© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.

com
a force on force companion

OSPREY
PUBLISHING

© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com

First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Osprey Publishing Ltd.

© 2011 Osprey Publishing Ltd. and Ambush Alley Games LLC.

Osprey Publishing
Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford, OX2 0PH, UK
44–02 23rd St, Suite 219, Long Island City, NY 11101, USA
E-mail: info@ospreypublishing.com

Ambush Alley Games LLC

1792 Denim Lane, Enid, OK 73703, USA
E-mail: info@ambushalleygames.com

All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as
permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced,
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical,
mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the
copyright owner. Inquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library

Print ISBN: 978 1 84908 534 2

PDF e-book ISBN: 978 1 84908 535 9

Authors: Piers Brand, Joseph Trevithick, Shawn Carpenter

AAG Editor: Shawn Carpenter
Additional Editing: Peggy Carpenter, Kathy Morgan, Tom Konczal

Play-Testers: Andy Rix, Chris Mihlan, Christopher Maes, Christopher Maes, Cyril Vallin, Donogh McCarthy,
Eric Emerson, Jake Rose, Jason Mastros, Jay Arnold, Jim Roots, Jim Wonacott, Joseph Trevithick, Ken
Gordhamer, Leigh Neville, Les & Alex Shorey, Mark Taylor, Michael Moore, Piers Brand, Rene Raap, Rich
Chambers, Robby Carpenter, Robert Connor, Rob Adams, Rutger van Marissing, Shaun Matthews, Stephen
Crawford, Steve Morris, Tim Spakowski, Tom Konczal. To anyone we’ve omitted – our heartfelt thanks and
apologies for the oversight!

Miniatures Photos by Piers Brand unless otherwise noted. Models and scenery from the personal collection of
Piers Brand. Miniatures displayed are from various manufacturers, including Elhiem Figures, Britannia Models,
Hobby Den, and Liberation Minis.
Other Photos by US Dept. of Defense
Maps by Shawn Carpenter

Cover concept and page layout by Myriam Bell Design, France

Cover artwork by Ramiro Bujeiro
Typeset in Bank Gothic and Minion Pro
Originated by PDQ Media, Bungay, UK
Printed in China through Worldprint Ltd

11 12 13 14 15 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Osprey Publishing is supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK's leading woodland conservation charity, by
funding the dedication of trees.

www.ospreypublishing.com

For more information on Force on Force and other products, please visit www.ambushalleygames.com

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS
SPECIAL THANKS 5 US Military Armor Units 46
INTRODUCTION 6 Basic Armor Units 46

Figure Availability 7 Miscellaneous US Army Armor 50

Alternate Basing 7 US Air Force Armor 52

Above Company Level 53
NEW OR MODIFIED RULES 8
US Army Cavalry Units 54
Tunnel Spots (Hot Spots) 8
Division and Brigade Cavalry Units 55
Initiative 9
The Armored Cavalry Regiment 56
Terrain 9
Above Troop Level 62
Paddy Fields 9
The Republic of Vietnam 63
Special Terrain Effects 9
Infantry Units 64
Combat 10
Armored Units 66
Body Armor 10
Free World Armed Forces 75
Night Fighting 10
Australia and New Zealand 77
Off-Board Artillery in Ambush Valley 12 The Republic of Korea 77
Special Weapons 14 The Kingdom of Thailand 82
Special Rules 18 The Republic of the Philippines 84
Civilians in Ambush Valley 18 Special Operations Forces 86
Special Troop Types 19 US Army Special Forces 87
Vehicle Rules: Aircraft 23 US Army Infantry Company, Ranger 88
Air Defense Environment 23 US Army Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog; Infantry
Spotter Aircraft 23 Platoon, Combat Tracker; and Infantry
Red, White & Pink Teams 24 Detachment, Combat Tracker 89
Boat Rules 25 US Navy SEAL Platoon 90

Boats Damage Result Table 27 USMC Force Reconnaissance Company and 92

USMC Reconnaissance Company,
Example Boats 29
Reconnaissance Battalion, Marine Division
A PLACE CALLED VIETNAM 30 South Vietnamese Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB) 95
The Advisory Period (1963–64) 32 South Vietnamese So Cong Tac 96
The Defense, Counteroffensive, and the End 33 (Special Mission Service)
(1965–75) South Vietnamese Lien Doi Ngoui Nhia 97
(LDNN) and So Phong Ve Duyen Hai
UNIT ORGANIZATIONS 36
(Coastal Security Service)
The United States 36
ANZAC Special Air Service Troop, Special 98
US Basic Infantry Units 37 Air Service Squadron, Special Air Service
Specialized Infantry Units 43 Regiment
Above Company Level 44 Special Programs 99

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The Civilian Irregular Defense Group 100 The Pathet Lao 136
(CIDG) Program Cambodia 137
Projects Delta, Sigma, and Omega 106 Unit Organizations 139
Intelligence Collection and Exploitation 108 The Forces Armees Royales Khmere 139
(ICEX) and the Phoenix / Phung Hoang
Program The Forces Armees Nationales Khmere 140

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and 111 Covert Operations in Cambodia 146
the National Liberation Front The Khmer Rouge 147
The People’s Army of Vietnam 113 VEHICLES LIST 149
PAVN Infantry Company, Infantry Battalion, 114 New Vehicle Attributes 149
Infantry Regiment
Free World Vehicles 149
PAVN Sapper Company, Sapper Battalion 115
PAVN Vehicles 151
PAVN Armor Company, Armor Battalion, 116
Armor Regiment SCENARIOS 153
The People’s Liberation Army and People’s 118 Scenario 1: First with Honor 153
Liberation Armed Force Scenario 2: Enemy at the Gate 156
Viet Cong Local Force 119 Scenario 3: Shutting the Barn Door 158
Viet Cong Main Force 119 Scenario 4: Dong Nai River, 2nd June 1969 161
PLAF Infantry Company (“Main Force” and 120 Scenario 5: Binh Ma Marketplace 164
“Local Force”), Infantry Battalion, Infantry
Regiment Scenario 6: The Longest Fight 167

PLAF Sapper Company, Sapper Battalion 122 SOLO & CO-OP VS. VICTOR 170
CHARLIE
A NOT SO SECRET WAR – 123
LAOS & CAMBODIA Hot Spots in Solo/Co-Op Games 170
Laos 124 VC Motivation 170
Unit Organizations 126 VC Action Checks 171
The Armee Nationale Laotienne, Forces 126 GLOSSARY 173
Armee Laotienne, and Forces Armee
Royales ARTWORK REFERENCES 175
The Hmong Irregulars 129 BIBLIOGRAPHY 176
The Thai Unity Battalions and Other Irregulars 131 FOG OF WAR & BOOBY TRAP 177
Covert Operations in Laos 132 CARDS

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 SPECIAL THANKS
The authors thought it might be nice to start out with a It would probably be impossible to thank all the individuals
few words of thanks. Firstly to Shawn and all at AAG for who helped in one way or another with this project without
once again being fully committed to Ambush Valley, to doubling its size. I would like to first thank Shawn and Piers
Joe Trevithick for his huge amount of work and support for bringing me in to help in the first place. Their support,
in this second edition – without Joe, the book would not and that of the other members of the AAG team, has been
be the reference work that it is. Next heartfelt thanks to immense and without it I am not sure I would have been
Michael Moore, Ambush Valley’s biggest fan, for his as motivated. I am happy to have contributed to a product
tireless desire to see the game developed and his constant that has so dedicated a staff. I would like to thank Gordon
poking to get the job done! My thanks also go to my Rottman and Laurent Touchard, among many others, who
wargames club, the Green Machine Gamers (GMG) of have directly supported my research efforts over the years.
Kildare, Ireland. Without their unflinching enthusiasm Without their help I would likely not have had the same
for the period, this project would never have been knowledge base when starting out on this project. I would
possible. So big thanks to Thomas, Brian, Skip, Ruardhi, also like to thank my family and close friends for all the
Gary, Sean and of course Ho Chi Cyril. Lastly my emotional support they have given me since I started
thanks go to my wife, Ruth, my daughter, Evey, and the working on this. Lastly, I would like to thank my wife, Kelly,
new son, Lyndon – thank you for putting up with Daddy’s who has put up with my ramblings for almost a year now,
odd hobby. and probably knows more about inefficiencies in the Khmer
I hope players will get as much use and enjoyment Republic now than most other people would ever want to.
from this book as I have, and will find they get many I can only hope that the time and effort that we all put
enjoyable hours of gaming from it. Just remember – into making this work shows. It was truly a labor of love for
Charlie owns the night. all those who contributed.

Piers Brand, January 2011 Joseph Trevithick, February 2011

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© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
 INTRODUCTION
Legend has it that Vietnam’s origin lay in the harmonious which had led the resistance movement against the
union of Lac Long Quan, King of the Sea, and Au Co, Princess Japanese, declared the country independent. The French
of the Mountains. Real life was not such a paradise as Indochina War ensued, until France finally admitted defeat
Vietnam’s early history, like its recent history, is characterized in 1954, and the Geneva Accords left Vietnam divided into
by a near continuous struggle for self-governance. First came a Communist north and an anti-Communist south. By this
a thousand years of Chinese control, which was finally thrown time the US had taken the place of the French as the
off in 938AD. From then until the 1800s, Vietnam undertook primary sponsor of the anti-Communist South Vietnam
the role of conqueror and suffered civil wars. Foreign control government. Tension between north and south mounted
was once again imposed by a series of military conquests from over the next few years, until in 1964 full scale war erupted.
1859 to 1885, when Vietnam was occupied by the French. The conflict lasted for the next eight years, and involved
French rule lasted until World War II, when the country at its peak, 500,000 troops from the US plus military
was invaded by Japan. At the war’s end the predominantly personnel from other countries such as Australia, South
Communist Viet Minh, founded by Ho Chi Minh in 1941, Korea and Thailand.

Operation Dewey Canyon, 1969

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© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
 Introduction

The Vietnam War was fought not only in Vietnam, but mechanics and special rules that evoke the atmosphere and
spread to Cambodia and Laos. The Viet Cong, a communist tactical challenges of the Vietnam War. Players will now be
guerilla force, fought a long insurgency in South Vietnam able to undertake their very own “Tour of Duty”.
while the North Vietnamese Army became increasingly
engaged in a conventional war as time progressed. While the FIGURE AVAILABILITY
North enjoyed manpower superiority, the US and South A number of companies produce excellent figures suitable
Vietnam could call upon vast quantities of firepower and for use in Vietnam-era games.
air superiority. In 28mm:
The US viewed the war as a preventative measure to stop Westwind Productions – westwindproductions.co.uk
a communist takeover in South Vietnam and it was part of The Assault Group – theassaultgroup.com
their containment strategy for communism in the region. Force of Arms – forceofarms.co.uk
The North Vietnamese regarded South Vietnam as a puppet In 20mm:
state of the US and fought the war as a struggle against Elhiem Figures – elhiemfigures.com
colonialism in much the same manner as it viewed its Britannia Miniatures – grubbytanks.com
previous war with France. As the number of troops rose, the Platoon 20 (Produced by East Riding Miniatures) –
fighting spread into Laos and Cambodia, destabilizing both shop.eastridingminiatures.co.uk
these countries and plunging the region further into chaos. SHQ Miniatures – shqminiatures.co.uk
With the war losing support at home, the US eventually In 15mm:
began to pull out of South Vietnam. Despite the Paris Peace QRF – quickreactionforce.co.uk
Accord in 1973, fighting continued with the US providing Flashpoint – flashpoint-miniatures.com
some support to South Vietnam. By 1975, North Vietnamese Peter Pig – peterpig.co.uk
troops and tanks rolled into Saigon and the war was over.
The Vietnam War took a huge toll in human fatalities. Special Operators’ Group
The exact figure will never be known, but it is estimated Members of Ambush Alley Games’ Special Operators’
that 1 to 3 million Vietnamese died during the war. Add to Group (SOG) receive significant discounts from many
this a further 400,000 casualties in Laos and Cambodia, and vendors of miniatures, terrain, and other hobby related
the death toll rises significantly. The cost to the US was also items or services. They also receive a 15% discount on
heavy. 58,159 American servicemen paid with their lives purchases from Ambush Alley Games and Osprey
fighting to support South Vietnam. Publishing. To learn more, visit our website at
This second edition of Ambush Valley builds upon the www.ambushalleygames.com today!
success of our initial volume by expanding, and improving,
the amount of historical data provided. Thanks to the work ALTERNATE BASING
of Joe Trevithick, we now have a detailed look at unit Many Ambush Valley players may already have modern
organization for all the combatants, offering every Vietnam military figures based on multi-figure stands for use with
wargamer a superb resource available for the first time in other games. This basing method works perfectly fine with
print. Within you will you find new scenarios, rules, and Ambush Valley, so there’s no need to rebase your existing
organization information covering all aspects of the war armies or replace them with new figures. Simply treat each
and its theatres. stand as a fireteam and keep track of how many casualties
This edition once again allows players to re-fight battles it has taken with casualty caps, counters, a die placed by the
from the Vietnam War, taking either side, with a set of stand... whatever method seems most convenient to you.

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© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
 NEW OR MODIFIED RULES
Only new rules or rules that have been significantly
modified are presented here. All other rules are described
in Force on Force.

