deteriorated in the late If oil prices remain low, the country will not be able to
Communist period, the decline worsened after the re- replenish the stabilization fund.
gime changed. Mortality rates rose sharply after the tran- Figure 11.7 shows the breakdown of spending for the
sition, especially among males. Life expectancy for males 2016 federal budget by policy category. Social spending
in Russia is at a level comparable to that in poor and de- takes up over a quarter of the state budget, an expense
veloping countries (male life expectancy at birth in Russia that is likely to grow in coming years as the population
is sixty-five, about the same level as in Pakistan, Bolivia, ages. Military and law enforcement spending take up
and the Philippines). Although life expectancy has risen about a third of the budget, and subsidies to industry
in recent years, the disparity between male and female and agriculture (“economic policy”) another 15 percent.67
mortality—enormous by world standards—reflects the Together, education and health care spending account
higher rates of abuse of alcohol and tobacco among men. for 4 percent of the budget. Debt service and transfers
Other demographic indicators are equally grim. Rates of to lower-level governments represent another 8 percent.
incidence of HIV and other infectious diseases, murders, The government faces difficult trade-offs between its de-
suicides, drug addiction, and alcoholism are high. sire to build up its military and law enforcement capac-
Russia’s leaders believe the demographic crisis poses ity and its need to maintain social stability in a stagnant
a grave threat to the country’s national security, both economy.
 Politics in Russia 333

Figure 11.7 Russian State Budget Breakdown, 2016

2016 Russian State Federal Budget Breakdown

3.6%

7.2%
4.2% Social policy
3% Education
27.7% Genaral state issue
Grants to lower governments
Health care
National defense
19.2%
National economy
4.1% National security, law enforcement
Other
Servicing debt
12.7%
2.4% 15.9%

Source: Data from Vedomosti, October 8, 2015.

Toward the Rule of Law? of making the judiciary independent of the authorities,
but in the 2000s, political control over the legal system
11.10 Briefly describe the route and obstacles to the has increased.
rule of law in Russia.
Although Russia’s laws and institutions reflect a formal Obstacles to the Rule of Law
commitment to the rule of law, Russian rulers and citizens In addition to the continuing abuse of the law for political
routinely behave in ways that undermine it. Corruption purposes, corruption in the courts and law enforcement
remains widespread, as does the abuse of power by the system, and the wide discretion granted to the security
authorities for political purposes. police also stand in the way of the rule of law.
In the post-Soviet state, the security police continue
to operate autonomously. In the Soviet period, the agency
The Law-Governed State with principal responsibility for maintaining domestic
One of the most important goals of Gorbachev’s reforms security was called the KGB (State Security Committee).
was to make the Soviet Union a law-governed state The KGB exercised wide powers, including responsibil-
(pravovoe gosudarstvo), rather than one in which the au- ity for both domestic and foreign intelligence. Since 1991,
thorities manipulate the law for political purposes. Since its functions have been split up among several agencies.
1991, Russian leaders have repeatedly affirmed that the The main domestic security agency is called the Federal
state must respect the primacy of law over politics—even Security Service (FSB). Although the structure and mis-
when they take actions grossly violating the constitution sion of the security agencies have changed, they have
and infringing on the supposed independence of the ju- never undergone a thorough purge of personnel. No
dicial branch. The difficulty in placing law above politics member of or collaborator with the Soviet-era security
testifies to the rulers’ habit of using the legal system as an services has been prosecuted for violating citizens’ rights.
instrument of rule. In contrast to Eastern Europe, there has been no review
The struggle for the rule of law began well before of officials’ records for past collaboration with the secret
Gorbachev. After Stalin died, his successors ended mass police. This is one of several ways in which post-Soviet
terror and took significant steps to reduce the use of law Russia has still not put its Communist past behind it.
for political repression. Still, throughout the late Soviet The security police are regarded as one of the more
era, the Communist Party and the KGB often used legal professionally competent and uncorrupted state agen-
procedures to give the mantle of legal legitimacy to cies. However, despite being assigned new tasks, such
acts of political repression. The use of the legal system as fighting international narcotics trafficking and terror-
for political purposes by state authorities continues. ism, they still demonstrate a preoccupation with policing
Reforms in the 1990s moved somewhat in the direction the country’s political life. For example, they have broad
334 Chapter 11

