The Announcement of August 20th, 1917

Author(s): Richard Danzig

Source: The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Nov., 1968), pp. 19-37
Published by: Duke University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/2942837
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The Announcement of August 20th, 1917
RICHARD DANZIG

ON August 20th, I9I7, Edwin Montagu declared in the House of Commons

that: "the policy of His Majesty's Government ... is that of the ... gradual
development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realiza-
tion of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Em-
pire."' This announcement, more than any other single event, may properly be
described as signalling the creation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and the
breakup of the third British Empire. It affirmed that a nonwhite portion of the em-
pire could aspire to the same goal of self-government as the white colonies of
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa had successively achieved.
In I9I7, as now, the nature of the events that prompted the cabinet to approve
so radical an announcement was fairly apparent. Britain was in the midst of a
more damaging war than she had ever before experienced. She depended on India
for the provision of over one million troops and large sums of money. She was
confronted by an increasingly successful, increasingly militant, "home rule" move-
ment in India which the Viceroy (Chelmsford), his governors and the Secretary
of State for India (Montagu) chose to interpret as "extremist." This movement
could have been suppressed by force; but both Montagu and Chelmsford accu-
rately perceived (as Gandhi was later to grasp) that British rule in India could
not function without the active collaboration of an elite and at least the passive
acquiescence of the mass. It was feared that repression of "extremists" would alien-
ate the "moderates" whose support was thus deemed vital. The government in
the period I9I6-I7 therefore decided to "rally the moderates" by presenting them
with an acceptable ideal which would counter the extremist demand for immedi-
ate home rule.
Added to this motivation was a widespread feeling among those responsible
for the government of India that a general reform of British Indian administration
(especially in the direction of decentralization) was desirable. Individuals sup-
ported an announcement of a goal as a way of initiating this reform.
Another set of influential individuals favored Indian reform as a way of better
fitting India into the framework of a united self-governing empire which they hoped
to mould at the conclusion of the war.
I have occasion to discuss these intriguing causative factors elsewhere.2 The
intent of this essay is to discuss the at first sight much more mundane question
of how the announcement came to be worded as it was by the cabinet. This
Richard Danzig holds the Bachelor of Philosophy and Doctor of Philosophy degrees from the
University of Oxford and is a consultant to The RAND Corporation. This article was written while on
a Rhodes Scholarship at Magdalen College, Oxford.
1 House of Commons Debates, Vol. 97, cc. I695-97 (20 Aug. I9I7). Also conveniently reprinted
in Report, paragraph 6.
2 In a forthcoming study: British Reform Policy and Indian Politics on the Eve of the Rise of
Gandhi.

19

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20 RICHARD DANZIG
process has been subject to much speculation, but only recently with the opening
of cabinet papers until I92I and the granting of access to a large number of pri-
vate collections3 has it become possible to piece together an accurate picture of
these secret discussions. The picture is illuminating in several ways.
Because detailed minutes of cabinet discussions were maintained only after the
formation of Lloyd George's war cabinet in December of I9I6, the phrasing of the
announcement is the first cabinet decision in regard to India which can be
studied with some confidence. As such, it, provides a first example of how Indian
affairs were treated at the highest levels.
Of more immediate importance to students of Indian affairs in this period,
a close reading of available documents will cast Curzon's actions and attitudes
in a clearer and more comprehensible light.
Moreover these discussions suggest the general thesis that British reform policy
and practice at this time (and probably at other times) was in part compounded
of misunderstanding and confusion. We find political-administrative decisions at
the highest levels interpreted by individuals at lower levels in a way which yielded
consequences very different from those intended. The question of how the an-
nouncement came to be worded as it was proves especially interesting when juxta-
posed with the consideration of how administrators imagined it came to be
worded at it was.

In mid-1916 faced with events in India whose detail we will not discuss here,
Chelsmford's Executive Council proposed a "formula" which it thought pos-
sibly suitable for promulgation as the "goal" of British policy. Its critical passage
ran as follows:

The only goal to which we can look forward is to endow India, as an integral
part of the British Empire, with the largest measure of Self-Government com-
patible with the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule. The special cir-
cumstances of India must govern the form of Self-Government with which she
shall eventually be endowed.4

The India Office had decided to alter this formula because the original draft was
judged too elaborate and "its phraseology bore the marks of many hands and
suggested that from a divergence of views a compromise had emerged; . . ."5
It was thus reworded and presented to the cabinet by Chamberlain and then Mont-
agu in these terms:

3 Available through the kindness of the Barnes, Butler, Chelmsford, Gendel, Lloyd, Meston and
Willingdon families, the University of Birmingham, the India Office Library, the Scottish National
Registry Office, the Public Record Office, the National Archives of India, and Trinity College, Cambridge.
4 Chelmsford Coll., Vol. 2. Formula 7/7/I6. The earliest draft of this passage appears to have been
written by Sir Valentine Chirol. A memoir by Barnes records: "Sir Valentine Chirol (who was a
guest in Viceregal Lodge at the time [late April]) was also invited to put down on paper any views
he might have [i.e. as well as members of Council]. Sir Valentine accordingly wrote a short note on
half a sheet of notepaper . . . On the 25 May I9I6 a meeting of the Council was held, at which the
various memoranda were considered generally, and Sir Valentine Chirol's note was used as a basis
for an agreed formula." (Barnes Papers, Memoir written on 2/5/33, "Initiation by Lord Chelmsford
of Reforms in India." Chirol's original handwritten note is preserved in the Barnes Papers.)
6 Cab. 23/3, 172 (I3), 29/6/I7. Chamberlain's comment is quoted in the minutes. Also found in
Trinity Coll. Cab. folio I9I6/I7. Cf. also Chelmsford Coll., Vol. 3, Chamberlain to Chelmsford:
". . . I dislike the elaboration and formality of your definition" (15/5/17).

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 21
His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have in view the gradual
development of free institutions in India with a view to ultimate self-government
within the Empire.6

The announcement that finally emerged from the cabinet read:

The policy of His Majesty's government with which the Government of India
are in complete accord, is that of the increasing association of Indians in every
branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing in-
stitutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible Government in
India as an integral part of the British Empire.7

We may note two major changes. The phrase "compatible with the mainte-
nance of British supremacy" was removed in the India Office draft. "Self-govern-
ment," which appeared in both the Government of India and the India Office
drafts, became in the final cabinet version "responsible government." Both of these
changes were highly significant.
Chelmsford's Council memorandum was first criticized by the permanent un-
dersecretary of the India Office, the very competent Sir Thomas Holderness. It
was he who in I9I6 recommended that the pledge to secure "the largest measure
of Self-Government" be left to stand without the qualification "compatible with
the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule." In later analyses this change
has been skipped over as a superficial linguistic modification. "As an integral part
of the British Empire" achieved, some said, the same effect, and, it was rightly
argued, would be less offensive to nationalist opinion.
But in retrospect it seems certain that this view is wrong and that Holderness
held a view about the ends of Indian development which was fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of Chelmsford and Chelmsford's Executive Council. Con-
servative members of the Council read "maintenance of the supremacy of British
rule" as the negation of self-government. Sir Michael O'Dwyer (not a member
of the Council, but a participant in its discussions) wrote that the formula showed
"that the idea of colonial self-government for which the most advanced politicians
are striving is not suitable to India," because any goal "must be compatible with
'the maintenance of the supremacy of British rule.' "8
Another governor involved in the reforms discussions, Sir James Meston, in-
terpreted the possibility of concessions under the formula more liberally, but also
regarded the phrase "supremacy of British Rule" as clearly fixing a ceiling on the
possibility of self-government. "The Minto-Morley Reforms stood us on an inclined
plane," he wrote to Valentine Chirol,

in the middle of which we cannot stop. We must go on until we reach the stage
at which the legislative power passes to the people, subject always to-and this
is the great virtue of the Viceroy's formula-the supremacy of British rule.9