TUNNEL SPOTS (HOT SPOTS)

Ambush Valley uses a similar mechanism as Force on Force
to represent insurgent entry points. Players familiar with
Force on Force will recognise Hot Spots, which in Ambush
Valley are called Tunnel Spots.
Some scenarios require the use of Tunnel Spots to
randomize the entry points for reinforcements. In Ambush
Valley these represent entrances to Viet Cong tunnel
networks. Unless the scenario dictates a different method,
US Troops investigate a tunnel entrance.
Tunnel Spots are placed as follows: (Piers Brand)
At the beginning of the game, place five (5) Tunnel Spot
counters on the table. No Tunnel Spot may be placed within Tunnel Spots have a secondary role in Ambush Valley:
6” of another. Each Tunnel Spot should be labeled with a They recreate the advantages of the Viet Cong tunnels
number from 1 to 5. without the need for bookkeeping and maintain the fast
Some scenarios will specify Tunnel Spot locations while flow of the game.
others will leave their placement entirely to the player’s Players using Viet Cong forces may move units into a
discretion. Some scenarios may use board edges and forego tunnel during the movement phase. If the unit can reach
the use of Tunnel Spots all together. a Tunnel Spot with more than half of its figures during its
movement, it is removed from the board and placed to one
US Troops locate a VC tunnel entrance.
(Piers Brand) side. The unit may not be targeted and remains off-table
until the player’s next turn.
The VC player may move a unit in the tunnel network
back onto the table in any following turn by activating the unit
and designating the Tunnel Spot from which it will emerge.
A unit emerging from the tunnels may make a Tactical move
but can only engage in Reaction fire for that turn.
Enemy troops with line of sight to a Tunnel Spot may
interrupt the movement from it and open fire as enemy
units exit the tunnels.
The Viet Cong player may hold units in the tunnels for
as long as he wishes. The tunnel complex may hold a
number of infantry units equal to the current number of
active tunnel spots on the table.

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 New or Modified Rules

Tunnel Spots
At the beginning of the game, place five (5) Tunnel Hot Spot the unit arrives at. A roll of 6 allows the
Spot counters on the table. No Tunnel Spot may VC player to pick which Hot Spot units arrive at.
be placed within 6” of another. Each Tunnel Spot VC units may move into Tunnels. Tunnels will hold
should be labeled with a number from 1 to 5. a number of units equal to active Tunnel Spots.
To determine which Hot Spot a reinforcement unit If a Tunnel Spot is neutralized, roll 1D6 for each
arrives from, roll 1D6. unit in the tunnels. Units are eliminated on a
A roll of 1 through 5 indicates which numbered roll of 1.

If a Tunnel-Spot is neutralized by the enemy, roll a D6 TERRAIN

per unit currently in the tunnels. On a roll of 1, a unit is Ambush Valley introduces a new terrain type to Force on
eliminated by the C4 used to destroy the tunnel or rendered Force – Paddy Fields.
combat ineffective by CS gas grenades. Such units are
removed from play. Paddy Fields
Certain scenarios may not feature tunnels and others Paddy Fields are filled with mud and water that impede
might only allow Tunnel Spots to be used as a point for movement. As a result, units may not use Rapid Movement
reinforcement. This is specified in each scenario briefing. through a Paddy Field. Certain scenarios may remove
Tunnel Spots may be used as normal Hot Spots if the this effect.
players wish, forfeiting the added benefit of the tunnel
network and associated rules. Special Terrain Effects
The following special terrain effects are applicable in
INITIATIVE Ambush Valley:
Initiative in Ambush Valley is determined in the same
manner as a standard Force on Force game, but US forces VC & Terrain
always gain +1 Initiative die. Unless stated otherwise, Viet Cong units suffer no
movement penalties for terrain other than impassable
terrain, which remains impassable to them.

Spotting Charlie
Viet Cong units were renowned for their ability to remain
concealed even when enemy troops passed nearby. The
following rules recreate this characteristic in game terms.
Viet Cong troops that are stationary and in cover may
not be seen beyond Optimum Range unless they open fire.
ing for Such units are considered Hidden.
w e r e hard go r most
Rice Pad
die s
d im p o s sible fo Viet Cong units that open fire are seen by all troops in
n
ldiers a
foot so line of sight.
.
vehicles

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Example: A VC light MG team has taken cover in a stand Outside of Optimum Range is a Viet Cong infantry cell hiding
of trees. A US Army fireteam with a Troop Quality of Trained among the trees. The Kit Carson scout rolls his D8 and will
moves within 10” of the VC but cannot engage them. The VC successfully spot the enemy unit on a 4+.
are outside the Army fireteam’s Optimum Range and so A Squad of US Green Berets with Troop Quality of D10 is
cannot be seen or fired upon. When the VC unit opens fire, moving along a trail through dense jungle. Up ahead the VC
it will reveal its position and become visible to all enemy units player has an MG unit in a piece of dense jungle terrain
within line of sight. designated as “Heavy Foliage Cover”. The Green Beret unit
Viet Cong troops in the open or moving are spotted by rolls a single D8 to try and spot the enemy unit, requiring a
all troops in line of sight. 4+ to be successful.
Certain US Forces have the ability to spot concealed Viet
Cong outside of Optimum Range. These are detailed below; COMBAT
US Special Forces – All LRRP Teams, Green Berets and Body Armor
SEALs are allowed to make a Troop Quality check to spot In Ambush Valley the only body armor available is the US
VC units in cover outside of their Optimum Range. issued Flak Vest. These gave intermittent protection at
Kit Carson Scouts – These VC turncoats are particularly best, as they were often worn unzipped, fell apart from the
adept at spotting their former comrades’ hiding places and rigors of combat or were discarded by the soldiers. They
may make a Troop Quality check to spot VC units in cover also offered little protection from actual bullets, indeed
outside of their Optimum Range. M60 crews found that a belt or two of 7.62mm ammo for
Attempts to spot VC in Heavy Foliage Cover (dense their guns offered better bullet protection than the flak
jungle or woodland, Elephant grass etc.) suffer a -1 die shift vest. To reflect this primitive form of modern body armor,
to Troop Quality rating. units in body armor only receive an extra armor defense
Examples of Play: die when hit by fragmentation weapons, such as RPG,
A squad of US soldier with an attached Kit Carson scout, mortar, or artillery fire.
Troop Quality D8, are moving through a rubber plantation.
Night Fighting
US troops patrolling a jungle trail
(Piers Brand) “We own the day, Charlie owns the night.”
While American troops and their allies had the technological
advantage over their Vietnamese adversaries, that superiority
didn’t extend to the night-mastery that we see in today’s
modern armies. Night vision devices tended to be too large
and cumbersome to be of much tactical value on patrol or in
a firefight. Even the famed “Starlight Scope” was bulky and
impossible to use on the move.
Without a technological solution, superiority at night
fell to the side that was most attuned to its environment
men who were able to sort out night sounds, smells, and
the slightest blur of shadow to find and locate the enemy
before their enemy found them. While Special Forces and
other elite units might boast of this familiarity with the
night, only the VC could truly call themselves its master.

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 New or Modified Rules

Night Eyes Illumination Rounds

The normal Force on Force rules for night fighting apply in On-board mortars or M79 grenade launchers may fire
Ambush Valley, but some units have developed “night eyes.” illumination rounds (or “illume”) at the beginning of any
VC are treated as if they have night vision devices. This given turn, in lieu of HE or smoke. No die roll is required.
is to represent their familiarity with the local environment Off-board mortars or artillery may fire illume missions
and long practice in moving and fighting at night. in lieu of HE or smoke, if the FO or other leader has access
Kit Carson Scouts, Special Forces units, snipers and to a radio and passes a Troop Quality check to call in
SEAL teams are also treated as if they are equipped with the illume.
night vision devices. Other units may receive this benefit Illumination rounds negate night combat effects for
based on the dictates of a scenario. both forces for 2 turns, starting the turn after the flare was
Units who haven’t developed night eyes suffer a -1 die fired.
shift to their Troop Quality die when attempting to “Spot Units that have had the protective cover of night
Charlie” or other hidden units, Booby Traps, or ambushes. suddenly torn away from them by Illumination rounds
have a tendency to freeze in place. When illumination
Starlight Scopes rounds are fired by a force, all units in the opposing force
Units equipped with starlight scopes have some advantages must make a Troop Quality test to move. They may fire
at night. If a unit equipped with a starlight scope doesn’t as normal.
move, it can make normal spot checks at daylight ranges. Due to the nature of forest canopies, units firing at
Figures who have not moved and are equipped with targets located wholly within dense woods and heavy jungle
weapon mounted starlight scopes may engage targets at still suffer night combat effects.
normal ranges and without penalty.
Flares
Illumination Rounds & Flares A variety of flares were also used to provide temporary
Illumination rounds fired by mortars or artillery and flares illumination and/or to warn of enemies approaching under
launched from the ground or from aircraft were often used the cover of night. These flares, often known as slap flares
to roll back the night and blunt the edge the VC possessed or trip flares, could be used in two ways: Slap flares could
during night attacks. The following rules describe their be used to directly illuminate an area while trip flares
game effects in Ambush Valley. could be set as “Booby Traps” that would launch a flare and
illuminate the intruder while simultaneously alerting
defenders to his presence.
Slap Flares
A unit equipped with slap flares may use them to illuminate
the enemy during its turn or as a reaction to enemy
movement. The unit may “fire” them at any unit. The firing
unit must make a successful Troop Quality test in order to
launch the flare effectively. If successful, the flares negate
night combat effects for both forces for the remainder of
on a rif
le the turn. If the unit fails its Troop Quality test it may try
mounted
t scope again in subsequent turns.
Starligh
Units may only use their slap flares once per game.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The defense of Lang Vei, 1968 Off-Board Artillery in

Ambush Valley
Trip Flares In the case of US, ARVN, ROK, and ANZAC forces,
Fire-bases and temporary positions were often ringed with off-board artillery in Ambush Valley is governed by the
a combination of Claymore Mines and trip flares. Trip same rules described in Force on Force with the added
flares were normally activated by trip wires situated across requirement that a unit calling in a fire mission must
likely avenues of approach to alert defenders of an enemy include a radio operator that is not seriously wounded
intrusion into their perimeter. or dead.
If a scenario indicates that a force has strung trip flares The following modifiers applied to the Troop Quality
around their position, any enemy unit that moves within Test for the fire mission request:
twice the Optimum Range of the unit within the defensive Spotter is an actual Forward Observer: +1
position must make a Troop Quality check. If they pass Spotter is a Special Forces leader: +1
the check, they’ve successfully bypassed any alarms for Spotter is a Squad Leader or lower: -1
movement in that turn. If they fail the check, they trip a flare ARVN Forces: -1
and are automatically illuminated and spotted by the enemy. ANZAC Forces: +1

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 New or Modified Rules

NVA: – 1
NVA Radio Communications: – 1
Designated Target: +1
If the NVA unit making the request is located in a
bunker and the scenario permits, it may have a field
telephone line to a battery. This will negate the minus for
NVA Radio Communications.
The above factors limit the rapid response of NVA
artillery to reflect the historical difficulty that the NVA had
in its employment.
However the NVA may fire on “Designated Targets”.
In scenarios that call feature designated targets, the NVA
player may identify up to D6 locations (terrain features,
A US FO calls for supporting fire.
(Piers Brand) buildings, Tunnel Spots, road junctions) before the beginning
of the game as pre-plotted artillery zones. NVA artillery may
Viet Cong and NVA off-board artillery is handled slightly be called down on any unit within Optimum Range (as
differently to reflect their lack of radio communications determined by the spotter’s Troop Quality) of the center of
below battalion level. the location. The spotter will receive a +1 on his Troop
Viet Cong units may never have designated off-board Quality test to call in the mission.
artillery. The only support they will receive will be via NVA artillery may never be heavier than “light artillery”.
Booby Trap/Asset Cards. Mortars fired when played with Example: An NVA Platoon Leader (Troop Quality D8)
an asset card may target any unit on the table, but the card wishes to call down mortar fire on an ARVN unit within 8”
is discarded after use. of a Tunnel-Spot that he has recorded as a “Designated
Only NVA Leaders and FOOs may call in off-board Target” for artillery support. The NVA Leader must pass a
artillery at targets within their line of sight, no other models Troop Quality Test in order to call in the support. He is using
may do so. They follow the standard procedures with the a radio, but as he is firing at a designated target he only
following modifiers: suffers a -1 to his dice roll. He rolls a “6” and successfully calls
Spotter is an actual Forward Observer: +1 in the off-board mortars on the target.