powers to shut down Internet providers and media out- in Russia and the other former Soviet states. Corruption
lets for publishing “extremist” content. on this scale imposes a severe drag on economic develop-
President Putin also uses criminal and civil proceed- ment, both because it diverts resources away from public
ings to suppress media opposition. An example is the needs and because it undermines people’s willingness to
series of legal maneuvers taken against the owners of in- invest in productive activity.73 Moreover, much corrup-
dependent media in the early 2000s. These included po- tion is tied to organized crime, which bribes government
lice harassment and criminal prosecution, as well as civil officials for protection and drives out legal businesses.
actions such as bankruptcy proceedings. For example, The corruption of the police and courts ensures that many
the owners of two television companies were forced to crimes go unpunished and forces legal businesses to com-
divest themselves of their media holdings and transfer pete in the market with illegal ones.
ownership to companies loyal to the administration. As a Corruption in Russia has deep roots, and many
result, Russia’s two relatively autonomous national tele- Russians assume that it is ineradicable. Comparative
vision companies lost their political independence, one studies of corruption demonstrate, however, that a cul-
respected liberal newspaper was shut down, and the en- ture of corruption can be changed by changing the expec-
tire media establishment was put on notice that it would tations of the public and the government.74 The key is for
be wise to avoid crossing the current administration. the political leadership to make a serious effort to combat
Extralegal coercion has also been used to suppress corruption and to back up this commitment with insti-
opposition. A number of opposition politicians, lawyers, tutional reform and sustained attention to the problem.
and journalists have been murdered, often through the Since the early 1990s, there have been a number of
use of rare poisons and radioactive substances that are reforms, such as the adoption of trial by jury and the cre-
not available to the public.68 ation of the Constitutional Court, that have the potential
The legal system is also sometimes used to force a to strengthen the judiciary’s independence from both po-
private company to sell out at a bargain price so that it litical pressure and corruption. However, the authorities’
can then be taken over by a pro-regime state-owned en- habitual use of the procuracy and the courts for political
terprise. For example, the state used charges of tax eva- purposes and the powerfully corrosive effect of corrup-
sion and theft to force the Yukos oil firm into bankruptcy tion continue to subvert the integrity of the legal system.
so that its most profitable elements could be sold at a low In the long run, movement toward the rule of law would
price to the state oil company, Rosneft. These forced hos- require that power be sufficiently dispersed among
tile takeovers are called reiderstvo (raiding). groups and organizations in the state and society so that
neither private nor state interests are powerful enough
CORRUP TION Another obstacle to the rule of law is en- to subordinate the law to their own purposes, and that
demic corruption. Corruption increased substantially after political elites themselves respect the law.
the Soviet period. It is widespread both in everyday life
and in dealings with the state. A survey in May 2010 found
that 55 percent of respondents agreed with the statement
that “everyone who deals with officials gives bribes,” al- Russia and the
though 79 percent of the respondents had not paid a bribe
themselves in the past twelve months.69 Transparency International Community
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2015
11.11 Discuss Russia’s conflicted international
ranked Russia 119th out of 167 countries in the pervasive-
relations.
ness of corruption, tied with Sierra Leone, Guyana, and
Azerbaijan.70 Experts have estimated that the total volume Russia’s thousand-year history of expansion, war, and
of corrupt transactions in the economy exceeds the total state domination of society has left behind a legacy of
value of the state budget.71 Law enforcement (especially autocratic rule and a preoccupation with defending na-
the traffic police), health care, education, and government tional borders. The collapse of the Soviet regime required
registration offices are considered the worst offenders. Russia to rebuild its political institutions, economic sys-
In an effort to reduce official corruption, the regime tem, national identity, and relations with the outside
has passed legislation requiring officials to publish world. During the Soviet period, state propaganda used
declarations of their income and property. So far, however, the image of an international struggle between capital-
most observers believe that his drive has had little effect ism and socialism to justify its repressive control over so-
in reducing corruption. It is common for deputies of the ciety and its enormous military establishment. Now the
State Duma to file for divorce, for example, at the time the country’s leaders recognize that only through strong ties
declarations are due, in order to avoid reporting assets with the world economy can Russia hope to prosper. Yet
registered to their spouses.72 they also want to maintain strong controls over the po-
Corruption is hardly unique to Russia or to the former litical system in order to preserve stability and prevent
Communist world. However, it is especially widespread threats to their power.
 Politics in Russia 335

