EMERGING RIFT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST – A PERMANENT FEATURE

Why Putin considers that Russia is under threat, is the perception in his mind, which
goes back to historic invasions of Russia: Karl the XII’s in the 18th, Napoleon’s in the
19th and finally, Hitler’s in the 20 th century (“Russia Cannot Afford to Lose, so We Need
a Kind of a Victory”: Sergey Karaganov on What Putin Wants, 2022). Putin’s grievances
also touch Vladimir Lenin, Soviet Union’s first leader, who–according to him–weakened
Russian territorial integrity by “creating” Ukraine. Regardless of the precise duration of
perceived injustice and threat, it has been amply evident since the mid-2000s, that Putin
is not satisfied with the status quo of Russia’s position in the world (Press, 2016), the
fact, which is evident by his rhetorical and territorial provocations.
Despite these early warning signs, over the past decade, the Western response
to Putin’s aggressive demeanor has been unenthusiastic. Among other lukewarm
reactions, the USA and Europe, signaled their friendly intentions to Russia through
economic appeasement, expecting that commerce, finance and socialization would
encourage Western values among Russians. But it was evident that Putin was not
swayed by these economic incentives. Paradoxically, he pushed even harder against
the standards, the West thought would contain him as he saw the balance of power
tilting away from him and the threat level rising both militarily and politically. As a result,
after the war in Ukraine, the rift now emerging between Russia and the West is likely to
become a permanent feature: a new barrier that separates the geopolitical and geo-
economic landscape for as long as Putin's administration is in place.
Russia’s Apprehensions and the West’s Response
During his speech in state of the nation address in 2005, Putin called the collapse of the
Soviet Union, as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” and a “genuine
tragedy” for the Russian people, saying that, “Tens of millions of our fellow citizens and
countrymen found themselves beyond the fringes of Russian territory” (Russia: Excerpts
from Putin’s State-Of-The-Nation Speech, n.d.). This statement signaled Russia’s
intention to recuperate land in order to achieve geopolitical rebalancing it intended. That
speech came in the wake of the anti-regime “color revolutions” which Putin believed
were fueled by the West.
In 2007, at the Munich Security Conference, Putin forwarded three key
complaints. First, about NATO’s expansion into the Baltics. Second, concerned election
monitoring and regime-change efforts in the former Soviet republics by the US, which
the Kremlin considers to be within its sphere of influence. Third, Putin protested a
proposal to build an anti-missile shield over the United States, with bases in Eastern
Europe (Shanker & Landler, 2007). Putin’s apprehensions seemed to be stirred by
former Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s criticisms of the unipolar order led by the US
and the security threat he felt it posed to Russia. Those fears came true when in 2008,
then Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko requested a NATO membership action
plan. In April 2008, Putin gave clear warning to the West in a NATO summit in
Bucharest saying that Russia viewed expansion up to its border as a direct threat
(Dawar, 2008). From Russia’s perspective, if the bids for Ukraine and perhaps Georgia
for joining the NATO were successful, Russia would have a rival military alliance
positioned on its Western frontier, creating a hostile corridor extending from the Baltics
to the Black Sea. Just a few months after the Bucharest Summit, feared by NATO’s
open-door policy toward Ukraine and Georgia, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of
Georgia in August 2008.
The provocation received almost no resistance as the West mounted no
challenge. The European Union proposed a cease-fire on Russian terms, and the U.S.
offered to “reset” relations with Moscow (Dickinson, 2021). After seeing little resistance
to his campaign in Georgia, Putin decided to take on other potential NATO member,
Ukraine. In 2014, Russia invaded and annexed Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula. At this
point, the U.S. and its allies condemned and sanctioned Russia for its incursion and
annexation of Crimea. A few years later, by 2017, NATO had deployed rotational battle
groups to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. Putin warned his rivals that he saw the
bases near Russia’s border as well as the EU and NATO’s continued engagement with
post-soviet states as a “direct threat” that would provoke a response. But Ukraine and
Georgia continued to pursue NATO membership, and this year, the response came –
Russia invaded Ukraine on Feb 24. After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, NATO
responded by increasing its forward presence in Eastern Europe, stationing more battle
groups in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The U.S. has also committed more
than $8.8 billion in weapons and military support to Ukraine (U.S. Announces $820
Million in Ukraine Military Aid, Including Missile Systems, 2022).