Fire Mission Request Modifiers

Free World Troops (must have a living RTO): NVA Troops:
Spotter is an actual Forward Observer: +1 Spotter is an actual Forward Observer: +1
Spotter is a Special Forces leader: +1 NVA: – 1
Spotter is a Squad Leader or lower: -1 NVA Radio Communications: – 1
ARVN Forces: -1 Designated Target: +1
ANZAC Forces: +1 Only NVA Forward Observers and Unit Leaders
can call in Fire missions.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Special Weapons The development of the M60 was heavily influenced by

M20A1B1 Rocket Launcher World War II designs. Although it had a number of
(3.5” Bazooka) problems in South-East Asia, including jamming and its
The venerable US 3.5” Bazooka lacked the blast effect that weight, the M60’s firepower was a welcome addition to US
made the rival RPG-7 so effective against personnel in the troops in Vietnam.
open, but its remarkable penetration made it the bane The following rules recreate the M60 in Ambush Valley:
of many bunkers. To reflect this, the M20A1B1 has a Heavy
weapon rating of AP:1/AT:2(M). Units in bunkers or The M60 was a heavy weapon to lug around the Boonies.
prepared positions lose two Cover dice when fired at with To represent this, any model armed with an M60 who uses
an M20A1B1. Rapid movement receives no extra bonus firepower dice.
He may only claim 1 die as his usual firepower.
M14 Modified Rifle Fire & Move
With the adoption of the M14 by the US Army, the If a model armed with an M60 makes a normal Tactical
companion M15 rifle was to replace the M1918A2 BAR move, it receives +1 Firepower dice to represent the M60’s
as rifle squad’s automatic rifle. This weapon was later automatic fire.
determined to be unsuitable. An automatic rifle variant of Sustained Fire!
the M14, known variously as the M14 Modified, M14E2, If a model armed with an M60 remains stationary and
and finally M14A1, was subsequently adopted in its place. opens fire, it receives +2 Firepower dice.
This weapon was used by both the US Army and the USMC. M60s deployed as Weapons Teams follow the above
Figures armed with the M14 Modified add +1 to their unit’s rules and may claim their weapons team bonus for Fire &
Firepower if they remain stationary, otherwise the weapon is Move and Sustained Fire!
counted as a normal infantry small arm.
M79 Grenade Launcher – The
M60 Machine Gun Blooper
The M60 is the US Force’s main support weapon The M79 Grenade Launcher was a popular weapon with
in Ambush Valley. American troops in Vietnam. Its wide range of ammunition
types and its accuracy in the hands of an experienced
grenadier added yet more firepower to US Squads.
The M79 is governed by the following rules:
Grenade Launcher
Any model equipped with an M79 gets +1 Firepower dice.
Multiple Projectile Rounds
A grenadier may elect to use a M576 Multiple Projectile
(MP) or “buckshot” round at close range. At targets within
Optimum Range the grenadier adds +2 Firepower dice.
Units must make a Troop Quality check before firing
an MP round – if the check is failed, a unit has none of
Machine the rounds available. Poorly Supplied units never have MP
Purpose
General rounds, while units with Abundant Supplies receive a +1
The M60
MG) die roll modifier when testing for availability.
Gun (GP

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 New or Modified Rules

are within Optimum Range they decide to use CS Gas to clear

the unit out of its cover.
Two members of the team open fire with their weapons
as normal with no effect. The USMC player now rolls two
firepower dice for his attack with CS Gas grenades. He scores
two hits on the NVA unit.
The NVA unit (Morale D8) must now take its Morale test
with its Morale shifted down one die type (from D8 to D6).
The NVA player rolls 4D6. He fails his Morale test and the
unit is pinned. As the unit is under attack with CS Gas it
must leave its present position, even though it is in cover and
pinned, and moves 12” to the nearest cover in the direction of
its base edge. The unit may also be shot at by units on
overwatch as it retreats from its position.

r
enade Launche Recoilless Rifles
"B l o oper" Gr
The M7 9 Recoilless Rifles have been popular since their introduction
in World War II. They are capable of throwing a heavy shell
from a relatively light gun tube. They are generally deployed
CS Gas Grenades as anti-tank weapons, but are effective against infantry as
US Units may use CS Gas against enemy units occupying well. In game terms, they are a heavy support weapon that
structures (houses, bunkers etc.). To make a CS attack, the
unit must be within Optimum Range of its target and have
a clear line of sight. One firepower die is rolled for each
model making the attack. Defense rolls are made as normal.
The player may elect to fire part of the squad normally
while others use CS Gas. Resolve the attacks separately, but
they must both be at the same target unit.
Every hit on the unit forces a Morale test. Multiple hits
reduce the unit’s Morale dice type by one step for every hit
(to a minimum of D6). Units that fail the Morale test must
move to alternative cover, even if already in cover, and
count as pinned. This is to reflect the success that US forces
had when using CS Gas to clear structures, particularly
during the fighting for Hue.
CS Gas grenades should be seen as a scenario specific
weapon, but players may agree on their use in games as
standard. A US iss
ue CS g
Example: A USMC rifle team is clearing part of Hue City. renade

They spot a four-man NVA unit hiding in a building. As they

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AMBUSH VALLEY

World War II-era weapons, such as a variety of bolt-action

rifles, plus weapons such as the SKS Carbine. On the US side
some units used Garand rifles and M1 Carbines.
These units would be outclassed in terms of firepower
compared to units equipped with contemporary assault
rifles such as the M16 and AK47. To reflect this, units with
over half their models equipped with bolt action or semi-
auto rifles lose one Firepower die to represent their slower
rate of fire.

Booby Traps
Viet Cong and NVA forces have a special Booby Trap card
deck. This deck is used to provide extra support for the
A VC Recoilless Rifle. (Piers Brand)
Communist force, generally in the form of various traps
can either move or shoot (not both) and can only fire once and devices with which to harass and injure enemy models.
per turn. They are classified as Heavy Support Weapons The VC/NVA player receives a number of Booby Trap cards
(AP:3/AT:2(M). All rules relating to anti-tank guns in Force specified by the scenario. These may be used as the player
on Force apply to recoilless rifles. sees fit during the course of the game.
The VC/NVA player may use a given card once per game
Bows and Crossbows and may target any enemy unit (other than air or riverine
Some indigenous troops made use of bows and crossbows assets) at any time during the
for hunting. In some cases these were used in combat. The
following rules describe the use of such primitive weapons
in combat.
Units armed with bows or crossbows use their standard
Troop Quality die to determine Firepower when firing at
units within Optimum Range. When firing at targets beyond
Optimum Range, they use a D6 for Firepower regardless of
their normal Troop Quality.
Bows and Crossbows have a maximum range of 3 x
Optimum Range.
All units targeted by models armed with such bows and
crossbows gain an extra defense die to represent the fickle
nature of primitive weapons designed for hunting rather
than combat.

Bolt-Action Rifles & Semi-Auto

wire booby
Rifles and trip
grenade
During the Vietnam War both sides had units equipped with A simple
trap
out-dated weaponry. The Viet Cong made use of various

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 New or Modified Rules

turn sequence. The effects of the card played are applied Claymore Mines
immediately, as are the results of any Morale tests that may Units equipped with Claymores may use them to attack an
be required. If played as an interruption along with other enemy force moving within line of sight.
units interrupting, the Booby Trap card is always played A unit with Claymores can attack the enemy either in its
first and its effects applied before any other interruptions. own turn or as a reaction to enemy movement. The unit
Once a Booby Trap card is played, it is removed from the can “fire” a Claymore at any enemy unit that comes within
VC/NVA player’s hand and returned to the bottom of the twice Optimum Range (this represents the distance at
Booby Trap deck. which remotely detonated claymores could be triggered
When a Booby Trap card is played, the unit it is played from ambush positions).
against may make a Troop Quality roll to avoid the trap, if The firing unit must make a successful Troop Quality
it successfully passes the test it may avoid the trap safely test in order to fire the Claymores. If the Troop Quality test
and the card is discarded with no effect upon the unit other is successful, the target unit takes an 8D8 Firepower attack.
than a –1” movement penalty. If the firing unit fails its Troop Quality test it may try
If a Booby Trap card is played that is not a trap (such as again in subsequent turns.
the Sniper, Bunker, Mortar and Local Support cards), the Units may only use their Claymores once per game
target unit may not make a Troop Quality roll against its unless a scenario indicates otherwise.
play. Only those cards marked as “Trap!” require or allow an Claymores may also be used to as part of a prepared
avoidance roll to be made. defense at a firebase or other strongpoint and are used as
If a unit targeted by a Booby Trap is making a Rapid described above. The quantity of Claymores available to the
Move, it gets no roll and suffers the effects of the trap defenders is dictated by the scenario.
immediately. In games featuring attacks on a strongpointed position
If a target unit is moving through difficult terrain (Dense such as a firebase, the simplest method to handle defensive
Woods, Paddy Fields and Heavy Foliage) the unit makes its Claymores is to allow every defending unit a chance to fire
test with a -1 Die Shift for its Troop Quality (i.e., a troop one set of claymores to represent the mines set in a
with a D10 Troop Quality would make its test as if it had a defensive pattern around the base. Players should note that
quality of D8). in such games the attacking force should significantly
Examples of Play: outnumber the defender.
A unit of US Marines (Troop Quality D8) is moving
through open terrain at Tactical speed (6”). The VC play a
“Grenade Trap” card on the unit. The unit must roll 4+ on a
D8 to discover the trap before setting it off. The unit rolls a “5”
and successfully avoids the trap. The card is discarded by the
VC player.
A group of ARVN Rangers (Troop Quality D8) are on
patrol through dense jungle. The VC player attacks a unit
with the “Spike Board” card. As the unit is in difficult terrain
the ARVN player must roll 4+ on a D6. He rolls a “3” and "This Sid
e Towar
the trap is triggered! mine d Enemy
" – A Cla
ymore

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Design Note: Representing Claymore Mines

So, a unit can only use Claymore Mines once per turn, the placement of mines using a Troop Quality test.
but if it fails its Troop Quality test it can try again If a unit passes the Troop Quality test, it recognized
later? Huh? a trail or path that the VC might use and their field
The Troop Quality test to “fire” Claymores at craft has paid off. If a unit fails a Troop Quality test,
an enemy doesn’t just represent the successfully the chances are it’s because the VC unit has shown up
triggering of a mine; it also represents a unit’s at a place where no mines were placed. As the VC unit
foresight in placing a mine. We didn’t want to resort (or other VC units) continues to approach, they may
to book-keeping or onboard counters and dummy blunder into the path of mines the unit did place –
counters to represent Claymores, so we abstracted hence Troop Quality tests after the first has failed.

Example: An American LRRP Team (Troop Quality D10) business, while others may well be disguised members of
is hiding in bushes beside a well-worn jungle track. A Viet the Viet Cong.
Cong unit moves to within 20” of the American unit which Due to their rules of engagement, US Players may not
decides to use its claymores. The American player passes a target civilian groups or direct off-board support within 12”
Troop Quality test for the unit and successfully fires the of them unless a friendly unit within that distance is under
claymores at the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong unit takes an 8D8 enemy fire. Players fielding ARVN forces may not target
firepower attack. the civilians directly but have no restrictions on their use of
off-boards support. Viet Cong forces may target civilian
Improvised Alarms groups with fire if they so wish.
US units would often ring their defensive positions with Civilian models should be moved by the VC player and
improvised alarms such as small bells on strings, empty tin may be moved as an interruption to firing. They have a
cans full of pebbles, etc. VC or NVA approaching their default troop quality rating of D6 for any reaction-based
position at night were likely to stumble across one of these tests. If the civilians move into the line of fire of US troops,
alarms and the ensuing racket would reveal their position. the US unit may not fire if the civilians block the line of
If a scenario indicates that a force has strung improvised sight to the intended target. This allows the VC player to
alarms around their position, any enemy unit that moves use civilians as a blocking force against enemy firepower.
within twice the Optimum Range of the unit within the The VC player may also elect to swap civilian groups for
defensive position must make a Troop Quality check. If they a successful reinforcement roll if he wishes, if the scenario
pass the check, they’ve successfully bypassed any alarms for permits. The player immediately removes the civilian group
movement in that turn. If they fail the check, they trip an and places the VC reinforcements within 4” of the civilian
alarm and are automatically spotted by the enemy. group’s position. This is to simulate VC units posing as
civilians to ambush US forces.
SPECIAL RULES If a civilian group is fired upon, resolve the firing in the
Civilians in Ambush Valley following manner. The civilian group will make no reaction
Civilian groups play a fundamental role in games of test and will make its defense rolls based on a D6 troop quality
Ambush Valley and will appear in many of the scenarios. rating. There is no need to test for Morale and after being fired
Some will be normal peasants going about their daily upon the civilian group will move a full movement distance

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 New or Modified Rules

from the direction of firing or to the nearest piece of cover Special Troop Types
to break line of sight between them and the attacker. Players can include these special troops to add a little extra
They may however never move nearer to the unit firing. flavor to their games. They are designed to give added
If hit by off-board weapons the civilian group will move in a personality to a force and reflect some of the more specialist
random direction. roles played by soldiers during the Vietnam War.
If an ARVN, US Army or ANZAC unit causes casualties
by fire on a civilian unit, or is in line of sight of a civilian Medic
unit that is targeted by fire and takes casualties they must The medic in US military units performed a vital function
make an immediate Morale test. If the unit fails they count during the war. They provided critical emergency first aid
as pinned for the rest of the turn while they argue over who to stabilize seriously wounded personnel and patch up the
fired, spend time calling off fire or just gape in shocked lightly wounded. It was due in no small part to their work
dismay. Viet Cong, NVA and ROK forces need never take that 82% of men seriously injured in Vietnam managed to
such a Morale test. Causing casualties on civilian groups will recover. Given the role they played, often risking their own
also cause the loss of Victory Points as noted in the scenario. lives to save another, we wanted to give them a role on the

Medevac, 1969

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AMBUSH VALLEY

tabletop that reflects their heroic nature. The following

special rules apply to Medics in Ambush Valley:
Stay with me, buddy...
Every turn that a seriously wounded figure remains on the
table, a roll must be made to see if the figure succumbs to
their wounds.
At the start of each turn roll a D6. On a roll of “1” the
injured man has died from his wounds. This effect may be
avoided if the model is placed with a Medic.
A Medic may be detached from his parent unit to look
after any number of seriously wounded models. Once with
a Medic, the seriously wounded no longer need to roll for
survival as described above and can safely await CASEVAC. Medic! (Piers Brand)
Players are encouraged to set up forward aid stations and
casualty evacuation points at which to post a medic and Tunnel Rat
drop off their wounded. Scenarios may dictate that US/ARVN/ANZAC/ROK
It’s just a nick, you’ll live . . . platoons have a Tunnel Rat attached. If the unit containing
If a unit with a figure suffering a light wound remains a Tunnel Rat moves into contact with a “Tunnel-Spot”, it
stationary and there is a medic within 6”, the Medic may is taken out of action immediately and the unit does not
try and patch up the wounded soldier. On a successful TQ need to spend a turn in contact with the Tunnel-Spot to
test one light wound is removed from the unit. A single neutralise it from play. In addition if any Viet Cong troops
Medic may only remove one Light Wound per turn. This are currently hidden in the
represents the Medics patching up lightly wounded soldiers
and getting them back into the firing line, an often vital role
especially when in defence.