Gorbachev, Yeltsin, and Putin have all asserted that the somewhat. Low-level fighting between the secessionists
integration of Russia into the community of developed de- and the Ukrainian government continues, however, and
mocracies is strategically important for Russia. Gorbachev prospects for a political settlement remain remote.
was willing to allow Communist regimes to fall throughout Russia’s quasi-imperial behavior in parts of the former
Eastern Europe for the sake of improved relations with the Soviet Union and its refusal to be bound by democratic
West. Yeltsin accepted the admission of Eastern European principles have kept it from becoming fully integrated into
states into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as a nec- the international community. Russia’s leaders recognize
essary condition for close relations with the United States that they cannot retreat into isolation and autarky. They
and Europe. Putin has repeatedly emphasized that he re- are also aware of the grave vulnerabilities Russia faces—
gards Russia’s admission to the World Trade Organization its declining population, aging infrastructure, dependence
as critical for Russia’s long-term economic success. on immigrant labor, and overreliance on natural resources
At the same time, Russia has not accepted the con- for state revenues. Thus, while they seek to dominate the
straints of international law. It has expanded its military territory of the former Soviet Union, they also do not want
presence in several former Soviet republics, pressuring to resurrect Russia’s role as the United States’ enemy in
them to become satellites of Russia. In August 2008, it the bipolar world; they would prefer that Russia be one
launched a well-prepared military invasion of indepen- of several major powers in a multipolar world. Yet the re-
dent, pro-Western Georgia after Georgia attempted to gime is taking a defensive and hostile position toward the
use force to take back control of a Russia-backed break- West, claiming that the West is conspiring to block Russia
away region, South Ossetia. The overwhelming Russian from taking its rightful place as a great world power. Putin
response was clearly intended to subjugate Georgia to has endeavored to promote good relations with China and
Russia’s interest in preserving a buffer of subordinate to present Russia as a major power in the Asian-Pacific
states in the territory of the former Soviet Union. region. The weakness of Russian industry, however,
Russia’s most drastic act defying international law means that it can only offer potential investors access to
was its annexation of Crimea in 2014. The Crimean penin- its natural resources. The outward migration of Russians
sula has a long history as part of the Russian state, and its from Siberia and the Far East also is making Russia more
population is majority Russian, but in 1954, Khrushchev dependent on immigrant labor, particularly from China.
formally declared it to be an autonomous region of
Ukraine. In February 2014, after the pro-Moscow presi-
dent of Ukraine was driven from office by a popular up-
rising, and was replaced by a pro-European president, Conclusion
Putin acted quickly to infiltrate Russian special forces into Russia’s vast territory, weak administrative capacity, and
Crimea and take over control of the Crimean government. tradition of state domination over society make it likely
In doing so, Russia violated an agreement it had signed in that the primary objective of its leaders for the foresee-
1994 pledging to honor the existing boundaries of Ukraine. able future will be to strengthen the state, in both its in-
Immediately after taking control, Russia held a referen- ternal and its international dimensions. The end of the
dum in Crimea in which, according to the official report, Communist regime and the dissolution of the Soviet
96.7 percent of the voters supported Crimea’s incorpora- Union damaged the state’s capacity to enforce the laws,
tion into Russia. Russia then formally made Crimea a sub- protect its citizens, and provide basic social services.
ject of the Russian Federation (both Crimea and the Black Favorable economic conditions in the 2000s enabled the
Sea port city of Sevastopol were added). Only a handful state to rebuild its power at home and abroad, but recent
of countries have recognized Crimea’s annexation. The economic crises demonstrate Russia’s vulnerability to
United States and the European Union responded to the trends in international financial and energy markets. In
annexation by imposing economic sanctions on Russians. the long run, self-sustaining economic development will
These included restrictions on the ability of Russian banks require the rule of law and effective institutions for ar-
to take out long-term loans on international markets and ticulating and aggregating social interests. The viability
on Russian energy companies from acquiring technology of Russia’s postcommunist state will ultimately depend
abroad. A group of high-ranking individuals in govern- on how responsive and adaptive its institutions are to
ment also had their assets in the West frozen. the demands of Russia’s citizens in a globalized and in-
Russia also gave material support to pro-Russian terdependent world. The political regime established by
rebels in the eastern provinces of Ukraine itself. The se- Vladimir Putin aims above all at maintaining political sta-
cessionists are seeking independence from Ukraine and bility in the country and preserving the power of its rul-
have taken de facto control of two regions (Donetsk and ers. Like the Soviet regime before it, however, the Putin
Luhansk), which they have declared to be independent regime may find that the preoccupation with preserving
republics. After the rebels used a Russian missile to shoot stability leaves the regime poorly suited to reforming its
down a civilian aircraft flying over eastern Ukraine in July political and economic institutions to the challenges of a
2014, Russia’s military support for the rebellion diminished changing world.
336 Chapter 11