6 Cab. 24/22/2I4 (appendix i), GT I6I5 Montagu Mem. on Indian Reforms.

7 Report, paragraph 6.
8 Chelmsford Coil., Vol. 5I, No. I3, O'Dwyer to Chelmsford (note) 25/8/I6 and cf. e.g. ibid.,
No. 6, memorandum by P. C. Lyons, appended Carmichael to Chelmsford 20/8/I6: "There is no
clear indication that the eventual form of self-government which we contemplate will contain such
elements of national freedom as will suffice to constitute India a partner in the Empire rather than
one of its dependents."
9 Meston Papers, Vol. 4. Meston to Chirol. I0/9/I6.

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22 RICHARD DANZIG
He continued: "This means, to my interpretation, that when foolish or mischiveous
or vicious or retrograde legislation is passed by a Council, executive power
whether it be the Head of the province or the Governor-General must promptly
and courageously intervene with his veto. In this way the alternative sovereignty will
rest with him and not with Council, and this is what I understand by the supremacy
of British rule."'10
The significance of the phrase must have been apparent to all concerned."
For six months we struggled with this problem [the formula] and only ar-
rived at our definition after scrapping numerous alternatives."'12 Holderness cer-
tainly saw the issue clearly. He had read a private letter from the Viceroy to Chamber-
lain in which Chelmsford had written: "I am not prepared to agree at the present
moment to Colonial Self-Government, as a possible goal."'13 In this light, the phrase
"maintenance of the supremacy of British rule" had to be read as directed not
towards the general idea of loyalty to the Crown and participation in Empire (as
would be implied if Holderness' modification were mere "linguistic") but rather
towards the maintenance of British power at the center in India.
Holderness, in fact, goes out of the way to underscore the importance of this
phrase. His memorandum compares Chelmsford's Council's views with those
of another permanent undersecretary who was also a former Viceroy, the much
admired Lord Hardinge.

They both emphasise the fact that the self-governing institutions of the Dominions
are the product of evolution. But whereas Lord Hardinge finds evidence in this
that like institutions will be reached in India only by long and patient endeavour
and not per saltum, the formula [of Chelmsford] hints that India can never ex-
pect to attain them in fullness or identity.'4

Thus, the India Office change was of vital importance. Despite the vaunted
role of the cabinet in making Indian policy, despite Montagu's reputation as a
radical and the lengthy considerations of the Government of India (the supposedly
highly influential "men on the spot"), perhaps the most important change in the
announcement of August 20th-the elimination of this Viceregal "hint"-was
made by the India Office permanent staff. The pledge to grant "self-government"
became a reality there, it became self-government without "the maintenance of
the supremacy of British rule."
Those involved chose to overlook the import of the change. Chelmsford, with
a strong sense of duty, a commitment to the belief that policy should be made in
England, and an increasingly desperate desire for an announcement, accepted the
change. The alteration would not, after all, affect the actions of his lifetime and
in the long run if he were right his view would, in practice, triumph. The cabinet

10 Ibid.
11 The fact that it had not appeared in the original Chirol draft suggests that the introduction
of this phrase followed discussion and was quite self-conscious.
12 Chelmsford Coll., Vol. 3, Chelmsford to Chamberlain, 26/5/17.
13 Trinity Coll., Cab. Folio i9i6/17, Hulderness Memorandum on Viceroy Formula 31/7/I6.
14 Ibid. (Holderness Memorandum). And cf. Barnes Papers, Holderness to Barnes 5/IO/I6: "Viewing
the formula as one that might be publically used and made a catchword, I could not help expressing
apprehension that the Indian politician, so ready to take alarm and to discern signs of retrogression
and to suspect the honesty of the British Government, would at once compare it with Lord
Hardinge's utterances and find in it a denial of progress beyond a finite point."

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 23
never focussed on this change, and it is impossible to tell whether they were even
aware of it and its implications.
The wording, however, papered over a difference of opinion which was bound
to reemerge in the cabinet discussions. Therefore it is not surprising that when
Balfour took the first step in opening cabinet debate he sought to modify the "for-
mula" to achieve the same end as Chelmsford desired. But whereas Chelmsford
had included the term "self-government" as a sop while severely restricting its in-
terpretation, Balfour less subtly objected to the term itself.

Historically, religiously, ethnologically, the case of India at the present moment

differs profoundly from the case of the self-governing dominions; and the termi-
nology which is applicable to the latter may be, and at present is, quite inappropriate
to the former.15

A month later he went further:

The whole difficulty centres on the words "self-government" . . . The word "Self-
government" as applied to any faction of the British Empire, has a perfectly
definite and familiar meaning. It means Parliamentary Government on a demo-
cratic basis . . . Now everybody admits that for India, as it is, this form of Gov-
ernment is totally unsuitable. Where I differ with some misgiving, from high
Indian authorities, is in holding the view that in all probability neither the lapse
of time nor the development of education will ever make it suitable. East is
East and West is West. Does India as a whole possess the characteristics which
would give Parliamentary government a chance? To me it seems that it does
not.16

The battle over "self-government" was to be joined again. Who were the com-
batants ?
In December I9I6 Lloyd George had become head of a small war cabinet
designed to vigorously prosecute the war. Ministers were appointed to head each
government department as was usual in peacetime, but they did not meet together
as members of a cabinet. All policy decisions were referred to the war cabinet
whose members, except for Bonar Law, had no departmental duties.
In August 1917 this war cabinet consisted of Lloyd George, Curzon, Milner,
Bonar Law, Barnes, Smuts, and Carson; of these only Curzon exerted any in-
fluence on the formulation of the announcement. Lloyd George (who presided
over most meetings) rarely commented on the Indian proceedings.

It is so disenheartening to find that lack of interest in Indian affairs, excused

now because of the pre-occupations of the war, but I am afraid always present ...
I cannot get the PM to take the slightest interest in the matter....17

15 Cab. 23/3, 176 (i8) 5/7/I7.

16 Cab. 24/22, GT I696, Balfour: A Note on Indian Reform 7/8/I7; also found in Trinity
Coll., Cab. folio I9I6/I7.
17 Montagu Coll., Vol. 2, Mont. to Chelmsford 5/9/i8. Before he became a member of the
cabinet, Montagu sent Lloyd George a long letter on Indian reform. On forwarding a copy to Hankey
he confessed that the PM "has never expressed an opinion on the matter." (Cab. 2I/66 File 20/F/I,
Montagu to Hankey 2I/4/I7.) Hankey broached the subject to Lloyd George and cheerfully wrote back:
". . . I am quite sure that he never got the end and really important part of your letter." (Cab. 2I/66
File 20/F/I, Hankey to Montagu 27/4/I7.)