US troops question suspected VC

insurgents. (Piers Brand)

Rats
Tunnel

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 New or Modified Rules

Tunnels they are removed from play on a “1” or a “2” on a Kit Carson Scout
D6. If the scenario dictates that the “Tunnel Spots” Kit Carson Scouts were former Viet Cong who turned
represent Hot Spot entry points and not an actual tunnel against their previous comrades and were employed by the
complex, the Tunnel Rat has no effect and the unit US/ARVN/ANZAC/ROK as scouts and informers. They
must spend a turn in contact with the “Tunnel-Spot” to proved particularly adept at spotting VC traps, caches and
neutralise it as normal.

Pointman
Some US/ARVN/ANZAC/ROK soldiers excelled in the
role of Pointman, leading their squads through the terrain,
taking extra care to spot the enemy and his traps. While
moving at Tactical speed, a Pointman may re-roll any failed
Troop Quality check to spot enemy Booby Traps.
Units with a Pointman attached cannot be Ambushed.
A Pointman also increases his Optimum Range to the
next die type for the purposes of spotting concealed VC.
Thus, if the Pointman has a Troop Quality of D8, he will spot
VC in cover as if he had a Troop Quality of D10, or out to 10.”
Free World Forces may have one Pointman per Platoon
unless otherwise stated in a specific scenario.

Pointma
n

Marine Force Recon, 1967

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AMBUSH VALLEY

hiding places. A Free World Force may have one Kit Carson
Scout per platoon. Scenarios will indicate whether a Kit
Carson scout is in play.
Units with a Kit Carson Scout attached cannot be
Ambushed.
A unit with a Kit Carson Scout may perform a Troop
Quality check against Booby Traps, even when moving
at the “Rapid” speed as the scout will quickly spot likely
traps and VC field signs. At “Tactical” speed the Scout will
receive a re-roll to the Troop Quality check should he fail a
roll. At Rapid speed, the scout may not re-roll a failed test. A militar
y workin
g dog o
A Kit Carson scout may also make a Troop Quality n point
check to spot any VC in line of sight, even those in cover
outside his Optimum Range.
Unfortunately, there is always the chance that the Kit Military Working Dog teams in Ambush Valley follow
Carson Scout may not be reliable. On the first turn that a the basic rules presented for them in Force on Force and
unit containing a Kit Carson Scout comes under fire, the have the following additional effects on play:
scout must immediately take a Morale check. If he fails the If a Scout Dog fails its Troop Quality check to spot a
check, the scout runs off into the bushes never to be seen Booby Trap, it receives a re-roll. If the re-roll is successful,
again. This check is only performed once per game. the Booby Trap is spotted and avoided. If the re-roll fails,
the Booby Trap is not detected.
Scout Dogs also receive a re-roll for a failed attempt to
detect an Ambush.
Automatically spots VC units within 8”
+1 to all TQ rolls related to moving or dispersing
civilians

Suicide Squads
Certain VC units were designated as suicide squads and
fear of death in combat was not an issue to them. These
units often took part in important attacks on enemy
facilities, such as those against the US Embassy during the
on Scout
Kit Cars Tet Offensive and the attacks on the Da Nang airbase.
Any unit designated as a “Suicide Squad” in the scenario
need never take a Morale test.
Scout Dog Teams
Scout Dogs were used extensively by US forces in Vietnam. NVA Sappers
Their keen senses kept many a patrol from walking into an NVA Sappers are teams designated for the initial assaults
ambush or alerted OPs of approaching VC infiltrators. on Firebases or high value targets. They may re-roll failed

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 New or Modified Rules

Morale checks. They follow all other rules that apply to VC, Air Defense Environment
though, including “Lack of Initiative”. The use of these With Vietnam having only one side fielding air assets, only
troops will generally be specified by the scenario. the air defence environment for non-Free World forces
Sappers and Claymores/Flares needs to be evaluated. In general, the majority of games
Sappers were notoriously effective at bypassing defensive would feature No or Light Air Defences unless specifically
traps such as Claymore Mines, trip flares, and improvised stated in the scenario.
alarms. If a Sapper unit is the target of one of these defensive
measures, it may make a Troop Quality test. A successful Spotter Aircraft
check indicates that the unit was able to avoid the defensive Both fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft were often
measure and it was not triggered. employed as spotters and forward observers for units and
Some sappers were so adroit at detecting and avoiding artillery batteries on the ground.
Claymore Mines that they would turn the mines around
to face the defenders, who would receive a lethal surprise Spotter Aircraft During
when they squeezed the clackers to detonate their mine. Daylight Hours
To represent this, sappers who have successfully avoided a In daytime operations, spotter aircraft can be used as “real”
Claymore Mine may opt to make a second Troop Quality Forward Observers to call in fire missions or air strikes. The
test with -2 to their die roll. If the test is successful, the unit Spotter Aircraft always counts as a Tactical Air Controller
that fired the claymore receives the attack instead of the and a Forward Observer and gains +1 to all Troop Quality
sappers. If they fail the test, the sappers receive the claymore tests to request air and artillery support.
attack after all. Spotter aircraft can also spot enemy troop movements
on the ground, no matter how stealthy that enemy might
VEHICLE RULES: AIRCRAFT be. To reflect this, enemy units may not make Out of
For the most part, aircraft in Ambush Valley adhere to the Combat moves if a spotter aircraft is able to make a
rules presented in Force on Force such as the rules for successful Troop Quality test at the beginning of a turn.
airmobile operations. A few notable exceptions are found Note that enemies inside tunnels are not subject to this rule.
below, however.
Spotter Aircraft During
NVA anti-aircraft guns at work. (Piers Brand) Nighttime Hours
Most fixed wing aircraft during the Vietnam conflict lacked
the night vision capabilities to function as effective spotters
during hours of darkness. A notable (and notorious) exception
was the AC-47D Spooky Gunship, and (from 1967 on) the
OV-1 Mohawk and OV-10A Bronco. Some helicopters were
equipped with powerful Xenon spotlights that could be used
in both the visible and infrared spectrum.
During hours of darkness, helicopters equipped with
Xenon spotlights may still block enemy Out of Contact
Movement, and they may detect hidden units, by making a
successful Troop Quality test at the beginning of the turn.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

It was a common practice to pair a gunship from a Red

Team with a Loach from a White Team to form a Pink Team.
Pink Teams were “hunter/killer” teams that specialized in
locating, fixing, and destroying enemy positions. They were
brutally efficient at this task.
Typically, a Loach would fly “low and slow” over an area
in search of the enemy. The low flying Loach made a
tempting target that few enemy troops on the ground could
resist. They often gave their position away by firing at the
little bird. This was usually a fatal mistake. The Loach
round
troops on the g would circle and drop a smoke grenade to mark the enemy
ing
support position and then dart away, its rapid, jerky movement
Spooky
making it a difficult target at best.
They may also engage ground Once the scout chopper was clear, a gunship would
targets in gun-runs with no night-fighting penalties. swoop in from above and orient on the smoke. Chain guns
AC-47D Spooky gunships, and (from 1967 on) the and rocket salvos told the rest of the story, which usually
OV-1 and OV-10A, were equipped with the latest in night culminated with a dead or scattered enemy unit.
vision and heat sensing technology of the day and were quite If a Pink Team located a significant enemy force, an
effective night-time predators. As a result, these aircraft Aerorifle platoon might be sent to make contact while the
deployed over the battlefield at night prevent enemy Out of Pink Team provided support fire and engaged “leakers.”
Contact Movement (although this does not apply to enemy If the contact proved merited, more Pink Teams and
units in tunnels) and detect hidden units with a successful Aerorifle platoons might be deployed to the area to “Pile
TROOP QUALITY check as during the day, and may engage On” the enemy.
ground targets at night without night fighting penalties.

Red, White & Pink Teams

Air Cavalry units often operated beyond the range of friendly
artillery. Helicopter gunships often acted in support of Air
Cavalry operations to provide them with “aerial artillery”
support in the form of rockets and withering hails of lead.
These gunships were organized in two ship teams, known as
Red Teams.
Pairs of OH-6A “Loach” spotter choppers were used to
locate and fix enemy activity on the ground (despite the
rapid advances in electronic sensor technology during the
Vietnam era, Loaches and the Mark I eyeball proved to be
the most effective “sensor platform” of the war). Loaches A Pink T
eam hun
were also organized in pairs, which were referred to as ting Charlie
White Teams.

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 New or Modified Rules

Pink Team Operations

White Teams and Read Teams are covered by the rules for
Spotter Aircraft above and the normal Helicopter Gun Run
rules in Force on Force, but Pink Teams require a little extra
attention.
Loaches move very slowly across the battlefield, often at
speeds of less than 80 knots. Rather than cut a scorching
strip across the table as fast burners and Cobra gunships
do, the Loach ambles along over the table at low altitude.
Loaches begin play at the controlling force’s friendly table
edge and may move 18” per turn while conducting Pink
Team operations. The Loach’s partner, a Cobra gunship is
left off the table and is assumed to be loitering at altitude
waiting to swoop down when its little friend has fixed
enemy positions for it to destroy. A PBR on patrol. (Piers Brand)
Loaches are a powerful temptation to ground troops.
To reflect this, all Hidden units must make a Troop Quality Contesting this would be vital to any successful counter-
test or reveal themselves by firing at any Loach that comes insurgency effort.
within 18” of their position. Such units are automatically By 1966, Military Assistance Command – Vietnam
spotted by both ground units and the Loach’s partner gunship. (MACV) had begun planning for what was at the time
Once a Loach has been engaged by the enemy (and referred to as the Mekong Delta Mobile Afloat Force.
the enemy locations thus spotted and fixed), it is removed By the end of 1966, this force, which would be a joint US
from the table after all ground fire against it is resolved. Navy–US Army endeavor was approved. The force would
The Loach (assuming it survived the ground fire) is now consist of US Navy River Assault Squadrons combined with
loitering off the table’s edge, waiting for the all clear from US Army infantry units with specialized riverine training.
the gunship to resume hunting for targets. Some Army personnel were sent to the USMC Amphibious
After ground fire against the Loach has been resolved, Assault School to receive instruction.
the Cobra gunship may immediately engage ground targets The US Army component consisted of elements of the 9th
using the standard Force on Force helicopter Gun Run rules. Infantry Division, the only division outright activated during
Once all visible targets have been destroyed, the Loach the conflict. As with other units deploying to Vietnam, it left
may return to resume hunting targets for the Cobra, which its 106mm recoilless rifles and other anti-tank weapons
is removed from the board until fresh enemy positions have behind. Its 4.2” M30 heavy mortars were retained. Otherwise
been fixed. its organization was identical to other standard leg infantry
units mentioned in this section.
BOATS The US Navy component, Task Force 117, operated a
By the start of the buildup of US forces in Vietnam in 1965, mix of boats specifically developed or modified for riverine
it became obvious that there was a need for additional warfare. The majority of the types were converted from
forces in southern III Corps and in IV Corps. Insurgents LCM6 landing craft. The extensive modifications allowed
heavily relied on the Mekong River and its tributaries, along the creation of Armored Troop Carriers (ATCs), Monitors
with the vast canal network to move supplies and men. (MONs), and Command and Control Boats (CCBs).

