The Eastern Question

Russia, the West,

and Europe’s Grey Zone

Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Editors

Center for Transatlantic Relations

Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies
Johns Hopkins University

German Council on Foreign Relations/

Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister, eds., The Eastern Question: Russia, the
West, and Europe’s Grey Zone

Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016.

© Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016

Center for Transatlantic Relations

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 Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v

Headline Summary
The Eastern Question: Recommendations for Western Policy . . . . . . .vii
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Section I
East and West in a New Era
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
The New Era
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9
Eastern Challenges
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33
Western Dilemmas
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Section II
What the West Must Do
1. What the West Must Do with Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .41
2. What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood . . . . . . . .52
3. What the West Must Do for Itself . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .78
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Section III
Perspectives on Russia, the West, and Europe’s Grey Zone
Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .93
Russia's Putin and Putin’s Russia:
How They Work and What We Should Expect
Vladislav L. Inozemtsev

Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .109
Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better?
Marek Menkiszak
iv THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

Chapter 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .133
The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to
Long-Term Crisis Management
Marie Mendras

Chapter 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .141
Western Strategy toward Russia
Sergei Guriev

Chapter 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .149
Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space
William Courtney

Chapter 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .167
Twilight of the Putin Era?
Donald N. Jensen

Chapter 9 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .177
When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s
Relations with the West?
Andrew C. Kuchins

Chapter 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .189
Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe's
Grey Zone and Western Policy
John E. Herbst

Chapter 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .219
A Bridge Too Far? How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western
Policies toward Wider Europe
Hiski Haukkala

Chapter 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .233
An Eastern Partnership for Peace: Why NATO
and the EU need a Coordinated Approach to their
Former Soviet Neighbors
Ian Bond

Chapter 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .243
Western Policy toward Wider Europe
F. Stephen Larrabee

About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .259

 Headline Summary

The Eastern Question:

Recommendations for Western Policy
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Russia under Vladimir Putin has become a revisionist power seeking to

undo the post-Cold War settlement, control its neighborhood, and dis-
rupt Western influence. By annexing the eastern Ukrainian region of
Crimea and waging war in other parts of the country, the Kremlin seeks
not only to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty but the European security
order. The comfortable verities of the “post-Cold War era” are a para-
digm lost. The Soviet succession continues to rumble, and a new era has
begun—more fluid, more turbulent, more open-ended.
Ukraine is now the crucible of change. It stands at a critical cross-
roads between a more open society integrated increasingly into the
European mainstream and serving as a positive alternative model to that
of Putin for the post-Soviet space; or a failed, fractured land of grey
mired in the stagnation and turbulence historically characteristic of
Europe’s borderlands.
Europe’s eastern lands beyond the EU and NATO are less secure and
less at peace than they were a decade ago. They are challenged as much
by their own internal weaknesses as by Russian aggression. Corruption
and crony capitalism, kleptocratic elites and festering conflicts drain
resources from countries that are already fragile and poor. Their insta-
bilities have mixed with Moscow’s revisionism to form a combustible
brew.
The greatest gap between Russian and Western thinking is not over
Syria, Iran, or other world regions. It is over the common European
neighborhood. The United States and its European allies and partners
must forge consensus on how to deal with a resurgent, belligerent Rus-
sia and with Europe’s grey zone before things get worse.
Unfortunately, the chances of that are high. Moscow’s aggression
extends beyond Europe’s east to both the northern and southern
expanses of the continent. Its intrusion into Syria has further inflamed

vii
viii THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

Middle Eastern turmoil. Dangers in each region are blending in ways

that threaten Europeans, Americans and many others around the globe.
Russia’s assertiveness and wider Europe’s tumult come at a time of
immense strain on Western countries. A dizzying array of challenges is
tearing at European unity and has left Europe’s west with less confi-
dence and readiness to reach out in any significant way to Europe’s east.
Moscow is exploiting fissures within European Union countries to gen-
erate uncertainty about the European project itself.
Europe’s hesitations are magnified by those of its American partner.
Yet Western principles, institutions and interests are under assault.
Unity rooted in shared values will be essential. Western actions, while
coordinated, have largely been ad hoc responses to Russian provoca-
tions. They are unlikely to be sustainable unless they are tied to a long-
term Western strategy towards Russia and wider Europe. This strategy
should consist of three components.

1. What the West Must Do with Russia

Western policy toward Russia must be proceed along three parallel and
mutually reinforcing tracks: deterring the regime where necessary; con-
tinuous communication and selective engagement with the regime
where useful; and proactive engagement with the broadest range of
Russian societal actors as possible.
• Track One: North America and Europe should make be clear that rela-
tions with Russia must be based on respect for international law, the
UN Charter and the Helsinki principles, including respect for the sov-
ereignty and independence of Russia’s neighbors. Track One should
encompass both clear signals to Moscow and independent measures
that can reassure allies and partners concerned about Russian pressure
and deter Russia from further intimidation. Western states must
• reject any effort to negotiate the future of the common neighborhood
over the heads of those societies.
• strengthen Western non-recognition of Russia’s illegal annexation of the
Ukrainian areas of Crimea and Sevastopol.
• maintain Russian sanctions until full military and political implementa-
tion of the Minsk agreements has been secured, and be prepared to
increase sanctions if Minsk is not fully implemented.
• consider suspension of Russian membership in the entire Council of
Europe, not just its parliamentary assembly.
 Headline Summary ix

• stop enabling Russian corruption in Europe and elsewhere.

• Track Two: North America and Europe should be clear that they stand
as willing partners with a Russia that decides to invest in its people,
build a more sustainable economy grounded in the rule of law, tackle its
health and demographic challenges, build better relations with its
neighbors, and act as a responsible international stakeholder. They
should set forth in concrete terms the potential political, economic and
security benefits of more productive relations.
• Engage selectively on geopolitical issues such as terrorism, the so-called
IS, Syria, North Korea, Iran, and climate change.
• Revitalize the NATO-Russia Council with a narrow focus on arrange-
ments to avoid dangerous incidents.
• Upgrade where possible Europe’s conventional arms control framework
via confidence-building measures in the Vienna Document, the CFE
and Open Skies treaties.
• Reinforce the architecture of nuclear security through continued
START Treaty implementation, examine challenges to the INF Treaty
system, and open or reopen discussions over issues related to missile
defense, dual-use delivery systems and tactical nuclear weapons.
• Track Three: Western actors should engage as robustly as possible
with the Russian people, including with alternative elites, civil society,
entrepreneurs and innovators, media and opposition figures, as well as
promote opportunities for student and professional exchanges and visa-
free travel. Track Three initiatives will be difficult as Moscow seeks to
isolate its people from Western NGOs. But Russia is not the semi-
autarkic Soviet Union. It is integrated in many ways in the global econ-
omy, and the digital age offers many points of access to Russian society.

Efforts along all three tracks of effort should be advanced via close
transatlantic consultation and united by a vision of Russia as part of a
new Europe, a Russia that embarks on a course of profound, systemic
internal economic and political reform and modernization, a Russia that
refrains from the use of force, a Russia that does not seek a sphere of
influence but develops integration through cooperation and by increas-
ing its own attractiveness. Today’s Russia is not that Russia. Yet it is
important that Western interlocutors not engage in the zero-sum think-
ing that characterizes Kremlin policy,
x THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

2. What the West Must Do with Wider Europe

Meet the Immediate Challenges in Ukraine
Ukrainian society has made a clear choice for reform and for Europe.
This historic opportunity can be lost unless Western actors engage
more vigorously with Ukrainian partners to stabilize the country.
Ukraine must lead the way by reforming the judiciary, rooting out cor-
ruption, selling off parasitic state-owned companies and privatizing top
performers, supporting independent media and civil society, reinforcing
its capacity for self-defense, and meeting the needs of 1.5 million people
displaced by the war with Russia and its proxies. Western assistance can
make a difference in all of these areas.

Revise Western Approaches to the Common Neighborhood

The region’s great diversity makes an overarching Western policy diffi-
cult Nonetheless, some broad principles are relevant across the region.
The most pressing task for the West is to help Ukraine make its transi-
tion a success. In the region more broadly, Western countries need to
discourage Kremlin coercion of neighbors and encourage countries
willing to make tough choices for reform.
A proactive policy along these lines might be best characterized as
“Open Door, Straight Talk, Tough Love.”
• Open Door. All countries of wider Europe that express interest and
prove commitment to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions
should have a membership perspective. The Open Door is the only
principle that can credibly generate stability for Europe. Without it,
Western leverage and regional incentives enact reforms will be low.
• Straight Talk. Open Door does not mean lower standards. Member-
ship is a generational challenge. This calls for straight talk. First, most
countries are threatened as much from their internal weaknesses as
from external meddling. Second, closer association with the West
begins at home. Countries must make tough choices for democratic
reforms, not as a favor to others, but as a benefit to themselves. Third,
closer integration is likely to be accelerated to the extent a country “acts
like a member” even before it becomes a member.
• Tough Love. Societies seeking to join the European mainstream must
be prepared to create conditions by which ever closer relations can be
possible. The West can and will help. But the states themselves must
lead the way, and will be held to account when and where they do not.
 Headline Summary xi

With these three principles in mind, Western actors should:

• Revamp the Eastern Partnership.
• Differentiate between those for whom political association, economic
integration and eventual membership is a goal (Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia), those who are interested cooperation short of membership
(Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Belarus).
• Focus on the most urgent needs.
• Offer a “European Perspective” to Partnership countries willing and
able to create conditions by which this could be possible.
• Adjust Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements to match the
real needs, capacities and intentions of each partner.
• Create More Mobility Options.
• De-link the Eastern Partnership from Russia policy.
• Consider new forms of association, including EU associate mem-
bership, through selective extension of the “variable geometry” princi-
ple, to keep countries engaged.
• Develop transatlantic complements to EU strategies.
• Consider U.S.-EU “Atlantic Accords” with countries in the common
neighborhood, joint political statements that can provide reassurance
and add substance to Western commitments to work with countries to
create conditions drawing them closer.
• Consider a U.S. Black Sea Charter, drawing on principles and mecha-
nisms found in the U.S.-Baltic Charter, the U.S. Adriatic Charter, and
elements of the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe.
• Deepen NATO’s ties to the countries of the region while affirming the
Open Door principle. Make the Partnership for Peace as substantive as
possible for reforming post-Soviet states.
• Engage robustly within the OSCE. At a time of military tension and
growing possibilities for incidents, accidents and miscalculation, the
OSCE can provide a common platform for mediation, dialogue and
conflict prevention—if its members want it to.
• The OSCE is one of the international community’s most important on-
the-ground presences in the Ukraine crisis.
• OSCE members must provide adequate support for the OSCE’s Spe-
cial Monitoring Mission in Ukraine so it can focus both on security
and humanitarian issues.
• The Special Monitoring Mission should monitor and report on the
entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea.
• Local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk under
Ukrainian law and in line with OSCE standards must be monitored
xii THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

(ODIHR).
• Western members should ensure that OSCE field missions, ODIHR,
the Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the High Commis-
sioner on National Minorities can effectively and independently per-
form the duties assigned to them by their mandates, and are provided
with sufficient resources to do so.
• The German and Austrian Chairs-in-Office should encourage energetic
expansion of such civil society activities throughout wider Europe. This
could include efforts to strengthen OSCE monitoring of human rights
and expand OSCE attention to minority issues to encompass newer
minorities and refugees.
• Address with greater urgency the region’s festering conflicts in
Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), Arme-
nia and Azerbaijan (Nagorno-Karabakh) and, most likely, in the eastern
Ukrainian regions of Luhansk and the Donbas. The West must be
attentive to Russian efforts to use these conflicts to influence or disrupt
neighboring countries. The OSCE should make an effort to provide
fresh impetus for the Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations in the
OSCE Minsk Group, and establish a status-neutral field presence in
Georgia with access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

3. What the West Must Do for Itself

Eastern policy begins at home. The best way the United States and its
European partners can act together vis-a-vis Europe’s east is by getting
their respective acts together in the West. Putin’s challenge is as much
about the West as it is about Russia. The more people in Western soci-
eties feel secure about their own prospects, the more confident they will
be about reaching out to those in wider Europe. And the more robust
our community, the better the odds that the people of wider Europe will
find the courage they will need to make hard choices for reform.
In short, while we must deal with Russia realistically, and craft more
proactive efforts with the countries of the common neighborhood, there
is also much we must do for ourselves.
• NATO: In Area or In Trouble. NATO’s old mantra was “out of area
or out of business.” Today’s mantra must be “in area or in trouble.”
• Full Spectrum Deterrence. Deterrence has become more complicated
and its scope much broader than during the Cold War. NATO allies and
partners face an authoritarian challenge from Russia to their east and
 Headline Summary xiii

extremist challenges to their south. Full Spectrum Deterrence requires a

mix of tried, true and new instruments that can be applied 360 degrees
around NATO’s borders. NATO has taken some steps, but more are
needed.
• Enhance U.S. presence and participation in European defense and
deterrence. The Obama Administration’s intent to increase European
Reassurance Initiative funding by $3.4 billion is an important step.
• Enhance defense and deterrence in NATO’s east, including forward
deployment of NATO multinational forces in the Baltic region on a
rotational basis.
• Strengthen NATO’s Conventional and Special Operations Forces.
• Meet Russia’s growing anti-access area denial challenge.
• Revise the Alliance Maritime Strategy to better focus alliance efforts
on collective defense and deterrence in the maritime domain.
• No excuses burden-sharing. The United States continues to fund
about 70 percent of NATO’s expenditures. Increased contributions
from member states are essential.
• Make use of Partnerships.
• Sweden and Finland should become Premier Interoperable Partners
(PIP) of NATO, a new top-tier designation for high-performing
partners.
• Extend Nordic Baltic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) to the
Baltic states.
• Maximize Resilience. Critical arteries underpinning and linking free
societies are vulnerable to disruption by terrorists, energy cartels, illicit
traffickers, cyber-hackers, internet trolls and “little green men.” Gov-
ernments accustomed to protecting their territories must now also
focus on protecting their connectedness.
• NATO allies should each make a Pledge on National Resilience at
the 2016 Warsaw Summit pursuant to Article 3 of the North Atlantic
Treaty
• Make Resilience a Core Task of NATO.
• Develop Resilience Support Teams, small operational units that could
offer support to NATO members’ national authorities.
• Increase support to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence and its Strategic Communications Command.
• Reinforce NATO’s pledge with a U.S.-EU Solidarity Pledge, a joint
political declaration that each partner shall act in a spirit of solidarity—
refusing to remain passive — if either is the object of a terrorist attack or
the victim of a natural or man-made disaster, and shall work to prevent
terrorist threats to either partner; protect democratic institutions and
xiv THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

civilian populations from terrorist attack; and assist the other, in its terri-
tory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist
attack, natural or man-made disaster.
• Project resilience forward. North American and European leaders
should identify—very publicly— the resiliency of their societies with
that of others, including those beyond the EU and NATO, and share
strategies and procedures to improve societal resilience to corruption,
psychological and information warfare, and intentional or natural dis-
ruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other dynamic
infrastructures, focusing both on prevention but also response. Forward
resilience would also enhance joint capacity to defend against threats to
interconnected domestic economies and societies and resist Russian
efforts to exploit weaknesses of these societies to disrupt and keep them
under its influence.
• Take action again Western enablers of Kremlin operatives and
eastern oligarchs. Despite Western efforts to blunt Putin’s aggression
and tackle east European corruption, many Western institutions and
countries enable those activities through legal loopholes, tax havens,
shell companies and lax law enforcement of anti-corruption laws at
home, or through their own activities in eastern countries.
• Develop a more strategic approach to energy.
• Enforce the EU’s Third Energy Package and rules governing the
Energy Community.
• Facilitate greater U.S. energy supplies to Europe.
• Invest in North-South infrastructure in Europe stretching from the
Baltic to the Adriatic. Integrate Ukraine and Moldova into the corridor.
• Review plans for building a North Stream II pipeline to ensure they
correspond to basic principles underpinning the EU’s 3rd energy pack-
age or the Energy Union.
• Encourage Turkey to join the Energy Community.
 Preface and Acknowledgments
Dramatic developments across Europe’s east are testing fundamental
assumptions that have guided Western policies over the past quarter
century. With this in mind, our two institutions, together with our part-
ner, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, brought together leading Western ana-
lysts and decision-makers to build Western awareness, understanding
and, where possible, renewed Western consensus on Eastern policy. We
engaged senior officials, regional experts, scholars, foreign policy strate-
gists and other opinion leaders in a Transatlantic Strategy Group as well
as in a series of consultations in Kyiv, Moscow, Berlin and Washington,
DC. Eminent authors were asked to contribute their perspectives, and
we are pleased to present their insights and recommendations in this
volume.
We wish to thank our Strategy Group members, who participated in
our deliberations in their personal capacities: Thomas Bagger, Director
of the Policy Planning Staff, German Foreign Office; Hans Binnendijk,
Senior Fellow, Center for Transatlantic Relations; Paula Dobriansky,
visiting scholar at Harvard University and former U.S. Undersecretary
of State; John Herbst, former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and to
Uzbekistan; Linas Linkevičius, Foreign Minister of Lithuania; Jüri
Luik, Director, International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS)
and Former Minister of Defense and Foreign Affairs of Estonia; Olga
Oliker, Director for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies; Constanze Stelzenmüller, Robert
Bosch Fellow at The Brookings Institution; and Ernest Wyciszkiewicz,
Deputy Director of the Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and Under-
standing in Warsaw.
We would also like to thank our authors and the many colleagues who
participated in the deliberations and meetings that produced this book.
We are grateful to Madeleine Albright, Elena Alekseenkova, Anders
Aslund, Irina Avyagelskaya, Péter Balás, Juulia Barthel, Alexander
Baunov, Carl Bildt, Claudio Bisogniero, Ian Brzezinski, Debra Cagan,
Michael Carpenter, Alexander Chernenko, Ed Chow, Maria Davydchyk,
Ihor Dolgov, Mustafa Dzhemilev, Michael Emerson, Evelyn Farkas,
Vasyl Filipchuk, Jacob Freeman, Rüdiger von Fritsch, Yevhen Glibovyst-
sky, Mykhailo Gonchar, Lev Gudkov, Stefan Gullgren, Maria Gurova,

v
vi THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

Michael Haltzel, Oleksiy Haran, Stefanie Harter, John Heffern, Fiona

Hill, Hans-Peter Hinrichsen, Taras Kachka, Kornely K. Kakachia, Daria
Kalenyuk, Pavel Kanevskiy, Kirsti Kauppi, Ivanna Klimpush-
Cincadze, Andrei Kolesnikov, John Kornblum, Andrey Kortunov, David
Kramer, Vasily Kuznetsov, Sergei Lukasevskij, Douglas Lute, Oleksandr
Lytvynenko, Fyodor Lyukanov, Timur Makhmutov, Tetyana Malyarenko,
Eerik Marmei, Andrey Movchan, Oleksii Mushak, Renatus Norkus,
Karolina Nowak, Michael Nowak, Robert Nurick, Heidi Obermeyer,
Tina Olteanu, Georgios Pokas, Elizabeth Pond, Geoffrey Pyatt, Steve
Pifer, Viktoria Ptashnyk, Andris Razans, Florian Razesberger, Gunda
Reire, Kirill Rogov, Eberhard Sandschneider, Stanislav Secrieru, Alena
Shkrum, Dmytro Shulga, Martin Sieg, Aleska Simkic, Andras Simonyi,
Julianne Smith, Angela Stent, Susan Stewart, Oleksandr Sushko, Boris
Tarasyuk, William B. Taylor, John Tefft, Michael Thumann, Jan Tombin-
ski, James Townsend, Vygaudas Ušackas, Sergey Utkin, Alexander Versh-
bow, Karsten Voigt, Kurt Volker, Victoria Voytsitskaya, Yevhen Vystrytsky,
Christof Weil, Peter Wittig, Bohdan Yaremenko, Mariia Zolkina and
others who remain anonymous for helpful insights and support.
We are particularly grateful to the Robert Bosch Stiftung for its sup-
port of our efforts, its continued commitment to transatlantic partner-
ship, and its sustained engagement with eastern Europe and with Russia.
We would also like to thank the International Renaissance Founda-
tion in Kyiv, the Russian International Affairs Council, the Levada and
Carnegie Centers in Moscow, and Steven Szabo, Ted Reinert and the
Fellows of the Transatlantic Academy, with whom we have had ener-
getic and fruitful discussions.
While our recommendations reflect the many deliberations held, the
views expressed are those of the respective authors, and do not necessar-
ily reflect those of every contributor or of any institution or government.

Daniel S. Hamilton
Stefan Meister
 Section I

East and West in a New Era

 Introduction

The New Era

Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

A quarter century ago, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Cold War
ended. Since then, and particularly after the Balkan wars of the 1990s, a
generalized sense took hold in Western capitals that the natural state of
the post-Cold War era would be European peace and stability. In the
1990 Charter of Paris, societies from Vancouver to Vladivostok united
around common principles: a commitment to democracy grounded in
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; an end to spheres
of influence; and recognition of equal security for all countries.1 Central
and southeast European countries joined the European Union and
NATO to extend the spaces of Europe where democracy and market
economies prevailed and war simply did not happen. The EU created a
variety of means to associate neighboring countries not yet willing or
able to join its structures. NATO forged new relationships through the
Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, the
NATO-Ukraine Commission, the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the
NATO-Russia Council. Russia joined the G8, helped implement the
post-Dayton peace in Bosnia, cooperated with the West to fight terror-
ism and decommission nuclear, biological, and chemical weapon stock-
piles, and agreed to respect the territorial integrity and political inde-
pendence of Ukraine in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.
In the West, consensus grew that the “post-Cold War” security order
in Europe was stable; that the magnetic qualities of life within the Euro-
pean Union would eventually lead eastern and southeastern European
neighbors to align themselves to its standards; that Russia, while still
distant, could, with Western support, modernize and eventually arrange
itself within Europe’s evolving order; and that NATO’s more important
missions would be crisis management far away rather than collective
defense at home.

1 These principles were reaffirmed most recently in the 2010 Astana Declaration by all mem-
bers of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). http://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/25/AR200912 2501286.html.

3
4 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

Europe, it seemed, had turned the page on its 20th century horrors
and divisions. Western leaders and publics were eager to move on. Their
attention was captured by terrorist attacks, Middle Eastern turmoil, ris-
ing powers and economic and financial crises at home.2 The vision of a
Europe whole, free and at peace became more slogan than project, and
the business of integration was left undone.
History, it turns out, did not end with the Cold War. Walls came
down, but throughout the vast unsettled spaces to the east of the EU
and NATO, other walls remained—historical animosities, ethnic
hatreds, unresolved borders, struggles for power and control. Freed of
Soviet shackles but with no early prospect of being moored to the West,
each country went its own way. Belarus became an authoritarian regime
with symbiotic ties to Moscow. Armenia and Azerbaijan also turned to
authoritarianism, even as they fought each other over the unsettled ter-
ritory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia’s reluctance to negotiate a settle-
ment, and its isolation by Turkey, rendered it dependent on Moscow for
security and political support, while Azerbaijan used its resources to bal-
ance between Russia and the West. Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia each
struggled with its Soviet legacy of systemic corruption, politically cap-
tive judiciaries, distorted markets, dysfunctional bureaucracies, and
informal networks fostering patronage, privilege and cronyism. Each
became “momentocracies,” regimes captured by small groups of oli-
garchic insiders who used state structures to enrich themselves while
leaving their economies in ruins, their governing institutions bankrupt
and their citizens in dire need.3
In Georgia and Ukraine, however, popular anger and desperation
fueled demands for change. The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia and
the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine inspired hopes that each society
had turned an important corner. Georgia under Mikheil Saakashvili
implemented radical economic and administrative reforms, turned anti-
Russian and looked to the West. Hopes were dashed in Ukraine, however,
as “Orange” authorities maintained symbiotic relationships with oli-

2 See Daniel S. Hamilton, Andras Simonyi, Debra L. Cagan, eds., Advancing U.S.-Nordic-
Baltic Security Cooperation (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2014);
Matthew Kroenig, “Facing Reality: Getting NATO Ready for a New Cold War,” Survival,
January 2015, pp. 49–70.
3 Former Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko used this phrase to describe Ukraine, but it
applies to others in the region as well. See Taras Kuzio, “Political Culture and Democracy:
Ukraine as an Immobile State,” East European Politics and Society, vol.25, no.1 (February
2011), pp. 88–113.
 Introduction 5

garchs, preserved the rent-seeking traditions of their predecessors, used

administrative levers to influence the courts, and failed to make any sub-
stantial progress in integrating Ukraine more deeply into the European
mainstream.4 Infighting among “Orange” leaders enabled Victor
Yanukovych to regain power and roll back democracy. When Yanukovych
reneged on an Association Agreement with the EU in November 2014
and Ukrainian security forces beat students who had been peacefully
protesting the move, popular anger once again spilled onto the streets.
The Maidan “revolution of dignity,” Ukraine’s second post-Soviet mass
protest movement, began, ultimately forcing Yanukovych from power and
resulting in the election of pro-reform forces.
Meanwhile, since starting his third term as Russia’s President in 2012
Vladimir Putin has turned Russia into a revisionist power seeking to
renegotiate the post-Cold War order, secure authority and control over
its neighborhood, and to challenge and disrupt Western influence wher-
ever possible. Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia briefly roused somnambu-
lant Western leaders, but they quickly hit the snooze button. Russia
then jolted the West, and the world, in 2014 by its intervention and
annexation of the Crimean region of Ukraine, its active support for
Ukrainian separatists and destabilization of Ukraine’s new reform-ori-
ented government, launching of missiles from Russia into Ukrainian
territory, and deployment of tens of thousands of troops on the Russian-
Ukrainian border and many into Ukrainian territory itself. These acts
violated assurances given by Russia against threats or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine in
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum; as well basic commitments to respect
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states made by Russia
under the UN Charter, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the 2010 Astana
Declaration, the 1997 Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agree-
ment, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act and the 2002 NATO-Rus-
sia Rome Declaration. Concerns were further raised by Putin’s procla-
mation of a duty to protect ethnic Russians in other countries regardless
of their citizenship, efforts to intimidate European energy consumers,
cyber attacks in Estonia, Ukraine and other countries, and provocative
military activities, including simulated nuclear exercises and snap con-
ventional force alerts, as well as violations of the air, land and seaspace
of a number of EU and NATO member states.

4 The one exception being membership of the WTO in 2008.

6 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

The Soviet Succession Is Still Rumbling

Russia’s actions rudely awakened Western elites and publics to the tur-
moil and violence that continue within Europe and to the possibility
that the fashionable certitudes of the “post-Cold War era” offer a less
useful historical frame to understanding Europe’s security challenges
than the unfashionable uncertainties of the “Soviet succession”—a far
more turbulent, open-ended and longer-lasting reshuffling of relation-
ships among and within European societies and among states than many
care to admit or acknowledge.
The “post-Cold War” mindset posits that Europe’s 20th century
earthquake has ended. Things have stopped shaking. The ground is sta-
ble. According to this perspective, Russian intervention in Ukraine is an
episode to be resolved. Tragic, but peripheral and fixable. But Europe’s
20th century earthquake did not end in 1989 or in 1991. The “Soviet
succession” is still shaking the European landscape, and when one is in
the middle of an earthquake, the best prediction one can make is that
things will keep shaking. Russian intervention in Ukraine is a symptom,
not an isolated episode. While Ukrainians bear significant responsibility
for the dysfunction and turmoil that has gripped their country, their
drama is only part of much broader and deeper tensions that beset the
entire region. This is first and foremost a Russia crisis, not a Ukraine
crisis.
Europe’s vast eastern spaces, including Russia, will remain turbulent,
and sporadically violent, for the foreseeable future. Europe’s east is less
secure and less at peace than it was at the beginning of this decade.
Moscow has proven itself willing and able to intimidate, harass, and
project force to assert influence and prerogatives over an expanse of
peoples and territories far beyond its own, extending into the member
states of the EU and NATO.5 In fact, one of the most striking aspects of
these challenges is that they are not limited to central and eastern
Europe, but have extended across both northern and southern Europe
as well, and are being further accentuated by the violence and turmoil
that has engulfed the Broader Middle East. Moscow has been engaging
more actively beyond Europe in part to shore up its influence over
crises within Europe. It is increasingly cooperating with other regimes

5 Kroenig, op. cit; Lawrence Freedman, “Ukraine and the Art of Limited War,” Survival, De-
cember 2014.
 Introduction 7

ruling countries such as China, Iran, Egypt, and Venezuela to stabilize

authoritarian leaders and undermine democratic movements.6
Moscow’s revisionism and weak states in eastern Europe are a com-
bustible mix. Putin has openly rejected the rules of the road in Euro-
pean security, and in eastern Europe beyond the EU and NATO there
are neither rules nor roads. Institutions are challenged. NATO does not
provide security for the countries in-between and is struggling to assure
its members of their own security. The Kremlin has publicly renounced
values and principles espoused by the EU. It is presenting neighbor-
hood countries with a no-win, either-or choice of EU-led or Russian-
led integration. Broader institutions that include all post-Soviet states,
like the OSCE and the Council of Europe, have been weakened by
Western disinterest and by the ability of Russia and other states to
undermine reforms and undercut decisions. European-wide mecha-
nisms built up over decades to increase transparency, predictability and
de-escalation, including through arms control, have lost priority.
The stakes are high. European order itself is questioned.
These security challenges affect all Europeans, but it is unlikely that
Europeans will be able to resolve them on their own. Moscow’s irreden-
tism, together with continued turbulence in wider Europe, challenge
U.S. interests in a Europe at peace, whole and free. For more than a
decade, the United States has focused its attention on security chal-
lenges far from European shores. Yet the greatest gap between Russian
and Western thinking is not over Syria or Iran. It is over their common
neighborhood in Europe.
Europe’s in-between lands have again become the key source of con-
flict between Russia and the West. Russia’s leadership believes that
growing Western activities in this region are a threat to its hold on
power at home. It is not only willing to pay a much higher price to
assert influence over the common neighborhood with the EU and
NATO than any Western state, it has shown it is prepared to use force
to protect what it believes is Russia’s sphere of influence. This is differ-
ent than other regional conflicts, where the Kremlin has not considered
the stakes to be as high and has been more willing to balance interests
with the West. The post-Soviet region is Russia’s primary area of inter-
est, as it is intimately tied to Russia’s as a regional and global power.

6 Christopher Walker, NED, Authoritarianism Goes Global, Washington D.C. 2016.

8 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ' S GREY ZONE

In short, the United States and its allies and partners must again
engage on challenges to security in Europe, and in particular to forge
consensus on how to deal with a resurgent, belligerent Russia and with
the grey zone that has emerged in eastern Europe, before things get
worse and Europe itself faces more serious risks of instability. The com-
fortable verities of the “post-Cold War era” are a paradigm lost. The
Ukraine conflict is the most visible and dramatic evidence of these
changes. A new era has begun—more fluid, more turbulent, more open-
ended. Western values, principles and institutions are under assault.
Unity will be essential.
 Chapter 1

Eastern Challenges
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Russia under Putin

Russia under Putin is an authoritarian system cloaked in the trappings

of “democracy” yet run by a kleptocratic oligarchy1 that excludes all but
a few insiders from political power and uses administrative resources to
enrich itself and to control or suppress media, opposition and civil soci-
ety. The rule of law and an independent judiciary exist only on paper.
Through censorship, propaganda and efforts to silence elites and poten-
tial opponents through repression or cooptation, the regime seeks to
maintain domestic support by convincing the public that the only alter-
native to its continued rule is chaos, instability and subservience to out-
side forces.2
Russia’s actions abroad are directly linked to the Kremlin’s main goal
of securing its political survival at home. Following the chaos and
upheaval of the Yeltsin years, Putin’s first two terms in office rested on
an implicit social bargain in which public passivity and the regime’s
legitimacy were tied to greater stability and better economic perform-
ance. Annual growth rates of 7 percent between 2001 and 2008 trickled
down to nearly every part of Russian society. Unemployment fell,
poverty levels declined, and consumption boomed along with Putin’s
popularity. In the 2004 presidential elections, Putin received 71 per-
cent—much more than in his first election in 2000 (53 percent). Consti-
tutional limits did not allow Putin to run in 2008, so he nominated
Dmitri Medvedev, who obtained 70 percent of the vote—at par with
Putin’s own 2004 result.
At about this time, however, Russia’s growth ran out of steam. The
global financial crisis of 2008/09 changed the situation fundamentally,
making it clear that the Russian economy had not diversified and in

1 See Karen Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy. Who Owns Russia? (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2014).
2 Michael Ignatieff, “The New World Disorder,” The New York Review of Books, September
24, 2014.

9
10 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

many areas had become uncompetitive. It had exhausted the sources

fueling its decade-long growth—rising oil prices, unutilized production
capacity, growth in retail lending, and the liberal reforms of the early
2000s. Instead of using nearly eight years of growth to diversify the
Russian economy, dependency on the price for oil and gas grew over
this period. Russia’s reserves helped buffer the blow, but Putin’s social
contract was beginning to unravel.
Reforms could have come—in fact they were promised by Medvedev.
But the decision for Putin to return was also a decision against modern-
ization of the economy and serious reforms because they would have
undermined the power position of the regime. Productivity growth and
new investment would have required the government to reform the
business and investment climate, reduce government ownership and
intervention in the economy, protect private property, enforce contracts
and fair competition, and curb corruption. Such initiatives would have
collided with the entrenched interests of Putin’s extractive oligarchy of
corrupt bureaucrats, politically connected business people and employ-
ees of state-owned companies, whose support had become even more
critical to the regime’s survival.
Russia’s failure to implement reforms resulted in stagnating produc-
tivity and investment, massive capital flight, and meager growth. The
regime used the country’s energy wealth to enrich itself rather than
build a broader base of support by investing in Russia’s future by mod-
ernizing creaking infrastructure, deal with its horrendous demographic,
health and environmental challenges, or shift from a resource-based
economy to a more sustainable model.3 This means it remains
extremely vulnerable to energy price fluctuations. The precipitous fall
of these prices whacked Russia and plunged it into slower growth. By
the time of the Crimea crisis, Russia’s economic growth had essentially
come to a halt. Its GDP declined by 4 percent in 2015 and may decline
by an additional 1-2 percent in 2016.
The regime tried to defuse rising discontent and deflect attention
away from Russia’s growing economic woes by stepping up its propa-
ganda and censorship and in conjuring internal enemies as the 5th col-
umn of the West. Putin then set forth a second informal social contract
exchanging continued political loyalty for restoration of Russian

3 Andrey Movchan, “Just an oil company? The true extent of Russia’s dependency on oil and
gas,” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 14, 2015.
 Eastern Challenges 11

national pride as a great power.4 Putin’s regime used its interventions

into both Georgia and Ukraine to consolidate its hold on power at
home, and since 2012 by fueling nationalist fervor while further repress-
ing civil society and independent media. Enforcing Crimean annexation
over Western opposition became an excellent opportunity for Putin to
shore up his approval ratings. He has turned to anti-Western and anti-
American approaches as a key source of his legitimacy, presenting his
illiberal regime as a conservative alternative to Western liberal social,
political and economic models and saturating his population with disin-
formation about how the West besieges the Motherland.5 His ratings
remain high.
Over the longer term, economic and political pressures will continue
and accumulate. Oil prices are unlikely to recover any time soon. Rus-
sia’s economic health is linked to its participation in the global economy,
yet Russia has reacted to Western sanctions with import substitution
and counter-sanctions of its own, which worsens the situation for the
Russian people. The regime scrapped free trade with Ukraine and, after
the downing of a Russian fighter, cut multiple trade, tourism and infra-
structure ties with Turkey.6 Russia’s ambitious military modernization
program has come at the cost of investments in health, education and
civilian infrastructure. The government has cut 2016 spending by about
9 percent and has stopped indexing pensions to inflation. While the
Reserve Fund is sufficient to fund the budget deficit in 2016 and possi-
bly in 2017, the numbers for 2018 do not seem to add up. Not surpris-
ingly, the government has stopped producing 3-year budgets, sticking
only to annual ones. Net emigration of the most active and productive
part of the Russian society rose from 35,000 people a year from 2008 to
2010 to more than 400,000 in 2015.7
Russia’s economic problems are daunting. Still, some perspective is
warranted. The quality of life in Russia has improved dramatically since
the Yeltsin years. Real incomes now exceed 2000–2002 levels by at least
three times, if not more. While the real disposable income of an average
Russian may have declined 8-9 percent per cent over the past year, that

4 F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter A. Wilson, John Gordon IV, The Ukrainian Crisis and European
Security (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2015)
5 Ibid.
6 Ignatieff, op. cit.
7 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Putin’s self-destructing economy,” The Washington Post, January 18,
2016, p. A15.
12 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

is not enough to provoke widespread public opposition. Russia’s signifi-

cant financial reserves can keep the economy afloat for at another few
years, while some degree of import substitution has reduced the price
(and, of course, also the quality) of many daily goods. Military modern-
ization shores up Putin’s support within the armed forces. And the
regime’s political and informational control, the lack of a viable political
opposition, and the regime’s capacity and determination to strike out at
its opponents are all likely to reinforce Putin’s authority. In short,
despite Russia’s domestic challenges, Putin and his regime is likely to be
with us for some time, and even a change of president is unlikely to
mean a fundamental change of the regime or system.

The Ozero Maxims

Russia’s domestic and foreign policies are controlled in an exclusive and

opaque fashion by Putin and the small circle around him. This circle of
loyalists has become smaller since 2012, and has shifted from a rough
balance between economic “liberals” and siloviki to a more dominant role
for those focusing on security issues. We are not likely to be dealing with
this circle for all time, but we are likely to be dealing with them for some
time to come. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, has stated that “Mr.
Putin lives in another world.” Understanding how to deal with Russia
today, therefore, means understanding Putin’s world. That world’s under-
standing of events, its discourses, its methods, its policy rationales and its
calculus of risks differ fundamentally from those of the West.8
Some time after Vladimir Putin returned from his KGB service in
Dresden, he and a group of close associates built a cooperative for a
dacha community, which they called Ozero (Lake), in Solovyovka, on the
eastern shore of Lake Komsomolskoye near St. Petersburg.9 There is
considerable speculation and growing evidence that Putin’s early riches
and his meteoric rise to the Presidency can be traced to his Ozero associ-
ations. For instance, the cooperative kept a common bank. Each could
put money in, and anyone could take it out. Confidential documents

8 James Sherr, “The New East-West Discord,” Clingendael Report, December 2015, p. 6.
9 Luke Harding “Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune,” The Guardian,
December 21, 2007; 15 лет самому мутному «Озеру» в мире! Novaya Gazeta, November
11, 2011; Fiona Hill & Clifford G. Gaddy, “How the 1980s Explains Vladimir Putin. The
Ozero group,” The Atlantic, February 14, 2013; Mumin Shakirov, “Who was Mister Putin?
An Interview with Boris Nemtsov,” Open Democracy, February 2, 2011; Dawisha, op. cit.
 Eastern Challenges 13

obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists

reveal that members of Putin’s circle used this arrangement as a profit-
sharing model for a clandestine network that over the years has secretly
shuffled $2 billion through shadow companies and financial institutions,
including Bank Rossiya.10 As Putin went on to become President of the
Russian Federation, the other members of the Ozero cooperative became
top Putin associates and some of Russia’s wealthiest business leaders.
What we dub the “Ozero maxims” is shorthand for a set of perspec-
tives that came to shape Putin and his close associates during the forma-
tive period of the mid-to-late 1990s and beyond. These perceptions
have continued to evolve over many years, and new ones have been
added, as circumstances have changed and as challenges and opportuni-
ties have emerged. They are representative points of orientation, not
ideological fixations, less strategy than predilection, more perspective
than prescription. Yet they may be said to encapsulate the worldview
that frames the Putin regime’s thinking about Russia, its future, and its
relations with other countries. They may be summarized as follows.
The power of the powerful. When Putin rose to the presidency he
was determined to extricate Russia from the turbulence of the Yeltsin
years, amidst concern that the unity of the vast Russian Federation was
at stake in the face of dysfunctional central and regional governments
and growing separatist pressures. He consolidated his rule via the so-
called “power vertical,” a centralized system of hierarchical authority
among high-ranking officials and between Russia’s regions and its cen-
ter with him at the top. He replaced directly elected governors with
appointees and stopped moves toward autonomy of mostly ethnic
republics. He ensured that the party in power (today United Russia) was
in control of the Duma and regional legislatures and that party mem-
bers in regional and local governments toed the line orchestrated by the
Kremlin. Media, which was mostly owned by oligarchs, were taken over
by loyal persons or by state companies like Gazprom. All together, Putin
has generated a mutually reinforcing system of patronage, inside and
outside of government, in which jobs, money and influence are meted

10 SeeJake Bernstein, Petra Blum, Oliver Zihlmann, David Thompson, Frederik Obermaier
and Bastian Obermayer, “All Putin’s Men: Secret Records Reveal Money Network Tied to
Russian Leader,” https://panamapapers.icij.org/20160403-putin-russia-offshore-network.html.
Boris Nemstov, the opposition leader assassinated on a Moscow bridge in February 2015,
featured Ozero in a 2011 report documenting alleged corruption in Putin’s inner circle.
Putin. Corruption. Independent report, available at https://larussophobe.wordpress.com/2011/
04/03/special-extra-the-nemtsov-white-paper-part-v-putin-the-thief/.
14 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

out to protected loyalists who wield power to the benefit of his inner
circle. As Vladislav Inozemtsev has noted, “at every level of the hierar-
chy a certain degree of bribery and clientelist parochialism is not only
tolerated but presupposed in exchange for unconditional loyalty and a
part of the take for one’s superiors.… The weak pay tribute up, the
strong provide protection down.”11 Corruption is not an aberration, it is
central to the system.
Authoritarian state capitalism. The Kremlin relies on both direct
government intervention in key sectors of the Russian economy and
control of politically connected businessmen to further the political and
commercial interests of the Russian state and those who run it. In con-
trast to Ukraine, oligarchs are not independent actors who control the
state, they depend on the sources and decisions of the Kremlin. This
dependency has become even more important since the global financial
crisis in 2008/2009 and the economic crisis since 2014. Putin and his
associates knew they could not return to the command economy of
Soviet times, yet as a result of the situation in the 1990s they were fear-
ful that truly free markets could spin beyond their control to enrich
independent power centers that could ultimately challenge their rule.
They opened Russia to the global economy, but they want to be able to
calibrate and control the interdependencies that such openness gener-
ates, for instance energy or financial flows. The regime uses the system
to dominate key economic sectors, using state-owned and politically
loyal privately-owned companies to intervene in global resource mar-
kets and other industries. As Ian Bremmer has noted, the ultimate
motive is not to maximize growth or improve living standards but to
maximize the state’s power, the regime’s chances of survival, and the
welfare of the circle around the president.12
Restoration of Russia as a Great Power. The Russian political elite
was traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet Union and many want to

11 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Neo-Feudalism Explained,” The American Interest, March–April 2011,

http://www.the-americaninterest.com/article.cfm?piece=939. See also Alexander Goltz,

“Putin’s Power Vertical Stretches back to Kursk,” Moscow Times, August 17, 2010; P. Baker
and S. Glasser, Vladimir Putin’s Russia And The End Of Revolution (Washington D.C.: Potomac
Books, 2007); Andrew Monaghan, “The Vertikal: Power and Authority in Russia,” International
Affairs (88:1, 2012), available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/default/files/public/In-
ternational%20Affairs/2012/88_1/88_1monaghan.pdf, pp.1-16.
12 Ian Bremmer, “The Rise of State Capitalism,” Real Clear Politics, May 21, 2010,

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/05/21/the_rise_of_state_capitalism_105677.ht
ml#ixzz3xXDeAStb.
 Eastern Challenges 15

reverse perceived past geopolitical losses. Putin believes that the post-
Cold War European security order does not reflect Russia’s interests or
its importance. He wants to renegotiate that order with leaders of other
big powers, particularly the United States, to affirm mutual respect for
state-centric balances of power. His model is Yalta, not the Helsinki
Final Act, it is Metternich, not Monnet.
This big power perspective ranges beyond Europe. In Putin’s view,
only the UN Security Council, rooted in negotiation among big pow-
ers, each with its own veto, is the legitimate basis for international law.
The rising popularity of such concepts as the BRICs and G-20 in a
“multipolar” world afforded Putin means to reassert influence by fash-
ioning Russia as an independent global pole of power. In Putin’s world,
big powers guarantee stability. Every big power is responsible for one
region, which means that Russia’s great power statues is based on its
dominance of the post-Soviet region, even though the regime has no
interest in building a new Soviet Union. On some issues, such as the
Iran nuclear negotiations or the Paris climate change talks, this has
meant alignment with Western powers. But Moscow has also intervened
in the Syrian crisis to protect its client and assure itself a seat at the
negotiation table.13 Putin wants Russia to be recognized by other big
powers, particularly the United States, as a key player on global issues.
In these ways, Putin’s Russia continues to define Russian greatness in
terms of external influence and power projection rather than in terms of
improved livelihoods, better health or the secure exercise of basic civil
rights by and for the Russian people.14
Russkiy mir. When the Soviet Union dissolved, 25 million people
living outside the Russian Federation found themselves to be former
citizens of a non-existent country; in many cases it was questionable
whether they had just as suddenly become equal citizens of their newly
independent countries of residence. Putin’s declaration that the breakup
of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the
20th century” reflected his perception that Russians suddenly living in
other nation-states were often being treated as second-class citizens. He
has responded to this ambiguous situation by asserting a right to “pro-
tect” ethnic Russians or Russian speakers wherever they are located and
whatever their citizenship, that Russian law can be used to bring charges

13 Larrabee, et. al, op. cit.

14 Ibid.
16 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

against non-Russian citizens who are not residents in Russia for crimes
not committed on Russian territory if their actions are “against the
interests of the Russian Federation”, and that Russian military forces
can take preemptive action, including occupation through military
forces, to protect themselves from the possibility of danger posed by
foreign forces on foreign soil.15 His precept of a unique “Russian world”
is grounded in expansive völkisch concepts of Russian ethnicity unrelated
to territorial borders.16 Moscow used this rationale in part to justify its
right to respond to conflicts in Georgia’s separatist territories by attack-
ing Georgia itself. It was a reason that Putin cited for seizing the
Ukrainian region of Crimea, even though there was no evidence of any
threat to ethnic Russians on the peninsula, and for his support for
Ukrainian separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk. One must question
whether the Kremlin might seek to apply this self-proclaimed right
elsewhere. This has tremendous implications for Ukraine, Kazakhstan,
Belarus and Moldova, none of which enjoys consensus on its respective
national identity or has ever existed as a state within its current borders.
Putin reportedly told President George W. Bush in 2008 that “Ukraine
is not even a state” and has been known to refer to Ukraine as “Little
Russia”—a term used during the Russian Empire to describe parts of
modern-day Ukraine that came under czarist rule. He has made similar
claims about Kazakhstan, claiming that “Kazakhs never had any state-
hood” prior to the rule of President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Moreover,
NATO members Estonia and Latvia each have populations that are
about one quarter ethnic Russian.
The post-Soviet space is treated as a sphere of Russia’s “privileged
interest.” In Putin’s world, Russian hegemony over its post-Soviet
neighborhood is one foundation for its credibility as a great power. It
offers insulation against encroachment, either from the West or from
civil society. The regime seeks to exert as much influence as possible
over its neighborhood, without running the risk of subsidizing pliant yet
fragile states, which would only drain Kremlin coffers further. These
precepts inform Moscow’s actions in its neighborhood. Moscow’s inter-
ventions in Georgia and Ukraine were designed to ensure its hegemony
in its neighborhood, prevent inroads by NATO and the EU, and consol-
idate its domestic support. The Kremlin views so-called “color revolu-

15 See Frederick W. Kagan, “Situation report, Russo-Georgia Conflict,” August 9, 2008, AEI,
http://www.aei.org/publication/situation-report-russo-georgian-conflict/.
16 Timothy Garton Ash, “Putin’s Deadly Doctrine,” New York Times, July 18, 2014.
 Eastern Challenges 17

tions” as instruments of the West designed to undermine Russian influ-

ence. This leads to an important deficit in Russian policy: it always
underestimates civil society as a political actor, and therefore believes
that only Western influence can be the reason why Ukrainian society
went into the streets in 2004 and 2013-14.17 Russia’s leadership believes
that the agency of civil society in this region can be instrumentalized
and magnified by growing Western activities to threaten its hold on
power at home. It is not only willing to pay a much higher price to
assert influence over its neighborhood than any Western state, it has
shown it is prepared to use force to protect what it believes is Russia’s
sphere of influence.
The West, by its nature, is seen to threaten the regime’s goals, which
puts Russia in conflict with the West. Traditionally, Russian concerns
revolved around U.S. and NATO activities. But now these concerns
have come to embrace the EU as well. This has not always been the
case. After the collapse of the USSR, the EU came to be seen as a
potential partner in Russia’s own modernization. In the early 2000s
Moscow showed considerable interest in developing a strategic partner-
ship with the EU, and did not resist the EU’s own expansion with the
vehemence with which it opposed that of NATO—even if it did point
out possible negative consequences for Russia. From the outset, how-
ever, the EU-Russia strategic partnership has been fraught with inher-
ent tensions and misperceptions regarding their common neighbor-
hood. Russia’s interest in such a “partnership” was premised on its
impression of the EU as a weak security actor and its low profile in the
post-Soviet space.18 The EU’s European Neighborhood policy (ENP)
was of such a general nature that it did not awaken Russian concerns. In
2008, however, in a context of marked deterioration in relations
between Russia, the United States and NATO over the latter’s possible
expansion to Georgia and Ukraine, the independence of Kosovo, and
finally the war in Georgia, the EU’s shift to hard-law integration under
the Eastern Partnership was understood in Moscow as a bold and
potentially destabilizing initiative. From the Kremlin’s perspective,

17 Stefan Meister, “Getting Putin right. Why the Putin crisis is a Russia crisis,” DGAP Stand-
punkt 6, September 2014, https://dgap.org/en/think-tank/publications/dgapviewpoint/get-
ting-putin-right.
18 See the paper of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation from 1999,

“Russia’s Middle-Term Strategy towards the EU (2000-2010)”; also Hiski Haukkala, “False
Premises, Sound Principles: The Way Forward in EU-Russia relations” (Helsinki: FIIA
Briefing Paper No. 20, 2008).
18 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs) and many

sectoral chapters of the EU’s Association Agreements, in particular,
would imply a drastic shift towards the EU’s legal framework and ulti-
mately integration into the EU’s internal market, and a corresponding
attenuation of these countries’ ties to Moscow. The regime has thus
come to view the EU as a threat to Moscow’s position in the region and
even its hold on power at home. When the Eastern Partnership’s offer
materialized, with the negotiation of four Association Agreements and
DCFTAs, Russia adopted an overtly confrontational position vis-à-vis
the EU. The EU has begun to change the political, economic, social and
legal context in which domestic reform debates in these countries are
now occurring. The Rose, and especially the Orange, revolutions set off
alarm bells in the Kremlin because they signaled waning Russian influ-
ence and growing Western influence in the region.
These maxims should not be surprising to anyone following Russian
developments. Putin himself has expressed them clearly. In 2007, for
instance, he set forth in Munich a fundamentally different view of post-
Soviet developments than those commonly held in the West.
What is new is the regime’s determination to make use of a full tool-
box of instruments, including the use of force, to defend and where pos-
sible control informal ties and rent-seeking opportunities. This new
determination is buttressed both by a renewed sense of Russian strength
and a perhaps equally vibrant sense of concern for instabilities in the
neighborhood and at home. With the forcible annexation of the eastern
Ukrainian region of Crimea, Putin made it clear that he proudly and
manifestly rejects the post-Cold War order in Europe.19 Fyodor
Lukyanov summarized Russia’s new attitude:

This reluctance of the West to stare the facts in the face is because,
ever since the late 1980s, Europe and U.S. have become used to
Moscow always leaving room for compromise, no matter how
loudly it initially protested.... Now Russia is acting regardless of
the costs, which renders the previous model of relations with its

19 Igor Torbakov, “Understanding Moscow’s Conduct. The Analysis of the Domestic Politics-
Foreign Policy Nexus in Russia,” in Stefan Meister, ed., Economisation versus Power Ambitions.
Rethinking Russia’s Policy towards Post-Soviet States [Baden-Baden; Nomos, 2013, pp. 19-33.;
Kadri Liik, “Putin’s New World Order,” European Council on Foreign Relations, March
18, 2014.
 Eastern Challenges 19

leading Western partners obsolete. But that means its relations

with the East, too, need to change.20

Putin’s Toolbox

The current Russian regime has energetically applied the full suite of
Russian power to advance its interests abroad.21 Particularly notable are:
Military modernization. Strengthening and modernizing the Russ-
ian military has been central to Putin’s ambition of reasserting Russian
power on the world stage. The 2008 Russia-Georgia war showcased
Russia’s military shortcomings and saddled it with additional Caucasus
headaches via the occupied territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.22
The regime launched a 10-year, $700 billion defense modernization ini-
tiative to expand Russia’s fleet, modernize its nuclear arsenal and its air
forces, increase the capabilities of its Special Operations Forces,
improve its capacity to mobilize and deploy large forces quickly, deploy
new missiles, and militarize the Arctic. It is developing long-range con-
ventional precision-guided munitions that could have effects previously
achievable only with nuclear weapons, thus creating a new “pre-nuclear”
rung on the escalation ladder.23 Putin has been steadfast in his support
for Russia’s arms modernization program in the face of mounting
budget pressures.
Russia has deployed its military forces in provocative ways from the
Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean and the Middle East to demonstrate
capability, to intimidate, harass, disrupt and divide Russia’s neighbors,
and to probe Western resolve. Russia’s military is increasingly able to
project significant anti-access/area denial capabilities in the Arctic, the
North Atlantic and the North Pacific. The annexation of Crimea has
significantly increased Russia’s strategic footprint in the wider Black Sea
region. The expansion of the Black Sea Fleet will strengthen Russia’s

20 Fyodor Lukyanov, “Крым на весь мир,” Ogonyok, March 24, 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/

doc/2432085; in English as “Russia has positioned itself at the epicenter of global politics,”
Russia direct, March 26, 2014, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/russia-has-positioned-
itself-epicenter-global-politics
21 See Ian Brzezinski, “United States Policy on Europe,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate Com-

mittee on the Armed Services, April 28, 2014.

22 See Marek Menkiszak’s chapter in this volume.
23 Brzezinski, op. cit.
20 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

ability to project power in the region and raises important questions

about how Russia will use that power.24
Large-scale Russian military exercises, some conducted on very short
notice, are cause for concern. Russia has held major exercises in the Arc-
tic, joined with China in naval drills near Japan, and tens of thousands
of troops conducted exercises on NATO’s eastern flank. It has spon-
sored exercises intended to simulate the invasion of Denmark and the
Baltic states and nuclear attacks on Poland. In some cases, exercises have
been used to mask long-term Russian troop deployments, such as in
Syria and in eastern Ukraine.
Little Green Men. Moscow has supplemented its hard power projec-
tion with active use of an array of soft power tools to seek influence
within European societies.25 It employs holistic, multi-dimensional and
flexible diplomatic, economic, military and subversive measures to tar-
get key societal functions and arteries, both in its neighborhood and in
the West, to mask its intentions, confuse and disrupt adversaries, strain
their solidarity, sap their resources, slow down their decision-making
and impede effective responses. This is combined with a greater readi-
ness for brinkmanship, which also means greater potential for local
actors, as well as Russia and the West, to misread each another’s actions
and intentions.
The Russian approach was initially labeled by some in the West as
“hybrid warfare” and treated as a new phenomenon. But this term only
captures part of Russia’s approach, which leverages non-military means
and the threat of force with a new emphasis on surprise, deception, dis-
ruption and ambiguity in intent and attribution. The Russian approach
is geared toward achieving strategic aims without war, with a primary
concern being to stay below NATO’s threshold for reaction. However,
as in the Ukraine crisis, Russia’s steadily improving full-spectrum forces
could be poised to act should non-military means fail, to deter potential
reactions to Moscow’s adventures, and to exploit opportunities for easy
wins. As Paul Bernstein has noted, it is this element of brinkmanship

24 Ibid.;Heather A. Conley, Testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, October 8,

2015; Larabee, op. cit.
25 Mike Winnerstig, ed., Tools of Destabilization. Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in

the Baltic States (Stockholm: Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), December 2014).
 Eastern Challenges 21

that makes the non-military elements of a hybrid campaign dependent

on the threat of military violence.26
In Crimea, for instance, Russia employed a skillful mixture of overt
military measures and covert action, combined with an aggressive use of
propaganda and disinformation carefully calculated to avoid crossing
established thresholds for military response. By deploying special opera-
tions forces in unmarked uniforms, Russia was able to sow enough con-
fusion and doubt to prevent effective countermeasures from being
taken. In eastern Ukraine, Russia employed some of the same tactics
that it had used in Crimea and in Georgia in 2008. Russia massed troops
and conducted exercises along the Ukrainian-Russian border. This was a
transparent attempt to exert psychological pressure on Ukraine. But it
also kept Russian troops in a state of high readiness in case they actually
had to be deployed in combat missions.27 The Kremlin has also sought
to destabilize and distract the Ukrainian government from addressing
its pressing economic, financial and other challenges, as well as from
drawing closer to the European Union through implementation of the
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Agreement.
Manipulating frozen conflicts. Russian troops and irregular forces
now occupy five regions in three neighboring countries—Georgia,
Moldova, and Ukraine. Five of the EU’s six Eastern Partnership coun-
tries now have a separatist conflict on their territory where Russia either
directly occupies territories or supports one of the conflict parties. Only
Belarus has no conflict of this type, but does have Russian military bases
on its territory. In the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution, Russian-
backed separatists seized control of Georgia’s Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia regions as well as Moldova’s Transnistria region. In both situations
the Kremlin exploited local conflicts to help local proxies seize de facto
control of a breakaway region. These regions have become engines for
corruption and criminality, and Trojan horses to block progress in coun-
tries on Russia’s periphery. When Georgia started to make significant
progress in its ambitions to draw closer to Western institutions in 2008,
Moscow invaded the two regions to stop Georgia’s westward drift.
Moscow has since declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia to be independ-

26 Paul Bernstein, “Rethinking Deterrence and Assurance,” NATO Defense College Conference

Report, September 2013; Lilia Shevtsova, “A new way for the west to contain Putin’s Krem-
lin,” Financial Times, February 8, 2015; Brzezinski, op. cit.
27 Larabee, op. cit.
22 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

ent, but has also signed treaties with both that hint at annexation. The
international community has yawned.
The same game is now playing out in eastern Ukraine, where the
Kremlin seeks to create an additional “frozen conflict” to use these
regions to have leeway on decisions in Kyiv and prevent the Ukrainian
government from achieving desperately needed reforms and weakening
the country economically. Putin’s endgame is to federalize Ukraine from
the outside and give the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk “peoples
republics” as much as autonomy as possible within the Ukrainian state.
Through these two separatist regions Moscow can block every rap-
prochement with the EU. Moscow has no interest in annexing these terri-
tories as it did Crimea, but rather to create a frozen conflict on Ukrainian
territory that it can control. Kyiv would end up paying for this bleeding
wound, which Moscow can use either to weaken or threaten the Ukrain-
ian central government and undermine the sovereignty of the Ukrainian
state. Such an outcome in eastern Ukraine could also weaken other
regions and open the way for a real “Bosnianization” of Ukraine.28 While
Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko has said he would not allow a
Transnistrian scenario in eastern Ukraine, he may not have much choice.
Until Russia and its proxies can carve out clearly defined continuous ter-
ritory, it will be difficult to freeze the conflict,29 although Russia’s eco-
nomic crisis may change its cost-benefit calculation and may lead
Moscow to freeze the Donbas conflict now to get rid of Western sanc-
tions. The Minsk 2 agreement includes everything that the Russian lead-
ership wants to reach in Ukraine: recognition of separatists, dictated con-
stitutional and decentralization reform, and Ukraine’s financial
responsibility for the occupied territories without political control. Imple-
mentation of this agreement can only weaken the Ukrainian state.30
Russia seeks to distract the governments in Kyiv, Chisinau and Tbil-
isi from successfully pursuing reforms to reduce corruption and build
representative institutions. Instead of concentrating on improving their
own governance, these disrupted countries must deal with the charged
and emotional issues associated with territorial conflict. Moreover, sepa-
ratist conflicts serve as Kremlin patronage vehicles, fueling the organ-

28 Arkady Moshes, “The EU won’t fight for Ukraine,” Kyiv Post, August 25, 2014.
29 Brian Whitmore, “Why Eastern Ukraine Could Become Russia’s Next ‘Frozen Conflict,”
The Atlantic, August 29, 2014.
30 Stefan Meister, “Welcome, Escalation! Why Minsk 2 is not going to work,” DGAPstandpunkt

2, 23.02.2015, https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/26470.
 Eastern Challenges 23

ized crime and corruption that is the oxygen of Putin’s system of gover-
nance. The conflicts provide opportunities for transferring money and
power to Russia’s Federal Security Service and its military. These insti-
tutions are an important base of power for Putin, and the spoils seized
in these territories yield new resources for buying their loyalty at a time
when his regime can no longer count on a flood of petrodollars to meet
such needs. Putin cannot allow the rebels in eastern Ukraine to fail
because it would weaken his position among important nationalistic and
patriotic circles at home. At the same time, he cannot permit the gov-
ernment in Kyiv to succeed because that would present the Russian
people with an alternative governance model.
Using the energy tool. Putin seeks to maintain European dependence
on Russian gas and continues to use that dependence as an instrument
of influence; he deftly applies a “divide and conquer” strategy to under-
mine Europe’s cohesion. We see this also through the Nord Stream I
pipeline, which connects Russia directly to Europe while bypassing
Ukraine, in efforts to construct a Nord Stream II link over the objec-
tions of many European countries, and in Russia’s gas pricing tactics
which reward its friends and punishes its opponents.31 Russia’s influence
is based in part on strategic control of transportation corridors through
which oil and gas can be delivered to the West.32 These pipeline net-
works imply the opportunity to control the countries in-between
through rent-seeking opportunities for their elites. At the same time the
gas price has always been a Russian tool to inculcate loyalty among
post-Soviet and EU countries.
Using soft power. Russia’s means of influence in wider Europe, via
soft power tools such as media, language, business networks and labor
markets, are much stronger than those of the EU. Shared tsarist and
Soviet pasts reinforce Russia’s immense influence in the region. The
Russian language remains the lingua franca. The Russian Orthodox
Church, state agencies like Rossotrudnicestvo and foundations are very
active in these countries. Russian state media is engaged in an informa-
tional contest for the hearts and minds of Russian-speakers wherever
they may be. Russia is a key trading partner for most post-Soviet states.
Its market is broadly accessible to countries that share the legacy of
Soviet standards and struggle to meet World Trade Organization

31 James L. Jones, Testimony to the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, October 8,
2015.
32 Brzezinski, op. cit.
24 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

(WTO) requirements. Russian influence is further enhanced by mobil-

ity and migration flows. Over the past two decades Russia’s neighbor-
hood has largely remained visa-free. Remittances from migrants work-
ing in Russia contribute significantly to economies ranging from
Armenia and Moldova to Tajikistan. Russia’s soft power capital ensures
that its influence remains strong throughout the region.33
Promoting Russian-led integration projects. The Kremlin has cre-
ated institutions like the Eurasian Customs Union and the Eurasian
Economic Union to give form to its hegemony over its neighborhood
and to thwart the EU’s Eastern Partnership. In principle, neighborhood
countries could sign DCFTAs with the EU and also sign free trade
agreements with the Russian-led Customs Union. But the Kremlin has
pressured them to become full members of the Customs Union, which
would end their sovereignty over trade policy and set common tariffs
that are incompatible with elimination of tariffs as planned under the
DCFTA. This is incompatible with the DCFTA, a sign that Russia is
using its integration projects to compel countries to choose between it
and the EU.34 Other institutions include Russia-led security organiza-
tions such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Shang-
hai Cooperation Organization, which is dominated by Moscow and Bei-
jing. Their purpose is to create an alternative institutional framework to
Western-led regional and international institutions.
Bullying neighbors. Moscow has deeply undermined Ukraine’s sta-
bility and sovereignty. But it has also been able to counter the EU’s
association process in Armenia and it acts as a spoiler in Georgia and
Moldova. It uses economic sanctions to prevent reforms or integration
with the EU.
Moscow attempted to sway Moldova’s 2015 elections with massive
support for new pro-Kremlin parties, is courting separatists and instru-
mentalizing the Transnistrian conflict to disrupt and destabilize the
country. It has imposed sanctions to penalize Chisinau for signing the
EU Association Agreement and the DCFTA.35
Despite Georgia’s efforts to normalize relations with Moscow, the
Kremlin has continued its creeping annexation of Georgia’s breakaway

33 See Laure Delcour and Hrant Konstanyan, “Towards a Fragmented Neighborhood: Policies

of the EU and Russia and Their Consequences for the Area That Lies in Between,” Center
for European Policy Studies, October 2014.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
 Eastern Challenges 25

regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It has used pressure to under-

mine further progress of EU integration in Georgia by threatening to
suspend the 1994 free trade agreement, by constructing barricades
along the administrative border with South Ossetia, and by gradually
expanding the territory by moving the fences.
By questioning Armenia’s security situation with regard to Azerbai-
jan, Moscow was instrumental in pushing Armenia to join the Eurasian
Economic Union rather than finalize an Association Agreement, includ-
ing a DCFTA, with the EU. Armenia will now have to increase its exter-
nal tariff from an average 2.9 percent to 7.02 percent after its entry into
the Eurasian Economic Union. The Armenian government asked for
almost 900 exemptions from external tariffs. This high number reflects
Armenian concerns about the economic consequences of Eurasian
Union accession. Moreover, if the exemptions are not granted, Armen-
ian membership to the Russia-led Custom Union will greatly add to its
economic difficulties. At the same time, Kazakhstan successfully entered
the WTO at the end of 2015 even though it increased custom tariffs for
Russian products due to its declining competitiveness vis-a-vis the Russ-
ian economy as a result of the high inflation of the Russian currency
and low prices for Russian products. The Kazakh example shows how
other EEU member states are working to balance Russian influence and
unilaterally create new barriers to trade. Neither Kazakhstan nor
Belarus, for instance, have followed Russian counter sanctions against
the EU in the context of the Ukrainian crisis.
Subverting Western unity. Russia deploys an array of soft power
tools to seek influence within EU and NATO member states. Actors
financed or directed by the Russian Federation are actively engaged in
media and other efforts to influence the relatively sizable Russian-
speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia, undermine the confidence of
non-Russian populations in the ability of the EU and NATO to assist
them in the event of an external crisis, undercut Baltic credibility
through a drumbeat of accusations regarding their allegedly “fascist”
past and current attachment to “fascism”, and interfere directly in the
domestic political systems of the Baltic states via nontransparent finan-
cial flows, for instance between the Russia’s United Russia party and the
Estonian Centre Party, the Latvian Harmony party and the Lithuanian
Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania.36

36 Winnerstig, op. cit.

26 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Moscow also funds extremist parties of both right and left within the
European Union that rail against both the EU and the United States,
deploys an army of internet trolls, fans historical and ideological
embers, and targets some of the EU’s weakest links to assert influence in
some of Europe’s most troubled corners, disrupt the European project
itself, and break Western unity over the conflict in Ukraine and on sanc-
tions against Russia. It uses the very arteries and mechanisms of open
societies to disrupt those societies. Russia’s role in Cyprus is a case in
point. A secret deal struck in spring 2015 allows Russian warships to
dock in Limassol, Cyprus’ commercial hub, which has become heavily
dependent on wealthy Russians who set up shell companies to shuffle
their assets overseas.37

The Common Neighborhood

When the Soviet Union collapsed, it revealed among the peoples of the
entire region both a strong yearning for civil society and powerful eth-
nic and nationalist passions. It was inevitable that there would be some
tension between the two. “This post-communist Europe of ours is rent
by a great conflict of two spiritual cultures,” Poland’s Adam Michnik
wrote in 1990. “One of these cultures says, let us join Europe and let us
respect European standards, while the other says, let us go back to our
own national roots and build an order according to our national peculi-
arity.” Decades earlier, the Hungarian thinker Istvan Bibo warned that
the greatest threat to democracy would come when “the cause of the
nation separates from the cause of freedom.”
Of course, these dangers have never been confined to Europe’s east,
and the fact that they still resonate within Poland, Hungary and other
EU and NATO members today remind us that they are also not a fea-
ture particular to the successor states of the Soviet Union. Yet the strug-
gle between forces of inertia and forces for change has become the
everyday drama of societies throughout wider Europe today.