Review Questions
1. How did Yeltsin’s “shock therapy” program contrib- 4. What are the Putin regime’s methods for dealing
ute to the constitutional crisis of 1993? with civil society?
2. What effects did the constitutional struggles 5. Russians hold contradictory views of democracy.
of 1992–1993 have on the features of the 1993 What explains these attitudes?
constitution? 6. What is a party of power? Is United Russia a party
3. How did President Putin go about strengthening the of power?
power of the central government vis-à-vis regional 7. What are the main obstacles to the rule of law in
governments? What were his reasons for shifting the Russia? What changes in the political system would
balance of power in this way? be required to overcome them?

Key Terms
Chechnya (the Chechen Republic) League of Committees of Soldiers’ procuracy
commercial courts (arbitrazhnye sudy) Mothers Public Chamber
Communist Party of the Russian Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich Putin, Vladimir Vladimirovich
Federation (CPRF) Liberal Democratic Party of Russia Russian Union of Industrialists and
Constitutional Court (LDPR) Entrepreneurs (RUIE)
Federation Council loans for shares Security Council
Federation of Independent Trade Medvedev, Dmitry Anatolyevich shock therapy
Unions of Russia (FITUR) nomenklatura Stalin, Joseph
glasnost oligarchs State Council
Gorbachev, Mikhail party of power State Duma
law-governed state (pravovoe presidential decrees Telephone justice
gosudarstvo) privatization United Russia

Suggested Readings
Aslund, Anders. Russia’s Capitalist Revolution: Why Hale, Henry. Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics
Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy Failed. in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge
Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International University Press, 2015.
Economics, 2007. Hill, Fiona, and Clifford G. Gaddy. Mr. Putin: Operative
Colton, Timothy J. Yeltsin: A Life. New York: Basic Books, in the Kremlin. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution
2008. Press, 2015.
Fish, M. Stephen. Democracy Derailed in Russia: The McFaul, Michael. Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political
Failure of Open Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2005. University Press, 2001.
Greene, Samuel A. Moscow in Movement: Power and Treisman, Daniel. The Return: Russia’s Journey from
Opposition in Putin’s Russia. Stanford, CA: Stanford Gorbachev to Medvedev. New York: Free Press, 2011.
University Press, 2014. Zygar, Mikhail. All the Kremlin’s Men: Inside the Court of
Vladimir Putin. New York: Public Affairs, 2016.