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The ATCs functioned not only as troop carriers, but also The only boat used by the Mobile Riverine Force that
as re-fuelers, or even mobile hospitals. Some, known as was designed from the hull up for its mission was the
ATC(H) were fitted with small helicopter landing pads to Armored Support Patrol Boat (ASPB). The ASPB was a
allow evacuation of casualties, or in the cases of those relatively fast shallow draft watercraft with two armored
configured as hospitals, delivery of them. turrets, each with a 20mm cannon. These boats acted to
Monitors received their name from the civil war Union secure the flanks of other elements of the Navy River
Navy ironclad ship of the same name, to which they bore Divisions, and often acted as mine-sweepers.
some basic resemblance. Unlike the largely open troop Other boats sometimes participated in MRF operations.
carriers, Monitors had a large turret forward, first with a River Patrol Boats (PBRs) and Fast Patrol Craft (PCFs;
40mm Bofors cannon, and a direct fire mortar in a pit better known as Swift Boats) were sometimes called in to
between the turret and the pilot house support missions or respond to enemy presence. These
in the rear. Later variants took craft, however, were assigned to the Navy’s Task Force 116,
turrets from M132A1 flamethrower working to interdict enemy movements non-only in the
carriers and mounted them on the rivers and canals, but also in the immediate coastal areas, as
forward deck, replacing the main part of Operation Game Warden.
turret, becoming known as Hovercrafts were also tested, both by the US Navy and
Zippos after the popular the US Army. The Navy tested a more or less off-the-shelf
lighter. Even later on, the variant of the SR.N5 (a craft built initially by Westland
main turret was Aircraft and later by the British Hovercraft Company).
replaced outright Navy craft were designated as Patrol Air Cushion Vehicles
with the main turret (PACVs) and featured a gun turret on the top of the main
with one from an cabin identical to that on the PBRs. 7.62mm M60 machine
LVTH6 with its 105mm guns were mounted at the side windows, while either a
howitzer. A large bar 7.62mm M134 “Minigun” or two .50-caliber M2 machine
armor screen was guns were mounted in the front cabin fixed forward.
fabricated around it. The Army’s variant, a modified SR.N5 type designed by
CCB boats were Bell Helicopter, was referred to simply as the Air Cushion
configured similarly to Vehicle (ACV). It featured two separate gun turrets, each with
Monitors, but featured only a single .50-caliber M2 machine gun, on top of the cabin.
a communications van Weapons were also mounted in the forward cabin and at the
where the mortar pit was side windows. One of the three craft tested also featured a
on Monitors. The ATCs, 40mm M75 automatic grenade launcher in the M5 helicopter
Monitors, and CCBs, armament subsystem, but field modified to mount on the
all shared the same armored forward hull of the craft. Miniguns were also sometimes
pilothouse arrangement, with substituted for the weapons in the top turrets. Hovercrafts
three additional turrets, each in general, while fast and capable, were also found to be
with a 20mm cannon. extremely noisy, making their utility limited against an elusive
enemy. The Navy had no more than six PACVs in country at
Petty Officer 1st any one time, while the US Army only operated three ACVs,
Class, US Navy, 1966 destroying two in the course of operations.

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 New or Modified Rules

On 16 February 1967, the first mission of what would Tactical movement. Passengers may use Rapid movement
be referred to as the Mobile Riverine Force, Operation to board a boat, however. Boats may not move in the same
River Raider I, began. The MRF subsequently conducted turn the unload passengers.
operations through 1969, before the bulk of the 9th Infantry Units may only use Suppression Fire or fire as a Reaction
Division was redeployed as part of the acceleration on the turn they dismount.
of Vietnamization. 3rd Brigade, 9th Infantry Division Combat with boats is resolved in the same manner as
remained as a separate entity for an additional period, but regular vehicle combat, but the Boat Damage Result Table
the Mobile Riverine Force had effectively ended. is used to determine the result of hits.
The South Vietnamese Navy (VNN) had also operated
a number of riverine craft since its creation. These vessels, Boats Damage Result Table
organized into River Assault Groups, conducted similar Table Results
operations to the MRF. As time went on, most of the Boat Suppressed! The boat has been hit by fire that, while
outdated vessels inherited from the French were replaced not damaging, is definitely disturbing! The boat receives a
by American designs. With the end of the MRF in 1969, -1 die shift on Reaction Tests and Firepower for the
many of its remaining vessels were transfered to the VNN, duration of the turn.
and also to the Marine Nationale Khmer (Khmer National Mobility Hit: Half Movement: Boats Tactical and Rapid
Navy) in Cambodia. Speed are reduced by half. A subsequent Half Movement
We have included a number of boats to provide players hit on the same boat Immobilizes it.
with the chance to field this unique element of the Vietnam Bridge Damaged: -1 RT: The boat’s command area is
War. damaged. The boat suffers a -1 to Reaction Test rolls for the
Boats have individual movement speeds determined by duration of the game.
their type. Weapons Damaged: Half FP: The Firepower for all the
Boats must be within 2” of a shoreline to disembark boat’s weapons is cut in half. If a boat suffers two such
passengers. Passengers unloading from a boat may only use results, consider it a Main Gun K/O.

LIGHT BOAT CLASS DAMAGE TABLE

Die Heavy Gun
Roll Light Gun Medium Gun
1 Boat Suppressed! Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Mobility Hit – Half Movement
2 Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Mobility Hit – Half Movement Immobilized
3 Mobility Hit – Half Movement Immobilized Main Gun K/O
4 Immobilized Main Gun K/O Boat Kill – Casualty Check
5 Main Gun K/O Boat Kill – Casualty Check Boat Kill – Casualty Check
6 Boat Kill – Casualty Check Boat Kill – Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check!
7 Boat Kill – Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
8 Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
9 Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
10 Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check! Catastrophic Kill!
11 Sunk! Casualty Check! Catastrophic Kill! Catastrophic Kill!
12 Catastrophic Kill Catastrophic Kill! Catastrophic Kill!

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AMBUSH VALLEY

MEDIUM BOAT CLASS DAMAGE TABLE

Die Heavy Gun
Roll Light Gun Medium Gun
1 Boat Suppressed! Boat Suppressed! Main Gun Damaged – Half FP
2 Boat Suppressed! Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Mobility Hit – Half Movement
3 Boat Suppressed! Mobility Hit – Half Movement Immobilized
4 Bridge Damaged (-1 RT Die Roll) Immobilized Main Gun K/O
5 Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Main Gun K/O Boat Kill – Casualty Check
6 Half Movement Boat Kill – Casualty Check Boat Kill – Casualty Check
7 Main Gun K/O Boat Kill – Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check!
8 Immobilized Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
9 Half Movement + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
10 Main Gun K/O + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check! Sunk! Casualty Check!
11 Immobilized + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check! Catastrophic Kill!
12 Boat Kill – Casualty Check Catastrophic Kill! Catastrophic Kill!

HEAVY BOAT CLASS DAMAGE TABLE

Die Heavy Gun
Roll Light Gun Medium Gun
1 Boat Suppressed! Boat Suppressed! Boat Suppressed!
2 Boat Suppressed! Boat Suppressed! Main Gun Damaged – Half FP
3 Boat Suppressed! Boat Suppressed! Mobility Hit – Half Movement
4 Bridge Damaged (-1 RT Die Roll) Bridge Damaged (-1 RT Die Roll) Immobilized
5 Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Main Gun Damaged – Half FP Main Gun K/O
6 Half Movement Half Movement Boat Kill – Casualty Check
7 Main Gun K/O Main Gun K/O Boat Kill – Casualty Check
8 Immobilized Immobilized Sunk! Casualty Check!
9 Half Movement + Casualty Check Half Movement + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check!
10 Main Gun K/O + Casualty Check Main Gun K/O + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check!
11 Immobilized + Casualty Check Immobilized + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check!
12 Weapon K/O + Casualty Check Sunk! Casualty Check! Catastrophic Kill!

Immobilized: The boat has lost all power and may not pass are moved to the nearest riverbank and within 2” of
move for the duration of the game, it drifts 4” per turn in each other.
the direction of the river current. Catastrophic Kill: The boat explodes dramatically,
Main Gun K/O: The boat’s main weapon is damaged and throwing flaming wreckage in all directions. All crew and
may not fire for the duration of the game. passengers are instantly killed.
Boat Kill: The boat has been disabled and rendered combat Casualty Check: Where Casualty Checks are called for,
ineffective. Make casualty checks for all crew and passengers. make a Troop Quality Check for each crewman and
The boat is moved to the nearest riverbank and the survivors passenger in the boat. Those that pass the check are
placed within 2” of the boat. unhurt. Those that fail are casualties. A first aid check must
Brew Up: The boat “brews up” in a ball of flame. The boat be made to determine the extent of their injuries. Those
is destroyed. Crew and Passengers make survival checks suffering Serious Injuries are deemed drowned and count
with a -1 die shift to their Troop Quality. The crewmen that as KIA for all purposes.

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 New or Modified Rules

Secondary Hits: When a boat suffers a damage result that Kill result), make crew casualty/AI damage checks for its
is already in effect (i.e. a second Immobilized or Main Gun crew and apply no additional effects.

EXAMPLE BOATS
Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Movement Firepower Crew Notes
Armor Armor Armor Armor
May carry one fireteam of up to
Small Sampan L 6”/12” per turn N/A 1D6 1D6 1D6 1D6 5
5 models
May carry up to ten models. May also
cross any flat terrain but may not cross
Twin .50s: AP:4/AT:1
obstacles such as woods, jungle, walls
May fire to front and
Patrol Air etc. It may cross hills, dirt banks around
side of boat. Crew
Cushion Boat L 12”/24” per turn 2D8 1D8 1D8 1D6 4 paddy fields, and swamps.
Weapons/MGs: AP:1
(PACV) Hard to Hit: All attacks against the
addition to front and
PACV are at –1 firepower dice when
side of boat.
moving at Rapid speed due to the boats
high-speed maneuvering.
Twin .50s: AP:4/AT:1
May fire to front and
side of boat.
May carry one fireteam of up to five
.50 with 40mm GL:
models. All Gunners count as in
PBR Mk1 & II M 9”/18” per turn AP:3/AT:2 May fire to 2D8 2D8 2D8 1D8 5
protective cover when fired upon
side and rear of boat.
(+2 Defense dice)
Crew Weapons/MGs:
AP:1 addition to any
fire arc.
.50 Cal turret:
AP:3/AT:1 May fire to
front and its side of
boat. May carry up to 25 models.
Armored Cannon turret: Unsinkable: All damage rolls suffer a
H 6”/12” per turn 4D10 3D10 3D10 2D10 8
Troop Carrier AP:4/AT:3 May fire in -1 to represent the boat’s resilience to
all arcs. attacks.
Crew Weapons/MGs:
AP:1 addition to any
fire arc.

A PACV cruises upstream. (Piers Brand) An armored troop carrier unloads US troops
during a riverine assault. (Piers Brand)

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 A PLACE CALLED VIETNAM
The Vietnamese trace their history to the formation of a The modern South Vietnamese state came into being in
civilization in the area of the Red River Delta. Their lands 1954, after the abortive attempt by the French to maintain a
were occupied and administered by the Chinese for roughly hold on what had previously been a major foreign colony.
a thousand years between the 1st and the 10th century of Under the Geneva Accords that ended the fighting between
the Common Era. After achieving their independence in the French and the communist-inspired nationalist movement
939 CE, they steadily expanded south, taking over first the led by Ho Chi Minh, two states would be created from what
Kingdom of Champa and then ejecting fleeing Chams and had previously existed as the French administrative regions of
Khmer from the Mekong Delta, at that point part of the Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. The Republic of Vietnam
Khmer Empire. Chinese attempts to restore dominion in in the south and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the
the region were largely repulsed, but the Ming Dynasty north were to be separated by a demilitarized zone centered at
managed to control Vietnam for a short period during the the seventeen parallel, with the understanding that a state
15th century. By the end of the 15th century, the Vietnamese referendum take place on unification soon thereafter.
Empire had again become independent and featured In the Republic of Vietnam, the government that had
borders very similar to its post-1975 incarnation. been established by the French, centered on a largely
During the 19th century, the French arrived in the ceremonial monarchy and democratic parliament became
region and by the end of the century had turned Vietnam the official government of the state. The ineffectual
into an important Far East colony. A “civilizing project” emperor Bao Dai lasted only two years before his Prime
saw Vietnam separated into three separate colonies, Minister Ngo Dinh Diem managed to consolidate power
Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina. While Vietnam from his opponents, dissolve the monarchy, and establish
experienced World War I from afar, the French an almost neo-fascist police state. Public support for
capitulation during World War II saw Japanese occupation reunification, which almost undoubtedly would have
with the retention of a pro-Vichy French government. In resulted in the establishment of the communist-inspired
1945, the Japanese deposed the French government in government in the north taking control, is debatable.
their Indochina colonies, promising freedom for help However, it is clear that Ngo Dinh Diem left nothing to
against the advancing allies. After the end of World War chance, corrupting the required referendum to a large
II, the French returned and attempted to reassert their degree and ensuring the continued division of the country.
authority, leading to a counter-insurgency campaign that Ngo Dinh Diem continued to consolidate authority
was almost entirely funded by the United States at its end. after 1956, pursuing a populist national development
By 1954, a combination of broad military stalemate, program, but allowing for little public dissent. That Diem
a major defeat at Dien Bien Phu, growing domestic was a devout Catholic, a decided minority in the majority
opposition, and concerns over the future of Algeria, led Buddhist nation, and that nepotism was a key feature of
the French to seek a negotiated settlement and effectively his government, meant that discontent with his regime
quit Southeast Asia. quickly began to soar. His violent repression of protesting
The post-World War II history of the state of the Buddhist monks during the 1960s meant that support for
Republic of Vietnam, better known as South Vietnam (and his regime was virtually non-existent by 1963, even in the
not to be confused with the Democratic Republic of United States. Diem was assassinated in a violent military
Vietnam, or North Vietnam), is tumultuous and complex. coup in 1963, along with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the