Forces of Inertia
Throughout Europe’s vast eastern spaces, the forces of inertia are
strong—and often abetted by Moscow. As Ian Bond notes in this vol-

37 AndrewHiggins, “With cash and charm, Putin aims at sanctions,” International New York
Times, April 7, 2015.
 Eastern Challenges 27

ume, the biggest threat to the integrity of these countries is not Russian
intervention or economic collapse (although both are possible); it is that
the countries will be destroyed from within by corruption and crony
capitalism.38 Widespread, systematic corruption is arguably the greatest
obstacle to development in all the post-Soviet states. When the Czech
Republic, Poland and the Baltic states emerged from the Empire, they
soon took comprehensive steps against corruption—starting with lustra-
tion and transforming the police, prosecutor general’s office and judici-
ary. Georgia took some important steps in this direction following the
Rose Revolution with police and administrative reforms. Former Presi-
dent Saakashvili effectively tackled petty corruption, but the country
still lags in addressing high-level corruption. Moldova, however, has yet
to address this problem in a serious way, while Ukraine has now taken
first steps to address corruption in the gas sector and is in the process of
creating honest traffic police in major cities. Ukraine has become one of
most transparent countries in Europe in terms of openness of registers
of real estate property, cars and other private property. Improvements in
public procurement have been made with the ProZorro online system.
Following many delays and scandals, new independent institutions for
fighting corruption have been established (Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Anti-Corruption Prosecutor)—though still some of them incompletely
(National Anti-Corruption Council, Agency for Assets Recovery). These
institutions finally need to be set up; those which are already in place
have already started work and we anticipate seeing real results. The
main test is whether these institutions will really work or if they will
only imitate fighting corruption, as has been the case in Moldova, where
similar institutions were built in the context of the EU’s action plan, but
which produced no results.
A second immediate danger to reform-interested societies in the
common neighborhood is posed by weak institutions and states, which
have been undermined and robbed by their own elites over the past
quarter century. Dysfunctional governments based on informal rules
with a bureaucracy disinterested in reforms are not only a threat to the
security of these countries and their neighbors but open opportunities
for Russia to influence decision-making and elite opinion. Weak institu-
tions make reforms very difficult in states where officialdom, and soci-
ety at large, need to have both desire and ability to resist corruption.
Lack of rule of law, opaque decision making and dysfunctional checks

38 See Ian Bond’s chapter in this volume.

28 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

and balances undermine necessary reforms and economic development,

and are a threat to the integrity of these countries.
As John Herbst discusses in this volume, the situation becomes even
more alarming with regard to such security organs as the ministries of
defense and interior, intelligence, the border guards and, in some coun-
tries, the Ministry of Emergency Situation or financial institutions like
the Central Bank, the Ministry of Finance, and tax authorities.
Throughout this space—with the exception of Georgia, which energeti-
cally rooted out Russian agents in its power ministries following the
Rose Revolution—much of the senior leadership in these ministries was
trained in the Soviet Union. Russian security organs have gone to great
effort to place agents, retain contacts and exert influence in these
organs. At the start of Moscow’s hybrid war in Ukraine’s east, Ukrainian
officials assessed that only 6,000 of its soldiers were politically reliable,
trained and equipped to participate in a counter-offensive.39 In the
Donbas, a good number of Ukrainian police and secret police joined the
Russian-organized military operation. Moldova’s challenges in this area
are severe as well.
Third, vast swaths of the common neighborhood are still beset with
historical animosities and multiple crises, including a number of con-
flicts that affect all of Europe. Tensions over Transnistria, Nagorno-
Karabakh, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which some euphemistically
label “frozen” or protracted conflicts, are in reality festering wounds
that absorb energy and drain resources from countries that are already
weak and poor. They inhibit the process of state-building as well as the
development of democratic societies. They offer fertile ground for cor-
ruption, organized crime, trafficking and terrorism. They foster the pro-
liferation of arms and a climate of intimidation. They are a major source
of instability within these countries and the broader region. These con-
flicts severely undermine future prospects for these countries, while giv-
ing Moscow major instruments for leverage on domestic policy and to
question the sovereignty of these states. Within the past three years
Moscow has forced leadership changes in Abkhazia and South Ossetia
to assert greater control and influence in Georgia, although it failed to
push its candidate through in Transnistria. Ukraine, already impover-
ished, insecure and in turmoil, can only lose from a situation that
enshrines two more festering conflicts on its territory in Crimea and the

39 See John Herbst’s chapter in this volume.

 Eastern Challenges 29

Donbas. Moreover, the separatist entities across the common neighbor-

hood are establishing diplomatic relations, which is generating a new
dynamic of separatist polities in communion with one another.40

The Changing Economic Map

Beyond these challenges, the economic map is also changing. Trade is
declining between Russia and Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, which have
started to implement DCFTAs with the European Union. Between mid-
2014 and mid-2015 Russia’s share in Ukraine’s exports fell from 21 per-
cent to 11 percent and its shares in Ukraine’s imports declined from 24
percent to 17 percent. Russia’s shares of Moldova’s exports and imports
also declined from 21 percent to 13 percent. Russia’s share of Georgia’s
exports and imports are already low at around 8 percent for both imports
and exports. These changing interdependencies are likely to accelerate. As
of January 2016 the EU-Ukraine DCFTA went into effect over Russian
objections, prompting Moscow to cancel its own free-trade regime with
Ukraine and to ban agro-food imports from Ukraine—an illegal act
under WTO law. That same day the EU extended coverage of its prefer-
ential DCFTA with Moldova to encompass its separatist region of
Transnistria. It is also important to recall that the decision to end the FTA
between the Confederation of Independent States and Ukraine was made
in Moscow, not Kyiv. For Ukraine it would not have been a problem to be
party to an FTA with Russia and one with the EU at the same time. The
EU may also agree to visa-free travel for Ukrainians and Georgians,
which Moldovans already enjoy, even as Russia threatens to introduce
visas for Ukraine. Civil aviation bans by Ukraine and Russia have further
pulled the two economies apart. Moreover, Ukraine’s energy dependence
on Russia has fallen. This has been due in part to economic decline, but
also to Kyiv’s decisions to stop electricity imports from Russia and to
engineer reverse-flow gas arrangements with EU partners.41 In 2011
Ukraine imported 91 percent of its gas from Russia. By 2015 it only
imported 23 percent of its gas from Russia.

40 On November 12, 2014 South Ossetia established diplomatic relations with the “People’s
Republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk. On January 28, 2015 Luhansk recognized the inde-
pendence of South Ossetia, and on May 12, 2015 Donetsk recognized the independence of
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. See Philip Remler, “Ukraine, Protracted Conflicts and
the OSCE,” Security and Human Rights, 26 (2015) pp. 88-106.
41 Michael Emerson, “2016 already puts its mark on the economic map of Europe,” CEPS,

January 8, 2016, https://www.ceps.eu/publications/2016-already-puts-its-mark-economic-

map-europe
30 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The Maidan Precepts

Counterpoised to these forces of inertia, and to Putin’s Ozero maxims, is
another powerful force for change across the common neighborhood
that we call the Maidan precepts. They take their name from the protest
movement that began at the end of November 2013 on Kyiv’s Inde-
pendence Square, and which led to the toppling of the Yanukovych
regime and elections leading to a new Ukrainian president, government
and parliament. Like the Ozero maxims, the Maidan precepts are short-
hand for a diverse set of perceptions and predilections. Unlike Putin’s
maxims, however, which reflect the worldview of a small group of pow-
erful insiders, the Maidan precepts encompass a wide variety of perspec-
tives from a jumble of actors, most of them outsiders.
As a reaction to a regime that sought to undermine basic principles
and human rights that already existed in Ukraine, the Maidan precepts
are rooted in a shared belief in the agency of civil society and the power
of societal transformation. As growing parts of Ukrainian society started
to become citizens instead of Soviet people, the country’s ruling elites
failed to understand or support this transformation. The Maidan was
civil society’s answer to a weak and dysfunctional state that had been
undermined by Ukrainian elites and which could not fulfill basic tasks.
Their message of the Maidan was that these stupendous failures left civil
society with little choice but to fill this gap and to demand greater
responsibility and accountability from decision makers. It was a reaction
to the threat that Ukraine could become more like Putin’s Russia, which
was triggered in particular by Yanukovych’s desperate attempt on Janu-
ary 16, 2014 to suppress dissent by introducing what the opposition
labeled “dictatorship laws,” based on Russian models, which would have
made the country much more repressive.
The Maidan precepts mix high principles and basic needs. They are
grounded in the understanding that the improvements in living stan-
dards are linked to basic rights and principles like rule of law, freedom
of expression, independent media as well as free and fair elections. The
people of the Maidan, and the millions who supported them, sent a clear
message that they didn’t want to live in a authoritarian and corrupt “lit-
tle Russia” but in a European Ukraine that guarantees these basic prin-
ciples. The message of the Maidan protesters was that Ukrainian society
could simply no longer afford the revolving-door replacement of one
set of corrupt oligarchs with another. Maidan was driven by dignity and
a commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, anti-oli-
 Eastern Challenges 31

garchic and anti-corruption sentiments; and a vision for the country’s

future development based on European rather than Russian models.
The “Euromaidan” demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine began
the night of November 21, 2013, the moment the Ukrainian govern-
ment reneged on its intent to sign an Association Agreement and Deep
and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the European Union.
The European flags on the Maidan signaled that Ukrainians were not
Russians, they were Europeans—despite their corrupt elites.
The Maidan precepts represent an ideal—a benchmark against which
to judge a highly imperfect reality. Circumstances are unique in each
country, and achievement does not always match aspiration. At their
best, for instance, the Maidan precepts embrace tactics of active, nonvio-
lent protest. Reality has differed. These coalitions can also be short-
lived. Bickering among the winning forces behind Ukraine’s 2004
Orange Revolution paved the way for Viktor Yanukovych’s eventual
political return in 2010. Contradictions between the Euromaidan’s
intellectuals, civil society activists and radical nationalist wings have also
been strong.42
Nonetheless, these ideals continues to animate those committed to a
better life, those who believe that civil society, not government decree,
is the earthquake driving the Soviet succession, and that eventually this
earthquake is likely to rumble throughout Europe’s east, including Rus-
sia. Their fragility and ephemeral nature underscore what is at stake.

Ukraine’s Meaning and Importance

Ukraine is now the crucible of change for Europe’s grey zone, not just
because of its size and location in the heart of Europe, or because of its
rich resources or its poor economy, but because of its meaning. Ukraine
has always been a critical strategic factor for European and Eurasian
security, but today it stands at a critical crossroads between a more open
society increasingly integrated into the European mainstream and serv-
ing as an alternative model to that of Putin for the post-Soviet region;
or a failed, fractured land of grey mired in the stagnation and turbu-
lence historically characteristic of Europe’s borderlands.

42 Leonid Luks, “Putin needs a Polish Lesson in Ukraine,” Open Democracy, April 1, 2014,
https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/leonid-luks/putin-needs-polish-lesson-in-ukraine-
solidarnosc-solidarity-maidan%20.
32 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Ukraine’s future orientation will influence Russia’s long-term

geostrategic orientation and political path. A stable, independent, demo-
cratically oriented Ukraine on Russia’s western border with close ties to
the EU and the transatlantic community would resonate throughout
wider Europe and into Russia itself. A failed, dependent, corrupt and
authoritarian regime would hold little attraction for the Russian people
and would strengthen Putin’s efforts to impose his maxims in Russia and
the rest of the post-Soviet space.43
Ukraine is also important to the future of Europe itself. Commenting
on the Euromaidan, Myroslav Marynovych, a former Gulag political
prisoner, said that “Ukraine is not a trouble spot, it is a partner offering
a vision—a reminder of the original European spirit: youth, dynamism,
and a profound belief in the principles and values that founded the
European project. The Ukrainian youth carries this vision, and have
been martyred for this same hope. What is Europe’s answer to them?”44
Putin’s aggression is more than an attack on Ukraine; it is an assault
on basic principles and structures underpinning Europe’s security—no
forceful changes of borders, the right of countries to choose their alle-
giances, equal security for all countries. These principles go to the heart
of what the transatlantic community stands for. Putin’s aggression is also
test of the West’s ability to refute his efforts to establish contrary princi-
ples, such as his claim that Russia has an inherent right to defend the
interests of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers, regardless of territo-
rial boundaries. Such a generalized right would wreak havoc in a world
where most states are multiethnic.45 Putin seems to understand the key
role of Ukraine much better than Western countries, because he is
investing much more in the failure of post-Maidan Ukraine than the
EU or the United States are investing in its success.
As Ukraine goes, so goes much of the region. But Ukraine’s reforms
are stuttering. Corruption is not being addressed adequately. The coun-
try remains in a state of war, and has no control of around 400 kilome-
ters of its eastern frontier. It is still an open question whether the
momentum for change can be sustained, or whether oligarchic interests
and legacy structures, aided by Putin’s tactics, will be able to delay, dis-
tract, disrupt and ultimately derail reform efforts.

43 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard, New York: Basic Books, 1997, p. 46; Larrabee,
op. cit.
44 Cited in Riedemann, op. cit.
45 Garton Ash, op. cit.
 Chapter 2

Western Dilemmas
Daniel S. Hamilton and Stefan Meister

Eastern Europe’s future is likely to be shaped in large part by the inter-

play between the region’s legacy challenges, Putin’s Ozero maxims, and
the precepts of the Maidan. Western engagement can make a difference.
But Russia’s assertiveness and Ukraine’s tumult come at a time of
immense strain on Western countries.

Doubts and Distractions

The most dizzying confluence of domestic and foreign challenges in a

generation is tearing the seams of European unity. Many of these chal-
lenges are not new, but their velocity, intensity and complexity have
come together to generate a perfect storm. Terrorist attacks, refugee
streams, high youth unemployment and uneven growth have given life
to popular anxieties, nationalist voices and illiberal responses that are
squeezing the political center and challenging some of the EU’s most
fundamental premises and structures. The Schengen agreement on
open borders has been upended as EU member states slap border con-
trols on each other. Greece’s debt crisis continues. The 2016 British ref-
erendum on its EU membership will lead headlines, absorb energy and
agitate markets for months. A UK exit from the EU would diminish
both parties, including in their ability to respond to Russian aggressive-
ness. All of this plays into the hands of Vladimir Putin, who describes
the EU as a failed project.
Europe today is turning from being an exporter of stability to an
importer of instability. The vision of a Europe, whole, free and at peace
is being tested as much by a Europe fractured and anxious.
Europe’s west is less confident and prepared to reach out in any signif-
icant way to Europe’s east than at any time in a generation. A European
Union whose societies are once again defining and delineating them-
selves from each other is not a Union willing or able to integrate addi-
tional societies knocking on its door. Despite the EU’s Eastern Partner-

33
34 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

ship and such initiatives as the DCFTAs, member states still suffer from
“enlargement fatigue” and are preoccupied with their own problems.
Many also wonder whether countries like Ukraine and Georgia—not to
mention Azerbaijan, with its Muslim population and historical and cul-
tural ties to Iran—are really part of Europe and European culture, and
are uncertain as to why the EU should engage as an active partner for
change in the region. The April 6, 2016 Dutch referendum rejecting the
EU’s Association Agreement with Ukraine offers ample evidence of this
sentiment and reflects as much the anti-EU mood in the Netherlands as
anything about Dutch attitudes toward Ukraine.
EU hesitations are magnified by those of their American partner,
who is preoccupied with its own problems and paralyzed by political
polarization at home. As other world regions beckon and threaten,
Americans are tempted to retrench from Europe, to ask why Europeans
can’t tackle their own problems, why America is still needed, whether
Europe matters as it may have in the 20th century, why Europe’s chal-
lenges should be more relevant and pressing than problems at home or
elsewhere in the world.
Efforts to forge Western consensus on common or complementary
strategies to Russia and the common neighborhood are further compli-
cated by basic differences in U.S. and European perspectives, interests,
capabilities and priorities.
The United States views Russia in the context of its global interests
and perspectives. The bilateral relationship is strategic and symbolic, but
relatively thin when it comes to economic relations, energy ties or links
between American and Russian societies. EU countries focus on Russia’s
actions through a regional perspective. EU-Russian economic and social
ties are much more extensive than U.S.-Russian links, and because of
their geographic location most Europeans are more concerned than
most Americans about worsening relations with Russia. While EU mem-
bers are themselves torn when it comes to the specifics of Russia policy,
most are primarily interested in deterring Russian aggression while tying
Russia into a predictable neighborhood; preventing illicit networks of
criminals and trafficking from spilling over from Europe’s east into the
EU, promoting economic links and ensuring secure energy supplies
without becoming unduly dependent on Moscow.1 These differences are

1 See Angela Stent, “The Lands In-Between: The New Eastern Europe in the Twenty-First
Century,” in Daniel S. Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, eds., The New Eastern Europe:
Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2007)
 Western Dilemmas 35

reflected in how each side perceives the relative cost of specific policies.
Sanctions are relatively cheap for Americans but expensive for Euro-
peans, whereas the overall costs of European defense have become rela-
tively cheap for Europeans but expensive for Americans.
These differences in perspective can generate doubts among Ameri-
cans whether Europeans will have the will or capacity to maintain a
consistent policy of firmness towards Moscow, given their energy and
economic interdependencies and their own internal squabbles. They
also generate doubts among Europeans about U.S. guarantees of Euro-
pean security, despite Washington’s repeated assurances and steps to
make that guarantee more credible and real. They wonder whether the
United States will prioritize issues of the region over other U.S. global
interests related to Russia. Many European elites fear loss of influence
and are worried that Washington will pay less heed to their concerns
even as it demands more from them in terms of assistance with chal-
lenges far from their region, at a time when many European countries
are struggling with considerable challenges at home.
These mutual doubts continue to gnaw away at the relationship like
termites in the woodwork. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s penchant for
exploiting such doubts and differences, not only between the United
States and EU member states, but between EU members themselves,
remains robust.

Shared Interests

These hesitations, differences and doubts provide the setting within

which the United States and its European partners each approach the
question of Western strategy towards Europe’s east. Nonetheless, there
are compelling reasons for the United States and its European partners
to prioritize their work on Russia and the common neighborhood.
Shared Western interest in a Europe that is hospitable to democratic
and economic freedom is challenged by further deterioration of democ-
racy in the EU itself and in eastern Europe, which could severely dam-
age the normative foundation of Europe’s integration and its close
alignment with the United States.
Shared Western interest in a European continent that is at peace with
itself is challenged by Russian military interventions in Ukraine and
36 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Georgia, festering conflicts and continued tumult across much of east-

ern Europe.
Shared Western interest in ensuring that significant parts of Europe
are not dominated by any power or constellation of powers hostile to
the West is again at risk.
Shared Western interest in expanding oil and gas pipelines networks
connecting the Black Sea and Caspian regions to Europe in ways that
bolster competition, diversify suppliers, and facilitate production are
challenged by continuing Russian efforts at disruption and energy
blackmail.
Shared Western interest in a confident, capable, outward-looking
Europe that can work together globally with the United States to con-
front illicit and illegal transnational flows of people, money and materi-
als is challenged by a continent beset by turmoil or distracted by insta-
bility along its periphery.
Finally, eastern Europe’s strategic importance has grown in relation
to challenges in the broader Middle East. Western countries are keen
on enlisting regional partners in a global campaign against terrorists
and the networks that support them. They have an interest in the coun-
tries of the region acting as a stable bulwark resistant to encroachments
or instability emanating from other parts of the broader Middle East,
and preventing eastern Europe and central Asia from becoming a sec-
ond vast space of turmoil abutting the tumultuous Middle East.
All told, the West’s fundamental interests lie in stable, democratic
societies integrated in the European mainstream, not a band of unset-
tled in-between lands that will continue to be a source of instability,
conflicts and bad governance.2
These goals face several significant challenges. First, Russia’s interest
and political influence is much stronger and more pervasive in the com-
mon neighborhood than in central-eastern Europe or the western
Balkans. Moscow regards the expansion of Western influence and insti-

2 Daniel S. Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott, eds., The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st
Century: Strategic, Economic and Energy Perspectives (Washington, D.C.: Center for Transatlantic
Relations, 2008); F. Stephen Larrabee, “Western Policy Toward Wider Europe,” Center for
Transatlantic Relations/DGAP, January 2016; Ian Lesser, “Global Trends, Regional Conse-
quences: Wider Strategic Influences on the Black Sea,” Xenophon Paper No. 4 (Athens: In-
ternational Centre for Black Sea Studies (ICBSS), November 2007).
 Western Dilemmas 37

tutions into the former Soviet space as a serious threat to its security
and national interests. Second, the countries of the region are compara-
tively weaker and poorer than other countries of the former Soviet
Empire. Third, festering conflicts threaten the ability of the region’s
societies to consolidate themselves as states, are obstacles to the integra-
tion of these countries into Western structures, and offer Moscow levers
for manipulation, disruption and influence. Fourth, the common neigh-
borhood lacks strong regional mechanisms that can promote coopera-
tion and mitigate conflict.3
Despite these challenges and mutual hesitations, the United States
and European governments have not worked so closely together on key
security issues in quite a while. Russia’s annexation of Crimea prompted
a remarkable alignment of tactical responses by Western countries. They
worked closely to lend economic support and secure an International
Monetary Fund package for Ukraine. They reinforced the airspace and
territory of NATO allies Romania, Poland and the Baltic states and
tightened NATO partnerships with Sweden and Finland. They forged
closer ties with the new Ukrainian government. They excluded Russia
from the G8 and imposed targeted sanctions against a limited number of
Russian officials, and on other individuals and commercial entities con-
sidered financially close to Putin, as well as on a number of Russian
defense firms; placed restrictions on new financing to Russia’s largest
banks and energy companies; instituted stricter limits on the export of
certain technologies to Russia; and put limitations on Russian access to
certain U.S. facilities involved in developing cutting-edge technologies.4
They have been united on the negotiations leading to the Minsk agree-
ments, and have maintained their unity with regard to monitoring imple-
mentation of the accords. The United States has quadrupled the funding
for its European Reassurance Initiative to increase the presence of U.S.
forces in Europe and to improve the defense and security capabilities of
allies, as well as partners Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The EU-
Ukraine DCFTA came into force on January 1, 2016. The United States
has also offered Ukraine $1 billion in loan guarantees and technical assis-
tance with financial, energy and political reforms. Several European
countries have boosted their defense budgets.

3 Hamilton and Mangott, op. cit.; Larrabee, “Western Policy...”, op. cit.
4 Anne Applebaum, “Ukraine’s war on two fronts,” The Washington Post, October 30, 2015.
38 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

These tactics, however, have largely been ad hoc responses to Russ-

ian provocations. They are unlikely to be sustainable unless they are tied
to a long-term Western strategy towards Russia and the common neigh-
borhood.
The NATO Alliance has yet to develop a coherent strategy of pro-
jecting stability and resilience forward, beyond the bounds of NATO
territory itself, to partner countries in wider Europe. NATO has acted
to reassure nervous allies, but it is not prepared to engage militarily to
protect Ukraine. Ukrainians have been left to doubt the credibility of
commitments made by the United States and the United Kingdom in
the 1994 Budapest Agreement to assure Ukraine’s territorial integrity,
and to the value of such instruments as the Partnership for Peace and
the NATO-Ukraine Commission. U.S.-EU coordination has been
patchy—and the transatlantic partners have yet to harness their assorted
efforts to a more strategic effort to project stability and opportunities
for integration to this region. The economic and technical assistance
provided thus far to Ukraine is an important signal of support, but
remains far below what Ukraine needs for success.
In short, Western instruments are out of tune with the times. There
is a growing mismatch between the nature of our challenges, the capac-
ity of our institutions, and the tools at our disposal. In this new era,
Western societies must work differently with Russia, they must engage
differently in the common neighborhood, and there is much they must
do for themselves.
 Section II

What the West Must Do

 1. What the West Must Do with Russia

A Realistic Western Russia Policy

The United States and its European partners need a realistic policy
towards Russia and the common neighborhood that is based not on
hopes or ideology but on a sober analysis of the nature of the Russian
regime, the domestic challenges and foreign policy dilemmas of post-
Soviet countries, and their own common and diverging interests. It
should be guided by recognition that for the foreseeable future, Putin is
here to stay, and that for the moment, a Europe whole, free and at peace
is neither possible with or against Putin’s Russia. Western policy thus
must encompass short-term strategies to deal with Putin’s Russia today,
while laying the groundwork for a post-Putin Russia tomorrow. This
calls for tactical flexibility and strategic patience. In this section we offer
specific recommendations, a number of which are elaborated by our fel-
low authors in subsequent chapters.
Western policy toward Russia must be proceed along three mutually
reinforcing tracks: deterring the regime where necessary; continuous
communication and selective engagement with the regime where useful;
and the broadest range of proactive engagement with Russian society as
possible.

Track One

The United States and Europe should make it clear that relations with
Russia must be based on respect for international law, the UN Charter
and the Helsinki principles, including respect for the sovereignty and
independence of Russia’s neighbors. The international community will
hold the Russian leadership accountable for use of force to change bor-
ders, as in the case of Crimea; failure to meet agreements, as is currently
the case regarding the Georgian and Ukrainian cease-fire arrangements;
resorts to intimidation or attempts to assert any type of “privileged”
sphere of influence that would undermine the integrity of another
country.

41
42 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Track One should encompass both clear signals to Moscow and inde-
pendent measures that can reassure allies and partners concerned about
Russian pressure and deter Russia from further intimidation. This
should include steps to reinforce the credibility of NATO’s own mutual
defense commitment, invest more in the security of those states who
feel threatened by Russia and who have both expressed interest and
demonstrated commitment to draw closer to the EU and NATO,
improve the resilience of Western societies to Russia’s disruptive chal-
lenges and project resilience to weaker societies in the common neigh-
borhood, diversify European energy resources, and other steps as we
outline later.
The West must be alert to Kremlin initiatives and be prepared to
address Kremlin responses to Western policies. Western efforts must be
grounded in appreciation of the fact that as long as common neighbor-
hood states are weak, dependent on Russia, and have no security guar-
antees, the current Russian leadership will not accept their sovereignty,
and in fact would prefer their “Bozniazation” over their Europeaniza-
tion.1 Western states must reject any type of deal to negotiate the future
of common neighborhood states over their heads. It is an illusion to
believe that any such deal on the post-Soviet states would enhance
Europe’s security.
• Strengthen Western non-recognition of Russia’s illegal annexa-
tion of the Ukrainian area of Crimea. The Ukrainian govern-
ment has correctly focused its attention on resolving the conflict
in eastern Ukraine and said that the issue of Crimea should be
addressed in the longer term. That is a wise course, especially as it
is difficult to see how Kyiv can muster the leverage in the near
term to restore Crimea’s status as part of Ukraine. While Crimea
is not now the priority issue, it is important that the United States
and the West not forget or move to “normalize” the question.
Until such time as the status of the peninsula is resolved to Kyiv’s
satisfaction, the international community should sustain a policy
of not recognizing Crimea’s illegal incorporation into Russia. The
West should:
• maintain a strong policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation;
• continue to ensure the strict implementation of all possible measures
aimed to address the legal consequences of the annexation, including

1 Meister, “Getting Putin right,” op.cit.

 What the West Must Do with Russia 43

those related to the economy, visa policy, trade, sports, transportation

and finances;
• maintain Crimea-related sanctions regardless of developments related to
the Donbas and Russia’s compliance with the Minsk agreements;
• condemn violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
Crimea by Russia and as appropriate increase sanctions as a consequence;
• press Russia to give international organizations, such as the OSCE,
access to monitor the situation on the ground;
• continue to support Ukraine’s economic and political transition, and, in
the case of the EU, rapid delivery of a visa-free regime for Ukrainian cit-
izens once Kyiv has met the relevant criteria.
This policy should be given content by, inter alia, maintaining
official recognition of Ukrainian passports of the residents of the
Crimean peninsula and ensuring that official maps do not show
part of Ukraine belonging to another country. Crimea may appear
a lost cause now, but the future may tell another tale.2
• Maintain Russian sanctions until full military and political
implementation of the Minsk agreements has been secured, and
be prepared to increase sanctions if Minsk is not fully imple-
mented. Sanctions may not have altered Putin’s calculus in
Ukraine, but they have raised a cost to his actions, left Russia eco-
nomically isolated, and underscored Western disapproval and
resolve. As the Minsk process advances, the solidity of the sanc-
tions front becomes more fragile. While the official line of both
the EU and the United States is to insist on “full implementation”
of Minsk, which has quite a number of components, political
debate over maintenance of the sanctions is often being conducted
in terms of whether there has been “enough progress” to warrant
and end to the sanctions. Here Russian propaganda exploits Kyiv’s
political difficulties in passing legislation on special status for the
separatist regions, with arguments that “Kyiv is not doing its part.”
It is therefore of great political importance that these complica-
tions do not erode prematurely the maintenance of the sanctions.

2 Steven Pifer, “Russian Aggression against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response,” Testi-
mony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and
Regional Security Cooperation, March 4, 2015; Amanda Paul, “Crimea one year after
Russian annexation,” European Policy Centre, March 24, 2015, http://www.epc.eu/docu-
ments/uploads/pub_5432_crimea_one_year_after_russian_annexation.pdf; Paul Goble, “The
West Needs a Non-Recognition Policy for Crimea Now,” The Interpreter, April 21, 2014,
http://www.interpretermag.com/the-west-needs-a-non-recognition-policy-for-crimea-now/
44 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

To avoid confusion over whether Minsk 2 is advancing adequately,

Western officials should be clear about the bottom line condition,
which is described as the final stage of the process, namely that
Ukraine must regain control of its external frontier. This is surely
a pre-condition for effective implementation of other provisions
of Minsk 2. It is also here that there is greatest scepticism as to
Russia’s willingness to cooperate.
Instead of six-month reviews of sanctions, which generate recur-
rent strains on Western unity, the EU should keep the sanctions
open-ended until conditions warrant change or additional review.
Western actors should be prepared to ratchet sanctions up or scale
them back in accordance with Russian actions in this regard. They
should also clear that higher-end sanctions remain on the table,
including expanded visa restrictions against key Putin allies, or
sanctions targeting specialized imports important to Russia’s
defense industry or to entire sectors of the economy, as well as
access to global financial networks, including through the SWIFT
global electronics payments system.3
• Suspend Russia’s membership in the Council of Europe. Russian
membership in the Council of Europe, a body supposedly consist-
ing of democracies, is an embarrassment. Russia has violated the
convention of the Council’s European Court of Human Rights
numerous times since 2015. In the past, the argument that the
Court has been an important tool for Russians to sue the Russian
state has blunted discussion of Russian suspension from the Coun-
cil. But in December 2015 Putin signed new legislation that gives
Moscow a legal justification to defy verdicts by international
courts—itself a violation of Russia’s obligations under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties.4 If Moscow refuses to accept
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, then Russia’s
membership in the Council of Europe should be suspended alto-
gether. This same standard should be applied to other states,
including Azerbaijan.

3 Bernstein, op. cit.

4 Hannah Kozlowska, “Putin signs a law that allows Russia to ignore international court
rulings that it doesn’t like,” Quartz, December 15, 2015; Human Rights Watch, “Dispatches:
Russian Court Hopes to Thwart International Law Rulings,” December 10, 2015,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/12/10/dispatches-russian-court-hopes-thwart-international-
law-rulings; Ivan Krastev and Mark Leonard, “Europe’s Shattered Dream of Order,” Foreign
Affairs, May/June 2015.
 What the West Must Do with Russia 45

• Prosecute Russian corruption where possible, cast a public spot-

light on networks of influence, and target key figures of the Russ-
ian ruling elite if they participate in criminal business. A promi-
nent opportunity is the July 2014 ruling of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration in the Hague that Moscow’s 2003 dismantling of
the Yukos oil company violated international law, and that the
Russian state owes former Yukos shareholders $50 billion. The
EU and the many other member states to the Court should insist
that the Court’s ruling be respected and that Moscow pay the
compensation.
• Take action again Western enablers. Despite Western efforts to
blunt Putin’s aggression and tackle east European corruption,
many Western institutions and countries enable those activities
through legal loopholes, tax havens, shell companies and lax law
enforcement of anti-corruption laws at home, or through their
own activities in eastern countries. Western countries must crack
down on the Western enablers of Kremlin operatives and eastern
oligarchs.5

Track Two

The United States and its European partners should make it very clear
that they stand as willing partners with a Russia that decides to invest in
its people, build a more sustainable economy grounded in the rule of
law, tackle its health and demographic challenges, build better relations
with its neighbors, and act as a responsible international stakeholder.
They should set forth in concrete terms the potential benefits of more
productive relations. They should also engage selectively in areas of
mutual interest. Even during the tensest periods of the Cold War, com-
munication channels were available and occasionally vital to prevent
miscalculation and avoid escalation.

5 Confidential documents obtained by the International Consortium of Investigative Jour-

nalists, for instance, show that a clandestine network operated by Putin associates has
shuffled at least $2 billion through banks and offshore companies. Bank Rossiya, identified
by the U.S. as Putin’s personal cashbox, has been instrumental in building a network of off-
shore companies. Dozens of loans, some worth hundreds of millions of dollars, sold between
offshore companies for as little as $1 or less. See Bernstein, op. cit. For other examples, see
Anne Applebaum, “Russia’s Western Enablers,” Washington Post, March 5, 2014, or Lucy
Komisar, “Russian Sanctions Highlight Role of Western Enablers,” 100 Reporters, May 21,
2014, https://100r.org/2014/05/russian-sanctions-highlight-role-of-western-enablers/.
46 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Continue non-corrupt transactional relations. In some cases this

makes sense, for instance Western payments to Russian entities for
space launch services, or reimbursement of Russian railways for
logistical services in support of the NATO-led Resolute Support
mission (and earlier, the International Security Assistance Force)
in Afghanistan.6
• Engage selectively on geopolitical issues. Western actors should be
prepared to engage with Russian interlocutors on a select range of
issues, such as fighting terrorism and the so-called IS, stabilizing
the situation in Syria, addressing potential nuclear provocations
from North Korea, or possibly again Iran, working on issues of
climate change or Arctic affairs.
• Revitalize the NATO-Russia Council as a regular channel of
communication on security issues. Currently the Council is being
treated as if its existence is a favor to Russia, yet it is in the inter-
ests of both parties to maintain communication, particularly at
times of tension. A reconvened Council should begin by address-
ing ways to prevent dangerous incidents, as outlined below. If the
relationship improves, practical cooperation could be resumed
step by step. Contacts at military level might first be activated in
politically uncontested areas of immediate benefit to both sides,
such as maritime search and rescue.7
• Act to prevent dangerous incidents. Given the increased scale of
military activities in the Euro-Atlantic area today, and the increased
number of close military encounters, an agreement is needed
between NATO and Russia to prevent accidental incidents or mis-
calculations leading to an escalation of tension and even confronta-
tion. We endorse the proposal made by a high level Russian-West-
ern task force, sponsored by the European Leadership Network, to
use the NATO-Russia Council urgently to discuss a possible Mem-
orandum of Understanding between NATO and its partners and
the Russian Federation on Rules of Behavior for the Safety of Air
and Maritime Encounters between the two sides. Such a memoran-
dum of understanding would be modeled on a similar memoran-
dum signed between the United States and China in November

6 See William Courtney’s chapter in this volume.

7 Margarete Klein and Claudia Major, “Perspectives for NATO-Russia Relations,” Stiftung
Wissenschaft und Politik, December 10, 2015, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/con-
tents/products/comments/2015C49_kle_mjr.pdf
 What the West Must Do with Russia 47

2014.8 It would build on and expand two existing U.S.-Russia

agreements, the 1972 Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents
On and Over the High Seas and the 1989 Agreement on Preven-
tion of Dangerous Military Incidents.
The agreement would:
• Set out the principles and procedures of communication that should be
observed during encounters between military vessels and aircraft;
• Require each side to give timely hazard warnings if military exercises
and live weapons firing are to take place in a vicinity where military
assets of the other side are operational;
• Commit each side to communicate in a timely fashion about the maneu-
vering intentions of military vessels and military aircraft.
It would also contain a list of actions to be avoided, including sim-
ulations of attacks by aiming guns, missiles, fire control radar, tor-
pedo tubes or other weapons in the direction of any military ves-
sels and military aircraft encountered.9
Sweden and Finland, both of which are exposed to the dangers
connected with increased military activities in the Baltic Sea
region, should be included in the discussions. The agreement
could be open to other members of the Partnership for Peace and
OSCE.
• Review and upgrade where possible Europe’s conventional arms
control framework. All three pillars of the interlocking web of
agreements that make up the European conventional arms control
framework are either frozen or degrading. First, Russia has termi-
nated its participation in the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Arms
Control in Europe (CFE). Second, the 1990 Vienna Document, an
agreement among 57 OSCE states that codified militarily signifi-
cant and verifiable confidence- and security-building measures
(CSBMs) to enhance transparency, exchange military information,

8 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Department of Defense of the United States

of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China Re-
garding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, Section 1, p.2.
Available at: http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/141112_Memorandum
OfUnderstandingRegardingRules.pdf.
9 For the original proposal and further details, see European Leadership Network, Task
Force on Cooperation in Greater Europe, “Avoiding War in Europe: how to reduce the
risk of a military encounter between Russia and NATO,” http://www.europeanleadership-
network.org/medialibrary/2015/08/18/2f868dfd/Task%20Force%20Position%20Paper%20
III%20July%202015%20-%20English.pdf.
48 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

provide on-site inspections and notifications of certain types of

military activities, is updated periodically to keep pace with
changes in the European security environment, but has not been
revised since 2011. Third, the 1992 Open Skies Treaty has been
difficult to update to allow the use of modern equipment to reflect
rapidly evolving technology.
• Rework the Vienna Document on Confidence and Security Building
Measures (CSBMs). Many existing elements of the Vienna Document can
be adapted readily to current conditions—if there is an interest to do so.10
• At minimum efforts should be undertaken to reduce risks of accidents
or incidents involving military forces and provide for military-to-mil-
itary channels regarding prevention and management of such inci-
dents. Such provisions could complement any NATO-Russia agree-
ment in this area by broadening scope and country participation.
• The current 13,000-troop threshold for automatic international
observation of exercises should be reduced to a much lower level.
• Consider new CSBMs for cyber, with a view to avoiding miscalcula-
tion and escalation.
• Consider extending codes of conduct to spacefaring countries.
• Western countries should press that the rules be amended to reflect
Russia’s snap exercises, which Moscow is using to sidestep the Vienna
document transparency requirements.
• Review the CFE Treaty with a view to salvaging its confidence-building
functions. A CFE Treaty review is slated for fall 2016. Although revital-
ization of the CFE Treaty appears unrealistic, its numerical limits on
military forces have been undershot for some time. The more important
CFE provisions, which bear reviewing with an eye to salvaging and
updating, relate to verification, transparency and inspection provisions.
Discussions on doctrine and defensive orientation of armed forces would
also be useful.
• Review the Open Skies Treaty. The Open Skies Treaty calls for a review
conference to be held every five years. The last such conference took
place in 2010. A new review conference should be held.
• Reinforce the Architecture of Nuclear Security. Deteriorating
NATO-Russia ties have the potential to threaten the architecture
of nuclear security, built up over decades, that consists of an inter-
locking set of monitoring and verification procedures, communi-
cations channels and commitments to reduce nuclear stockpiles.

10 IanAnthony, “Damage limitation for Vienna document,” SIPRI, November 9, 2015,

http://www.sipri.org/media/expert-comments/anthony-november-2015
 What the West Must Do with Russia 49

The United States and NATO should review their policies for
nuclear forces, missile defense, and arms control with the aim of
putting in place stronger incentives to encourage Russia to cease
nuclear intimidation and to return to INF Treaty compliance.
• First is the New START Treaty, which the United States and Russia
should continue to implement.
• Second is the challenge to the INF treaty system. Washington asserts
that that Russia has breached the INF Treaty by testing a new medium-
range, ground-launched cruise missile. Moscow has countered that U.S.
long-range drones and missile-defense systems that are capable of
launching cruise missiles also violate the treaty. In July 2014, the United
States made known that Russia had begun testing in 2008 a ground-
launched cruise missile that by 2011 the Obama Administration had
concluded was prohibited under the 1988 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty.11
• Third is the issue of missile defense. Russia deems the deployment of
U.S. missile defense systems to Europe as a threat to its ballistic-missile
systems, putting them at a strategic disadvantage and thus destabilizing
the region. Indeed, the threat of a missile defense system in eastern
Europe is believed by some to have been the catalyst for the Russian
development of the R-500 cruise missile for the Iskander system. This
was the system initially suspected of violating the INF Treaty.
• Fourth is the role of dual-use delivery systems and tactical nuclear
weapons, which remain unconstrained by international treaties, and
information regarding their possible uses is scarce. Estimates are that
about 200 US B-61 tactical nuclear systems are hosted by European
NATO members, while Russia is estimated to have between 1,000-2,000
such weapons, a significant portion of which are deployed in European
Russia, but whose precise location is unknown. U.S. and NATO efforts
to engage Russia in information sharing and discussions of mutual verifi-
cation mechanisms, both with regard to numbers and positioning of tac-
tical nuclear weapons, have been rebuffed by Moscow. Still, the issue
should be kept on the agenda.

Track Three

The Maidan precepts are rooted in a belief in the agency of civil society
and the power of societal transformation.12 Western actors should sup-

11 “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” The New York Times, July 28,
2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-mis-
sile-in-violation-of-treaty.html?_r=0
12 Constanze Stelzenmüller, “Transatlantic Power Failures,” Brussels Forum Paper, German
Marshall Fund of the United States, March 2008.
50 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

plement the first two tracks of their approach, each of which is geared
to the Russian regime, with a third track that engages as robustly as pos-
sible with the Russian people. It should supplement its communications
with the regime with broad-based mechanisms of dialogue and
exchange with alternative elites, civil society and opposition figures.
Track Three efforts should help the Russian people maintain contacts
with the West, have access to reliable information, and support civil
society exchange between Russia and the West. Visa ease would be one
important tool to improve people-to-people contacts and to send a
strong signal that there is no conflict with Russian society. The West
ought to
• sponsor more young Russians for education abroad and invest in
exchange on all level of society and business, including entrepre-
neurs and innovators.
• employ Russian émigrés in various educational and information
activities.
• help high-quality Russian journalists and experts in the West to
develop various Russian-language media outlets, TV and radio
stations, journals, newspapers and internet portals that can provide
Russians and Russian speakers with reliable information and alter-
native viewpoints.
• expand opportunities for productive dialogue with influential
elites in Russia, including at regional and municipal levels, as well
for educational programs and for people-to-people exchanges.
• organize more roundtables with Russian civil society actors, jour-
nalists and experts and to learn more about domestic Russian
developments
• support independent Russian-speaking journalists and media.

Track Three initiatives will be difficult as Moscow seeks to isolate its

people from Western NGOs. But Russia is not the semi-autarkic Soviet
Union. It is integrated in many ways in the global economy, and the
digital age offers many points of access to Russian society. Over the past
decade, a fledgling Russian middle class has begun to come of age that
will invariably begin to demand political rights. Just as importantly,
Russia has its digitally connected generation—what Richard Whitmore
calls the “power horizontal.” While still in its infancy, over the long
term it will make it very difficult for Putin’s “power vertical” to go on
 What the West Must Do with Russia 51

with business as usual. Russian efforts to shut down such contacts

should be met with persistent efforts at openness and engagement.13
Efforts along all three tracks of effort should be united by a vision of
Russia as part of a new Europe, a Russia that embarks on a course of
profound, systemic internal economic and political reform and modern-
ization, a Russia that refrains from the use of force, a Russia that does
not seek a sphere of influence but develops integration through cooper-
ation and by increasing its own attractiveness.
Unfortunately, today’s Russia is not that Russia. Yet it is important that
Western interlocutors not engage in the zero-sum thinking that charac-
terizes Kremlin policy, and to convey the consistent message that Western
efforts to enhance stability in wider Europe are neither anti-Russian nor
intended to expel Moscow from the region, and in fact have the potential
to build a more secure and prosperous region that is a better partner for
Moscow. Moscow decision-makers do not believe this, but there may be
some opportunity at the margin to influence Russian thinking—if the
message is clear and consistent, and matched by actions on the ground.
While at any particular time Western policies are only likely to have mar-
ginal effect on Russian actions and on Russian society, the West should
not discount its long-term influence in Russia, first by its example and
second through its support for democratic governance and economic
openness. Western policy ought to be resilient to political winds in Rus-
sia, but flexible enough to foster positive change if openings occur.
Keeping faith with our principles and holding true to our mutual
commitments does not have to mean stumbling into a new Cold War.
That is why all three tracks of a new Russia strategy are so important.
For this overall approach to be effective, each track must be advanced
via close transatlantic consultation. Inevitable differences will need to be
addressed, and nations on each side of the Atlantic will need to make
resource commitments and difficult political choices of their own to
make the strategy work.
We have no illusions about the difficulty of such a strategy. The
Putin regime today is in a self-confident and assertive mood. Putin’s
choices are his to make, but it is the West’s responsibility to make the
opportunities and consequences of those choices clear and credible—to
him, and to the Russian people.

13 Richard Whitmore, “The Power Vertical vs. The Power Horizontal,” Radio Free Europe/Ra-
dio Liberty, March 6, 2012, http://www.rferl.org/content/the_power_vertical_vs_the_power_
horizontal/24507183.html
52 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

2. What the West Must Do

with the Common Neighborhood
Pursuing an overarching Western policy towards the common neigh-
borhood is difficult because of the region’s great diversity. Each country
is different and faces different problems. Nonetheless, some broad prin-
ciples are relevant across the region. Western policymakers need to
adopt specific policies for each of the individual countries in the region,
within a broadly consistent short, middle-term and long-term approach
that supports societal transformation.
This run is a marathon, but some quick sprints are necessary. The
most pressing task for the West is to help Ukraine make its transition a
success. Ukraine is a key state for the entire region. In the region more
broadly, Western countries need to discourage Kremlin coercion of
neighbors and encourage countries willing to make tough choices for
reform. They will need to make more effective use of the tools they
have, and acquire new ones relevant to current challenges. They need to
tie short-term priorities to long-term perspectives. This will require
persistence, patience, and consistent engagement.
A proactive policy along these lines might be best characterized as
“Open Door, Straight Talk, Tough Love.”
Open Door. The principle of the Open Door is affirmed in the foun-
dational documents of NATO and the European Union. The Washing-
ton Treaty of 1949, which established NATO, states that “The Parties
may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a
position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the
security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.”14 The
Treaty on European Union similarly states that any European state
which respects the values of the Union and is committed to promoting
them may apply to become a member.15 The willingness and ability of
EU and NATO members to act on these principles by bringing others

14 “TheNorth Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC”, NATO Official Text, April 4, 1949.
15 Those values are defined as “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to mi-
norities.”Articles 49 and 2 of ‘The Treaty on European Union’, Lisbon, December 13,
2007.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 53

into their fold counts as among their most significant achievements of

the past 70 years.
The Open Door remains as valid and relevant today as it was in the
past. The West must be clear that the door to the European and Euro-
Atlantic space where democracy and market economies prevail, and
where war does not happen, stands open to those prepared to create the
conditions by which they, too, could walk through that door.
All countries of wider Europe that express interest and prove com-
mitment to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions should have a
membership perspective. The Open Door is the only principle that can
credibly underpin frameworks, conditions and incentives to improve
governance and generate stability for Europe. Without this inclusive
message, Western leverage to induce reforms will be low. Most of these
societies do not want to remain in-between lands, but they do not know
where their future lies. This uncertainty can be paralyzing. It reinforces
anxieties and instabilities, and fuels those forces intent to blocking the
types of reforms that could set these countries toward more promising
futures.16
If countries are willing to make the hard choices necessary for reform
to create the conditions by which they can join Western institutions,
then we should stand with them. By affirming the right of others to
choose their allegiances, we in the West also defend ourselves and our
principles.
Straight Talk. Affirming the principles of the Open Door should not
mean lowing standards. Those who seek to join our institutions do so
because our norms and values mean something. Neither we, nor they,
are served by diluting those standards. Realistically, that makes a mem-
bership perspective for the countries of wider Europe a generational
challenge. Moreover, even current aspirants for membership, such as
Turkey, Serbia or Albania, will not join the EU in this decade. The issue
is not whether there can be a consensus on membership for any particu-
lar candidate today, it is whether those who are determined to take their
countries into the European mainstream can create conditions in which
the question of integration, while controversial today, can be posed pos-
itively tomorrow.

16 SeeJudy Dempsey, “The EU’s Benign Neglect of Eastern Europe,” Carnegie Europe,
January 16, 2016.
54 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

As they proceed, we in the West can be passive or active. Passivity

gives little incentive to reform, and empowers those with narrow agen-
das. Activity can empower those who are prepared to implement the
fastest and farthest reaching reforms. This calls for tailored efforts to
help guide and support reformist nations along what could be a long
and winding road. It also calls for Straight Talk.
Point One: The chief threats to the peace, stability and development
of most countries in the region stem as much from their internal weak-
nesses as from external meddling.17 Russia is an aggressor and a spoiler
in most countries of the region, a role that those countries and their
Western partners must resist. But Russia’s role in magnified by each
state’s own internal challenges. Russia should not be held out by these
countries as an excuse for not implementing reforms. Sustained eco-
nomic and democratic development throughout this region is a function
of the regional states’ own capacity to provide human security to their
citizens, in large part by improving their “stateness” through function-
ing institutions grounded in the rule of law.
Point Two: closer association with the West begins at home. Western
countries will deepen their links with neighboring countries to the extent
they see that leaders and their people are making tough choices for dem-
ocratic reforms, not as a favor to others, but as a benefit to themselves. In
most countries of the region, too many elites talk the talk of reforms, but
still walk the walk of corrupt autocratic and patronage-based structures.
The societies and elites of this region must decide whether they truly
want to reform and Europeanize by fighting corruption and building the
rule of law, democratic institutions and competitive economies, or
whether they prefer to stagnate with weak governance, opaque decision-
making and crony capitalism. They must stop the game of playing Russia
and the West off against each other while blocking fundamental reforms.
This only weakens them further. The West should not only focus on
elites, they should actively engage alternative elites and civil society. In
many cases these societal forces, not the current elites, are likely to be
partners for modernization and transformation.
Point Three: closer integration is likely to be accelerated to the
extent a country “acts like a member” even before it becomes a member.

17 See Svante Cornell and Anna Jonsson, “Expanding the European Area of Stability and
Democracy to the Wider Black Sea Region” and Charles King, “The Wider Black Sea
Region in the Twenty-First Century,” both in Hamilton and Mangott, “The Wider Black
Sea...”, op. cit.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 55

Countries seeking closer association with the West need to articulate

clearly and consistently to Western partners how their closer association
would benefit the entire Euro-Atlantic community—and then they need
to act accordingly.
Tough Love. Open Door and Straight Talk underscore that a long-
term strategy for democratic transformation and enhanced security in
the region will be more effective if its goals are tied to conditions rather
than institutions. This sets up possibilities for Tough Love. Societies
seeking to join the European mainstream must be prepared to create
conditions by which ever closer relations can be possible. The West can
and will help. That’s the “love” part of the message. But the states them-
selves must lead the way, and will be held to account when and where
they do not. That’s the tough part. Benefits will only come if reforms
are implemented, that is a tough condition. Holding states accountable
also means working closely with alternative elites and civil society actors
to monitor processes of reform and in communication with societies.
Such an approach has the advantage of prioritizing practical
progress over institutional debates that can divert countries from their
immediate challenges, push ambivalent EU members so hard that they
stop being a positive force for active change, or elicit Russian opposi-
tion and intervention. It also provides an opportunity for the EU and
each associated country to focus more squarely on that particular coun-
try’s most urgent needs.
With these three principles in mind, Western strategy toward the
common neighborhood should incorporate the following considerations.
Revamp the Eastern Partnership. The EU’s Eastern Partnership,
bringing together the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine, was launched in 2009 with the goal of creating
“the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further
economic integration between the European Union and interested part-
ner countries.” It can demonstrate some achievements, such as its Asso-
ciation agreements, in particular DCFTAs with Ukraine, Georgia and
Moldova.18

18 Othernotable efforts include the Civil Society Forum, Pilot Regional Development Pro-
grams, a Neighborhood Investment Facility to support lending in neighboring partner
countries, and engaging European financial institutions, such as the European Investment
Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to
provide significant loans for infrastructure projects and the development of small and
medium enterprises.
56 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

But the Eastern Partnership has not provided the right kind of lever-
age to incentivize the countries in question to pursue demanding and
wide-ranging reform programs. First, it has failed to distinguish more
comprehensively between countries for whom political association, eco-
nomic integration and eventual membership are goals (Ukraine, Moldova
and Georgia), those who are interested in cooperation short of member-
ship (Azerbaijan and Armenia), and Belarus under Lukashenko.19
Second, for those who do seek eventual membership, the Eastern
Partnership does not offer that prospect—unlike the EU’s Association
Agreements with the states of the western Balkans. For that reason the
Eastern Partnership is the very embodiment of the EU’s debilitating
ambivalence about its relationship to its eastern neighbors. It has
become more about holding countries off than about bringing them in.
Does the EU seek a compensatory regionalism intended to mollify
neighbors who will never be offered membership? Or does it seek a
truly transformative regionalism that would tackle priority challenges of
the region and then work to align and eventually integrate these coun-
tries into the EU and related Western institutions? It doesn’t really
seem to know. By refusing to refer even to the Treaty of European
Union’s language that any European state which respects EU values
“and is committed to promoting them may apply to become a member
of the Union,” the EU conveys the message that it does not want east-
ern countries as members and that this region is indeed one of “privi-
leged interests” for Russia. As former Swedish Prime Minister Carl
Bildt has said, “Putin makes you an offer you can’t refuse; the EU makes
you an offer you can’t understand.”20
Third, the Eastern Partnership was forged as a fair weather tool at a
time when EU confidence was high and wider Europe seemed mostly sta-
ble. It became a process-heavy, unprioritized effort to export the EU’s pre-
ferred model of society with insufficient carrots or sticks. It did little to
tackle fundamental challenges, such as corruption, lack of education,
poverty and high unemployment and proved ill-suited to stormier times.21

19 “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, EU document 8435/09

(Presse 78), May 7, 2009.
20 See Ian Bond, “The Riga Summit: Enter, pursued by a bear,” Centre for European Reform,
May 18, 2015, http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/riga-summit-enter-pursued-bear.
21 Steven Blockmans, “The 2015 ENP Review: A policy in suspended animation,” CEPS, De-
cember 1, 2015, https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SB%20ENP%20Review%20CEPS%
20Commentary.pdf; Michael Leigh, “Rethinking the European Union’s Neighborhood
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 57

Fourth, the Eastern Partnership was disconnected from conflict miti-

gation, crisis management or geostrategic considerations, as has been
made evident by the ongoing Russia-Georgia conflict and Russia’s inter-
vention in Ukraine.
In 2015 the European Commission made some course corrections. It
intends to streamline procedures and has recognized the need to distin-
guish among Partnership countries. Export of the Union’s values is fea-
tured less prominently than attention to such “shared interests” as eco-
nomic development, energy security, climate action, irregular migration,
trafficking, conflict prevention, and border management. But it is still
unclear whether EU institutions and members will be able to muster
the extra resources and political will to implement such measures.22
We recommend the following considerations:
• Differentiate between those for whom political association, eco-
nomic integration and eventual membership is a goal (Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia), those who are interested cooperation
short of membership (Azerbaijan and Armenia, and Belarus). Eco-
nomic, technical and financial cooperation with each country
should relate to its specific needs and capacities.23
• Focus on the most urgent needs. Differentiation should enable the
EU and each partner to prioritize a very limited number of urgent
issues, some of which lie outside existing frameworks. EU associa-
tion and free trade agreements are very comprehensive documents
that include commitments to a broad range of reforms. They set
forth long-term goal, but what is needed are short- and mid-term
prioritization of efforts. Urgent needs should be tackled vigor-
ously on their own merits, without tying them to an unwieldy
mechanism that has little meaning in the countries concerned.
Only when fundamental needs are addressed and capacity is built
can both sides hope to address more comprehensive efforts to
address all aspects of the EU’s acquis communitaire.24

Policy,” in Aylin Ünver Noi and Sasha Toperich, eds., Challenges of Democracy in the European
Union and its Neighbors Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2016)
22 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, “Review of the European Neigh-
bourhood Policy”, JOIN(2015) 50 final, Brussels, 18 November 2015.
23 Leigh, op. cit.
24 Ibid; Kerry Longhurst and Beata Wojna, ed., Asserting the EU’s Mission in the Neighborhood:
Ten Recommendations for an Effective Eastern Partnership (Warsaw: Polish Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, September 2011).
58 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Improve security. Insecurity is a major challenge to these coun-

tries’ ability to sustain reforms. They are only likely to succeed at
transformation when they are less vulnerable. The EU needs to
invest more in institution-building in the security sphere, includ-
ing training, border management and playing a more prominent
role in addressing separatist conflicts. The Eastern Partnership’s
approach to transformation must be tied to other instruments of
EU diplomacy and security policy.
• Offer a “European Perspective” to Partnership countries willing
and able to create conditions by which this could be possible. The
EU should get off the fence. It should not only affirm Article 49 of
the Treaty on European Union, it should be clear that it will keep
the door to membership open, however long it takes partners to
get through it, and that Russia has no right to veto it. This will
incentivize state bureaucracies and the private sector, while offer-
ing a lifeline to pro-EU civil societies and political parties operat-
ing under difficult circumstances. This must proceed step by step,
and can at best be a distant goal. But without a clear membership
prospect, EU demands and prescriptions find little resonance. The
EU has a vital interest in the prospect of a space of stability, pros-
perity and democracy that extends as far across the European con-
tinent as possible. It should embrace it, not fear it, and work prag-
matically to that end.25
• Build Institutions. In contrast to the situation facing central Euro-
pean states before their accession, the main challenge for Eastern
Partnership countries is posed by weak institutions. A membership
perspective alone will not be sufficient to change the rules of the
game in these countries, especially in an environment in which key
political forces and authorities are controlled by vested interests
that hold vast veto powers against reforms. The competitive envi-
ronment in which oligarchs fight for control over institutions
requires external guarantees to ensure, even enable their independ-
ence. Therefore Western policies cannot be limited to cheerleading
for reforms that the countries are expected to undertake essentially
on their own, nor have conditionality and pressure proven to be
very effective under current circumstances. New instruments are

25 Blockmans, op. cit.; Salome Samadashvili, Building a Lifeline for Freedom : Eastern Partnership
2.0 (Brussels: Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, October 2014). Bond, “The
Riga Summit...”, op. cit.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 59

needed that would allow EU and other authorities to participate

directly with national authorities in implementing reforms,
matched by the political will that will be necessary to accept co-
responsibility for such efforts at transformation.
• Move Forward but Adjust DCFTAs. With neither NATO nor EU
membership on the horizon, DCFTAs in the context of the Asso-
ciation Agreements are the primary vehicle for keeping open the
prospect for closer ties between Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to
the European mainstream. Yet even though the DCFTAs liberal-
ize 95 percent of bilateral trade, they offer few immediate trade
benefits to partners, since the 5 percent of bilateral trade that
remains protected covers precisely those sectors where partner
countries are competitive. Efforts should be prioritized in favor of
trade and assistance arrangements matching the real needs, capaci-
ties and intentions of each partner. Regulatory convergence
should be limited initially to requirements affecting products and
services actually traded between the two sides, even as the grind-
ing yet important work continues regarding alignment and har-
monization of economic legislation.26
• Create More Mobility Options. The migrant crisis is roiling Euro-
pean politics and rendering EU member states more restrictive
and cautious with regard to the flow of people across their bor-
ders. Nonetheless, visa liberalization is the single most important
initiative the EU could take to signal to ordinary people in wider
Europe that deeper association with the West can make a differ-
ence in their lives. The EU should create additional possibilities
for cultural, educational, business and local government exchanges
and fellowship opportunities in the EU for students and young
professionals. The scope and range of Local Border Traffic Zones
(LBTZs) should be extended. These measures should be coupled
with targeted visa bans and restrictions for officials in these states
engaged in undemocratic or illegal activities.
• De-link the Eastern Partnership from Russia policy. The EU
should emphasize that Eastern Partnership countries have a right
to choose their own political destinies and to pursue integration
with EU institutions. The Eastern Partnership should not become
a function of policy toward Russia. The EU must reject Russian
interference with its activities with Eastern Partnership countries.

