Case 2:23-cv-07321-SPG-PD Document 15 Filed 11/22/23 Page 1 of 18 Page ID #:157

Case 2:23-cv-07321-SPG-PD Document 15 Filed 11/22/23 Page 2 of 18 Page ID #:158

1 4. Plaintiffs are informed and believes, and based upon this information and belief
2 alleges, that each Defendant is, and at all relevant times was, the agent, servant, employee,
3 and/or co-conspirator of the other Defendants, and that each defendant and unnamed co-
4 conspirator was acting within the course and scope of his or its authority as the agent,
5 servant, employee, and/or co-conspirator of the other Defendants; that each Defendant is
6 jointly and severally liable to Complainant for the damages sustained as a proximate result of
7 his or its conduct and that each and every act or omission of any defendant herein was
8 ratified, expressly and/or impliedly, by each of the other Defendants herein. Therefore,
9 Defendants refers to all Defendants in this complaint, named or unnamed, collectively, as
10 “Defendants.”
11
12 WELLS FARGO SECURITY PROCEDURES’ AND AGREEMENT TO CONFIRM
13 “AUTHENTICITY” OF WIRE TRANSFER PAYMENT ORDERS
14 5. Plaintiff Fries established a banking relationship with Defendant WELLS
15 FARGO BANK (“WF”) in or about 1986. Fries thereafter established her online banking
16 access pursuant to the security procedures in place and set up by WF. From time to time, WF
17 modifies its “Online Access Agreement” (“OAA”) with periodic policy and procedures
18 updates, and posts those updates on its website and/or emails those updates to its customers.
19 The OAA and all of the online updates, detail some of the various security procedures in
20 place and are the agreed upon means by which the authenticity of payment orders (wire
21 transfer requests) issued to the bank in the name of the customer as sender, will be verified.
22 Pursuant to Commercial Code 11202, payment requests deemed “authentic” are “effective”
23 as the payment order of FRIES only if:
24 1) the agreed upon security procedure is a “commercially reasonable” method of
25 providing security against unauthorized payment orders; and
26 2) the bank proves it accepted the payment order in good faith and;
27 3) in compliance with the security procedure.
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1 6. On or about February 15, 2022, WF posted the OAA which discusses some of
2 the agreed upon security procedures. The OAA at paragraph 15(c) states that WF would use
3 the security procedures described in the OAA “and/or additional addenda” and that the
4 “purpose of the security procedure is to verify the authenticity of a transfer request delivered
5 to” WF. At paragraph 18(b) the OAA confirms that WF would not be obligated to honor any
6 transaction if it had “reason to believe” any such transaction “may not be authorized” by the
7 customer whose authorization was necessary or if it was “not in accordance with any other
8 requirement of our policies, procedures or practices” or if WF had “other reasonable cause
9 not to honor” the requested transaction. FRIES uses WF’s online platform, and therefore,
10 agreed to these security procedures in the OAA and as amended/supplemented from time to
11 time.
12 7. WF has at least three known security procedures in place to confirm a wire
13 transfer payment order is authentic and therefore “effective” as the order of its customer:/1
14 1) WF will restrict the amount of money its customers can send online via a wire
15 transfer payment order. WF specifically informs its customers in writing: “To request hire
16 limits for online wires, please visit your local branch.” As discussed below, anything above
17 $50,000.00 is above the online wire transfer limit.
18 2) Wire transfer payment orders exceeding $50,000.00 will require a “secondary
19 review” that will take 24-48 hours to complete before the funds will be sent to the designated
20 recipient bank.
21 3) A more general security procedure used by WF on telephone conferences with
22 customers is commonly known as “two factor authentication” (“2FA”) in conjunction with
23 security questions (the “2FA/security question procedure”). On this procedure, and during a
24 phone call with a customer, WF sends a text message to the customer’s cell phone and/or
25 email address with a numeric code. The customer is then required to read back that numeric
26
27 1/
There may be other WF security procedures in place and once the deposition of WF is taken, those additional
procedures will be revealed and a determination made as to whether any of those other procedures were
28 violated along with the violations described in this complaint.