Internet Resources
The official English-language version of the government The Moscow Times, an English-language daily
website, with links to the websites of the president, newspaper primarily for expatriates: http://www.
the parliament, and the government and other themoscowtimes.com.
bodies: http://gov.ru/index_en.html. The English-language site of the Levada Center for Public
The University of Pittsburgh links to resources on Opinion Research, an independent, high-quality
Russia: http://www.ucis.pitt.edu/reesweb. survey organization: http://www.levada.ru/eng/.
 Politics in Russia 337

Endnotes
1. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive nor most of the international community, has recog-
Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War nized the annexation of Crimea.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 14. Julia Kusznir, “Russian Territorial Reform: A Cen-
2. Henry E. Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime tralist Project That Could End Up Fostering Decen-
Dynamics in Comparative Perspective (New York: tralization?” Russian Analytical Digest 43 (June 17,
Cambridge University Press, 2015). 2008): 8–10, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/56388/
3. Max de Haldevang, “Observer Group Questions Pres- Russian_Analytical_Digest_43.pdf.
idential Vote Result,” Moscow Times, March 8, 2012. 15. J. Paul Goode, “The Push for Regional Enlargement
4. President Dmitry Medvedev, “Rossiia, vpered! [Go, in Putin’s Russia,” Post-Soviet Affairs 20, 3 (July–
Russia!],” as published on the presidential website September 2004): 219–257.
http://kremlin.ru on September 10, 2009. 16. On the Chechen wars, see Daniel Treisman, The Re-
5. Richard Pipes, Russia Under the Old Regime, 2nd ed. turn: Russia’s Journey from Gorbachev to Medvedev
(New York: Penguin Books, 1995). (New York: Free Press, 2011).
6. Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (New York: 17. Timothy J. Colton, Yeltsin: A Life (New York: Basic
Oxford University Press, 1996). Books, 2008).
7. In 2008, the constitution was amended at President 18. Henry E. Hale, “The Myth of Mass Russian Support
Medvedev’s request to extend the president’s term for Autocracy: The Public Opinion Foundations of a
of o"ce from four years to six, and that of the Duma Hybrid Regime,” Europe-Asia Studies 63, 8 (October
from four years to five. Both amendments took e#ect 2011): 1364.
after the 2011–2012 election cycle. These are the only 19. Viktor Khamraev, “Rossiiane vidiat vokrug de-
amendments to have been made so far to the con- mokratiiu,” Kommersant, March 20, 2012.
stitution. Based on the new schedule, the next presi- 20. Levada Center, May 26, 2010, http://www.levada
dential election will be in 2018. .ru/press/2010052618.html, accessed May 30, 2010.
8. In April 2013, the director of the Security Council in- 21. Hale, “The Myth of Mass Russian Support,”
structed his subordinates to develop proposals “to 1357–1375.
strengthen national security in the spiritual–ethi-
22. Fond obshchestvennogo mneniia, http://fom.ru
cal sphere.” Representatives of the Security Coun-
/Nastroeniya/12101, accessed August 24, 2016.
cil were unsure what he had in mind but thought it
might have to do with fighting same-sex marriage. 23. Polit.ru, June 25, 2010. Interestingly, those most
Taissiia Bekbulatova, Ivan Safronov, and Maksim likely to report that they feel protected from arbi-
Ivanov, “Na strazhe dukhovnoi bezopasnosti,” Kom- trary treatment are women, individuals with lower
mersant, April 25, 2013. educational levels, and those with low incomes.
9. Many observers agreed that the point of the reform was 24. Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Neil Munro, Pop-
to weaken the influence of local interests on Duma dep- ular Support for an Undemocratic Regime: The Changing
uties, further centralizing power with the executive. Views of Russians (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011).
10. Ben Noble and Ekaterina Schulmann, “Parliament
and the Legislative Decision-Making Process,” in 25. Khamraev, “Rossiiane vidiat vokrug demokratiiu.”
Daniel Treisman, ed., Arrested Development: Rethink- 26. Elena Lisovskaya and Vyacheslav Karpov, “New
ing Politics in Putin’s Russia (forthcoming). Ideologies in Postcommunist Russian Textbooks,”
11. A vivid portrait of a jury trial in Moscow is pre- Comparative Education Review 43, 4 (1999): 522–532.
sented by Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Kremlin 27. “Shkol’niki Rossii predpochli izuchat’ svetskuiu
Rising: Vladimir Putin’s Russia and the End of Revolu- etiku,” Vedomosti, February 24, 2010; Polit.ru, March
tion (New York: Scribner, 2005), 231–250. 26, 2010.
12. On nationality policy in the Soviet Union, see Terry 28. 86% of the public rely on television as a major source
Martin, The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and of news; only 33% cite Internet publications and 23%
Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939 (Ithaca, the social media. Levada Center survey, July 2016,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2001). http://www.levada.ru/2016/08/12/14111/.
13. Following Russia’s forcible annexation of Crimea 29. A law passed in 2012 requires Internet service provid-
in 2014, Russia incorporated Crimea and the city of ers to remove any sites that violate laws on illegal
Sevastopol within it as two new subjects of the fed- content. Although the law’s sponsors argued that the
eration. Neither Ukraine, of which Crimea was part, law was needed to fight child pornography and other
338 Chapter 11