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24 RICHARD DANZIG
Smuts, Carson, and Barnes, who had joined the cabinet in June, July, and August,
respectively, were too new and too uninterested in Indian affairs18 to have any in-
fluence. Milner and Bonar Law were preoccupied with other matters.
But Curzon was not alone in setting cabinet policy. The Secretary of State
for India, though not a member of the war cabinet, was admitted to meetings
when Indian affairs were discussed,'9 and Balfour, by virtue of his own interest
and position as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was always present during
1917 Indian discussions.20 As a result, cabinet formulation of the announcement
was the product of discussions within first the triangle of Austen Chamberlain
(the Secretary of State for India), Balfour, and Curzon, and later, after Chamber-
lain's resignation (in July of 1917), of Montagu, Balfour, and Curzon.
In these triads Curzon was dominant. He occupied the middle ground be-
tween Chamberlain's and Montagu's progressive and liberal proposals and Bal-
four's extremely conservative reaction. He alone was a member of the war cabi-
net. He was also acknowledged as their Indian expert.

He has, I think, been given a certain special authority by the Cabinet as a reporter
to use the French phrase, to the Cabinet on Indian questions. The same thing
has been done with other members of the Cabinet in other matters....21

No one in 1917 could challenge this position. Balfour had no Indian experience;
Chamberlain was inclined to underestimate his knowledge and Montagu was too
new in his position to carry much weight in the August discussions.
This was the only time in the history of the reforms that Curzon predominated.
After 1917 the other two sides of the triangle changed. Montagu became increas-
ingly assertive, with the weight of a trip to India and seven solid months' work
on the joint report behind him; Balfour never again attended a meeting on Indian
reform; and Chamberlain's influence revived, when in April of I9I8, just as the
reforms report came up for consideration, he gained a seat in the war cabinet.
The remainder of cabinet history in relation to these reforms is dominated by
Chamberlain who now assumed the middle role between the increasingly bitter
disputants, the "conservative" Curzon and the "liberal" Montagu. Further, though
there was no admission of this fact at the time, Chamberlain increasingly assumed
the role of the war cabinet "reporter" on Indian affairs. It was, for example,
Chamberlain, not Curzon, who was consulted on the appointment of Chelmsford's

18 Smuts expressed an interest in writing on the subject, but appears never to have done so.
19 Cf. Cab. 2I/68 File 20/F/3 Hankey to Montagu, 23/5/I8 guaranteeing that under normal
conditions he would always be called when the Cabinet would be discussing India.
20 This was not at all unusual. "From its formation in December I9I6 until its dissolution at the
end of October I919 the War Cabinet held over 650 meetings. At these meetings over 500 persons
who were not members of the War Cabinet and its secretarial were summoned at different times
to attend." (Public Record Office, Handbook no. ii, London: HMSO, 1966, p. 3), and cf. Sir Ivor
Jennings, Cabinet Government (Cambridge, I959), p. 298. It would seem to have been accepted
procedure that interest alone would gain a minister admission to war cabinet discussions of Indian
matters. Cf. Cab. 2I/68 File 20/F/3, Hankey to Long I4/8/I7, noting that Long would normally
be summoned to such meetings because of his expressed interest, Note also that Balfour enjoyed
a rather peculiar status. He was not a member of the War Cabinet, but except for the King, was
the only person outside of it to receive copies of all papers it dealt with. (Public Record Office
Handbook, p. 8.)
21 Trinity Coll., Austen Chamberlain Folio, Chamberlain to Montagu, 3I/5/I8.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 25
successor. His impact on Indian policy (based on nothing more than a continuing
interest and nine months in the India Office) was greater than that of any other
British politician, excepting only the incumbent Secretary of State. Astonishingly,
it was to continue through the I935 Act.22
But in August I9I7 Chamberlain was not in office, and it was Curzon who
dominated. His great influence rested on the fact of a triad, but the existence of
a triad was itself indicative of an important fact. The only opinions which counted
at the ministerial level were those of ministers. The argument over the wording
of a formula was an argument in a vacuum. The Government of India, through
the Secretary of State, had pressed home the necessity of an announced "formula"
and suggested a model. The cabinet took it from there.
It seems not to have occurred to Balfour that he might have found support
for his arguments in the opinions of the Viceroy and his council. Had he intro-
duced a fourth force-the Government of India-into the cabinet discussions, the
triad would have been broken and his own influence extended. But he argued
on a theoretical, not a political, basis, and his contact with his natural allies was
nonexistent. Because of Holderness's change, Balfour never realized the extent
to which the Government of India would have supported his view (and be-
cause of the cabinet system and his nature he never thought to look for such
support). The "men on the spot" were supposedly represented by Montagu, but
his emphasis was on the importance of including the phrase "self-government" in
the announcement. It was Curzon who drafted the final version of the announce-
ment,23 and not surprisingly Balfour and Montagu readily yielded to it because
of the balance of influence and because, as a result of Curzon's masterly drafting, each
found the formula not unsatisfactory.
This final drafting of the announcement has given rise to a furious though
unenlightened dispute. Curzon's major change over previous wordings was to insert
the phrase "responsible government" in place of "self-government." Those who
thought the change important imagined "responsible government" to be the
stronger term, but Curzon was presumably searching for a more conservative ver-
sion of Chamberlain and Montagu's announcement that would meet Balfour's ob-
jections and suit his own temperament. Why then "responsible"? Montagu himself
admitted to being thoroughly perplexed:

For some reason that I am absolutely unable to understand people [i.e., the Cabi-
net] prefer "responsible government" to "self-government." I do not know the
difference.24

22 An analysis of the Lothian and Chamberlain collections indicates that Chamberlain's role in
I935 was exceptionally significant. He was "elder statesman" and an example of moderation to
all factions (cf. e.g. Lothian Coll., GD 40/17/I67, Kerr to Willingdon 4/8/33) and as such was
the natural person to form a bridge between the conservatives on the Parliamentary Committee and the
more liberal Hoare.
23 There is no doubt about this. Curzon's pencilled corrections of Montagu's draft may be found
in Curzon Coll. F III/438 (Montagu's draft is GT i6i5). Also in this file is a copy of the final
announcement with Curzon's handwritten comment across the top: "This is the formula drawn
up by me and accepted by the Cabinet which was announced simultaneously in England and in
India."
24 Chamberlain Papers, AC I5/5/8, Montagu to Chamberlain I5/8/I7, and cf. Montagu Coll.,
Vol. i, 2I/8/I7.