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1 code to confirm the person is in fact, the WF customer they are purporting to be. After the
2 code is confirmed, security questions are required to be asked by the WF representative, to
3 which only the actual customer will have the answers. WF will not complete transactions
4 until the “2FA/security question” procedure is successfully completed.
5
6 THE FRAUDULENT OCTOBER 24, 2022 WIRE TRANSFER PAYMENT ORDER
7 8. On October 24, 2022, at 1:10 p.m. FRIES placed a call to a WF “premier
8 banker” who works out of the Hollywood branch, (“WF Advisor 1"). This person’s direct
9 WF’ office line is 323-745-3096. FRIES told WF Advisor 1 during this four minute call the
10 she (FRIES) would not be able to move forward with certain investments WF Advisor 1 had
11 recently pitched. Upon hearing this, WF Advisor 1 expressed her disappointment and told
12 FRIES that she had been working with two other WF associates (WF Advisor 2 and WF
13 Advisor 3) and that the proposed investments should be pursued. FRIES again stated she
14 was not interested in moving forward with any investments. After this brief four minute call
15 ended, Ms. FRIES could hear WF Advisor 1 express her frustration to an unknown person
16 and stated “I’m so sick of this.”
17 9. Nine minutes after the call with WF Advisor 1 ended, at 1:23 p.m., FRIES
18 received a phone call from an individual purporting to be a WF representative (“the WF
19 Fraudster”). The fact that FRIES received a call from the WF fraudster just minutes after
20 concluding her call with WF Advisor 1, proves either: 1) the WF fraudster is affiliated with
21 or somehow connected to, WF and/or WF Advisor 1; or 2) it’s one of the biggest
22 coincidences in bank/wire fraud history. The “caller i.d.” on FRIES’ cell phone stated the
23 call was coming from WF and listed the caller i.d. number as 800-225-5935 – which is an
24 actual WF number as evidenced by the WF web site:
25
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1
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3
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7
8 The call by FRIES to WF Advisor 1 and the incoming call nine minutes later from the
9 WF Fraudster to FRIES, are both confirmed in FRIES’s cell phone bill:
10
11
12
13 The WF Fraudster told FRIES that her account had potentially been compromised and was
14 exposed to fraudulent activity. The WF Fraudster sent a 2FA text to FRIES and told FRIES
15 to read back the code so that FRIES could be verified as the actual customer. Because this
16 exact scenario had played out numerous times before with a genuine WF representatives,
17 FRIES had no reason to believe this 2FA scenario was any different or was in any manner,
18 suspicious. FRIES received the code and read it back to the WF caller. FRIES spent the
19 majority of this 60 minute phone call initiated by the WF Caller, on hold.
20 10. While on the phone with the WF caller, FRIES drove to a WF Santa Clarita
21 branch to find out the status of her account. She was told by a WF employee (“Walter”) to
22 hang up her cell phone because it sounded like a scam. Walter told FRIES that funds were in
23 the process of being wired out of her account (“the fraudulent wire transfer.”) FRIES called
24 the WF customer service line from the Santa Clarita branch phone as instructed by Walter.
25 FRIES confirmed on this call, that she did not initiate nor authorize nor approve the wire
26 transfer and that it needed to be recalled. FRIES was transferred to a WF representative
27 named “Chavi” who confirmed the wire was recalled and gave FRIES a confirmation
28 number. Chavi confirmed that the entire $100,000.00 would be back in FRIES’ account

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1 within 1-2 business days. The next day on October 25, 2022, FRIES contacted WF to check

2 status of her account and when she could expect to receive the return of her $100,000.00.

3 She was now told the wire was not recalled and that her money was sent to “Savage Car

4 Wash” in Miami, Florida. After many conversations with different levels and departments,

5 FRIES explained again and again, over and over, that she did not approve the wire and that

6 she had a confirmation number for the recall. FRIES went to her local branch in Hollywood

7 and again restated what occurred. On October 26, 2022, WF Advisor 1 sent an email to

8 FRIES wherein WF Advisor 1 admitted the in-house WF investigator “is aware of this well-

9 known scam.”

10 11. For days, weeks and months thereafter, FRIES embarked on a futile attempt to

11 get her money back – endless phone calls and in person appearances at WF’ branch offices.

12 WF told FRIES that unless she admitted in writing that she “authorized” the fraudulent

13 $100,000.00 wire transfer, WF would not assist her in getting her money back. There was

14 exactly zero legitimate or necessary reason for FRIES to make that false representation urged

15 by WF, which was clearly an attempt by WF to shift liability from itself to FRIES. WF

16 eventually sent an email to FRIES that it “regretted” any WF’ “unsatisfactory service” and

17 informed FRIES she would be receiving a “courtesy” credit to her account in the amount of

18 $50.00 – which is $99,950.00 short of the $100,000.00 stolen out of her account as a direct

19 result of the WF malfeasance described herein.