social harms, opponents warned that the language of of economic costs is one of the major reasons
the law was su"ciently broad that it could be used to that Russia’s economy continues to be so slow to
block any politically objectionable sites. Human Rights restructure.
Watch, “Laws of Attrition: Crackdown on Russia’s 43. Article 59 of the constitution provides that young men
Civil Society after Putin’s Return to the Presidency” of conscription age who are conscientious objectors
(New York: Human Rights Watch, 2013), available at to war may do alternative service rather than being
https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/04/24/laws- called up to army service. Legislation specifying how
attrition/crackdown-russias-civil-society-after-putins- this right may be exercised finally passed in 2002.
return-presidency, accessed May 7, 2013.
44. The chairwoman of Soldiers’ Mothers estimated that
30. Levada Center, April 29, 2013, http://www.levada some 3,500 servicemen lose their lives each year as
.ru /print/29-04-2013/svyshe-poloviny-strany- a result of “various accidents and suicides,” RFE/RL
schitaet-er- partiei-zhulikov-i-vorov. Newsline, February 14, 2008.
31. Masha Gessen, “Alexe Navalny’s Very Strange 45. Polit.ru, June 18, 2009.
Form of Freedom,” New Yorker, January 15, 2016,
46. On the labor unions and the tripartite commissions,
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk
see Sarah Ashwin and Simon Clarke, Russian Trade
/alexey-navalnys-very-strange-form-of-freedom.
Unions and Industrial Relations in Transition (New
32. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic York and Houndsmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire,
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UK: Palgrave Ma cmillan, 2003).
University Press, 1993).
47. Richard Rose, “New Russia Barometer VI: After the
33. Marc Morje Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Presidential Election,” Studies in Public Policy no.
Post-Communist Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- 272 (Glasgow: Center for the Study of Public Pol-
versity Press, 2003). icy, University of Strathclyde, 1996), 6; and Richard
34. I. Mersiianova, “Sotsial’naia baza rossiiskogo grazh- Rose, “Getting Things Done in an Anti-Modern Soci-
danskogo obshchestva,” in E. S. Petrenko, ed., ety: Social Capital Networks in Russia,” Social Capi-
Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo sovremennoi Rossii. Sotsio- tal Initiative Working Paper no. 6 (Washington, DC:
logicheskie zarisovki s natury (Moscow, Institute Fonda World Bank, 1998), 15.
Obshchestvennoe mnenie, 2008), 131. 48. Graeme B. Robertson, “Strikes and Labor Organiza-
35. Maksim Ivanov, “Televidenie ostalos’ v glavnoi roli,” tions in Hybrid Regimes,” American Political Science
Kommersant, April 5, 2011. Review 101, 4 (2007): 781–798.
36. For one such example, see Sarah Lindemann- 49. In hard times, Russian enterprises tend not to lay o#
Komarova, “How a Siberian Mom Took on Poli- workers but instead put them on short hours and
tics as Usual in Russia and Won,” the Nation, https: eliminate bonuses. Workers may still get a wage
//www.thenation.com/article/how-a-siberian- while looking for a job in the informal sector. Among
mom-took-on-politics-as-usual-in-russia-and-won/. other things, this preserves workers’ pensions and
37. Olga Kryshtanovskaya and Stephen White, “Putin’s medical benefits.
Militocracy,” Post-Soviet A!airs 19, 4 (2003): 289–306. 50. On social movements, see Samuel A. Greene, Mos-
38. On the predatory behavior of many of the o"cials cow in Movement: Power and Opposition in Putin’s Rus-
and business tycoons close to Putin, see Karen Dawi- sia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
sha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? (New 51. Ora John Reuter and Thomas F. Remington, “Domi-
York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). nant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem:
39. Jane I. Dawson, Eco-Nationalism: Anti-Nuclear Ac- The Case of United Russia,” Comparative Political
tivism and National Identity in Russia, Lithuania, and Studies 42, 4 (2009): 501–526.
Ukraine (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996). 52. Stephen White, Richard Rose, and Ian McAllister,
40. Sergei Sergei Konovalov, “Grazhdan razlozhili na How Russia Votes (Chatham, NJ: Chatham House,
atomu,” Nezavisimaia gazeta, December 21, 2011. 1997), 241–270.
41. Nikolaus von Twickel, “Kremlin Earmarks $350M to 53. Quoted from a press release of the election observer
Friendly NGOs,” Moscow Times, March 9, 2011. mission of the Organization for Security and Coop-
42. In a system where all prices were set by the state, eration in Europe, posted to its website immediately
there was no meaningful measure of profit in any following the election, as reported by RFE/RL News-
case. Indeed, relative prices were profoundly dis- line, March 15, 2004.
torted by the cumulative e#ect of decades of cen- 54. In all, 108 candidates on the United Party list de-
tral planning. The absence of accurate measures clined to take their seats in parliament. Such
 Politics in Russia 339