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26 RICHARD DANZIG
Ronaldshay, in his standard biography of Curzon, can find no explanation
other than an inexplicable failing of competence:
Lord Curzon's attitude now becomes extremely difficult to understand. Contrary
to all experience, his mind on this, the one question of all others on which he
might have been expected to see clearly, seemed to be tossing painfully on a sea
of indecision. For once his power of setting forth in precise language exactly what
he had in mind seems to have deserted him. He had certainly never give anyone
cause to suppose that he regarded a Parliamentary system as in the least suit-
able to the circumstances of India.25

Ronaldshay's explanation can be rejected for a host of reasons. First, if we wish

to charge a loss of competence we must charge not only Curzon but Balfour as
well, for he found Curzon's formula satisfactory while he disliked that of Austen
Chamberlain. Further, all the evidence indicates that both men would have been
exceptionally careful in their choice of words when drafting a formula. At the first
cabinet meeting where a promulgation was discussed, the minutes record:
He [Curzon] attached particular importance to the form which the pronounce-
ment of their policy should take. Educated Indians were past-masters in casuistry,
and their criticism of formulae was embarrassingly subtle and meticulous. Every
word of a declaration drawn up by a former PM [Lord Derby] for Queen Vic-
toria, and hailed at the time and ever since as "The Charter of Indian Liberties,"
had been analysed and cited, often to our disadvantage.26

And Balfour? If we wish to consider a charge of acceptance of imprecise

language, Churchill's description of him must be borne in mind:
Curiously enough this most easy, sure and fluent of speakers was the most timid,
labourious of writers . . . Once he saw in his mind's eye a reasoned proposition,
he was certain he could unfold it intelligently and with distinction but when he
took up the pen, he came all over of a tremble and crossed and transposed and
rewrote to an amazing extent. He would spend hours on a paragraph and days
upon an article . . . in his bedroom his writing pad on his lap and fountain pen
poised judicially over the blank sheet of paper, a score of arguments against every
case and against every phrase and almost every word paraded itself and marched
and counter-marched before his speculative gaze.27

Ronaldshay's analysis breaks down in still one more respect. It is true that Cur-
zon had "certainly never given anyone cause to suppose that he regarded a Parlia-
mentary system as in the least suitable to the circumstances of India," but, while
holding this opinion, he had more foresight than Balfour, in seeing that Indian
Parliamentary institutions could not be prevented from developing.
. . . I entertain no shadow of doubt that these bodies [provincial and imperial legis-
latures] will gradually convert themselves into the very form, i.e. of small Parlia-
25 Ronaldshay, Earl of, The Life of Lord Curzon, Vol. III (London, 1928), i66. Cf. also Crad-
dock, The Dilemma in India (London: I929), p. i68: "To anyone who knew Lord Curzon's views . . .
the inseertion of these words by him is explicable only as an extraordinary temporary lapse of a
brilliant brain."
26 Cab. 23/3, 172 (I3) 29/6/17. Also found in Trinity Coll. Cab. folio I9I6/17. Curzon's
statement is given all the more weight by his repetition of it one year later. "The Indian mind
was prone to dissect phrases and to examine very minutely every word of a government proclamation."
(Cab. 23/6 428 (3), 7/6/I8.)
27 Churchill, Winston, Great Contemporaries (London, I941), p. 2I5.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 27
ments, which I ventured to forecast in the House of Lords Debates in igog, and
which Lord Morley repudiated with a vehemence that was equally shortsighted and
sincere.28

Curzon was not to be trapped in a short-sighted vehemence. This was a man

who never fought the inevitable for the sake of a fight.

Lord Curzon. What a strange man he was! And how much the reality of the man
was at variance with his public reputation. For he gave the impression that his
views were rigid and inflexible . . . Again and again he would throw over a cause
with which he had been long and publically identified without sign or warn-
ing . . .29

Throughout the reforms Curzon showed a remarkable willingness to accept what

had to be accepted, just as he at other times accepted women's suffrage and House
of Lords reform, remarkable turnabouts after years of rejection of these proposals.
Thus, in his first cabinet memorandum on the proposed announcement he ap-
parently had no hesitancy in declaring, "I do not dissent from the broad view that
in some form or other the statement is desirable that self-government within the
British Empire is the goal at which we aim."30
What then did Curzon seek to gain by the substitution of "responsible"? A
considerable weight of evidence suggests that what he sought to achieve was the
displacement of the "lawyer class" from control of Indian politics and so, from
any Indian home rule in the future. We can get some insight into Curzon's mind
by considering the extraordinary fact that six thousand miles away, six months
before he advanced his version of the formula, another man who was to figure
crucially in the reforms was penning a diatribe against the phrase "self-govern-
ment." What was his substitute? Lionel Curtis urged that "to avoid the risk of
misunderstanding it will be better, I suggest, to drop this ambiguous term and
to use the words 'responsible government' instead."31
Curtis's explanation of the merits of this substitution is extraordinarily ambig-
uous itself. Much to the exasperation of the historian, when Curtis returned to the
question in a later work he merely reproduced his earlier writing, as though no
further comment were necessary. The reader may be spared the intricacies of his
account. Suffice it to say that he concludes with a relatively clear-cut statement:

. . . responsible government means handing over the final authority in Indian af-
fairs to the Indian electorate . . . which by their votes can either turn their exec-
utives out of office or bring about an election.32

From his commentary, written in March I9I7, the reader is left with this thought:
self-government might have meant handing power to Indian politicians; but re-
sponsible government clearly meant giving it to electorates.
Of course the fact that Curtis was concerned with the semantics of an announce-

28 Cab. 24/17, GT II99 Curzon Mem. 27/6/17. Also in Trinity Coll. Cab. folio I9I6/17.
29 Beaverbrook, Lord, Men and Power I9I7-I8 (London, I956), pp. 309 and 314. Cf. also Beaver-
brook's Politicians and the War I9I4-I6 (London, I928), p. 5 "Curzon always tried to take up
with the winner when the battle was joined." Beaverbrook could hardly, of course, be described as
an impartial critic of Curzon, but these descriptions correspond with the facts of his career.
30 Cab. 24/I7. GT II99. Curzon Mem. 27/6/I7. Also in Trinity Coll. Cab. folio I9I6/I7.
31 Curtis, Lionel, Dyarchy (Oxford, I920), p. 82.
32 Ibid., pp. 8I-82 (my italics).

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28 RICHARD DANZIG
ment in March of I9I7 demonstrates nothing about Curzon's concerns in August. He
probably had read Curtis's published "letter," but there is not even proof of this.
But there is evidence that Curzon had read the text of a lecture by the Undersecretary
of State for India Lord Islington on Indian Government. There the phrase "respon-
sible government" is often used. Curzon read this only two or three days before
drafting his own formula, and he underlined the phrase in his own copy. Islington
advocated a voluntary adoption by a British controlled government of suggestions
made by Indian politicians, thus making Indians "responsible" for certain programs.
Here the emphasis is entirely different. Islington's "responsibility," the speech makes
quite clear, is not a statutory responsibility to an electorate by an Indian executive
as Curtis seemed to be urging. It is responsibility for certain policies.

I should like to see . . . a Government consisting of a Governor and four Exec-

utive Councillors, two European and two Indian. ... It would be open to the
Legislative Council to criticise and suggest improvements which the Government
would adopt unless they could convince the Legislative Council that there were
sufficient reasons for acting otherwise. If the Indian members of the Governor's
Council were properly chosen, it cannot be doubted that the Government's policy
would be formulated with due regard for the views of the Indian elected mem-
bers of the Legislative Council . . . it is to be remembered that, if in deference
to the Legislative Council the Government modified their policy, the Council
would have to shoulder the responsibility for the results. This is the essence of
responsible Government as we understand it.33

Islington spends pages discussing the concept of responsibility in this manner.