20 THE FRAUDULENT WIRE TRANSFER IS NOT

21 AN “EFFECTIVE ORDER” AS TO FRIES

22 12. An October 24, 2022 phone call to WF that enabled the WF fraudster to induce

23 WF to wire $100,000.00 from the FRIES account, was recorded by WF (“the wire fraud

24 recording”). After this action was filed, FRIES obtained a copy of the wire fraud recording

25 in which the conversation between the WF fraudster and the WF representative can be heard.

26 The identity of the WF representative on this phone call cannot be ascertained at this time so

27 he will be referred to as the “WF Mark.” All WF security procedures were completely

28 disregarded, ditched and thrown out the window by this utterly incompetent, WF employee.

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1 13. The fraudulent wire transfer payment order was not an “authentic” or

2 “effective order” of FRIES for several separate and distinct reasons:

3 1) it was not in compliance with the WF security procedures for wire transfers;

4 2) it was not in executed in good faith by WF;

5 3) the wire transfer procedures used on this transaction were not “commercially

6 reasonable.”

7 Therefore and because the fraudulent wire payment order is “not effective” as the

8 order of FRIES, she is entitled to a full refund of the $100,000.00 fraudulent wire transfer

9 payment order pursuant to Commercial Code Sections 11202(b), 11204(a).

10
11 FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

12 Violation of Uniform Commercial Code–Funds Transfers [CA Commercial Code 11101

13 Et. Seq.; (UCC §4A-202)] –VIOLATION OF SECURITY PROCEDURES

14 Against WF and DOES 1-10

15 14. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 13 as though set forth

16 in full.

17 15. WF internal documents obtained after this action was filed, and the wire fraud

18 recording itself, confirm the following time line of events occurred in the afternoon of

19 October 24, 2022:

20 1) 1:24:30 the password to the FRIES online account was changed [by the WF

21 fraudster].

22 2) 1:25:35 [the WF fraudster] logged into the FRIES on line account

23 3) 1:27:30 [the WF fraudster] enrolled the FRIES account into a wire transfer program

24 known as “Wires Basic.”

25 4) 1:31:11 [the WF fraudster] added a “wire payee” and attempted to wire from the

26 FRIES account, $100,000.00 to Savage Car Wash.

27 5) 1:47:08: on a telephone call for the next 9 minutes and 44 seconds wherein nothing

28 but superficial questions were asked by the WF Mark, the WF fraudster duped the WF Mark

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1 into wire transferring $100,000.00 out of the FRIES account to Savage Car Wash where
2 those funds would never be seen again. FRIES has zero connection to Savage Car Wash and
3 does not know any person affiliated with that business.
4 16. One of the security procedures implemented by WF is to reject online wire
5 transfer requests from its customers if that request exceed a certain amount. The WF Mark
6 confirmed in the wire fraud recording, the maximum online wire transfer request WF would
7 accept, was $50,000.00. His statement on the wire fraud recording is consistent with the
8 OAA as supplemented and amended on the WF website which specifically states: “For your
9 security, we restrict the amount of money you can send recipients online....To request
10 hire limits for online wires, please visit your local branch.” The WF Mark further told the
11 WF fraudster that the $100,000.00 online wire request was “an unusual amount of money”
12 and that is why the FRIES account “had been flagged” and that any attempted transfer above
13 $50,000.00 required a “second review” and that a delay of 24-48 hours could occur before
14 the wire was sent.
15 17. The wire fraud recording conclusively proves the WF Mark violated
16 all three security procedures implemented by WF and described in paragraph 7 above:
17 The WF Mark was fully aware of the WF time line set forth above in paragraph 15 during his
18 phone call with the WF fraudster and therefore, was fully aware the FRIES online password
19 had just been changed (indeed, the WF Mark actually asked the WF fraudster if the password
20 had just been changed); the FRIES “basic wire” ability had just been added and a new wire
21 payee had just been added to the account as well. Incredibly, and despite all of these clear
22 and unmistakable red flags, the WF Mark, in absolute and utter disregard of all known WF
23 security procedures, told the WF fraudster: “But no worries I’m going to release this wire
24 transfer transaction and transfer it today.” He then stated: “I’m going to go ahead and
25 authorize this transaction and have this released so that you, you or your brother will be able
26 to receive it...” Seconds later the WF Mark stated: “I would like to let you know that I
27 already released the $100,000.00 on the wire that you initiated earlier.” And just like
28 that, in a span of minutes, the funds were in fact released – in clear violation of all three