candidates were used as “locomotives”—they were 63. Thane Gustafson, Capitalism Russian-Style (Cam-
used to attract votes, but had no intention of serving bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 2–3,
in the Duma once the party won. 94–95.
55. On the scale of fraud in recent Russian elections, see 64. World Bank, “The Long Road to Recovery,” Russian
Mikhail Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dmitri Sha- Economic Report no. 35 (Moscow: World Bank, April
kin, The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine 2016), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). release/2016/04/06/russia-economic-report-35,
56. Arkady Lyubarev, “An Evaluation of the Results of accessed August 26, 2016.
the Duma Elections,” Russian Analytical Digest 108 65. Credit Suisse Research Institute, Global Wealth Data-
(February 6, 2012): 2–5. book 2015, Table 6-5, p. 149
57. In a famous episode in February 2012, members of 66. Quoted from Vladimir Putin’s address to an ex-
a female punk rock group called Pussy Riot entered panded session of the State Council, February 8, 2008,
the Cathedral of Christ the Savior in Moscow and “On the Strategy of Development of Russia to 2020,”
tried to hold a “punk worship service” mocking Pu- president.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/02/159528
tin before being forcibly removed by police. They .shtml.
were charged with hooliganism and sentenced to 67. Many believe that the published budget underes-
two years’ imprisonment. Although many thought timates actual military spending, some of which is
the sentences excessive, most Russians were ap- hidden in other budget categories.
palled by their actions. Putin gave them amnesty
68. Andrew E. Kramer, “More of Kremlin’s Opponents
shortly before the 2014 Sochi Olympics.
are Ending Up Dead,” New York Times, August
58. On workplace mobilization, see Timothy Frye, Ora John 20, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/21
Reuter, and David Szakonyi, “Political Machines at /world/europe/moscow-kremlin-silence-critics-
Work: Voter Mobilization and Electoral Subversion in poison.html?_r=0.
the Workplace,” World Politics 66, 2 (April 2014): 195–228.
69. Polit.ru, May 13, 2010.
59. Joel S. Hellman, “Winners Take All: The Politics
70. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#results-
of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions,”
table.
World Politics 50, 1 (1998): 203–234.
71. Polit.ru, November 17, 2009.
60. An excellent account of the “loans for shares” pro-
gram, based on interviews with many of the par- 72. Polit.ru, April 26, 2013.
ticipants, is Chrystia Freeland, Sale of the Century: 73. Joel S. Hellman, Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann,
Russia’s Wild Ride from Communism to Capitalism “Seize the State, Seize the Day: State Capture, Cor-
(New York: Crown, 2000), 169–189. ruption, and Influence in Transition,” Policy Research
61. Joseph R. Blasi, Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse, Working Paper no. 2444 (Washington, DC: World
Kremlin Capitalism: Privatizing the Russian Economy Bank Institute, 2000).
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 50. 74. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government:
62. Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruse, Kremlin Capitalism; Mi- Causes, Consequences and Reform (Cambridge: Cam-
chael McFaul, “State Power, Institutional Change, bridge University Press, 1999), 159–174.
and the Politics of Privatization in Russia,” World
Politics 47 (1995): 210–243.
 HEILONGJIANG
Qiqihar
N
Harbin