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 A Place Called Vietnam

head of the state’s secret police apparatus, and other Chinese gave their blessings to his plans for resistance in the
members of his family. areas then encompassing French Indochina. Their hope was
While the subsequent governments were perhaps less that Ho Chi Minh’s resistance would prove to be a thorn in the
autocratic, corruption, patronage, and nepotism remained side of the Japanese, leading to a need for them to divert
a key element of South Vietnam’s political scene. Between resources further south. The US Office of Strategic Services
the coup against Diem and the establishment of a new (OSS), a precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
government under President Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime had similar beliefs and actively supported Ho’s group.
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, there were numerous coups and With the end of World War II, Ho Chi Minh’s organization
countercoups. The government was effectively run by a attempted to establish an independent Vietnamese
junta formed around the Diem coup leader, Duong Van government, but found that the British occupation forces in
Minh, otherwise known as Big Minh. the south had no intention of allowing this. The British sought
The government of Thieu and Ky faced similar concerns to immediately neutralize Ho and his organization. The
about internal unrest, not only from the government of British went so far as to rearm
North Vietnam, but from within its own government and Japanese prisoners of war to
military. After a decade of battling essentially form a sense assist the occupation forces.
of national unity and then defend it against the forces of the While the insurgents were
North, South Vietnam found itself in a conventional civil dispersed, they were not
war that lasted two years and ended with the fall of Saigon destroyed or broken. The
in early 1975. Soon thereafter, South Vietnam ceased to Nationalist Chinese forces
exist, forcibly reunified with the rest of the nation. in occupying the north
The history of the state of the Democratic Republic of were indifferent to
Vietnam, better known as North Vietnam (which later the activities of the
reunified with the southern portion of the country to form communist-inspired
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), is just as complex and rebels, being far more
nuanced as that of the short lived South Vietnamese state. concerned about the
As with the South Vietnamese state, the North Vietnamese coming storm in China.
state came into being in 1954, after the success of communist- They made no serious
inspired insurgents against the French and their colonial efforts to derail Ho’s
forces. These rebels, known popularly as the Viet Minh, had activities and in some cases
come into being as a resistance organization to the Japanese enterprising units sold
organization of what had been French colonial possessions in weapons to his organization.
Southeast Asia. By the time the French
Their leader, the unimposing, but charismatic Ho Chi returned they quickly found
Minh had agitated for increased rights for those in French themselves engaged with Viet
colonies prior to World War II. He returned to the region Minh. After almost a decade of
shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, running afoul of combat, they suffered a major
Chinese Nationalist authorities, already engaging their own defeat in 1954 that effectively
domestic communist-inspired insurgency. drove them out of the country.
The Japanese invasion, however, prompted the government
of Chiang Kai Shek to release Ho Chi Minh. The Nationalist NVA Regular, 1968

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AMBUSH VALLEY

After the Geneva Accords split the region into two regular military units. The PAVN made modernization a
nations along the seventeenth Parallel, a mass migration clear prerogative and quickly began to source military aid and
occurred. Those in the north wishing to travel south were advisory assistance from friendly communist powers. By the
allowed to do so and vice versa. This was also supposed to 1970s, Vietnam had one of the most extensive air defense
allow for the evacuation of remnant insurgents in the south networks in the world and had transformed from a primarily
to the north, as per the agreements. However, military light infantry army to a largely mechanized, combined arms
elements remained in the south and went to ground, in force. The fighting that occurred first in 1972 during the
many ways to protect against the possibility of irregularities Nguyen Hue Offensive (known to most Americans as the
in the referendum on reunification. This turned out to be Easter Invasion) and in 1974 during the Ho Chi Minh
an important decision. Campaign that led to the end of the South Vietnamese state,
Those in the south soon formed the National Liberation reflected a mid to high intensity conventional conflict as
Front (NLF), and its associated military wing, the People’s opposed to a guerilla insurgency.
Liberation Army (PLA). Later the PLA was renamed After the war and reunification, at least some members
as the People’s Liberation Armed Force (PLAF). These of the NLF and veterans of the PLAF found that there was
organizations are better known as the Viet Cong. While very little space in the new administration for them and left
receiving a certain level of administrative and technical the country, becoming outspoken critics of its leaders. Post-
support from the DRV, the NLF did truly exist as a separate unification Vietnamese histories conspicuously left out the
entity. It had similar, but not identical goals to the DRV contributions of the NLF, and those in the south in general,
government. Between 1956 and 1965 it recruited most of to the overall cause of reunification, co-opting the western
its force locally in South Vietnam and managed the perception that the NLF and those in the North had been
majority of its logistics by itself. The DRV’s Central Office inseparable entities.
in South Vietnam (COSVN) was not even established until
1959, though technically the PLA did not appear until 1960. THE ADVISORY PERIOD
The authorities in the DRV always looked for ways to keep (1963–64)
the NLF and PLAF at arm’s length. The period prior to the introduction of major United States
After 1965, the DRV began sending larger numbers of ground forces in 1965 is often referred to in English as the
regulars from its own army to help replace casualties and Advisory Period. The US Army, for example, awards
shortly thereafter was infiltrating entire units. These units participation credit to individual units for a campaign in
operated in concert with those of the PLAF, but had Vietnam known simply as “Advisory.” It is determined to
independent command structures, a reality never fully have been conducted from 15 March 1962 until 7 March
grasped by contemporary intelligence sources. After the 1965. Both the term and the definition of the US Army
disastrous outcomes of the PLAF offensives in late 1967 and campaign are, however, not entirely accurate.
early 1968, culminating in the events surrounding the Tet Firstly, the time line of the US Army campaign, only one
holiday in February 1968, the People’s Army of Vietnam of the services involved in advisory efforts that continued
(PAVN; better known as the North Vietnamese Army or throughout the conflict, is truncated. Ngo Dinh Diem’s
NVA) began to take the dominant role. government enjoyed generous support from the US by the
While the NLF and the PLAF in the south conducted their time he had consolidated his authority in 1956. The United
guerilla war and in many ways paved the way for the eventual States had become the primary sponsor of the French
reunification, in the North the forces that had ousted the efforts before the Geneva Accords and had steadily replaced
French were consolidated and formed into more traditional, them as the main advisors to the South Vietnamese military

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 A Place Called Vietnam

after 1954. There had been military assistance advisory Covert operations, such as the insertion of agents
group established to support the French effort in 1950, into North Vietnam, as well as raiding of coastal facilities,
which was renamed as the Military Assistance Advisory were also conducted. The United States provided generous
Group – Vietnam (MAAG-V) in 1955. The 1962 date in the support for these operations, which became part of a
US Army campaign most likely represented the formation larger program referred to as Operation Plan 34A or
of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV), the OPLAN 34A, officially begun in 1961. The objective of this
successor to MAAG-V, in that year. operation was to coerce the North Vietnamese into ceasing
Secondly, the term is centered on the American their support for guerillas in the south. Support included
perspective. Though US military personnel were engaged the use of electronic intelligence assets of the US Navy off
primarily in advisory roles during this period, the Republic of the Vietnamese coast. An attack on one of these vessels, the
Vietnam was waging a civil war against communist USS Maddox, in August 1964, followed by a second alleged
insurgents, receiving a certain amount of support from attack on the same ship, provided a pretense for an
outside parties, notably the Democratic Republic of Vietnam escalation of US involvement in the counter-insurgency
and its allies. Covert operations were also being directed operations in South Vietnam. The true mission of these
against North Vietnam. The varied activities of ships was not disclosed to the American public at the time.
unconventional units such as the US Army Special Forces
were also not placed under the purview of MACV until THE DEFENSE,
November 1962, as part of Operation Switchback. COUNTEROFFENSIVE, AND
During this period, the majority THE END (1965–75)
of combat operations were In March 1965, the initial elements of III Marine Amphibious
conducted by the South Force arrived in Vietnam. This is the date used by the US
Vietnamese military, with the Army to mark the end of the advisory period. By May 1965,
focus being primarily on the initial elements of the US Army’s 173rd Airborne
operations within its Brigade (Separate) had also arrived in Vietnam. With these
deployments, a fundamental shift in the conflict in Vietnam
had begun. What had once been largely the responsibility
of the Republic of Vietnam, had become the responsibility of
borders. United States military the United States. At their peak, US military forces in the
personnel in country were region would swell to more than a half a million personnel.
primarily concerned with the By the beginning of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, the South
advisory mission or providing Vietnamese would claim almost a million people under arms,
support, notably in the form though a large portion of these were members of localized
of helicopter transport, militias, most under-trained and under-equipped.
to the South Vietnamese. While the South Vietnamese and United States bore the
Advisory and other military brunt of the fighting between 1965 and 1971, a number of
support came from all the other countries deployed large military contingents. These
major US military services. forces were deployed mostly at the behest of the United States,
who offered large aid packages and other incentives for
US Special Forces,
Reconnaissance participation by its regional allies. These forces were grouped
Team Zeta, 1968 under the moniker of Free World Armed Forces (FWAF).

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The contributions of the combined Australian and New conventional and unconventional warfare. The other
Zealand forces to the conflict are relatively well reported, as was between the application of force and the application
are those of the Republic of Korea (better known as South of what is today known as soft-power. The latter was
Korea). The contributions of the Kingdom of Thailand and generally referred to at the time as “winning the
the Republic of the Philippines are less well known. Fear of hearts and minds.” There was a constant debate over
involvement by the People’s Republic of China meant that the best application of resources throughout the conflict,
the contingent from the Republic of China (also known as and it largely centered on these two issues. General
Taiwan) was purely advisory. FWAF contributions peaked in Westmoreland, head of MACV, was said to have
1969, with almost seventy-thousand personnel deployed complained that if he had not been required to divert so
from all six nations. much energy to “pacification,” the official term used for
After 1965, the conflict itself took on two extremely soft-power programs combined with limited military
important dichotomies. One of these was between action, he could have won the war.
The result of these ideological conflicts was a myriad of
The fight for Hill 861A, 1968 different programs, initiatives, military strategies, and the

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 A Place Called Vietnam

like, often being implemented with little or no coordination. The Tet offensive did much to promote a change in US
One of the most fanciful imagined the construction of policy toward the conflict in Vietnam. Though it had been
a Maginot Line style fortified position running along hoped from the very beginning that US support would
the demilitarized zone separating the two Vietnams, and eventually provide the space for the Republic of Vietnam
continuing along the seventeenth parallel into Laos. A no to take over its own defense and security responsibility,
less grand program was that of the Strategic Hamlets, which after 1968 such efforts were accelerated. The term used to
sought to eliminate the difficulty in separating guerillas describe the policy, “Vietnamization,” showed just how
from the overall population. Corruption and neglect did not much the conflict had become the responsibility of the
prevent the relocation of almost a million villagers, often United States. In January 1973, after reaching an agreement
by force. with North Vietnamese negotiators in Paris, and with
Actual military action was focused on locating and strong objections from the Republic of Vietnam, the United
eliminating enemy forces and materiel. These operations States signed an agreement effectively ending offensive
were often phrased as counteroffensives against insurgent operations against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.
forces. The term was used to describe the response to the What followed was a rapid deterioration of the
major offensive launched by the PLAF and the PAVN agreement with regards to the Republic of Vietnam.
around the Vietnamese lunar New Year holiday, known as Learning from the mistakes they had made during the
Tet, in 1968. It was used to describe the response to a far Nguyen Hue Offensive in 1972, the North Vietnamese
more limited operation during Tet in 1969 and for the US launched a new campaign to reunify the country in 1974,
intervention into Cambodia in 1970. A euphemism, the named after the founder of the state, Ho Chi Minh. By the
term belies the fact that the operations of the US military in end of April 1975, the capital of the Republic of Vietnam,
South Vietnam were generally of a reactive nature. Saigon, had been occupied and the war was over.

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 UNIT ORGANIZATIONS
Standing military forces devote endless effort and shelves
of carefully indexed manuals to record the structure,
equipment, and capabilities of their organizations. Looking
at a Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE) for a unit
gives one a fine feeling for military precision. Units are
clearly defined and soldiers and gear are evenly distributed.
Everything and everyone has its place and symmetry is king!
Unfortunately, the world presented by TOEs exists
primarily within those very TOEs. The concept of “mission
based organization” has been gaining steam as an official
concept throughout the 20th century and has probably been
an unofficial fact of military life since man first started writing
US troops in contact with the enemy.
down how many spearmen should be in a “proper” formation. (Piers Brand)
The organizations presented here and elsewhere in this
book are rough guidelines for the forces they represent, not responded to the experience of the Korean War and the
inviolable “army lists” handed down from on high. During new reality of the Cold War differently than it had at the
the conflicts in Southeast Asia, it was not uncommon for end of World War II. Its peacetime military was larger and
commanders to dramatically alter the structure of their units decidedly better trained and equipped than it had been in
to fit the environment. An attempt has been made to explain the past. Among the ranks of the non-commissioned
such changes in the text. However, since in many cases each officers were men who had in some cases served in Korea.
squad might have had its own unique interpretation, it is Some had even served in World War II, then a not overly
impossible to detail every possible variation. distant memory.
However, by the end of the 1960s combat had taken its
THE UNITED STATES toll. More and more draftees were being called up to replace
Between the arrival of the first formalized advisory losses. Many of the more senior NCOs had finally gotten
elements in 1955 and the withdrawal of the last embassy to the age of retirement. Domestic concerns and foreign
personnel and security forces in 1975, the United States policy confusion led to issues in-theater.
deployed almost the full spectrum of its military capacity to What this means in game terms is that for US infantry
Southeast Asia. However, it was primarily an infantryman’s units, as well as other non-Elite US units, depending on the
war. All units in this category as generally rated as time frame you are gaming, feel free to change the morale
Troop Quality D8 and Morale D8. The quality of training modifier as you see fit. How dramatic the change is can be
throughout the conflict remained more or less the same. left up to an agreement between players.
The level of morale fluctuated widely. In this chapter are descriptions of basic US Army and
When the US first deployed ground combat forces to USMC infantry elements, more specialized formations (not
Vietnam in 1965, the soldiers and marines that made up including special operations forces, etc.), and a description
the bulk of these initial forces were perhaps some of the of the support assets available to the various units above
finest that the country had ever sent abroad. The US had company level.