26 See Leigh, op. cit., and Longhurst and Wojna, op. cit.
60 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Consider new forms of association. Given that the states of the

common neighborhood on balance are weaker and more fragile
than previous candidates for membership, that there is currently
little appetite among Western governments for any effort to rush
enlargement, and Russia is both more willing and able to block
such efforts, Western support and outreach should supplement
current mechanisms with new forms of association.
• Consider new sub-regional associations. New EU macro-regional
strategies, for example with the Danube states, offer a potential
model for engagement with Carpathian states. This special area is
surrounded by four EU member states, namely Poland, Slovakia,
Hungary and Romania. All four are attached to Transcarpathia and
to each other by cultural, historical and ethnic ties. The Tran-
scarpathian region could be developed into a real Ukraine bridge-
head to integrated continental Europe. It is already linked by
broad-gauge railway to Hungary and Slovakia, and its special loca-
tion and multi-ethnic traditions are convenient for offshore zones
and assembling factories. The support of cooperation between
Ukraine, Moldova and the EU through common cross-border
projects could improve civic engagement and exchange on
regional and local levels.
• Facilitate cooperative regional links. The states of the common
neighborhood should be encouraged to support each other’s aspi-
rations, rather than holding each other back in a zero-sum compe-
tition for Western favors in some sort of wider European beauty
contest. Lessons can be derived from mutual support provided by
Visegrad countries, regional cooperation under the Northern
European Initiative, the support network created by the Vilnius
10, and cooperative regional mechanisms created by the Stability
Pact for southeastern Europe.
• Consider selective extension of the “variable geometry” principle
allowing for differing participation and overlapping organizational
frameworks for various policy domains. A good example is Ukrain-
ian and Moldovan membership in the Energy Community, which
serves to align their energy sectors, and those of most southeast
European states, with the EU’s Energy Union, including its Third
Energy Package. The EU might extend this principle by allowing
participation by associated partners in other designated EU mech-
anisms, such as customs, border security and transport policies, or
the civil components of European Security and Defense Policy.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 61

Such efforts would simply recognize differing levels of European

integration that are already European reality.27
• Consider associate memberships and differentiated integration. The
ideal enshrined in the 1957 Treaty of Rome that EU members will
seek ‘ever closer Union’ and its implicit premise that integration
proceeds in lock-step or not at all—remains a goal for most EU
member states. But EU members have also adapted EU mechanisms
and procedures to account for many overlapping subsets of integra-
tion, from the euro and the Schengen zone to UK and Danish opt-
outs of various policy areas, or special arrangements with Norway,
Switzerland, Turkey and other countries. Reconciling Europe’s het-
erogeneity with the impulse toward integration, in short, is not alien
to the European Union. With this in mind, consideration should be
given to concept of associate membership, which could convey many
but not all rights and obligations of full EU members, and tailor par-
ticipation to areas of greatest progress and value. Legally, an associ-
ate member would be a member of the EU, with many, but not all, of
the rights and obligations of EU membership. This approach could
apply to a range of EU partners, and perhaps even be used by some
existing members, such as the UK. This new form of EU member-
ship could only be introduced by way of Treaty amendment, a
prospect many member states dread. But some proponents argue
that with the appropriate political will only a minor amendment to
the Treaties would be needed to provide for the existence of the new
concept, with the details to be worked out in the treaties with the
countries concerned, supplemented perhaps by a general legal
framework governing the new form of EU membership (to be
adopted by the Council or European Council by unanimity, with the
consent of the European Parliament).28
Develop transatlantic complements to EU strategies. In the end, only
the EU can offer a conclusive framework anchoring east European
countries to the West. But the United States can play complementary

27 The ENP Review has recommended consideration of cross-cutting partnerships between

the EU, individual member states, accession countries like Turkey, other third countries
and international organisations. Blockmans, op. cit.
28 See, for instance, Andrew Duff, “The Case for an Associate Membership of the European
Union,” http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2013/03/06/associate-eu-membership/; Charles
Grant, “Can variable geometry save EU enlargement?” Centre for European Reform, Oc-
tober 3, 2005, http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2005/can-vari-
able-geometry-save-eu-enlargement.
62 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

and supporting roles, not only via NATO but bilaterally and together
with the European Union.
• Consider U.S.-EU “Atlantic Accords” with countries in the com-
mon neighborhood, joint political statements that can provide
reassurance and greater substance to Western commitments to
work with countries to create conditions drawing them closer,
based on OSCE principles. As the sanctions with regard to Russ-
ian action on Crimea and the war in Donbas region have shown,
U.S.-EU coordination gives Western policy more clout.
• Consider a U.S. Black Sea Charter. The United States might con-
sider a Black Sea equivalent of the U.S.-Baltic Charter, the U.S.
Adriatic Charter with Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, or elements
of the Stability Pact for southeastern Europe. Such political framing
documents can provide important reassurance to states in difficult
transitions; affirm some basic principles that can guide efforts
toward democratic transformation and regional cooperation; and
widen the agenda of cooperation to such areas as health, environ-
ment, human rights, economic development good governance and
resilience. A regional Charter could facilitate contacts among
Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, EU/NATO members Romania and
Bulgaria, and NATO ally Turkey together with the United States.
• Deepen NATO’s ties to the countries of the region via practical
means that can advance reforms and project resilience forward,
while affirming the Open Door principle. The EU cannot replace
the United States with regard to Europe’s security. NATO remains
the main guarantor of European security, not only for its own
members and partners, but as the most relevant actor with regard
to stabilizing the security of countries within wider Europe. EU
transformation policy with regards to democratization and
reforms can only be successful if it is linked with security guaran-
tees, and only NATO can provide such guarantees.
NATO’s invitation to Montenegro to join the Alliance in 2016 is
an important affirmation that NATO’s door remains open. A simi-
lar effort should be made to unlock the political conflict among
NATO allies that has prevented Macedonia from joining the
Alliance. Looking further east, the situation is more difficult.
Russian opposition is stronger, aspirants are weaker, and allies are
distracted and divided. Allies remain divided in particular over
membership prospects for Ukraine and Georgia, even though all
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 63

NATO allies have affirmed that the two countries will someday
become allies.
With Ukraine in the midst of a turbulent transition and under
siege, it would be a mistake to force the issue of membership now.
More practical steps could be taken now to strengthen coopera-
tion under the NATO-Ukraine Partnership in areas where there is
mutual interest, while encouraging progress toward more open
democratic institutions. Such activities include engaging on mili-
tary reform; further developing crisis consultative mechanisms and
ties in such areas as civil-military relations, democratic control of
the armed forces, transparent military budgeting, armaments
cooperation, joint exercises and defense planning. Through all the
ups and downs since Ukraine’s independence, Kyiv has consis-
tently demonstrated an interest in working in partnership with
NATO. It was the first CIS state to join the Partnership for Peace,
has been one of the most active participants in its exercises, and
the NATO-Ukraine Charter on a Distinctive Partnership gives
Ukraine a unique status with the Alliance.
NATO should make the Partnership for Peace program as sub-
stantive as possible for reforming post-Soviet states. In making
decisions about bilateral military assistance to post-Soviet states,
NATO member states should be forthcoming, commensurate with
foreseeable security threats.29

Engage robustly within the OSCE. The Organization for Security

and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) occupies an important if often
underrated place in Europe’s security architecture. While groupings such
as NATO and the EU gather countries in common cause, the OSCE
gathers countries with disparate and conflicting claims and causes. At a
time of military tension and growing possibilities for incidents, accidents
and miscalculation, the OSCE can provide a common platform for
mediation, dialogue, trust-building and verification measures and con-
flict prevention—if its members want it to.30 Western countries should
seek to make maximum use of the OSCE’s possibilities, realizing that

29 See Herbst, op. cit.; Bond, op. cit.; Judy Batt, et al., Partners and Neighbors: A CFSP for a
Wider Europe, Chaillot Paper No.64 (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2003).
30 See Jaako Iloniemi, “Not Just Another Tea Party. The Lasting Value of the OSCE,” in FIIA
Finnish Foreign Policy Papers, No. 4, December 2015. Also Petri Hakkarainen and Christian
Nünlist, “Trust and Realpolitik. The OSCE in 2016.” Policy Perspectives Vo. 4, No. 1, Jan-
uary 2016, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich. ]
64 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

current tensions may make this difficult. Germany’s 2016 as Chair-in-

Office, followed by Austria, offer opportunities in this regard.
The OSCE is one of the international community’s most important
on-the-ground presences in the Ukraine crisis, through its Special
Monitoring Mission, its Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints
Gukovo and Donetsk, the Trilateral Contact Group, and the OSCE
project coordinator in Ukraine.31 It is likely to play a prominent role in
the crisis’ resolution or long-term management, much as it has done in
the western Balkans.32
• OSCE members must provide adequate support for the OSCE’s
Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine so it can focus both on
security and humanitarian issues. The Special Monitoring Mission
should, in keeping with its mandate, monitor and report on the
entire territory of Ukraine. This requires the Mission to have
unrestricted access to Crimea, which remains an integral part of
Ukraine and the entire separatist regions. Unfortunately, Moscow
continues to block the Observer Mission’s efforts to fulfill its man-
date to monitor and verify on both sides of the Ukrainian-Russian
border and to create a security zone in the border areas of Russia
and Ukraine. OSCE observers are denied access to the border
because Moscow is still supplying troops, heavy weapons and
ammunition across the Ukrainian-Russian border and does not
want witnesses to these activities.33
• Local elections in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk under
Ukrainian law and in line with OSCE standards must be moni-
tored by the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR). As long as the conditions for free and
fair elections under OSCE rules are not possible, OSCE should
not be used to legitimize the separatists in any sense.
The OSCE can also be useful in addressing other issues.
• Western members should be vigilant to ensure that OSCE field
missions, ODIHR, the Representative on Freedom of the Media,
and the High Commissioner on National Minorities can effectively

31 Remler,op. cit.
32 E. Wayne Merry, “Dealing with the Ukrainian Crisis. Transatlantic Strategy Dilemmas,”
IAI Working Paper 15/51. Rome. Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2015.
33 See “Russia ‘still sending troops and weapons’ to East Ukraine,” AFP, February 2, 2016.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 65

and independently perform the duties assigned to them by their

mandates, and are provided with sufficient resources to do so.
• The OSCE plays a constructive role as a vehicle for civil society
engagement. The German and Austrian Chairs-in-Office should
encourage energetic expansion of such activities throughout east-
ern Europe. This could include efforts to strengthen OSCE moni-
toring of human rights and expand OSCE attention to minority
issues to encompass newer minorities and refugees.
• The OSCE should make an effort to provide fresh impetus for the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace negotiations in the OSCE Minsk
Group, and establish a status-neutral field presence in Georgia
with access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia.34 These separatist con-
flicts should not be forgotten, they are fragile and new military
conflicts can break out any time, as witnessed most recently by the
resumption of hostilities between Armenia and Azerbaijan in April
2016.
Encourage mentoring and good practice exchange. Within or along-
side these initiatives there is great scope for smaller groups of Western
countries to ‘mentor’ regional partners. In fact, leadership by individual
member nations or coalitions can be essential, since big institutions like
the EU move slowly and operate by consensus. For instance, large-scale
twinning between officials and agencies in Partnership and EU coun-
tries, as was done with earlier accession candidates, is important. The
3+3 initiative between the Baltic countries and the three South Cauca-
sus states is another good precedent. These two groups of comparably-
sized former Soviet republics, with much in common but great differ-
ences in experience, developed mechanisms to explore collaboration and
build on lessons learned, using “lead nation” concepts within an infor-
mal common framework. The informal 8+1 format of the Enhanced
Partnership in Northern Europe (EPINE) between the United States
and its Nordic and Baltic partners offers orientation as another useful
mechanism to engage on regional issues.
Address the region’s festering conflicts. An invigorated U.S.-EU
strategy toward the common neighborhood must include active efforts
to address the region’s festering conflicts — in Moldova (Transnistria),
Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia), and Armenia and Azerbaijan
(Nagorno-Karabakh). The situation in the eastern Ukrainian regions of

34 Tiilikainen, et al., op. cit.

66 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Luhansk and the Donbas could become a fifth such festering conflict.
The West must be more engaged in conflict management and negotia-
tions in all conflicts, and be attentive to Russian efforts to use these con-
flicts to influence or disrupt neighboring countries. The EU and the
United States should not accept Moscow as the main broker in these
conflicts. Doing so only serves to weaken the sovereignty of the post-
Soviet states involved. Moreover, the pattern of Russian actions and tac-
tics should cause Ukrainian, Moldovan and Western officials to consider
that Transnistria in particular could become a further entry-point for
Russian special forces and provocateurs into Mariupol and Odessa
Oblast. It is conceivable that a combined Russian-Transnistrian force of
10,000-12,000 military personnel could be quickly mustered to threaten
southwestern Ukraine.35
Remain strongly engaged with the Balkan countries. Continued U.S.
and European engagement remains essential if the Balkans are to con-
tinue along the path towards Europe’s mainstream. The goal should be
integration not only into the EU and Euro-Atlantic institutions, but also
greater integration within the region. Croatia has joined the EU and
NATO, and Montenegro has now received an invitation to NATO mem-
bership. But others are struggling. Serbia and Kosovo have made some
progress in resolving their differences, but some EU member states do
not recognize Kosovo’s independence, damaging its ability to move for-
ward and obstructing wider progress in the region. Greece continues to
block progress with Macedonia due to issues surrounding its name.
Bosnia and Herzegovina is mired in a swamp of corruption amidst
squabbles among ethnically-based politicians; most reform efforts have
gone nowhere. The Kremlin’s influence in the area is strong and grow-
ing. The region still requires constant attention from both the EU and
the United States to ensure that forward progress continues.
Be strategic about energy. Energy is central to any coordinated
Western strategy in and for the region. Russia is and will remain an
important energy provider to Europe. The issue is not whether Russia

35 Robert Ledger, “Power, corruption and lies - the vortext of ‘Frozen Conflict,” Transconflict,
November 11, 2015, http://www.transconflict.com/2015/11/power-corruption-and-lies-
the-vortex-of-frozen-conflict-111/; Dumitru Minzarari, “ Ukraine Taking Drastic Measures
to Diminish the Risk of an ‘Odessa People’s Republic”‘, Eurasian Daily Monitor, August
14, 2014; Stefan Meister, “Reframing Germany’s Russia Policy - An Opportunity for the
EU,” European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2014; Thomas Frear, “New Realities:
The Ukrainian Approach to Transnistria,” European Leadership Network, March 24, 2015,
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/new-realities-the-ukrainian-approach-to-
transnistria_2569.html.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 67

will continue to play this role, but under what conditions and to what
extent Europeans want to be dependent on Russian supplies, and
whether Russia is ready to accept the rules under which the European
Energy Union and the 3rd energy package operates. Gazprom has been
linking economic and political interests in the context of gas supplies
for years, punishing some countries and favoring others pursuant to
Kremlin policy directives.
• Enforce the EU’s Third Energy Package and rules governing the
Energy Community. We have seen some progress in this area over
the past year. For example, Ukraine was able to purchase some gas
via “reverse flow” of Russian gas sold to other European con-
sumers; and suit has been brought against Gazprom for violating
EU laws and statutes. Still, the EU has not insisted on full imple-
mentation of its energy policies, which would be useful to both
Ukraine and Moldova. Gazprom must come to an agreement with
the EU on competition. It cannot be given special carve-outs and
exceptions. Russia must fully embrace market rules and the com-
petition rules of the European Union as spelled out in the EU’s
Third Energy Package. Its plans to construct/export nuclear
plants and its involvement in infrastructure development must not
only correspond to EU technical requirements; contracts must be
transparent, open, and void of graft.
• Facilitate greater U.S. energy supplies to Europe. Europe remains
extremely interested in access to U.S. crude oil and LNG exports.
In December 2015 the United States lifted a forty-year-old ban on
exports of crude oil. Should the Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership, known as TTIP, be agreed and ratified, LNG
exports would be liberalized. But that could take time. Washington
should do what it can now to facilitate greater U.S. efforts to
diversify Europe’s energy imports. Licensing requirements for
U.S. companies seeking to export LNG to NATO allies or EU
member states should be eliminated. Investors and companies
should be encouraged to examine possible participation in
Europe’s LNG infrastructure development, realizing that the pri-
vate sector is likely to drive these activities.36

36 Skeptics point to higher Asian prices as a reason why such exports are unlikely. But such
price differentials have narrowed and there is reason to believe they could narrow further.
See Paolo Natali, Christian Egenhofer and Gergely Molnar, “TTIP and Energy,” in Daniel
S. Hamilton and Jacques Pelkmans, eds., Rule-Makers or Rule-Takers? Exploring the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015)
68 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Invest in North-South and West-East infrastructure in Europe.

The EU should develop its energy, telecommunications and trans-
portation infrastructure along a North-South axis from the Baltic
to the Adriatic Sea. Ukrainian gas storage capacity should be inte-
grated into the corridor and the EU gas network. This North-
South corridor would constitute the most strategically viable alter-
native to Russia’s regional abuse of current energy supplies and
supply routes, foster greater cohesion among central and east
European states, undermine Russia’s monopoly on energy pricing,
and severely inhibit its ability to use energy as bargaining tool.37
West-East interconnectors are also important to bring gas from
Atlantic sources as well as from north Africa to central and eastern
Europe.
• Help Ukraine. Russia must come to understand that its continued
cooperation with Ukraine on gas transit is related to its ability to
be a long-term partner for the EU. Brussels and Washington must
support Ukraine in modernizing its pipeline infrastructure and to
develop alternative sources of energy as well as energy efficiency.
At the same time, Ukraine must become a transparent partner and
introduce attractive conditions for competition and investment.
• Review Nord Stream 2. The European Commission should
review plans for building a North Stream II pipeline for Russian
gas to flow directly through the Baltic Sea to Germany and further
via the OPAL pipeline to central and western Europe. If the
pipeline violates basic principles underpinning the EU’s 3rd
energy package or the Energy Union, it needs to be stopped. If it
fulfills all rules of unbundling and a competitive energy market,
there is no reason to over-politicize it.
• Encourage Turkey to join the Energy Community. Turkey could
take a significant step to further pan-European energy integration,
grounded in EU principles and laws, as well as advance its own
goals to accede to the European Union and to become a regional
energy hub by becoming a full member of the Energy Commu-
nity. Full membership is unlikely to be difficult. Energy Commu-

37 For more details and a comprehensive discussion of the EU’s proposed North-South Cor-
ridor, see Atlantic Council, Completing Europe: from the North-South Corridor to Energy, Trans-
portation, and Telecommunications Union, November 20, 2014, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
publications/reports/completing-europe-from-the-north-south-corridor-to-energy-trans-
portation-and-telecommunications-union; Jones, op. cit.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 69

nity staff have judged Turkish compliance with the Energy Com-
munity Treaty already to be “legally synchronized.”38 Remaining
issues could be via phase-in periods and adaptations.
Turkey actively negotiated the Energy Community Treaty but
joined only as an observer in November 2006. Ankara has been
hesitant about full membership due to concern that it could delay
the opening of the energy chapter in its EU accession negotia-
tions. Yet full-fledged membership in the Energy Community
would bring Turkey farther and faster, since membership entails
not only full implementation of EU energy law, it includes full
access to the EU internal energy market and would have a lever-
age effect on EU accession talks. Turkey’s membership would be
another step diversifying Europe’s energy markets and linking the
EU together with southeastern Europe to Black Sea partners
Ukraine, Georgia and Turkey.39
• Facilitate the development of Caspian energy. In a global energy
market that is becoming more competitive, the development and
export of Caspian energy serves Western interests in increasing
and diversifying sources of supply of energy. The West should
encourage Caspian energy producers to offer more stable invest-
ment climates and pursue increased efficiency, such as by privatiz-
ing wasteful state energy companies. The international financial
institutions and the West ought to find ways to increase the
rewards for privatization of inefficient, corruption-prone state-
controlled enterprises in the post-Soviet space and for offering
more leeway for dynamic private sector development.40

38 Energy Community Secretariat, Energy Governance in Turkey. Report on Compliance with the
Energy Community Acquis, October 1, 2015, https://www.energy-community.org/portal/
page/portal/ENC_HOME/DOCS/3894261/25824B882CF017E0E053C92FA8C0EE59.P
DF
39 Ibid; Janez Kopac and Mehmet Ekinci, “Turkey as a member of the energy community,”
Daily Sabah, February 17, 2015, http://www.dailysabah.com/opinion/2015/02/17/turkey-
as-a-member-of-the-energy-community.
40 Courtney, op. cit.
70 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Country-Specific Priorities
Ukraine
Ukraine is the forefront of conflict with Russia and in the midst of a
fundamental reorientation. The Ukrainian leadership faces several criti-
cal challenges. It must implement a coherent and sustainable domestic
reform agenda, tackle rampant and widespread corruption, ensure its
energy security, regain control over its eastern border and recover its
eastern territories. Many Ukrainian elites and much of Ukrainian soci-
ety have made a clear choice for change and reforms. This is an historic
opportunity, but one that can be lost unless Western actors engage with
Ukrainian partners to stabilize the country together.41
Ukraine must take the lead. While many reforms were introduced in
2015, much more work remains. Now that financial decentralization has
been enacted, now more fundamental decentralization reforms are
needed that give local and regional authorities more rights to solve their
problems locally. This is not about “federalization”, as demanded by
Russia with maximum autonomy for the separatist regions, it is about
strengthening the principle of subsidiarity where it makes sense for the
Ukrainian state.
A main priority is reform of the prosecution and courts. After the res-
ignation of Prosecutor General Viktor Shokin in February 2016, a new
start must be made, judges must be lustrated and new judges appointed
in a reformed court system. Two major forces are blocking judicial
reforms. The first are current judges, who widely oppose reform of the
courts and have foiled many bottom-up efforts to reform the judiciary
through self-governing bodies of judges. The second is the Presidential
administration, which is not interested in judicial freedom, and is con-
cerned that if it loses influence over judges, that influence could accrue
to those who would use their control to target the President.
Energy reforms have advanced and must continue to enable a real
market for gas and electricity to emerge.42 The country’s largely state-
owned companies must be privatized where it makes sense in a competi-
tive and transparent way. Civil service reforms must be implemented

41 See Steven Pifer, “Taking Stock in Ukraine,” The American Interest, October 28, 2014,
/http://www- the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/10/28; Anders Aslund, “Ukraine’s
Old Internal Enemy,” Wall Street Journal, October 1, 2014;
42 For specific recommendations, see Anders Aslund, “Securing Ukraine’s Energy Sector,” At-
lantic Council Issue Brief, April 2016.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 71

and budgets must be made transparent. Success in each of these areas is

dependent on a serious anti-corruption campaign that involves civil
society and stronger independent media. And in each area, Western
assistance can make a difference.43 Ukraine has been a member of the
European Energy Community since 2011 and is integrating its energy
market with the EU. It should abolish state control on transit pipelines,
as have EU member states. Fees related to transit of Russian gas to the
EU is an important source of corruption in Ukraine.
The war with Russia and its proxies produced 1.5 million internally
displaced people, who have not received enough support. Western
countries should provide immediately more serious support to meet
their needs. They should also work with Kyiv to assess damage in the
conflict zone with a view to reconstruction once the government
reestablishes control in the Donbas.
Greater effort must also be made to reinforce Ukraine’s capacity for
self-defense. The United States has provided advanced radar systems,
but more must be done. The West should provide Ukraine $5 billion a
year over five years for military equipment including anti-tank missiles,
secure command and control communications, sophisticated drones,
electronic countermeasures to jam enemy unmanned aerial vehicles,
secure communications equipment, armored Humvees, medical support
equipment, and anti-aircraft radar equipment to dissuade Moscow from
using air power against Ukraine. The best way to support Ukraine in
this field is to invest in its military industry, which has huge capacities
from Soviet times but is lacking investment, modernization and clients.
It could bring benefits to Ukraine in terms of labor and know-how and
for Western companies if they would integrate Ukrainian companies in
the production line. Ukraine can provide technology and help itself.
Additional intelligence and surveillance capabilities should be deployed
and additional training provided. NATO Trust Funds created at the
Wales NATO Summit to focus on demining should be expanded to
include training. None of these recommendations would present a terri-
torial threat to Russia, but they would complicate Putin’s ambitions
regarding Ukraine.44

43 Herbst, op. cit.; Anders Aslund, “Seven Key Reforms for Ukraine in 2016,” Atlantic Council,
January 18, 2016, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/seven-key-reforms-
for-ukraine-in-2016.
44 See Jones, op. cit.; Herbst, op. cit.; Ian Brzezinski, op.cit.; Steven Pifer, “Russian Aggression
against Ukraine and the West’s Policy Response,” Testimony to the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Europe and Regional Security Cooperation, March
72 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Moldova
Moldova is one of Europe’s poorest countries. It has been mired in a
political crisis for most of the past decade, most recently by a spectacular
scandal in which top politicians from the Alliance of European integra-
tion government was implicated in plundering the country’s banks of $1
billion, or roughly 15 percent percent of the economy. Endemic corrup-
tion has thoroughly infected business and politics and created fertile
ground for criminal networks, many with Russian ties, that are engaged
in a wide range of illicit activities, including efforts to provide the Islamic
State and al-Qaeda with radioactive material.45 Frustrated with leaders
that called themselves pro-European and were supported by Brussels,
civil society activists formed a Dignity and Truth movement in winter
2015 as the population’s trust in “pro-European” forces has faded.46
Media portrayals of the situation in Moldova as a clash between pro-
European and pro-Russian factions are overly simplistic and ultimately
misleading. Unfortunately, most Moldovan elites have tended to follow
the political path that has promised greater opportunity for corruption
and rent-seeking. Currently there is no serious partner for the West
except for fragmented parts of the opposition and weak civil society.
Moldova’s most recent scandal underscores that Western partners
must support reforms rather than particular governments. There is a
need for a much more strict conditionality. No additional financial sup-
port should be forthcoming without reforms. Western actors should
invest more in building ties with a new generation of reform-oriented
politicians. If a more credible partner emerges, Western partners should
engage more directly, for instance through a rule of law mission to

4, 2015; Ivo Daalder, Michele Flournoy, John Herbst, Jan Lodal, Steven Pifer, James
Stavridis, Strobe Talbott and Charles Wald, Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian
Aggression: What the United States and NATO Must Do, Atlantic Council/Brookings/Chicago
Council on Global Affairs, 2015, http://www.brookings.edu/ ~/media/Research/Files/Re-
ports/2015/02/ukraine-independence-russian-aggression/ UkraineReport_February2015_FI-
NAL.pdf?la=en.
45 See Desmond Butler and Vadim Ghirda, “AP INVESTIGATION: Nuclear black market
seeks IS extremists,” October 7, 2015, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6fd1d202f40c4
bb4939bd99c3f80ac2b/ap-investigation-nuclear-smugglers-sought-terrorist-buyers; Kelly
Davenport, “ Illicit Traffickers Arrested in Moldova,” Arms Control Today, January/February
2015, https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_0102/News-Briefs/Illicit-Traffickers-Ar-
rested-in-Moldova.
46 See Igor Boţan, “Letter From Chisinau,” Carnegie Europe, December 4, 2015,
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=62180; Richard Martyn-Hemphill, “Moldova’s
Maidan,” Politico Europe, October 1, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/ moldovas-maidan/.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 73

monitor and assist in implementing reforms on the ground, direct par-

ticipation in the selection process for the heads of key judicial, law
enforcement, and regulatory bodies, financially supporting significant
pay rises for higher officials in return for more objective selection, eval-
uation and promotion procedures; and employing professionals from
the EU—through awarding the citizenship—as Moldovan officials in
key functions. Civil society should not become part of the government
but should maintain vigorous oversight. The EU should help civil soci-
ety monitor the success and failure of reforms and improve communica-
tion with Moldovan society. This could strengthen the role of civil soci-
ety actors vis-a-vis the government and give the EU more information
about the real implementation of reforms. Perhaps the biggest boost to
improved relations between Chisinau and the people of Transnistria,
and the strongest argument within Transnistria against independence
from Moldova, was their inclusion in the visa free travel under the Asso-
ciation Agreement with the EU.
The West should invest more in development projects in the ethnic
region of Gagauzia. It should have an eye on how the Moldovan govern-
ment treats its minorities, because the policy towards Gagauzia is impor-
tant for how the Transnistrian conflict will be solved. It can either be
treated as a good practice example or as a showcase of failed leadership.

Georgia
The United States and the EU should give priority to encouraging the
development of strong democratic institutions and strengthening civil
society. Both NATO and the EU should state their commitment to the
principle of the Open Door, underscoring that the most immediate
focus should be political and economic reform to create conditions by
which integration into the European and Euro-Atlantic mainstream
may be possible. The United States and its European partners should
continue to insist that Russia withdraw its troops from Georgian terri-
tory, as called for in the ceasefire that Moscow signed ending the 2008
war Five Day War. They should be prepared to respond with sanctions
if and when Moscow decides to move the demarcation line separating
South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia deeper into Georgia. They
should consult with Georgia on its military needs, consider increasing
training programs, plot out a regular stream of port visits in the Black
Sea, including to Batumi and Odessa, and reassure Tbilisi that they will
never accept Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. At the
74 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

same time, they should also move away from the policy of total isolation
of that has pushed both entities so deeply into the Russian orbit, and
redouble their efforts at “engagement without recognition,” particularly
with Abkhazia. Economic, political, and cultural engagement and socie-
tal connections have the potential to transcend political barriers, making
them more permeable. The aim of EU and North American policymak-
ers, together with Georgia, should be to encourage establishing a wide
variety of contacts through which the Abkhaz can better understand
Western priorities and political values while offering a real alternative
to dependence on Russia. Over the medium term, the nature and degree
of these contacts could be adjusted or even explicitly tied to an actual
status process or certain reconciliation initiatives with Georgia. Once an
array of international links has been created, the West will have consid-
erably more leverage over Abkhaz actors in future status negotiations
than they do now.47
• First, travel restrictions should be loosened and regulated in new
ways. UN-sponsored, politically neutral travel documents should
be issued to break the deadlock between each side over recogni-
tion of passports. The UNMIK Travel Document was used suc-
cessfully in Kosovo from 2000-2008 to enable residents to travel
who were unable to obtain a Yugoslav (Serbian) passport. The
issuance of a similar UN-sponsored document to residents of Abk-
hazia, in combination with a coordinated recognition of the docu-
ment by the EU and other Western actors, would give Abkhazians
a valid travel option without the tacit acquiescence of Russian
authorities. With such documents in hand, tourist visas should be
possible for many countries. Abkhaz officials and civil society rep-
resentatives should be able to visit Western capitals to participate
in discussions relating to the future of their region. Abkhaz NGOs
have played an important role in supporting the free press and in
the creation of civil society within Abkhazia and must be able to
sustain contacts with the outside world. Abkhaz students and
young professionals should have opportunity to study and engage
in professional exchanges.

47 SeeAlexander Cooley and Lincoln Mitchell, “Engagement without Recognition: A New

Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States,” Washington Quarterly, Vol.
33, No. 4, 2010.
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 75

• Fewer travel restrictions for Abkhazians would open up the possi-

bility of greater trade with the region, lessening the region’s total
reliance on Russia.

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus

The West’s common neighborhood strategy must not forget these three
states. Ongoing cooperation with Baku on energy and security matters
is very much in the interests of the West but it needs to be much more
balanced with human rights policy like in the case of Russia. The West
cannot ignore human rights problems in Azerbaijan and not subsume its
interests in human rights to its energy interests. Western credibility is
threatened when vocal criticisms are made of Russian practices that
challenge or threaten basic human rights but relative silence greets what
arguably have been even more aggressive attacks on critics and opposi-
tion circles in Azerbaijan. While Belarus has recently released political
prisoners after a wave of arrests in 2010, in Azerbaijan activists still get-
ting arrested, disappear, or are tortured. A consequent human rights
policy is in the interest of the West.
At the same time, energy relations and security in the region are also
in the interest of the West. Recent tensions between Ankara and
Moscow over Syria may mean that Turkey might be more willing to
bolster Azerbaijani and Georgian security. There is already a practice of
these countries meeting in a trilateral forum. The United States and
NATO should encourage this and explore with Ankara what additional
measures it might be willing to take in this area. Such cooperation could
remind Moscow that there might be additional costs to further aggres-
sion in the south Caucasus.
The West should also underscore its interest in better relations with
Armenia, including progress toward a new Partnership and Cooperation
agreement with the EU. The EU and Armenia have initiated negotia-
tions on a new framework agreement for their relations, which may
provide an opportunity to deepen relations. Although Armenia has
decided for integration with EEU, there is an ongoing interest by the
elites and broader society for good relations with the EU. Armenia was
a forerunner in many reform areas in the context of Eastern Partner-
ship.48 Armenia has a developed and Europeanized civil society. The

48 C.f
the results of the EaP-Index of the Renaissance foundation of the last years: http://eap-
index.eu/armenia2014. See also John Herbst's chapter in this volume.
76 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

EU should invest more in social ties and needs a long-term strategy to

overcome the isolation of the country.
Turkey is crucial as the main partner of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh
conflict. The growing authoritarian tendency under president Recep
Tayyp Erdogan makes any solution of the conflict less likely. A growing
interest and engagement of the EU in Turkey could help to strengthen
those groups who are interested in the “Europeanization” of Turkey.
Therefore the refugee crisis and Turkey’s key role might help to
increase the rapprochement with the EU.

Belarus
Belarus is the most problematic case in the common neighborhood
because it is the most isolated country from the West and depends very
much on Russian subsidies. At the same time the current improvement
of Belarusian-European relations, caused by the Ukrainian crisis and
geopolitical tension between the West and Russia, has reopened a dia-
logue between Minsk and Brussels entitled the “Interim Phase” of coop-
eration (or “Dialogue on Modernization”). As Russia’s economic prob-
lems have intensified and threatened to drag down Belarus’s economy,
Lukashenko has sought to distance himself from Moscow and cultivate
closer ties to the EU. The EU agreed to suspend most sanctions against
Belarus in an attempt to encourage further gestures toward liberaliza-
tion on Lukashenko’s part. Whether this approach succeeds remains to
be seen. Lukasenko’s record does not give cause for optimism. Yet there
is little to be lost and perhaps something to be gained by further
improving the dialogue with the Belarusian authorities on relations with
the West and the situation in the region. Lukashenko would welcome
that as at least a small card to play as he tries to fend off Kremlin plans
to establish a military base in his country.
• Create a ‘Shadow’ Eastern Partnership for Belarus. Informal
efforts to demonstrate what the EU could bring to Belarus are
dated and lack appropriate detail. The time might be right for
developing a more precise and content-focused document to spell
out more courageously what the EU can offer to Belarusian citi-
zens and what would be involved in taking cooperation forwards.
Belarus will be a test case for a revitalized Eastern Partnership and
in particular for the European Endowment for Democracy and its
 What the West Must Do with the Common Neighborhood 77

mission to offer support for civil society groups with pro-democ-

racy credentials banned by the governing regime.49
• The economy offers the biggest opportunity to reduce the depend-
ency of the Belarusian economy from Russia and increase West-
ern influence, because Belarus is in a deep economic crisis and
needs a change of the system. There is a need for expanding
investment opportunities in key sectors of the Belarusian economy
to drive growth and innovation; providing technical and fiscal
assistance to reform and modernize the main branches of industry;
intensifying and deepening bilateral trade and economic coopera-
tion and creating favorable conditions for small and medium-sized
enterprise; developing the transport and logistics sectors; promot-
ing a sustainable low-carbon economy and energy efficiency;
strengthening cooperation in the areas of innovation and advanced
technology, R&D and space; ensuring the judiciary’s effective
functioning and fighting corruption; developing people-to-people
contacts; and strengthening civil society dialogue to promote the
participation of individuals and businesses.

49 Leigh, op. cit.

78 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

3. What the West Must Do for Itself

Eastern policy begins at home. The best way the United States and its
European partners can act together vis-a-vis Europe’s east is by getting
their respective acts together in the West. The EU’s seeming inability to
deal with challenges to its unity and its vibrancy threatens to drain U.S.
confidence in Europe and its institutions and derail American support
for major transatlantic policy initiatives. Similarly, if the United States
proves unable to revive its economy and break its debilitating political
deadlocks, Washington is unlikely to be the type of consistent, outward-
looking partner that Europeans need and want. Economic and political
turmoil at home also undermines the influence of the United States and
Europe elsewhere, since the normative appeal and continued relevance
of Western models for others depends heavily on how well they work
for their own people.
Andrey Kortunov makes the point:

...long term Russian attitudes towards Europe and even the West at
large will, to a large extent, depend on the success or failure of the
European project. For centuries, educated Russians looked to the
West in search of modernisation patterns, best social practices, and
intellectual inspiration. Today many critics of the EU in Russia argue
that the European project is doomed, that Europe is losing its com-
petitive edge, and that the future belongs to other regions and con-
tinents. I hope that Europeans can prove these critics wrong.50

That is why Putin’s challenge is as much about the West as it is about

Russia. If we stand up for our values and give fresh life to our mutual
commitments, Putinism will fade. The more people in Western societies
feel secure about their own prospects, the more confident they will be
about reaching out to those in Europe’s east. And the more robust our
community, the better the chance that the people of the common neigh-
borhood will find the courage they will need to make hard choices for
reform.

50 Andrey Kortunov, “How not to talk with Russia,” European Council on Foreign Relations,
April 1, 2016, http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_how_not_to_talk_with_russia_6053.
 What the West Must Do for Itself 79

In short, while we must deal with Russia realistically, and craft more
proactive efforts with the countries of the common neighborhood, there
is also much we must do for ourselves.
NATO: In Area or In Trouble. NATO’s old mantra was “out of area
or out of business.” Today’s mantra must be “in area or in trouble.” Col-
lective defense is back.
Build “full spectrum” deterrence. Deterrence has become more com-
plicated and its scope much broader than during the Cold War. NATO
allies and partners face an authoritarian challenge from Russia to their
east and extremist challenges to their south. As Russia has challenged
the West, it has used its full spectrum of integrated tools to invade
neighboring countries, annex their territory, intimidate them via energy
cutoffs and nuclear saber-rattling, generate insurgencies abroad via
irregular forces, initiate surprise conventional force exercises, wreak
havoc on air traffic; and exploit societal differences and generate politi-
cal and economic instability within NATO member and partner states.
Deterrence south of NATO is in many ways even more complicated
when it comes to threats posed by Iranian missiles, attacks on Turkey by
Syria, barbaric practices of the Islamic State, mass migration, and the
instability that flows from failing and failed states. Many of these chal-
lenges are not NATO’s alone, but they are NATO’s as well.
NATO has been unprepared to deal effectively with many of these
interrelated issues. Russia’s actions have exposed gaps in NATO deter-
rence and highlighted potential new gaps to come. Crimea-style tactics,
which are localized, low-intensity and quick, are designed to be just
below the threshold of triggering the commitment of NATO Allies to
mutual defense in response to armed attack, as provided in Article V of
the North Atlantic Treaty. NATO is neither structured militarily nor
disposed politically to handle such challenges. Moreover, new doctrinal
and technological challenges could further impair NATO’s physical
ability to defend NATO members under attack.51
If Russia can poke a hole in Article 5, it would like to do so. The
Alliance must adjust by expanding the way it has come to think about
deterrence in the Cold War and by reemphasizing its importance.
Strengthening deterrence and assurance requires NATO to raise the

51 Fora critique, see Edward Lucas and A. Wess Mitchell, “Central European Security After
Crimea: The Case for Strengthening NATO’s Eastern Defenses,” Center for European
Policy Analysis, March 25, 2014.
80 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

costs to Russia for bad behavior, establish a more robust military pos-
ture in NATO’s center and east, develop strategies to counter Russia’s
approach to conflict, and help non-NATO states on Russia’s periphery
improve their resilience to Russian pressure and efforts at destabiliza-
tion.52 What NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has referred to
as “Full Spectrum Deterrence” must be designed to deal with the full
panoply of Russian provocations from low level hybrid warfare through
nuclear blackmail. It requires a mix of new and old deterrent and
defense instruments that can be applied 360 degrees around NATO’s
borders. It will require the Alliance to be able to dissuade and deter
threats to its members, from whatever source, while also reassuring
allies and being prepared and to defend all parts of the Alliance. NATO
needs to become more agile, flexible, mobile, and creative. This will
require cultural change.
The Obama administration’s intention to quadruple its funding for
Washington’s European Reassurance Initiative53 represents a significant
upgrade of U.S. engagement in European security and will expand per-
sistent rotational presence of U.S. air, land and sea forces in central and
eastern Europe, enable more extensive U.S. participation in exercises
and training, enhance prepositioned equipment stocks to reduce force
deployment times and facilitate rapid response to potential contingen-
cies, improve infrastructure, and further build the capacity of allies and
partners to defend themselves and join with U.S. forces in responding
to crises in the region. NATO has already taken a series of significant
military steps since the Wales Summit to move in this direction. More
are needed.
Enhance defense and deterrence in NATO’s east. In the 1997
NATO-Russia Founding Act, “NATO reiterates that in the current and
foreseeable security environment the Alliance will carry out its mis-
sions” through means other than “by additional permanent stationing of
substantial combat forces.” Russia’s takeover of Crimea and intervention
in Ukraine alter the security environment foreseen in 1997.54 Russia is

52 Bernstein, op. cit.

53 In June 2014 President Obama announced the ERI to increase U.S. force presence in
Europe, expand exercises and training with NATO allies and partners, and augment prepo-
sitioned equipment for use in joint exercises. See “Fact Sheet: The FY2017 European Re-
assurance Initiative Budget Request,” The White House, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2016/02/02/fact-sheet-fy2017-european-reassurance-initiative-budget-request.
54 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation signed in Paris, France,” NATO website May 22, 1997.
 What the West Must Do for Itself 81

doing nothing to create a Europe “without dividing lines or spheres of

influence limiting the sovereignty of any state.”55 Measures beyond
NATO’s Readiness Action Plan can be implemented which would fur-
ther enhance deterrence, not violate the letter of the Founding Act and
not give Russia any pretext for taking further counter-measures.
Numerous steps have been taken since Russia’s annexation of Crimea
to reinforce NATO’s will to implement its Article 5 collective defense
clause, reassure NATO’s eastern allies, and deter Russia from taking
aggressive steps on NATO territory. They range from creation of a so-
called “Spearhead Force” (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force,
VJTF) able to deploy on short notice at the head of a more capable
NATO Response Force (NRF), boosting the size of the NRF from
19,000 to 40,000 soldiers; the adaptation and expansion of NATO’s
German-Danish-Polish Multinational Corps Northeast in Szczecin
(Poland), stockpiled military equipment in front line states, reinforced
Baltic Air Policing and NATO AWACS missions over Poland and
Romania, as well as deployment of eight permanent multinational
reception bases (NATO Force Integration Units) in the Baltic states,
Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Slovakia to facilitate VJTF
operations and coordinate delivery of reinforcements, Enhanced Stand-
ing Naval Forces and persistent naval deployments in the Baltic and
Black Seas, and ambitious NATO exercises.56 At present, the United
States provides one company in each of the Baltic states and Poland on
a persistent rotational basis. Germany and the United Kingdom have
also committed to deploying rotational forces in the Baltic states and
Poland for longer periods and on a regular basis. European allies have
been deploying rotational forces on an ad hoc basis, for one- or two-
month drills.57
Nonetheless, stronger measures must be adopted, including at
NATO’s Warsaw Summit in July 2016.

55 Ibid.
56 For a recent review, see Rainer L. Glatz and Martin Zapfe, “NATO Defence Planning be-
tween Wales and Warsaw. Politico-military Challenges of a Credible Assurance against
Russia,” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2016, http://www.swp-berlin.org/filead-
min/contents/products/comments/2016C05_glt_Zapfe.pdf
57 Piotr Szymanski, “Between continuation and adaptation: The Baltic states’ security policy
and armed forces,” OSW Commentary, November 24, 2015, http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-11-24/between-continuation-and-adaptation-baltic-
states-security.
82 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Forward deploy NATO multinational forces in the Baltic region

on a rotational basis, starting with a Multinational Battalion in
each of the Baltic states and in Poland. Those Multinational Bat-
talions might be composed of the one U.S. infantry or armor com-
pany already deployed rotationally in each of these nations, a sec-
ond company from a major European ally (e.g. UK, Germany,
France), and a third company drawn from the host country, com-
bined with a host nation battalion headquarters elements and
multinational logistics. Such a multinational force would have suf-
ficient fighting capabilities to remove any Russian doubt that the
full Alliance would respond to any provocation, ranging from the
ability, in conjunction with national defense forces, to counter a
limited incursion to the ability, in the unlikely event of a robust
attack, to be able to delay the opposing forces until allied rein-
forcements arrive.58 At the same time, the relatively modest size of
these forward deployments and the fact that they would be rota-
tional rather than permanent makes the initiative completely con-
sistent with the NATO Russia Founding Act.These three multina-
tional battalions should be commanded by a multinational brigade
headquarters in an appropriate location in one of these four states.
• The United States should move towards the deployment of four
Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs) in Europe. That was the deploy-
ment profile a decade ago. The United States is already moving in
this direction. Two BCTs are stationed permanently in Europe today,
the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) in Italy and the
2nd Calvary Regiment in Germany. A third BCT will now be
deployed from the United States to NATO states in eastern Europe
on a continuing ‘heal-to-toe’ rotational basis for the foreseeable
future. A fourth U.S. Army heavy BCT equipment set is slated to be
prepositioned in Europe within the next few years. It will be place in
operational-ready storage for short notice contingencies. Progress
towards this last mentioned requirement must stay on track over sev-
eral budget cycles. It will need to be kept a high priority.
• Enhance NATO’s current framework nation approach by prepo-
sitioning, development of reception and other logistics require-
ments, and the establishment of an additional maritime framework
for the Baltic.

58 Acombat brigade of 3,000 troops is basically comprised of multiple battalions, three of

which are fighting battalions of either infantry or armor. A battalion is comprised of com-
panies, three of which are its fighting infantry or armor companies.
 What the West Must Do for Itself 83

• Empower the SACEUR to make rapid troop deployments. Russia’s

reliance on strategic surprise and hybrid warfare poses acute risks
for NATO allies. They fear a Russian snap exercise that could
potentially result in encroachment on their territorial sovereignty.
To counter this threat, NATO must empower the SACEUR to
employ his best military judgment and order rapid troop deploy-
ments in the interest of Alliance security.59

Strengthen NATO’s Conventional and Special Operations Forces

(SOF). At Warsaw, the Alliance should set specific and higher goals for
deployable and sustainable European conventional forces. European
conventional forces have been badly depleted by budget cuts and stabil-
ity operations in Afghanistan. Now there is a greater demand for higher
intensity capabilities. The number of European ground forces now
available for NATO operations can be measured in brigades rather than
divisions.
NATO’s SOF mission is more important than ever, both for hybrid
threats from Russia and to deal with instability in the south. Nations
should be encouraged to sustain their investment in SOF capabilities as
a priority even with tight budgets. This has to include funding partici-
pation in NATO as well as bilateral and multilateral SOF exercises.
Meet the anti-access area denial challenge. A major element in
deterring Russian aggression against NATO will be the Alliance’s ability
to deal with the so-called anti-access area denial (A2/AD) problem
without creating disunity in the alliance. A2/AD relates to the fact that
forward deployed Russian missiles and aircraft can control areas along
the NATO-Russian border in ways that would make initial defense and
subsequent reinforcement of occupied NATO territory very difficult.60
The steps needed to counter this Russian capability could be seen by
some allies as provocative and make a consensus NATO response diffi-
cult. Nonetheless, NATO must take the steps that are necessary to
defend its territory. Russian bases in Kaliningrad, Crimea, and on Rus-
sia’s northern periphery provide Moscow with the opportunity to make
NATO access to parts of the Baltic, Black and Arctic Sea difficult. Actu-
ally executing such a plan would ultimately prove folly for Russia, how-
ever, since it would surely lead to conflict with unpredictable conse-

59 Jones, op. cit.

60 For more, see Lucas and Mitchell, op. cit.
84 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

quences. Designing a viable response to the Russian A2/AD problem

will need to be a priority item for NATO.
Design new NATO maritime capabilities. NATO’s maritime flanks,
stretching from the High North, through the Baltic Sea, and down to
the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, have become direct friction zones
between the alliance and an assertive Russia. In 2015 Russia also
demonstrated its growing maritime power by firing cruise missiles from
surface warships in the Caspian Sea against targets in Iraq and launch-
ing missiles from a submarine in the Mediterranean against targets in
Syria. While conducted in the context of Russia’s intervention in the
Middle East, the potential of these capabilities should not be lost on
NATO’s members. Russia’s vastly increased naval activity is under-
pinned by an ambitious naval modernization program, which is part of
Moscow’s long-range modernization effort that was begun in 2008. In
the maritime context, the northern fleet (where Russia’s submarine-
based nuclear deterrent can be found) and the Black Sea fleet have
received the bulk of new and future investments, including new sub-
marines and guided missile surface warships. Russia also recently
released an updated maritime strategy charting a further build up in the
Arctic, as well as access to the Atlantic Ocean. Moreover, much of Rus-
sia’s new assertiveness is expressed in the maritime domain, with close
and dangerous encounters, shows of force, harassment of civilian ships,
A2/AD capabilities, and probable submarine incursions deep into the
territorial waters of NATO allies and partners.61
While maritime challenges are clear and urgent, NATO has to date
found itself poorly equipped and oriented to deal with them. Its 2011
Allied Maritime Strategy places a strong emphasis on crisis manage-
ment and counter non-state challenges that threaten commerce and
flows across the global maritime domain. It says comparatively little
about maritime forces’ contribution to collective defense and deter-
rence, and what the alliance needs to do to safeguard its interest in the
maritime domain made more competitive and contested by regional and
global powers. In order to better prepare the alliance and its members
for a contested, congested, and competitive maritime domain NATO
and its leaders should consider the following:

61 For more on these and related recommendations, see The Washington NATO Project, Al-
liance Revitalized (Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, Atlantic Council,
Center for a New American Security, German Marshall Fund of the United States, Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2016).
 What the West Must Do for Itself 85

• Revise the Alliance Maritime strategy to better focus alliance

efforts on collective defense and deterrence in the maritime
domain.
• Focus on high-end maritime capabilities including anti-submarine
warfare, surface warfare, strike from the sea, and amphibious oper-
ations.
• Consider how maritime forces can become more survivable and
contribute to breaking A2/AD capabilities.
• Create a NATO Black Sea fleet composed primarily of regional
allies and perhaps an American contribution.
• Create a NATO consortium to enhance maritime domain aware-
ness that would draw together and pool national assets.
• Organize frontline maritime powers in order to provide a “first
response” capability in case of a crises or war.
• Serve as an advocate for good order at sea.
No excuses burden-sharing. East European NATO members have
taken the lead in defense spending increases, and Poland has announced
plans to double the size of Poland’s army. Other NATO countries are
also turning their defense expenditures around. Germany approved a
4.2 percent increase in defense spending for 2016. Britain reversed its
planned cuts to stay roughly at the 2 percent pledge and will maintain
its armed forces at 82,000. France’s President has pledged to increase
French defense spending by 12 percent by 2019. Overall, however, the
United States continues to account for the lion’s share of NATO’s
defense expenditures. Increased contributions from member states is
essential for NATO to have the resources to meet its challenges.
Make use of Partnerships. Russian actions in Ukraine have intensi-
fied Sweden and Finland’s interest in closer cooperation with NATO,
and given new impetus to the debate regarding possible Swedish and
Finnish membership in NATO. Each country signed a host-nation sup-
port agreement with NATO at the Wales summit, indicating the readi-
ness to receive assistance from Allied forces and to support them with
their military assets, such as ships and aircraft, and NATO deepened its
partnership with each country through an Enhanced Opportunities
Program. The two countries have also solidified their own defense and
security cooperation. Sweden and Finland are increasingly important to
NATO’s defense planning and offer critical links for operations involv-
ing the Baltic states. Moscow has stepped up efforts to undo this coop-
86 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

eration, including through tactics of harassment and intimidation. If

Moscow’s effort is successful, it would not only decrease security in the
Nordic-Baltic region but weaken NATO’s credibility more broadly.
Thus, there is an important linkage between Nordic-Baltic security and
the broader security challenge posed by Russia’s actions in Ukraine.62
• NATO should consider a further step by designating both coun-
tries as Premier Interoperable Partners (PIP) that could bring
each into the Readiness Action Plan, include them in the VJTF, and
provide for structures and regular consultations at the political mil-
itary and intelligence levels with the North Atlantic Council, the
Military Committee, the International Staff and the International
Military Staff. This would occur routinely on all levels, including
ministerials and summits. These would not be plus-one models, but
a practical and regular part of doing business at NATO headquar-
ters, the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
and at the Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk.
• Extend Nordic Baltic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) to the
Baltic states. This would cement the prominent role of Sweden
and Finland as premier partners of NATO, strengthen the NATO
aspect of Nordic-Baltic security, and facilitate security cooperation
with the United States. The focus would be on defense planning,
professional military education cooperation and training facilities,
exercises, and defense capacity building.
Maximize Resilience. Transboundary arteries criss-crossing coun-
tries to connect people, data, ideas, money, food, energy, goods and
services are essential sinews of open societies, daily communications,
and the global economy. Yet they are also vulnerable to intentional or
accidental disruption. Each in their own way, terrorists, energy cartels,
illicit traffickers, cyber-hackers, internet trolls and “little green men” all
seek to use the arteries and instruments of free societies to attack or dis-
rupt those societies. Governments accustomed to protecting their terri-
tories must now also focus on protecting their connectedness. New
approaches are needed that blend traditional efforts at deterrence and
defense with modern approaches to resilience—building the capacity of
societies to anticipate, preempt and resolve disruptive challenges to
their critical functions. the networks that sustain them, and the connec-
tions those networks bring with other societies.

62 See Andrew Michta, “Putin Targets the Scandinavians,” The American Interest, November
17, 2014; Larrabee et. al, op. cit.
 What the West Must Do for Itself 87

• NATO allies should each make a Pledge on National Resilience at

the 2016 Warsaw Summit pursuant to Article 3 of the North
Atlantic Treaty, whereby allies commit to “maintain and develop
their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”
This pledge would encompass protection of civilians and infra-
structure; maintaining essential government functions and values;
protecting and defending cyberspace; modernizing resilience
capacities; and promoting transatlantic resilience across the
Alliance.
• Make Resilience a Core Task of NATO. A key element of Russia’s
strategy is the use of strategic surprise and hybrid threats to take
advantage of weak states. Extremist threats from the south also
challenge the fabric of Western societies. Greater societal and
defense resilience can be an important component of an effective
response. Creating a higher degree of resilience in vulnerable soci-
eties makes it more difficult for state or non-state actors alike to
disrupt and create the instability they need for their success. Soci-
eties deemed indefensible in traditional defense terms can be ren-
dered indigestible through resilience. Adding resilience as a core
task would complement NATO’s current core tasks of collective
defense, cooperative security, and crisis management. Initial activi-
ties could include the following:
• Allies focused on the east should establish a working group to coordi-
nate critical overlapping civil authority functions with an initial focus on
the development of resilience to hybrid threats and strategic communi-
cations.
• Develop Resilience Support Teams, small operational units that could
offer support to NATO member national authorities in such areas of
emergency preparedness including assessments; intelligence sharing,
support and analysis; border control; assistance to police and military in
incident management including containing riots and other domestic dis-
turbances; helping effectuate cross-border arrangements with other
NATO members; providing protection for key critical infrastructures
including energy; and, in the cyber arena, support to and enhancement
of NATO’s Cyber Response Team. In certain countries, Resilience Sup-
port Teams could be collocated with NATO Force Integration Units,
and help national responses with NATO military activities including
especially special operations activities.
• Increase support to NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of
Excellence in Estonia, assist potential targets of cyber warfare in increas-
ing their individual cyber security, and lead NATO in drafting a clear
policy on responding to cyber attacks.
88 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

• Develop a more robust strategic communications strategy to address

Russia’s information operations, particularly where Moscow seeks to
exploit social and political differences in allied states, including those
with sizable ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking populations.
• Reinforce NATO’s pledge with a U.S.-EU Solidarity Pledge, a
joint political declaration that each partner shall act in a spirit of
solidarity — refusing to remain passive — if either is the object of
a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster,
and shall work to prevent terrorist threats to either partner; pro-
tect democratic institutions and civilian populations from terrorist
attack; and assist the other, in its territory, at the request of its
political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack, natural or
man-made disaster.
• Project resilience forward. The United States and its European
partners share a keen interest in ensuring the societal resilience of
other countries, particularly in wider Europe, since strong efforts
in one country may mean little if neighboring countries, with
which they share considerable interdependencies, are weak. Rus-
sia’s hybrid efforts to subvert Ukrainian authority are but the latest
examples of this growing security challenge. The U.S. and its part-
ners should share societal resilience strategies with allies and part-
ners, and
Through a strategy of ‘forward resilience,’ the United States and its
partners would identify—very publicly— their resiliency with that
of others, and share societal resilience approaches and operational
procedures with partners to improve societal resilience to corrup-
tion, psychological and information warfare, and intentional or nat-
ural disruptions to cyber, financial and energy networks and other
critical infrastructure, with a strong focus on prevention but also
response. Forward resilience would also enhance joint capacity to
defend against threats to interconnected domestic economies and
societies and resist Russian efforts to exploit weaknesses of these
societies to disrupt and keep them under its influence.

Engage Turkey. Any effective strategy for wider Europe will have to
include a special track for Turkey, an important Black Sea state and
NATO ally, which is part of the West but not of the EU, and which has
its own particular perspectives on the desirability and feasibility of
transatlantic approaches to wider Europe, including the wider Black Sea
region. Traditionally, Turkey has been skeptical of initiatives to extend
 What the West Must Do for Itself 89

Western presence in the wider Black Sea area. It has preferred to pro-
tect maritime security in the region through Black Sea Harmony, its
own multilateral initiative, than through NATO. It is particularly con-
cerned that such activities could undermine Ankara’s claims of (limited)
Turkish jurisdiction over the Turkish Straits as outlined by the Mon-
treux Convention. Turkish-Armenian animosity is a further roadblock
to enhanced regional cooperation. Moreover, there are many neuralgic
aspects to Turkey’s accession negotiations with the EU that could easily
affect Ankara’s willingness to be a constructive force for change in the
broader region. Turkey could easily be a spoiler unless and until it is
convinced that it has more to gain than lose from more vigorous West-
ern engagement in the region. One relatively easy yet important step, as
we have suggested, would be for Turkey to join the Energy Community
as a full-fledged member.
 Chapter 10

Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of

Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy
John E. Herbst

Over the past two years, the security situation in Europe has deterio-
rated sharply. The Kremlin’s seizure and “annexation” of Crimea, fol-
lowed by its not-so-covert hybrid war in the Donbas, has prompted the
United States and the EU to level economic sanctions on Russia and to
provide some military assistance to Ukraine. It has also prompted
NATO to deploy fighters and armor to the Baltic states and other east-
ern members of the alliance and to deploy to the Baltic a battalion on a
rotating basis. These last steps were designed to bolster deterrence
against any Russian aggression or further provocations in the eastern
states of NATO.
The sanctions and the strengthening of NATO in the east have not
been lacking in controversy. A number of member states opposed sanc-
tions by the EU and cautioned NATO against “overreacting” to Putin’s
aggression in Ukraine. Some Western observers accept the Kremlin
argument that the West “provoked” Russia by expanding NATO to
include former Warsaw Pact members and even parts of the Soviet
Union (the Baltic states), and by considering NATO membership for
Ukraine and Georgia (at the NATO summit of 2008). In that same
spirit, some have criticized the EU for its Eastern Partnership Program
and particularly for the trade deal with Ukraine (and Georgia and
Moldova) that first sparked the crisis in Ukraine in November 2013.1
Two years into this crisis, it is apparent that NATO is taking steps to
protect its eastern members from—and to deter—Kremlin aggression.
It is also clear that NATO nations are not going to send their troops to
protect countries outside of NATO facing Kremlin aggression.

1 For instance, see Richard Sakwa, “The Death of Europe? Continental Fates after Ukraine”
in Chatham House, May 2015, Volume 91, Number 3, https://www.chathamhouse.org/pub-
lication/ia/death-europe-continental-fates-after-ukraine; Peter Van Ham, “The EU, Russia
and the Quest for a New European Security Bargain,” Clingendael Institute Report, November
2015: http://www.clingendael.nl/pub/2015/eu_russia_rapport.

189
190 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

But neither is the West giving Moscow a free pass in Ukraine.

Moscow was expelled from the Group of 8; sanctions were levied multi-
ple times and renewed; Ukraine has been offered limited military assis-
tance, and substantial but not sufficient economic aid. Still, the policy
toward Ukraine has been developed ad hoc; and no effort has been
made to develop a consistent policy for Ukraine and certainly not for all
six nations of the “grey zone” between NATO and the EU on the west-
ern side and Russia on the eastern side; or even for the three states in
the grey zone that would like to establish open societies and integrate
into the Western world—Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Belarus are the other three countries.
This chapter takes a look at the post-Cold War emergence of the
grey zone, the clash between Russia and the West in this area, Moscow’s
policy instruments to dominate the region, and how the West should
respond.

The Emergence of the Grey Zone and the Western Vision

There was no grey zone in Europe during the Cold War. NATO and
the Warsaw Pact bordered each other: Norway and the Soviet Union in
the north; West and East Germany in the center of Europe; and Bul-
garia/Greece and Turkey/the Soviet Union in the south. In between
there was neutral Austria—neutralized by the 1955 agreement between
the Soviet Union and the West—and also Yugoslavia, which escaped
Kremlin influence under Marshal Tito also in the 1950s. In the north,
democratic Finland bordered the Soviet Union; while not formally neu-
tral, Finland never sought NATO membership and pursued a cautious
security policy designed not to provoke the Kremlin, while also focusing
its self-reliance defense efforts on vigilance and “total defense.”
The grey zone emerged at the end of the Cold War when fifteen
countries appeared following the implosion of the Soviet Union. Nine
of them lay between NATO and Russia: the three Baltic states of
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the three Caucasus states of Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia; and then Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine. The
three Baltic states carried out rapid and successful internal transfor-
mations and joined the EU and NATO. Not so with the other six.
They became and remain to this day an area in which the West and
Russia vie for influence, an area in which there are no clear rules or
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 191

understandings, a grey area ripe for tension, confrontation and even

conflict.2
This was not understood 25 years ago when the Cold War ended, not
in Washington, West European capitals and perhaps not even at the
highest levels in Moscow.
At that time, it was not just the 15 states of the former Soviet Union
that were newly independent; the nations of the Warsaw Pact, tightly
under Soviet control, likewise found themselves truly independent.
Europe entered an unprecedented era of peace and prosperity and the
West naively played with the notion that “history had ended” and liberal
democracy had triumphed.
Western statesmen looked forward to integrating the new nations
that arose from the Soviet Empire, Russia among them, into the liberal
institutions that they had established—the UN, the International Mon-
etary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and, for
some, the EU and NATO. It was an inspiring vision; and one that has
been partly achieved. Every country that emerged from the Soviet yoke
or Warsaw Pact are members of the UN, most have joined the three
international economic organizations, and most of the Warsaw Pact
states and the three Baltic states have joined NATO and the EU.
It is not too early to conclude that every nation that made it into the
EU and NATO over the past 25 years has benefitted greatly. All have
established a working democracy and made substantial economic
progress. To take a few examples, Poland and Latvia’s GDP per capita in
1991 were $6,513 and $5,965, respectively. In 2014 they were $25,247
and $23,793. On the low end, Bulgaria’s numbers are $8,397 and
$17,925.
This achievement is substantial even as the Greek economic crisis
tests the limits of the single currency and the massive immigration from
the Mediterranean tests the tolerance and absorption capacities of indi-
vidual EU states. All this was a realization of the Western concept of a
“Europe whole and free” from the Bay of Biscay eastwards to Russia; or,
in the more ambitious variant, from Vancouver east to Vladivostok.