But in Curzon's copy only two paragraphs of the speech are underscored. One
simply urged "responsible government in the Empire" as a goal without explaining
what this means. The other deals with a point so peripheral that Islington devotes
only three sentences to it in a speech which ran to fifteen foolscap pages. But to Cur-
zon, it seems it was fundamental.

. . . it is to be remembered that, if in deference to the Legislative Council that

Government modify their policy, the Council would have to shoulder the responsi-
bility for the results. This is the essence of responsible Government as we under-
stand it. To secure its introduction into Indian Local Governments a suitable
system of elections is important, so that the elected members may be properly
representative of the various classes of Indian Society. Only if this is done will
it be possible, consistently with the interests of the people, to make them realize
that for whatever they say or do, they will be held accountable to constituents free
to replace them if they fail to give satisfaction.34

Again then, in a context where the thrust was entirely different, Curzon found
the recurring theme: the electorate should have power over the politician; the
politician should not have power over British policy.

33 Cab. 24/22 GT I659. Islington's Oxford Speech: "The Problems of Indian Government,"
circulated to the cabinet 9/8/I7. Also found in Chelmsford Coll. Vol. I5, No. IogA.
34 This underlining is cited by Ronaldshay (op. cit., p. i68). The original document may be found
in Curzon Coll. F I II/438. There are actually two marked copies in this file. The blue crayon
markings are by Islington (he sent out several copies marked in this way for those whose time was
limited). The other markings Ronaldshay attributes (almost certainly accurately) to Curzon.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 29
We know that the idea of responsibility to a broad electorate was in Curzon's
mind when he thought about responsibility. He had probably read Curtis's writ-
ings. He had certainly read and underscored the relevant part of Islington's lecture.
And-most indicative of all-he prominently mentioned this concern in his cabi-
net memoranda.

The real reform to work is, however, not so much expansion of powers, as it is
a more representative class of non-official members. I believe that an examination
would show that 75% of the elected members of the Indian Legislative Council
are lawyers . . . [who are] as a rule profoundly indifferent to the welfare of the
agricultural classes who constitute between 8o and 90% of the people.35

A memorandum of the previous July was quite explicit:

Not until representative institutions in India . . . are representative of a far wider

section of the community than the narrow but powerful factions by whom they
are at present controlled and run . . . will she be in a position to claim the rights
of a self-governing nation.36

Craddock, who talked with Curzon shortly after the announcement and who
knew that Curzon had drafted it, wrote to his mentor soon after arriving in Burma
to assume his lieutenant governorship:

I understand the announcement in Parliament to mean first steps towards respon-

sible government and that was why the term responsible was adopted. If the
desire had been merely to give power to a few intellectuals, surely the case would
have been put differently.37

Despite his conversations with Curzon, Craddock may, of course, have seen
his own aims reflected where they were not intended. He had, after all, written
in I9I6:

If we hand over our power, let us hand it over to responsible representatives of

the manifold interests which Providence has committed to our charge, and not
to an oligarchy of legal practitioners.38

But the fear of a concession towards "home rule" by an Indian oligarchy was
widespreadY9 As an argument against liberal reform it frequently appears in con-

35 Cab. 24/I7. GT II99, Curzon Mem. 27/6/I7. Also in Trinity Coll. Cab. folio I9I6/I7.
36 Cab. 24/I8, GT I252, Curzon Mem. 7/I7.
37 Curzon Coll. Craddock to Curzon 5/2/I8.
38 Chelmsford Coll., Vol. I7, No. I37. Craddock Minute 26 June I9I6. In private he expressed
these feelings even more strongly: "We cannot contemplate a small oligarchy of Indian intellectuals
kept in power over the diverse millions that inhabit India by the bayonets of European mercenaries e . ."
(Barnes Papers, Craddock to Barnes I2 May I9I6). See also his denunciation of "vakil raj" in
Home (Poll.) Files, Series D. 9 December I9I2/I7, (National Archives of India), "Considerations
Arising from the Interpretation of Paragraph 3 of the Government of India Despatch Dated 25
August I9II." Craddock's note is dated 26 August I9I2.
39 Cf. also e.g. Barnes Papers, Meyer to Barnes 6 May I9I6: "Now I am no political theorist, and
I should have no objection to handing over India to the internal rule of an oligarchy if the latter
can obtain . . . ready acquiescence . . . But with the oligarchy in question this would not occur."

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30 RICHARD DANZIG
servative thought from the eighteen-eighties through the nineteen-forties.40 Curzon
himself had opposed Congress aspirations in I892 by arguing:

. . . the constituency which the Congress party represent cannot be described

otherwise than a minute and almost microscopic minority of the total population
of India.41

Perhaps the most influential exponent of this view in the period under study was
the former Times correspondent, Sir Valentine Chirol, whose Indian Unrest, pub-
lished in I9IO, was an extended diatribe against the Brahminical oligarchy which
ruled Congress and would rule the people wherever representative institutions
were conceded without proper control.

The Congress has, in fact, displayed exactly the same feature which has been so
markedly manifested in the case of municipalities, namely, the tendency of "repre-
sentative" institutions in India to resolve themselves into machines operated by, and
for the benefit of, an extremely limited and domineering obligarchy.42

There is every reason to believe that Curzon, taking advantage of what he retro-
spectively called a "very stubborn and reactionary note" by Balfour, sought to re-
work the formula in a way which was "rather safer and certainly nearer to my
point of view"43 by blocking this one tendency of the reforms which he disliked
most, and which he was capable of blocking.
There was a secondary thought which appears to have been considered by those
who insisted on broader electorates and electoral control as a prerequisite for re-
form. Handing over power to electorates was "too drastic a step to be made at one
stroke."44 Considering the numbers involved it would take decades.
I once said to Morley: "Our difficulty is that we are forced to build from the top.
You can find me representatives, but where are you going to find me electors?"
"My dear Austen," cried Morley, "I grow old in the search for constituency."45
40 For a later example of this argument see Churchill's speeches in opposition to the Government
of India Act evolving during the nineteen thirties, e.g.: "These masses will be delivered to the mercies
of a well-organized, narrowly elected, political and religious oligarchy and caucus." (House of Com-
mons Debates, Vol. 247, 26/I/3I. cc. 698.)
41 Vol. 3, 28/3/92, cc. 66. The phrase "microscopic minority" originated with Lord Dufferin,
Viceroy when Congress was founded.
It is especially notable that Curzon used the word "responsibility" in this debate in the special sense
which it is suggested he intended in the I9I7 announcement. As cited in Col. 68, he remarked that
the proposed act was valuable because it would "provide the means by which representatives of the
most important sections of native society may be appointed to the councils, and may have an
opportunity of explaining their views with a fuller sense of responsibility than they at present enjoy."
Compare the sense of this use of the word with that of the Earl of Norhbrook in discussing the same
act (House of Lords Debates, Vol. 342, third series, 6/3/90, cc. 64): "India is a long way from
having what is called a Responsible Government, namely, an administration which is composed of
men who possess a majority in the Representative Assembly...."
42 Chirol, Valentine, India Unrest (London, i9io), p. i6i. Chirol was still actively propounding
this viewpoint during the period under discussion. In a letter to Meston, for example, he argued:
"The danger seems to me that in our anxiety to do something we should forget that our main
obligations as rulers of India are towards the great masses of the people and not towards any one
particular class such as the intelligentsia, and what assurance have we that the interests and aspirations
of the latter coincide with those of the former?" (Meston Papers Vol. 4. Chirol to Meston 4/9/16.)
43 Chamberlain Papers, AC I6/I/5. Curzon to Austen Chamberlain 25 August I9I7. N. B. how
difficult it is to reconcile this statement with Ronaldshay's analysis.
44 Curtis's analysis significantly uses this phrase. Op. cit., p. 8i.
45 Petrie, Sir Charles, The Life and Letters of the Right Hon. Sir Austen Chamberlain (London,