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 Unit Organizations

Author’s Note: TOEs and MTOEs

Throughout this section and the others dealing with US and have often submitted MTOEs for their units that
military forces, you will see the term TOE and MTOE. better reflect the situation on the ground. Official
These stand for Table of Order and Equipment, as already MTOEs were common in Vietnam. Unofficial changes
noted, and Modified Table of Order and Equipment. The not covered by these MTOEs were also common.
US Army to this day has specific numbered TOEs for For simplicity the TOEs and MTOEs are noted, but
almost every unit type that is active (and likely some that the numbers not given. The USMC to this day uses a
are not). The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similar system, but has separate numbered Tables of
later adopted a similar system, reflecting the US influence Order (T/Os) and Tables of Equipment (T/Es) for each
on their military. During operations, commanders can unit. These numbers are also omitted.

US Basic Infantry Units division (with the exception of mechanized infantry).

US Army Rifle Company, Infantry Perhaps the most important distinction among them was
Battalion, Infantry and Airborne that personnel in airborne infantry elements were of course
Division, and Airmobile Division jump qualified. The rifle elements of the company across
or Separate Light Brigade the board were more or less identical. Company weapons
Initiative Level: D8 to D10 platoons were more or less identical between infantry and
Confidence Level: Confident to High airborne divisions and between airmobile divisions and
Supply Level: Abundant separate light infantry brigades.
Body Armor: Flak Vests The official TOE organization of companies was more or
Troop Quality/Morale: D8 to D10/D8 to D10 less the same. The companies consisted of a company
headquarters platoon, three rifle platoons, and a weapons
The straight leg infantry company was essentially common platoon. The rifle company headquarters performed
to all infantry battalions, regardless of their assigned command and administrative functions. Unlike the battalion

US Special Rules
Abundant Supplies Rules of Engagement
In Ambush Valley, all US Army units are US Players may not target civilian groups or direct
considered to have Abundant Supplies by default. off-board support within 12” of them unless a
Units with Abundant Supplies have pouches full of friendly unit within that distance is under enemy fire.
ammunition and bellies full of decent rations. They Superior Intel
have all the “beans, bullets, and bandages” they US Forces in Ambush Valley always gain an extra
need to take it to the enemy in style. In game die in the Initiative phase due to the difficulty and
terms, units with Abundant Supplies gain a die of lack of communications exhibited by their
Firepower. opponents. When playing against a Viet Cong
force, the US Player always has the Initiative and is
classed as the Aggressor for the entire game.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Weapons Squad
1x Squad Leader w/Rifle
2x Machine Gunner w/M60 (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
2x Asst. Machine Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
2x Anti-Tank Gunner w/M67 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
2x Asst. Anti-Tank Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
2x Ammunition Bearer w/M1911 Pistol

Personnel equipped with “rifles” would have had either M14s

or M16A1s. Personnel equipped with “automatic rifles” would
have either had M14 Modified or M16A1s. Airborne units,
along with Airmobile units and Army Special Forces had been
Securing the LZ. (Piers Brand)
authorized the M16A1 beginning in 1964. Other infantry
headquarters, the company headquarters also accompanied units retained the mix of the M14 and M14 Modified rifles
the rest of the unit out into the field on operations. until. By June 1966 sufficient M16A1s had been made
On paper, the individual rifle platoons had a platoon available for all units deploying to Vietnam. Units already in
headquarters, three rifle squads and a weapons squad. Vietnam had also been transitioning
from the M14 to the M16A1.
Platoon HQ The Weapons Squad noted
1x Officer w/Rifle in the organization above holds
1x NCO w/Rifle true for Infantry and Airmobile
1x RTO w/Rifle Divisions. In Airborne
Divisions and Separate
3x Rifle Squad Light Infantry Brigades,
2x Fireteams per Squad the M67 was substituted
for the M20A1B1 3.5”
Fireteam 1 rocket launcher. The
1x Squad Leader w/Rifle Separate Light Infantry
1x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle Brigade’s Weapons Squad was
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) also supposed to have twelve
1x Automatic Rifleman w/Automatic Rifle (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) M72 Light Anti-Tank
1x Rifleman w/Rifle Weapons. Infantry Companies
in Airmobile Divisions and
Fireteam 2 Separate Light Infantry
1x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle Brigades were authorized a
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) portable M9-7 flamethrower in
1x Automatic Rifleman w/Automatic Rifle (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) each platoon headquarters
2x Rifleman w/Rifle
US Army Infantryman,
1968

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 Unit Organizations

The company could also call upon its organic weapons

platoon for additional support. The platoon included a
platoon headquarters, a mortar section, and anti-tank
section. Both leg and airborne units both had three M29
81mm mortars in the mortar section and two M40 106mm
recoilless rifles in the anti-tank section. The recoilless rifles
were carried by M151C and later M825 weapon carriers.
In Airmobile infantry elements, the anti-tank section was
never present in the weapons platoon.
In Vietnam, however, the paper organization rarely held.
The utility of the M20A1B1 rocket launcher and M67
recoilless rifle were immediately seen as suspect.
The weapon’s weight and lack of enemy armor led it to be
left at base while companies went on operations. Units that
Mechanized Infantry with armor support.
deployed with the 106mm recoilless rifles often did the (Piers Brand)
same. Units that deployed later in the conflict often left the
weapons in storage at their home stations. The utility of the Mechanized infantry companies, on were organized
portable flamethrower was also debated, with some very according to a TOE almost identical to their straight leg and
limited use seen by units where the weapons were available. airborne counterparts. The most important exception was
The gunners and assistant gunners were either morphed of course that each squad, including each platoon’s weapon’s
into an additional machine gun teams (with the platoon squad, was authorized a single armored personnel carrier.
weapons squad sometimes becoming a reduced strength The platoon headquarters was dispersed among the four
machine gun squad) or used as replacements in the other carriers. Each rifle squad had an additional member in the
squads. In addition, across the board units in Vietnam were form of a vehicle driver, while one of the weapons squad’s
habituallyunder-strength. In practice platoons often operated ammunition bearers doubled as a driver. By 1965, this was
with two to three squads with anywhere from five to nine either a M113 with a gasoline engine or a M113A1 with a
personnel per squad. The weapons squad as separate entity diesel engine.
very often ceased to exist. Attached personnel such as On paper, the individual platoons had a platoon
forward observers and medics were also found dispersed headquarters, three rifle squads and a weapons squad.
among the squads.
Platoon HQ
US Army Rifle Company, Infantry 1x Officer w/Rifle
Battalion (Mechanized), Infantry 1x NCO w/Rifle
Division (Mechanized) 1x RTO w/Rifle
Initiative Level: D8 to D10
Confidence Level: Confident to High 3x Rifle Squad
Supply Level: Abundant 2x Fireteams per Squad
Body Armor: Flak Vests 1x M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier with Driver per
Troop Quality/Morale: D8 to D10/D8 to D10 Squad

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Design Note: The M113 and M113A1

The US Army adopted the M113 with its in a later chapter). Externally, both vehicles are
gasoline-powered engine in 1960 and subsequently virtually identical.
received over fourteen thousand vehicles of the type. Vehicles based on the M113 series available at the
It adopted the diesel-powered M113A1 in 1964 time, such as the M106 and M125 mortar carriers
and received over twenty thousand of them. were similarly split between gasoline-powered
Both are known to have served in Vietnam, variants and diesel-powered A1 variants.
both with the United States Army and with For purposes of this volume the two types of
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (discussed vehicles can be seen as interchangeable.

Fireteam 1 Weapons Squad

1x Squad Leader w/Rifle 1 x Squad Leader w/Rifle
1x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle 2 x Ammo Bearers w/M1911 Pistol
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) 2 x MG Teams
1x Automatic Rifleman w/Automatic Rifle (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) 2 x AT Teams
1x Rifleman w/Rifle
MG Team
Fireteam 2 1 x Machine Gunner w/M60 (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
1x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle 1 x Asst. Machine Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1x Automatic Rifleman w/Automatic Rifle (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) AT Team
2x Rifleman w/Rifle 1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/M67 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
1 x Asst. Anti-Tank Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
US infantry mounted in M113s. (Piers Brand)
Transport
1 x M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier

Mechanized Infantry units were not among those

immediately issued M16A1 rifles in 1964, and so too
transitioned from the M14 to the M16A1. In addition, each
squad was officially authorized an M60 machine gun, which,
when available was often mounted on the squad’s M113A1.
The company’s weapons platoon differed from the leg
and airborne versions only in the mortar section. The
company’s three mortars came in the form of full-tracked
M125 mortar carriers, each carrying an 81mm M29 mortar.
The M40 recoilless rifles remained mounted on their
wheeled carriers.

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 Unit Organizations

In Vietnam, like other infantry units, dwindling ranks and was an official decision that saw the anti-tank section
adaptation to the situation caused changes in the structure of deleted in an authorized MTOE. In some few instances
mechanized infantry. While the infantryman could dismount units removed them from the wheeled carriers and
from their carriers, they operated more often from the track, mounted them on company M113s to add additional
either riding on top or firing from the open rear hatch. The firepower during operations.
habitually under-strength units fielded squads ranging from M113s and M125s were also eventually authorized
five to seven men, including similar attachments to those under an MTOE additional armor and weapons, popularly
found in other infantry units. The weapon’s squad was often known as the Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV)
treated like another rifle squad. An official MTOE saw the kit. This kit included a shield and open-topped copula for
addition of one M9-7 flamethrower to each rifle platoon as the main weapon, plus two shields and mounts for M60
well, though this was rarely used. machine guns on the M113s only. While the squads
The 106mm recoilless rifles generally suffered the same remained authorized only one M60 machine gun, Army
fate in mechanized infantry elements as they did in other reports by the ending stages of the conflict showed that
infantry elements. They were retained either for static base mechanized infantry weapons had a “substantial” number
defense or left in storage at the home stations. The latter of unauthorized machine guns.

US Infantry taking fire, 1967

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AMBUSH VALLEY

3x Rifle Squad
1x NCO w/Rifle
1x Grenadier w/M/79 (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
3x Fireteams

Fireteam
1x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
1x Automatic Rifleman w/Automatic Rifle (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2x Rifleman w/Rifle

Personnel equipped with “rifles” would have had either

M14s or M16A1s. Personnel equipped with “automatic
rifles” would have either had M14 Modified or M16A1s.
ACAV. (Piers Brand)
During the summer of 1967, the USMC made the decision
to replace the M14 with the M16A1.
USMC Infantry Company, Infantry It also decided, like the Army to
Battalion, Infantry Regiment replace the M14 Modified with
Initiative Level: D8 to D10 another M16A1 in the automatic
Confidence Level: Confident to High rifle role. As with the Army, the
Supply Level: Abundant transition was not instantaneous
Body Armor: Flak Vests and it took until well into 1968 to
Troop Quality/Morale: D8 to D10/D8 to D12 make a complete switch.
As noted, in the USMC infantry
The US Marine Corps’ infantry companies were similar to company, all of the company’s
their Army counterparts. The platoon headquarters and support weapons were in an
each squad were authorized more personnel in the USMC organic weapons platoon. These
companies. In addition, each platoon was to include a included six M60 machine guns,
number of permanent medics in the form of one or two US three M20A1B1 3.5” rocket
Navy Corpsman. Support weapons were held at company launchers, and three 60mm
level, with no platoon weapons squad or similar formation. M19 mortars. These weapons were
On paper, the individual platoons had a platoon intended to be evenly dispersed among
headquarters and three rifle squads. the rifle platoons during operations.
However, as with the US Army, USMC
Platoon HQ units were habitually understrength.
1x Officer w/Rifle Mortar teams were often reduced two men
1x NCO w/Rifle from three and two-man machine gun
1x RTO w/Rifle teams often became permanent parts
1x Messenger w/Rifle of reorganized infantry squads.
1–2x Corpsman w/Rifle
Marine Grenadier, 1965–66