2 This is not an historic anomaly, at least for the territory of Belarus Moldova, and Ukraine
which have traditionally been in the borderlands between major powers in Central Europe
and Russia. See: Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe Between Hitler and Stalin (New York:
Basic Books, 2010).
192 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The Western vision was to spread the benefits of democracy, a toler-

ant and open society, and a market economy across the whole post-
Soviet space. Substantial assistance was part of this. Most of this aid
came in the form of technical assistance for creating the institutions of a
free society. This included advisers for transforming a socialist economy
to a market one; for building an honest judiciary free of political pres-
sure; for creating an independent and free media; to facilitate the emer-
gence of civil society; to develop honest law enforcement. The United
States spent $12,038,178,734 in assistance on the countries of the grey
zone from 1991 to 2013.3 Through TACIS the EU spent 7.3 billion
euro between 2000 and 2006.4
In 2014 that assistance was $458,944,520 and €587,250,000 respec-
tively. (The United States and the EU also spent $18,136,627,196 and
€2,475,190,000 on similar aid to Russia in the period 1991-2013.)5
The West also offered interim arrangements to develop institutional
ties for the post-Soviet states, including Russia, with NATO and the EU.
NATO in 1997 established the NATO-Russia Council and the NATO-
Ukraine Commission.6 More broadly NATO developed the Partnership
for Peace as a program for former Warsaw Pact states and the Newly
Independent States to enhance cooperation, and as it turned out, to
Moscow’s great dissatisfaction, as a way station on the road to NATO
membership. The EU developed its Eastern Partnership program.

Moscow’s Alternate Vision

This, however, was not the only vision to emerge in the years following
the Cold War. While Russian President Yeltsin was the man who pro-
posed the Belovezhiya Agreement that dissolved the Soviet Union,

3 U.S. Agency for International Development, “Data Query,” https://explorer.usaid.gov/query.

4 Welcomeurope, “Eurofunding tools”, http://www.welcomeurope.com/european-funds/tacis-
270+170.html#tab=onglet_details.
5 Anders Aslund, Building Capitalism (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press: 2001); Euro-
pean Commission, International Cooperation And Development, “Annual Reports 2001-
2015 on the European Union’s Development and External Assistance Policies and their
Implementation:” https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/search/site/annual%20report% 20exter-
nal%20assistance_en?solrsort=ds_created%20asc&f[0]=sm_field_type_comm%3Ataxon-
omy_term%3A5827.
6 For more on the NATO-Russia Council see: http://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/
59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf. For more on the NATO-Ukraine Commission
see: http://www.nato.int/nrc-website/media/59451/1997_nato_russia_founding_act.pdf.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 193

Moscow never abandoned the idea that it should sit at the center of a
Eurasian political and economic bloc. Instead of Russia and the states of
the former Soviet Union becoming part of a “Europe whole and free,”
Moscow wanted to somehow and in some way restore its influence over
the territory of the former Soviet Union and beyond into eastern
Europe.
This was apparent in the Kremlin’s efforts to establish the Common-
wealth of Independent States (CIS) as a major international organiza-
tion on par with the EU, and to provide it with a major military func-
tion through an agreement to coordinate and cooperate on responses to
threats towards any member’s security or sovereignty. The CIS also fea-
tured an economic component, with member states agreeing to coordi-
nate trade policies, open up borders, and coordinate development proj-
ects. This first effort to establish a Eurasian counterweight to NATO
and the EU failed as only some of the states of the former Soviet Union
joined the economic arm and fewer the military arm of the CIS, and the
EU and NATO and major Western states essentially ignored the CIS.
As the CIS floundered, Moscow presented other concepts to bind the
states of the former Soviet Union: the Single Economic Space, the Cus-
toms Union and finally the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). The
Customs Union became a reality in 2010 as Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus,
Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan agreed to a single unified customs
and tariff code.
The Eurasian Economic Union appeared after the Customs Union
(CU) and subsumes it. The EEU has the goal to create a free space of
goods, capital, services and people. The economic justification for creat-
ing the Eurasian Union is dubious. The two strongest economies in it—
Russia and Kazakhstan—are based on hydrocarbons. The other actual
and would-be members in Central Asia and the Caucasus are among the
world’s poorest countries. Membership in the Eurasian Union would
make it harder for each national economy to integrate into the global
economy—the proven path to prosperity. The Eurasian Economic
Union is in reality a political project.
Moscow’s war on Ukraine is an offshoot of this political project. The
“Ukraine crisis” began when the Kremlin decided it was unacceptable
for Ukraine to sign a trade agreement with the EU that would compli-
cate the effort to pull it into the Eurasian Economic Union.
194 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The war was also the culmination of a policy that Moscow adopted
early in the post-Soviet era. The FSB (the successor organization to the
KGB that focuses on internal security) and the GRU (military intelli-
gence) began operations to exploit ethnic conflicts in the Near Abroad
to give Moscow leverage over the policies of the Newly Independent
States. In this effort, Moscow supported the grievances of ethnic Arme-
nians in the Azeri province of Nagorno-Karabakh; Ossetians, Abkhaz
and Armenians in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Ajaria in Georgia; and
Slavs in Transnistria, Moldova. This was the policy of frozen conflicts.
While the West, particularly through the OSCE, has spent much time
trying to resolve these conflicts, it has never challenged the pre-eminent
Russian role in them; indeed it has often allowed Moscow serve as
mediator and in some cases “peacekeepers;” subsequently, no progress
has been made towards resolving any of these disputes.
The origins of this policy are not clear. It may be that the FSB and
the Ministry of Defense (two of Moscow’s power ministries) pursued
these operations and President Yeltsin chose not to reign them in. The
alternate possibility is that this policy came from the top.
Throughout Yeltsin’s Presidency and in the first years of Putin’s Presi-
dency, the Kremlin’s main concerns were to restore domestic political
stability and to stabilize and grow the economy. Russia was weak and
Western assistance and investment were critical. Moscow could not
afford a foreign policy that challenged the West directly. So it pursued its
frozen conflict policy far from prying Western eyes; it complained, but
took no serious counter measures as NATO and the EU took in former
Warsaw Pact members; and it did the same as the West intervened mili-
tarily in the Balkans against Serbia in the Bosnian and Kosovo crises.

The Clash of Visions

The Role of Russian Domestic Policy
These two visions for the same real estate were bound to clash. But it
was not just Russian weakness that delayed the confrontation. There
was also the matter of Russia’s domestic political development.
Throughout the Yeltsin years at least, Moscow was on a democratic
trajectory. Under President Yeltsin, Russia conducted largely honest
elections; opposition parties were organized; the media were free from
government control. There were, naturally, major problems. Corruption
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 195

and crime were rife; oligarchs owned the major media. In the Presiden-
tial elections of 1996, Yeltsin did use administrative resources of the
state to enhance his prospects. The economic crisis of 1998 sent the
Russian economy into a tailspin just as it was recovering from economic
impact of the fall of the Soviet Union.
With Russia striving to build democracy, its leaders did not see West-
ern democracy promotion as a threat. In 2002, Moscow analyst (and for-
mer intelligence agent) Dmitri Trenin wrote ‘The End of Eurasia,’
which predicted that Russia would put aside its imperial history and
seek to integrate into the global, liberal order.7
Trenin did not reckon with the instincts of President Putin, a former
KGB officer who said, significantly, that one never leaves the KGB. At
the point that Trenin’s book was released, Putin was still in the early
phase of his Presidency; he was focusing on establishing order—eco-
nomic and political—in the wake of the messy Yeltsin years. In this
period he, like Yeltsin, was interested in good relations with the West.
But Putin was never interested in democracy. During his first year in
office, he began to take control of the major television station owned by
the oligarchs; and he next moved against the major print media. With
the takeover of the oil company Yukos in 2003 and then the arrest of its
owner, the politically active Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Putin sent a clear
message to the oligarchs that their independent participation in politics
would not be tolerated. Putin’s distrust of an open society at home was
matched by his distrust of it in his neighborhood.
The point is that the domestic and national security reasons for a
clash between Russia and the West were growing in the early 2000s.
Russia’s period of strong economic growth—2000 to 2008—turned the
economy into the world’s sixth largest and gave Putin the confidence to
challenge the West.
Even early in his tenure, Putin spoke like the KGB veteran that he
was of Moscow’s right and duty to protect ethnic Russians and Russian
speakers in neighboring countries. This “doctrine” was used to justify
Moscow’s frozen conflict policy in the Transnistria area of Moldova; it
would loom large in Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.8

7 Dmitri Trenin, The End of Eurasia: Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and Globalization,
(Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002).
8 For an outline of this doctrine see: Vladimir Putin, “Russia: The National Question,” Neza-
visimaya Gazeta, January 23, 2012.
196 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The Crisis Emerges

Contrasting policies pursued by the West and Moscow since the first
days of the Post-Cold War period set the scene for the East-West clash
in Ukraine. But the actual clash required a third factor. That factor was
the determination of the people in several states of the post-Soviet space
to rid themselves of corrupt and authoritarian leaders and to establish
democratic political institutions. The first example occurred in Serbia
(in the former Yugoslavia). The second, the Rose Revolution in Georgia,
occurred in the late fall of 2003. The next was Ukraine’s Orange Revo-
lution in November/December 2004.
Putin played a large, but limited (in retrospect) role in the effort by
then Prime Minister Yanukovych to steal the 2004 Presidential election
in Ukraine. That role included extensive Russian media support for
Yanukovych; political advisers; billions of dollars of campaign funding.9
Putin also reportedly urged then-President Kuchma to crack down on
the massive demonstrations against the falsified second round of Presi-
dential elections.10 Furthermore, the Kremlin was a suspect in the Sep-
tember 2004 poisoning of opposition candidate Yushchenko.
In the wake of Yushchenko’s victory in the extraordinary third round
of Ukraine’s 2004 presidential elections, Moscow identified a new threat
to its security: “colored revolutions.” It had come to the conclusion that
the tossing out of authoritarian leaders in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine
was the result not of popular revulsion, but of ingenious efforts by
Western intelligence services in cahoots with Western and local NGOs
to mobilize mobs to overthrow legitimate authority. These were “coup
d’états” designed by the West to spread its influence at the expense of
Moscow.11
Moscow’s approach toward the West hardened in the aftermath of
the Orange Revolution, as did its determination to act against the bene-
ficiaries of the “colored revolutions” in Kyiv and Tbilisi. In the winter of
2005-06, the Kremlin shut off the gas supply to Ukraine to compel the

9 For more on Putin’s electoral support for Yanukovych see: Nathaniel Copsey, “Ukraine,” in
Donnacha O. Beachain and Abel Polese, eds., The Color Revolutions in the Former Soviet Re-
publics, (Routlege: Abingdon, 2010), pp. 30–44.
10 Interviews with senior officials from the Kuchma Administration, Kyiv, September 2014.
11 For a full account of the Kremlin’s interpretation of the color revolutions as coups d’état

see: Yulia Nikitina, “The ‘Color Revolutions’ and ‘Arab Spring’ in Official Russian Discourse,”
Quarterly Journal, (Winter 2014).
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 197

Yushchenko government to pay a higher price for gas. At the Munich

Security Conference in February of 2007, President Putin delivered a
sharp indictment of Western and especially U.S. policy and its alleged
transgressions against Russia.12 And in August of 2008, despite a clear
decision at the Bucharest NATO summit earlier that year to put off
indefinitely a Membership Action Plan for Georgia, Moscow launched a
war against Tbilisi that led to South Ossetia and Abkhazia declaring
“independence” from Georgia.
The West’s response to Russian aggression in Georgia was loud, but
weak. Western leaders condemned the aggression; then-President
Sarkozy rushed to Moscow to negotiate a ceasefire that left Russian
troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but removed the threat of Russian
troops marching on Tbilisi; and quickly returned to business as usual
with Moscow. President Sarkozy even agreed, after the dust had settled,
to sell Mistral warships to Russia; and when Barak Obama became Presi-
dent in 2009, he launched his ineffectual re-set in relations with Russia.
The point the Kremlin drew was clear: the West did not want Moscow’s
“indiscretion” in Georgia to alter its relations with Russia.
At the same time, there was no lessening of the numerous EU and
U.S. programs designed to promote good governance, rule of law and a
free press and to empower civil society. And U.S. and EU diplomacy in
the post-Soviet space continued to promote democratic values and
growing cooperation with the EU, as evidenced by the Eastern Partner-
ship program and the trade agreement with Kyiv (and other Eastern
Partnership members) that provided the initial spark to the crisis in
Ukraine. This too was noticed by the Kremlin.
The Western response to the first phase of Moscow’s aggression
against Ukraine—the seizure by force and “annexation” of Crimea—was
similar to its reaction in Georgia. There were loud condemnations and
even some weak sanctions; but nothing to suggest that the West saw a
need to deter Moscow from further aggression.
When Moscow struck next with its hybrid war in Ukraine’s east, it
seemed like the West would repeat the same pattern. Initially the West
limited itself to sanctions against individual Russians. But as Ukraine

12 Vladimir Putin, “Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,” speech

delivered at Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 12, 2007, http://www.wash-

ingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/ AR2007021200555.html.
198 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

launched a successful counteroffensive in June of 2014, the Kremlin was

compelled to send in “volunteers” (the Vostok battalion of Chechens) and
more and more advanced military equipment (tanks and missiles). One of
those missiles, the Buk system, shot down Malaysian Airliner 17 with two
hundred passengers aboard in July. The next month, Moscow had to send
in regular army troops to stop the Ukrainian counteroffensive.
These two measures finally prompted the EU to follow the U.S.
lead and impose serious sanctions—especially sanctions on the finan-
cial sector—in July and September of 2014.13 Those sanctions were
renewed in June of 2015 despite the two Minsk ceasefires (September
2014 and February 2015) that were regularly breached, especially by
Moscow’s proxies. A July 2015 report by the International Monetary
Fund suggests that “sanctions and counter-sanctions could initially
reduce real GDP by 1 to 1.5 percent.”14 What is more, the United
States and other Western nations have begun to provide Ukraine lim-
ited military support.

The Kremlin Challenge in the Grey Zone

Since early September 2015, the Kremlin has reduced the violence in
the Donbas as it has begun a new intervention in Syria. But its inten-
tions in Ukraine and the broader neighborhood remain problematic and
Moscow has made them clear in numerous statements. Putin and other
senior Russian officials claim the right and duty to intervene on behalf
of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers wherever their interests are
threatened.15 This gives Moscow a pretext for intervention that they
have used in Moldova and Ukraine.
Moscow has declared a sphere of influence on the territory of the
former Soviet Union, which certainly includes the six states situated
between NATO and Russia—Armenian, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine. The Kremlin has also declared its intention to
establish new rules for the international order—or there will be no

13 This is based on conversations with numerous European officials in Berlin, Brussels and
London July and October 2014.
14 “Russian Federation: Staff Report for the 2015 Article IV Consultation,” International

Monetary Fund, July, 2015. http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2015/cr15211.pdf.

15 “Vladimir Putin Promises to Stand Up for the Rights of Ethnic Russian Abroad,” RT, July

1, 2014. https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2014-07-01/Vladimir-Putin-poobeshhal-otstoyat-prava.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 199

rules.16 Its explicit objective is to overturn the post-Cold War order

established in Europe. No Europe, whole democratic and free for Putin.

The Kremlin’s Instruments

The Kremlin has a variety of tools to establish and maintain control in

its “sphere of influence.” They include Russia’s information apparatus,
cultural and religious institutions, intelligence services, criminal net-
works, business community and military.
The heavily subsidized Russian media have been conducting a viru-
lent anti-Western and particularly anti-American campaign for years. At
home, this campaign has been part of Putin’s effort 1) to reduce the
chance that the Russian people are attracted to democratic and other
“subversive” ideas, and 2) to mobilize the Russian people for his adven-
turism in neighboring countries. Abroad, Russian Television and other
media operate to promote specific Russian objectives. In the grey zone,
it is used to demonize the West and to undercut politicians, NGOs and
other actors that support moving their countries toward an open society
and a Western orientation.
Culture features in Moscow’s efforts to expand its influence espe-
cially to ethnic Russians and Russian speakers. The Moscow Patriarchy
of the Orthodox Church has worked closely in support of Moscow’s
goals in Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, where its hierarchs openly sided
with Victor Yanukovych during the Orange Revolution in 2004 and its
clerics were conspicuous by their absence among the many Orthodox
and other clergy trying to prevent violence on the streets during the
Euro-Maidan in the winter of 2013–14. The Moscow Patriarchy is of
limited use in Muslim Azerbaijan, Coptic Armenia or even, albeit to a
lesser extent, Orthodox Georgia, which enjoys its own Patriarch.
Over the past several years the Kremlin has developed the concept of
the “Russkiy Mir” or “Russian World.” This concept suggests that the
“Russian World” is apart from the West, a distinct civilization with differ-
ent values: traditional, communalistic and religious as opposed to ever-
changing (if not unstable), individualist (if not egotistical) and secular.

16 NikolaiLitovkin and Nikolay Surkov, “Time to Establish a New World Order, Says Putin,”
Russia Behind the Headlines. October 29, 2014. See: http://rbth.com/international/2014/10/
29/time_to_establish_a_new_world_order_says_putin_40973.html.
200 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Given its use of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers—Russian com-

patriots—as a pretext for intervention in the grey zone, Moscow has
devoted a great deal of attention and ingenuity to magnifying their
attachment, real or alleged, to Russia. Kremlin efforts start with the soft
power exerted by the Russian media and Russian culture, and then
humanitarian policies that lobby for improving the lot of Russian com-
patriots in target countries. It expands to information warfare, sharply
criticizing the treatment of Russian compatriots in these countries and
proceeds to the distribution of Russian passports. The idea is to create a
situation where “Russian citizens” call for Moscow’s protection. This
becomes the justification for Moscow’s military intervention. Moscow
handed out these passports in South Ossetia and Abkhazia for years
before its 2008 war with Georgia; it did the same in Crimea before its
seizure of the peninsula and “annexation.” Moscow’s passport operation
is currently underway in Latvia and Estonia, two NATO allies.17
Russian intelligence services and connected criminal networks play
an important part in Putin’s efforts to undermine the post-Cold War
order. The very organization of Moscow’s intelligence agencies provide
a clue about its intentions. The Soviet Union’s intelligence service (the
KGB) was split in half. The Federal Security Service (FSB) was given
responsibility for domestic security. The External Intelligence Service
(SVR) was given responsibility for foreign intelligence. The fact that the
independent states of the former Soviet Union have been the responsi-
bility of the FSB indicates what Moscow thinks of their independence.
A main purpose of the FSB—and the GRU, Russian military intelli-
gence—is to penetrate the security organs of the neighboring states to
ensure that they will promote Russian interests as defined by the Krem-
lin. That includes, as we have seen in Ukraine, making sure that
Ukraine’s military, police and intelligence will not mobilize against a
Russian-led insurrection or even an invasion.
A major feature of Putin’s Russia is corruption, an important tool for
the Kremlin in promoting its influence in the Near Abroad. The Krem-
lin understands that corrupt foreign officials are more pliant. Coopera-
tion between Russian intelligence services and criminal organizations
figure here. For instance, a huge scandal in Russia and Ukraine has been
the siphoning off of huge resources from the gas sector into private

17 Agnia Grigas, The Rebuilding of the Russian Empire (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT,
2016).
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 201

hands. Shadowy companies were created to manage this —EuroTrans-

Gas, RosUkrenergo — and the man who first put this together was
major Russian crime boss Semion Mogilevich.
While consolidating his power in Moscow, Putin made clear that
Russian companies were subject to Kremlin control to promote objec-
tives abroad. The heart of the Russian economy is its gas and oil pro-
duction. Putin has used these assets to promote his foreign policy in a
number of ways. He has built gas pipelines to western Europe around
Ukraine and even ally Belarus so that he can use gas as a weapon against
these countries while maintaining access to his wealthy western Euro-
pean customers. The North Stream pipeline from Russia to Germany in
the Baltic Sea is already in operation. Germany and Russia are now
looking at a second North Stream pipeline despite the fact that the cur-
rent pipeline with a capacity of 55 billion cubic meters per year is only
carrying half that amount because of the unbundling policy of the EU
with regard to OPAL pipeline (3rd energy package) not because of the
lack of demand.18 Moscow spent years trying to develop a South Stream
pipeline across the Black Sea and when that failed in 2014, it began
negotiations with Ankara on a Turkish Stream to perform the same
service, which is now less likely with the Russian-Turkish crisis.
Moscow has also been quick to boycott exports from grey zones
states that displease it. Shortly after reformer Mikheil Saakashvili
became president of Georgia in late 2003, Moscow banned Georgian
wine and other products. Moscow likewise signaled its unhappiness with
Ukraine’s intention under President Yanukovych to sign the trade
agreement with the EU by threatening a boycott of Ukrainian products
in the summer of 2013. As a last resort, of course, former Minister of
defense Serdukov has modernized and rebuilt the Russian military; and
he has not hesitated to use it in pursuit of his revisionist objectives in
Georgia and Ukraine.

The Vulnerability of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine

Putin’s muscular assertion of a sphere of influence and the clear limits of

Western support place Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine in a vulnerable

18 Dennis Pinchuk, “Gazprom Mothballs Extension of Nord Stream Pipeline,” Reuters, January

28, 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/russia-gazprom-nordstream-idUSL6N0

V71HO20150128.
202 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

position. Russian troops are in all three countries. All three face eco-
nomic sanctions from Moscow and all are subject to an omnipresent
Russian media that promotes a picture of events supporting Moscow’s
policy goals. In Georgia, with a small Slavic population, the Russian
media have limited impact; in Ukraine the Russian media’s impact was
formidable up until the war in the East; even now in the East and South
it is influential. In Moldova, the nearly 50 percent of the population that
is Slavic receives most of its news from the Russian media.
Chisinau, Kyiv and Tbilisi recognize that they can expect only lim-
ited Western support, as described above, as they face assertive Kremlin
policies. Despite this, all three countries are pursuing policies that the
Kremlin finds objectionable.
The Georgian government has pursued better relations with
Moscow since Saakashvili stepped down as President in 2013, but Tbil-
isi has continued to seek closer association with NATO with member-
ship as its avowed goal. Numerous NATO officials have told Tbilisi that
there is no prospect for a MAP at the NATO summit set for Warsaw in
the summer of 2016.19 Georgia has likewise been passing the legislation
needed to put the DCFTA with the EU into practice.
While its military is fighting in Syria and leading its proxies in the
Donbas, the Kremlin is still committing provocations in Georgia. It has
moved the internal demarcation line in Georgia (between South Ossetia
and the rest of Georgia) a few hundred meters further into Georgia.20
In Chisinau the “reform government” was in crisis for most of 2015
because of a major scandal in which over $1 billion disappeared from
Moldovan banks. The country had four Prime Ministers in 2015 and
the last two were interim appointments. While weakened, the govern-
ment remains on a pro-Western course and enjoys a visa free regime
under the DCFTA with the EU. Moscow is meanwhile maintaining an
embargo against many Moldovan products, with the exception of course
of products from Transnistria and Gagauzia. Moldovan authorities fear
that the Kremlin might create a frozen conflict in Gagauzia to match
the one in Transnistria.21

19 Conversations with numerous Georgian senior officials in Tbilisi May 13-14 and November

12, 2015.
20 According to Western diplomats in Georgia, November 12, 2015, the Russians have claimed

the area now covered by the “new demarcation line” according to old Soviet maps.
21 Conversations with senior Moldovan officials in Chisinau, May 10–12, 2015.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 203

Ukraine of course is where the Kremlin threat currently looms

largest. Beginning in September 2015, fighting in the East dropped to
its lowest tempo since the war began in April 2014. Still, there were an
average of over 35 shooting incidents a day, and starting in late Novem-
ber the number of incidents increased. Large numbers of Russian troops
remain in the occupied areas of Ukraine and there has been only partial
withdrawal of Russian tanks, artillery and missiles.22 Russia also has sta-
tioned tens of thousands of troops on its border near the Donbas. In
short, Moscow can conduct a new offensive at any time.
At the same time, Kremlin efforts to subvert Ukraine continue. The
Security Services of Ukraine cracked down on a major Kremlin plan of
sabotage and assassinations to be followed by demonstrations calling for
a People’s Republic in both Odessa and Ukrainian Bessarabia in spring
2015. The Security Services brought in forces from outside the area—
due to Kremlin penetration of the local service—and arrested scores of
people.23

Relative Quiet in the Grey Zone:

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus

In Belarus illiberal President Lukashenko anticipated Moscow’s turn

away from democracy well before Vladimir Putin came to power. To
date this has made him a pariah in Europe, which limited his ability to
seek Western help in 2011 when Moscow made a successful bid to take
ownership of the country’s gas pipelines, and again now when Moscow
seems set on establishing a military base in Belarus close to its northern
border with Ukraine.24
Armenia’s reluctance to negotiate with Azerbaijan a serious compro-
mise on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh has rendered it dependent on
Moscow for security and political support. So when Moscow objected in
fall 2014 to Yerevan’s plan to sign the Deep and Comprehensive Tree

22 The information on firing incidents comes from conversations with senior Ukrainian
officials October 22–24, 2015. They also put the number of Russian troops in the Donbas
at approximately 10,000. The information on Russian hardware comes from both Ukrainian
and OSCE officials.
23 Conversations with Ukrainian and Western officials in Kyiv and Washington in May,

October and November of 2015.

24 Alan Cullison, “Russia Tightens Its Grip in Belarus,” The Wall Street Journal, November 26,

2011. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970203764804577060312640356138.
204 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Trade Area agreement with the EU, the Armenian government decided
not to proceed.
Azerbaijan is the exception in this group. While as illiberal as
Belarus, Azerbaijan has been a good partner of the West and particularly
the United States on both energy and security issues. In the late 1990s it
joined with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to create GUAM—for a
time this group included Uzbekistan, making it GUUAM—a grouping
of Newly Independent States that did not want close integration with
Russia in any of the Commonwealth of Independent States structures.
Azerbaijan has also been zealous in protecting from Moscow its control
over the production and transit of its hydrocarbons. These interests
make Baku’s relations with Moscow more difficult than those of either
Yerevan or Minsk.
The Azerbaijani government’s authoritarian characteristics, however,
have complicated its relations with the United States and even more
with the EU. Since countries must pass liberalizing reforms as part of
the process to establish a DCFTA, Baku decided against negotiating
such an agreement with the EU. These obstacles to a truly close rela-
tionship with NATO or the EU have thus far spared Baku the heavy
hand that Moscow has extended to Kyiv and Tbilisi. Still, pressure is
mounting on Baku to join the Eurasian Economic Union.

Current Western Policy Towards the Grey Zone

There have been at least two dimensions to Western policy in the grey
zone. The first has been constant since the fall of the Soviet Union. It is
driven by our values, supports our national interests and is carried out
under the headlines by the foreign policy bureaucracies of the United
States, the European Commission and the European External Action
Service. It is the daily interactions, diplomatic exchanges and billions of
dollars and euros of assistance in numerous small projects promoting an
open society. This is a basic activity of our national security apparatus in
the grey zone. It occurs largely without reflection at the political level.
The second dimension concerns the highly political responses to
crises that have broken out partly as a result of the success of our first
dimension policy. It is when grey zone countries decide that they want an
open society and closer association with the West—and when they start
to undertake the necessary reforms to achieve those goals—that Moscow
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 205

plays rough. Western policy towards the grey zone becomes a headline
issue and the subject of debate when the states make a determined effort
to get closer to the West or when Moscow resorts to coercion.
The debate comes because there are interests, both economic and
political, that see value in cooperation with Russia, and they would like
to avoid the emergence of issues threatening such cooperation. By 2012,
the Russian economy was the world’s ninth largest economy in dollar
terms and its trade with the EU in 2014 totaled €284.6 billion.25 Busi-
ness communities in countries like Germany, the Netherlands, France,
Italy and Spain had developed lucrative ties with Russian counterparts
that they do not want to see disrupted. This is particularly true in the
energy sphere. These interests have either opposed or reluctantly
accepted sanctions on Russia for Moscow’s aggression. (Today, thanks
largely to the drop in hydrocarbon prices, but also to sanctions, Russia’s
economy is the world’s tenth largest and its trade with the EU in the
first half of 2015 was $274 billion.)26
There are also political interests at stake in the current strained rela-
tionship with Moscow. Contrary to President Obama’s assertions about
Russia being a declining power, Russia is a global power with a veto in
the UN Security Council, a large, if under stress, economy, one of the
world’s two great nuclear arsenals and a strong military capable of oper-
ating far from the homeland. Recognizing all of this, there are some
Western politicians and scholars (the realist school) that claim the West
would be better served by accommodating Moscow in its neighbor-
hood—not contesting its self-proclaimed “sphere of influence”—in
order to secure its cooperation on “greater” issues such as Iranian denu-
clearization talks and defeating the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL). These thinkers are amenable to the Kremlin argument that the
West has “provoked” this crisis by expanding NATO, and now the EU,
into its neighborhood.

25 For GNP data see: Knoema, “World GDP Ranking 2015 | Data and Charts”, http://knoema.com/

nwnfkne/world-gdp-ranking-2015-data-and-charts; http://knoema.com/atlas/ranks/GDP.
For Trade data see: European Commission, “European Union, Trade in goods with Russia,”
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/ september/tradoc_113440.pdf.
26 Central Bank of Russia, “Merchandise Trade of the Russian Federation (per Balance of

Payments Methodology),” http://www.cbr.ru/Eng/statistics/?PrtId=svs.

206 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Main Western Schools of Thought on Russia

and the Grey Zone

There is a distinguished group of American foreign policy thinkers and

practitioners who espouse this “realist” view that Russia is a great power
that has historically had a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe that we
should acknowledge. It includes Henry Kissinger,27 Harvard Professor
Graham Allison,28 former Council on Foreign Relations President Les
Gelb,29 Ambassador Jack Matlock,30 former Senator Bill Bradley, Uni-
versity of Chicago Professor John Mearsheimer,31 and journalist Marvin
Kalb.32 Some of these thinkers number the late George Kennan in their
ranks because in the late 1990s he warned that NATO expansion to the
East would spark a new period of tension with Moscow.
In Europe, particularly on the Continent, there are influential diplo-
matists and thinkers likewise uneasy with the current state of East-West
tensions. They stress the importance of stable political and close eco-
nomic relations with Moscow. They believe that growing interaction
with Moscow will move Russian policies closer to the European norm.
A number of prominent former statesmen belong to this group—ex-
French President Sarkozy,33 ex-Italian President Berlusconi, and former
German Chancellors Schroeder and the late Helmut Schmidt.

27 Jacob Heilbrunn, “Henry Kissinger: The Interview,” The National Interest, August 19, 2015,
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interview-henry-kissinger-13615.
28 Allison Graham and Dimitri K. Simes, “Russia and America: Stumbling to War,” The

National Interest, April 20, 2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russia-america-stum-

bling-war-12662.
29 Leslie H. Gelb, “Russia and America: Toward a New Détente,” The National Interest, June 9,

2015, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/r oiussia-america-toward-new-detente-13077.

30 Barbara Hollingsworth, “Former Ambassador: U.S. Should Not Risk ‘Spiraling Confronta-

tion’ With Russia Over Ukraine,” CNSNews.com, February 13, 2015,

http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/barbara-hollingsworth/former-ambassador-us-should-
not-risk-spiraling-confrontation.
31 John J. Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault. The Liberal Delusions

That Provoked Putin,” in The New Global Context, Foreign Affairs Anthropology Series, Sep-
tember/October 2014 Issue, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-
18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault.
32 Martin Kalb, Putin, Ukraine and the New Cold War (Brookings Institution Press, 2015), 230

p; Kalb, Martin, “Putin won his war in Ukraine,” The Washington Post, September 7, 2015,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/putin-won-in-ukraine/2015/09/07/ 02a0283c-
5341-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html.
33 Ukraine Today, “Former French President Sarkozy visits Moscow, tells Putin ‘Europe needs

Russia’,” http://uatoday.tv/politics/former-french-president-sarkozy-visits-moscow-tells-
putin-europe-needs-russia-524345.html; also see footnote 1 in this chapter). Much of the
European Left has also laid the blame for East-West tensions at the door of the West and
especially Washington.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 207

In the United States, there has been widespread sympathy for

Ukraine in the face of Moscow’s aggression. It is manifest on Capitol
Hill, where both parties favor substantial support for Ukraine and
strong measures against the Kremlin. Not surprisingly, both neoconser-
vatives (such as Senator Marco Rubio, the editorial page of the Wall
Street Journal), and liberal interventionists (Hillary Clinton, Madeleine
Albright, Ambassador Samantha Power, the Washington Post editorial
page) have favored such policies. This groups argues that:
• Russia is a great power with revisionist objectives in Europe and
has twice changed borders by wars of aggression.
• This is a great national security danger requiring an American-led
response.
• The best way to stop a revisionist Russia is to stop it where it is
currently committing aggression: Ukraine.
• Sanctions did not stop Moscow from helping in achieving the Iran
nuclear deal and Russia’s intervention in Syria has not been helpful
in moving toward a resolution of the civil war.
• At the time of Russia’s war with Georgia and with Ukraine, there
was no prospect of NATO or EU membership for either one.
• The NATO and EU expansion that has occurred is the result not
of conquest or coercion, but of attraction.
• The peoples of the grey zone should not be sacrificed to the impe-
rial fantasies of the Russian power ministries.
President Obama has tried with limited success to prevent Kremlin
aggression from becoming a distraction to the major focus of his foreign
policy, which he sees as reducing U.S. military interventions in the Mid-
dle East and pivoting U.S. focus to East Asia. He famously and naively
stated that Russia is a “regional power” and the Ukraine crisis a “Euro-
pean crisis.” While advocating a strong sanctions policy on Russia, he
has handed Western leadership in the crisis to Chancellor Merkel and
has been reluctant to provide military assistance to Ukraine.
But the political debate has not been kind to President Obama, the
American “realists” or the European left. Thanks largely to the Putin’s
actions—the invasion of and “annexation” of Crimea, the war in the
Donbas, the shooting down of MH-17, the introduction of regular Russ-
ian troops into the Donbas, the seizure of an Estonian intelligence offi-
cer from Estonia, numerous violations of NATO airspace—Washington
and Brussels have adopted stronger policies designed to deter and punish
the Kremlin for its aggression: sanctions against Russian leaders and sec-
208 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

tors of the Russian economy, a larger military presence in NATO’s east,

increased assistance to Ukraine including military supplies.34
To sum up, Western support for grey zone countries facing Kremlin
aggression is substantial, but cautious. In response to the war in Ukraine
the West has demonstrated a willingness to impose costs on Russia
through sanctions. It has also provided limited military assistance,
although at the moment lethal equipment is off the table. The much
weaker measures taken against Moscow for the Georgian war may have
been due to the fact that the Georgian war came first; and it was the
pattern of Kremlin aggression that led to the sharper reaction in
Ukraine. The sharper reaction may also be explained by the fact that
Ukraine is a much larger country and borders the EU.
The West has also provided substantial economic support to reform-
ing countries facing Russian aggression. On a per capita basis, Georgia
has received substantially more aid than Ukraine. This may be explained
by the fact that the Georgia war occurred just before the Great Reces-
sion and the EU’s very expensive bailout of Greece. Western assistance
is also prudently dependent on the commitment of the respective gov-
ernment to reform (Georgia has pursued reform more thoroughly than
Ukraine and Moldova).35
Over the past decade the West has established a mixed record of
meeting its commitments to the countries of the grey zone in a con-
frontation with Moscow. On the plus side, while dawdling on the imple-
mentation of the DCFTA with Ukraine, the EU has decided to imple-
ment it in January 2016. It is ready to do the same with Georgia and it

34 In the spring and summer of 2014, the Obama Administration was refusing to send even
body armor to Ukraine. By February 2015, the Administration reacted to the debate on
arming Ukraine by announcing that it would not provide Ukraine with even defensive
lethal weapons. See: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, “Preserving Ukraine’s Inde-
pendence, resisting Russian Aggression. What the United Nations and NATO Must Do,”
http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/UkraineReport_February2015_FI-
NAL.pdf. Yet a few weeks later it provided Humvees to Ukraine. In September of 2015, the
same week President Obama met with President Putin, the U.S. announced that it would
send counter battery radar for missiles to Ukraine.
35 From 1991 until 2013, the U.S. provided $3.6 billion in aid to Georgia. See: Jim Nichols,

“Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. In-
terests,” Congressional Research Service, April 2, 2014, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RL33453.pdf. In that same period U.S. assistance to Ukraine totaled over $10 billion. See:
Katie Sanders, “The United States Spent $5 Billion on Ukraine Anti-Government Riots”,
Politifact, March 19th, 2014, http://www.politifact.com/punditfact/statements/2014/
mar/19/facebook-posts/united-states-spent-5-billion-ukraine-anti-governm/.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 209

has done so with Moldova. Moreover, it has provided Moldova (includ-

ing the separatist area of Transnistria) visa-free travel, and is offering
the same for Georgia and Ukraine.
On the negative side of the ledger was the failure of the United
States, the UK and France, in spite of the assurances of the Budapest
Memorandum and related statements, to aid Ukraine quickly and
strongly in the face of Moscow’s aggression. In addition, the West is not
ready at this moment to consider the possibility of Georgia or Ukraine
joining NATO. As described above, it is not even willing to consider
offering either country a Membership Action Plan (MAP), an interim
step to NATO membership.
It is likewise true that the EU at the present time is not willing to
broach the subject of EU membership for Georgia, Moldova or
Ukraine. In the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, the original
decision to offer the DCFTA to grey zone countries has been criticized
as naïve in certain EU circles. Still, the EU has reaffirmed its commit-
ments under the DCFTA while making clear that EU membership is
not a fit subject to discuss.

Crafting a Realistic Western Policy for the Grey Zone

It is safe to say that Western policy toward the grey zone should be con-
sistent and flow from an agreed set of objectives. The original objectives
were set in the early 1990s. The United States and the EU sought to
help all the countries of the former Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact
transform from totalitarian or authoritarian states into democratic soci-
eties with market economies. While those goals may not have initially
included membership in NATO and the EU, they came to include that,
at least for most of the Warsaw Pact states, and the Baltic states.
These social transformation objectives have driven nearly all Western
aid projects and most Western daily diplomacy ever since. Even when,
out of deference to an increasingly authoritarian and belligerent Russia,
Western leaders consciously decide that NATO or EU membership is a
bridge too far for “grey zone” countries, they do not review or revise the
open society policies of our assistance programs, or our overall diplo-
macy This suggests that democratic, tolerant societies remain our objec-
tives in Europe and perhaps even in Eurasia. The pause regarding
NATO and EU membership is not a matter of principle. It is largely a
210 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

reaction to the Kremlin’s strong objections. It is true that some govern-

ments say privately that they would never support membership for
Georgia and Ukraine in NATO or membership in the EU for those two
countries and Moldova, but that is not in any sense an agreed position
(It is also true that, particularly in the wake of the Greek crisis, some in
the EU are concerned about the economic costs of further expansion).
This, however raises some difficult questions for the current period.
Kremlin leadership is on an imperial march. President Putin has devel-
oped principles that seek to justify a Kremlin zone of influence in the
post-Soviet space; has at hand a full array of instruments to exert that
influence on weaker neighboring countries; and has shown a willingness
to use all of those instruments, including his military, even in violation
of Russian commitments and international law. At this dangerous
moment, how does the West protect the grey zone countries that want
to establish open societies and much closer relations with the West?
The first order of business is to help Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine
address their internal weaknesses that Moscow exploits to keep them
under its influence. These weaknesses include prominently corruption, a
weak banking system, compromised and incompetent security organs
and ethnic tensions.

Corruption and the Banking System

Widespread, systematic corruption is arguably the greatest obstacle to
development in all the post-Soviet states. The countries that have made
the greatest progress over the past 25 years, the Czech Republic, Poland
and the Baltic states, took comprehensive steps against corruption—
starting with lustration and transforming the police, procurator gen-
eral’s office and judiciary—early into their independence. Georgia also
took this on during the Rose Revolution; but Ukraine and Moldova
have yet to address this problem in a serious way (Ukraine, however, has
taken major steps to address corruption in the gas sector and is in the
process of creating honest traffic police in major cities).
Both the EU and the United States spend significant political capital
and run technical aid programs to address this in Ukraine. They should
continue to make clear that the large assistance Ukraine needs from the
international community to meet its international financial commitments
is at least in part dependent on progress in this area. The large assistance
package that Ukraine receives is an important tool for the West.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 211

Unfortunately, there is no such tool in Moldova. The current gov-

ernment in Chisinau, however, is anxious for closer and more frequent
engagement with Washington and Brussels. Establishing a high level
anti-corruption task force—led at the Minister level—would be attrac-
tive to the Western-leaning leaders in Moldova for its promise of regu-
lar high level contact with the West. Badly tarnished by the 2014 bank-
ing scandal, they might find this proposal worth pursuing to reduce the
stain of the scandal and to enhance their political prospects.
A poorly regulated banking system is a perfect vehicle for both cor-
ruption and laundering criminal money. Georgia fixed this problem
over a decade ago. Since the Euro-Maidan, Ukraine too has made great
strides towards a clean banking system by closing a third of its banks.
Moldova is once again the outlier.
The United States and the EU should include the banking sector in
the high level corruption task force. At the same time, the West could
make an immediate impact by establishing a bank in country subject to
international standards. In the wake of the banking scandal, the appear-
ance of a “Western bank” would be very popular. It would attract enor-
mous business and by that fact alone spur the major banks in the coun-
try to develop the same clean standards in order to ensure their
profitability and even survivability.

Loyal Security Organs

Perhaps the most immediate danger to reform-interested governments
in the grey zone are their own security organs: the Ministry of Defense,
the Ministry of Interior, the secret police, the border guards and, in
some countries, the Ministry of Emergency Situation. Throughout the
zone, with the exception of Georgia, much of the senior leadership in
these ministries were trained in the Soviet Union. The FSB and the
GRU have paid great attention to placing agents, retaining contacts and
exerting influence in these organs.
At the start of Moscow’s hybrid war in Ukraine’s east, Ukrainian offi-
cials assessed that among the hundreds of thousands of soldiers, police-
men, secret policemen and border guards, they had just 6,000 who were
politically reliable, trained and equipped to participate in a counter-
offensive.36 In the Donbas, a good number of the police and secret

36 Conversation with senior security officials in Kyiv, June 30–July 2, 2014.

212 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

police joined the Russian-organized military operation. One and a half

years of war and training from the United States (first of Ministry of
Interior Units, then of the military) has greatly improved the reliability
and competence of Ukraine’s security forces, but more help vetting out
Kremlin agents would still be useful.
Georgia, too, has done good work in these areas. From the start of
the Rose Revolution, it began to root out Russian agents in its power
ministries. Its enthusiastic participation in coalition operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq honed the Georgian military, as has its participa-
tion in numerous training programs with the United States.
Moldova is once again the country that most needs Western assis-
tance to ensure the reliability of its security organs. Washington should
offer a program to vet its officials in the Ministries of Defense and Inte-
rior and in its secret police. Needless to say, such a program cannot be
effective unless it occurs alongside or following a program to go after
corruption.

The Ethnic Factor

Ethnic differences and ethnic tensions have been the essential element
in Moscow’s frozen conflict policies. Moscow takes the side of the
minority as a means to exert pressure on the governments of Georgia,
Moldova, Ukraine and also Azerbaijan. Western policy on this matter is
to do what comes naturally—to urge the governments in question to
practice tolerance and fair treatment for all; but also to provide practical
advice as issues arise in this area; and to offer incentives for all parties in
grey zone countries to get along.
In Georgia, the EU and the United States should consider assistance
programs that promote reconciliation with Abkhazia. Tbilisi, for exam-
ple, has built a hospital not far from the internal demarcation line with
Abkhazia; this has drawn patients from Abkhazia and in the process pro-
moted goodwill. The EU and the United States should consult with
Tbilisi about building other projects that could serve the process of rec-
onciliation.
Ethnic relations in Moldova can also profit from greater interaction
with the West. Perhaps the biggest boost to improved relations between
Chisinau and the people of Transnistria was their inclusion in the visa
free travel under the DCFTA. This highly valued right is perhaps the
strongest argument within Transnistria against independence from
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 213

Moldova. Regular visits by senior officials from the West would also be
useful to keep an independent eye on what is happening in Transnistria
and to encourage nationalist forces in the country to be mindful of the
needs and sensitivities of the Slavic population.
Despite massive Russian propaganda to the contrary, authorities in
Ukraine have been rather sensitive to the needs of ethnic Russians and
speakers. The one clear error made in this area—the passage of legisla-
tion shortly after President Yanukovych fled Ukraine mandating that
only Ukrainian would be a state language—was quickly reversed. But
Ukraine has two large problems in this area resulting from the war: 1)
1.5 million internally displaced people; and 2) massive destruction in
the areas currently and previously controlled by Moscow’s proxies.
The UN has not provided enough assistance to the IDPs. Ukraine’s
GNP is likely to have fallen in 2015 by approximately 10 percent. The
EU and the West should provide immediately $250 million to meet
IDP needs. They should also send a mission to analyze the needs of the
IDPs and to study whether some portion of them should be settled per-
manently outside the conflict zone. Left unaddressed, the humanitarian
crisis could undermine the stability of the reform government. The U.S.
and the EU should also join with the government in Kyiv to begin the
process of assessing damage in the conflict zone. This would provide
hope that the people of that area have not been forgotten and that once
Ukraine reestablishes control in the Donbas reconstruction will begin.

Economic Opportunity and Energy

While complaining that the West’s sanctions against Russia have no
place in modern international life, Moscow has been quick to halt
imports from Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine to pressure them to back
away from the DCFTA (and for other purposes). The DCFTA has of
course helped Moldova diversify its trade away from Russia and will
help Georgia and Ukraine do the same. Despite Kremlin protests, the
EU must proceed with the implementation of DCFTA with Georgia
and Ukraine.
The United States could make its own contribution by signing a Free
Trade agreement (FTA) with each of the three. This idea, unfortunately,
is not likely to happen soon. There is no political impetus for it. Passing
new FTAs can be politically difficult; and the U.S. Trade Representative
Office has limited personnel to devote to new FTAs. If this is not possi-
214 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

ble, the United States and the EU should agree to include the three
countries in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. This
would give the three much better access to the U.S. market.
Energy is another area where the West can strengthen the grey zone.
Gazprom has been playing politics with gas supplies for years, punish-
ing some countries (especially Ukraine, but even Belarus at one point)
and favoring others pursuant to Kremlin policy directives. There is a
relatively easy way to fix this. The EU needs to complete its energy
market integration, reinforce its energy acquis and build a robust energy
union that extends beyond the borders of the EU. We have seen signifi-
cant progress in this area over the past year. For example, Ukraine was
able to purchase some gas via “reverse flow” of Russian gas sold to other
European consumers; and suit has been brought against Gazprom for
violating EU laws and statutes. Full implementation of EU energy poli-
cies with financial support for energy sector modernization would be a
big boon for Ukraine and Moldova.
At the same time, the EU should disapprove plans for building a
North Stream II pipeline for Russian gas to flow directly to Germany.
The North Stream I pipeline’s capacity has not been fully used (because
of the 3rd energy package and the 50 percent rule for the OPAL
pipeline, not because of the lack of demand); Ukraine is cleaning up its
gas sector; and the real purpose of additional undersea pipelines is to
give Moscow the option of punishing Ukraine, Belarus and Poland by
not shipping gas through their pipelines.

Security Assistance, Power Projection and Political Engagement

Ukraine is currently fighting a defensive war against Russia, and Geor-
gia fought in 2008. Both countries are in clear need of U.S. training and
Western military equipment. Georgia has been the beneficiary of many
training programs over the past 12 years and the United States has pro-
vided training to Ministry of Interior units and now military units in
Ukraine. This should continue.
But the United States and its European allies have been slow to give
Georgia and especially Ukraine the equipment they need to fight a
much larger aggressor. This must change. There was a time when the
West understood that it was both right and strategically sound to pro-
vide weapons to nations invaded by larger neighbors; and when it
understood that it was the invasion, and not the provision of weapons,
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 215

that was a “provocation.” The single best thing that the United States
could do right now to support freedom in the grey zone would be to
give Ukraine the weapons it needs to deter a Russian offensive deeper
into Ukraine.
The West should provide Ukraine $1 billion a year for five years for
military equipment. It should include anti-tank missiles, secure com-
mand and control communications, sophisticated drones, anti-aircraft
radar for missiles that could also detect incoming fire from Russia, and
some anti-aircraft equipment to dissuade Moscow from using air power
against Ukraine. It is true that Moscow has “escalation dominance” (a
fancy way of saying that the Russian military is stronger than that of
Ukraine) but providing this equipment means that either Moscow is
deterred, or it pays a much higher price for its additional aggression,
which is politically risky.
Under the same logic, the United States should consult with Georgia
on its military needs. At the same time, the United States, with its
NATO allies, should consider increasing its training programs in
Ukraine and Georgia, and plot out a regular stream of port visits in the
Black Sea, including to Batumi and Odessa.
It is critical that NATO come up with some formula and plan regard-
ing its relationship with Georgia and Ukraine that keeps open the path
to membership. It must avoid summit statements and outcomes that
highlight the vulnerability of grey zone countries to Kremlin aggres-
sion. This can be done, for instance, by scheduling NATO exercises for
the months immediately after the summit, and arranging visits by the
Secretary General or the Deputy Secretary General for the months fol-
lowing the conclave.
Increased political engagement with individual NATO countries,
especially the United States, is also an important instrument. Kyiv sees
plenty of high-level Americans and Europeans. Tbilisi and Chisinau do
not. Regular visits at the Deputy Minister level and up would remind
these countries that the West is not leaving them alone with Putin and
help persuade them to make the difficult changes on various domestic
issues outlined above. Also, the West should be prepared to respond with
sanctions if and when Moscow decides to move the demarcation line
separating South Ossetia and the rest of Georgia deeper into Georgia.
216 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Armenia, Azerbaijan and Belarus

The West’s grey zone strategy must not forget these three states. Ongo-
ing cooperation with Baku on energy and security matters is very much
in the interests of the West. It is essential that the United States step up
its political engagement with Baku to offset the pressure from Moscow
to join the Eurasian Economic Union.
The West cannot ignore human rights problems in Azerbaijan, but
they should be one item on the agenda. We should not forget that if
Baku moves closer to Moscow, the prospects for human rights in Azer-
baijan drop sharply. The recent tensions between Ankara and Moscow
over Syria meant that Turkey might be more willing to bolster Azerbai-
jani and Georgian security. There is already a practice of these countries
meeting in a trilateral forum. The United States and NATO should
encourage this and explore with Ankara what additional measures it
might be willing to take in this area. Such cooperation could remind
Moscow that there might be additional costs to further aggression in
the Transcaucasus.
Those regular visits to Baku should include stops in Yerevan. The
message there is that the West is interested in better relations and
would be delighted if the Armenians decided to proceed with the
DCFTA. Also, if Armenia was able to show more flexibility on
Nagorno-Karabakh, that would open up relations with Turkey and
reduce its dependence on Moscow.
Belarus is the most problematic case in the grey zone. Before Presi-
dent Putin’s clear turn to authoritarianism, President Lukashenko was
aptly labeled the last dictator in Europe. The West’s policy of minimal
contact with the government of Belarus has yielded little fruit. There is
little downside and plenty of possible upside of initiating a dialogue
with the Belarusian authorities on relations with the West and the situa-
tion in the region. Lukashenko would welcome that as at least a small
card to play as he tries to fend off Kremlin plans to establish a military
base in his country.
 Forsaken Territories? The Emergence of Europe’s Grey Zone and Western Policy 217

Final Thoughts

The West cannot be true to its values or its interests by letting an

authoritarian Kremlin mark off a sphere of influence in Europe’s back-
yard. If the West accepts the limitations Moscow proposes for its activi-
ties, the progress toward an open society in Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine will be reversed. Moscow’s revisionist agenda, which challenges
the current European order, will be enhanced.
Principled support for democracy and a market economy, economic
and technical assistance, security support and active political engage-
ment would greatly increase the odds that these fragile democracies will
survive the reactionary wind blowing from the north. None of these
require military confrontation with the Kremlin. But it does require the
confidence to stand up for one’s principles and the empathy to embrace
those who, under duress, would still like to live by them.
 Chapter 11

A Bridge Too Far? How to Prevent the Unraveling

of Western Policies toward Wider Europe
Hiski Haukkala

The question of Western unity of purpose vis-à-vis eastern Europe is as

vexing as it is old. During the Cold War the issue was framed in terms
of Western solidarity in the face of potential Soviet military aggression
as well as the unity of overall approaches concerning the Soviet Union
and wider European security. In its crudest form the question was put in
binary fashion; the West was seen as having two options—either hang-
ing together or hanging separately. During the post-Cold War era the
question lost most of its salience and was replaced with a perhaps more
technocratic question concerning the mutual complementarity of
visions and actions: is the West more—or perhaps less—than the sum of
its parts in terms of effecting positive change beyond its boundaries, and
how do the different actors and policies relate to and interact with each
other? In the final analysis the question boiled down to the West’s abil-
ity to guide and support the transition of the eastern part of the conti-
nent towards liberal democracy and market economy.1
It goes without saying that wider Europe (the set of countries that
have come to reside between the enlarged NATO/EU and Russia) has
been an integral part of these developments. Yet I would maintain that it
makes no sense to speak of the region in isolation from Russia. In fact, it
can be argued that it has been precisely the West’s stubborn attempts at
decoupling the two that have resulted in the current conflict in Ukraine
and the wider impasse in relations with Russia. Indeed, since the early
1990s the West’s propensity to view the region through the lens of ‘Rus-
sia First’2 has created a situation where in most instances the other
countries in the region have been treated almost as an afterthought,
with Russia’s nationalistic and post-imperial tendencies being strength-
ened in the process.

1 Journal of Democracy (2014) “Reconsidering the Transition Paradigm,” Special Section,

Journal of Democracy, 25 (1): 86–100.
2 Peter Truscott (1997) Russia First. Breaking with the West (London: I. B. Tauris).

219
220 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

This is not to say that the West should accept at face value Russia’s
claim at a privileged sphere of influence—or interests, for that matter,3
it is simply an assertion that to devise and execute policies void of the
wider context that includes the Russia factor are bound to remain prob-
lematic, to say the least. This is also the message that Russia itself has
tried to convey with its actions in and over Ukraine: certain key devel-
opments in the region will simply not be tolerated if they go against the
grain of Russia’s essential interests, almost no matter what the associated
price tag may be.
This article discusses the role that the West—the U.S./NATO and
the EU—have played in the developments in eastern Europe, widely
understood. Although the main focus of the article is on recent events,
background concerning earlier post-Cold War strategies is necessary.
The discussion proceeds in three stages. First, earlier post-Cold War
settings and strategies are briefly discussed. The following section ana-
lyzes more recent developments. The third and final section draws some
conclusions about the future of relations between the West and Russia
over and in wider Europe, while pondering what the necessary ingredi-
ents to arrive at a more effective strategy should be. The main conclu-
sion of this article nevertheless is that the West is in dire danger of los-
ing its ability to shape wider Europe for the better.

The Post-Cold War Setting and

Western Policies toward Wider Europe

The end of the Cold War division and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union that soon ensued opened up the political space in Europe. The
rigid bipolar confrontation gave way to a much more fluid setting where
fresh opportunities and challenges rapidly mushroomed. This called for
new policies on part of both the United States and the emerging Euro-
pean Union. For the United States, the four main objectives were: (i)
managing the transition to a new post-Cold War order in a peaceful and
orderly fashion; (ii) facilitating the emergence of Russia as a successor
state of the Soviet Union as a responsible and constructive player,
including the development of cooperative threat reduction with Russia

3 Dmitri Trenin (2009) “Russia’s Sphere of Interest, not Influence,” Washington Quarterly, 32
(4): 3–22.
 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 221

to deal with the toxic assets left behind by the Soviet Union; (iii) ensur-
ing the primacy of NATO—and consequently also the United States—
in European security, first of all by ensuring the continued viability of
NATO while downplaying the potential of the EU to emerge as a fully
independent security actor; while (iv) still continuing to use that very
EU as a proxy to organise the political and economic integration and
consequent transition in the emerging wider Europe.4
This is not the occasion to give a thorough analysis of whether and to
what extent the United States has succeeded in these tasks. Suffice it to
say, that by and large, the United States was successful. It was able to
secure an unrivalled position at the top of the international hierarchy
but was also able to stabilize the conflicts on European territory in the
1990s and to lock the majority of the continent into its preferred secu-
rity structure through the expansion of NATO.5 Even if Russia made
some dissatisfied noises at the time, there was an expectation that these
could be successfully placated by offering Russia some privileged forms
of partnership with the West and the United States in particular.6 The
countries eventually residing in the common neighborhood between the
enlarged Alliance and Russia—wider Europe—were mainly an after-
thought and were given the status of ‘partners’ through the Partnership
for Peace (PfP) program.
Turning to the EU, the most significant aspect of developments in
the early 1990s was the fact that the EU started to express ambitions
and develop capacities for increased willingness and ability to have its
own indigenous views about international affairs and to develop them
into its own policies and actions on the world stage. In this respect the
adoption of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the
Maastricht Treaty of 1991 was of particular significance, as it created
fresh instruments of external action and institutionalized a cooperative
culture that over time have resulted in impressive (although perhaps
needlessly cumbersome) finesse and complexity in today’s European

4 For a discussion of key U.S. tenets, see James M. Goldgeier and Michael McFaul (2003)
Power and Purpose. U.S. Policy toward Russia after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings);
Strobe Talbott (2002) The Russia Hand. A Memoir of Presidential Diplomacy (New York:
Random House); and Angela Stent (2014) The Limits of Partnership. U.S. –Russian Relations
in the Twenty-First Century (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press).
5 Michael Mastanduno (1997) “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S.
Grand Strategy after the Cold War”. International Security, 21 (4): 49–88.
6 Ronald D. Asmus (2002) Opening NATO’s Door. How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era
(New York: Columbia University Press).
222 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Union.7 Primarily this stage was one where the EU was effectively
thrust into assuming a leading role in responding to the economic
effects of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. Initially the EU also
sought to assume, and failed, to play a role in stabilizing the violent ten-
dencies unleashed by the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the EU’s
inability to respond to the escalating crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
any meaningful and effective manner resulted in a general disillusion-
ment over the EU’s general ability to act as an effective force in stabiliz-
ing its own backyard.8 It also underlined the still indispensable role that
the United States played, and continues to play, in European security.
The objectives of the nascent European foreign policy and those of
the United States in the early 1990s were largely compatible with and
even complementary to each other. Therefore, the EU’s Eastern enlarge-
ment was clearly in the U.S. interests while the expansion of NATO was
seen as the key in stabilising central and eastern Europe with a view to
smoothing and paving the way for the eventual and in certain respects
much more demanding EU accession.9 At the same time the fact that
these two institutions did move and enlarge in lock-step created the
expectation, perhaps even fear, in Moscow that this would be the case
also in future. Whether this perception was justified is a moot point as it
seems evident that Russia has taken it as a starting point in its own for-
eign and security policy becoming increasingly paranoid about the West-
ern penetration of its ‘near abroad’ in the process.10
One way to characterize the role the two played and the relationship
they enjoyed is to think of two concentric hegemonies. U.S. global pri-
macy set the liberal and benign overall framework in which the EU’s
own attempts at hegemonic ordering of the European continent and
beyond took place.11 In this respect, the policies of the United

7 See Stephan Keukeleire and Tom Delreux (2014) The Foreign Policy of the European Union.
Second edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).
8 Elfriede Regelsberger and Wolfgang Wessels (1996) “The CFSP institutions and procedures:

A third way for the second pillar”. European Foreign Affairs Review, 1 (1): 29–54, p. 29.
9 Michael Baun (2004) “The Implications of EU Enlargement for the United States,” Per-

spectives, No. 21 (Winter 2003/04): 27-38; Steven McGuire and Michael Smith (2008) The
European Union and the United States. Competition and Convergence in the Global Arena (Bas-
ingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 222–225.
10 See, for example, Stefan Meister (ed.) (2013) Economisation versus Power Ambitions: Rethinking

Russia’s Policy towards Post-Soviet States (Berlin: Nomos).

11 Hiski Haukkala (2008) “The European Union as a Regional Normative Hegemon: The

Case of European Neighbourhood Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies, 60 (9): 1601–1622.

 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 223

States/NATO and the EU were mutually reinforcing and suggested a

natural division of labour on the European continent. The United
States would guarantee security (through the expansion of NATO) and
through its primacy set global parameters, while the EU would take the
main responsibility for stabilizing the European setting through the
enlargement of its institutions and/or projection of its policies through
modes of external governance12 in directions where a rapid and full
immersion into the EU was not viewed as an option.
Having established this, one should be wary of assigning too much
strategic intentionality on the part of either the United States or the
EU. On the contrary, an analysis of the evolution of their responses to
the unfolding events in the 1990s has shown that both were proceeding
on the basis of trial and error and that the hegemonic underpinnings of
their policies were arrived at in a piecemeal, almost haphazard manner.
In a word, both NATO’s and the EU’s eventual Sprung nach Osten were
more reactions and responses to events and demands beyond their con-
trol or initial appetite rather than preconceived programs to order or
subjugate eastern Europe to their will.13 That said, none of this neces-
sarily detracts from the eventual effects and ramifications of these poli-
cies, and even if it did, the fact remains that Russia, as will be discussed
below, has chosen to frame the issue increasingly in this manner.
In hindsight, and regardless of its origins, this two-pronged approach
proved remarkably successful: the transition to a new post-Cold War
order in Europe, although fraught with dangers, was achieved in a
largely peaceful and orderly fashion. The conflicts particularly in the
former Yugoslavia were pacified and the region was steered towards the
path of eventual EU accession. Although a set of ‘frozen’ conflicts were
left simmering in the east, both the EU and NATO were successful in
answering the calls for accession from central and east European coun-
tries, resulting in an increasingly hegemonic, even unipolar setting in
Europe. Even in cases where full immersion into Western structures
was not in the cards, as in Russia and the rest of the Newly Independent
States (NIS) in the former Soviet Union, the objective was to eventually
tie them as well into this new Western-centric architecture.