The magnitude of the shift in Russian-European relations cannot be overstated.
In the words of Finnish Prime Minister Sanna Marin, “Russia is not the neighbor we
thought it was” (PM: Nato Decision Must Happen This Spring, 2022). If the West had
paid attention to Russia's red flags, it could have successfully deterred its belligerence.
With the West’s awakening, NATO’s strategic concept (Strategic Concept for the
Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2010)
is in for a major overhaul, regardless of whether Russia pulls out of Ukraine before the
alliance’s Madrid Summit in June.
Europe’s Legacy of Compulsions
European allies encouraged stronger ties with Russia wherever they saw the
opportunity. This was particularly true when, in the beginning of 1980s, Europe had to
look for alternative suppliers in the face of depleted gas reserves in the North Sea.
Russia had both the capability and the willingness to meet Europe's energy demands.
Although, Russian gas imports were not an option during the Cold War, but by the early
2000s, engaging Russia economically was a good geopolitical choice. It made sense for
Europe to strengthen its economic ties with Russia, even if doing so has been
controversial both on the continent and in relations with the US, which has long
opposed reliance on Russia. But that strategy has meant that, in the weeks since
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the U.S. issued a complete ban on Russian energy
imports (The White House, 2022), Europe was slow to follow suit.
Negotiations over a comprehensive energy boycott are causing divisions within
the European Union, with some countries stalling and others pushing ahead (Sandford,
2022). While oil sanctions are more likely, EU-wide gas sanctions may be impossible to
implement. An all-inclusive EU gas embargo would be economically costly for highly
reliant countries, however, EU members that are not overtly dependent on Russia can
afford to turn off their gas valves individually, with the aim of collectively harm Russia.
A New Barrier b/w Russia and the West
Despite its economic interdependence with Europe, the security threat from Russia has
now intensified outside of its zone of influence, frightening potential NATO members in
Scandinavia. Democratic states are not likely to restore relations with Russia with an
aggressive, authoritarian regime that now poses a direct security risk to them. Other
economic players might not want to deal with Russia again even if governments chose
to do so. According to New York Times, 600 companies had scaled back or suspended
business in Russia (Sonnenfeld & Tian, 2022). According to CNN, in the art world,
Christie’s, Sotheby’s and Bonhams have cancelled their summer arts events in London;
oligarch buyers of Fabergé eggs, Kandinsky paintings and the like are too sanctioned to
participate (Reuters, n.d.). These actions are not the consequence of a U.S. policy of
extraterritorial sanctions. They are the result of independent economic actors self-
policing conduct, which neither needs enforcement nor can be removed through
mandates without meddling with free markets.
Russia is in for a rough patch. According to former finance minister Alexei Kudrin,
gross domestic product of Russia contracted 2 percent in this quarter and is projected to
fall more than 10 percent in 2022, the biggest fall in gross domestic product since the
years following the 1991 fall of the Soviet Union. Russia is facing soaring inflation and
capital flight while grappling with a possible debt default after the West imposed
crippling sanctions to punish President Vladimir Putin for sending tens of thousands of
troops to Ukraine on Feb. 24 (Reuters, 2022). The Kremlin continues to enforce import
restrictions, capital controls, and exorbitant 20 percent interest rates in an effort to save
the national currency.
Sanctions' fundamental tenet is that they be lifted if the party receiving them
satisfies the conditions made of them. However, that bet is contingent upon other
economic participants following suit and returning to the sanctioned market when it
reopens. The more the human, social, and economic costs of the prolonged war in
Ukraine, the less probable it is that Russia's business, sporting, and artistic industries
will return to business as usual. A deep transformation may be underway. Russia's
military effort may be stopped by the sanctions in place today, but they also risk
permanently ending the country's great power position on the political, economic, and
cultural fronts.
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