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1 known WF security procedures: 1) the second review that should have taken 24-48 hours was
2 not implemented; 2) requiring FRIES to visit in person, her local branch was not
3 implemented; 3) security questions were not asked as part of the 2FA/security question
4 procedure: after the 2FA code was sent to the WF fraudster, an unknown voice can be heard
5 in the background reading the 2FA code to the WF fraudster who then repeated it to the WF
6 Mark – a massive red flag that the WF Mark failed to detect. Furthermore, the “security”
7 questions asked by the WF Mark were absurd because he failed to ask any questions to which
8 only FRIES would have known the answer. Instead, the WF Mark asked childish questions
9 like: “Is your name Alice M Fries? “Can you tell me to whom are you sending the funds to?”
10 And “you are sending the funds directly to Savage Car Wash?” and “Do you share your
11 device with anyone?” Detailed personal questions about FRIES, not even a basic security
12 rudimentary question like “what is your social security number” were ever asked.
13 18. Within minutes of the $100,000.00 fraudulent transfer payment order, FRIES
14 realized what was happening and demanded WF cancel all wire transfers. If the WF Mark
15 had complied with the WF security procedures, that $100,000.00 wire would have been
16 cancelled and the funds never would have been sent. WF’s absolute and clear violations of
17 its security procedures allowed the fraudulent wire transfer to occur and directly caused
18 Plaintiff’s damages. The above recited sequence of events can be confirmed from the wire
19 transfer recordings, and WF’s own internally generated “OTP History/Online Challenge” it
20 produced after this action was filed (See below and attachment Exhibit A):
21
22
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1
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12 19. When the WF Mark approved the fraudulent wire transfer payment order of
13 $100,000.00 from the FRIES account, that payment order was not “authentic” and was not
14 effective as a payment order from FRIES because WF did not comply with its own security
15 procedures, in violation of California Commercial Code, section 11202(b)(ii), to wit: the WF
16 Mark failed to reject the WF transfer payment order pending a “second review” for transfers
17 exceeding $50,000.00 and he failed to require FRIES to visit a local branch before the
18 transfer would be sent and he failed to implement properly, the security question/2FA
19 procedure.
20 20. Per the express terms of Section 11202(b)(ii), WF has the burden to prove it
21 complied with its agreed upon security procedures; based on the foregoing, it will be unable
22 to do so. Therefore, the fraudulent payment order was not effective as to FRIES per
23 Commercial Code 11202(b)(ii) and Fries is entitled to general damages, which includes but is
24 not limited to, the full amount of the of the fraudulent wire transfer in the amount of
25 $100,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest pursuant to Commercial Code 11204(a).
26
27
28

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1 SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

2 Violation of Uniform Commercial Code–Funds Transfers [CA Commercial Code 11101
3 Et. Seq.; (UCC §4A-202)] TRANSFER NOT MADE IN GOOD FAITH
4 Against WF and DOES 1-10
5 21. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 20 as though set forth
6 in full.
7 22. Based on all of the foregoing details set forth above and incorporated herein by
8 reference, when the WF Mark on behalf of WF, wire transferred the funds out of the FRIES
9 account, he did not do so in good faith, and instead chose to disregard all of the known WF
10 security procedures described herein.
11 23. Per the express terms of Section 11202(b)(ii), WF has the burden to prove not
12 only that it complied with its agreed upon security procedures, but that it acted in good faith;
13 based on the foregoing, it will be unable to do so. Therefore, the fraudulent payment order
14 was not effective as to FRIES per Commercial Code 11202(b)(ii) and Fries is entitled to
15 general damages, which includes but is not limited to, the full amount of the of the fraudulent
16 wire transfer in the amount of $100,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest pursuant to
17 Commercial Code 11204(a).
18
19
20 THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
21 Violation of Uniform Commercial Code–Funds Transfers [CA Commercial Code 11101
22 Et. Seq.; (UCC §4A-202)] SECURITY PROCEDURE NOT
23 COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
24 Against WF and DOES 1-10
25 24. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 23 as though set forth
26 in full.
27 25. Based on all of the foregoing details set forth above and incorporated herein by
28 reference, the security procedure actually implemented and used by WF in the fraudulent