12 Sandra Lavenex (2004) “EU External Governance in ‘Wider Europe,’” Journal of European
Public Policy, 11 (4): 680–700.
13 For a discussion, see Asmus, op. cit.; Karen Elizabeth Smith (1999) The Making of EU

Foreign Policy: The Case of Eastern Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

224 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

A Bridge Too Far? The Russian Challenge to

Western Policies toward Wider Europe

If history had really ended in lockstep with the 20th century our story
would probably have a happy ending. But since the early 2000s a series
of developments have taken place that have both aggravated the situa-
tion on the European continent while also increasingly putting the
notion of Western transatlantic harmony into doubt, especially when it
comes to wider Europe. Paradoxically, the root cause for the mounting
problems seems to be a host of unintended consequences of the very
successes of the West, particularly the rapid and successful expansion of
its key institutions towards the east as well as the handling of the crises
in the Balkans in the 1990s. These issues had the combined effect of
aggravating relations between Russia and the West, and the United
States in particular. As such, wider Europe has increasingly turned into a
theatre where increased Russian–Western rivalries are played out.
First and foremost, the question of NATO enlargement(s) to the east
has proven an object of bitter contention between Russia and the West.
The Russian contestation to NATO’s enlargement has taken mainly two
forms. On the one hand, Russians argue that the United States and the
West have betrayed a promise given to Gorbachev already at the end of
the Cold War that NATO would not expand beyond the boundaries of
unified Germany. Although U.S. officials at the time did perhaps exer-
cise some ambiguity in terms of wording, not a rare occurrence in the
world of diplomacy, it seems safe to conclude that no such explicit
pledge was ever given.14 The second strand of criticism stems from the
perceived threat of a Western military alliance moving closer to the
Russian heartland. Western policymakers probably do not recognize the
bogey man that Moscow has been painting of their intentions and
actions. But once again we are faced with a situation where this need
not matter: Russia has chosen to frame the issue in these terms and has
shown that it will act accordingly. Russia’s framing and consequent reac-
tions, not the hopes and intentions of Western policymakers, have
become the main driving force on this occasion as well.
Related to this is the wider Russian complaint concerning the role the
United States has played globally. U.S. post-Cold War primacy in gen-

14 Asmus, op. cit., pp. 3–7; Mark Kramer (2009) “The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement
Pledge to Russia.” Washington Quarterly, 32 (2): 39–61.
 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 225

eral and the way Washington chose to respond to the 9/11 terrorist
strikes in particular accentuated the Russian impression of a rampant
United States bent on dominating Russia and the world unilaterally. In
Vladimir Putin’s spectacular and resentful words, uttered already in
2006–07, “the wolf knows who to eat… and is not about to listen to any-
one” and that, as a consequence, the United States had “overstepped its
national borders in every way.”15 Indeed, positioning itself as a counter-
force to a reckless and overly domineering United States has become the
leitmotif of Putin’s rhetoric and Russian foreign policy in recent years.
Although not felt as keenly at the time, EU enlargement has also cre-
ated frictions between Russia and the West. In particular, the question
of a ‘common neighbourhood’ (a term never accepted by Russians, by
the way) created in the aftermath of the ‘Big Bang’ eastern enlargement
of 2004 has proven to be a source of problems. In particular, Ukraine’s
Orange Revolution—which took both the EU and Russia by surprise—
changed Moscow’s tack concerning the role the EU played in the
region. Moscow’s previous indifference subsided and it began to view
the EU’s growing role and the Western orientation of CIS countries
with increasing suspicion.16 Although it was not appreciated at the time,
the Orange Revolution was the starting gun for the preparation of oper-
ations and practices witnessed first in Georgia in 2008 and then in
Crimea and eastern Ukraine since 2014.17
Finally, the Kosovo war in 1999 and its diplomatic aftermath proved
to be highly disruptive. For Russia, the Kosovo case drove home at least
two lessons that made a lasting impact on its subsequent relations with
the West, the EU included.18 The first lesson was that the United
States, and to a lesser degree also the EU member states, were prepared
to use military intervention to effect regime change in cases where they

15 Vladimir Putin (2006) Annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, May 10, 2006, available

at http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105
566.shtml, last accessed 28 October 2015; and Vladimir Putin (2007) Speech and the Following
Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, February 10, 2007, available at
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/page/552, last accessed 28 October 2015.
16 Igor Gretskiy, Evgeny Treshchenkov and Konstantin Golubev (2014) “Russia’s perceptions

and misperceptions of the EU Eastern Partnership.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies,

47, 3–4: 375–383.
17 Ulrike Franke (2015) War by non-military means. Understanding Russian information warfare.

FOR-R-4065-SE, March 2015 (Stockholm: FOI).

18 Derek Averre (2009) “From Pristina to Tskhinvali: The Legacy of Operation Allied Force

in Russia’s Relations with the West.” International Affairs, 85 (3): 575–591.

226 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

see fit. The second lesson was that unilateral military intervention can
take place without an explicit mandate from the UN Security Council
and against the voiced objection of the Russian Federation in particular.
This is a pattern Russia has continuously perceived in other color revo-
lutions in the post-Soviet area, including recently in Middle East and
North Africa. Taken together, the Kosovo affair had the wider implica-
tion of distancing Russia from the West, the EU included, paving the
way for the galvanization of a much more hard-nosed realist foreign
policy consensus during the Putin era.19
These tensions have been exacerbated by the fact that countries in
wider Europe have presented the West with their own challenges. To
begin with, countries in the region are usually weak states with limited
administrative capacity. Corruption is entrenched. They are often
divided states, either physically, as is the case with Georgia or Moldova,
or mentally and politically when it comes to their place in Europe, as is
the case with Ukraine. As a consequence, these countries have faced
severe limitations in their ability and even basic willingness to engage in
the kinds of reforms propagated by the West.20
In addition, the element of competition between the EU and Russia
has not gone unnoticed by the countries residing in-between. In fact,
this constellation has invited and enabled a recurring political pattern
where the states in the ‘common neighborhood’ have alternated their
allegiances between the EU and Russia, always looking for a better
political and economic deal. Therefore, instead of fully Europeanizing
or falling loyally into Russia’s orbit, the countries have used the two
protagonists as bargaining chips and sources of political leverage to but-
tress their own sovereignty and freedom of manuever.21
As a result, neither the West not Russia has managed to achieve its
aims, and both have been played off one another by the countries-in-
between. Moreover, this process has fed a feeling of latent competition

19 Dmitri Trenin (2007) “Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West,” Washington
Quarterly, 30 (2): 95–105.
20 See Elena Gnedina and Evghenia Sleptsova(2012) Eschewing Choice: Ukraine’s Strategy on

Russia and the EU, CEPS Working Document No. 360, January 2012, http://www.ceps.eu/
book/eschewing-choice-ukraine%E2%80%99s-strategy-russia-and-eu, last accessed 29 Oc-
tober 2015.
21 Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson (2009), The Limits of Enlargement-lite: European and

Russian Power in the Troubled Neighbourhood (London: European Council on Foreign Rela-
tions).
 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 227

in the region, eroding trust and hindering the development of coopera-

tion further afield, in effect acting as an important backdrop to the cur-
rent conflict between Russia and the West.
The challenges for the EU are further complicated by the strong
Russian presence in the region. Russia has on its own initiative been
excluded from the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), but it is nev-
ertheless a player (in one form or another) in all of the conflicts in the
region, and has remained far from disinterested when it comes to the
development of these countries’ ties with the West.
The conflict in Ukraine can be seen as a culmination of all of these
unhappy trends. This is not the place to discuss the conflict in any
detail.22 Suffice it to say that it has unearthed a set of divergences within
the Western camp as well as between the West and Russia that account
for the gestation of the conflict as well as point out to some future chal-
lenges for the West, both in terms of handling the negative tendencies
and in preserving unity.
Starting with the United States, it would be erroneous to argue that
Washington is a disinterested party to events in wider Europe. On the
contrary, the strong role the United States has played in fostering West-
ern unity over the conflict in Ukraine shows that Washington is any-
thing but disinterested. At the same time, U.S. interests are mainly
geostrategic, i.e., to deal with the wider security setting in Europe and
the potential military challenge posed by Russia. This leads to two con-
sequences related to the role the United States can be expected to play
in the region. First, since the war in Georgia in 2008 and the reset that
followed a year later, the significance of wider Europe on its own merits
has been downplayed by the United States—a development that has not
gone unnoticed in Moscow and one that can be seen as a potential back-
ground factor influencing Russia’s growing willingness to make its claim
for a recognized sphere of influence in wider Europe increasingly public
and the eventual decision to back this claim by resorting to violence in
reacting to the events in Ukraine.23

22 For useful works in this respect, see Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer (2015) Conflict in
Ukraine. Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press); Andrew
Wilson (2014) Ukraine Crisis: What it Mean for the West (New Haven: Yale University Press).
23 See Bobo Lo (2015) Russia and the New World Disorder (London and Washington D.C.:

Chatham House and Brookings), pp. 171–72.

228 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Second, the United States needs to balance its role and commitments
in wider Europe, and indeed in wider European security, with develop-
ments and challenges elsewhere in the world, including the volatile
Middle East and the dynamics in Asia. On the one hand this accentuates
U.S. stakes in Europe, as Russia’s challenge and the U.S. response can
be seen as a test case concerning U.S. resolve and ability to handle
regional security challengers in general. On the other hand, notwith-
standing its recent increase in relevance the European theatre can still
be envisaged as of being secondary importance, an unnecessary drain on
scarce U.S. resources that could be better spent elsewhere. From a
Russian perspective this opens up potential avenues for probing
whether an understanding with the United States about the future of
wider Europe could be reached. One way to read the role Russia has
played in Iran and Syria is to signal to Washington that, depending on
the case and the context, Moscow can be either an asset or a liability,
and that if the two could reach agreement over Ukraine and the rest of
wider Europe, Russia might be willing to act more in the former capac-
ity. Whether this is an offer the U.S. or the wider West could ever trust
or accept is an entirely different matter, of course.
Turning to the European Union, since its eastern enlargement in the
early 2000s the region has been one of the main issues on its external
agenda. For example, one of the three strategic objectives in the 2003
Security Strategy was building security in the EU’s neighbourhood.24
Geographical proximity alone ensures that the EU needs to address the
issues much more seriously and in a more comprehensive manner than
the United States. In addition, due to its own nature as a value-driven
regional integration project, the EU’s essential objectives and tools have
differed somewhat from those of the United States. Therefore, instead
of adopting a geostrategic perspective, the EU has pursued a values-dri-
ven approach where good governance and economic reforms have been
promoted with a view of tying Europe’s east, Russia included, into a
wider European economic and political area. These differences have not
shielded the EU from Russian criticism, as it was long hoped or
believed, as the EU has, whether it intended it or not, started to chal-
lenge and even erode the viability and legitimacy of Russian approaches
in wider Europe.

24 European Council (2003) A Secure Europe in a Better World—European Security Strategy,

Brussels 12 December 2003, p. 7.
 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 229

Russia considers wider Europe to be of primary, even overriding

geopolitical interest. With its actions Russia has made abundantly clear
that it views the region a no-go zone for both the EU and NATO and
that is willing to use all the means at its disposal to enforce this policy
and pay a high price in terms of economic hardship and international,
although mainly Western, opprobrium in doing so. The reasons for this
are myriad and stem mainly from Russia’s own domestic development;
they need not be discussed on this occasion.25 The main point worth
stressing here is that the near-existential nature of Russian interests in
and over wider Europe create an asymmetry that is unfavorable to the
West: no matter how hard the West pushes its policies in the east,
Moscow is always willing to push back a little harder. This has been
reflected in the efficacy of Western responses to the conflict in Ukraine,
where instead of capitulating—as was perhaps hoped by the West—Rus-
sia insisted both on its own objectives and the chosen hybrid modus
operandi of continued destabilization of Ukraine. The combined effect
of differences in stakes and Russia’s acumen to play to its relative
strengths sub-regionally have resulted and will continue result in signif-
icant hardships for the West if and when it hopes to continue keep
pushing for its policies in wider Europe.

Conclusions

The present situation finds the key Western actors in a paradoxical situ-
ation. On the one hand, a great deal has been accomplished: key institu-
tions have enlarged successfully and as a consequence the geographical
heart of Europe has been stabilized. On the other hand, Russia’s angry
response to the continued eastward drift of these policies and institu-
tions tests the continuation of these practices as well as some successes
we have already been accustomed to take for granted. This will spell
continued challenges and even hardships for the West in and over wider
Europe.
The tragic turn of events in Ukraine in early 2014 was a wake-up call
to Western assumptions. Russia decided to check the growing presence
of both NATO and the EU in the East and launched a wide-ranging
hybrid conflict against Ukraine, and by extension the EU and the West.

25 Fora wonderful exposition of this issue, see Fiona Hill and Clifford Gaddy (2015) Mr.
Putin—Operative in Kremlin, Second edition (Washington, D.C.: Brookings).
230 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

These developments have in effect nullified the EU’s approach towards

the region as well as forced the United States to become much more
engaged in European security and the EU’s neighborhood yet again.
Although it is clear that the U.S. role is indispensable in stabilizing the
security situation in Europe, the fact that such a posture is once again
required is hardly a welcome development. On the contrary, the whole
Europe, including Russia, risks losing most of the co-operative security
gains achieved during the post-Cold War era.
Yet the Western record is not entirely negative. To a degree, the
2000s had already showcased the potential for a fruitful division of labor
between the EU and the United States. By accentuating the EU’s role
especially in its eastern neighborhood adjacent to Russia, the ENP
offered a way for developing a mutually beneficial division of labor over
the Atlantic Ocean.26 For the EU, this offered a chance to make good
on its earlier rhetoric about ‘the hour of Europe’ in the early 1990s. For
the United States this offered an opportunity to divert attention and
resources away from the region that could be put to a better use in
other troubled hot spots of perhaps greater strategic importance to the
United States than eastern Europe. A theatre where this approach has
worked has been the Western Balkans, where the EU has relieved the
United States from both peacekeeping and crisis-management duties as
well as taken the lead in the civilian management and stabilization of
the region through the stabilization and association process since
November 2000.
By assuming greater responsibility over the Balkans, the EU has car-
ried its own share of the transatlantic burden. At the same time it has
manifestly failed to repeat the feat and act as an engine of stability in
wider Europe. To a large degree this stems from the fact that, and unlike
in the western Balkans, the EU has had to operate in an environment
where a regional hegemon has actively sought to challenge and under-
mine its policies. But the EU itself is also to blame, as its current and, as
it seems growing, immersion in successive and overlapping crises is in
danger of creating highly unstable dynamics also within the EU itself.
The slowly simmering crisis within the EU risks becoming a systemic
malaise, potentially overshadowing the future development and even
the very viability of the European project itself. This is, or at least

26 For a discussion, see Hiski Haukkala (2008) “The European Neighborhood Policy”. In
Sven Biscop and Johan Lembke (eds.), EU Enlargement and Transatlantic Alliance: A Security
Relationship in Flux (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner): 159–172.
 How to Prevent the Unraveling of Western Policies toward Wider Europe 231

should be, a cause for concern not only for the EU and its member
states but for the United States as well, which has sought to use the EU
as a tool for stabilizing the European continent. A failure of the EU is a
risk that neither EU member states nor the United States can afford.
The only party that would seem to gain from such a turn of events
would be Russia, although it is hard to see how an increasingly dysfunc-
tional EU could be in its long-term interests, either.
The fact remains that the West is in for a very difficult time in and
over wider Europe. The countries themselves will pose a set of difficult
challenges and will be anything but easy partners. Russian belligerence is
not likely to disappear in the nearest future, either. On the contrary, Rus-
sia is more likely to seek to challenge Western policies in the region as
well as question and seek to undermine the domestic cohesion and soli-
darity of these countries. This leaves the West with the unenviable task of
managing these challenges in a situation in which the essential interests of
the United States and the EU are anything but identical. For the EU in
particular a time of trials and tribulations seems to be in the offing, as it
will have to try to deal with these issues while combating increased dys-
functionality and sclerosis at home. One is indeed hard pressed to remain
optimistic about any of the issues discussed in this article.
In the final analysis, the main challenge for Western actors across the
board is to adopt a more coherent and thoughtful response to wider
Europe. As was argued previously, a great deal of the evolution of West-
ern policies towards the area can be explained by happenstance. In the
current and tense situation this will no longer suffice. For the moment
the only actor that has a comprehensive view and approach to wider
Europe is Russia. This enables Moscow to control the essential conflict
dynamics as well as ensure that it can play to its own strengths. The
West, by comparison, remains stuck in a reactive mode, (over)burdened
by a host of other issues and crises and slowed down by the cumber-
some process of internal coordination and negotiation as well as by
institutional rivalries.
This applies in particular to the EU, but the United States does not
escape reproach either. As a consequence Western policy remains adrift,
with Russia controlling the pace of events. In the process Moscow has
been able to desensitize the West into accepting things that were seen as
entirely unacceptable only a while ago. For example, the West’s initial
nightmare scenario in Ukraine, namely a frozen conflict in Donbas,
seems more recently to have become the preferred scenario. This strate-
232 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

gic drift in Western objectives, if continued, will ensure that Russia will
eventually reach its objectives in Ukraine, as to a degree it already has.
Moreover, if it manages successfully to call the Western and perhaps in
particular the EU bluff over sanctions, it seems safe to conclude that
Russia will not only be able to achieve its immediate aims in Ukraine
but that a larger challenge and an eventual roll back of Western policy
towards wider Europe could be around the corner.
This does not need to entail that the Western policy towards wider
Europe need remain a bridge too far. To avert this eventuality a serious
re-think of Western policies is required. If the West is to play its game
more successfully it must, firstly, learn the right lessons from its earlier
policies. Pointing these out has been the aim of this chapter. Second, the
key Western actors need to acknowledge that the challenge is and will
remain strategic and will require some head-on collisions with Russia in
certain issues while avoiding conflict in others. It also means strategic
patience and the ability to assess and decide when the stakes are too
high for overall European security. A game of chicken, which at times
seems to have been in the offing in the East, is not a particularly safe
sport. Indeed, the underlying concern is that the auto pilot mode of
Western responses—ambitious on surface, timid in implementation—to
the current crisis may result in further sleepwalking into another and
potentially much bigger clash with Russia. It is high time for the West
to acknowledge the radically altered nature of the game in wider
Europe and to start to act accordingly, carefully weighing possibilities
and risks, options and dangers. This will pose demands on both sides of
the Atlantic: the EU must come of age as a strategic, although not nec-
essarily a fully-fledged security actor, and the United States, and by
extension NATO, must remain intimately involved in European secu-
rity. It seems likely that the question of Western unity of purpose and
vision of eastern Europe is set to remain relevant for quite some time.
 Chapter 13

Western Policy toward Wider Europe

F. Stephen Larrabee

The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 marked the end of the
Cold War. In the two and a half decades since then the former commu-
nist states in central and eastern Europe have been integrated into
Euro-Atlantic institutions. Today they enjoy a degree of economic pros-
perity, political stability and external security exceeding anything most
of them have experienced in their history.
However, two regions—the western Balkans and the states on Rus-
sia’s western periphery (often referred to as “wider Europe”) are part of
the “unfinished business” left over from the end of the Cold War. wider
Europe includes six states—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia,
Moldova and Belarus—three of which want to join NATO.
The United States and the European Union share a common interest
in extending democratic stability into the wider Europe region and pro-
moting greater security there. As Daniel Hamilton and Nikolas Foster
have noted, failure to deal with wider Europe’s problems risks destabi-
lizing competition and confrontation among its regional and external
actors, leading to festering separatist conflicts, greater international
challenges and dysfunctional energy markets, the negative consequences
of which could spill over into Europe and Eurasia.1
However, projecting stability and democracy into wider Europe
poses a difficult challenge for several reasons.
First, Russia’s interests and political influence are much stronger and
more resilient in wider Europe than was the case in central/eastern
Europe or the western Balkans. The states in wider Europe are seen by
Russian officials as part of Russia’s sphere of “privileged interest”2
Moscow regards the expansion of Western influence and institutions,

1 Daniel Hamilton and Nikolas Foster, “The Obama administration and Europe,” in Alvaro
de Vasconcelos and Marcin Zaborowski (eds.), The Obama Moment (Paris: The EU Institute
for Security Studies, 2009), p. 52.
2 See George Friedman, “Geopolitical Diary: The Medvedev Doctrine,” Stratfor, 2 September
2008.

243
244 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

particularly NATO, into the former Soviet space as a threat to its

national security, and Russia is determined to defend its interests in this
region, with force if necessary, as Russia’s war against Georgia in August
2008 and its military intervention in eastern Ukraine have underscored.
Second, the wider Europe region lacks strong regional institutions
that can promote regional cooperation and mitigate conflict. Efforts
have been made to foster closer regional cooperation, such as the estab-
lishment of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) organization.
However, BSEC lacks strong mechanisms for policy coordination and it
is not well-equipped to deal with security issues.
Third, the wider Europe area contains a number of potentially explo-
sive unresolved or “frozen” conflicts. These conflicts include the dispute
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh, the
Transnistria conflict between Russia and Moldova, the secessionist con-
flicts between Georgia and Abkhazia and South Ossetia and the sepa-
ratist struggle in eastern Ukraine. These conflicts pose a threat to
regional stability and are obstacles to the integration of the countries of
wider Europe into Euro-Atlantic institutions.
Fourth, many European members of the EU and NATO have reser-
vations about whether countries like Georgia and Ukraine—not to
mention Azerbaijan, with its Muslim population and historical and cul-
tural ties to Iran—are really part of Europe and European culture. This
ambivalence about the “Europeanness” of the countries in wider Europe
is an important obstacle to the integration of these countries into Euro-
pean and Euro-Atlantic institutions. In the case of central Europe, many
European officials had reservations about the wisdom of inviting them
to join NATO and the EU, but no one questioned whether these states
were part of Europe.
Finally, many EU officials have concerns about EU’s capacity to
absorb new members at a time when the EU is still wrestling with
demands imposed by the enlargements of the EU 2004 and 2007. These
concerns have been reinforced by growing worries about a host of new
challenges posed by terrorism, immigration, the influx of refugees from
the Middle East, and the sovereign debt crisis. European officials fear
that EU institutions, already facing a growing pile of challenges, may
become “overwhelmed” and prove incapable of managing all these
mounting challenges simultaneously.
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 245

NATO Enlargement

The difficulty of projecting stability into wider Europe is compounded

by the fact that the political and strategic context for eastern enlarge-
ment today differs significantly from the political and strategic context
that existed in the mid l990s and early 2000s when the first rounds of
enlargement occurred.
The most important difference is that Russia’s hostility to the expan-
sion of the NATO and the EU into the post-Soviet space is much
stronger today. As noted earlier, Russia regards the post-Soviet space as an
area of “privileged interest”—that is, an area of special strategic impor-
tance for Russian security—and it views the expansion of NATO and the
EU into post-Soviet space as a direct threat to its national security.
Within NATO, there are strong reservations about any further
enlargement of the Alliance in the near future. The NATO summit in
Bucharest in April 2008 represented an important turning point in the
process to further enlarge the Alliance. At the summit, President Bush
pushed for offering Georgia and Ukraine a Membership Action Plan
(MAP)—a program designed to prepare aspirants for NATO member-
ship. However, the proposal to award MAP to Georgia and Ukraine was
blocked by France and Germany, who feared such a move would exacer-
bate tensions with Russia. However, in order to reassure Georgia and
Ukraine and assuage their disappointment at having been denied MAP,
the communiqué issued by the heads of state and governments of the
Alliance at the conclusion of the summit stated that Georgia and
Ukraine would be admitted to the Alliance, but without specifying a
specific date for their entry.
In short, the Bucharest summit sent a confusing and ambiguous mes-
sage. On the one hand, NATO refused to award Georgia and Ukraine
MAP, which was considered to be an important step toward member-
ship. On the other, the two countries obtained an unprecedented writ-
ten promise that they would at some undefined time in the future
become members of the Alliance. In effect, Alliance leaders tried to
square the circle—to have their cake and eat it too—by reassuring
Georgia and Ukraine that they would be become members at some
unnamed point in the future while saying indirectly to Russia “But don’t
worry it won’t happen soon.”
246 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 underscored the

dangers of giving an Article 5 security guarantee unless NATO mem-
bers are fully committed and able to implement that guarantee. Prior to
the Russian invasion of Georgia, NATO members, especially the new
aspirants for membership, had focused primarily on the security benefits
of NATO membership. The Russo-Georgian war was a sharp reminder
that membership also entailed obligations as well.
This delicate balancing act, which had worked in the past, failed at
Bucharest. It did not reassure Georgia and Ukraine because the
timetable for membership was too vague. And it did not reassure Russia
because the communiqué was seen by Moscow as meaning that NATO
would enlarge sooner rather than later. Indeed, the summit not only
failed to deter Russia but, as Ron Asmus has suggested, it may actually
have emboldened Moscow to step up pressure on Georgia and con-
tributed to the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian five-day war in August
2008.3 It also threatened to slow down the transformation and reform
process in wider Europe because without a strong sense of security
these states would have difficulty introducing a coherent and effective
reform program.
While the invasion was aimed at punishing Georgian President
Mikheil Saakashvili for his pro-Western course, especially his pursuit of
NATO membership, it was also designed to send a broader message to
the West, especially the United States, that Russia regarded the post-
Soviet space to be part of its sphere of influence, and that it was pre-
pared to defend its these interests, with force if necessary
The invasion was thus a sharp reminder—to the countries in the
West as well as those in wider Europe—that Russia was still a power to
be reckoned with and that any attempt to establish close security ties to
countries located on the former Soviet space would need to take Russ-
ian security interests more prominently into consideration. At the same
time, it made clear to the Russian leadership that there would be no
military response by NATO if Moscow took military action against a
post-Soviet state that was not a member of NATO (or the EU)—a les-
son that may have influenced President Putin to use military force
against Ukraine in 2014.

3 Ronald D. Asmus, A Little War that Shook the World (New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010),
p. 138.
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 247

EU Enlargement

The momentum behind enlargement has significantly slowed within the

EU as well. The global financial crisis forced a shift in the EU’s priori-
ties and outlook. Today the emphasis in Europe is on internal retrench-
ment, not external expansion. European governments are concerned
with the continuing sovereign debt crisis in the EU, the social impact of
the largest influx of refugees since World War II, the growing threat
from terrorism, and reducing the costs of maintaining the social welfare
systems built up in the decades since World War II. EU members have
little enthusiasm for—and are less ready to underwrite—expensive poli-
cies aimed at integrating the EU’s eastern neighborhood.
Within the EU a feeling of “enlargement fatigue “ has emerged in
recent years. There is a strong sense among EU members that the EU
needs to strengthen its institutional capacity to absorb the new mem-
bers that were admitted during the latest rounds of negotiations—the
most recent being Croatia, which was admitted in 2013—before consid-
ering a further ”widening” of its ranks. In particular, there has been
growing discontent and disillusionment among European publics with
the process of enlargement. Right-wing political groups opposed to
enlargement have gained ground in many European countries, espe-
cially France, Netherlands, Denmark, Finland, and Greece, and have
made EU enlargement one of their prime targets.
Today there is little support in the EU for new initiatives aimed at fur-
ther enlargement to the east. The Eastern Partnership—the EU’s main
policy instrument for dealing with countries on its eastern periphery—
emphasizes trade and soft power as instruments for promoting closer ties
with the countries on the EU’s eastern periphery. However, unlike the
association agreements with the states of the western Balkans, the East-
ern Partnership does not offer the prospect of membership. Membership
is the “golden carrot.” Without the incentive of membership, many of
the countries in the Eastern Partnership are not likely to be willing to
undertake the risks of introducing meaningful reform programs.

The Eastern Partnership

In addition, since 2009, Russia’s views regarding the EU have hardened.

Initially Russia did not see the EU as a threat. Moscow’s main concern
was focused on trying to block the enlargement of NATO. However,
248 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Russian attitudes began to change with the development in 2009 of the

EU’s Eastern Partnership. A joint Polish-Swedish initiative, the Eastern
Partnership was designed to increase cooperation with six states in
wider Europe: Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia. However, the Eastern Partnership never had the full support
of the strongest EU member states, particularly Germany, which feared
that the initiative could have a negative impact on its effort to deepen
relations with Russia.
However, EU and Russian perspectives about the goals and benefits
of the Eastern Partnership differed significantly. The EU saw the East-
ern Partnership as a win-win situation for all concerned. EU officials
believed the initiative could forge closer ties to Russia’s neighbors in the
post-Soviet space and simultaneously maintain good relations with
Moscow—a view which proved to be naive and misguided. Russia, EU
officials argued, would benefit from greater stabilization of its periphery
and the members of the Eastern Partnership could act as a bridge
between Russia and the EU.
Russia, however, saw things quite differently. To Russian officials the
Eastern Partnership looked more like a “hostile takeover.” Russia envis-
aged the Eurasian Customs Union as a counter-initiative to the Eastern
Partnership and confronted members with a stark either/or choice.
Membership in the Eurasian Union was incompatible with the deep and
comprehensive trade agreements that the EU sought to sign with the
members of the Eastern Partnership.

The Western Policy Agenda

The Ukrainian crisis marks an important watershed in relations with

the West and raises a number of important questions and challenges
regarding Western policy in the future. What should Western policy
toward wider Europe be in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis? How
can Western goals be achieved in the face of a more assertive Russia?
What adjustments in Western policy need to be made in light of recent
developments?
Pursuing an overarching Western policy towards wider Europe is dif-
ficult because of the region’s great diversity. Each of the countries in the
region is very different and faces very different problems Thus a one-
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 249

policy-fits-all approach won’t work. Western policymakers will need to

adopt specific policies for each of the individual countries in the region.

The Eastern Partnership

This is particularly true in the case of the EU’s Eastern Partnership.
The Partnership was launched in 2009 with goal of creating the neces-
sary conditions to accelerate political association and further economic
integration with the countries of wider Europe. In terms of their inter-
est in promoting closer contacts to and greater integration with the EU,
the countries of wider Europe can be divided into two groups. The first
group consists of Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Belarus has shown
little serous interest in forging close ties to Europe and is currently
under EU sanctions; Azerbaijan has also shown little serious interest in
close ties to the Eastern Partnership, particularly those elements of the
Partnership that would require Baku to improve its dismal human rights
record; Armenia was on the verge of initialing an Association Agree-
ment with the EU in September 2014, but under strong Russian pres-
sure put its plans on hold and joined the Russian-led Customs Union
instead.
Thus, only three countries—Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine—sub-
scribe wholeheartedly to the Eastern Partnership. And Moscow is fun-
damentally opposed to the Partnership and sees it as a threat to its basic
interests. Thus as the Centre for European Reform has argued, rather
than trying to keep all six partners in a single framework as they
increasingly move along diverging paths, the EU should accept reality
and try to structure its relations with the six countries on an individual
basis that recognizes this diversity.4
In addition, the geopolitical context has significantly changed in the
last several years. The Ukrainian crisis has resulted in a sharp deteriora-
tion of the EU’s economic and political relations with Moscow. Russian
and EU policy are out of sync. Since the annexation of Crimea Russia
has pursued an assertive policy that that emphasizes “hard security”
while the EU continues to give priority to “soft security.” This discrep-
ancy in basic goals and behavior makes an attempt by the EU to seri-
ously engage Russia in a meaningful way very difficult and has sparked a

4 http://centerfor European reform.blogspot.de/2013/12/the-eastern-partnership-the road–

from.html
250 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

wide-ranging debate within the EU regarding the future of the Eastern

Partnership.5
In a thoughtful contribution to this debate, two German analysts,
Kai-Olaf Lang and Barbara Lippert, argue that the countries to the
EU’s east are caught between a vague “wider Europe” proposal from
Brussels and Russia’s increasingly forceful idea of a “wider Russia.” The
Ukrainian crisis has forced the EU into a permanent crisis management
mode in which security issues and the search for diplomatic compro-
mise dominate the political agenda. The EU can only succeed in achiev-
ing its goals in this new phase, they contend, if it faces up to the Russian
factor and realigns its relations with Russia on an Eastern policy of what
they term “cooperative confrontation,” which gives priority three goals:
stability, cooperation and norm-driven transformation.
The problem is that Russia has shown by its recent actions in eastern
Ukraine and Crimea that it is not interested in the three goals of their
proposed Eastern policy—stability, cooperation and norm driven trans-
formation—and that it is wedded to the pursuit of a policy based on
hard power and maintaining political dominance over the states in
wider Europe. Thus the policy of cooperative confrontation (an oxy-
moron if there ever was one) has little chance of being accepted as a
basis for a new EU policy toward wider Europe.

Ukraine
As far as Western policy is concerned, top priority should be given to
stabilizing Ukraine and preventing the country’s economic collapse. All
the lethal weapons in the world will not help Ukraine if its economy
collapses—and there is a danger that it could unless the West makes a
stronger commitment to ensuring that Ukraine embarks upon a serious
program of economic reform.
Some important steps in this direction were taken in the late summer
of 2015. In August Ukraine secured an agreement to avert default and
restructure billions of dollars of government debt. A group of Ukraine’s
largest creditors accepted an immediate 20 percent write-off on $18 bil-
lion of the country’s bonds.6 The deal also includes a freeze on debt

5 For a useful contribution to this debate, see Stefan Meister, “Rethinking the Eastern Neigh-
borhood,” https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/ip-journal/topics/rethinking-eastern neighbor-
hood
6 Elane Moore and Neil Buckley, “Ukraine secures debt deal for war ravaged economy,” Fi-
nancial Times, August 28, 2015.
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 251

repayments for four years. The restructuring allows Ukraine to main-

tain access to capital markets and provide the stable economic platform
that will help the country to restore growth.
The agreement came at a crucial time, with tentative signs that the
Ukrainian economy is beginning to stabilize. While output is still
falling, the hryvnia has stopped its steep decline and inflation, which
had reached 60 percent earlier in the year, is moderating.
Ukraine, however, is far from being out of the woods. The Ukrainian
leadership faces several critical challenges. The first is to implement a
coherent and sustainable domestic reform agenda. Ukraine finds itself
in a highly vulnerable situation today largely due to bad decisions by its
political leadership.7 The previous leaders put off needed economic
reforms because they feared that reforms would undermine their own
political power and interests.
A second related challenge is posed by rampant and widespread cor-
ruption. Corruption reached alarming dimensions under President Vik-
tor Yanukovych. Prime Minister Yatsenyuk accused Yanukovych of steal-
ing $37 billion from the state—equal to one fifth of Ukraine’s GDP in
2013—during his four years in office.8
Energy security represents a third critical challenge. Ukraine needs a
viable energy policy. It is one of the most energy-inefficient countries in
the world. Ukraine needs to reduce its high level of energy wastage. It
pays fuel subsidies equivalent to 7.5 percent of its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP). Its energy intensity—the ration of energy used to economic
output—is twice that of Russia and ten times the OECD average.9 A
reduction in subsidies and higher fuel bills are unavoidable if Ukraine is
to solve its energy problems.
A lot will depend on whether the United States and Europe can
maintain a strong united front regarding the sanctions imposed on Rus-
sia in July 2015. In December 2015, the EU voted to extend the sanc-
tions for another six months. But as the deadline for the extended sanc-

7 See Steven Pifer, “Taking Stock in Ukraine,” The American Interest /http://www.the-ameri-
can-interest.com/articles/2014/10/28.
8 For a detailed discussion of the disruptive impact of corruption on Ukrainian economic and
social life, see Anders Aslund, “Ukraine’s Old Internal Enemy,” Wall Street Journal, October
1, 2014.
9 Ibid.
252 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

tions to expire approaches, pressure is likely to increase for repealing

the sanctions and returning to ”business as usual” is likely to mount.
However, lifting the sanctions before Russia fulfills its obligations
under the Minsk agreement would be a mistake. The sanctions are
beginning to have an impact and intensify Russia’s economic problems.
The decline of price of oil and signs of a deepening recession have
caused a cutback in on Russia’s Russian defense spending. The draft
defense budget for 2015-2017 calls for a cut in defense expenditures by
5.3 percent in 2016—the first cut in defense spending since 2008.10
Russian government officials have warned that the Russian budget can
be balanced in the next three years only if oil prices remain above $100
per barrel. Most projections expect the price of oil to be well below that
figure—closer to $60 or $70 per barrel. Some economists believe that
oil prices could drop even lower, depending on events.
Russia’s military intervention in Syria is likely to exacerbate the eco-
nomic the growing economic strains. As the economic costs of Russia’s
military intervention in Syria mount, Putin may be more open to a
Ukrainian settlement. Indeed, one of the motivations behind Putin’s
decision to launch the military intervention in Syria appears to have
been to deflect attention from Ukraine. Militarily the conflict with
Ukraine is a stalemate. Given its larger and better-equipped armed
forces, Russia would win an all out military conflict with Ukraine. But
the costs—financial, military and diplomatic—of such an intensification
of the conflict would be very high.
Putin appears to believe that he can achieve his goals without engag-
ing in an overt conventional invasion. Ukraine faces serious economic
challenges. Its economy is expected to contract by 9 percent. Russia has
threatened to eliminate all trade preferences if the EU-Ukraine free
trade deal signed by the Ukrainian government in July 2015 goes fully
into effect in January 2016, as planned. However, the impact of these
restrictions will be significantly reduced because in the last several years
Ukraine has systematically shifted its pattern of trade away from Russia.
In 2012, Russia accounted for one-quarter of Ukrainian exports and
one-third of its imports. However, since then its share of trade with Rus-
sia has more than halved.11 Ukrainian exports to Russia fell sharply in

10 Katherin Hille, “Russia to cut defense spending,” Financial Times, October 13, 2014.
11 “Ukraine adjusts commerce ties as trade war with Russia deepens,” Financial Times, November

23, 2015.
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 253

2015, while the proportion of its trade going to the EU jumped from
below 25 percent in 2012 to nearly 35 percent in the first seven months
of 2015.12 In addition, trade with China jumped from 5 percent to 8 per-
cent in the same period.
In short, Russia’s ability to inflict economic pain on Ukraine is
declining. Imports of Russian natural gas have sharply fallen to nearly a
bare minimum not only because of the sharp contraction of the Ukrain-
ian economy and disputes over unpaid bills, but because Ukraine has
responded by increasing energy efficiency and diversifying sources of
gas supply.
However, Ukraine’s economic situation remains precarious. A num-
ber of other steps could be taken that would contribute to the stabiliza-
tion of Ukraine. Western leaders should press Ukraine to
• reduce its dependence on Russian energy, particularly natural gas
and oil;
• diversify its sources of supply by concluding deals with alternative
energy suppliers such as Norway, Nigeria and Algeria;
• adopt measures aimed at increasing energy efficiency;
• develop new markets for food and agricultural products;
• strengthen political ties to the Visegrad group, especially Poland,
which serves as Ukraine’s “Gateway to Europe;”
• implement a serious anti- corruption campaign.
While the door to NATO membership should be kept open to
Ukraine, the issue of membership should be kept on the back burner for
the near future. Raising the membership issue at this juncture would be
a mistake. It would simply antagonize Moscow and make improvements
in other important areas more difficult.

Georgia
The United States and the EU should give priority to encouraging the
development of strong democratic institutions and strengthening civil
society. The door to NATO membership should be left open. But the
issue of NATO membership should not be actively pushed for the time
being. As in Ukraine, the emphasis instead should be on intensifying
political and economic reform.

12 Ibid.
254 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

In the foreign policy area, the United States and the EU should insist
that Russia withdraw its troops from Georgian territory, as called for in
the ceasefire that Moscow signed ending the Five Day War. However,
given the disparities in power between Georgia and Russia, achieving a
Russian agreement to withdraw its troops will require firmness of pur-
pose and a closely coordinated approach on the part of the United
States and the EU.
The issues of Abkhazia and South Ossetia present a much more diffi-
cult problem. Here too the United States and EU need a firm, coordi-
nated policy. The United States and the EU should encourage Georgia
to increase economic, political and human contacts with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The goal of these contacts would be to weaken the
dependence of both entities on Russia and prevent their de facto annexa-
tion by Russia.

Moldova
Moldova presents a difficult challenge for Western policymakers. The
country is on the verge of political and economic collapse. Multiple
government changes—including 3 interim governments in 16 months—
have left Moldova without effective governance. The current govern-
ment—a coalition of three major parties who advocate closer ties to
Europe—is an interim government with limited constitutional powers.
The parliament is splintered into a number of antagonistic parties and
has been unable to pass any major legislation since the November 2014
legislative elections. All ministerial government and prime ministers
since the summer of 2014 have essentially been lame ducks.
Economically, Moldova stands on the brink of financial insolvency. It
has been unable to pass a state budget for 2016 or to amend the 2015
state budget following the depreciation of the national currency.
Moldova’s currency has been devalued by 25 percent since 2015. It is
also under a Russian trade embargo, and the reforms it is being asked to
introduce by the IMF and EU involve raising utility bills and reducing
state spending, which if implemented would almost certainly result in
the collapse of the pro-European government and its probable replace-
ment by a coalition of pro-Russian parties, led by the Communist Party,
which is the most popular party in Moldova.
Moldova’s political and economic woes have been compounded by a
$1 billion banking scandal that could have far-reaching political and
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 255

economic repercussions for Moldova’s political future. In October 2015,

the Moldovan parliament lifted the immunity of Vlad Filat, the former
prime minister (2009-April 2013) and leader of the Liberal Democratic
Party of Moldova (PLDM), the largest non-communist party in the par-
liament (31 parliamentary seats in the 101-seat parliament) and the
most important party in the three party ruling coalition. As prime min-
ister, Filat pursued a strong pro-European course and oversaw the sign-
ing of an Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and Comprehensive
Free Trade Area (DCFTA) as well as a visa-free travel agreement for
Moldovans within the Schengen area.
However, the PLDM is dependent on the support of the second
member of the coalition, the Democratic Party (DP), led by billionaire
oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc, who controls key positions in the court sys-
tem, law enforcement agencies and business community. Plahotniuc has
little interest in European integration. His main preoccupation has been
to negotiate the spoils of governance in favor of the DP and he has con-
tinually threatened to withdraw its support from the government unless
the government conceded key positions or business opportunities to
Plahotniuc-related interests. The party has been responsible for much
of the governmental paralysis and increase of corruption in Moldova
over the last several years.
Moldova faces a double challenge: (1) It needs a comprehensive
restructuring and overhaul of the basic institutions of the state, particu-
larly the judiciary and party system; and (2) to reverse the process of
state capture by local and Russian business interests. The two challenges
are closely interlinked. Democratic Party leaders have continually frus-
trated the reform of the Justice and law enforcement agencies and used
them as a means to pay back old (and new) political debts to friends and
cronies.
As a result of the signing of the Association Agreement (AA) and
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) with the EU,
Moldova stands to receive broad access to EU grants and credits and
EU markets in the future. This will make Moldova more attractive to
foreign investors. It also will make Moldovan passports significantly
more attractive to citizens of Transnistria compared to Russian or
Ukrainian passports.
However, unless the EU takes a stronger hand in helping Moldova to
ensure a more open and transparent business environment and legal
256 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

framework, key local industries could be bought up by Russian oligarchs

and Moldova could find itself deeply entangled in a web of non-trans-
parent economic ties that restrict its economic freedom of maneuver
and its political independence.
In addition, the conflict between Moldova and Russia over Transnis-
tria poses a potential threat to Moldova’s security. While the dispute is
not of the same dimension as the conflicts between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh or the conflicts between Georgia and
the breakaway provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, it provides a
convenient means for the Kremlin to exert pressure on Moldova.

Belarus
Together with Azerbaijan, Belarus has shown little interest in signifi-
cantly intensifying ties to the Eastern Partnership. However, in the past
several years Belarus has shown some small but important signs of
change. These changes have been forced on Belarus by shifts in Russian
policy. After 2004 Russia began to push for a restructuring of its eco-
nomic relations with Minsk, especially energy ties. The loss of Russian
energy subsidies posed an existential threat to the regime in Minsk and
forced Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko to seek a controlled
opening to the EU after January 2007.13
The controlled opening resulted in a growing divergence between
U.S. and EU policy. Prior to 2007, both the United States and the EU
sought to isolate the Lukashenko regime and use coercive diplomacy to
force Minsk to liberalize. However, after 2008 this unity began to crack.
The EU increasingly pursued a policy of greater engagement with
Belarus while the United States continued to pursue a policy of ‘hard
conditionality’ designed to isolate the Lukashenko government.
After the December 19, 2010 presidential elections in Belarus,
Lukashenko adopted a harder line. The elections, which were character-
ized by ballot-rigging and repression of the democratic opposition,
marked a sharp rebuff of the EU’s engagement strategy. The brutal
crackdown in the aftermath of the December 19 election dashed hopes

13 For a detailed discussion of the reasons for the shift in Belarusian policy, see Margarita M.
Balmaceda, “At the crossroads: The Belarusian-Russian energy-political model in crisis,” in
See Sabine Fischer (ed.), “Back from the Cold? The EU and Belarus in 2009,” Chaillot Paper
no. 119, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, November 2009, pp. 79-91.
 Western Policy toward Wider Europe 257

of any meaningful liberalization in Belarus and left the EU’s policy of

engagement in tatters.
Belarus depends heavily on Russian gas and oil and loans from
Moscow. However, as Russia’s economic problems have intensified and
threatened to drag down Belarus’ economy, Lukashenko has sought to
distance himself from Moscow and cultivate closer ties to the EU. In
August 2015, with an eye on the upcoming presidential election on
October 11, 2015 he released some political prisoners. He also added a
surprising bit of political theater to the electoral campaign, going out of
his way to bluntly deny publically that there was any truth to reports
that Russia would open an air base in Belarus.14
But Washington and Brussels have good reason to be skeptical that
the leopard has changed his spots. Before the 2010 election,
Lukashenko also made a few liberal gestures designed to convince
Western officials that he wanted better relations with the West. But
soon after the polls had closed he sent in the riot police who violently
crushed a protest and arrested many of his political opponents, ending
all talk of a ”new” more moderate Lukashenko.
Lukashenko easily won the October 11 election, gaining 83.5 percent
of the vote. While there was no repeat of the brutal crackdown that fol-
lowed the December 2010 election, the U.S. State Department noted
that the elections were far from free and fair, and criticized the inability
of the international and domestic monitors to observe the vote count
and the almost complete lack of opposition party or independent mem-
bers on election commissions. However, the EU agreed to suspend
sanctions against Belarus for four months in an attempt to encourage
further gestures toward liberalization on Lukashenko’s part.
The likelihood that this approach will generate serious change, how-
ever, is slim. In the past Lukashenko has made small tactical gestures
toward relaxing repression (usually before elections) These were usually
followed by a crackdown after the election was over. There is little rea-
son to think that this time will be any different.
In the future, the United States and EU should closely coordinate
their policies toward Belarus in order to prevent Lukashenko from play-
ing one side off against the other. Economic assistance should be closely
tied to support for a coherent program of economic and political
reform.
258 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Whither Wider Europe?

With the exception of Ukraine, the prospects for the stabilization and
democratization of the countries of wider Europe remain highly uncer-
tain. All the countries in the region face major political and economic
challenges due to their underdevelopment, lack of strong democratic
traditions and structures, and the legacy of Soviet rule. Russia continues
to see the region as a part of its sphere of “privileged interests” and
remains intent on preventing the expansion of Western democratic
ideas and norms into the post-Soviet space. Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the political and strategic context in Europe has signifi-
cantly changed. Hostility to further enlargement of the EU has gained
considerable ground in the last decade. At the same time, the EU faces a
number of new challenges—the sovereign debt problem, growing pres-
sures related to immigration and refugees, terrorism and the growth of
right-wing extremism, which will increasingly preoccupy European
leaders in the coming decade, leaving less time, interest and resources
for stabilizing wider Europe.
 Section III

Perspectives on Russia, the West,

and Europe’s Grey Zone
 Chapter 3

Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia:

How They Work and What We Should Expect
Vladislav L. Inozemtsev

Many years ago Sir Winston Churchill said that Russia “is a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” These days, many Western
analysts are still trying to uncover this mystery and to understand how
the country works. They are particularly interested in the motives of
Russia’s paramount leader, Vladimir Putin, who has become another
life-long ruler of the nation so unfamiliar to any kind of democratic
governance. The famous question “Who is Mr. Putin?” posed by the
Philadelphia Enquirer’s Trudy Rubin in 2000, looks today much less
important than the question “What does Mr. Putin want?” and what
direction he is now taking not only his own country, but presumably the
whole world.
I argue that what happens these days in Russia is explicable and in a
great degree even predictable—but that to understand, one must forget
about traditional norms and logic as they that exist in democratic
nations. One must analyze Putin’s moves as they are, not interpret them
“as if”.
We should start by assessing Putin’s primary goal, which is two-fold.
Russia’s leader concentrates on money and on power. To put it bluntly,
from the very beginning of his meteoric rise in the late 1990s he wanted
to become Russia’s (and presumably the world’s) richest man, and he
wanted to stay in power indefinitely. These two aims are closely inter-
connected, since to become rich in Russia one should have direct access
to public funds and state property, and to stay safe one should control
the rules of the game as long as possible. All along the way, Putin com-
bined these two goals—whether by looting the St. Petersburg budget in
the early 1990s, restoring state (but in fact his personal) control over
Gazprom in the early 2000s, or appointing new “oligarchs” to manage
all state assets and quasi-state corporations.

93
94 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Putin succeeded in building a system that is based on a free exchange

of power for money and money for power,1 a system that is not rooted
in traditional corruption, but one in which administrative power is little
more than a form of business.2 This system was completed in the mid-
2000s, as Putin and a close circle of friends realized the enormity of
Russia’s oil windfall. Since that time the decision to stay forever was
never debated. When I first mentioned that Putin wanted to become his
country’s leader for life (in an op-ed published in Moscow in September,
2006),3 I was criticized by every possible political camp as someone who
does not understand either his intentions or how Russia’s political sys-
tem functions. But now this is sour reality.
I would add that Putin, now being one of the richest, if not the rich-
est man in Russia,4 actually never ran a competitive business, so he does
not believe in the market economy. He relies on state capitalism, where
the last word is his own. As long as he is in charge, there is no hope for
liberal economic reforms in Russia. Even falling oil prices will not
change this course, because Putin simply doesn’t know how any other
system works.
The same applies to the political sphere. Until Putin appeared from
nowhere to be elected President of Russia in March 2000, he had never
before run for any elected office. He considered democracy to be a dan-
ger, not the natural order of things. Recall that he first saw his country
crumble because of democratic transformation in the early 1990s, and
he later witnessed the fall of his St. Petersburg boss Anatolyi Sobchak in

1 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Neo-Feudalism Explained,” The American Interest, 2011, Spring

(March—April), Vol. VI, No. 4, pp. 73–80.
2 Ivan Krastev and Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Putin’s Self-destruction,” Foreign Affairs, www.for-
eignaffairs.com/articles/139442/ivan-krastev-and-vladislav-inozemtsev/putins-self-destruc-
tion, posted June 9, 2013.
3 Иноземцев, Владислав. “Вся надежда—на третий срок,” Независимая газета, 1-2 сентября,
2006, с. 3 (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “All the hopes are on the third term,” Nezavissymaya
Gazeta, Sept. 1-2, 2006) (Dutch translation: Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Laat Poetin zijn karwei
afmaken,” NRC Handelsblad, October 25, 2006, p. 7.
4 In 2007 Stanislav Belkovsky estimated Putin’s fortune at $40 billion (www.ilgiornale.it/
news/ex-consigliere-accusa-putin-l-uomo-pi-ricco-d-europa-html). Bill Browder put the
figure at $200 billion in 2015 (https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2015-02-16/ Brauder-uveren-
Putin-samij). Andrei Piontkovsky estimates the sum at $250 billion (www.sobesednik.ru/poli-
tika/2015-04-15-sostoyanie-putina-ne-7-millionov-rubley-a-250-milliardov). I doubt the
latest figures, but one might assume that he controls directly Surgutneftegaz (with a cash
pile of $34 billion), and some parts of Gazprom and Rosneft, not to mention several com-
panies formally owned by his friends. I would say that $100-120 billion is a very realistic es-
timate.
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 95

the 1996 mayoral elections. With these experiences in mind, ever since
his first term he has worked continually to secure his power position for
decades. It is true that he strengthened the role of the state, but for
Putin the state is the instrument by which he can own the whole coun-
try and keep his money machine running.
In short, there is no hope for genuine liberal economic and political
transformation in Russia as long as Putin rules the country. Putin
allowed Medvedev to stay as President for four years since he was sure
Medvedev would remain loyal to him, and at that time Putin wanted to
be considered as a rule-abiding guy. But he immediately foreshadowed
his comeback by extending the presidential term from 4 to 6 years.
Medvedev’s time was a time of possible change, but Putin secured all the
necessary levers to return to the Kremlin. The “windows of opportu-
nity” that were widely open in the 1990s, and again briefly during
Medvedev’s time, are now firmly shut and securely locked with the sup-
port of the majority of the Russian people.

The Primacy of Domestic Politics

To retain and secure his power position, Putin needs to control popular
moods and to adjust his policies in ways that match the hopes of the vast
majority of the population. He doesn’t believe in electoral democracy
(presumably thinking about it as about a senseless Western invention
unsuitable for Russia), but he pays considerable attention to popular
opinion and does not go against it. His main method to rule the country
is to consolidate public opinion around a particular focus point, and
then to characterize all other points of view as “dissenting” rather than
as “opposing.” In Putin’s system there cannot be an opposition, there
can only be dissidents. The difference is clear. “Opposition” connotes
those who wish to correct the way the country is going by proposing
more effective or alternative policies. “Dissidents” connote those who
want to derail the nation’s rise, presumably since they do not understand
and share people’s wishes.5 Putin is a populist, not a democrat, which
means that domestic, rather than foreign, policies are, and will remain,
his primary focus.

5 Иноземцев, Владислав. “Страна, подавляющая большинством” на сайте slon.ru:

www.slon.ru/posts/51273, размещено 7 мая 2015 г. (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Country
Which Suppresses By Majority (in Russian),” www.slon.ru/posts/51273, posted May 7, 2015.
96 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

This point should be understood quite clearly—once again because

Putin is very interested in Russia’s history and its spiritual uniqueness.
Both of this factors support his attention to domestic issues, since he
understands well that during the past 700 years Russia was never con-
quered by any foreign power, and that after every aggression the coun-
try appeared even stronger and more influential than it had before. At
the same time, however, Russia was often plagued by internal unrest and
conflicts that destroyed its state power, diminished its administrative
capacities, and even put the country on the brink of collapse. The strife
of the early 17th century, the revolutionary wave of 1917–1921, and then
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the “horrible 1990s”—all of these
terrible times were generated by mistakes—and, potentially, acts of trea-
son—that originated at home. That is why Putin believes that domestic
politics are much more important than everything else. His actions in
the “wider world” are primarily driven by his efforts to shape and con-
solidate public opinion inside his own country.

Agenda-Shifting

How does Russia’s President act to achieve his goals on the domestic
front? His tactics are quite sophisticated and developed to a degree of
perfection. First, he identifies and then inflames a particular aspect of
the public agenda in ways that make it the headline issue for popular
opinion at any given moment. He employed this tactic for the first time
in 1999, when the bombing of two apartment houses in Moscow turned
Russians’ attention away from political struggles among different
Kremlin factions toward the danger posed by Chechen terrorists. The
episode provided Putin with carte-blanche support to wage a victorious
war, after which he became president. Periodically since then a new
topic is chosen (the “fight with the oligarchs” in 2003–2005, the priority
of economic growth over political freedoms in 2005–2008, national
unity in the face of efforts to undermine stability in 2011–2012, com-
bating Western influence in 2012–2013, the war for the “Russian world”
in 2014, saving the world from U.S. dominance, etc.). These headline
issues are changing ever more quickly because incessant day-and-night
coverage of an “overheated” topic can exhaust popular attention. But
there is no doubt that as soon as one issue goes away, another will arise,
and the cycle will begin anew.
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 97

This kind of propaganda proves to be extremely effective due to one

crucial feature. Putin acts very fast, changing the agenda well before his
opponents adjust their positions and consolidate to criticize his
approach. He stakes out a seemingly mainstream position (who will
oppose combating Chechen terrorists, fighting oligarchs or securing
Russians’ rights in Crimea?) while cautioning the public that such
approaches could have costs (tolerating Kadyrov’s de facto independent
state in Chechnya, enduring tougher economic times as a result of
Western sanctions, budget crises and tough business conditions in the
wake of the annexation of Crimea, and so on). By the time the conse-
quences appear, however, Putin has moved on to the next topic, taking
public opinion with him. Kadyrov may neglect federal laws in Chech-
nya, but now the biggest problem is to defend Russian kids from gay
propaganda coming from the decadent West. Capital and thousands of
young professionals are fleeing Russia, but that is less urgent than the
need to “retake” the “holy” Crimea from “fascist” Ukraine. There is
chaos in Donbas, the ruble is falling and the economy is faltering. Yet all
this may need to wait until we finish with ISIS somewhere in the Ara-
bian deserts. As soon as one “crucial” issue wanes, another comes to
replace it. That makes the system in some sense immune to significant
criticism, since no one wants to hear about topics that are not longer
top priority, and very few will disagree with Putin on those that still are
headline issues. Putin is betting that he can manipulate this whirling
kaleidoscope of issues to stay in the center of public attention for as
long as he wishes.

Strategic Goals

Given all this, one may ask whether Putin has a long-term strategy for
his country. The question is provocative and the answer is complicated.
The right answer is “no and yes,” or more precisely, “no, since yes.”
To understand this, one should completely forget the context of the
21st century globalized information world to which contemporary
Westerners are accustomed. German Chancellor Angela Merkel was
definitely right to say that “Mr. Putin lives in another world,” but few
really understand how different this world is. The Russian President
perceives the new realities as some disturbing deviation from the “nor-
mal world” of the 19th or 20th centuries with their great armies, con-
tested territories, industrial might, and all that was important to policy-
98 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

makers a century or more ago. He praises the world system as it

emerged, if not from the Congress of Vienna, then from the Potsdam
Conference (and he really believes it would be better to restore the Yalta
system, which, as he noted when speaking at the UN in September
2015, was designed “in our country”). He used to describe himself as “a
conservative,” but he is not so much conservative as befuddled, refusing
to accept the world as it is. Putin does not use the internet, his adminis-
tration orders new typewriters to be secure from any leaks on the web,
he trusts the reports his aides present to him, and he believes in the
power of television. He sees in every popular movement a conspiracy
organized by his adversaries, and he believes that Russia needs to seize
more lands from its neighbors to consider itself again a great power.
Moreover, Putin does this all simply because he believes the “good old
world” will soon be back and “history will resume.” Herein lies the
answer to the main question of strategy.
Putin has stated many times that his primary goal is to maintain “sta-
bility,” by which he means no domestic change at all. It’s like the Second
Coming: those who are buried closer to the East will resuscitate first—
so if Russia does not change too much, it will be better able to adjust to
the old world when it returns. Every change in today’s Russia is seen
simply as an anomaly—just look at the regime’s economic strategy,
which is only about how to survive until the oil price will “inevitably”
rebound. Putin’s strategy is to “preserve” the current Russia until the
time the world recognizes that the country’s conservative path was the
only true course. This approach presupposes no strategic moves, since
the only goal is to resist change. Any actions that may in fact generate
change are mainly viewed as tactical adjustments within this broader
strategic frame of preservation. This may seem incredulous, but I can
offer no other explanation for Putin’s political course. Only a strategy
that encompasses a belief in the “eternal return” can explain what he is
doing in both the economic and political realms. He strongly—and will-
ingly—rejects the contemporary world, and centers his entire strategy
on outliving it. The sad side of this story is that Putin has little chance
to succeed, and when he is gone, perhaps in a decade or two, his country
is likely to face enormous challenges, even as the postmodern world
hurtles forward with little prospect of turning into a new Middle Ages.
Another issue often debated in the West is whether Putin is good or
bad at cost-benefit analysis—in other words, does he take the principle
of effectiveness seriously enough? Many signs suggest that he does not,
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 99

but one should take into consideration his extremely specific sense of
“rationality”.
For Putin these days, specific goals and tasks simply do not exist. His
rationale is built on the long-term goal of possessing Russia, and its
wealth, for the rest of his life. This has provided him with tremendous
returns many years in a row. Windfall profits from rising oil prices have
been at least $2 trillion since Putin’s first term in the Kremlin began.
Even more important is that these profits were increasing consistently
over the course of his tenure in top leadership positions. These “exces-
sive” annual earnings peaked in 2012–2013 at $400 billion, surpassing
those Russia received in 2000.6 Given this flows of funds, Putin’s cost-
benefit assessments of such projects as construction of the Olympic ven-
ues in Sochi, building new launching sites in the Far East or a high-
speed railway between Moscow and Yekaterinburg7 are made less in
terms of money than in terms of influence on public opinion and their
role in elevating his personal approval ratings.
The same may be applied also to some purely economic projects. In
2013, for instance, Rosneft, the leading state-controlled oil company,
acquired TNK-BP for $53 billion in cash and equity just before the
start of a downward wave in the Russian stock market, and now the
united company is valued less than the amount it spent on the acquisi-
tion. In a normal market economy the CEO would be immediately
fired, but Igor Sechin remains the president’s closest ally, not least
because he controls the state-owned oil assets that provide such huge
tax revenues for the federal budget.
Putin does not care about shareholder value because he believes he is
the main, if not the sole, proprietor of the whole country. This explains
his “cost-benefit” analysis. He is not so interested in assessing special
investment projects, since he sees Russia as a huge corporation that can

6 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Russia’s European Home,” Project Syndicate, January 5, 2015,

www.project-syndicate.org/ commentary/sanction-putin-not-russian-people-by-vladislav-
inozemtsev-2015-01.
7 See for more details: Зубов, Валерий и Иноземцев, Владислав. “'Белые слоны' российской
экономики: на что государство тратит деньги,” РБК, 2015, 1 сентября 2015, с. 11; “Почему
государству надо перестать инвестировать” в: РБК, 2015, 14 сентября, с. 7; “Экономика
«чудес»: почему государственные компании так неэффективны” в: РБК, 2015, 29 сентября,
с. 9 (Zubov, Valery and Inozemtsev, Vladilsav, “The ‘White Elephants’ of the Russian Econ-
omy,” RBC Daily, September 1, 2015, p. 11; “Why the State Should Stop Investing,” RBC
Daily, September 14, 2015, p. 7; “The Economy of ‘Miracles:’ Why State Corporations Are
So Ineffective,” RBC Daily, Sept. 29, 2015, p. 9.
100 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

afford some “branding” projects such as those that are channeled into
sport and infrastructure projects. Putin is well aware that such efforts
are in fact extremely effective compared to other, often more expensive,
means of securing popular support.8 In this regard Putin may be consid-
ered very effective since he does not take into consideration any small
and insignificant points. He prefers to concentrate on the big picture.
To some degree this explains his changing attitude towards Soviet his-
tory, and in particular to Stalin’s personality: the late tyrant is now
openly praised as an “effective manager.” This means that if you leave
the country stronger in military means, bigger territorially and more
“respected” in the world, any economic inefficiencies and even vast loss
of human lives may well be consider justified and reasonable. I am not
arguing that Putin may become another Stalin in a decade or so, but
many aspects of his thinking resemble those of Soviet leaders.
What ways and means does Putin have at his disposal to achieve his
goals? This may be the most crucial question facing Russia today.
Putin’s toolbox is very limited, and it is the result of what he has done
with Russian society.
For more than quarter of a century Russia has been turning into a
country where only money matters. As Putin went about constructing
his system, he eliminated any other means of appealing to the people for
getting things done. The so-called “vertical of power” that he estab-
lished was, and still is, a sophisticated system for securing loyalty, based
at every level on sufficient bureaucratic autonomy to organize “business
schemes” for self-enrichment. During the first ten years of Putin’s reign
the system worked quite well, since there was a growing pool of money
from rising oil income available both for social spending and “invest-
ment needs” from which bureaucrats could profit. In these years the
Kremlin was ready to boost spending on almost anything reliant on
growing oil revenues. The result was rather predictable—infrastructure

8 According to 2013 federal budget outlays, Russia spent 1.084 trillion rubles on its federal
government, which equaled $34 billion at the average 2013 exchange rate of $1.00 = 31.848
rubles. The U.S. federal budget for the same year allocated to “general government” totaled
$28.1 billion (www.usgovernmentspending.com/federal_budget_detail_ fy13bs12015n). On
the figures for road construction see the interview with the head of the State Road Con-
struction Agency of the Russian Federation at www.rbc.ru/interview/business/20/07/2015/
559d5f049a79470cc3c8a450. Also Иноземцев, Владислав. “Дешёвая пропаганда. Как оценить
эффективность государственных инвестиций в СМИ” на сайте slon.ru: www.slon.ru/posts/
54993, размещено 11 августа 2015 г. (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “The Cheap Propaganda: How
One May Assess the Effectiveness of State’s Investment into Media,” www.slon.ru/posts/
54993, posted on August 11, 2015.
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 101

project costs shot up, as did the costs of keeping the state machine
working (in 2013, Russia spent 20 percent more on the state apparatus
[at market exchange rates] than did the United States federal govern-
ment).9 These days the country spends around 15 percent of what
China spends on road construction, but annually delivers only around 2
percent as many new roads as China. The state is forced to pay more
and more every year to get things done, lest the principles of loyalty be
violated, since local and federal bureaucrats are not accustomed to
tighten their own belts. This is the main problem for Putin today,
because he has no other means to make the bureaucracy work. All other
motives have been largely downgraded, and no one would do anything
she or he should out of regard for ideological principles, patriotic feel-
ings, or sense of duty or honor. If this were not true, the government
would have found some means to reduce the budgetary spending during
the crisis—but it was unable to do so in 2015 compared to 2014, and is
also unlikely to cut the budget deficit in 2016.