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 31
Curzon apparently felt that in the course of such a search India would also
grow old. At the stage of the final drafting of the announcement he made his
opinion clear: "When the cabinet used the expression 'ultimate self-government'
they probably contemplated an intervening period of 5oo years."46 But, Curzon ob-
jected, an Indian would not interpret the phrase in that way. Therefore it had to
be altered.

To understand the impact this change had on the Montagu-Chelmsford Re-

forms it is necessary first to appreciate the unusual importance attached to every
word of the announcement of August 20th. The announcement was not merely
the herald of the reforms, it was the crucial buttress on which they depended. It
made reform inevitable and the reformers virtually unassailable.
The announcement-because it was a coalition cabinet decision,47 had the King's
blessing,48 and aroused no protest when it was made-provided a bulwark of seem-
ing unanimity which was an invaluable asset of the reformers. It was at one and
the same time the foundation rock of reform and a sacred touchstone which ad-
mitted of no, opposition without excommunication from discussion. Austen Cham-
berlain captured the sense of the situation:

I was very anxious, if it had been possible, that we should accompany the publi-
cation of the report with a restatement of the salient features of that Declaration
in the original words and that we should in addition have approved certain par-
ticular features of your recommendations so as to make it clear to everyone that
it was only within the restricted field thus left that our policy was open to doubt
or that we invited suggestions. I think it would have been wise thus to warn the
extremists at both ends of the scale, Sydenham on the one hand and Tilak on
the other, that they were out of court, and to let the services and the Indian
public know that the British government would neither go back from the declara-
tion of August nor allow itself to be dragged beyond it.49

Lionel Curtis was one of the high priests of reform. He too knew how to distin-
guish who was "out" from who was eligible.

If the chairman is to be drawn from the Lords you could do worse than Sel-
borne. You know his limitations, but unlike Salisbury he recognises the Pro-
nouncement of August as immutable and as governing the whole situation.50

Rare is the reformer who can find such a point of strength on so controversial
an issue as was liberalization of British control in India.5" Montagu and Chelms-
ford realized it. They defended everything in terms of the announcement. The
n.d.), p. 44, quoting Chamberlain. See also House of Lords Debates, 342 (third series), 6 March
I890, cc. 88. Viscount Cross's reply to the Earl of Northbrook: "But the noble Earl and the noble
Marquess [Ripon] have both avoided a very important point in discussing this question of repre-
sentation, and that is, where are your constitutents to be found?"
46 Cab. 23/3, 2I4 (II), I4/8/I7. Also in Trinity Coll. Cab. folio i9i6/17.
4 Lloyd George later claimed that the announcement had a further claim to special status,
because it was promulgated by an Imperial War Cabinet. Commons, Vol. 23I, Cc. I3I4 (7 Nov. I929).
48 Cf. Chelmsford Coll., Vol. I, Earl of Cromer to Chelmsford I7/8/I7.
49 Chelmsford CoIl., Vol. I5, Chamberlain to Chelmsford 20/6/I8.
50 Lothian Coll., GD 40/I7/33. Curtis to Montagu 3/8/I8.
51 Compare the situation in I929 (cf. Hansard, Commons, Vol. 231, cc. I318, 7 Nov. 1929)
and in I909 (cf. Mazumdar, Vina, "Imperial Policy in India I905-I0," unpublished thesis, University
of Oxford, I962, p. 396).

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32 RICHARD DANZIG
radical Indian paper Mahratta fumed: "The announcement is not the words of
God so that it may be a sin to transgress it .. . >52; and at the other end of the field,
Lord Sydenham railed: "I bitterly resent being regarded as a reactionary merely
because I claim the right of private judgment as to the declaration of I9I7."53 Ten
years after the fact, a conservative governor recalled the effect of the announce-
ment:

Thereafter any criticism of schemes of advance put forward was liable to be put
out of court at once as conflicting with this or that promise contained in the
announcement.54

Argument over the reforms came to turn, not on whether they were appropriate
to the Indian situation, but whether they conformed to the announcement of 20
August.55 As Shrinivasa Sastri stoically recorded: "The authors have felt bound
by an excessively literal interpretation of the declaration of last August."56 The
ready acceptance of this literal approach was in part a product of the cabinet's ob-
session with the problems of World War I and its consequent inattention to Indian
affairs. After the announcement Indian reform was never again a subject of ex-
tended discussion in the war cabinet. The reform report was published without
comment; the act formulated by a joint committee. As in other situations when
only a limited directive is available from on high, its every word was given extra-
ordinary weight.
Thus the Government of India, in defending itself against demands for liberal-
ization at the center telegraphed its representative in London indicating the line
he should adopt:

Therefore to depart from our well-considered and hitherto strongly defended

position with regard to Central Government would, we are of opinion, be a
fatal abandonment of the second paragraph of the announcement of 20 August
on which we hope you will lay full weight in final evidence before the Com-
mittee.57

Lord Sinha's strongest defence of the Government of India Bill, I9I9, in the House
of Lords was expressed in one sentence: "This Bill is the immediate outcome of the
memorable declaration of policy made by His Majesty's Government on 20 August,
I9I7."58 In the House of Commons Montagu employed rhetoric rather more artfully,
but it cannot be said that his argument was any more subtle.