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1 wire transfer at issue in this complaint, was not “commercially reasonable.” The security
2 procedure used by WF on this particular transaction consisted of ditching the “second
3 review” for wire transfers exceeding $50,000.00; ditching the “in person” requirement for
4 wire transfers exceeding $50,000.00; and ditching the security question prong of the 2FA/
5 security question procedure. Instead, the security procedure used by WF in this transaction
6 (and not agreed to by FRIES) consisted of the pathetic and worthless nine minute telephone
7 conference with the WF Mark described herein. The procedure actually implemented on this
8 transaction, therefore, was not a commercially reasonable security procedure to authenticate
9 the payment order, in violation of Commercial Code Section 11202(c) – especially given the
10 fact that FRIES had never before initiated a wire transfer, let alone a transfer for
11 $100,000.00, and given the fact that her password had been tampered with and changed
12 minutes before the request was initiated, and that wire transfer capability had just been
13 added. The “security procedure” actually used by WF on this particular transaction was per
14 se, commercially unreasonable.
15 26. Per the express terms of Section 11202(b)(ii), WF has the burden to prove it
16 complied with its agreed upon security procedures and acted in good faith and that its
17 security was commercially reasonable; based on the foregoing, it will be unable to do so.
18 Therefore, the fraudulent payment order was not effective as to FRIES per Commercial Code
19 11202(b)(ii) and Fries is entitled to general damages, which includes but is not limited to, the
20 full amount of the of the fraudulent wire transfer in the amount of $100,000.00 plus pre-
21 judgment interest pursuant to Commercial Code 11204(a).
22
23
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27 //
28

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1 FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION

2 Violation of Uniform Commercial Code–Funds Transfers [CA Commercial Code 11101
3 Et. Seq.; (UCC §4A-202)] 2FA/SECURITY QUESTION PROCEDURE
4 NOT COMMERCIALLY REASONABLE
5 Against WF and DOES 1-10
6 27. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 26 as though set forth
7 in full.
8 27. Pursuant to Commercial Code 11202(c) commercial reasonableness of a
9 security procedure is a question of law to be determined by considering the wishes of the
10 customer expressed to the bank, the circumstances of the customer known to the bank,
11 including the size, type, and frequency of payment orders normally issued by the customer to
12 the bank, alternative security procedures offered to the customer, and security procedures in
13 general use by customers and receiving banks similarly situated. In this particular case,
14 FRIES had never before initiated a wire transfer and did not even have wire transfer
15 capability set up on her account.
16 28. The 2FA/security question procedure is not a commercially reasonable security
17 procedure because it does not adequately provide security to insure payment orders are
18 “authentic” – especially when used in conjunction with the weak and superficial
19 “questioning” by persons like the WF Mark. WF is fully aware that the exact type of 2FA
20 scam perpetrated against FRIES happens on a regular basis to its customers all over the
21 United Sates. Nevertheless, WF continues to use this commercially unreasonable
22 2FA/security question system and has failed to undertake any steps to protect against
23 payment orders that are not “authentic” with this failed and flawed system. Indeed, this case
24 provides all the undisputed evidence needed to prove the commercially unreasonableness of
25 the 2FA/security question system: in matter of just a few minutes, the WF fraudster was able
26 to bypass the 2FA/security question system and was able to dupe the WF Mark, conclusively
27 proving the 2FA/security question system is per se, not commercially reasonable by any
28

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1 objective measure. And this exact same con-game is repeated over and over again all over the
2 country and WF does absolutely, positively nothing to even try and stop it.
3 29. Per the express terms of Section 11202(b)(ii) WF has the burden to prove the
4 2FA/security question system is commercially reasonable; based on the foregoing, it will be
5 unable to do so. Therefore, the fraudulent payment order was not effective as to FRIES per
6 Commercial Code 11202(b)(ii) and Fries is entitled to general damages, which includes but is
7 not limited to, the full amount of the of the fraudulent wire transfer in the amount of
8 $100,000.00 plus pre-judgment interest pursuant to Commercial Code 11204(a).
9
10 FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
11 (Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
12 Against Wells Fargo and DOES 2-20)
13 30. Plaintiff incorporates by reference paragraphs 1 through 29 as though set forth
14 in full.
15 31. Within minutes of becoming apprised of the wire transfer fraud, FRIES spoke
16 to several WF employees on telephone calls in a desperate attempt to try and stop it. After
17 this action was filed, WF produced some of those recorded telephone calls and some of them
18 are described and summarized in this fifth cause of action. On one of these calls with WF
19 “Employee 1" FRIES was placed on hold. While FRIES was on hold, WF Employee 1 made
20 a separate (recorded) call to WF Employee 2 whom later identified himself as “Chavi.” This
21 WF recording revealed that the two WF employees discussed the FRIES wire fraud situation
22 and the fact that the $100,000.00 wire had “already gone through.” While FRIES was still on
23 hold, the two WF employees discussed the fact that any successful attempt to recall the wire
24 could not be guaranteed and that whether or not the wire could be successfully recalled was
25 subject to an “online wire case” process that could take up to 120 days to complete.
26 32. Eventually, FRIES was added to the call between the two WF employees.
27 Employee 1 left the call, leaving just FRIES and Employee 2 (Chavi) on the call. Despite
28 knowing full well that it was probably too late to recall the wire and that the recall process