Searching for an Ideology

The topic of ideology must be investigated in greater detail. Of course,

ideological issues are widely debated in Russia these days, but I would
not say that there exists something that may be understood as ideology
in the strict sense of the term. The “search for ideology” (or “national
idea”) that had been underway within Russia since the fall of the Soviet
Union has never resulted in any meaningful concept—and this may be
explained by the fact that Russia is currently a nation-state, not the “ide-
ological empire” the USSR sometimes was. Nevertheless, the search for
ideology continues, largely because it is considered a crucial element of
the “glory” once possessed by the Soviet Union.
The problem with ideology in today’s Russia is even more profound,
since any possible kind of ideological doctrine for the country would be
entirely particularistic, whereas ideology should have a strong universal-
ist dimension. Russian political elites want to invent an ideology not
only because they look to the Soviet Union as an ideal they want to
resemble, but also because they are trying to challenge the United

9 ноземцев, Владислав. “У государства имущества на 100 триллионов, а оно залезает в

карман пенсионеров” в: Комсомольская правда, 2015, 2 октября, с. 7 (Inozemtsev, Vladislav.
“The State Controls 100 Trillion [rubles] In Assets, But Tries to Take the Last from the
Pensioners,” Komsomol’skaya Pravda, Oct. 2, 2015, p. 7.
102 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

States, which might be considered less an “historical” than an “ideologi-

cal” nation. It seems that the only possible option for the Russian politi-
cal class, however, is to adopt an exceptionalist ideology based on the
religious uniqueness of Christian Orthodoxy. This explains why there is
such a huge religious revival underway in the country—a revival that by
no means originates from the grassroots, but is actively propagated and
even imposed by the state. One may even say that the Orthodox version
of Christianity is now becoming the new Russian ideology, based on
belief in the special path of the country, in the superiority of the Russian
people, and in the unique, almost sacred role of the state. This factor
becomes even more important because Putin presents himself as a
deeply faithful person for whom issues of religion and “morality” are
more important than those of politics or economics.
This may be seen clearly in the case of Russia’s so-called “pivot to
Asia”—its turn away from the West towards China and Central Asia.
This shift has forceful religious-ideological causes and dimensions. To
explore them, one must turn to 13th century Russian history, notably
the story of Count Alexander of Novgorod, who became the ruler of a
northwestern Russian county at the time of the Mongol invasion, by far
the most devastating period for the country in centuries. The Mongols
had not advanced towards Novgorod, but the Teutonic knights emerged
from the West, trying to impose Catholicism on Russian lands. Count
Alexander engaged in war with them, defeated Germans and Lithuani-
ans in several battles, and then went to Saray and Karakorum where he
proclaimed himself the vassal of the Mongols and subsequently was
appointed the sovereign of Kiev, Vladimir and other Russian domains.
The Count was canonized by the Orthodox Church in 1547.
Why is this story is so important? St. Alexander fought for the
Orthodox faith (i.e., ideology), which was threatened from the West,
and later requested the union with the Mongols, who wanted subjuga-
tion but were oblivious to religious issues. Today, it seems that Putin
would rather become a junior partner of China and hand over to the
Chinese some of Russia’s natural wealth than, in his view, “surrender” to
an immoral and virulent West that wants to deprive Russia of its unique
spirituality. Putin’s particularistic “ideology,” therefore, has become a
significant roadblock to rapprochement between Russia and the West,
as well as to Russia’s adoption of contemporary human rights doctrine.
Whatever ideology Russia seeks to adopt, across the centuries it appears
to be unalterably anti-Western.
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 103

When discussing ideology, one should not forget the idea of the
“Russian world” that is often seen to be a part of the new Russian ideol-
ogy. I would disagree with such an assumption, because the “Russian
world” doctrine is ill-suited to serve as either an internal or external ide-
ology. In the first case, it is very dangerous to exploit nationalistic ideas
inside a multicultural and multiethnic country. In the second case, a
doctrine that seeks to unite all Russians, including those who live out-
side the current borders of the Russian Federation, may be seen, under-
standably, as dangerous for neighboring nation-states.
The “Russian world” idea serves a very local purpose. Putin uses it to
convince his core electorate that he is willing to help compatriots who
live abroad and who, presumably, are being oppressed by local authori-
ties. This was applied in Crimea and Donbas, but it seems likely to fade
since it cannot be applied successfully anywhere else (unless Putin
wishes to destabilize northern Kazakhstan, which seems unlikely). It
may also become harder for Putin to employ the “Russian world” theme
since a quite different Russian world is now emerging—a world of suc-
cessful Russians who leave Putin’s Russia and settle in Europe and in the
United States, where they can build their future much more effectively
than in their own homeland.10 Since Putin dislikes this group and has
adopted a series of measures preventing its members for being civil ser-
vants in Russia or to run for elected office, it will be harder and harder
for him to present himself as the protector of a united “Russian world.”
To conclude, I will reiterate some of the most important points. First,
Putin’s Russia is a country where the political class seeks both power and
money, and one doesn’t exist without the other. Second, Putin is a tal-
ented populist who has designed a sophisticated system of seducing the
crowd. This system continues to work well and gives his opponents little
chance to succeed. Third, the Russian leadership seems not to care about
strategic goals since, on the one hand, it believes that its strategic goal
consists in preservation of the country in its current state, and, on the
other hand, no one looks beyond his own lifespan. Fourth, the emerging
Russian ideology (or identity) is extremely confabulated and full of reli-
gious or quasi-religious elements that make it incompatible with the 21st
century post-modern world. The Russian leadership definitely lives in
another world, but this world is calculable and predictable.

10 For more details see Wladislaw Inosemtzew, “Wer gehört zur „russischen Welt“?” in Inter-
nationale Politik, 2014, no. 6 (November-December), pp. 94–101.
104 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

It is important not just to understand how Putin’s world works, but to

explore how stable it is and how long the “normal” world may be forced
to coexist with Putin’s world. This is a huge problem. I submit that the
“normal” world should prepare for a cohabitation that could last for
decades.

How Long Can Putin’s Regime Last?

Putin’s Russia can neither develop nor modernize.11 This simple fact,
however, says nothing about how stable it may be (I reiterate that stabil-
ity in today’s Russia means the absence of change, and therefore non-
development is actually desirable). Moreover, such non-development
may now easily be “sold” to the public, and therefore one can expect
Putin’s regime to last as long as its leader is alive. I will mention just a
few reasons for such an assumption.
First, there is the effect of state propaganda and the specific nature of
the Russian people. The vast majority of Russians these days believe
that Russia is rising from its knees and is on the right path to redeem
Soviet “glory”. They have already forgotten about the hardships of past
times, and instead have become inspired by the late country’s political
and military might. The state has been very successful in convincing the
people that the Soviet Union broke down because of Western conspir-
acy. This “explains” the current showdown between Russia and the
West, since according to this narrative the West doesn’t want Russia to
become sovereign and strong once again. This line of argument incul-
cates two feelings: on the one hand, Russia should not embrace the new
realities, but rather try to restore the world that existed earlier —which
Putin and his inner circle represent; on the other hand, all Russians
should unite lest they fail to win the “final battle” with their opponents,
the implication being that they should not demand any improvement in
living standards in coming years. This “defending” and “backward-look-
ing” consciousness ideally secures the regime.
Second, one should admit that the quality of life in Russia has
improved dramatically during Putin’s years in power. Real incomes now
exceed 2000–2002 levels by at least three times, if not more. Russia has

11 Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Dilemmas of Russia’s Modernization” in Ivan Krastev, Mark Leonard

and Andrew Wilson (eds.), What Does Russia Think? London: European Council on Foreign
Relations, 2009, pp. 46–52.
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 105

turned into a modern consumer society, and given all the forces of
destabilization, the economy could be doing much worse than it is
doing now. By the end of 2015, the real disposable incomes of an aver-
age Russian may have been down 8–9 percent from a year earlier, but
this type of decline is definitely not enough to change the mood of the
people. In my view, even current levels of well-being must decline by at
least 25-30 percent to provoke real disillusionment in the public’s mind.
Such a tremendous downturn does not seem very probable, due to sig-
nificant financial reserves that can keep the economy afloat for at least
two years; to some degree of import substitution that reduces the price
(and, of course, also the quality) of many daily consumable goods; and,
of course, due to inertia within the entrepreneurial community (many
businesses now run in the red, but their owners do not close them
because they hope for the better and understand how hard it would be
to get back into business if they were out of it for some time).
Third, Russian society has changed a lot in recent years—and the
major result of Putin’s policy is that it is now too “individualized” and
atomized to be an agent of change. For more than a decade the current
power elite designed a system in which a person can achieve almost
everything if he or she individually bribes officials, secures special condi-
tions for his or her business, neglects some rules, etc. At the same time,
any kind of collective action was crushed, and its participants never
achieved anything they desired.12 Authorities in Russia are quite open to
individual negotiations, but they fiercely oppose any collective claims.
Therefore, no protest movement has ever achieved any significant result
for which it has fought (the last success dates back to 2005, when pen-
sioners organized protests aimed at increasing compensation for the loss
of their right to use public transport and to acquire some medical sup-
port free of charge). Faced with economic difficulties, some people take
on additional jobs, while others prefer to emigrate. Russia today is a
country where there are only individual, not collective, paths out from its
systemic contradictions. This is not fertile ground for transformation.

12 See: Vladislav Inozemtsev, “Russie, une société libre sous contrôle authoritaire” in: Le Monde

diplomatique, 2010, No. 10 (Octobre), pp. 4–5.

106 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

How May the Current Regime End?

Two options are now the most realistic. The first option presents itself if
Putin dies or becomes incapacitated for some reason (it is unlikely that
this would happen as a result of a coup d’état or a conspiracy). As was
seen clearly seen in 2011–2012, Putin’s regime is not a systemic regime,
such as ones established in Mexico in the early 20th century or in China
after Mao’s death.13 It is purely dependent on just one particular person.
Those in Putin’s circle owe their positions and wealth only to him, and
they have no basis to claim that they somehow are a better fit or more
qualified for the top job in the country. Therefore, one may expect
either a quarrel that could destroy the “power vertical,” or a change in
political course that could allow the Russian political/financial elite to
renegotiate its relationship with the rest of the world to secure its
wealth and avoid an unnecessary showdown. Putin’s disappearance is
unlikely to bring to power even more conservative people, since the cur-
rent break with the West could be orchestrated only by such a charis-
matic figure as Putin himself (and it took even him more than a decade
to turn from a “Russian European” into the foe of the Western world).
Any other politician would not be as argumentative, and thus less likely
to exacerbate or continue current trends.
A second option may be considered if the current economic crisis
becomes more aggravated, oil prices dip under $35/bbl and Western
sanctions continue to ruin Russia’s financial sector. Since Russia these
days appears more like a big corporation that delivers quite healthy
profits and benefits for the politicians and bureaucrats who own it, this
option may be considered if the “corporation” goes into the “red” and
begins to generate constant losses. If you are a governor of a particular
region and you profit from the construction company that belongs to
your son; if you are Putin’s close friend and build bridges or railroads
funded from the budget, pocketing half of the money; or if you are the
minister for agriculture and at the same time Europe’s biggest land-
lord—everything goes well as long as people buy the apartments you
build, the budget has funds for the bridges you construct, and the land
you own constantly grows in value. But if there are no buyers, the
budget is deep in the red, and everybody wants to sell land rather than

13 See:
Иноземцев, Владислав и Павловский, Глеб. “Иноземцев vs. Павловский ” в: The New
Times, 2010, 22 марта, сс. 14–17 (“Inozemtsev vs. Pavlovsky (in Russian)” in: The New
Times [Moscow, Russia], March 22, 2010, pp. 14-17)
 Russia’s Putin and Putin’s Russia: How They Work and What We Should Expect 107

buy it, things look different. You may take a few million dollars from
your Swiss accounts and cover the losses for a year or two, but you can-
not do this indefinitely. And if the state has no money, it will press even
oil and commodity companies and take away their profits. With no
investment there would be no perspective—and at this point the gov-
ernment would lose its attractiveness. As the Soviet elite just disap-
peared in late 1991, the new Russian elite might render up their posi-
tions one by one and settle abroad, where everything is ready to
accommodate these “devoted patriots.”14
The system Putin created in Russia should be studied further, and in
a deeper way, since it is one of the most sophisticated authoritarian sys-
tems that ever existed. It possesses enormous reserves to confront any
changes and any challenges, and i is headed by a highly talented pop-
ulist who has every chance to rule the country for the rest of his life.
What this system cannot do, however, is sustain itself after Putin leaves
office. And nobody today can say with any certainty how Russia may
look “after Putin.”

14 See for more details: Как рухнет российский режим. Возможный сценарий” на сайте slon.ru:

www.slon.ru/insights/1202339, размещено 5 января 2015 г. (Inozemtsev, Vladislav. “How

the Regime May Fall: A Prospective Scenario (in Russian)”, www.slon.ru/insights/ 1202339,
posted on January 5, 2015.
 Chapter 4

Russia and the West:

What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better?
Marek Menkiszak

Unsuccessful attempts by Russia to push Ukraine to join the Moscow-

led Eurasian Economic Union and successful Russian pressure on the
country to drop its Association Agreement with the EU led to political
protests in Kyiv in fall 2013. In spring 2014, while revolution brought
pro-European regime change in Ukraine, Russia occupied and annexed
Crimea and started a war in Donbas, violating international law, various
bilateral and multilateral agreements as well as undermining the foun-
dations of the post-Cold War order in Europe. It led to the most serious
crisis in Russian–Western relations since the end of the Cold War,
involving mutual sanctions by the United States, the EU and some
other Western allies on one side and Russia on the other.
However grave the crisis is, these events are yet another in a whole
series of crises between Russia and the West over the 25 years since the
breakup of the Soviet Union. On the other hand we also witnessed peri-
ods of quite positive, pragmatic cooperation between the two during that
time. Unfortunately, none of these lasted long, nor was able to create a
critical mass allowing for a positive breakthrough in mutual relations.
This chapter is a modest attempt to offer some interpretations which
may be helpful in answering questions: why it has happened and where
we should go from here? In the first part it assesses differences between
Russia and the West1 related to perceptions, political cultures, values
and interests. In the second part it provides several conclusions based on
analysis of past periods of both cooperation and conflict between the
two sides. In the third part it gives recommendations on Western poli-
cies towards Russia: what approaches should be avoided and why, as well
as what policies should be pursued.

1 Meaning essentially the U.S., Canada, EU/EFTA Europe, Australia and New Zealand.

109
110 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Russia and the West: What Keeps Us Apart?

Current Russia differs considerably from what is considered to be a

Western model of liberal democracy. The nature of the current authori-
tarian political regime in Russia, where a very small group of people
tend to participate in decision-making processes, while sharing a very
peculiar mentality and world perception, seriously and adversely influ-
ence Russian policy and Russia’s relations with its neighbors and the
West. The following—mutually reinforcing—systemic problems seem
to play an especially negative role:

Clash of (Mis)Perceptions
The biggest problem of Western analysis of and policy making toward
contemporary Russia is a habit of projecting those elements of political
and strategic culture, ways of thinking or understanding institutions
that are dominant within the developed West. This tendency carries
with it the risk of underestimating differences between the formal and
real power systems in Russia and various political, economic and social
mechanisms peculiar to Russia. This habit of analysis also risks misun-
derstanding various paradoxes associated with modern Russia, for
instance the Russian government may simultaneously recognize serious
weaknesses and deficits of the state, including its limited capabilities, yet
do nothing to abandon or scale back ambitious policy goals and bold
policy actions. The same may be seen in Russian society. For instance,
according to opinion polls the majority of Russians simultaneously
believe in state propaganda claims yet also believe that the government
is lying to them. They overwhelmingly participate in elections, yet at
the same time they do not believe elections are fair or influence the
government. They declare their trust in President Putin, while simulta-
neously stating that he doesn’t represent the interests of the common
people.2
Russia’s narrow ruling elite (and sometimes, but not always, broader
circles of Russian society) suffers from a similar tendency to project
Russian ways of thinking onto the political and strategic culture of the
West. This problem can be illustrated by the approach taken by mem-

2 On peculiarities of opinion poll results in Russia, see reports made by Levada-Center’s

experts Denis Volkov and Stepan Goncharev on democracy http://www.levada.ru/sites/de-
fault/files/report_fin.pdf and media http://www.levada.ru/old/sites/default/files/levadare-
portmedia.pdf.
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 111

bers of the Russian ruling elite towards the so-called “color revolutions.”
Various public statements of such persons3 clearly suggest they believe
that so-called “color revolutions” (occurring in some post-Soviet states:
Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004 and 2013–14 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and
before also in Serbia in 2000) as well as the so-called Arab Spring in
North Africa and Middle East, which began in 2010 (especially events in
Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria), were in fact elements of a U.S.-led
Western conspiracy aimed against Russia. They tend to believe these
were “special operations” conducted by U.S. secret services through
active use of local NGOs, trained activists and modern communication
technologies (internet, social networks). Occasionally (as in Serbia and
Libya) these were supported by Western military interventions, all aimed
at regime change, and perceived as elements of the West’s geopolitical
advance at the expense of Russia and its regional influence.
Some statements suggest members of the ruling elite also believe that
political protests in Russia (2011–12) were a sort of a failed U.S.-spon-
sored attempt at coup d’état and regime change.4 Since these people
predominantly draw their background from Russia’s secret services, the
influence of their peculiar training and mentality on their analysis is
clearly visible. They don’t believe in any genuine social, grassroots
movements, instead they treat societal groups are mere objects of
actions conducted by hidden actors. They also project their own “pro-
fessional experience” (provocations, manipulation and other forms of
“active measures”) and threat perception onto Western policies. The
consequences of such perceptions are far-reaching. Since members of
the Russian ruling elite genuinely believe that they are under “Western
attack,” various aggressive anti-Western actions are perceived by them
as justified as measures of “self-defense.” The problem is exacerbated by
the fact that there are no effective means for the West to influence such
perceptions. Western denials, in fact, only serves to reinforce such
notions and are perceived as signs of Western hypocrisy and deceit.

3 President Vladimir Putin, head of the presidential administration Sergei Ivanov, secretary
of the Security Council Nikolai Patrushev, former deputy prime minister and head of
Rosneft’ state oil company Igor Sechin, deputy prime minister Dmitri Rogozin or FSB
head Nikolai Bortnikov in particular could be named.
4 Vladimir Putin stated on December 8, 2011, that organizers of the protests acted “according
to a well-known scenario,” that hasty critique of the Russian parliamentary elections by
U.S. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton “set the tone for some activists” and “gave them a
signal; they heard that signal and started active work, with the support of the State Depart-
ment.” http://ria.ru/politics/20111208/510441056.html.
112 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Clash of Political/Strategic Cultures

But it is not only perception that is mutually projected between the
West and Russia. Western (especially western European) analysts and
decision makers tend to project onto Russia their own pragmatic, liberal
policy approaches, their culture of seeking compromise, finding win-
win solutions and negotiating rationally-defined interests, all of which
project Western rationality criteria and its liberal-democratic
political/strategic culture onto a different political entity This can lead
to confusion when the Russian side responds with boldness, deception,
or zero-sum game approaches. In fact however brutal, radical or irra-
tional some Russian actions may appear, they are in fact perfectly
rational, logical and justified within specific perceptions and the politi-
cal/strategic culture embraced by the Russian ruling elite.
This phenomenon can be illustrated by the “symmetric beatings”
incident of 2013. On October 5, 2013 the Dutch police broke into the
flat of the Deputy Chief of Mission in the Russian embassy in The
Hague and detained him for several hours on charges of harassment
towards his children. The Russian side maintained he was beaten by the
police during the incident. On October 8, President Vladimir Putin
publicly demanded apologies, explanations and for those responsible to
be brought to account. Apologies were delivered by the Dutch authori-
ties. However, on October 15, 2013, unidentified perpetrators (dressed
as maintenance workers) stormed the flat of the Deputy Chief of Mis-
sion in the Dutch Embassy in Moscow and beat him up. Obviously
there is a high probability there was no coincidence for the Moscow
beating to happen and that it was allowed, if not directly ordered, from
a high political level in Moscow. Such suppositions are reinforced by the
fact that such cases have also happened before in Russia (as was the case
with Polish embassy employees in summer 2005).5 Why? We can
assume the Kremlin believed that maltreatment of the Russian diplomat
in the Netherlands was in fact intentional and connected with an inci-
dent two weeks earlier in the Arctic, where a Russian assault took place

5 On July 31 2005 four children of 3 Russian diplomats and one Kazakh diplomat in Warsaw
were beaten and robbed by a group of Polish hooligans in a park. On August 1 President
Putin called the attack a crime and ordered his staff to find what Polish authorities were
doing to investigate it. Apologies were delivered by Warsaw (later the perpetrators were ar-
rested, trialed and sentenced for imprisonment). Yet, between 5-11 August 2005 four persons
(3 Polish citizens and 1 Russian citizen) working in or connected with the Polish Embassy
in Moscow (1 diplomat, 2 technical workers, 1 journalist) were severely beaten by unknown
perpetrators in a series of incidents in Moscow.
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 113

on the Greenpeace ship Arctic Sunrise, which was sailing under a Dutch
banner, and which caused a spat between the two governments.
The second part of an answer pertains to the problem of Russia’s
political/strategic culture and values, or rather the peculiar version of it
embraced by members of Putin’s regime. It can be illustrated by
Vladimir Putin’s own words from December 2012: “...I am, for that
matter, a bad Christian. When someone smites you on one cheek, you
should turn to him the other. I am not morally prepared to act in this
way. If we are slapped, we must respond. Or otherwise we’ll be con-
stantly slapped...”6 The message is clear: any actor who takes any action
perceived as aimed against Russia (or even more against the personal
interests or the image of its leader) has to be punished, ideally by a sym-
metric Russian response. This is so because, among other things, the
prestige of the state and the image of its leadership are at stake. This
appeals to those elements of Russian culture that traditionally cherish
such values as masculinity, toughness, relentlessness, endurance—all
attributes of being a “true man” (nastoiashchiy muzhik). Within such an
(tendentious) interpretation of Russian culture, such behavior as
restraint, pacifism, risk-aversion, readiness for compromise or even
good manners are despised as signs of weakness or “femininity.” The
first approach is obviously especially (but not exclusively) popular
within both the criminal world and the institutions of force in Russia (to
which the overwhelming majority of members of the current Russian
ruling elite belong).

Clash of Norms and Values

What can be observed over the past decade is also an increasing discrep-
ancy between Russia and the West in terms of attitudes towards, and
preferences for, some important norms and values. In the sphere of
international relations this discrepancy is particularly visible with regard
to tension over two issues. The first has to do with perceived limits on
the principle of state sovereignty. The second is the freedom to choose
alliances.
The West (especially Europe) proclaims adherence to the idea that
state sovereignty, however crucially important, can no longer be seen as
absolute. In particular, it cannot serve as an excuse for committing mas-

6 News conference of Vladimir Putin, 20 December 2012, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/pres-

ident/news/17173.
114 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

sive violations of basic human rights. These matters are no longer solely
the preserve of the internal affairs of any given state. But Western
debates lead even further to proclaim that the international community
is obliged to react in cases when an individual government is unwilling
or unable to protect its own citizens from such occurrences (or especially
when it is responsible itself for such occurrences). This concept, known
as humanitarian intervention or the responsibility to protect (R2P),
hasn’t yet been incorporated into universal international law (mainly due
to resistance of various non-democratic governments), but was in fact
partially applied (not without controversies) in international practice, for
instance by the UN, the United States and some African states in Soma-
lia since the end of 1992, by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, in
Yugoslavia in 2000 and in Libya in 2011). In all these cases humanitarian
reasons were important as justification for military action.7
In contrast, Russia, especially under Putin, has increasingly resisted
this approach. Sovereignty as an unconditional principle of international
relations is often reiterated by Moscow. President Putin regularly has
been accusing the West (especially the United States) of violating or mis-
using international law for aggressive purposes, treating references to
humanitarian reasons as mere pretexts, often denying R2P’s legality. Rus-
sia has vehemently opposed humanitarian intervention in most cases.
The classical example of Russia’s approach has been Moscow’s ongo-
ing political and military support for Assad’s regime in Syria, despite the
crimes against humanity committed by the regime. While Russia did
not formally come out against R2P during UN debates, it did insist that
any application of the principle would require UNSC authorization and
consent by the government of the state in question.8 One can attribute
the Kremlin’s approach to its fear of possible Western military interven-
tion geared to regime change should a serious political crisis emerge
within Russia, and/or of any resistance to its ability to have a free hand

7 For more on R2P, see The Responsibility to Protect. Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty, http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.
8 See Gennadiy Gatilov, Opyt krizisnogo reagirovaniya, ili kogo obyazano zashchishchat’
mezhdunarodnoye soobshchestvo? Rossiya w globalnoy politike 6 November 2012, http://in-
teraffairs.ru/read.php?item=8883 ; Olga Labyuk, “’Otvetstvennost’ po zashchite” i pravo na
vmeshatelstvo,” Mezhdunarodnye Processy, vol. 6, No.3 (18)/2008, http://www.intertrends.ru/
. Interestingly enough Russia has annexed Crimea, partly justifing it, among other, by hu-
manitarian reasons (alleged necessity to protect Russian and Russian-speaking population
from potential threat).
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 115

to crush any potential internal opposition by all means (including use of

military force against the civilian population).
Another important norm underlined by the West (and reflected in
CSCE/OSCE documents) is the freedom of any nation to choose its
alliances, to become or not become a member of any international struc-
tures and communities, whether they be political, economic or military.
Such an approach was at the core of the process of accepting of new
members by NATO (including in subsequent waves of enlargement in
1999, 2004 and 2009) and the EU (e.g. in 2004, 2007 and 2013). Neither
NATO nor the EU pushed any country to join. On the contrary, both
have imposed difficult conditions on any country aspiring to membership.
From the very start Russia vehemently opposed NATO’s eastward
“expansion,” maintaining that it was aimed against Russia and its inter-
ests. To counter the principle that countries were free to choose their
alliances, Russia often referred to the principle of “indivisibility of secu-
rity,” i.e., the security of any given state should not be pursued at the
expense of security of other state. Russia tends to over interpret this
principle, however, as its de facto right to veto further NATO enlarge-
ment. Moscow has also tried to hamper EU enlargement. In the case of
central European states, Russia tried to establish some conditions and
receive some degree of economic “compensation.” Russia has also sought
to derail EU Association Agreements with individual post-Soviet states.
It was successful in the case of Armenia, but unsuccessful elsewhere.
Behind all of these efforts was in fact another principle strongly sup-
ported by Moscow: the right of Russia to a sphere of influence. Numer-
ous political statements by Russian leaders and elite members, as well as
various Russian official documents since the breakup of the Soviet
Union, have left no illusion about Moscow’s systematic efforts to
(re)create and uphold its sphere of influence, at least in the post-Soviet
area, and make the West, recognize it, either formally or tacitly. Con-
ceptual frameworks and labels may have changed (whether the “near
abroad” of the Yeltsin era, the “belt of good neighborliness,” Medvedev’s
“regions of privileged interests” or Putin’s “historical Russia”)9 the
essence remained the same. Russia’s ruling elite believes that possessing
an area of strategic control, where states are not free to choose their

9 See http://www.nytimes.com/1994/05/22/magazine/on-language-the-near-abroad.html ;
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm; Vladimir Putin, Russia: The National
Question, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 23.01.2012; http://rt.com/politics/official-word/migration-
national-question-putin-439/.
116 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

policies and cannot decide anything that may harm Russia’s self-per-
ceived interests,10 is simultaneously a basis, condition and reflection of
Russia’s great power status.

Clash of Interests
It would be difficult to enumerate all of many conflicting interests
between Russia and the West. Instead one may focus on two of them
which seem crucial, both related to Europe: European security architec-
ture and Europe’s political-economic space.
Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, the West has proclaimed and adhered to the idea of a “Europe
whole, free, and at peace.” In the security arena it was meant to expand
the zone of stability to the east of the continent by accepting gradually
new members to NATO following the adoption of required standards
(in military but also in political, legal and economic terms). From the
very beginning one of the challenges was to define Russia’s place in that
process. Despite Moscow’s perception, Russia has never been automati-
cally denied the possibility to participate. It was difficult however, not
only due to Russia’s size, potential and location, but mostly due to its
growing reluctance to accept Western rules and models. Russia felt too
proud as a self-perceived great power simply to adjust. Instead, it
decided early on to tread other paths, trying desperately to recreate its
sphere of influence and stop enlargement of Western structures to the
east. Nevertheless, the West was relentless in offering Moscow a secu-
rity partnership: examples included the creation of NACC (1991/92),
privileged dialogue with NATO (since 1995), the NATO-Russia Found-
ing Act and establishment of the Permanent Joint Council (1997), spe-
cial military cooperation arrangements in the Balkans (1995/1999), the
NATO-Russia Council (2002) and EU-Russia security dialogue and
arrangements (2000/2001).
Yet Russia was repeatedly frustrated, since none of these arrange-
ments has offered what Russia really wants (and what could not and
cannot be accepted): mechanisms that enable Russia to be a de facto co-
decision maker in European security, with effective veto power over

10 One of the recent examples of such an approach was the Russian foreign minister Sergei
Lavrov’s statement in his address in the State Duma (parliament) on November 19, 2014:
“Every state has a sovereign right to choose its economic partners, provided it doesn’t harm
legitimate interests of its neighbours.”
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 117

NATO (and the EU in security matters) without being a member of

Western security institutions. Even if Russia’s leadership has occasion-
ally suggested (as in 1991, 1995, 2000 or 2001) that Moscow could seek
membership in NATO’s political structure, it has never seriously
demonstrated the will to follow the path of transformation required in
such case. Instead, Russia keeps proposing alternative models of Euro-
pean security, some of them based on CSCE/OSCE, some on new bod-
ies with NATO or the EU. Their labels and institutional details have
varied (be it “all-European partnership”, a CSCE Executive Commit-
tee/European Security Council, US-EU-Russia concert, NATO-CSTO
partnership, an EU-Russia Council or a Treaty on European Secu-
rity).11 They all, however, reflect the tension between two approaches:
gradual integration of Russia into expanding Western institutional secu-
rity arrangements vs. the creation of new and more “even” arrange-
ments between Western structures and Russia/Russia-led structures.
The same patterns may be observed in the political-economic sphere.
On one hand we have witnessed the gradual enlargement of the EU’s
normative space in eastern Europe via the process of successive EU
enlargement, creation of European Stabilization and Association mech-
anisms, the European Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partner-
ship. EU Commission President Romano Prodi’s concept of a “ring of
friends” (2002) reflected an ambitious goal to establish a zone of stabil-
ity and prosperity around a growing EU, based on EU norms and stan-
dards and their voluntary acceptance by interested neighboring states of
eastern Europe and the southern Mediterranean. Here again, Russia
was not excluded. Flexible offers were passed on also to Moscow, with
whom the EU has been developing privileged partnerships at least since
2000 (including proposals for new institutions such as a Permanent
Partnership Council and documents charting ‘’road maps’’ to develop
four EU-Russia “common spaces” in 2005). But in this case as well, Rus-
sia has chosen another path. Despite occasional signals of entering into
a process of “legal harmonization/approximation” with the EU, Russia
has pursued an increasingly anti-European model of internal develop-
ment and started actively to undermine EU policies in the Eastern
neighborhood, and tried to develop alternative models of Eurasian inte-

11 Onthe Russian approach to its NATO membership and Russian proposals of European se-
curity architecture cf. M. Menkiszak, Russian Policy Towards NATO in a Broader European Se-
curity Context, in: Roger N. McDermott, Bertil Nygren, Carolina Vendil Pallin (eds.), The
Russian Armed Forces in Transition: Economic, Geopolitical and Institutional Uncertainties, Routlege,
December 2011.
118 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

gration (the recent manifestation of which has been a Customs Union

in 2011 and the Eurasian Economic Union in 2015).

Lessons from the Modern History of Russian-Western Relations

The abovementioned clashes have been clearly evident in the history of

the last 25 years of Russian—Western relations. During that period we
can distinguish four periods of generally positive Russian-Western rela-
tions: the “romantic period” of early Yeltsin (1992); a “pragmatic
period” of late Yeltsin (1996–98); the “pro-Western-turn” of early Putin
(2001–02); and the “Reset” with Medvedev (2009–11). However, we can
also point out four periods of conflictual relations: the Chechen and
Bosnian crises (1994–95); the Kosovo crisis (1999); the period of “cold
peace” and the Georgian crisis (2007–09); and finally the “‘revolutions’
crisis” (since 2012 and continuing). When we take a closer look at these
periods of cooperation and crisis, we can find certain regularities. In all
we can sum them up in four lessons:

Lesson 1: The Political Vector in Russia is Key

The per ods of best relations between Russia and the West coincided
with those when Russian leadership strived to reform the country
towards models that in principle would be compatible with the ideals of
liberal democracy and the market economy, and when it actively tried to
encourage the West to support such efforts politically but especially
economically. That was the case in 1992, when radical market economic
reforms were introduced in Russia under the guidance of Deputy Prime
Minister Yegor Gaidar, based on Western models and central European
experiences. The pattern was essentially repeated in spring 1997, when a
new government of liberal-minded “young reformers” was nominated,
headed by Prime Minister Sergei Kiriyenko and Deputy Prime Minister
Boris Nemtsov. Some also tend to forget that Vladimir Putin started his
first presidential term in spring 2000 as a reformer. Quite radical eco-
nomic market reform plans were prepared then by a team of experts
headed by German Gref (a young Putin aide and head of the Kremlin-
supported Center for Strategic Analyses—CSR, who was then nomi-
nated to be minister of economic development after Putin assumed
power). Finally when Dmitri Medvedev assumed presidential office in
spring 2008 he also tried to advance cautious liberal reforms under the
slogan of modernization, supported by a liberal-minded group of
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 119

researchers at the Institute of Contemporary Development—INSOR

(some of whom became government officials). Medvedev’s manifesto
“Go, Russia!”12 published in fall 2009 raised hopes among parts of
Russian society that not only economic but political reform could be
possible in Russia.
In all these cases, changes away from this pro-democratic and pro-
market course either cooled Russian relations with the West or pro-
voked open crisis. That happened when the communist and nationalist-
dominated parliament at the end of 1992 hampered reforms and
blocked the nomination of Gaidar to the post of Prime Minister. Prob-
lems were exacerbated after a conflict between president Yeltsin and
parliament culminated in bloodshed in Moscow in September 1993 and
led to the establishment of a new system of strong presidential rule in
Russia. The dismissal of Kiriyenko’s cabinet and the nomination of con-
servative Yevgeniy Primakov for Prime Minister in the wake of the
August 1998 financial collapse offers another example. The gradual
decline in influence of liberal-minded members of the government and
the de facto sabotage of the Gref reform plan eventually culminated in a
conservative turn in fall 2003 (with arrest of oligarch Mikhail Khodor-
kovsky as a symbolic event) and the rise of the so-called “Petersburg
chekists,” who came to dominate the ruling elite in the Putin’s second
term (beginning in 2004). Finally, Putin’s fall 2011 decision to return to
the presidency—and not allow Medvedev to run for a second term—led
to political protests. Open Western sympathy for the protesters and dis-
appointment with Putin’s return, along with the developments of the
Arab Spring and NATO intervention in Libya caused Putin and his
conservative-minded collaborators to accuse the West (especially the
United States) of anti-Russian conspiracy. Putin’s crackdown on inde-
pendent NGOs and media, political repression of liberal activists, as
well as the Kremlin’s conservative ideological project that has followed
Putin’s return in spring 2012 were in large part consequences of that
perception. The ‘’reset’’ was killed and tensions were then further by the
Ukrainian crisis.

Lesson 2: Russia’s Sense of Insecurity is Key

Without a doubt Russia’s ruling elite interpreted some Western deci-
sions and actions during this period as detrimental to Russia’s interests

12 September 9, 2009, http://en.kremlin.ru/ events/president/news/5413.

120 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

or to its security. Except for the Iraq war in 2003, however, all of these
Western actions were largely unavoidable due to Western interests and
values. Nonetheless, they played an important role in the genesis of the
crises in Russia-Western relations.
Western critique of Russia’s brutal war in Chechnya at the end of
1994, but especially NATO’s bombardment in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
September 1995 (an aftermath of the West’s “hangover” over its passiv-
ity during 1994 genocide in Rwanda and July 1995 Srebrenica massacre
in Bosnia-Herzegovina) were direct causes of brief crisis in mutual rela-
tions. Other contributing factors possibly included Russia’s unsuccessful
attempts to block NATO enlargement to central Europe or, between
mid-1993 and 1995, to persuade the West to create an alternative
CSCE-based European security architecture. Russia, striving for affir-
mation of its great power status, felt ignored and humiliated.
This pattern was repeated even more strongly in spring 1999 with
NATO’s bombardment of Yugoslavia over the humanitarian crisis in
Kosovo (an attempt to repeat Western success in Bosnia) and NATO’s
adoption of a new Strategic Concept, which were strongly criticized by
Moscow, which feared new NATO military operations without UNSC
authorization. In addition, NATO’s first eastward enlargement at that
time was perceived in Moscow as a symbol of adverse geopolitical
change in Europe. The 1999 Kosovo crisis shocked the Russian ruling
elite, revealing again Russia’s weakness and probably generating a sense
of insecurity in Moscow. The Western critique of the second Chechen
war (beginning in fall 1999) added to that and angered Moscow.
A series of bold moves by the administration of George W. Bush
strongly contributed to the end of the so-called “pro-Western turn” in
Russia’s foreign policy—especially U.S. withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty (December 2001/effective May 2002); its decision to develop
ballistic missile defenses in Europe; and the U.S.-led military interven-
tion in Iraq without clear UNSC authorization in spring 2003. These
actions were perceived by Russia’s ruling elite as symbols of U.S. adven-
turous unilateralism. Finally, recognition of the independence of
Kosovo, as well as setting a date for debate on NATO Membership
Action Plans for Ukraine and Georgia—both in early 2008—provided
Moscow with pretexts for aggressive moves.
What really made the Kremlin worry, however, was the series of
“color revolutions” in the post-Soviet area (2003-2005). In the eyes of
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 121

Russia’s ruling elite these were mainly the result of Western subversion
and part of Western geopolitical advances. EU debate on and develop-
ment of its neighborhood policy (partly addressed to the EU’s east) in
2002–04 was also perceived in Russia as part of this Western geopoliti-
cal advance and strongly criticized by Moscow.
During this time, Russian efforts to communicate red lines to the
West (BMD, Kosovo, NATO enlargement) and to suggest some geopo-
litical bargain that would include tacit recognition by the West of Rus-
sia’s sphere of influence in the post-Soviet area did not work. So after
issuing a final warning to the West (Putin’s speeches in Munich in Feb-
ruary 2007 and in Bucharest in March 2008),13 Putin decided to demon-
strate Russian resolve in the brief Russian-Georgian war of August 2008
(the plans of which Putin accepted in late 2006/early 2007—as he publi-
cally admitted)14 and temporary disruption of Russian gas flows to
Europe during the Russian—Ukrainian “gas war” of January 2009. From
Moscow’s point of view these actions brought success: they put an end to
the NATO debate on offering membership to Georgia and Ukraine;
they prompted the Obama administration to initiate a “reset” with Rus-
sia; and they led the EU to propose a “partnership for modernization.”
This pattern of Russia’s “offensive defense” was repeated again when
Putin and his conservative collaborators felt threatened by the Arab
Spring and especially protests in Russia, both of which they perceived to
be sponsored by the West. So when the Kremlin perceived that the
West was continuing its provocations by helping to derail Russian
efforts to bring Ukraine into the Eurasian Union and “organizing”
another revolution and regime change in Ukraine, Moscow responded
again with a “counter-offensive.” It shocked the West in Spring 2014 by
occupying and annexing the eastern Ukrainian region of Crimea and
bringing war into Ukraine’s Donbas area, clearly underestimating the
West’s unity and will to respond.

13 See Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, 10
February 2007, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/02/10/0138_type82912
type82914type82917type84779_118123; Speech of the President of the Russian Federation
Vladimir Putin at the NATO Summit in Bucharest, 2.04.2008 (translated into English).
UNIAN newswire 18.04.2008. http://www.unian.net/eng/news/news-247251.html.
14 Pavel Felgenhauer, “Putin Confirms the Invasion of Georgia was Preplanned,” Eurasia

Daily Monitor, vol.9, Issue 152, 8 September 2012, http://www.russialist.org/archives/rus-

sia-putin-admits-russian-invasion-georgia-preplanned-814.php.
122 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Lesson 3: Russia’s Weakness Fosters Cooperation

As indicated earlier, Russia’s self-perceived weakness has also been an
important factor in its relations with the West. When new Russia was
making its big opening towards the West following the break-up of the
Soviet Union, it was in deep economic and social crisis. During 1992
not only Western financial help but even food deliveries were on the
agenda of the Russian-Western political dialogue. It was much less a
problem in the 1990s, but events in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995
revealed how politically weak Russia still was at that time. The country’s
weakness was further underscored by its deep financial crisis in 1998
and its political humiliation during the Kosovo crisis in 1999 (with two
and a half months of NATO bombardments of Yugoslavia despite fierce
Russian protests)—elements highlighted by Prime Minister Putin in his
“Millennium speech” of December 1999. Russia’s leadership basically
realized then that Moscow was too weak to openly confront the West,
so it decided to focus on internal strengthening and seeking, at least
temporary, a modus vivendi with the EU and the United States (after a
brief unsuccessful attempt to revive “old” anti-Western partnerships).
Obviously the 9/11 terrorist attacks strongly contributed to the new
trend, providing Moscow with a perceived window of opportunity to
influence Western thinking and policies through its offer of a pragmatic
anti-terrorist alliance. When Medvedev started his presidency in May
2008, Russia felt quite confident and strong. This changed dramatically
only few months later, when economic crisis struck Russia in Septem-
ber. Therefore, not only the U.S. “reset” initiative, but also internal
Russian crisis (the bottom of which was reached in Russia in Spring
2009) contributed to a thaw in Russian-Western relations.
Some signs of a repetition of this pattern can be observed today.
Since September 2014 Russia has been confronted with another wave of
economic crisis, due mostly to a combination of growing longer-term
systemic problems of the Russian economy and the immediate effect of
a slump in oil prices. But Western sanctions—and, even more, Russian
counter-sanctions—have played a role as they have gradually exposed
the Russian economy’s very high level of import dependence. As Russian
society suffered, the Kremlin realized that agricultural and industrial
import substitution was largely a failure, while China was not eager to
provide Russia with financial relief (contrary to Moscow’s apparent
expectations). This overall situation clearly helped to change Moscow’s
tactics since late summer 2015, which have included de-escalation in the
Russian-Ukrainian war in the Donbas and attempts to re-engage with
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 123

the West, especially the EU, to persuade it to start relaxing sanctions

against Russia.

Lesson 4: Personalities Matter

The history of modern Russian-Western relations suggest that the role
of individual leaders is difficult to overestimate. This is especially the
case with Russia. Boris Yeltsin was not a naturally-born democrat, but
he understood the Soviet system couldn’t work. He needed a demo-
cratic movement to be his springboard to power and an instrument in
his political struggles, first with Gorbachev and the Soviet federal cen-
ter, and then with the communist and nationalist opposition. His strong
personality and readiness for bold action helped in the early years of the
new Russia to provide political cover for economic reforms and the
development of generally positive relations with the West. Yet in his late
years his personal weaknesses opened the way for an oligarchic system
and then created social demand for more authoritarian rule, which was
soon over satisfied by his chosen successor, Vladimir Putin.
Even Putin initially played a moderately positive role in fostering
cooperation with the West, while he was focused on creating a strong
power center and advancing some economic reforms early on in his
presidency. Unfortunately, the more unchecked power he assumed and
the more he benefited from growing economic prosperity based on ris-
ing oil prices, the less inclined he was to bring Russia closer to the West.
His deeply rooted traumas and grievances towards the West (partly
related to his personal experiences in the dramatic events in East Ger-
many and the breakup of the Soviet Union) became more and more vis-
ible and were fueled by his growing suspicion. He fell victim to anti-
Western conspiracy theories, partly due to his secret service
background, partly probably due to information filtered for him by
those services.
Medvedev’s presidency was a brief interlude. He also wasn’t “liberal”
in the Western sense, but his background was different than that of
Putin and he had around him people who believed in the necessity of
gradual economic and political modernization. He was too weak, how-
ever, both personally and politically, as Putin created enough checks to
stop him whenever he wished and to a large extent remained a key deci-
sion maker. Medvedev never decided to fight for real power. His deci-
sion to give up and not resist Putin’s return was detrimental for Russia
both internally and externally. It not only compromised him in the eyes
124 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

of liberal-minded Russians, it killed hope for Russia’s peaceful gradual

modernization and long-term pragmatic cooperation with the West.
As the Russian regime changed from authoritarian to almost auto-
cratic under Putin’s third term, with a high level of centralization and
personalization of the decision making processes, Putin himself deter-
mined the course of Russian-Western relations. He felt personally
offended by the West’s open preference for Medvedev. He also felt per-
sonally threatened by what he believed was a U.S.-led Western policy of
regime change and geopolitical advance. In addition, he has seemed to
cherish a real desire to rebuild Russia as an empire, and he wants to
make history. These attributes, together with his inclination toward
high-risk, bold actions, have put Russia on an open collision course with
the West and played an important role in generating the deepest crisis
in post-Cold War relations between Russia and the West.
The personality factor obviously has played a role also with regard to
the West—for instance the cowboy-style boldness of U.S. President
George W. Bush and the interventionism embraced by his neo-conserva-
tive collaborators; Barack Obama’s belief in dialogue and compromise,
his indecisiveness and aversion to foreign military interventions; and
German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cautious yet illusion-free approach
to Russia definitely have all had an impact on Russian-Western relations.

Conclusions
Preconditions for Positive Russian–Western Relations
This analysis suggests that there is a way for Russia and the West to
build a positive, constructive long term relationship or even create a
truly common space, be it Greater Europe or something else. But there
is one important precondition for that: Russian policy and Russia itself
should profoundly change. This means a Russia that embarks on a
course of profound, systemic internal economic and political reform and
modernization, a Russia that refrains from the use of political, eco-
nomic, energy coercion and threats to use, and actual use of military
force, a Russia that does not seek a sphere of influence but develops
integration through cooperation and by increasing its own attractive-
ness. This Russia should be fully supported by the West, politically and
economically and invited to integrate with the European space or join-
ing European or Euro-Atlantic structures if it wished to do so. Unfortu-
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 125

nately, today’s Russia is the opposite of that Russia. And since any per-
spective of change along these lines is perceived by Russia’s current nar-
row ruling elite as a mortal threat, any movement in this direction is
highly unlikely until this elite—not only Vladimir Putin but also his
like-minded collaborators—are no longer in power in Russia.

Policy Responses: What Should the West NOT Do?

For the West not only to recognize but to engage Russia “as it is,” and
to develop intensive political and economic cooperation with it, would
be a strategic mistake.
First, such an approach would suggest to the Russian leadership that an
aggressive, adventurous, anti-Western foreign policy that violates princi-
ples and norms really works with the West, advances Russia’s policy goals
and is rewarded. It would be an open invitation for Russia to continue
such policies and create a great danger of a repetition of crises compara-
ble to those surrounding Ukraine, or even something much larger.
Second, such a stance would give the Russian leadership arguments
vis-a-vis its own society about the effectiveness of its actions, and would
be likely to increase its legitimacy. At the same time such a policy, being
a betrayal of values and principles proclaimed by the West, would com-
promise Western policy in the eyes of the liberal-minded minority
within Russian society and prove to them and others the hypocrisy of
the West, essentially validating claims made to this effect by Russian
state propaganda.
Third, by developing even deeper and unconditional economic coop-
eration with large Russian companies closely linked to the members of
ruling elite, especially by providing significant capital and advanced
technology, the West would in fact be helping to prolong Russia’s cur-
rent economic system, and would be providing members of the Russian
elite with opportunities for self-enrichment at the expense of the Russ-
ian state. Such actions would decrease the chances of a real improve-
ment in the investment climate in Russia, make economic reforms less
likely, and eventually undermine the long-term prospects for Western
companies in the Russian market. Above all, they would increase the
risk of transferring Russian shadow economic practices to the West in
general and Europe in particular, and exporting corruption through the
development of corruption networks—a phenomenon that is already
under way.
126 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Another mistake would be to offer a geopolitical “grand bargain”

between the West and Russia. One variant of this approach would be to
suggest that “guarantees” of Ukraine’s non-aligned status (in essence, a
ban on NATO membership) would lead to a certain “Finlandization” of
this country, allowing it to expand its links with the EU without Russia’s
opposition, and thus ultimately solving the conflict and stabilizing Russ-
ian-Western relations. A related assumption is that forging formal ties
or even possible economic cooperation between European Union and
Eurasian Economic Union would stabilize the situation and persuade
Russia to develop a constructive approach.
Such propositions are both unrealistic and counterproductive. It is
true that Russia demanded guarantees of Ukraine’s non-aligned status in
the course of the current crisis, yet it is clear that Moscow did not start a
war with Ukraine solely because of the prospects of Ukraine’s NATO
membership (which was totally unrealistic), but because it failed to
bring Ukraine into the Eurasian Economic Union. Russian moves sug-
gest not only that Moscow is unable to accept Ukraine’s future EU
membership (which is perceived in Moscow as a low probability), it is
unable to accept any kind of integration of Ukraine into the EU’s nor-
mative space. In fact, the Putin regime considers the perspective of the
successful European transformation of Ukraine as a mortal threat.
Therefore any comparison between current Ukraine (regarded by Rus-
sia’s elite as natural part of “historical Russia”) and Cold War Finland
(used to be treated by Moscow as peripheral buffer zone) are simply
divorced from reality.
The same goes with relations between the EU and the EEU. The lat-
ter, despite its formal resemblance to EU’s institutional model, offers a
completely different model of integration. The EEU is based on Russ-
ian norms and standards, largely incompatible with those of the EU.
The EEU is asymmetric and politically dominated by Russia. Unlike in
the EU, new EEU member states are blackmailed (Armenia) or bribed
(Kyrgyzstan) to join. In addition, EEU integration is largely unsuccess-
ful; trade conflicts erupt regularly among its members. Moreover, Rus-
sia’s current economic crisis puts a question mark over the EEU’s
future. Above all, the EEU is in fact Russia’s geopolitical project. It is
the current institutional form of Russia’s effort to rebuild a sphere of
influence in the post-Soviet space. EU cooperation with it is therefore
economically unfeasible and politically doubtful.
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 127

It may be tempting to think that a realistic policy for the West that
could bring stability would be to recognize tacitly Russia’s sphere of
influence in the post-Soviet area and abandon any ambitions to help
those eastern neighbors of the EU who wish to integrate into its norma-
tive space. In fact, however, such a policy would be detrimental for all
actors. Social frustration in such neighboring countries as Ukraine,
Moldova and Georgia would grow, leading to political instability. Russia
would be strongly tempted to exploit such situations and try to lure or
force these countries to join the EEU, which could contribute to even
more chaos or even provoke new bloody crises. One cannot exclude the
possibility that Moscow, emboldened by Western retreat, would be also
encouraged in such cases to raise the stakes vis-a-vis the West by
demanding “Finlandization” of the Baltic states, causing another large
European crisis.15 Finally such a Western policy would have adverse
effects on Russia itself. By derailing processes of European transforma-
tion and integration in neighboring states, Russian society will not be
provided with precedents or role models for itself, which would lower
the chances that sustainable reform processes could also occur in Russia.

Narrow Windows for Cooperation

Yet another option is to decouple the “Ukrainian problem” (or broadly
“common neighborhood problem”) with other issues, put it aside and
focus on areas of prospective mutual cooperation between the West and
Russia. Three such fields of cooperation should be assessed in that con-
text: energy; the fight against radical Islam/terrorism; and regional crises.
Energy is perceived as a natural field for Russian-Western coopera-
tion, since Russia is dependent on its energy exports and many EU
countries are dependent on energy imports, are close geographically to
Russia and already have developed infrastructure links with Russia.
Russian-European gas relations, however, have been subjected to regu-
lar conflicts (unlawful practices, political pressures, gas disruptions of
supply etc.). On the other hand, development of the EU’s internal gas
market and infrastructure links have forced a reluctant Gazprom to
make partial adjustments to European regulations. As this process is

15 Itis worth mentioning in this context that until the mid-1990s even relatively weak Russia
tried to retain its influence in central Europe, offering “security guarantees” and multilateral
economic cooperation mechanisms. Even in 2002 president Putin demanded that the EU
guarantee that it would honor Russia’s “traditional” economic links with central European
states in the process of EU enlargement.
128 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

likely to continue, Russia may participate or even expand its presence in

an increasingly competitive European market on a purely market basis.
There is no reason, however, for the EU or its member states to grant
Russia any “special arrangements” or concessions. Prospects for addi-
tional Western investment in Russia’s energy sector (where some large
Western companies have operated for many years, despite the worsening
investment climate) will depend primarily on economic incentives or
guarantees from the Russian government, such as tax policy, ownership
safety, full gas export liberalization etc.) as well as economic profitability.
Yet current low oil price levels are likely to render development of the
most investment-intensive prospective oil and gas fields in Eastern
Siberia and the Russian Arctic as economically unfeasible. In all, Russia
will remain the West’s energy partner to the extent it will be ready to
play according to market rules and it increases its attractiveness.
Radical Islam and terrorism related to it clearly present challenges to
both the West and Russia. Cooperation in that field, however, faces
important hurdles. Moscow accuses the West of a selective and instru-
mental approach to Islamic radicalism and terrorism, or even of spon-
soring it, even as it pursues such policies itself. Examples include Rus-
sia’s clandestine support for Turkey’s PKK in the 1990s and its open
political (and clandestine military) support for Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Brutal Russian policies in the Northern Caucasus contributed to the
rise of Islamic radicalism in the region. Moreover, recent reports have
charged Russian secret services with facilitating the flow of Islamic radi-
cals from Northern Caucasus to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq.16 Finally,
Russian bombardment in Syria, which the Kremlin proclaims to be
aimed mostly against ISIS, in fact has been directed predominantly
against other anti-Assad groups, indirectly helping ISIS. In such cir-
cumstances one can cast serious doubt on the future development of
Russian-Western anti-terror cooperation.
Prospects for Western cooperation with Russia over regional conflicts
also seem overestimated. In some cases Russia’s approach was indeed
cooperative, as in the talks on the North Korean nuclear problem,
Israeli-Palestinian conflict or fighting piracy in the Horn of Africa. How-
ever in all these cases Russia’s role was in fact rather marginal, either

16 See Yelena Milashina, Khalifat—primanka dla durakov, Novaya Gazeta, 29 July 2015,
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/69364.html; Michael Weiss, “Russia is Sending Jihadists
to Join ISIS,” The Daily Beast, 23 August 2015, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/
08/23/russia-s-playing-a-double-game-with-islamic-terror0.html.
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 129

because of objective reasons or because Moscow chose to limit its

engagement. In various other conflicts, Russia’s role was dubious, partly
helpful and partly harmful. That was the case with the wars in the former
Yugoslavia (support for Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic vs. participation in
NATO peacekeeping), with Iran (energy and military cooperation with
Tehran vs. support for limited sanctions and participation in the Western
nuclear agreement with Tehran) and partly with Afghanistan (helping in
transit vs. pressure on the United States to leave Central Asia). Russia
also has been undermining Western policies in Syria with its uncondi-
tional political and military support for the Assad regime, which has been
responsible for massive atrocities. In short, the West’s past and current
experience of cooperation with Russia on regional conflicts is at best
mixed, which should cause caution with regard to future expectations.
We can expect limited cooperation only in cases when Russia feels
directly threatened or has no important interests.

Policy Responses: What Should the West Do?

Three directions are the most important:
Engage not Russia but the Russians. The West should continue pressure
Russia with sanctions, until the reasons for their adoption disappear.
This is especially important given Russia’s current economic crisis,
which makes Moscow more susceptible to such pressure and creates
incentives for it to fulfill the most important obligations of the Minsk
agreements. As has been said, however, only positive regime change in
Russia can open up perspectives for closer, productive cooperation.
Despite the Kremlin’s paranoid accusations, the West has not assisted
such a regime change in Russia before and it could not and should not
try it in the future. It is up to the Russian people alone to decide their
future. What the West should do, however, is to pursue an active, posi-
tive policy aimed at helping the Russian people maintain contacts with
the West, have access to reliable information, and develop civil society
in Russia based on democratic values. To that end, the West should
increase its political, technical and financial support through various
official and non-governmental channels to develop programs of human-
itarian contacts, exchanges (including youth), especially aimed at educa-
tion about the West, its institutions (NATO, EU) and democratic civic
education. In doing this it is important not to allow the Russian govern-
ment to control and direct such cooperation or use it to pursue its goals
(e.g. to influence Western public opinion to accept current Russian poli-
130 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

cies). However, since the Russian government actively suppresses such

activities within Russia and trying to close almost all channels of West-
ern support, focus should be made, on the one hand, on at least main-
taining political-free contacts and cooperation schemes and on the
other hand—on activities outside the Russian borders. Especially West-
ern non-governmental structures should make use of large and growing
communities of Russian fresh émigrés (scientists, journalists, NGO
activists or entrepreneurs), engaging them in various educational and
information activities. High quality Russian journalists and experts in
the West should be helped to develop various Russian-language media
outlets, TV and radio stations, journals, newspapers and internet por-
tals—all providing Russians and other Russian speakers with reliable
information and alternative viewpoints. In the long term such efforts
can help to build abroad alternative, democratic Russian elites who
could return to the country should regime change take place.
Put our own home in order: increase the resilience of the West towards nega-
tive Russian policies. The West has no instruments to change Russia
directly, but it can stop Russia from changing the West. Russia’s
provocative military activities aimed against individual NATO member
states and non-aligned countries in Europe, its attempts to exert politi-
cal or economic pressure on some of these countries, its aggressive state
propaganda aimed at Western audiences in various languages, its sup-
port for radical parties and groups of both the far right and the far left
in Europe, its corruption networks and shadow business practices in the
West—all of these tactics are part of the Russian challenge towards the
West.
The West should respond with concerted actions aimed at building
resilience against Russian negative policies and influences. There are
many ways to do this. In the security sphere NATO should adapt strate-
gically. It should increase its military capabilities and its effectiveness,
especially on its eastern flank, thus creating credible deterrence against
Russia. Here strong U.S. leadership is indispensable and no “power out-
sourcing” would be feasible. On the other hand, European NATO
members, both individually and collectively, should embark on a serious
increase of their defense capabilities. In the economic sphere the EU
should improve business transparency, if necessary with additional legis-
lation. EU member states should engage in concerted actions to fight
corruption and execute European law more effectively. They should
build a truly common EU energy market with expanded infrastructure
 Russia and the West: What Went Wrong and Can We Do Better? 131

links and storage and solidarity mechanisms in case of crises, and actu-
ally implement the EU’s declaratory policy of diversification of energy
imports. The EU and the United States should engage in more robust
transatlantic cooperation both in trade, through signing and imple-
menting the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, and in
energy, through U.S. energy exports to Europe.
Create positive precedents by supporting democratic transformation in the
Eastern neighborhood. While the West cannot change Russia directly, it
may help to do it indirectly by changing the EU’s and Russia’s neigh-
borhood. Despite serious deficits and mixed results to date, the West
should increase its engagement in promoting democratic and market
transformation in individual states of eastern Europe and the southern
Caucasus. If the process of transformation based on European standards
fails in countries like Moldova, Georgia and above all in Ukraine, it will
not only bring more instability to that region, but it will contribute to
increased challenges coming from Russia.
The West should pursue a proactive policy towards those Eastern
neighborhood countries that demonstrate their commitment to demo-
cratic and market transformation and European integration. Part of this
policy should be pressure on full implementation of the EU’s Associa-
tion Agreements with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, including their
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs). Russian
efforts to influence such processes adversely should be denied. Both the
United States and the EU, as well other willing Western allies, should
provide those countries with substantial technical and financial support,
subject to strict conditionality that agreed policies and reforms are
implemented. Western and Western-dominated international economic
structures such as the IMF, World Bank, OECD and EBRD play a cru-
cial role here. In the military and security sphere the supportive role of
NATO and its individual member states is crucial. Western support
should be also directed more towards civil society structures in Eastern
neighborhood countries to help NGOs and local watchdogs hold their
respective governments accountable for introducing European stan-
dards and pursuing declared and agreed policies. Russian attempts to
derail such processes (e.g. by using trade embargoes or energy black-
mail) should be met with even greater Western support for these coun-
tries. The West should eventually realize that what is at stake here is not
only future of individual neighboring countries but in fact the future of
Europe, Russia and relations between Russia and the West.
 Chapter 5

The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to

Long-Term Crisis Management
Marie Mendras

Russia entered a period of acute crisis the day it occupied and

annexed Crimea. In history textbooks, it might well mark the begin-
ning of the end of Putin’s rule. It will also read as a turning point in
European and transatlantic policies toward Russia’s leadership. Much
of the change in paradigm was triggered by Moscow’s intrusive and
subversive methods in the “in-between” states, the states that
remained stuck between Europe and the Russian Federation after
1991. 1 Moscow’s unswerving support of Assad’s dictatorial military
rule is, to a large extent, the consequence of Vladimir Putin’s fear of
“regime fall” and rule-of-law aspirations in several prominent east
European and Mediterranean countries.
In 2014–15, the pace of change was momentous. In 2016–17, it might
accelerate even further, as we see no sign of serious appeasement in
Russian domestic and foreign conduct. At the same time, Western gov-
ernments need to be ready for long-term crisis management, and not
just urgent conflict containment, as tensions and confrontations with
Moscow will continue on a regular basis. Even if Ukraine becomes a
low-intensity conflict, European countries will be facing the challenge
of long-term insecurity in their immediate vicinity.
Economic recession, authoritarian protectionism, and rising con-
frontation with most neighbors, west and south, are driving Russia onto
a very uncertain path. Confrontational policies are bound to be less safe
and less controllable than negotiation and conflict-resolution strategies.
It is always easier to fall into conflict and violence than to end war, and
to put the lid back on the Pandora’s box of nationalist, xenophobic hys-
terical war scares.
This chapter makes three major observations pertaining to Russia
and Vladimir Putin’s future policies, and offers three prospective sug-

1 Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.

133
134 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

gestions about how Western governments might want to tackle rising

challenges.

Russia’s Unreasonable Bets

The High Costs of the Ukrainian Adventure
Were Unforeseen by the Kremlin
Since 2013 costs have been rising for Putin’s regime, and for Russians.
Economic costs are obvious: Western sanctions and Russian counter-
sanctions burdened an already slipping economy. Diplomatic and mili-
tary costs continue to rise: Moscow will not regain minimal trust from
such key capitals as Washington, Berlin, Paris, London, or even Beijing.
Putin’s image as a potent and reliable partner is gone for good. The mil-
itary now has the upper hand in decision-making and in revenue spend-
ing. This is never good news for a leadership that becomes hostage to its
own military adventures.
It is important to follow the narrative of Russia’s miscalculations,
rather than to view two years of blunders as a success story. Donbas is a
failure for Russia, even if it also is a failure for Ukraine. Putin had to get
much more involved than he had planned. After the easy fall of Crimea,
he was hoping for a second quick victory in Donbas. But Crimea always
remained a Russia-controlled territory, even after 1991, with more
Russian military than Ukrainian law enforcement forces, and with a
largely Russian population. It was a much softer spot than the Donetsk
and Luhansk regions.
The Russian leadership did not expect such a strong Western
response, and was taken aback by the determination of Ukrainian soci-
ety. They displayed arrogance about the “low status” of Ukrainians and
Ukraine, and about the “weakness” of the EU. Hence, they had to go
much further than they had originally thought to support “rebels,” and
became directly involved in armed struggle and the all-out destabiliza-
tion of eastern Ukraine. They made a number of mistakes that forced
them to engage in full-scale military fighting, and they eventually had to
stop denying direct Russian involvement.
The Russian president is making his country an outcast in regional
and international affairs. Without Russia’s efforts to subvert Ukrainian
domestic affairs, Ukrainians could have completed a peaceful and
remarkably constitutional change of government in the winter of
 The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to Long-Term Crisis Management 135

2013–14. This point needs be restated at every stage of Ukraine’s

bumpy road.
Paradoxically, Moscow’s intrusive policies may bring the age of
spheres of influence to an end. In desperately seeking to keep the
“inherited sphere” under exclusive control, the Kremlin is losing not
only capacity and power, but also networks and attractiveness. It no
longer offers good deals to Ukrainian oligarchs, nor does it extend a
helping hand to the population. Before the Maidan, Russia failed to
retain influence; now it fails to exert post-imperial control, for nowhere in
eastern Europe is Russia seen as a recipe for future prosperity.