. . .if you start from the place where the authors of this Bill started, the form
of the Bill and the recommendations of the Bill are inevitable. Where did we
start? We started with the pronouncement of the 20 August I9I7.59

52 Cf. Besant, Annie (ed.), The Montagu-Chelmsford Report Reforms Proposals (Madras: The
Sons of India, I9I9 [?]), "Selected Criticism."
53 House of Lords Debates, Vol. 37, cc. IOOI. I2/I2/I9. Lord Sydenham.
54 Craddock, Sir Reginald, op. cit., p. I67.
55 Cf. e.g. Chamberlain's note Cab. 23/6, II4-D. 6/6/i8. The Montagu-Chelmsford Report is
revolutionary, but that is no objection because it was the announcement of 20 August that was
revolutionary.
56 Besant, Selected Criticism, op. cit.
57 Chelmsford Coll. Vol. I5, No. 222 (telegram); Viceroy to Meston 30/9/19.
58 House of Lords Debates, Vol. 37, cc. 94I. I I/I2/I9. Sinha.
59 House of Commons Debates, Vol. i i6, CC. 230I. 5/6/I9. Montagu.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 33
The change in wording that the cabinet effected had at least three major conse-
quences, only one of which was intended by Curzon. This is typical of the process
of imperial reform. The connection between intent and achievement is a precari-
ous one.
The intended effect was to lead to the development of larger electorates, thus
ending the dominance in politics of an "oligarchy of educated Brahmins." It was
hoped that once political life was placed on a broader basis it would become more
moderate in its methods and demands. As a result of the work of a franchise
committee appointed under the reforms, the electorates were enlarged and politics
was transformed.
In some areas the results were as expected. The bases of support for the recently
formed Justice Party of Madras and the Non-Brahmin Party of Bombay were vastly
increased. These anti-Brahmin lower caste organizations found their political birth-
right in the expansion of the electorates.60 The British ideal was for the first time
realized: there now existed strong, genuinely Indian parties that were anti-Con-
gress and prepared to work the reforms. Their growth may properly be viewed as
one of the effects of the seemingly inexplicable and uncomprehended change in
the announcement from "self-government" to "responsible government.'7
But the reverse effect was also achieved. A change in the electorate encouraged
a change in the Congress, and thus in the nature of the nationalist movement. Even
before the rise of Gandhi, Congress was turning from a Brahmin dominated group
of "trousered patriots, tittle-tattling in English,">61 into a mass movement. Sir Stan-
ley Reed wrote in I920: ". . . the decision of the Congress [to embark on non-coop-
eration as a result of the handling of the Amritsar Massacres] is [an attempt to
utilize] a perfectly simple clear cut issue to convert the less educated classes whom
we have now given the franchise."62 The irony is striking. The ex-Viceroy who was
most disdainful of popular opinion, one of the most conservative of cabinet mem-
bers, the be'te noire of the nationalist movement, was responsible for the guide-
lines which were later given a franchise committee, which was, in turn, to pro-
mote the broadening of Indian politics that was to push Congress further to-
wards becoming a truly national, truly mass movement.
But it was the third effect which most clearly followed from the change in the
announcement and which dominated political life in India over the next decade.
Responsibility was interpreted not only in the Curzonian sense of making repre-
sentatives "responsible" to broad electorates, but also in the context of giving promi-
nent politicians direct "responsibility" for certain aspects of government. This was
dyarchy. Chelmsford wrote:
There has been much discussion as to what is meant by responsibility, responsi-
bility to constituents, responsibility to Legislative Councils and the like and I
cannot but think that there has been much talk and writing on this subject which
has been beside the mark, and perhaps our Report is equally guilty with others
60 On the I2/5/I7 the Criminal Investigation Department noted the political potential of the
non-Brahmin movement, "The existence of a community which opposes Home Rule for India in
its own interests and is at the same time sufficiently advanced to start newspapers to spread its views
is a phenomenon which deserves study." (CID 446B. I2/5/I7.)
61This apt description was employed by Amrita Lal Roy in his Reminiscences English and
American (Calcutta, I890), Part II, p. i8. I am indebted to Dr. S. Gopal for the reference.
62Reed Papers, Reed to McGregor, 6/8/20. Archives of the Times (London).

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34 RICHARD DANZIG
in this respect. What are we aiming at in our policy? Surely this, that the decisions
of certain matters-I will not discuss what matters-shall rest with Indians; that
in these matters it will be for them to say "Yes" or "No"; and that our scheme
shall provide, as far as possible, for everybody knowing that the decision in any
particular matter is their decision, that the "Yes" or "No" is their "Yes" or "No."63

Chelmsford had never favored allowing Indian "responsibility for" aspects of gov-
ernment before August I9I7. What made him change his mind? His minute con-
tinues:

This definition of responsibility to be attained by Indians is one to which, I be-

lieve, most people will subscribe and I believe it to be the responsibility at which
His Majesty's Government was aiming when they made their declaration of
policy.64

The term "responsibility" in this sense had been introduced in the first India
Office discussions of Chelmsford's I9I6 formula. In the report of a special India
Office Committee, the policy of development along lines of association (as in the
Morley-Minto reforms) was unanimously criticized. Such a policy

will perpetuate and aggravate a vicious system which makes it the main function
of the Legislative Councils to oppose and criticise the Government while remain-
ing free from responsibility for their actions.65

Two months later, the chairman of this committee produced a personal memo-
randum intended to overcome this basic difficulty. The memorandum by Sir Wil-
liam Duke, perhaps more influential than any other written during the reforms,
was the first to outline the scheme of dyarchy. The scheme, Duke said, was de-
signed to overcome "the tendency of the existing system already towards the un-
due development of the critical faculty without concomitant responsibility....'66
Both the despatch and the Duke Memorandum were widely circulated among
those concerned with the reforms. Not *a few endorsed their criticisms. Meston,
for example, wrote to Chelmsford:

The present form of Council has served good purpose, but there is little vitality
about it, and its usefulness as an educational agency in self-government is evapo-
rating. The certainty that the educated element can nearly always be outvoted
by the officials and nominated non-officials is tending to generate an air or ir-
responsibility in the former.67

63 Montagu Coll., Vol. 8, Chelmsford to Montagu (minute appended to letter of 26/2/I9).

64 Ibid.

65 Chamberlain Papers, AC 2I/4/04. Report on Government of India Despatch, Home Department,

no. I7. (Duke Committee.) I6/3/I7. On the other hand, the despatch continued, the effect of giving
full responsibility would be disastrous. "Government will lose control over legislation; it will be
unable either to prevent mischevious legislation from being passed, or, what is even more serious,
to carry its own legislation."
66 "Suggestions for Constitutional Progress in Indian Policy," by Sir William Duke, June I9I6.
The memorandum was intended for use by the members of the Round Table, a group of intellectuals
concerned with remoulding the Empire and, in consequence, interested in the problem of Indian
government. A copy of the memorandum may be found in the Meston Papers, Vol. I0, among other
places.
67 Meston Papers, Vol. I. Meston to Chelmsford I9/8/I6.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 35
Most important, Austen Chamberlain placed great emphasis on the necessity of
meeting these points in any scheme of reform devised. As he began to press the
cabinet for an announcement he wrote the Viceroy:

But all this [discussion of a goal] makes me more anxious to find some means,
not only of increasing Indian responsibility in the Councils, but of increasing the
authority and responsibility of the representatives in these bodies. After all, we
want to train Indians in self-government. A mere increase in the number of repre-
sentatives does not really advance this object, unless we can at the same time fix
these men with some definite powers and with real responsibility for their ac-
tions. How this is to be done and where a beginning can be made, I cannot
yet see. But surely there can be no doubt that this is the real crux of the ques-
tion.68

Chelmsford appreciated this point, yet (like Chamberlain) hesitated about act-
ing on it. But when an announcement was finally authorized he believed the
cabinet had accepted "responsibility" as the key point in reforms, and that this ex-
plained the mysterious change of 20 August.