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1 would take up 120 days to complete before anyone knew if the funds would be returned or
2 not, Chavi affirmatively lied to FRIES and told her that wire transfer had been “stopped” and
3 that he “stopped the wire” and that the funds would be back in her account and that she
4 should check her online access to view the returned funds. FRIES was given a confirmation
5 “wire stop” number of 0117845909 and told by Chavi that he was “sure the wire was not
6 going to go through.” When Chavi made these false statements on behalf of WF to FRIES
7 that the wire had been “stopped” and that he was “sure the wire was not going to go through”
8 he knew they were false because he and Employee 1 had just discussed the fact it would take
9 up to 120 days and for the recall process to complete and it was entirely unknown if the wire
10 could be successfully recalled or not.
11 33. Upon hearing the “good news” from Chavi that the wire had been successfully
12 “stopped” and that the money would be back in her account in another day or so, FRIES was
13 extremely relieved and felt like the entire day had been a bad, horrific nightmare.
14 34. As instructed by Chavi, FRIES checked her online account for the next couple
15 days desperately looking for the return of her money; but it never appeared. She called WF
16 yet again and was now told by yet another WF employee that the wire was not recalled and
17 her money was gone. Upon hearing this news, FRIES was devastated, shocked and felt
18 extreme, substantial and severe emotional distress after having been assured by Chavi that
19 she would receive her money back in one or two days, and was now hearing from a different
20 WF employee days later, the exact opposite.
21 35. WF’s conduct in knowingly and intentionally lying to FRIES and falsely telling
22 her that she would receive her money back in one or two days, knowing full well that was not
23 going to happen, was extreme, outrageous and beyond the bounds of decency.
24 36. As if the foregoing was not bad enough, WF thereafter conditioned its
25 assistance in getting her money back, only if FRIES first admitted in writing that she
26 “authorized” the fraudulent $100,000.00 wire transfer. This was obviously done by WF to
27 shield itself from its own actions, misconduct and liability. WF’s demands that FRIES admit
28 she authorized or verified the theft before it would even try to help her retrieve her funds –

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1 knowing full well the funds were stolen from her – was further outrageous and intentional
2 misconduct that it exceeds all bounds of decency in a civilized community.
3 37. WF’s misconduct, first in lying to FRIES about the return of her money and
4 then its coercive outrageous demand that she admit in writing that she authorized the wire
5 transfer as a pre-condition to WF’s assistance, are all are acts of misconduct outside the
6 scope of the Commercial Code 11101 et. seq. and (UCC §4A-202)] and therefore, this cause
7 of action is not displaced by these statutes as confirmed in Zengen, Inc. v Comerica Bank 41
8 Cal.4th 239 (2007).
9 38. WF’s intentional misconduct as described herein, was outrageous and beyond
10 the bounds of decency, oppressive, malicious and fraudulent thereby entitling Plaintiff to an
11 award of general and punitive damages in amounts be determined at trial.
12
13 Plaintiff Prays:
14 ON THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, FOURTH CAUSES OF ACTION:
15 1. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial in an amount of not
16 less than $100,000.00, plus prejudgment interest.
17 ON THE FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION:
18 2. For general and special damages in an amount to be proven at trial in an amount of not
19 less than $100,000.00.
20 3. For punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial.
21 ON ALL CAUSES OF ACTION
22 4. For costs of suit incurred herein;
23 5. For attorneys’ fees permitted by law and the OAA.
24 6. For such other relief the court deems proper and appropriate;
25
DATED: November 22, 2023 KRISHEL LAW FIRM
26
//Daniel Krishel
27 By:_________________________
DANIEL L. KRISHEL
28 Attorney for Plaintiff Alice Fries

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