Putin Is Putting Russia at Risk

Russia has entered a new time of trouble. The economy is plunging into
recession with a negative growth rate, double-digit inflation, slumping
purchasing power, a crippling lack of investments, and no improvement
in sight. The oil curse has struck a country of 140 million people that
had grown accustomed to living off rising hydrocarbon exports rev-
enues without reforming or working very hard.
Elites and upper middle classes have much to lose, and Western sanc-
tions are raising the stakes. The rest of society is struggling to save a
way of life that brought them more comfort and prospects than at any
previous time in Russian history. In the 2000s, Russians became con-
sumers, enjoyed it, and thanked Vladimir Putin for that. Now, they are
petrified and caught up in the Kremlin’s war scare and “fifth column”
propaganda against Ukraine and the West. They are told that they had
better get used to living in a besieged fortress.

The System is Growing More Precarious

Notwithstanding blunt autocratic rule, there are reasons to believe that
the regime is less legitimate in the eyes of average Russians and of eco-
nomic and scientific elites, because it is less effective, less predictable,
and more prone to risk.
Russian society’s prospects look somber. Economic recession and
social distress are on the rise, while insecurity shows no sign of abating,
especially in the north Caucasus republics. The public mood echoes the
dark and abrasive language of official television. As a result, people feel
insecure and unsafe, and live in diffuse fear of the future and of the out-
side world. Maybe this sense that there is no end to the tunnel generates
136 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

a new fear, the fear that Putin is no longer capable of solving issues and
ending armed conflicts. Undoubtedly, this is a major question that
Western governments and experts should investigate in order to antici-
pate future developments. Is Putin really popular? Will a majority sup-
port his warmongering policies, no matter what negative consequences
such policies may hold for them?
Putin needs to trap his population in debilitating xenophobic nation-
alism. Tightly controlled media propagate extremely negative emotions,
served by blatant lies and a frightening coverage of news in Ukraine.
Many Russians feel nervous and angry, and indulge in the narrative of
“the Motherland threatened by enemies outside and traitors inside.” In
such an atmosphere, polls no longer measure opinion, they measure
emotion. People say they support Putin, but do so in a context in which
they are deprived of an alternative. In the same polls, Russians respond
they do not trust the government to fight corruption, which ranks high
on their long list of complaints.2 Emotions are volatile and may back-
fire. Russians do not want to fight a war against Ukrainians.
Elites are preoccupied, as they see no easy way out of recession and
uncertainty. Political, economic, scientific, cultural elites know that war
and being a big power (derzhavnost’) cannot replace reform and growth.
Many of them probably observe with concern an aging leader who lacks
strategic vision for domestic development. However, if they wish to stay
in Russia, they must accept compromises and contraction of their rev-
enues and assets. Hundreds of thousands have made another choice,
leaving their country and now working abroad. A significant number of
them state openly that they are in temporary exile and prepare to return
when the Putin group is out.
In a context of recession and rising political and security confronta-
tion with the West, no one knows how sustainable the current system is.
European and American sanctions did not deter Vladimir Putin from
further destabilizing Ukraine, but they sent shockwaves through elite
and business circles, which are so dependent on Moscow’s good will and
budgetary benevolence. Sanctions create anxiety, uncertainty, and prob-
ably muffled hostility to the Kremlin’s confrontational strategy. Sanc-
tions are also effective in delivering a message of Western solidarity for
Ukraine, which dampens hopes of renewed business deals for Russian
companies.

2 Levada Institute, www.levada.ru.

 The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to Long-Term Crisis Management 137

Urgent Tasks in Transatlantic Strategic Thinking

In the face of Moscow’s intrusive armed policies in eastern Europe, the

European Union did relatively well. Since the Maidan popular protest
started in November 2013, and throughout the years 2014 and 2015,
EU governments have acted consensually and with determination. They
have worked in close consultation with the United States, Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, Turkey and Japan. Sanctions were agreed and
imposed by most Western countries. This was an unexpected and prom-
ising moment of transatlantic and “like-minded” solidarity.
However, Ukraine is not pacified, and Moscow continues to support
“separatists.” Given front-burner issues such as the Syria war, ISIS ter-
rorism, and the refugee crisis, Ukraine no longer makes the headlines.
But it remains a central disruptive issue in Europe.
In 2016, the challenge will be to reinforce Western solidarity and to
sustain policies implemented by Western countries and Western multi-
lateral institutions, first and foremost the EU and NATO. One cannot
overrate dissenting views inside European countries about what Putin
can do, and cannot do, and how we should deal with him.
The Syrian tragedy confronts Western governments and multilateral
organizations with huge challenges: how to respond adequately to
mounting terrorism in Europe; how to contain Assad’s troops and
Islamists’ power; how to save civilian lives in Syria and Iraq; and how to
prepare a post-Assad, post-U.S.-occupied Iraq, without relying heavily
on Russian political will and military capabilities. Our task is made even
more difficult by the fact that the Kremlin does not seem to be pursuing
clear aims in the Middle East.
We will probably not act as effectively together in this next phase, a
phase of lasting conflict, in some cases low-intensity conflict (Ukraine),
in other cases still highly militarized battles (Middle East, ISIS, and ter-
rorism). Russia cannot be dismissed as a power that counts, but cannot
be treated as a partner.
138 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Recommendations
Adjust the Explanatory Toolbox of Why Putin Does What He Does
The exceptionally complex challenge for Western allies is to deal with
sharpening risks in the very short term, but also to look beyond current
crises and prepare for a post-Putin Russia that will be dysfunctional and
divided. As long as ruling clans and siloviki (power structures) remain
unchecked, economic lawlessness and political violence will grow inside
Russia. In a few years, the country will be in dire conditions. By 2025,
almost two generations will have been lost. Without even modest
reforms, Vladimir Putin will be closing all chances of a rebound. This is
the darkest, but most probable scenario in the event of no change of
leadership and methods of rule.
Confrontation between Russia and the West has reached new heights
and our policies need be reassessed. Now it is Russia alone versus the
West, not the old East-West confrontation. The EU, the United States
and other Western governments and multilateral organizations must
consolidate a consensual discourse and coordinated policies toward the
Kremlin.
Vladimir Putin is our one and only interlocutor. Only he has author-
ity to negotiate with Kiev, with Western governments, and with the
armed commandos in Donbas. The challenge for us is precisely that he
is the lonely leader of an unaccountable and militarized regime; he lives
retrenched in an inner circle, probably “self-disinformed” about realities
in Russia and outside, and has isolated his country on the continent and
in the world more widely. Even China does not support the military
destabilization of eastern Ukraine.

Prepare for the Post-Putin Reality

We also need to take a longer-term perspective, so as to better define
the direction in which to make progress in coming months, and the
desired results in a few years. There is no doubt that in a not-so-distant
future, Russia will no longer be ruled by Vladimir Putin. And we will
want to have good and stable relations with our Russian neighbor and
its 140 million inhabitants.
Western governments must develop channels of communication and
relations with as many Russian individuals, organizations, companies as
 The West and Russia: From Acute Conflict to Long-Term Crisis Management 139

we can, and in the most vigorous manner. This has become very difficult
because of abundant repressive legislation and harsh crackdown on all
forms of criticism and dissent. However, it must be done, so that we can
convince Russian economic, political, intellectual, and even administra-
tive elites of our determination to work in favor of Russia’s peaceful and
prosperous future, after the current leadership has left the scene.

Think Europe’s Continental Security Anew, Including Eastern Countries

Whether they are engaged in a long process of joining the EU and
NATO, or not, the six countries that are sandwiched between western
Europe and Russia must get out of their “in-between” predicament.
Ukrainians demonstrated that they cannot be forever a weak state,
stuck between Europe and NATO on one side, and an authoritarian
revisionist Russia on the other. Ukraine cannot be a convenient “bridge”
between Moscow and us. In recent years, our standby position, by which
we let Ukraine be a misruled buffer state under Moscow’s unwritten
yoke, was a dangerous illusion. Ukrainians paid, and continue to pay, a
high human price for this mistake. So let us not repeat this wrong mes-
sage that Ukraine is “naturally” closer to Russian political culture and
Russia’s economic space than to the European space. There is no “third
way” for Ukraine or Georgia, but a choice to make between democrati-
zation along with Europeanization, or unaccountable, weak government
à la russe. Ukrainians expressed their will on the Maidan, and later with
their ballots in May and October 2014.
Coordinating EU and NATO policies, and defining the division of
labor between the two organizations, in order to restrain Russia’s
actions and negotiate from a position of strength, is an urgent matter.
The EU cannot dismiss the security urgency, and must address it, in
connection with NATO and the United States. We need to be prepared
for a long standoff with Moscow. Therefore, we must better contain
Russian actions that would trigger confrontation and raise risks. At the
same time, we need to get ready for the post-conflict period with both
current and alternative elites.
Western governments and organizations have one substantial advan-
tage over the Kremlin: the capacity to engage in serious long-term
planning, and to revise and adjust our policies when need be. And we
have one unredeemable obligation: not to let Ukraine be again a large
140 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

misruled country of eastern Europe. We simply can no longer afford it.

The risks are too high, in political, economic, and security terms. Full
support of the Ukrainian population, with effective accountability
enforced on business and administration, in good intelligence with
Ukrainian institutions, is the only reasonable feuille de route.
 Chapter 6

Western Strategy toward Russia

Sergei Guriev1

I am a Russian citizen. It is therefore not my job to advise Western

governments on how to develop or implement specific policies,
including policies towards Russia. I also strongly believe that only
Russians, and not outsiders, can turn Russia into a more peaceful,
democratic and prosperous country. On the other hand, I think that a
more informed policy debate would be in everyone’s interest. This is
why I offer a few arguments that may be useful for Western policy-
makers and policy advisors to take into account when developing their
policies and strategies.
Everything we know about today’s Russian regime is consistent with
the following simple theory. This regime has neither an ideology nor a
global vision. Its domestic and foreign policy choices are dictated by the
logic of its political survival. The regime does not want to rely on mass
repression and so prefers “hybrid strategies:” propaganda, censorship,
cooptation of the elites, and limited repression against opposition. Its
foreign policy should be understood as part of this continuing struggle
to survive. Foreign policy adventures make propaganda narratives more
convincing; the external conflicts justify the need to rally around the
leader whatever his internal failures.
Previously, the regime’s legitimacy was based on its economic per-
formance. After the growth slowdown in 2012–14 and the respective
decline in its popularity, the regime started looking for alternative
sources of legitimacy. The annexation of Crimea came up as an excellent
opportunity to boost approval ratings. As the Russian economy entered
recession, foreign policy became a critical means to maintain popularity.
However, some time in the fall of 2014 the government understood that
further aggression could result in catastrophic economic consequences,
so it decided to freeze the conflict in Ukraine and started to look for an
alternative foreign policy agenda, in this case, Syria.

1 This chapter was written in fall 2015.

141
142 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Recent events suggest that, on the one hand, sanctions work and the
threat of future sanctions does constrain potential aggressive behavior.
On the other hand, there is also a reason to worry. As the economy is
unlikely to return to fast growth, eventually the regime will face the
existential risk of losing popularity and therefore may continue its for-
eign policy experimentation.
Whatever the immediate risks, in the long run the situation is even
more worrisome. Eventually, the regime will run out of cash and will
collapse. It is not clear when such regime change will take place, but
given Russia’s unsatisfactory economic performance, regime change will
certainly happen. I am optimistic about Russia’s economy and political
system in the long run, but the regime change may be very turbulent. It
is not at all clear that Putin’s immediate successor will be better than
Putin. Given that Russia is a nuclear power, there is a need for a strategy
for handling future regime change. A major commitment to a kind of
“Marshall Plan” supporting and re-integrating Russia into the world
may increase the odds of a more peaceful and predictable transition.

Interaction between Domestic Politics and

Foreign Policy in Russia

The key to understanding Russia’s recent foreign policy moves is to

remember that the Russian government’s main objective is stay in
power. This motivation is certainly not unique to the Russian govern-
ment. However, it has been extremely effective in using heterodox polit-
ical instruments and very innovative in developing new tools to main-
tain its legitimacy and popularity among the Russian public. Initially,
the main source of the regime’s legitimacy was its economic perform-
ance. In 1999-2008, Russian GDP grew 7 percent per year. This growth
trickled down to every part of Russian society, resulted in a consump-
tion boom and a dramatic fall in unemployment and poverty, and
brought about solid support for Putin. In the 2004 presidential elec-
tions, Putin received 71 percent—much more than in his first election
in 2000 (53 percent). Constitutional limits did not allow Putin to run in
2008, so he nominated Dmitri Medvedev, who obtained 70 percent of
the vote—on par with Putin’s own 2004 result.
Eventually, however, this growth ran out of steam. After an 8 percent
decline in 2009, the Russian economy only managed to recover to pre-
crisis levels by 2012, after which it again started to slow down. This was
 Western Strategy toward Russia 143

not surprising, as the sources of the 1999-2008 growth—low initial

base, rise in oil prices, cheap labor, unutilized production capacity,
growth in retail lending, and the liberal reforms of the early 2000s—
were exhausted. Further growth would only come from growth of pro-
ductivity and new investment. To tap these sources of growth, the gov-
ernment should have reformed the business and investment climate,
reduced government ownership and intervention in the economy, and
curbed corruption. While such reforms have been drafted and
announced—in particular, in Putin’s 2012 presidential campaign—they
have not been implemented. This has resulted in stagnating productiv-
ity and investment, capital outflows, and in a slowdown in growth. Even
before the Crimean crisis, Russia’s economic growth was close to zero.
Not surprisingly, this was accompanied by the fall in Putin’s popular-
ity. The regime responded with increased propaganda, censorship and
repression against opposition activists, and tried to raise xenophobic and
homophobic sentiment. This did not help, however. Only the annexa-
tion of Crimea produced the desired effect. The regime understood that
foreign policy can replace economic growth as the basis of popularity
and legitimacy and has been focusing on foreign policy ever since.

Economic Dead End

Russia’s GDP is likely to have declined by 4 percent in 2015 and to

decline by an additional 1-2 percent in 2016. This is all the more strik-
ing as the previous recession in Russia happened during the Great
Recession of 2008-09, which hit the entire global economy. Currently,
however, the global economy is growing, which makes it impossible to
attribute Russian recession to external circumstances. Moreover, unlike
2009 (when reserves helped to support Russians’ real incomes), this
time—for the first time in Putin’s 15 years in power—real incomes of
Russians have declined by almost 10 percent relative to the end of 2013.
There is no reason to believe that Russia will return to growth any
time soon. The three main factors contributing to the recession are (i)
the lack of reforms and the poor business climate, (ii) low oil prices and
(iii) sanctions and counter-sanctions. Given that the regime is unlikely
to give up Crimea and fully withdraw from eastern Ukraine, sanctions
are likely to stay.
144 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Will there be any economic reforms? Given the cost of recession,

why wouldn’t the government undertake pro-growth reforms to
improve its domestic legitimacy and its ability to grow its military
capacity? The answer is very simple. Pro-growth reforms require pro-
tection of private property rights, enforcement of contracts and protec-
tion of fair competition. These reforms collide with the interests of key
constituencies of the regime: corrupt bureaucrats, politically connected
business people, and employees of the government and of state-owned
companies. The regime cannot afford losing their support.
Finally, given the increased supply in the oil market and slowdown in
China’s growth, it is unlikely that oil prices will recover any time soon.
The government understands this very well, and has already
embarked on an austerity path. In real terms, 2016 spending will be cut
by about 9 percent. The Finance Ministry has proposed to end the
inflation indexing of pension payments, which would be illegal under
Russian law. Other major cuts will also be undertaken, especially in
health and education. This will of course result in lower popularity,
leading to more extensive propaganda and potentially to new foreign
policy moves.
Even with these unprecedented (and strictly speaking, illegal) cuts
foreseen in 2016, there is no consistent economic plan for the years
thereafter. While the Reserve Fund is sufficient to fund the budget
deficit in 2016 and possibly in 2017, the numbers for 2018 do not seem
to add up. Not surprisingly, the government has stopped producing 3-
year budgets, sticking only to annual ones.

Why Don’t Russians See the Risks?

Russia as an Informational Autocracy

Together with Professor Daniel Treisman of UCLA we have developed

a theory of informational autocracies—modern non-democratic regimes
that are based on manipulating information (through propaganda and
censorship) rather than on violence.2 These regimes pretend to be dem-
ocratic, to have elections and to allow some free press. In such regimes,

2 See Sergei M. Guriev and Daniel Treisman, “How Modern Dictators Survive: Cooptation,
Censorship, Propaganda, and Repression.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. 10454. Center for
Economic Policy Research, London.
 Western Strategy toward Russia 145

the leader’s goal is to maintain his popularity with the public and to
convince the public that this popularity is genuine. The leader wants to
prevent protests rather than suppress them. Using mass violence would
therefore be a problem in this case, as the very need for repression
would reveal that the regime’s popularity is based on force.
Our theory shows that even a rational public may—at least for a
while—support such informational autocrats. Given that the only
source of information is official propaganda (the other sources are shut
down through cooptation or censorship), Russians cannot infer how
incompetent and dangerous the current government is, as propaganda
attributes all problems to bad luck and external enemies.
While Russia is not the only example of informational autocracy, it
has probably gone further than others in terms of developing compre-
hensive and sophisticated propaganda and censorship. It has also relied
on silencing elites and potential opponents through cooptation. Overall,
it has so far succeeded in convincing the public that there is no alterna-
tive to today’s regime—which is even more striking given the economic
difficulties facing Russia today.
Our theory predicts that this cannot last forever. As Lincoln once
said, “You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the peo-
ple all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.”
However, a more important implication of our work is that informa-
tional autocracies should be confronted first and foremost in the infor-
mational battleground. Whatever economic, political or social chal-
lenges they may face, these regimes may remain popular if they can
control information flows.
Propaganda as shameless as in today’s Russia can only be convincing
if there are no objective and high-quality alternative news sources.
Given that only a few per cent of Russians speak foreign languages, the
effective alternative must be in Russian. There is no reason to believe
that the Russian government will welcome such alternative news
sources into Russia. However, in today’s connected world, censorship is
never perfect. Also, there is an important additional informational bat-
tlefield: the hearts and minds of Russian-speaking Europeans. Cur-
rently, they receive official Russian programs and are therefore vulnera-
ble to the propaganda. They then translate it further to their
non-Russian-speaking fellow residents, and to Russians back home. In
both cases, this reinforces propaganda, as their counterparts trust the
146 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

views of Europe-based Russian speakers more than that of Russian TV

anchors.
It is important not to counter Russian propaganda with “anti-Russian
counter-propaganda”. The response will be effective only as long as it is
consistent with Western values of professional and objective reporting.
Part of Russia’s official message is that the West is hypocritical and dis-
honest. Sticking to the West’s fundamental values will undermine this
view and will show the strength rather than the weakness of the West.

The Critical Importance of Ukraine’s Success for Russia

One of the key tenets of Russia’s official propaganda is that Ukrainian

reforms are doomed to fail. Given that Ukraine is close and similar to
Russia, the success of the Ukrainian revolution would disprove the
Russian government’s key argument—that any alternative to the current
regime would bring chaos. Given high initial corruption and the ineffi-
ciency of the economy, successful reforms in Ukraine will be difficult.
However, their importance goes well beyond Ukraine. They will create
an important precedent for many neighboring countries including Rus-
sia. This, in turn, may contribute to peace not only in the region but
also in those parts of the world which Russia may target for further for-
eign policy moves.

The Role of Sanctions

Sanctions are not the main driver of Russia’s recession. Other factors,
such as lack of reforms and the fall in oil prices, have been much more
important. But sanctions have reinforced the impact of the drop in oil
prices. In the absence of sanctions, Russia would have been able to bor-
row to smoothen the impact of the oil shock. Given its low level of sov-
ereign debt, that would not have been impossible.
However, the most important effect of sanctions is the proof they
offer of the West’s credibility—and thus the proof that further aggres-
sion may result in more serious sanctions. This has had major impact on
the regime’s behavior. During the annexation of Crimea, the Russian
government assumed that “the West is weak,” and did not expect sanc-
tions to follow. The events in eastern Ukraine started already after the
introduction of the first sanctions—and there annexation never hap-
 Western Strategy toward Russia 147

pened. Crimea became part of Russia right after the so-called “referen-
dum.” As for Donetsk and Luhansk, neither the May 2014 “referendum”
nor the fall 2014 “elections” had any implications. Russia continues to
confirm that Donetsk and Luhansk (unlike Crimea!) are parts of sover-
eign Ukraine.
Another important indication of the effectiveness of Western sanc-
tions is the Russian government’s continuing fight to have them
removed. Both openly and behind the scenes, the Russian government
works with Western business, politicians and NGOs lobbying to end the
sanctions. Finally, in Russia’s domestic debate, the “we do not care about
the sanctions” stance has been retired; even official propaganda
acknowledges that sanctions have had a major effect.

The “Pivot to China” that Wasn’t

The Russian government expected to replace the West with China as its
main economic partner. While China claimed to be interested (and is
certainly able) to invest in Russia, so far we have only seen (many) non-
binding declarations. No tangible investments or loans have taken place.
There may be several reasons. First, China may be waiting for better
terms when Russia becomes more desperate. Second, China may under-
stand that its relationship with the United States and with the West in
general is much more important that the one with Russia. Third, indi-
vidual Chinese companies take into account the multibillion dollar fine
paid by BNP Paribas for violating U.S. sanctions. Finally, the domestic
anti-corruption agenda in China may make it risky for individual Chi-
nese business people to deal with the Russian government and state
companies, as the latter are too corrupt.
Whatever the reason, it is clear that at least so far Russia’s hopes for
pivot to China have not materialized. The volume of trade between
Russia and China has actually declined, which of course is natural, given
the fall in oil prices and the weaker ruble.

Should the West be Blamed for Crimea?

Another important part of the debate in the West is that the West
should have behaved more carefully in talking to Ukraine and should
have avoided provoking Russia. This argument may have some truth to
148 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

it—it may have been the case that American and European foreign pol-
icy makers should have paid more attention to the growing desperation
of Russia’s regime in its search for legitimacy. The experience of 2014
probably also implies that the West must develop a strategy of dealing
with Russia both in the immediate future and in the long run. This
strategy should be clearly articulated both to the Russian government
and—as much as possible given the censorship—to the Russian public.
However, even if the West has made some foreign policy errors,
these are mistakes, not crimes. Therefore, whoever apportions blame for
what has happened equally to Russia and to the West (or even to
Ukraine) is wrong. Such arguments—whether made intentionally or
unintentionally—are tantamount to blaming the victim for the crime.
However imperfect the victim of a crime may be, it is the criminal, not
the victim, who is responsible for the crime.

The Need for Strategy

The previous Cold War ended in a regime change that was relatively
smooth and peaceful. This time, it may be more turbulent. For members
of the outgoing elite, the stakes are much higher. They have strong
incentives to stay in power whatever the cost. It is also not clear that
those who may be able to remove the current regime will be committed
to peace and democracy, since the task of removing stubborn autocrats
may require ruthlessness rather than peacefulness. And even if peaceful
protesters take over, it is also not clear whether they would stay for long,
given that economy is likely to be in very bad shape at that moment.
The West cannot change the regime—and should not even try to set
such an objective. Nobody knows when and how the current regime
ends. When it does, it may be unexpected. At that point, having a well-
thought strategy agreed by Western countries and articulated to publics
inside and outside of Russia will certainly raise chances of a less turbu-
lent transition to a democratic and peaceful Russia. This strategy should
include a roadmap for re-integrating Russia into European and global
institutions, for rebuilding Russia’s economy and in particular Russia’s
infrastructure, for reforming Russian public administration and the
judiciary. Most importantly, this strategy should make sure that the
post-regime-change transformation does not take place at the expense
of Russia’s poor and vulnerable; otherwise, these reforms will backfire
and we will be back where we started.
 Chapter 7

Western Strategy toward Russia

and the Post-Soviet Space
William Courtney

For nearly a quarter century, Western strategy toward the post-Soviet

space has enjoyed substantial accord between Europe and America, and
much bipartisan backing in the United States. Central to the strategy has
been support for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity
of the new states, for their integration into the global economy, and for
democratic and economic reform. (The three Baltic states are members
of the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
with a few exceptions they are not considered in this discussion.)
The West has substantial interests in the post-Soviet space. Peaceful
development across the vast region will enhance Western security,
economies, and cultural life. The post-Soviet space is a bountiful source
of hydrocarbons, metals, and other minerals, a major transport route
between Europe and Asia, and a repository of human talent. The West
has special interests in Russia because of its nuclear weapons and energy
resources, propensity to coerce neighbors, and “great power” capacity,
enabling it to influence global issues and intervene in distant locales.
Western interest is higher in post-Soviet states that make democratic
reforms, respect human rights, and improve economic performance.
Democratic advances in Georgia and Ukraine are notable. Shared secu-
rity interests, such as nonproliferation and countering violent extrem-
ism and narcotics flows, buttress Western ties with Kazakhstan and
other Central Asian and South Caucasian states. Caspian energy
resources and export routes in Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan are important. Links with diasporas in the West, such as
Ukrainian and Armenian, have salience.
Post-Soviet relations with the West are undermined by strains with
Russia over its aggression in Ukraine and the wider risks posed by the
conflict in its east, by illiberal governance and human rights abuses in
such places as Azerbaijan, Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbek-

149
150 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

istan, and by unstable “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia, Nagorno-

Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria. Without more progress in
the post-Soviet space, the risk of Western retrenchment will grow.
Where governments repress their people, the West tends to lose inter-
est and criticize bad behavior. Interests are sometimes at odds with each
other, and Western strategy must adapt. Despite energy wealth in Azer-
baijan, the West criticizes its human rights abuses, such as the imprison-
ment of recently released Leyla Yunus. The post-Soviet space lags in
competing against other global regions for investment and trade.
Although authoritarian rule in most of the post-Soviet space is a frus-
tration, the West does too little to nurture positive change and produc-
tive ties. The West will best serve its interests by encouraging reform,
building links with civil society, fostering economic opportunity, and
assisting states with geopolitical challenges that they are less able to
manage on their own, such as security threats, frozen conflicts, and
regional power shifts.

The Post-Soviet Space

U.S.–European Alignment
U.S.–European strategic alignment in the post-Soviet space is a source
of Western strength, but it will be tested, e.g., sustaining sanctions on
Russia if it does not withdraw from eastern Ukraine. When Europe and
America act together, they are effective and leverage complementary
strengths. Except in the military arena and upstream energy develop-
ment, Europe is more important than America in the post-Soviet space.
Europe is proximate, trade and investment are greater, and post-Soviet
elites send their children to study in Europe and travel and buy prop-
erty there. Europe’s importance is sometimes under-estimated, in part
because Russia’s leadership obsesses on the United States and its alleged
threat. Too many Americans think in terms of U.S.-Russian relations
when the scope of issues is wider.
U.S.-European cooperation on the Russia-Ukraine crisis, and on
Russia’s military intervention in Syria and the associated diplomatic
process, are models for the future. So, too, was U.S.-European collabo-
ration with Russia in the P5+1 format to achieve the Iran nuclear deal.
Europe and America have cooperated in international diplomacy to
address frozen conflicts, but results have been discouraging.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 151

In the Soviet period and since, Moscow has sought to split Europe
from America. It has rarely succeeded. An exception was European
refusal to accede to the U.S. desire at the May 2008 NATO Summit in
Bucharest to put Georgia and Ukraine on a path to membership in the
Alliance. The disagreement may have caused Moscow to believe it could
invade Georgia without eliciting a strongly negative Western response.
This proved to be the case when the invasion took place the following
August.
Recommendation: America and Europe should give priority to intensive consul-
tations and policy alignment in dealing with the post-Soviet space.

European Leadership
After a failed diplomatic mission in 1991 to avert the breakup of
Yugoslavia, an exasperated U.S. Secretary of State James Baker said,
“We got no dog in this fight.”1 He meant that Europeans ought to have
the capacity to deal with the issue. Europe was not then ready, but today
it is stronger. In the Russia-Ukraine crisis, Europe for the first time is
leading the West in negotiating with Moscow on a major international
security issue. Germany and France, and especially Chancellor Angela
Merkel, are Russia’s interlocutors in the Normandy format talks that
produced the Minsk ceasefire accords. America’s absence from this
forum is reminiscent of its “leading from within” (or “behind” as critics
claim) in the 2011 British-French-led military intervention in Libya. 2
Recommendations: Europe should exercise stronger leadership on post-Soviet
security issues. America and NATO ought to bear responsibility for projecting
military power, if needed, to avert or ameliorate security crises, and to this end
they should posture and exercise their forces. The United States ought to seek to
join the Normandy format.

Eurasian Economic Union

In 2012 then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called Russia’s push for
a Eurasian Customs Union “a move to re-Sovietize the region,” and

1
Michael Dobbs, “A War That Could Have Been Prevented,” Foreign Policy, May 9, 2012.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/05/09/a-war-that-could-have-been-prevented/.
2 Senator John McCain on Libya, Real Clear Politics, August 22, 2011. McCain stated, “the fact
is that young Libyans were wounded and were killed because of that, quote, ‘leading from
behind.’” http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2011/08/22/senator_john_mccain_on_
libya_111061.html.
152 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

warned, “we are trying to figure out effective ways to slow down or pre-
vent it.”3 The Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), successor to the Cus-
toms Union, is now a reality, but Russia may not allow it to become an
open, rules-based entity that treats all members fairly. An effective EEU
would facilitate substantial trade and investment. Exporters in Kaza-
khstan, for example, could ship goods across Russia to Europe without
undue hindrance. The EEU’s relatively high external tariff will hinder
economic links with China and Europe unless special arrangements are
made. Russia’s economy will benefit more from closer ties with wealthy
countries than with other post-Soviet states.
Recommendations: Consistent with other policies (e.g., sanctions), the West
should encourage economic ties with post-Soviet states. The West ought not to
oppose the existence of the EEU, but it should seek to ensure that members’
activities comply with World Trade Organization obligations. The EU ought to
engage the post-Soviet states, the EEU, and China to facilitate trade across
Europe and Eurasia.

Russia

Although some contend otherwise, Russia is both European and

Eurasian. As former Russian Ambassador to the United States Vladimir
Lukin points out, “most successful steps in building Russia were taken by
Western-oriented rulers, such as Catherine the Great and Alexander II,”
whereas “major isolationist projects,” such as undertaken by Nicholas I
and the Stalinist-style Soviet system, “ended either in military failures or
in decay.” Thus, the “path toward a united Europe…is far more realistic
than nostalgic neo-imperial dreams of Russian grandeur.”4
Despite Russia’s armed incursion in Georgia in August 2008, many
Western elites did not grasp that Moscow was becoming more assertive.
In early 2009 a prestigious, bipartisan U.S. group said both govern-
ments were to “blame for the decline” in relations, and lamented that an
“effective set of structures” for dialogue did not exist. The group urged
that America show “greater willingness to consider Russian perspec-

3
“Clinton Vows To Thwart New Soviet Union,” Financial Times, December 6, 2012.
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3v5Bmb-
htH.
4 Vladimir Lukin, “Looking West from Russia,” The National Interest, Number 140, Novem-
ber-December 2015, pp.64-65. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/looking-west-russia-the-
eurasianist-folly-14105.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 153

tives.” In retrospect, a lack of structures was not a primary source of

problems in U.S.-Russian relations. The group was on the mark, how-
ever, in calling for partnership with Russia to deal with the Iran nuclear
problem, cooperation to strengthen supply routes for NATO operations
in Afghanistan, a further reduction in strategic nuclear weapons, and
support for bringing Russia into the World Trade Organization.5

Russian Relations
The invasions of Georgia and Ukraine, threatening behavior toward the
Baltics, and attacks on Western-backed rebels in Syria have sapped
momentum from Russia’s relations with the West. They are now largely
transactional. In some cases this makes sense, e.g., the West pays for
space launch services in support of the International Space Station, and
for railway services to transport supplies to the NATO-led Resolute
Support mission (and earlier, the International Security Assistance
Force) in Afghanistan.
In 2011–12, peaceful anti-government protests surged in Moscow and
some other cities following a falsified Duma election. Since then the
Kremlin has accelerated a crackdown on internal freedoms. Russia’s
rulers seem concerned that popular uprisings of the kind that occurred
in Georgia and Ukraine (“color revolutions”) might take place. To abate
this risk and build legitimacy, the Kremlin has employed nationalistic,
irredentist, and “great power” policies and themes. Moscow’s assertive
stance abroad appears motivated more by political dynamics in Russia
than by Western actions. The West has little capacity to influence the
slide toward authoritarian rule. Government-controlled media are founts
of anti-Western, especially anti-U.S., propaganda. The authorities are
suppressing many independent media and journalists.
Even people-to-people dialogue is difficult as Moscow seeks to iso-
late its people from Western influences. For example, in late 2015 the
authorities added to the list of “undesirable organizations” The U.S.-
Russian Foundation for Economic Advancement and the Rule of Law.6
In 2014 Russia halted participation in the Future Leaders Exchange

5
Commission on U.S. Policy toward Russia, The Right Direction for U.S. Policy toward Russia,
March 2009, Washington, DC, pp. i-5. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/
18909/report_from_the_commission_on_us_policy_toward_russia_the_right_direction_for_
us_policy_toward_russia.html.
6 “Statement by the USRF Board of Directors,” USRF website, December 4, 2015.
http://www.usrf.ru/news_feed/general_eng/news_article_1449481649.html.
154 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

(FLEX) program, which sends high school students from former Soviet
states to study in America. This unfortunate step was one of a number,
including the banning of U.S. adoptions of Russian children. Such
actions diminish cooperation and trust. Foreign broadcasting and inter-
net outreach substitute only to a limited extent for face-to-face, people-
to-people contact.
Recommendations: The West, by example and support for democratic gover-
nance and economic openness, should not discount its long-term influence in
Russia. Western policy ought to be resilient to political winds in Russia, but
flexible enough to foster positive change if openings occur. The West should
expand the flow of truthful information to Russian audiences. Where feasible,
the West ought to sponsor more young Russians for education abroad.

Ukraine
Russia’s quick, bloodless seizure of Crimea in February-March 2014, a
stunning tactical gain, may have led the Kremlin to think that it could
achieve similar success in eastern Ukraine. But there Russian proxies
lacked strategic surprise, and local support for rebellion was weaker
than Moscow expected. After early, feckless military responses, Ukraine
forged effective defenses and fought the proxies and, beginning in
August 2014, Russian regular forces to a stalemate. It is enshrined in the
Minsk accords.
In the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act “NATO reiterates that in the
current and foreseeable security environment the Alliance will carry out its
missions” through means other than “by additional permanent stationing
of substantial combat forces.” Russia’s intervention in Crimea and eastern
Ukraine arguably alters the security environment foreseen in 1997.7 The
United States has announced plans to add a U.S. Army Brigade Combat
Team (BCT) to Europe (there are two now). An armored BCT will be
rotated through Europe on a persistent basis. In addition, equipment will
be pre-positioned for an additional armored BCT.
The West’s refusal to supply defensive lethal weaponry to Ukraine
(and to Georgia after Russia’s 2008 invasion), combined with NATO’s

7 “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the
Russian Federation signed in Paris, France,” NATO website, May 22, 1997.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm, and “NATO-Russia Pact
Mired In Mistrust Amid Ukraine Fallout,” RFERL website, June 16, 2015.
http://www.rferl.org/content/nato-russia-pact-ukraine-fallout-mistrust/27075857.html.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 155

reluctance to base forces permanently in the territory of eastern NATO

member states, may lead Russian leaders to underestimate Western
will.8 The Kremlin might also wrongly perceive that the Baltic states are
vulnerable to the kind of hybrid warfare employed in Ukraine.
Ukraine’s major port, Odessa, depends on sea lines of communication
that pass close to Sevastopol, where the Russian Black Sea Fleet is
based. This could increase their vulnerability to interdiction.
Recommendations: In light of Russia’s interventions in Georgia and Ukraine,
the West should be more assertive in seeking to reduce security risks in the post-
Soviet space. To augment persistent presence in NATO’s eastern area, a full
U.S. Army brigade combat team ought to be based or rotated in Poland and
another in the Baltics. NATO member states should provide Ukraine and
Georgia with anti-armor and anti-air weaponry, and increase military assis-
tance and training. NATO member states ought to rotate more warships
through the Black Sea consistent with the Montreux Convention.

Syria
In fall 2015 Russia deployed military forces to Syria, including fighter
aircraft and anti-air missiles that could threaten U.S. and coalition air-
craft. In early 2016 Russia announced a reduction in these forces.
Although Moscow and Washington have agreed on air safety protocols,
Russia does not coordinate air operations with U.S. and coalition forces.
U.S. President Barack Obama has signaled restraint, declaring,
“We’re not going to make Syria into a proxy war between the United
States and Russia.”9 Despite Russian air attacks on Western-backed
rebels fighting against the Bashar al-Assad regime, Washington has
refused to supply them with anti-air missiles, although it has increased
supplies of TOW anti-armor missiles. Russian combat aircraft have
pounded rebel positions with impunity.

8 Steven Pifer, Strobe Talbott, et al., Preserving Ukraine’s Independence, Resisting Russian Ag-
gression: What the United States and NATO Must Do, The Atlantic Council, February 2015.
This group of distinguished foreign policy experts recommended that light anti-armor mis-
siles be supplied to Ukraine. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/
2015/02/ukraine-independence-russian-aggression/ukrainereport_february2015_final.pdf.
9 “U.S. Will Not Directly Confront Russia in Syria, Obama Says,” The Washington Post,
October 2, 2015. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/2015/10/02/
44c1f7fc-6932-11e5-9223-70cb36460919_story.html.
156 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The United States and Russia play leadership roles in the Syria peace
process, involving the International Syria Support Group. Since the vast
majority of Russia’s Muslims are Sunni, Russia has an interest in being
part of political solutions that include Sunni as well as Shia. Moscow is
skeptical of Western ideas for a democratic transition in Syria. It backs
Assad’s regime but doubts its long-term viability.
As Moscow’s vituperative reaction to Turkey’s shoot-down of a Russ-
ian SU-24 combat aircraft in November 2015 shows, military chal-
lenges to Russia can impose political and economic costs.
Recommendations: The West should join with coalition partners to establish a
safe zone in northern Syria, with America leading the no-fly component, and
Turkey the ground component. The U.S.-led coalition ought not to scale back its
air operations against the Islamic State out of fear that Russian military air-
craft might interfere. The United States should be prepared to neutralize any
Russian drone targeting of Syrian moderate rebels. If Russian forces cease
attacking them, the West ought to work closely with Moscow in the search for
compromise political solutions to the Syrian crisis. The West should support its
NATO ally Turkey, but urge restraint on both sides so as to reduce the risk of
another incident that could impede work in the Syria peace process.

Arms Control
In recent years Russian authorities have employed intimidating rhetoric
about nuclear weapons, and altered some nuclear force deployments
and policies.10 Putin has said that during the seizure of Crimea, “we
were ready to put into play” nuclear weapons.11 In May 2012 Russian
Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov warned that short-range Iskander
surface-to-surface missiles could be used to counter planned U.S. mis-
sile defenses in eastern Europe.12 (The Iskander missile can carry
nuclear or conventional warheads.) In December 2013, the Kremlin-
friendly newspaper Izvestiya reported that Russia’s military had deployed
Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad region. Days later, however, Putin

10 “How World War II Became Possible: A Nuclear Conflict with Russia is Likelier Than You
Think,” Vox website, June 29, 2015. http://www.vox.com/2015/6/29/8845913/russia-war.
11 “Russia Was Ready to Put Nuclear Forces on Alert over Crimea,” Putin Says, CNN, March

16, 2015. http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/16/europe/russia-putin-crimea-nuclear/index.html.

12 “Russia Hints at Use of Short-Range Missiles on NATO Missile Shield,” Global Security

Newswire, May 14, 2012. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/russian-minister-hints-use-short-

range-missiles-against-nato-missile-shield/.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 157

denied this.13 Deployment of this missile, if it took place, may have had
the purpose of intimidating Poland and Lithuania, which border on the
region.14 Two months later Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev publicly
touted the capabilities of the Iskander.15
Negotiating experience with Moscow has shown that progress is
more likely when balances of power or interests exist. The 1987 Inter-
mediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty was made possible because both
sides were willing to eliminate comparable weaponry. Several strategic
arms control accords were achieved because the sides accepted rough
equality in capabilities. Since both Russia and the West face threats
from nuclear proliferation and terrorism, cooperation in this area has
been robust, e.g., Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction activities,
the Iran nuclear deal, the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Where imbalances exist or verification capacities are inadequate (e.g.,
non-nuclear missile defense, cybersecurity, space arms), meaningful
accords are less likely. To no evident avail, the West has made intensive
efforts to persuade Moscow to accept the deployment of Iran-oriented
missile defenses in NATO’S east. Moscow sees the Conventional Armed
Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty as “anachronistic” and “out of sync with
present realities.”16
In July 2014, the United States made known that in 2008 Russia
began testing a ground-launched missile that by 2011 the Obama
Administration concluded was prohibited under the INF Treaty.17 In
1994, Moscow, London and Washington signed the Budapest Memo-
randum of Security Assurances, in which they pledged to respect the
independence, sovereignty and existing borders of Belarus, Kazakhstan

13 “Putin Says Iskander Missiles Not Yet on NATO’s Border,” Global Security Newswire,
December 19, 2013. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/putin-says-no-iskander-missiles-have-
been-sent-enclave-bordering-nato-land/.
14 “Russia Has Stationed Iskander Missiles in Western Region: Reports,” Reuters, December

16, 2013. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/16/us-russia-missiles-idUSBRE9BF0

W020131216.
15 “Medvedev Touts Russian Iskander Ballistic Missile,” Global Security Newswire, July 23,

2012. http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/medvedev-urges-quicker-iskander-ballistic-missile-
production/.
16
“Russia Completes CFE Treaty Suspension,” Arms Control Today, April 2015.
https://www.armscontrol.org/ACT/2015_04/News-Briefs/Russia-Completes-CFE-Treaty-
Suspension.
17 “U.S. Says Russia Tested Cruise Missile, Violating Treaty,” The New York Times, July 28,

2014. http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/29/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-cruise-mis-
sile-in-violation-of-treaty.html?_r=0.
158 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

and Ukraine, and refrain from the threat or use of force against them.
Russia's 2014 invasion of Ukraine violates its Budapest pledge.
Recommendations: The West ought to give priority to security diplomacy with
Russia where balances of power or interests exist, and lower expectations where
negotiated accords seem less likely. The United States and NATO should review
their policies for nuclear arms, missile defense, and arms control—such as force
modernization and posturing, and negotiating stances—to strengthen deter-
rence and incentives for Russia to cease nuclear intimidation and return to INF
Treaty compliance. The West should seek to maintain international pressure on
Russia over its Budapest violation until it comes into compliance.

Russia’s Economy
Low energy prices, sanctions, and rising structural barriers combine to
weaken Russia’s economy. In 2009–2014, growth averaged only 1.5 per-
cent per year, sharply lower than in preceding years. In 2015 the econ-
omy declined by about 4 percent.
About half of the economy is state-controlled. The dominance of
inefficient and corrupt state-controlled enterprises reduces Russia’s eco-
nomic potential. Sanctions hurt private businesses more than state
enterprises, which enjoy favored access to official resources.18 Demo-
graphic decline, health problems, and brain drain do further harm.
The economy may remain stagnant for a prolonged period absent
new sources of growth.19 Some could be created by policy changes, e.g.,
privatization of state enterprises, reduction of monopolies, subsidies, or
excessive government regulation. In the view of the World Bank, “with-
out deep and sustained structural reforms Russia will remain at serious
risk of falling into a medium-term low-growth trap.”20
Since Russia is determined to be a great power, it may be willing to
offset the cost of rising defense spending by imposing stringencies in
other areas. Expensive military ambitions, however, could weaken Rus-

18 Simeon Djankov, Russia’s Economy under Putin: from Crony Capitalism to State Capitalism, Pe-
terson Institute for International Economics, Number PB15-18, September 2015, p. 3.
http://www.iie.com/publications/interstitial.cfm?ResearchID=2844.
19 Ibid, p. 5.

20 The World Bank in the Russian Federation, Russia Economic Report: Balancing Economic Ad-

justment and Transformation, Number 34, September 2015, p. 39. http://www-

wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2015/10/09/090224b0
83135111/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Russia0economi0t0and0transformation.pdf.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 159

sia’s overall correlation of forces. As Lukin has cautioned, attempts to

achieve “global greatness with no resources beyond willpower are
strategically deficient.”21
In 2011, after long negotiations and despite occasional Kremlin
ambivalence, Russia joined the World Trade Organization. The West
supported this move, which will yield benefit to Russia to the extent it
integrates further into the global economy. Gains will be less if sanc-
tions remain in force or the Kremlin pursues economic autocracy, as at
present.
The post-Soviet states (except the Baltics) are not included in the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership now under negotiation.
The post-Soviet space is not part of the just-concluded Trans-Pacific
Partnership. These absences will restrain some international trade and
investment in the post-Soviet space. If China is later brought into TPP,
Russia and several Central Asian countries may seek to join. As the rest
of the world liberalizes its economies and trade, the post-Soviet space
risks falling further behind.
Recommendations: The West should maintain sanctions on Russia as long as it
occupies part of Ukraine, but be ready to lift them when the reasons for the
measures no longer exist. Consistent with other policies (e.g., sanctions), the
West ought to encourage Russia’s integration into the global economy and avoid
actions that might do long-term or irreversible damage to Russia’s economy. In
designing sanctions on Russia, the West should take account of the potential for
collateral damage to neighbors and trading partners. In coordination with
international financial institutions, the West should encourage economic
reforms in Russia and open trading and investment policies.

Other Post-Soviet Republics

NATO Relations
Except for the Baltics, which are members of NATO, all of the countries
in the post-Soviet space participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace. It
furthers practical cooperation in defense, such as military exercises, and in
other spheres. Russia has long opposed the expansion eastward of
NATO’s membership. The Alliance has gone ahead anyway, and the result
has been to improve security for the Baltics and other new members.

21
Lukin, op. cit., p. 64.
160 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

At its 2008 Bucharest Summit, NATO declined to offer Membership

Action Plans—which provide a path to joining the Alliance — for Geor-
gia and Ukraine. The Summit did promise that they “will become mem-
bers.” Europeans prudently deflected the U.S. push for Membership
Action Plans. Georgia and Ukraine have strengthened their democra-
cies, but remain too poor, and their politics too uncertain, for member-
ship at this time. Frozen conflicts on an applicant’s territory should not
be an obstacle to joining NATO; this would give Russia a de facto veto.
Georgia's commitment of forces in Afghanistan merits considerable
NATO gratitude.
For security, Georgia or Ukraine will have to rely largely on their
own defenses, augmented by bilateral military assistance from the
United States and other NATO member states.
Recommendations: NATO should make the Partnership for Peace program as
substantive as possible for reforming post-Soviet states. NATO ought to con-
sider for admission any interested post-Soviet state when it has the capacity and
readiness to assume membership responsibilities. In making decisions about
bilateral military assistance to post-Soviet states, NATO member states should
be forthcoming, commensurate with foreseeable security threats.

EU Relations
The appeal of the rich, liberal EU as a partner for post-Soviet states is
strong. For most of them the EU, having a comprehensive character,
will be of greater importance than NATO.
The EU has entered into Partnership and Cooperation Agreements
(PCA) with most post-Soviet states (not Belarus and Turkmenistan, or
the Baltics, which are members of the EU). The purpose of PCAs is to
strengthen democracies and develop economies.22 The EU’s Eastern
Partnership encompasses six post-Soviet states lying west of the Caspian
Sea: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. The
purpose is to encourage and support reforms.23 PCAs and the Eastern
Partnership have built confidence in such countries as Georgia and

22 EUR-Lex, “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Countries of Eastern

Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Ar17002.
23 European Union External Action, “Eastern Partnership: Bringing Eastern European Partners

Closer to the EU.” http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm.

 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 161

Ukraine, but failed to spur liberalization in Azerbaijan and Belarus.

Association Agreements, including Deep and Comprehensive Free
Trade Areas, are framework accords for the conduct of bilateral rela-
tions with the EU. In certain cases they help prepare a country for
future admission.24 Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine have concluded
Association Agreements, and their citizens are set to enjoy visa-free
access to the EU.
Perhaps Russia’s greatest strategic misstep in the post-Soviet space
has been to use military force in a futile attempt to halt Ukraine’s fur-
ther integration with the EU. Ukrainians outside the occupied areas
now have a stronger consensus to move westward. Aid to Ukraine from
international financial institutions and the West is critical, but should go
forward only if Kyiv deepens economic and governance reforms, essen-
tial to reducing the burden of corruption and improving the investment
climate.
The EU’s core concept is of a foreign policy “organized in concentric
circles reaching at its outermost point Central Asia.”25 The eastern edge
of the Eastern Partnership ought not to be defined by the Caspian Sea.
The performance of a state and its commitment to European values
should count more than geographic boundaries in determining the
potential scope of EU cooperation and integration.
Kazakhstan is part of the EU’s Central Asia Strategy. An Enhanced
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement is planned. Kazakhstan has
become important to the EU, and made more economic reforms than
several countries in the Eastern Partnership. Kazakhstan is a key coun-
try in the emerging Silk Road network of transport routes between
China, Europe, and the Middle East.
Recommendations: The EU ought to consider for admission any interested post-
Soviet state when it has the capacity and readiness to assume membership
responsibilities. The West should provide more aid to Ukraine and other reform-
ing post-Soviet countries. The EU ought to reconsider the Eastern Partnership
and make it performance- rather than geography-based. The EU should inten-
sify cooperation with Kazakhstan, reflecting economic ties and reforms.

24 European Union External Action, “Association Agreements.” http://eeas.europa.eu/associ-

ation/.
25 Stefan Meister, “Geo-economics of Eurasia: A View from Europe,” Astana Club, September

2015. https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/27387.
162 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Caspian Energy
Soon after the collapse of the USSR the West began to encourage the
development of Caspian energy resources, controlled mostly by Kaza-
khstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. Supplies of Caspian energy serve
Western interests by increasing and diversifying global energy sources. A
Chevron-led team developed the huge onshore Tengiz deposit in west-
ern Kazakhstan, and a BP-led consortium, the large Shah Deniz deposit
offshore in the Caspian Sea. More troubled is the Kashagan offshore
project in Kazakhstani waters of the Caspian Sea, still a year or more
away from exporting oil despite years of work and massive investment.
Multiple export routes for Caspian energy have increased competi-
tion and lowered costs. The West supported the construction of two
major oil export pipelines, one from Tengiz to the Black Sea port of
Novorossiysk and another from Baku through Tbilisi to Turkey’s
Mediterranean Sea port of Ceyhan. More recently, China has built an
oil pipeline from Western Kazakhstan and a gas pipeline from Turk-
menistan to western China. Over time, the development of other global
deposits and new technologies may diminish the relative importance of
Caspian energy, but for decades to come it will remain a significant
source of world supply. The Iran nuclear agreement may spur Kaza-
khstan and Turkmenistan to ship more energy to and through Iran.
Russia’s Caspian Flotilla, which dates to the time of Peter the Great, is
far more powerful than the maritime forces of other littoral states. The
Flotilla’s launch in fall 2015 of dozens of medium-range cruise missiles
aimed at Middle Eastern targets showed the Fleet’s enhanced capability.
Recommendations: The West should encourage Caspian states to offer better
investment climates and privatize inefficient state energy companies. The West
ought to support even more export channels for Caspian energy, and not oppose
shipments to and through Iran. The West should assist Caspian states to develop
their maritime and coastal defenses and awareness.

Central Asia
Beyond Caspian energy, the West has a number of important interests in
Central Asia, e.g., counter violent extremism, WMD proliferation, and
narcotics and other criminal activities. At the same time democratic short-
comings, except to some extent in Kyrgyzstan, restrain Western interest.
A fall 2015 trip by John Kerry was the first time in nearly a quarter cen-
tury that a U.S. Secretary of State visited all five Central Asian states.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 163

The temporary Taliban seizure in fall 2015 of Kunduz, just south of

Tajikistan, heightened fears in Central Asia and Russia that threats of vio-
lent extremism from Afghanistan might increase as NATO forces draw
down. In October, Putin warned that 5,000–7,000 people from the post-
Soviet space had joined Islamic State forces.26 Russia’s troubled North Cau-
casus region and Central Asian states are among the sources of fighters.
The International Crisis Group warns that the poverty-ridden,
authoritarian-ruled region is “a sitting duck for the Islamic State.”27
Kerry has cautioned, “When the pathways to nonviolent change are
closed, the road to extremism becomes more inviting.”28 The U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State has pointed to the “potential in a number of
these states for that kind of extremism to emerge within them.”29 Better
and more inclusive governance in Central Asia is essential to reducing
risks of violent extremism.
Germany has closed down the last Western military base in Central
Asia, in Uzbekistan near Afghanistan. Russia opposes the establishment
of U.S. military bases in the region, and there is little support in Amer-
ica for such facilities. Russia is bolstering its forces in Central Asia. In
October 2015 it announced an increase in troops in Tajikistan from
5,900 to 9,000 by 2020. Russia has deployed capable Su-25 fighter jets
to an air base in Kyrgyzstan.30
Several Central Asian states want the West to stay involved in the
region as a way to help them balance relations between neighboring
powers, especially China and Russia.

26
“Putin Says Thousands from Russia and CIS Have Joined IS,” Bloomberg News, October 18,
2015. http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/putin-says-thousands-from-russia-and-cis-joined-
is/.
27
Deidre Tynan, “Central Asia is a Sitting Duck for Islamic State,” The Moscow Times, June 14,
2015. http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/central-asia/tajikistan/op-eds/tynan-cen-
tral-asia-is-a-sitting-duck-for-islamic-state.aspx.
28
“The United States and Central Asia: Partners for the 21st Century,” U.S. Department of
State website, November 2, 2015. http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/11/
249107.htm.
29 Anthony Blinken, “An Enduring Vision for Central Asia,” U.S. Department of State, March

31, 2015. http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2015/04/2015 0401314506.html

#axzz3osTwNawq.
30 Abdujalil Abdurasulov, CIS Summit: Russia to Bolster Central Asia Military, BBC News,

October 16, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34538051.

164 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

Central Asian trade with China is growing. For example, Chinese-

Tajik trade has climbed from $32 million in 2003 to $2 billion annually.31
Recommendations: Although progress will be slow or halting, the West should
encourage open and accountable governance in Central Asia. The Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe ought to be more active in Central Asia,
including in the security dimension. NATO should keep Central Asian states
abreast of threats in Afghanistan and the wider region, and make more use of
the Partnership for Peace to bolster their defenses. If Russia is willing to engage
in productive information sharing about such threats, the West ought to be open
to it. As China’s influence in Central Asia expands and Russia’s declines, the
West should assist regional states to manage shifting power realities.

China
Economic growth in China, while slowing, will propel it into a greater
role in the post-Soviet space. The region will benefit from billions of
dollars in planned Chinese spending on infrastructure, more than the
West or Russia is likely to invest. A prospective Chinese-built port on
Georgia’s Black Sea coast could help halve transit time for goods flow-
ing between China and Southern Europe and the Middle East. The
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank will mobilize resources for proj-
ects in transport and logistics. As more economic activity takes place in
China’s interior, where labor costs are lower, rail- and road-based trade
with European and Middle Eastern markets will become more attrac-
tive. It must compete against lower-cost albeit slower maritime carriage.
Russia’s turn toward China, accelerated after Ukraine-related West-
ern sanctions were imposed, has disappointed Moscow. The Chinese see
opportunity to take economic advantage of Russia’s increased isolation
from Europe, America, and Turkey.
Until recently China’s interest in Central Asia was mostly economic,
but political and security interests are growing. China is concerned
about ethnic Uyghur violent extremists who might return to the Xin-
jiang autonomous territory from Afghanistan and the Islamic State. At a
2014 summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Build-
ing Measures in Asia, a Central Asia-oriented group, Chinese leader Xi
Jinping called for the creation of a “new regional security cooperation

31 “Tajikistan:Under China’s Thumb,” EURASIANET.org, August 26, 2014.

http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69711.
 Western Strategy toward Russia and the Post-Soviet Space 165

architecture.”32 Russia may see China’s security interest as a challenge to

its role and that of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Rus-
sia-led military alliance with some other post-Soviet states.
Recommendations: The West and international financial institutions should
cooperate with China and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank on proj-
ects to improve economic infrastructure in the post-Soviet space. The West
ought to maintain dialogue with China and post-Soviet states about matters
affecting their common security.

32 “AtCICA, Xi Calls for New Regional Security Architecture,” The Diplomat, May 22, 2014.
http://thediplomat.com/2014/05/at-cica-xi-calls-for-new-regional-security-architecture/.
 Chapter 8

Twilight of the Putin Era?

Donald N. Jensen

In November 2015 Forbes magazine named Russian President Vladimir

Putin the world’s most powerful person for the third consecutive year.
He finished ahead of German Chancellor Merkel, U.S. President
Obama, Pope Francis, and China’s leader Xi Jinping. “Putin continues
to prove he’s one of the few men in the world powerful enough to do
what he wants,” the magazine’s editors wrote.1 Putin’s high rating was
based largely on his ability to flout Western and global dictates and get
away with it. Indeed, the Russian leader has never seemed more confi-
dent nor his grip on power more secure. In the past two years he has
outmaneuvered the West in Syria and the eastern Ukrainian regions of
Crimea and the Donbas. A faltering economy and Western sanctions
have failed to blunt Putin’s ambitions.

Political Decay

Putin’s powerful image, however, is belied by many signs that the system
he rules is in crisis. Russia faces mounting internal difficulties, including
a weakening economy, pervasive corruption, a political culture that sti-
fles enterprise and civil society, and a deteriorating social welfare sys-
tem. The combination of these forces endangers both security in
Europe and stability in Russia. Russia’s apparent rise poses a twofold
challenge: to the West, in terms of managing the increasing threats Rus-
sia poses to the international order; and to Putin himself, as he seeks to
define the country’s identity and consolidate his rule.2
Putin’s popular support—currently almost 90 percent—provides the
main source of legitimacy for the regime. He has a far higher approval

1 David M. Walt, “The World’s Most Powerful People 2015,” Forbes, November 4, 2015,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2015/11/04/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-
2015/)
2 See Keir Giles, Philip Hanson, Roderic Lyne, James Nixey, James Sherr and Andrew Wood,
The Russia Challenge, Chatham House Report, June 2015, https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150605RussianChallengeGilesHanson-
LyneNixeySherrWood.pdf

167
168 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

rating than any other leader or institution. The Kremlin makes sure
there are no serious challenges to Putin’s leadership. Putin’s popularity
was originally based on an increased standard of living, but since his
return to the presidency in 2012 he has grounded his popular support
more on political mobilization, especially against imagined external
threats—from NATO, the United States, “fascist rule in Kiev” and ter-
rorism. Whereas Boris Yeltsin’s regime is associated in the popular mind
with the country’s traumatic loss of superpower status, Putin is linked to
the recovery of that status. The mobilization potential by the regime of
the Russian population however, has been declining since the outburst
of support for the annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern
Ukraine. Since Putin’s rating is also boosted by Kremlin censorship and
propaganda, the depth and volatility of Putin’s actual support is unclear,
though there is little doubt most Russians support him.
In such a highly personalized system most political institutions are
ineffective. The judiciary lacks independence and is subordinate to the
Kremlin. Only one member of the legislature, Dmitry Gudkov, is inde-
pendent. Other legislators act as though they were appointed, not
elected, no matter what their formal party affiliation. Regional officials
also serve at the pleasure of the center.
The lack of political institutions means that Putin makes all impor-
tant decisions personally. However, he reportedly leaves some decisions
to other members of his inner circle, depending on the issue, because he
does not have the time, energy or interest to do everything. Such an
arrangement puts a premium on informal elite politics, where the strug-
gle among fluid alliances of Putin cronies, corrupt businessmen, bureau-
crats and members of the security structures—brokered by the Presi-
dent—are often less over policy issues than the allocation of resources.
Although the system is massively corrupt and opaque, the central role of
a few key players at the top means that decisions can be taken and
implemented quickly. The Kremlin’s move into Ukraine in 2014 and
Syria in 2015, for example, surprised the West. It also means wrong
decisions can be corrected rapidly. But Putin’s habit of staying out of
leadership conflicts and delaying decisions means that varies factions
sometimes work at cross purposes and are not fully under the control of
Putin or the Presidential Administration.3

3 Gleb Pavlovskiy, “The taking of decisions in the system,” http://www.novayagazeta.ru/pol-

itics/69125.html?print=1. Donald Jensen, “Russia’s elites battle over a shrinking economic
pie,” http://imrussia.org/en/analysis/politics/2454-russia%E2%80%99s-elites-battle-over-
 Twilight of the Putin Era? 169

Some of Putin’s former allies who have fallen from grace during his
15 years in power say that Putin’s position as Russian leader is less
secure than it seems. According to one former member of the inner cir-
cle, “Putin is a hostage of his entourage.” Russia’s experience with
Ukraine in the past two years suggests he sometimes receives inaccurate
or self-serving intelligence. The war in Ukraine and the economic
downtown, moreover, have exacerbated elite tensions. “He no longer
has confidence in his closest circle,” according to this source, “and if I
were in his place I would not trust them either. What they say to his
face and what they say when he is not there are completely different.”4
For now, however, those dissatisfied with Putin’s leadership are disor-
ganized and too intimidated to speak out. There is also no alternative
waiting in the wings. Whether Putin eventually departs voluntarily
depends on his assessment of his own personal safety and finding a suc-
cessor he trusts who can act as an effective arbiter in Russia’s never-
ending clan battles.