It is to my mind clearly evident that such criticism was the genesis of the form
of the announcement of policy made by the Secretary of State on behalf of His
Majesty's Government on August 20th.69

Now, whatever his attitude towards responsibility (and it was originally negative)
there was no going back. And there was no letting anyone else go back. Chelms-
ford publicly laid down three tests by which any scheme would be judged as ac-
ceptable under the announcement:

(i) Will it be possible under it to fix responsibility on Indians with regard to

any particular question of policy?
(2) Does it provide machinery by which a greater area of responsibility can be
later transferred?
(3) Does it lead up gradually to a stage under which full responsibility can be
attained by Indians in the provincial sphere?70

A fourth condition was so obvious that it did not have to be set forth in this
speech: "that complete responsibility for Government cannot be given immediately
without inviting a breakdown.' On the basis of these four tests, going forward
had to mean going forward to dyarchy.

68 Chelmsford Coll. Chamberlain to Chelmsford 2/5/I7.

69Montagu Coll., Vol. 8, Chelmsford to Montagu, minute appended to letter of 26/2/I9. Indeed,
Chamberlain had suggested a change in the announcement which appeared strikingly like the one
that was made. In a letter to Montagu circulated to the Cabinet during the final drafting stage of the
announcement, he noted four points worthy of consideration. The last one read:

I should be inclined to add (d) the growth of power must be accompanied by growth of the
sense of responsibility. Indeed, no great increase of power is possible till an increased sense
of responsibility makes itself evident. I wish you would consider whether a few words in the
sense of (b) and (c), and perhaps (d), might not usefully be added to your pronouncement
without overworking it.

(Cab. 23/3 GT I6I5, Chamberlain to Montagu, 8/8/I7.) Montagu never stressed the point and
there is no sign that Curzon ever considered it. But Chelmsford assumed the cabinet had done so.
70 Montagu Coll., Vol. 7, Speech of Chelmsford to Conference of Heads of Local Governments
and Administrations I3/I/I9.
'71 Report, 2I4.

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36 RICHARD DANZIG
I am all for joint consultation, but I think we should make it quite clear that
the respective responsibilities of the two sides of Government should not be
blurred. Responsibility is the basis for the whole scheme, and if we allow joint
consultation to become joint decision, it will mean that the Ministers will make
decisions on subjects for which no responsibility can attach to them, because
they will be able to point to the statute under which responsibility is definitely
placed on the Governor General in Council.72

It may, of course, be said that dyarchy, like non-Brahmin politics and the con-
version of Congress into a mass movement, would have come about even without
the change in the announcement. Here, "if history" is sounder than usual. Cer-
tainly the trend toward each of these can easily be detected with hindsight.
But an "if" has two sides. Had the announcement not been altered, Chelms-
ford might well have refused dyarchy. Even if Montagu and Chelmsford had
both adopted it, their difficulties in defending an unprecedented, highly compli-
cated scheme, criticized by virtually all provincial heads of government would
have been much greater. Had the announcement simply said "self-government"
could Chelmsford have delivered the following reply (or any other equally potent)
to the governors' alternative reform scheme?

He [Chelmsford] was, however, at a loss to understand the interpretation placed

by the majority minute of the governors on the announcement of August 20th. The
minute declared it to be association in the first place and responsibility in the
second. His Excellency thought it clear, however, that they ought to look to the
purpose of the announcement. The objective was responsibility and association only
came in as a means.73

Without the word "responsible," Montagu and Chelmsford would have been
battling against the announcement-or at the very best, without its support. But the
announcement, was a tremendous, perhaps a crucial source of support.
Perhaps the single most important thing about the Montagu-Chelmsford re-
forms is that they represented a turn from the Morley-Minto policy of associating
Indians in government by the British towards a policy of giving Indians responsi-
bility for governing themselves. But the announcement itself, as originally drafted,
said nothing which related to this change in policy.
The announcement was intended to deal with ends and not means. The end
of policy could have been Indian self-government, but the steps toward it increas-
ing association. In fact, the original announcement lent itself strongly to this
interpretation. "Responsibility" was not mentioned; "increasing association of In-
dians in every branch of administration" was; the phrase "gradual development
of self-governing institutions" would surely have been interpreted as referring to
local government through the panchayat and district board. Chelmsford's Coun-
cil left no doubt, in i9i6, that this was what they intended.
The announcement of August 2oth was a powerful and revolutionary docu-
ment, both in itself and in the effect it had on the course of the reforms. The
stunning fact, however, is that the phrase that was most influential was inserted
by the reforms' greatest critic, Lord Curzon. He was later to reject the most strik-

72 Montagu Coll., Vol. I0, Chelmsford to Montagu I9/5/20.

73 Montagu Coll,, Vol. 8, Minute A, op. cit.

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ANNOUNCEMENT OF AUGUST 20TH 37
ing conclusion drawn from his words. Called to comment on dyarchy during a
House of Lords debate in 1924 he said ". . . I profoundly detest it. ..."74
Clearly a good deal of misunderstanding and difference of opinion lay behind
the common ground so straightforwardly expressed in Montagu and Chelms-
ford's reform report:

Englishmen believe in responsible government as the best form of government

that they know; and now in response to requests from India they have promised
to extend it to India....75

KEY TO ABBREVIATIONS

Barnes Papers Papers of Sir George Barnes. Courtesy of Mr. Anthony Barnes.

Butler Coll. Papers of Harcourt Butler: India Office Library, Mss. Eur. F. II6.
Cab . Cabinet minutes or memoranda; Public Record Office. Citations first
list file number (Cab . . /. . .), then meeting number (...), then
minute number ( (. . .) ), then (where relevant) memorandum's file
number. All Cabinet papers may be found in the PRO, but where also
available in other collections refef:ence is further made to the file
number in those collections.

Chamberlain Papers Papers of Austen Chamberlain; University of Birmingham; prefixed

AC . ..

Chelmsford Coll. Papers of Lord Chelmsford; India Office Library, Mss. Eur. E. 264.

Curzon Coll. Papers of Lord Curzon relating to reforms; India Office Library, Mss.
Eur. F. III/438-39.

J and P (R) Reform Records, Judicial and Political Department; India Office
Records, Vols. I-38.

Lloyd Coll. Papers of Lord Lloyd by courtesy of the present Lord Lloyd. In his
personal possession.

Lothian Coll. Papers of Lord Lothian. Scottish National Registry Office. Prefixed
GD 40/....
Meston Coll. Papers of Lord Meston. India Office Library, Mss. Eur. F. I36.
Montagu Coll. Papers of Mr. Montagu; India Office Library, Mss. Eur. D. 523.
Report Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms Cd. 9gI9 (Montagu-Chelms-
ford Report), I9I8. Cited by paragraph number.

Triinity Coll. Papers of Mr. Montagu on deposit in the Library of Trinity College,
Cambridge.

Willingdon Coll. Papers of Lord Willingdon by courtesy of the present Lord Willingdon.
India Office Library. Mss. Eur. F. 93.

N.B. All dates are listed according to English practice month/date/year.

74House of Lords Debates, Vol. 59, cc. I77. 3I July I924.

75 Report, 7.

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