A Changchun
O LI
JILIN
O NG
Urümqi M Shenyang Sea
E R LIAONING of
I NN HEBEI Japan
XINJIANG Hohhot Beijing
GANSU
Dalian
Yumen TIANJIN
Taiyuan Shijiazhuang
Yinchuan
Jinan Qingdao
NINGXIA

g He
NG Yellow
SHANXI DO Sea
Huan
Xining AN J
QINGHAI SH IA
Lanzhou Zhengzhou
N GS
Xi'an U Nanjing
HENAN Hefei
SHAANXI SHANGHAI
TIBET
SICHUAN HUBEI Wuhan ANHUI
ang Hangzhou
n g Ji
Chengdu East
a

ZHEJIANG
Ch

Lhasa
CHONGQING China
Nanchang
Changsha Sea
XI Fuzhou
NG
Guiyang HUNAN JIA
C H I N A GUIZHOU
FUJIAN

0 200 400 600 Miles Kunming GUANGXI GUANGDONG

Pe arl Ri ver
0 200 400 600 Kilometers YUNNAN Guangzhou
Nanning HONG KONG
MACAO
Zhanjiang
Haikou South
Bay of
Bengal HAINAN China Sea

Country Bio
Population 1,357 million
Territory 3,705,386 square miles
Year of PRC Inauguration 1949
Year of Current Constitution 1982 (amended in 1988, 1993, 1999, 2004)
Head of Party and State Communist Party General Secretary and President of the PRC Xi Jinping
Head of Government Premier Li Keqiang
Standard Chinese or Mandarin (Putonghua, based on the Beijing dialect), Yue (Cantonese), Wu (Shanghainese),
Languages
Minbei (Fuzhou), Minnan (Hokkien-Taiwanese), Xiang, Gan, Hakka dialects, minority languages
Religion Daoist (Taoist), Buddhist, Muslim 2–3%; Christian 1% (estimate); nation is officially atheist

340