“Putinomics” Reaches a Dead End

The Russian economy has moved into crisis. If and when it returns to
growth, this will be sluggish at best. At the time of this writing, the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development predicts the over-
all economy will shrink by 4.5 percent in 2015. The decline is fueled by
capital flight, slow economic growth due to the war in eastern Ukraine,
and low global oil prices. Steadying the ruble at about 50 to the dollar
also has drained the country’s currency reserves.5
Middle- and lower-middle class Russians have been especially hard
hit by this downturn. Poverty grew to more than 15 percent—about 23
million people—in the first quarter of 2015, the first substantial increase
in the poverty rate since the economic crisis of 1998-1999, which
helped usher in the end of the Yeltsin administration. 2014 also saw an
average drop in real income of 10 percent, and an increase in mortgage
defaults to go along with rising food and energy prices. Inflation, more-
a-shrinking-economic-pie. Donald Jensen, “A coup against Putin,” http://imrussia.org/en/
analysis/politics/2166-a-coup-against-putin.
4 Guy Faulconbridge and Stephen Grey, “‘Czar Putin’: as secure as he seems?” Reuters, Oc-
tober 8, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/08/us-russia-putin-insight-
idUSKCN0S216R20151008.
5 Donald Jensen, “’Putinomics’ Reaches a Dead End?” Center for Transatlantic Relations,
2015, http://transatlanticrelations.org/sites/default/files/2015_09_Putinomics_Jensen.pdf.
170 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

over, is rising and expected to be more than 15 percent in 2015. For the
first time in a decade the government recently announced it will be
unable to raise pensions and other social benefits to fully match infla-
tion. A central question facing the Russian regime, therefore, is whether,
when the so-called “patriotic mobilization” over Ukraine and Syria
wears off, Russians may begin to blame Putin or the regime for their
deteriorating standard of living.6
Three more fundamental factors are dragging down the Russian
economy. First, structural problems limit growth in the near- to
medium-term: the decline in the working age population and restric-
tions the Putinist system places on competition, investment, and inno-
vation. Government projections predict that the work force will decline
from 84 to 80 million between 2015 and 2020. The number of young
entrants into the workforce will be only partly offset by immigration.
The weak rule of law and poorly protected property rights inhibits
competition, investment, and innovation. Business people without con-
nections to the authorities are vulnerable to attacks by law enforcement
agencies, often backed by corrupt courts. Corrupt state officials inter-
fere with what otherwise would be routine market activities.
Second are contextual challenges posed by the international system:
the end of quantitative easing in the United States, which pulls invest-
ment away from emerging markets; the rise of shale oil and gas produc-
tion in the U.S. and Canada, which puts downward pressure on global
hydrocarbon prices; the weaknesses in the eurozone economies, which
take a large proportion of Russian exports, the slowing of the Chinese
economy, and the fall in the oil price.
Finally, there are geopolitical impediments: the war in Ukraine;
Western economic sanctions; Russian counter-sanctions; Moscow’s
drive for import substitution; and the turn at home from liberal eco-
nomic policies toward greater reliance on the law enforcement and
security organs. Western economic sanctions, albeit partial, gradually
implemented, and with unclear objectives, nevertheless have helped
squeeze Russia’s liquidity and hard currency reserves. Although the
Russian economy is more sensitive to changes in the oil price than other
energy producers, experts differ about whether the sanctions or the

6 Mike Wheatley, “Poverty Rate in Russia Jumps to 16%,” Russia Insider, June 12, 2015,
http://russia-insider.com/en/business/poverty-rate-russia-jumps-16/ri7961.
 Twilight of the Putin Era? 171

drop in the oil price have had the greater role effect on Russia’s eco-
nomic slowdown.7
Despite these problems, the likelihood of a financial meltdown is low,
barring another sudden and sustained decline in world oil prices.
Although the large volume of scheduled external debt repayments has
led to speculation that Russia’s finances could experience a financial cri-
sis comparable to the shock of August 1998, these vulnerabilities are less
worrisome than they appear, since a large share of Russia’s external debt
is owed not to Western banks but to Russian parent companies or hold-
ing companies registered abroad.8
Such debt is easily rescheduled, moreover, which means the country
is less likely to suffer a currency crisis. Nevertheless, other indicators
showing the impediments to modernization are more worrisome and
unlikely to be reversed by the government’s continued significant
investment in the military-industrial complex: the lack of competitive-
ness in the educational and technology sectors—Russia has less than
two percent of global technology innovation, a problem made worse by
the Kremlin’s campaign of self-isolation; and the decline of foreign
investment—a key source of technology and expertise. If these trends
continue, the “effectiveness of Russia’s aggregate investment will
decline, productivity growth will slow, Russia’s international competi-
tiveness will slump further, and ultimately living standards will fall.”9
As the economy has slowed over the past year, the viability of the
regime again has become a key question. With prosperity threatened,
the regime may be in danger of losing its legitimacy and effectiveness.
To preserve domestic stability, Putin largely has chosen policies that
preserve jobs at the expense of real wages, even as inflation has grown.
But in dealing with the financial troubles the government policy-mak-
ing process has had trouble functioning effectively.
The economy’s problems also will make it more difficult for the
Kremlin to carry out its ambitious plans for military modernization.

7 Keir Giles, et. al, op. cit.; Kirill Rogov, “Can Putinomics Survive?” European Council on
Foreign Relations, June 5, 2015, http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/can_putinomics_
survive3049.
8 Anders Aslund, “The Russian Economy is Heading toward Disaster,” Peterson Institute for
International Economics, December 8, 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/realtime/?p=4644.
9 Richard Connolly, “Russia’s Finances are not as Vulnerable as They Appear,” Chatham
House, http://www.chathamhouse.org/expert/comment/17826.
172 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

The Russian government’s published 2014 military budget is about 2.49

trillion rubles (approximately $69.3 billion), the third largest in the
world behind the United States and China.10 The official budget was
set to rise to 3.03 trillion rubles (approximately $83.7 billion) in 2015,
and 3.36 trillion rubles (approximately $93.9 billion) in 2016. Unofficial
estimates place the total amount of military spending for the Russian
Federation higher. However, a collapse in the value of the ruble has
greatly reduced the dollar value of the Russian budget to around $50
billion as of February 2015, despite a 33 percent increase in the ruble-
value of the budget.11 As a result, the budget will be cut in 2016, with
the navy the most likely victim.12 The Russian military failed to meet its
plans in 2015 for re-equipping its armed forces with modernized
weapons because of Western sanctions over Ukraine and the decline of
domestic industries, according to deputy defense minister Yuri Borisov.
Although these economic problems are unlikely to affect current levels
of military activity in Ukraine and Syria, they are likely key factors
weighing against the expansion of operations in either theater.13

Increasing Hostility toward the West

Russia’s growing economic problems have undermined the social con-

tract that sustained the regime during the first decade of Putin’s rule—
the authorities would ensure a rising standard of living in exchange for
the population staying out of politics. In its place the Kremlin has tried
to forge a new social contract that would legitimize the regime by
reawakening popular imperial ambitions, including illegally annexing
Crimea, invading Ukraine and militarily intervening in Syria. As the ini-
tial popularity each of these moves ebbs, the Kremlin is likely to con-
sider new adventures.
Moreover, Putin’s Russia sees the global order as rigged against it.
Western efforts at democracy promotion, especially its assistance for

10 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, “The 15 countries with the highest mil-
itary expenditure in 2014” (table), retrieved 13 April 2015.
11 Vladimir Isachenkov, “Putin Spending Big On Military Modernization Despite Russia’s

Economic Woes,” Huffington Post, February 4, 2015, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/

02/04/russia-military-modernization_n_6612418.html.
12 Kathrin Hille, “Russia’s Finances Hit by Slowdown,” Financial Times, October 15, 2014.
13 Anna Dolgov, “Russian Military Struggling to Modernize,” Moscow Times, June 17, 2015,

http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/525782.html.
 Twilight of the Putin Era? 173

Ukraine, are seen as aimed at undermining his regime. Russian ambi-

tions and intentions have been developing for over a decade but the
West found it easier to disregard them and indulge in the illusion that
the country was progressing toward a liberal-democratic model with
which the West felt comfortable. The war in Ukraine is, in part, the
result of the West’s misreading of Russia.14 The Kremlin does not want
to isolate Russia, it wants to take part in international relations, even as
it wants to stop other countries from interfering in its internal affairs.15
Since the West views the former Soviet states as fully sovereign
countries, Putin’s determination to reestablish Russian influence in
those countries is at the heart of the Russian challenge to Europe and
his efforts to preserve his regime. There is little possibility for compro-
mise with the West on the future of the post-Soviet space. In its drive
for global equality with the United States, Moscow creates additional
challenges through a wide range of hostile measures against its neigh-
bors, none of which are compatible with European notions of coopera-
tive international relations. It has interfered in the European Union,
tried to monopolize energy markets, bribe European elites, finance left
and right wing populist parties, and conducted aggressive media cam-
paigns through RT and Sputnik.16

After Putin?

A weaker Russia makes it more likely that Putin will challenge the West
in order to maintain his popularity and will become more willing to
blame invented external enemies for the country’s problems. It cannot
be excluded therefore that Moscow in the coming months will increase
pressure against the Baltic Republics, Moldova, Kazakhstan and the
South Caucasus, even as it keeps pressure on Ukraine. However, it is an
open question whether the patriotic mobilization the regime has relied
on to boost Putin’s popularity and the system’s legitimacy can continue
to divert public attention from the country’s problems. The regime is
already taking measures to prepare for any new outbreak of unrest that
might be generated by the next round of parliamentary elections sched-

14 (http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/russian-challenge)(http://www.ecfr.eu/publi-
cations/summary/can_putinomics_survive3049).
15 Lilia Shevtsova, “The End of an Epoch,” The American Interest, October 16, 2015,

http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/10/16/the-end-of-an-epoch.
16 Giles, et. al, op. cit; Rogov, op. cit.
174 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

uled for later in 2016. It appears willing to use repression at home to

maintain power.
There is a contradiction, moreover, between holding on to power
and reforming the system At the end of 2015 the Russian press reported
that Aleksey Kudrin, former Finance Minister and Putin advisor, would
return to the Kremlin Administration to oversee radical reforms,
including raising the pension age, cutting the budget—including social
spending—and decreasing the state’s role in the economy and privatiza-
tion. If Kudrin returned to an official post, it would also be a sign that
Putin is easing tensions with the West, since Kudrin has argued that
Western sanctions have seriously damaged the Russian economy and
Russia cannot develop without Western capital.
Kudrin has long symbolized the hope that the current system might
reform itself, rather than collapse though a radical break with the past.
Since he resigned as finance minister in 2011 speculation about his return
has been frequent—and always wrong. But despite Kudrin’s reputation for
prudent fiscal management, he was also an architect of Putinism, whose
polices fostered the development of crony capitalism during the early
Putin era. Truly reforming the Russian economy would require gutting the
current political system, and possibly regime change. Putin is thus highly
unlikely to attempt deep reforms of the type advocated by Kudrin, no mat-
ter how much he likes and respects his long-time advisor.17
Nevertheless, Putin’s political dexterity, the regime’s remaining
financial and media resources, as well as its willingness to use repression
mean that the regime is unlikely to collapse anytime soon. Putin’s cur-
rent six-year presidential terms ends in 2018 and he already has indicted
he will stand for another. Putin has strong popular support for now, he
has strengthened the role of the security services and the oligarchs are
largely under control.
But the question of what comes next after Vladimir Putin haunts the
Russian political system. Since the president’s power is based in part on
the lack of alternatives, should a real number two emerge it would “be the
start of a game [Putin] fears,” according to commentator Gleb Pavlovsky,
“because he cannot control it.”18 Any sign of that Putin might depart is

17 http://www.rferl.org/content/so-you-want-to-be-a-mafia-accountant-kudrin-putin-

russia/27457808.html.
18 “Russia’sSergei Shoigu. Master of emergencies,” The Economist, November 7, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21677992-trusty-defence-minister-only-person-
serve-every-government-fall.
 Twilight of the Putin Era? 175

likely to bring great uncertainty or even instability, because the system of

personalized power means there is no real mechanism for choosing the
next leader or for continuing business as usual in the interim.
In addition to the lack of an alternative and the willingness to resort
to repression, Russia’s future trajectory will be determined by several fac-
tors that suggest muddling through and continuity with the present
regime: Russia’s cultural, historical and political traditions, which make
autocracy the rule rather than the exception; the disorientation of both
masses and political elites, who oppose Western-style democratic plural-
ism; and memories of the 1991 collapse, which contribute to the popular
fear of the unknown and new upheavals. The regime also has significant,
though diminished, administrative resources to buy loyalty. These forces
likely will provide the leadership with significant room for maneuver
over the short to medium term, despite deteriorating conditions.19
But several factors pose the possibility of an abrupt discontinuity.
They include: the end of the old social contract that guaranteed popular
welfare and security and the inadequacy of “patriotic mobilization’ as a
replacement; the emergence of social groups who no longer wish to sac-
rifice their standard of living for the sake of militarization or great
power status; the further deepening of the economic crisis which could
generate a wave of discontent; and the regime’s corruption and cyni-
cism, which some Russians can no longer bear.20 Two additional vari-
ables may become especially decisive for the fate of the current regime.
The first are the interests of Russia’s corrupt elite, which have become
economically integrated into Western society through bank accounts
and real estate holdings and opposes Russia’s international isolation.
The second is the willingness of the so-called siloviki, who pull the sys-
tem in the opposite direction, to support the regime. Their loyalty to
Putin cannot be assumed and is not automatic.
It is unclear, moreover, the extent to which regime change would
accelerate the system’s decline, or whether it would give it a new lease
on life, however, short-lived that lease may be.21 As the noted analyst
Lilia Shevtsova has pointed out, Russia is trapped, since its system of
personalized power undermines its own foundations. On the one hand,
the regime cannot survive as a peaceful “normal state” and has had to
turn to military-political mobilization. On the other hand, it is not

19 Shevtsova, op. cit.

20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
176 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

strong enough for a real fight with the West. All signs indicate, however,
that the hard men in charge of the Kremlin have no intention of leaving
the stage as meekly as did Mikhail Gorbachev. The price Russia and the
outside world will pay for the end of Putin’s system, Shevtsova correctly
concludes, thus may be much higher than they paid for the USSR’s
demise.22

22 Ibid.
 Chapter 9

When Could We See the Normalization of

Russia’s Relations with the West?
Andrew C. Kuchins

Russia’s ties with the West hit an all-time post-Cold War low after the
annexation of Crimea and Moscow’s catalytic role in the war in the
Donbas in the first half of 2014. The Ukraine crisis put an exclamation
mark on the fact that a quarter century after the end of the Cold War
and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia and the West together had
failed to create a new, stable European security framework in which all
players felt that their interests were adequately met. The war in Ukraine
came especially as a shock to Europe, as at times in the summer of 2014
and winter of 2015 the intensity of fighting and destructive conse-
quences were as bad or worse than the continent had experienced since
World War II.
The crisis was a long time in the making, with roots going back at
least to the debates twenty years ago about NATO enlargement. In fact,
the Russian narrative starts with their belief that in negotiating the
reunification of Germany in 1990, Gorbachev was assured by the Bush I
administration that NATO would not expand its military infrastructure
east into former Warsaw Pact states, let alone former Soviet republics,
as the Soviet Union still existed at that time. NATO’s attack on Serbia
in March 1999 struck a deep and enduring blow in the security psyche
of the Russian political elite, showing they were virtually powerless to
prevent Washington and its allies from taking actions in nearby coun-
tries that Moscow viewed as diametrically countering its interests.
Further enlargement of NATO and ballistic missile system deploy-
ments in Europe in the following decade only deepened Vladimir
Putin’s view that the existing European security system was illegitimate
because from his perspective Russian interests were systematically
ignored. He saw the West taking advantage of Russia during a period of
historical weakness. While Western policymakers at the time claimed
they were working very hard to integrate Russia into essentially West-
ern institutions and norms, the bottom line is that the West was not

177
178 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

willing to allocate any decision authority to Russia in NATO. Then

Russian President Dmitri Medvedev put forward a proposal in 2009 for
a new European security architecture, but the proposal was poorly
thought out and basically brushed aside by Washington and its Euro-
pean allies.
While the Russian list of grievances is long and familiar, Russian pol-
icymakers never seemed open to asking themselves the question why
central and east European states looked west rather than east for institu-
tional security guarantees. Of course, a long history of imperial and
hegemonic behavior on Moscow’s part had a lot do with their choices,
but a Russia in the 1990s waging a brutal war on its own territory in
Chechnya and where democratic parties and politicians rapidly lost
power also hardly served as a magnet.
Cataloguing all of the mistakes and misunderstandings over the past
quarter century that extinguished our hopes and dreams for a “Europe
whole and free” and the “belt of peace from Vancouver to Vladivostok”
to the situation today that resurrects some features of the Cold War is
not the goal of this chapter. But again, one clear lesson we all must
absorb from this experience is that if Russia feels aggrieved and left out
of key aspects of European security decision-making, neither Europeans
nor Russians will ever really feel secure.
Further, what is most distressing about the current state of affairs is
that the most successful aspect by far of post-Cold War Russian-West-
ern relations, the deep economic integration between Russia and
Europe, is gradually unwinding under the pressure of the West’s eco-
nomic sanctions against Russia for its violations of Ukrainian sover-
eignty. Western sanctions policy reverses nearly a quarter century’s
efforts to integrate Russia more deeply into Western and global eco-
nomic multilateral institutions as well as much deeper and multifaceted
bilateral economic ties with European states as well as the United
States. The last significant achievement of the Obama Administration’s
reset with Russia was the successful conclusion of Russia’s 19-year nego-
tiations to accede to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at the end
of 2012. Only a little more than a year and a half later, Washington was
pushing its European allies and Japan hard to isolate Russia, mainly
through punitive economic sanctions.
Russia has not helped its case by habitually criticizing its European
partners as lackeys of Washington for supposedly acting in a manner
 When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s Relations with the West? 179

counter to their own interests, as viewed from Moscow. Not only were
such comments interpreted as insulting by European leaders, they did
not reflect the growing outrage in most European capitals with Russian
policy in Ukraine and, to put it politely, the disingenuousness of Putin
and his colleagues in not acknowledging any role of Russian armed
forces in supporting the insurgents in the Donbass. Even Putin’s most
empathetic and effective European mediator, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, was repulsed by Putin’s continuous lies and obfuscation.
The dramatic achievement of post-World War II Russo-German rap-
prochement, whose roots date back to generations to the Ostpolitik of
Willy Brandt in the late 1960s, has eroded significantly. A deep lack of
trust permeates Russia’s relations with the West today.

A Conflict Nobody Wanted Except Perhaps Vladimir Putin

It is important, if a bit baffling, to recall that the Ukraine crisis emerged

essentially from European and Russian competition over Ukraine’s eco-
nomic trade orientation in the fall of 2013. Under pressure from Putin
that included a $15 billion loan as a carrot, Ukrainian leader Viktor
Yanukovych reneged on his promise to move forward with signing a
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the
European Union (EU) in November 2013. This brought tens of thou-
sands of Ukrainians into the streets in Kyiv to demonstrate in protest in
Maidan Square, similar to what happened in the winter of 2004 after the
alleged falsifications of presidential elections led to the Orange Revolu-
tion. These demonstrations continued through the winter until they
exploded in violence on February 18, 2014, leading to the killing of
approximately 100 demonstrators and further violence and ultimately
Yanukovych’s escape from his residence in Kyiv and virtual abdication
from power four nights later.
For Putin, the fall of Yanukovych represented the complete and total
failure of Russian policy in Ukraine that could have dire consequences
for his own legitimacy as leader of Russia. For Putin and his circle in the
Kremlin, such an outcome was unacceptable. Putin’s ingenious response
to this seeming debacle was the bloodless seizure of Crimea on Febru-
ary 27-28, 2014 and its annexation on March 18, an act that marked a
watershed in Russia’s transition to a highly chauvinistic strain of Russian
nationalism that was nearly universally greeted with great enthusiasm
by the Russian public as Putin’s popularity jumped almost overnight
180 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

from about 60 percent to close to 90 percent. This was a remarkably

striking case of a politician “making a silk purse out of a sow’s ear”. Even
though the Kremlin keeps very close tabs on public opinion, there likely
was some pleasant surprise at just how effective the Crimean escapade
was in rallying support around Putin. The Western response consisted
mostly of righteous indignation, threats of action, and very weak eco-
nomic sanctions directed against some of the individuals and a couple of
banks close to the Kremlin.
For Europe, the Ukraine crisis and subsequent civil war marked a
tremendous blow to the values espoused by the European Union (EU)
at a time when the EU was still dealing with the impact of economic
stagnation from the global financial crisis, the ongoing Greek economic
crisis, major rifts between better off and less well-off member states, and
a bit later, a growing crisis over large numbers of migrants and refugees
from Africa and the Middle East. The Ukraine crisis again exposed the
schism between some of Europe’s leading powers such as Germany,
France, and Italy versus newer member states located much closer to
Russia such as Poland and the Baltic States. Great Britain and Sweden
were also inclined to take a much tougher position towards Moscow.
Moscow, through a variety of mechanisms such as energy deals, sup-
port for conservative national parties critical of the EU and others, also
increased its efforts to peel away various states from the growing anti-
Russian European consensus after Crimea, most notably Greece and
Hungary. And while Moscow’s arguments about the great losses for Euro-
pean business resonated in many quarters, the shoot down of MH-117 in
July 2014 by a Russian Buk air defense missile controlled either by insur-
gent or Russian military forces in the Donbas sharply consolidated Euro-
pean public opinion, especially in Germany, to support stronger and
deeper economic sanctions against Russia that exist to this day.
The Obama Administration was clearly caught flat-footed by Russian
military action in Ukraine. The administration just two years earlier in
2012 had announced a “rebalancing” of U.S. military, economic, and
diplomatic attention to Asia primarily in response to the rapid rise of
China and concern over Beijing’s increasingly bellicose policies towards
several of its neighbors over territorial claims. For nearly a quarter of a
century, despite the Yugoslav wars of succession in the 1990s and Rus-
sia’s five-day war with Georgia in 2008, Washington’s political elite (as
well as our older western European allies) for most intents and purposes
viewed fundamental European security issues resolved with the end of
 When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s Relations with the West? 181

the Cold War. Coming to power in 2009, Obama’s core goals were to
end U.S. military engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan and to resolve
the Iranian nuclear problem. The last thing he needed or expected was
the “re-opening of the European security theater” thanks to a resurgent
and bellicose Russia.
Moscow accused the United States of supporting the illegal coup in
which Ukrainian President Yanukovych was essentially deposed by
street demonstrations. This is not an accurate interpretation of U.S.
policy. The Obama administration certainly did want the February 21st
agreement signed by Yanukovych, the Ukrainian opposition, and the
foreign ministers of Germany, France, and Poland to succeed. The fail-
ure of U.S. policy from the fall of 2013 to the fall of Yanukovych
stemmed more from sins of omission rather than sins of commission.
While the core of the problem was the dispute between the EU and
Russia over Ukraine’s economic orientation, the administration should
have been more attuned to the danger of that dispute devolving into a
binary choice for Kyiv of either Europe or Russia.
It should have been perfectly obvious to any reasonably informed
observer that for a multitude of economic and political reasons, a uni-
tary Ukrainian state would not be viable having to make such a stark
choice, especially given Ukraine’s deep economic and energy vulnerabil-
ity. Neither the Europeans nor the Americans were willing to ante up
adequate resources to address Ukraine’s economic crisis, and while
Moscow was willing to put far more funds on the table more quickly,
they would not be adequate either. Yanukovych, and his predecessors,
had made Ukraine such an endemically corrupted money pit that all
resources plus remarkable Ukrainian political will to reform would be
required.
As for what transpired between February 21–28, 2014, from the sign-
ing of the agreement to its nearly immediate breakdown to the subse-
quent Russian military takeover of Crimea, again the problem from
Washington stems from sins of omission, a failure of intelligence, and a
lack of minimal creative thinking. First, upon reading the February 21st
agreement which called for holding early elections in 10 months for the
next president of Ukraine, it should have been obvious to any reason-
ably informed observer that this would not be acceptable to the tens of
thousands of demonstrators in the streets of Kyiv.
182 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

It has been reported that Obama did phone Putin after the agree-
ment was signed. This was the right thing to do, but what would have
been much more useful, indeed urgent, would have been for Obama to
speak with Putin after the agreement had fallen apart. I am virtually cer-
tain this did not happen. And what the U.S. president should have said
was something like this: “Vladimir Vladimirovich, WE have a very dan-
gerous mess on our hands with the breakdown of state power in
Ukraine, and WE need to work together with our European colleagues
and friends in Ukraine to try to resolve this in a peaceful manner as
soon as possible. I can assure you that neither did the United States play
any role in supporting this illegal coup, nor did we hope that would
happen, and we condemn those who violated the February 21st agree-
ment.” There is no guarantee that this or a similar action could have
prevented the total breakdown of relations beginning with the Russian
seizure of Crimea, but we should have been very sensitive to how deep
of a political blow this was to Putin and make every effort to reassure
him that we saw it as our joint responsibility to maintain peace and
order in Ukraine. But I fear that in too many circles in the administra-
tion, the fall of Yanukovych was viewed as our victory and Putin’s loss
rather than our mutual danger.

Today’s Dilemma and a Possible Way Forward

More than two years have passed since the Russian annexation of
Crimea and the onset of the Ukrainian civil war. Russia remains under
sectoral economic sanctions imposed by the United States, Japan, and
the EU, and Moscow’s relations with its transatlantic partners remain in
the deep freeze. Perhaps the only beneficiary has been Vladimir Putin’s
domestic political popularity ratings, which remain around 85 percent,1
but for the Russian people, the EU, the United States, and especially
Ukraine, what has transpired has been an unmitigated disaster that is in
the national interests of none of the key players.
Three developments over the past two years, however, are likely
altering the calculus of leaders in Russia, the EU, and the United States,
and may facilitate rapprochement first between Russia and the EU, and
to a lesser extent between Washington and Moscow. First, after the suc-

1 ‘Approval for the performance of Vladimir Putin’, December 2015, Levada Center, Accessed:
http://www.levada.ru/indikatory/odobrenie-organov-vlasti/
 When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s Relations with the West? 183

cessful Russian/insurgent offensive in January 2015 and the subsequent

Minsk II agreement in February, violence in Ukraine has diminished
considerably to something akin to a stalemate. Second, the Russian
economy went into a tailspin in the latter half of 2014 mainly caused by
a 50 percent reduction in the oil price and subsequent depreciation of
the ruble by a similar rate. Economic sanctions also are a problem as
Russian companies can no longer go to Western financial institutions to
roll over debt. After a partial recovery of oil price and ruble value in the
first half of 2015, as of this writing the oil price has tumbled to about
$30/barrel, its lowest level in more than ten years. Russia finds itself in
deep recession as a result. Finally, the threat of the Islamic State’s rapid
growth in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere coupled with high profile ter-
rorist attacks such as those in Paris in November, have elevated this
issue to the top of the agenda for European, Russian, and U.S. policy-
makers. Let us address the impact of these developments below.
My personal reaction to the Russian seizure of Crimea on February
28, 2014 was a deep feeling of foreboding, a sense in my bones that a
real disaster would unfold including the possibility of a broader war
involving Russia and the West. First, I believed that Putin was driven to
this action to a considerable extent by domestic political concerns in
Russia. The Russian economy was already stagnant at near zero growth
before Crimea, and Putin needed something else besides economic
prosperity, which had been the foundation of his popularity and legiti-
macy for most of his rule, to rally the people to support his continuing
leadership. And he found it. I also believed that he would feel embold-
ened to take further action in Ukraine because it would politically be
very difficult for the West to mount a credible reaction that any further
action would bring grave consequences for Russia.
And with the authorization for the destabilization and support for
military action by insurgents in the Donbas, Putin acted on several mis-
calculations. Since Ukrainian military forces in Crimea remained in
their barracks and did not respond to the stealthy Russian invasion,
Putin and his cronies likely over-estimated how easy it would be to
embark on similar actions in eastern Ukraine. He also likely overesti-
mated how ethnic Russians in Ukraine would welcome Russian troops
as liberating them from under the yoke of the Ukrainian government.
Finally, he probably underestimated the unity and the force behind the
Western reaction—albeit without the shoot down of MH-117, that
unity and force behind Western reaction would have been far less.
184 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

It did require far more overt support of Russian military forces in

September and again in January to secure more defensible borders for
the so-called Donetsk Peoples’ Republic and the Lugansk Peoples’
Republic, but at that point the structure of a stalemate started to emerge
over the winter of 2015. While most analysts in Washington expected
Russia to continue to advance, by April I sensed that both for military
and economic reasons, the risk of a further Russian/insurgent advance
outweighed the reward. On the military side, the question emerged
whether Russian/insurgent forces would seize the fairly large port city
of Mariupol (population about 500,000) on the Black Sea as a major
step towards creating the land corridor from Russia to Crimea, making
supply of key resources like energy and water logistically much easier.
The danger, however, was multifold. One, the urban fighting in Mar-
iupol would have been a gory bloodbath causing major losses on both
sides, and for the Russians, you would still need to capture far more land
for the corridor. Such an attack would undoubtedly have led the United
States to supply lethal weapons to Kyiv which implied a very dangerous
escalation of the conflict. And the escalation would have certainly led
the United States and Europe to adopt far more punitive economic
sanctions at a time when the Russian economy had just reached a shaky
equilibrium that foresaw a contraction of the economy of 3-5 percent in
2015.2 Such a contraction was unpleasant, but manageable; a further
external shock could bring on a deeper contraction approaching 8-10
percent that would risk much greater social and political repercussions.
It seemed to make sense for Moscow to resist the temptation of such an
offensive, and the military stalemate on the ground endures to this day.
When Moscow seized Crimea, although Russian economic growth
had stagnated to near zero, Russian financial reserves amounted to more
than $500 billion, and the oil price remained over $100/barrel. Accord-
ing to the World Bank, the Russian economy contracted by 3.8 percent,
inflation averaged over 10 percent, 2 percent more of the population fell
under poverty levels (from 13 percent to 15 percent), and reserves fell to
less than $360 billion.3 With the ruble/dollar exchange rate falling from
a bit more than 30rr/$ to more than 80rr/$ consumption levels have

2 Kuchins A. C. and Mankoff J., “A Shaky Equilibrium in Ukraine,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), 29 April 2015, Accessed: http://csis.org/publication/shaky-
equilibrium-ukraine
3 Russia Overview, World Bank, Accessed: http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/russia/
overview
 When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s Relations with the West? 185

fallen tremendously, and industrial enterprises dependent on imported

parts and machinery have experienced deep supply chain disruptions.4
With the oil price around $30/barrel, the prospects for 2016 are grim,
and we should not forget that parliamentary elections will take place in
September.5 Further budgetary cutbacks will have to be carried out to
avoid cascading budget deficits. More calls will be made on reserves for
Russian state companies to pay off debt and to ensure the liquidity of the
Russian banking system.
Russia is not in imminent danger of a 1998-like default, but if current
trends continue into 2017 and beyond, the danger of a deep disruption
grows, and this could coincide with the next presidential elections sched-
uled for 2018. Throughout Tsarist, Soviet, and post-Soviet history, Russia
has evinced a higher proclivity for non-linear events than most other
great powers and European states, and the current trend of developments
only increases the possibility of a Black Swan descending on the Russian
motherland once again. Putin cannot control the oil price, still the most
important factor for the Russian economy, but he can control to a great
extent the insurgents in the Donbas, and certainly the incentives to stand
down and reach a durable accord with Kyiv—so that Western sanctions
are removed—are growing by the day. Whether a political miscalculation
or not, supporting an insurgency in neighboring Ukraine seemed an
affordable adventure for Moscow two years ago, but today it is not.
To put the economic and political situation in a broader historical
context, since the first oil crises in the 1970s, during periods of high or
rising oil prices, Soviet/Russian foreign policy has been more assertive
and aggressive. This was the case from 1973-1985/86, and again from
2003-2014. During periods of low or falling oil prices that existed from
1985-2003, Soviet/Russian foreign policy has been more accommodat-
ing and moderate. The past year, 2015, stands out as an anomaly since
the oil price for much of the year was falling, yet Moscow maintained a
belligerent stance against the West. I think two factors explain this: 1)
Putin’s anti-Westernism has become the backbone of his domestic polit-
ical consolidation so it is harder to move from it; and 2) it does take
time for Russia’s ruling elite to adjust to new circumstances, and they

4 Ostroukh A., ‘Russian Ruble Falls to Record Low Against the Dollar on Weak Oil Price’,
Wall Street Journal, 21 January 2016, Accessed: http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-ru-
ble-falls-to-record-low-against-the-dollar-on-weak-oil-price-1453391389
5 Russia Monthly Economic Development, World Bank, 19 January 2016, Accessed: Russia
Monthly Economic Developments
186 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

were hopeful that the oil price fall in the second half of 2014 would be a
shorter-term phenomenon. If the oil price remains in the $30-$50 range
for 2016, I expect that Russian foreign policy would return to its histori-
cal patterns and become less bellicose and more accommodating to its
Western partners, especially those in Europe.
Finally, major advances by the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq the past two years coupled with a large
migrant and refugee challenge in Europe and a proliferation of terrorist
attacks around the world claimed by ISIS have focused the attention of
the EU, the United States, and Russia about the urgency of resolving
the Syrian civil war and attacking ISIS strongholds. The entry of Russ-
ian military forces into Syria in late September, 2015 initially came
under considerable criticism from the Obama administration and key
European allies, but the terrorist attack in Paris on November 13
shifted the calculations about working together with the Russians. The
key difference between the Americans and the Russians about the politi-
cal future of Syrian president Assad remains, but each side has moved to
a somewhat more flexible position so that Vienna peace talks are taking
place. Both the Americans and the Europeans have made it clear to
Putin that Russia will not get a special break on Ukraine because of
Russian cooperation on Syria if, as many suspect, this was the sort of
deal that Putin was seeking.
During the fall of 2015 a more cooperative spirit emerged among
U.S., European, and Russian leaders about the urgency of working
together to address the growing terrorist threats that we all face from
ISIS. How successful these efforts will be remains to be seen. While
U.S./EU/Russian cooperation is essential to have any chance of success,
the diplomatic challenge of bringing together key regional actors
including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey is actually far more daunting.
One Russian friend in Moscow in November described this as “the
diplomatic problem from hell.” In 2015 we did see one of the most suc-
cessful diplomatic challenges of our generation, the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram, successfully resolved, but Syria and the growing ISIS problem
may well be more complex and difficult.

How to Respond to a Kinder and Gentler Putin?

Primarily because of growing domestic economic pressures, it is my

expectation that Vladimir Putin will seek a broader political agreement
 When Could We See the Normalization of Russia’s Relations with the West? 187

with Ukraine in order to have Western sanctions lifted sooner rather

than later. Because of space limitations, this is the only hypothetical sce-
nario we will pursue. If the Russians maintain the status quo, then sanc-
tions will continue. If Moscow were to increase its pressure on Ukraine
and/or violate the sovereignty of another neighbor, then certainly the
West should respond in an appropriate manner.
First, we need to be ready to be flexible about the Minsk II ceasefire
agreement. It served an important role in addressing certain urgent mil-
itary and political exigencies nearly one year ago, but it is not likely to
be the platform for a longer-term peaceful resolution between Moscow
and Kyiv, as neither capital sees aspects of the agreement in its interests.
It made sense to use Minsk II as a benchmark for extending or not
extending existing sanctions in 2015, but I would caution against over-
valuing Minsk II as the beacon illuminating our policy henceforth, oth-
erwise we increase the risk of the Donbas taking on the status as an
enduring “frozen conflict” that will similarly freeze our capacity for
more creative and effective policymaking.
Ultimately a broader agreement addressing security, economic,
energy, and political relations between Russia, Ukraine, and the EU will
need to be negotiated, including a promise from the West that NATO
will not consider the possibility of Ukraine’s membership. The so-called
principle that all states have the right to choose their security relation-
ships/alliances is irresponsible. Certainly those states have the right to
seek their security ties, but alliances, NATO in this case, is not required
to accept their membership. NATO must clearly assess the extent to
which a new member state actually enhances the capabilities and mis-
sion of the alliance as well as maintaining the credibility of Article V
commitments to the new member states. For the foreseeable future
Ukraine fails on both counts.
But hopefully with a broader and more sustainable resolution of the
current ongoing crisis, then the United States and the EU can focus
much more attention on assisting Ukraine to develop durable market
and democratic institutions that are the best means to enhance the sov-
ereignty of Ukraine. This is frankly the hardest aspect of the policy
challenges, but has not gotten the attention it deserves partly because of
consistent Russian efforts to destabilize Ukraine and partly because of
Ukraine’s own governance dysfunction. Once we achieve adequate
progress on security and Ukrainian sovereignty, then we can return to a
broader set of issues with our Russian partners such as reform of Euro-
188 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

pean security institutions including the OSCE, a remodeling of the

CFE and other disarmament measures, but this agenda is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
The current state of affairs with Russia so alienated from Europe,
albeit as a result of their own actions, is unnatural, somewhat of an his-
torical anomaly with only the early Cold War period having a similar
dynamic. This alienation is especially debilitating for Russia that is far
more economically dependent on Europe than vice versa. Strong eco-
nomic integration with Europe is imperative if Russia will ever develop
a more diversified and modern economy that adheres to high legal
norms, guarantees property rights, and ultimately a more open and plu-
ralistic polity. Given its geographic proximity to Russia, it is only natu-
ral that Europeans are more sensitive to the dangers of Russian aggres-
sion as well as to potential implosion. If I am correct that deepening
economic problems in Russia shift the weight of concern from Russian
aggression to implosion over the next year or two, then our policy
response to Russia must undertake a rapid makeover as well. This will
be easier for Europe than for the United States since there are major
economic constituencies supporting strong ties with Russia.
As for the United States, normalization with Russia will be more
challenging because of the relative lack of economic interest groups and
the much deeper domestic political animus against Putin. Despite a
seeming “bromance” with Republican presidential candidate Donald
Trump, Putin should realize that dealing with Barack Obama in the
coming year is likely to be the most fruitful course of action rather than
waiting to take a chance on whoever is the next U.S. president. Obama
is thoughtful, pragmatic, and does not have to worry about another
political campaign. His relatively restrained reaction to Russia’s military
action in Ukraine and general bellicosity over the past two years should
serve as evidence of this. His administration also continued to work
effectively with the Russians on two major security and diplomatic
achievements in this difficult environment: 1) the removal and disposi-
tion of all of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal; and 2) the Iranian
nuclear agreement. It is not impossible to imagine that normalization of
relations with Russia could be the final diplomatic achievement for
Obama.
 Chapter 12

An Eastern Partnership for Peace:

Why NATO and the EU need a Coordinated
Approach to their Former Soviet Neighbors
Ian Bond

If Europe is surrounded by impoverished and unstable neighbors, its

security, stability and prosperity will be damaged; if its neighbors are
flourishing, Europe will benefit. That simple equation should lead both
the EU and NATO to invest more in strengthening the countries
beyond the borders of the Union and the Alliance. Yet so far, the two
organisations have been slow to react to the failure of their existing
regional policies, and reluctant to work together more effectively.
Twenty-two countries are members of both organisations, yet it often
seems as though the Union and the Alliance occupy different planets,
rather than office buildings a few kilometers apart in Brussels.
It is understandable that the chaos in the Middle East has become
Europe’s main preoccupation. State failure in Libya and brutal civil war
in Syria have created the conditions in which hundreds of thousands of
refugees and migrants are now heading for the EU. But Russia’s behavior
means that the future of both Europe and the transatlantic relationship
will be shaped as much by what happens in Donetsk as in Damascus.

Putin vs. the EU and NATO in Eastern Europe

While the EU and NATO are distracted and uncertain, President

Vladimir Putin of Russia knows exactly what he wants in his neighbor-
hood. He wants either pliant authoritarian countries like Belarus, or
weak, unstable and poorly-governed democracies like Moldova, which
show the Russian people the terrible fate awaiting them if they turn
their backs on Putinism. And he wants to divide and undermine the EU
and NATO; in Putin’s view they humiliated Russia when they opened
their doors to former Soviet vassals and offered them an alternative
future, and a stronger Russia can now turn the tables.

233
234 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

So far, Putin has played a weak hand very well, because he has been
allowed to do so. Russia is an economic basket-case. Andrey Movchan
has made a powerful case that the Russian economy is even more
dependent on oil and gas extraction than official figures suggest.1 The
country is expanding its armed forces and plowing money into modern-
izing military equipment at the expense of investing in education, health
and civilian infrastructure. Russia’s demographic prospects are poor. Yet
the West often behaves as though Russia is a country too powerful to
stand up to.
The EU’s Eastern Partnership, bringing together the EU and Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, has failed. It
was launched at a summit in Prague in 2009, with the goal of creating
“the necessary conditions to accelerate political association and further
economic integration between the European Union and interested part-
ner countries.” More than six years later, three of the partner countries
are not pursuing political association or economic integration with the
EU; Ukraine has been invaded by Russia in an effort to block Kyiv’s
shift towards the EU; and none of the six can claim to show full respect
for the values of democracy, the rule of law and human rights which are
supposed to underpin the Eastern Partnership.2
On the NATO side, things are no better. At their summit in
Bucharest in April 2008, NATO leaders confidently stated:

NATO welcomes Ukraine’s and Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations

for membership in NATO. We agreed today that these countries
will become members of NATO.... MAP [a NATO Membership
Action Plan] is the next step for Ukraine and Georgia on their
direct way to membership. Today we make clear that we support
these countries’ applications for MAP.3

Seven years and two Russian invasions later, neither Georgia nor
Ukraine has a NATO Membership Action Plan, and as President

1 Andrey Movchan, “Just an Oil Company? The True Extent of Russia’s Dependency on Oil
and Gas,” Carnegie Moscow Center, September 14th 2015.
2 Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit, EU document 8435/09 (Presse
78), May 7th 2009.
3 Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating
in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2008, NATO document
Press Release (2008) 049, April 3rd 2008.
 An Eastern Partnership for Peace 235

Obama said in March 2014, after Russia had annexed Crimea, “Neither
Ukraine or Georgia are currently on a path to NATO membership.”4

A Common EU/NATO Vision of Europe?

How can the EU and NATO start to put things right in the east? First,
the 22 countries that are members of both organisations need to clear
away the political obstacles and the silo thinking that bedevil EU-
NATO co-operation. They have to look at European security in the
round; and they have to ensure that the leaders of the institutions follow
suit. The Secretary General of NATO and the President of the Euro-
pean Commission should not be taking diametrically opposed lines on
the future development of relations with Russia, as Jens Stoltenberg and
Jean-Claude Juncker did in separate remarks on October 8, 2015.
Stoltenberg noted that NATO had to respond to Russia’s annexation of
Crimea, its intervention in eastern Ukraine and its occupation of parts
of Georgia, and had therefore reinforced the Baltic states and Poland.
Juncker said that Europe had to ease tensions with Moscow, and could
not allow its policy towards Russia to be dictated by Washington.5 The
members of the EU and NATO need to establish a common vision of
Europe that they can both work to realize: a translation of the hallowed
phrase “Europe whole and free” into coherent strategies and practical
policies for European and Euroatlantic organisations and states.6
Before they can start to build a Europe whole and free, however, the
EU and NATO need to decide which Europe they are talking about. It
is often said that Russia historically lacked natural boundaries, and that
this led it to seek security by constantly expanding to prevent threats
emerging beyond its borders.7 Both the European Union and NATO
have suffered since the end of the Cold War from analogous problems:
they have defined political boundaries to their enlargement, but not

4 Press Conference by President Obama, European Council President Van Rompuy, and Eu-
ropean Commission President Barroso, Whitehouse transcript, March 26th 2014.
5 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meeting of
the North Atlantic Council in Defence Ministers session, NATO transcript, October 8th
2015; “Europe Needs Better Relations with Russia—Juncker,” Reuters, October 8th 2015.
6 A Europe Whole and Free: Remarks to the citizens in Mainz, President George Bush.
Rheingoldhalle. Mainz, Federal Republic of Germany, May 31st 1989.
7 See for example, Andrei Tsygankov, Russia and the West from Alexander to Putin: Honor in In-
ternational Relations, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
236 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

geographical ones. Thus the Washington Treaty of 1949, which estab-

lished NATO, stated: “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite
any other European State in a position to further the principles of this
Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to
accede to this Treaty”, without seeking to define which states were or
were not European.8 The Treaty on European Union similarly states
that any European state which respects the values of the Union and is
committed to promoting them may apply to become a member. The
values are defined as “respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy,
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the
rights of persons belonging to minorities.”9
These vague criteria have produced two contrasting but negative
effects. For a Russian regime obsessed with the fear of encirclement,
they justify the belief that the EU and NATO have unlimited territorial
ambitions in Russia’s neighborhood, which Moscow must resist. At the
same time, they enable those within the two organisations who oppose
further enlargement to argue either that potential new members are not
European; or that their membership would not contribute to European
security; or that they do not in practice respect and promote the values
of the EU.
There is no perfect definition of Europe: the Organization for Secu-
rity and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) includes the five Central
Asian states and Mongolia; the Council of Europe excludes Belarus on
human rights grounds, but includes Russia; the Treaty on Conventional
Forces in Europe has part but not all of Kazakhstan within its area of
application. What matters is that the EU and NATO should agree on
which countries are in principle eligible for membership, and state
clearly that if those countries meet the criteria for joining then the two
organisations will not allow any third party to stop them.

Europe United, or Europe Divided?

Meanwhile, regardless of which countries may eventually join, the EU

and NATO have to accept that their security interests do not stop at
their current borders; and they have to decide what kind of neighbors
they would ideally like to have. They have a number of options. None is

8 The North Atlantic Treaty, Washington DC, NATO Official Text, April 4th 1949.
9 Articles 49 and 2 of The Treaty on European Union, Lisbon, December 13th 2007.
 An Eastern Partnership for Peace 237

problem free, though some risk worse outcomes than others. They can
accept that the countries of the former Soviet Union lie within Russia’s
sphere of influence and that their fate is for Russia to decide; they can
have implicit or explicit understandings with Russia to allow the coun-
tries concerned to remain independent but neutral and non-aligned; or
they can push forward with integrating those countries that want to
become members of the EU and NATO, concentrating on making them
as secure as possible in the face of (inevitable) Russian pressure while
accepting that some former Soviet countries are headed in a different
direction.
The first and second options would accept the division of Europe
into spheres of influence. They differ only in the degree to which the
sovereignty of the states between Western Europe and Russia would be
limited. In the second version, they would presumably be allowed to
pursue democratic and market reforms internally, but would not have
full autonomy in foreign relations. In the first version, Russia’s view of
how its interests should be protected, including the kind of govern-
ments its neighbors could have, would count for more than the will of
the inhabitants.
These two options would essentially represent a return to pre-1989
Europe, but with a more porous Iron Curtain (it is hard to see the Russ-
ian elite accepting the kinds of restrictions on their travel or right to
own property in London that their parents or grand-parents had to),
and the division drawn further to the East.
To the extent that the countries of the Warsaw Pact were relatively
stable for most of the four decades after World War II, the Cold War
system of Western and Soviet spheres of influence could be said to have
‘worked’. A similar system might still work in the former Soviet coun-
tries that have reformed the least. But it is highly unlikely that it could
be imposed on Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In all three countries
there is some degree of civil society; a reasonable amount of democracy;
and popular support for EU and/or NATO membership. People have
shown their willingness (repeatedly, in Moldova and Ukraine) to take to
the streets to press their governments to be more ‘European.’ Russia
would have to be willing and able to use considerable force to crush
opposition and reimpose some sort of stability; and it would need the
resources and economic model able to sustain conquered territory The
experience of eastern Ukraine suggests that Russia is ready to use force,
but only within limits and preferably covertly; and (with the obvious
238 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

exception of Crimea) it has shown no wish to administer or subsidise

the areas where it has intervened.
Moreover, the second of these options would effectively codify the
unsuccessful policy that the EU and NATO have de facto (but not offi-
cially) pursued ever since Ukraine first raised the possibility of joining
the two organisations in the early 1990s.10 The problem with it is that
Putin fears not only the possibility that former Soviet countries might
host NATO military bases but that European standards of governance
might be contagious, threatening the survival of the corrupt post-Soviet
system in Russia. He therefore wants a cast-iron guarantee that the
buffer states of Eastern Europe will stay out of both NATO and the EU.
Since he does not trust the West to keep its word, the guarantee has to
come by means of destabilising or intimidating Russia’s neighbors so
that it is impossible for them to join Western organisations.
Ukraine and its neighbors have certainly provided the West with
many excuses to exclude its ex-Soviet neighbors from its clubs; but
Western countries have been only too eager to grasp those excuses. Bul-
garia, Croatia and Romania have joined the EU and NATO despite per-
forming worse than Georgia (though significantly better than Moldova)
in terms of corruption and poor governance.11 The members of the two
organisations accepted that the countries of Central Europe and the
Balkans were unquestionably European, while they looked at former
Soviet states (with the exception of the Baltic States) as being in a spe-
cial and less European category.
The EU and NATO cannot and should not try to impose a Western
orientation on countries that are not ready for it or do not want it; the
countries of Eastern Europe are not homogeneous. Both organisations
need to pursue differentiated policies towards Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Belarus, rather than (as hitherto) trying to keep them in a single group
both with each other and with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.12

10 Ian Bond, “The EU, NATO and Ukraine: Prospects for Future Co-operation” in Artis
Pabriks and Andis Kudors (eds.), The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Europe, The Centre for
East European Studies/University of Latvia Press, Riga, 2015.
11 “Corruption Perceptions Index 2014,” Transparency International website (www.trans-

parency.org).
12 Ian Bond, “Eastern Mess: The EU’s Partners Need Attention,” Centre for European Reform,

September 24th, 2015.

 An Eastern Partnership for Peace 239

But while some countries may not (yet or ever) aspire to join West-
ern organisations, the current members of the EU and NATO should
accept that they cannot force the other three countries of Eastern
Europe to remain post-Soviet societies against their will forever. If the
people and governments of Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine make clear
choices in favour of the West, it is at least as destabilising for the West
to keep them at arm’s length as it is do everything possible to support
their choice. That should be the lesson of the aftermath of Ukraine’s
Euromaidan.

Helping the Neighbors

What kind of support do the three countries need? In the security

sphere, they need positive statements that their sovereignty and inde-
pendence matter to NATO, backed up with concrete programs of train-
ing and assistance designed to make them as interoperable as possible
with NATO forces. Some NATO members have made shibboleths of
Article 5 and the NATO-Russia Founding Act. Article 5 prescribes what
Allies must do in the event of an armed attack on one of them; it does
not prohibit a response if a neighboring country is attacked. Nor could
it: sovereign nations have the right of individual and collective self-
defense under the United Nations Charter. The premises of the Found-
ing Act have been overturned by Russia: Russia’s military doctrine gives
the lie to the assumption that NATO and Russia do not regard each
other as adversaries; Russia is not building a democratic society, nor is it
reducing its conventional and nuclear forces; it is doing nothing to cre-
ate a Europe “without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the
sovereignty of any state.”13 There is no sense in NATO allowing its
hands to be tied by the Founding Act when Russia is no longer abiding
by its terms.
NATO should make clear to Russia that the security of those coun-
tries that share borders with NATO and Russia is as important to the
Alliance as the security of its own members. That is nothing more than
the truth: if Russia had chosen to or had been able to continue its attack
on Ukraine in 2014, or on Georgia in 2008, there would have been seri-
ous security consequences for countries like Poland and Turkey. At the

13 NATO official text, Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between

NATO and the Russian Federation, Paris, May 27th 1997.

240 THE EASTERN QUESTION : RUSSIA , THE WEST, AND EUROPE ’ S GREY ZONE

same time, it should make clear to the countries concerned that while
NATO will help them protect the territory that they hold, it will not
support the use of military means to recover lands lost to Russia and its
proxies: no one wants to start World War III to recover South Ossetia.
In the economic sphere, the EU needs to ensure that the Association
Agreements with Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine are fully implemented
as quickly as possible. Even on the most optimistic interpretation, how-
ever, that will take some years. It will be hard to ensure that the popula-
tions of the three countries see the benefits soon. Implementation will
be a major challenge: these are huge and complex agreements that will
oblige countries with corrupt and ineffective bureaucracies to adopt
European standards and practices.
If they are left to themselves, all three countries are more likely to
fail than succeed in exploiting the transformative potential of their
agreements with the EU. They will need advice from the countries of
Central Europe with recent experience of harmonizing their own legis-
lation and practices with those of the EU. They will need large-scale
twinning with officials and agencies in EU countries, as the Central
Europeans did in the run-up to their accession to the Union. Their
businesses will need advice on how to sell into EU and other new mar-
kets—and in many cases, potential Western competitors will be the best
placed to offer the advice, bringing its own challenges. They will need
to be open to foreign investment, even if that means giving foreigners
control of the ‘crown jewels’ of their economies: the lesson of Central
Europe is that trying to protect national champions merely delays
development.
But the biggest threat to these countries’ prospects of being stable
and prosperous, and on course to join the EU and NATO, is not that
Russia will invade them or that their economies will collapse (though
both scenarios are possible); it is that the countries will be destroyed
from within by corruption and crony capitalism. This is the golden
thread that links together colour revolutions, street protests and popular
discontent in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine over more than a decade.
The West cannot escape its share of responsibility: it has allowed oli-
garchs and corrupt politicians to pretend to be ‘pro-EU’, even while
their actions have given the concept of ‘European values’ a bad name.
Some EU member-states have even facilitated the corruption: the
Moldovan banking scandal involved 48 UK-registered shell companies,
 An Eastern Partnership for Peace 241

many with bank accounts in Latvia. The EU needs to make a serious

effort to stop dirty money from eastern Europe flowing through the
financial systems of EU member states, as a contribution to increasing
the economic and political resilience of the countries concerned; and it
needs to work with anti-corruption activists in Georgia, Moldova and
Ukraine, as well as with the authorities.
Initiatives such as the EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and
Ukraine (EUBAM) can help reduce low-level corruption in customs
authorities, but the EU needs also to step up its support for judicial and
law enforcement reform (areas in which it had some success with its
mission in Georgia from 2004-2005). Unless the EU can show more
clearly that it is on the side of transparency and good governance, not
simply backing local elites who appropriate the label ‘pro-EU’, there
will be a growing risk of the EU being discredited in the eyes of ordi-
nary people.
The West should be under no illusions: whenever it tries to help its
neighbors with their defenses against invasion or corruption, it will be
acting against the perceived interests of Moscow. The Russian authori-
ties will claim that the West is acting provocatively in the historical
‘Russian World.’ Eastern Europe was indeed part of the Russian Empire
and then the Soviet Union for many years. But that does not mean that
only Russia has interests there. In the 21st century, the choice of the
peoples of eastern Europe should be decisive. In defending their right
to choose their futures, the West will also be defending itself.
 About the Authors
Daniel S. Hamilton is the Austrian Marshall Plan Foundation Profes-
sor and Founding Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at
the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS),
Johns Hopkins University. From 2002-2010 he served as the Richard
von Weizsäcker Professor at SAIS. From 2001-2015 he also served as
Executive Director of the American Consortium for EU Studies. He
has held a variety of senior positions in the U.S. Department of State,
including Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs; U.S. Special
Coordinator for Southeast European Stabilization; Associate Director
of the Policy Planning Staff for two U.S. Secretaries of State; and
Director for Policy in the Bureau of European Affairs. In 2008 he
served as the first Robert Bosch Foundation Senior Diplomatic Fellow
in the German Foreign Office. He has authored over 100 articles, books
and other commentary on international affairs, been a consultant to var-
ious business associations, research institutes and foundations, and has
also taught at the Hertie School of Governance in Berlin, the Univer-
sity of Innsbruck and the Free University of Berlin. From 1990-1993 he
was Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and from 1982-1990 Deputy Director of the Aspen Institute
Berlin. He has a PhD. and MA with distinction from Johns Hopkins
University SAIS.
Stefan Meister heads the program for Eastern Europe, Russia, and
Central Asia at the Robert Bosch Center at the German Council on
Foreign Relations/Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik DGAP. Pre-
viously he worked as a senior policy fellow on the European Council on
Foreign Relations’ Wider Europe Team and as a senior research fellow
at the DGAP. He writes extensively on Germany’s Russia policy, con-
flicts in the post-Soviet region (especially the South Caucasus), the
interrelationship between Russian domestic and foreign policy, as well
as on the EU’s Eastern Partnership. He has served several times as an
election observer for the OSCE in post-Soviet countries and was
responsible for educational projects in Russia. In 2003–04 he was
researcher-in-residence at the Center for International Relations in
Warsaw, analyzing Polish Eastern policy. He earned his doctorate at the
University of Jena.

259
260 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Ian Bond joined the Centre for European Reform as Director of For-
eign Policy in April 2013. Prior to that, he was a member of the British
diplomatic service for 28 years. His most recent appointment was as
political counsellor and joint head of the foreign and security policy
group in the British Embassy, Washington (2007-12), where he focused
on U.S. foreign policy toward Europe, the former Soviet Union, Asia
and Africa. He was British Ambassador to Latvia from 2005-07. He was
posted in Vienna as deputy head of the UK Delegation to the Organiza-
tion for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) from 2000-04,
working on human rights and democracy in the OSCE area, and on
conflict prevention and resolution in the Balkans and the former Soviet
Union. His earlier career included postings in Moscow (1993-96) and at
NATO HQ (1987-90), and working in the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office on the former Soviet Union, on the EU’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy and on NATO and UK defense policy.
William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corpora-
tion and executive director of the RAND Business Leaders Forum, as
well as president of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association. In 2014
he retired from Computer Sciences Corporation as senior principal for
federal policy strategy; from 2000 to 2003 he was senior vice president
for national security programs at DynCorp (bought by CSC in 2003).
From 1972 through 1999 he was a career foreign service officer in the
U.S. Department of State. Among his many assignments he served as
U.S. Ambassador to Georgia and to Kazakhstan, as special assistant to
the President for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia, and as deputy U.S.
negotiator in U.S.-Soviet defense and space (missile defense) talks. He
graduated from West Virginia University with a BA and Brown Univer-
sity with a PhD in economics.
Sergei Guriev is a professor of economics at the Instituts d’études poli-
tiques (Sciences Po) in Paris. He is a Research Affiliate at the Centre for
Economic Policy Research (CEPR), London. He is also member of the
board of the Dynasty Foundation, a member of the Scientific Council of
Bruegel, of the Advisory Council of the Peterson Institute on Interna-
tional Economics, and of the Academic Advisory Board of the Blavatnik
School of Government at Oxford University. He has published in inter-
national refereed journals including the American Economic Review, Jour-
nal of European Economic Association, Journal of Economic Perspectives, Eco-
nomic Journal, and American Political Science Review. Between 1999 and
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 261

2013 he was on the faculty of the New Economic School in Moscow

and between 2004 and 2013 he was a tenured faculty member and Rec-
tor of the New Economic School. In 1997-98 he was a post-doctoral
fellow at the Department of Economics at M.I.T. and in 2003-2004 he
was a Visiting Assistant Professor in the Department of Economics at
Princeton University. In 2006, he was selected a Young Global Leader
by the World Economic Forum. He has been a regular columnist for
Forbes Russia, Vedomosti, the New York Times, Financial Times, Washington
Post, Moscow Times and Project Syndicate. He received his Dr. Sc. (habil-
itation degree) in Economics (2002) and PhD in Applied Math from the
Russian Academy of Science (1994), and MSc Summa Cum Laude from
the Moscow Institute of Physics in Technology (1993).
Hiski Haukkala is an Associate Professor of International Relations at
the School of Management at the University of Tampere and a Special
Adviser in the Policy Planning Unit of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
of Finland. He also serves as a Visiting Professor at the Natolin Campus
of the College of Europe, and has held visiting positions at the Finnish
Institute of International Affairs, the Universiy of Turku, the Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies, University of Stirling, and the
European Union Institute for Security Studies. He has a doctorate from
the University of Turku.
John E. Herbst is Director of the Atlantic Council’s Dinu Patriciu
Eurasia Center. He served for 31 years as a Foreign Service Officer in
the U.S. Department of State. Among his many assignments, he served
as U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine and to Uzbekistan, led the U.S. govern-
ment’s civilian capacity in societies in transition from conflict or civil
strife and oversaw the establishment of the Civilian Response Corps of
the United States as the State Department’s Coordinator for Recon-
struction and Stabilization. He also served as U.S. Consul General in
Jerusalem; Principal Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for the Newly
Independent States; the Director of the Office of Independent States
and Commonwealth Affairs; Director of Regional Affairs in the Near
East Bureau; and at the embassies in Tel Aviv, Moscow, and Saudi Ara-
bia. After retiring from the State Department he served as Director of
the Center for Complex Operations at National Defense University.
His writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post,
the Atlantic, the National Interest, and Foreign Policy. He earned a bache-
lor of science in foreign service from Georgetown University’s School
262 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

of Foreign Service and a master of law and diplomacy, with distinction,

from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. He also attended the
Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies
Bologna Center.
Vladislav L. Inozemtsev is Professor of the Higher School of Eco-
nomics in Moscow and Founder and Director of the Center for Post-
Industrial Studies. He has served as a Senior Fellow at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies and the German Council on Foreign
Relations DGAP. Between 2012 and 2014 he was a leading researcher
for Russia’s Council on Productive Capacities, and between 2008 and
2010 he served as staff member of Russia’s State Commission for Mod-
ernization under President Dmitry Medvedev. Since 2000 he has been a
Member, and between 2004-2011 Presidium Member, of the Russian
Council on Foreign and Defense Policy. He was co-founder and former
CEO and Chairman of the Moscow-Paris Bank. From 2003-2011 he
was Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Svobodnaya Mysl (Free Thought), a
monthly political and economic journal. He graduated from the Faculty
of Economics of Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU) with a
Doctor of Sciences degree in Economics.
Donald N. Jensen is a resident fellow at the Center for Transatlantic
Relations at Johns Hopkins University’s School of International Studies,
where he writes extensively on the politics and foreign policies of Russia
and the former Soviet states. He is a regular commentator on post-
Soviet affairs for CNBC, Fox Business, and the VOA Russian Service.
From 1996 to 2008 he was associate director of broadcasting and direc-
tor of research at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, where he was
instrumental in expanding the station’s broadcasting to Central Asia,
Iran, Afghanistan, and the North Caucasus, and broadening its web
presence. He served in Moscow and Sofia as a Foreign Service officer
from 1985–1996, and was a member of the first ten-man U.S. team to
inspect Soviet missile bases under the Intermediate Nuclear Forces
Treaty in 1988. He received his BA from Columbia University and his
MA and PhD in government from Harvard University.
Andrew C. Kuchins is a senior fellow at the Center for Eurasian, Russ-
ian, and Eastern European Studies at Georgetown University, where he
conducts research and writes on Russian foreign and security as well as
domestic policy. He is a senior associate and former Director of the
Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies. From 2000 to 2006 he was a senior associate at the
 ABOUT THE AUTHORS 263

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he served as direc-

tor of its Russian and Eurasian Program in Washington, D.C and as
director of the Carnegie Moscow Center in Russia. He has also held
senior positions at the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Founda-
tion, Stanford University and the University of California at Berkeley.
He holds a BA from Amherst College and an MA and PhD from Johns
Hopkins SAIS.
F. Stephen Larrabee is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corpo-
ration, its Distinguished Chair Emeritus in European Security, and a
member of the Pardee RAND Graduate School faculty. Before joining
RAND, Larrabee served as vice president and director of studies of the
Institute of East–West Security Studies in New York from 1983 to 1989,
and was also a Distinguished Scholar in Residence from 1989 to 1990.
From 1978 to 1981, he served on the U.S. National Security Council
staff in the White House as a specialist on Soviet–East European affairs
and East-West political-military relations. He is a prolific author and
commentator with articles in a wide range of publications, from Foreign
Affairs and the National Interest to The International Spectator. He has
taught at Columbia, Cornell, New York, Johns Hopkins, Georgetown,
and The George Washington universities, and at the University of
Southern California. He received his PhD in political science from
Columbia University.
Marie Mendras is professor at the Paris School of International Affairs
of the Instituts d’études politiques (Sciences Po), and researcher with
the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) in Paris. In 2015-
2016 she served as Senior fellow at the Transatlantic Academy and visit-
ing scholar at Georgetown University. She is an Associate Fellow of the
Russia and Eurasia Program at Chatham House in London. Between
2008-2010 she was Professor of Government at the London School of
Economics, and has taught at a number of European universities, as well
as at MGIMO in Moscow. She has been a consultant for both the
French Foreign and Defense Ministries, and is former Director of the
Policy Planning Staff for the French Foreign Ministry. Her latest book
is Russian Politics. The Paradox of a Weak State. She received her doctorate
from Sciences Po and her MA from Harvard University.
Marek Menkiszak is the Head of the Russian Department at the Cen-
tre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw. From 1995 to 2003 he was a
faculty member at the University of Warsaw’s Institute of International
Relations. He has been a visiting fellow at the Transatlantic Academy
264 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

and visiting researcher at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs in

Helsinki, and a member of the EU–Russia Task Force at the EU Insti-
tute for Security Studies in Paris. Since 1995 he has been an author for
Rocznik Strategiczny (Strategic Yearbook) and has written numerous arti-
cles for publication. He received his PhD and MA from the Institute of
International Relations at the University of Warsaw.