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 Unit Organizations

The USMC made greater use of their company weapons The EOD Detachment (Tactical) had an identical
than the US Army did. 60mm mortars would often personnel authorization, but was intended for operation in
accompany companies on operations, though they usually the field. Seven of the ten personnel were authorized M16
remained grouped at the company level rather than being rifles, while the detachment leader and the clerks were
dispersed to individual platoons. The M20A1B1s could also authorized M1911 pistols. To help with mobility, the tactical
be found on operations, though after 1968 they were detachment had two M37s, two M151s, and a single M35
increasingly replaced by M72 LAWs. truck, along with trailers for each to carry the necessary
equipment. None of the vehicles in either unit type were
Specialized Infantry Units authorized weapons. Each unit was equipped with detection
US Army EOD Detachment and demolition equipment to perform its mission.
Initiative Level: D8 to D10
Confidence Level: Confident to High USAF Combat Security Police Flight
Supply Level: Abundant Initiative Level: D8 to D10
Body Armor: Flak Vests Confidence Level: Confident to High
Troop Quality/Morale: D8 to D10/D8 to D10 Supply Level: Abundant
Body Armor: Flak Vests
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units first deployed Troop Quality/Morale: D8 to D10/D8 to D10
to Vietnam with other Army units in 1965. However,
their primary missions were more logistical, responding In late 1966, the US Air Force organized a test unit for the
to emergencies at ammunition facilities and similar purposes of defending installations from attack in combat
installations. Experiences in Vietnam led to first the vast areas, specifically in the Republic of Vietnam. The test
expansion of Ordnance detachments tasked with EOD squadron deployed to Vietnam in 1967. By 1968, the USAF
work, and then the development of a specific TOE for had begun deploying additional squadrons of what had
EOD Detachments in 1969. By 1971, the US Army in the become known as Combat Security Police. Unlike previous
Republic of Vietnam (USARV) had organized a number of Security Police elements, the new unit would be more
EOD detachments, some focused for work in metropolitan suited to conduct limited combat operations in and around
locales and others for tactical deployment in the field. the installation to be defended. A single squadron would
defend a single air base or other installation.
EOD Detachment The Combat Security Police Squadron was organized
1x Officer similar to a reinforced Army or Marine Infantry Battalion.
1x Senior EOD Supervisor Each of the Squadron’s Flights corresponded roughly to a
2x EOD Sergeant company. Each flight was made up of three Field Sections
4x EOD Specialist and a Support Section.
2x Clerk/Typist Organized like platoons, the Field Sections had a
headquarters and three Elements, corresponding to an
The Metropolitan unit was intended to deploy personnel infantry squad.
as needed. The Detachment was authorized M17 revolvers
for all personnel, plus four M16A1 rifles. It also had access Field Section HQ
to four M151 trucks and a single M37 truck. 1x Officer w/M16A1 Rifle

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AMBUSH VALLEY

1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle rifles. The heavy mortars were generally the 4.2” M30
1x Communications/Driver w/M16A1 Rifle mortar. In mechanized infantry battalions the M106 mortar
carrier, utilizing the same mortar was found. The additional
3x Elements recoilless rifles were all still on wheeled carriers.
1x Element Leader w/M16A1 Rifle per Element When the new TOEs for the airmobile division had been
2x Fireteams per Element drawn up, a special Combat Support Company was
developed, adding a fourth company to each battalion. This
Fireteam element was also later found in the separate light infantry
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle brigades. What this did was essentially move the heavy
3x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle weapons elements of the HHC into a separate company. In
1x GPMG Operator w/M60 (Med. AP:2/AT:0) the case of the airmobile elements it also provided the
lowest order of heavier anti-tank support in the division.
In addition to the relatively heavily armed Elements, the The Combat Support Companies of the airmobile division
Support Section contained even greater firepower. It included included the battalion scout platoon, with its three ten-man
a Weapons Element in which there were four M29 81mm scout squads, four 81mm mortars and four 106mm
mortars, three .50-caliber M2 heavy machine guns, and either recoilless rifles.
a tripod-mounted 7.62mm GAU-2B/A “Minigun” or 40mm In late 1967, all Army infantry battalions, with the
XM174 automatic grenade launcher. All the weapons were exception mechanized infantry battalions, had formed
emplaced in static positions to support the Field Sections. Combat Support Companies. The scout platoon was often
Also in the Support Section were nine sentry dog teams (dog reorganized as an additional rifle platoon and used for
and handler) and a surveillance element that included fixed security and other missions in addition to its intended
ground search radar and other monitoring equipment. function. As in other instances, the 106mm recoilless rifles at
battalion level were often absent entirely. In mechanized
Above Company Level battalions these provided additional weapons for enterprising
Infantry companies, both in the Army and the USMC often units looking to add them to their M113A1s.
had elements attached to them from higher headquarters. Mechanized infantry battalions on the other hand
In many cases these were elements organic to their parent received additional firepower in the form of a tracked
battalion headquarters element. Armor or cavalry might be flamethrower platoon. This platoon included four M132A1
attached from other units within a Marine Regiment or tracked flamethrower vehicles based on the M113A1.
Army Infantry Brigade by higher headquarters as well, but US Army airmobile infantry battalions did not have an
these units will be discussed in their respective chapters. organic lift, contrary to popular conceptions, but could rely
All US Army infantry battalions were organized around on the aviation elements organic to the airmobile division,
a headquarters and headquarters company (HHC) and which were not necessarily available to other infantry units.
three rifle companies. Later on almost all battalions gained Two types of helicopters were commonly used, the UH-1D
a fourth under-strength rifle company, with the exception and CH-47A, and later the UH-1H and CH-47B/C. These
of mechanized infantry units. The HHC performed a wide helicopters were grouped into two separate types of
array of command and administrative functions, but also formations, the Aviation Company (Airmobile – Light) and
included various support assets that could be dispersed to the Aviation Company (Medium Helicopter). These unit
its units during operations. Among these elements were types were redesignated in 1966 as the Assault Helicopter
generally heavy mortars and additional M40 recoilless Company (AHC) and the Assault Support Helicopter

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 Unit Organizations

Battalion (ASHB) respectively. Separate aviation groups 7.62mm M60D machine guns at the forward cabin door
were eventually activated to provide helicopter support to and emergency exit window, using the M24 armament
non-airmobile units. These also consisted of various subsystem. A machine gun mount for the rear cargo ramp,
numbers of AHCs and ASHBs primarily. also using the M60D machine gun, was also developed,
The AHC consisted of two airlift platoons, with designated the M41.
generally between eight and eleven UH-1Ds (and UH-1Hs In the case of the Marines, additional anti-tank and
after 1967), and a weapons platoon with between six mortar support for individual companies existed in the
and eight UH-1B/C gunships (and AH-1Gs after 1967 battalion’s Headquarters and Service Company, similar in
and UH-1Ms after 1969). Troop carrying UH-1Ds were form and function to the Army’s HHCs. 81mm M29
initially unarmed, but were quickly fitted with improvised mortars and M40 106mm recoilless rifles were available,
mounts allowed 7.62mm M60 machine guns attached via but generally used for static base defense or on-call support.
bungee cords to the crew cabin ceiling. Later, the purpose The USMC infantry regiment also had access to a Scout
built M23 armament subsystem was issued, which allowed Sniper Platoon. Units also organized security platoons to
for a single 7.62mm M60D machine gun to be mounted at protect regimental headquarters. These platoons had a
the crew cabin door. headquarters and two nine-man squads.
As for the weapons platoon, when they were first created Also, while the Marine Corps did not
they were first issued an equal number of M6 armament have mechanized infantry units in
subsystems with a total of four 7.62mm M60C machine guns the sense that the US Army did, that
and M3 armament subsystems with one twenty-four tube is to say infantry units where
2.75” rocket pod on either side of the aircraft. This was the transport was organic,
to allow units to mix and match based on the expected there were Amphibian
opposition. By 1965, the M16 armament subsystem, adding in Tractor (Amtrac) Battalions
bomb racks for a single seven-tube rocket pod on either side available for moving
of the aircraft had supplanted the M6s and in most cases the forces around during
M3s, though some units were still using M3s (and UH-1C/M operations. Each level
gunships) as late as 1971. By late 1966, these had begun to be of the Amtrac
replaced by the M21 armament subsystem with two 7.62mm battalion could move
M134 “Miniguns” instead of the four M60C machine guns. an infantry element of the
Units also acquired varying numbers of M5 armament next largest size. That is to say
subsystems, consisting of a nose turret with a 40mm M75 that an Amtrac platoon could
grenade launcher. Airmobile divisions also had an Aviation carry a company, a company
Company (Escort), later redesignated as an Aerial Weapons could carry a battalion, and the
Company, which had only armed gunships. full battalion was intended to be
The ASHB also consisted of two lift platoons, but had able to move a full Marine Infantry
no organic weapons element. The platoons each had eight Regiment with its one hundred
CH-47A helicopters (and CH-47B after 1967 and CH-47C LVTP5A1s and other support
after 1969). Some CH-47s were equipped with ladders at vehicles. This unit is described in more
the rear cargo ramp, allowing them to deploy troops even detail in the US Armor section.
without a clear landing zone. CH-47s like troop carrying
UH-1s were not initially armed, but were later fitted with USMC M60 Gunner, 1969

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The Marines, like the US Army, had access to organic Marines had deployed with a large portion of their heavy
aviation, in the form of two entire utility Marine Aircraft equipment despite a clear reticence on the part of Military
Groups, at first equipped largely with UH-34D helicopters. Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV). MACV had not
At least some UH-34D helicopters remained in Vietnam necessarily felt that armor was a worthwhile addition to the
until as late as 1969, despite the appearance of the CH-46 force posture in Vietnam. In the end, before their departure
family beginning in the mid-1960s. By the late 1960s, the from Vietnam in 1969, the Marines would deploy two slightly
USMC had also begun to deploy the CH-53A, a decidedly modified tank battalions to Vietnam.
more powerful helicopter than either the UH-34D or With the exception of Company D, 16th Armor (a special
CH-46 series. CH-46s and CH-53As would serve the case to be discussed later in this section), deployed with the
USMC throughout the rest of the conflict. As of 1967, 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate) in March 1965, there
USMC helicopter squadrons equipped with any of these were no US Army armored units (not counting cavalry units
three types had a total of twenty-four aircraft. also be discussed in a later section) deployed until the arrival
Armament on the original UH-34Ds was limited at first of the 25th and 4th Infantry Divisions during 1966. So
to a single 7.62mm M60 machine gun in the main doorway, negative were the perceptions of the potential contribution of
and even then it was done with the reticence of senior Marine armor to the conflict that the 1st Infantry Division deployed
Corps leaders. A second weapon was later added out of the to Vietnam in 1965 without its tank battalion. This decision
passenger cabin windows opposite the main doorway. Test was made despite a protest by the Division’s commanding
fittings of .50-caliber M2 machine guns showed them to be officer. The 1st Infantry Division’s two mechanized infantry
unstable when mounted and capable of causing potentially battalions were also converted to standard leg infantry.
dangerous vibrations. M60 machine guns were mounted in By 1971, the US Army had only three tank battalions in
the forward doorways and emergency windows on both the Vietnam, having gained another with the deployment of
CH-46 series and CH-53A. In some units these were later 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division (Mechanized).
replaced with .50-caliber M2 machine guns. All units in this category as generally rated as Troop
In the case of the USAF Combat Security Police Quality D8 and Morale D8. Like Infantry, the quality of
Squadrons, all the support weapons were dispersed to the training throughout the conflict remained more or less the
lower echelons. The squadron itself had access to a number same, while the level of morale fluctuated widely. Refer to the
of vehicles, to be discussed later, but no additional weapons introduction in the infantry section for more detail on this.
or maneuver units. Units did manage to acquire heavier In this chapter are descriptions of basic US Army and
weapons as time went on. M67 90mm recoilless rifles were USMC armor elements, more specialized formations
acquired, as were M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons (LAW). (including specific units), and a description of the support
These weapons were distributed to the squads or to so- assets available to the various units above company level.
called Security Alert Teams mounted in vehicles (discussed
in the next chapter), who were to act as reaction elements Basic Armor Units
to signs of disturbance on their bases. US Army Tank Company, Armor
Battalion, Infantry and Infantry
US Military Armor Units Division (Mechanized)
The use of armor by the US military in Vietnam formed a Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
contentious debate almost from the beginning. The first Tank companies found in the Armor Battalions in infantry
armor units to deploy, coming from the US Marine Corps in and mechanized infantry divisions were identical. These
March 1965, were, in many ways, deployed by accident. The were also identical to those found in armored divisions, but

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 Unit Organizations

Light Section, Tank Platoon

2x M48A3 Patton

With:
2x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
2x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
2x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
2x Driver w/M1911 Pistol

Each tank also carried two .45-caliber M3 submachine guns

to be used by the crew.
While the basic organization remained largely unchanged
M48A3 Tank. (Piers Brand)
for armor units in Vietnam, the equipment and concept of
since no elements of any armored divisions were deployed operations differed greatly from the intended usages of armor.
to Vietnam, this has been omitted from the section title. Tank companies themselves were often broken up to support
Unlike other US Army elements, the Tank Company other units during operations. Armor supported various
remained relatively true to its paper organization. The types of operations, from major offensives to patrols securing
company consisted of a Company Headquarters, split into fire bases and convoy operations. They also performed
the Company Headquarters Section and a Maintenance static defense of important facilities and infrastructure (such
Section, and three tank platoons. The headquarters section as bridges).
had two M48A3 tanks and various wheeled vehicles, while In Vietnam, it was not uncommon for units to modify
the maintenance section had an M113A1 armored the tank and crew roles to provide additional relevant
personnel carrier and an M88 recovery vehicle, as well as firepower. The most common modification was the removal
additional wheeled vehicles. of the .50-caliber M2 machine gun from the commander’s
The rest of the company was formed around the three cupola on the M48A3. The weapon was remounted on
tank platoons, each broken into a Heavy Section and a Light an improvised mount on top of the cupola. The cupola
Section. The platoon’s five M48A3 tanks were split in a had been found to be very cramped, making it difficult to
three-two vehicle arrangement between the heavy and light observe targets and reload the machine gun. Various types
sections. of machine gun were often added at the tank’s loader’s hatch
as well. The vehicle’s gunner often rode on top of the tank,
Heavy Section, Tank Platoon equipped with an M79 grenade launcher or M16A1 rifle for
3x M48A3 Patton rear security.
This change in the roles of the crew was facilitated by a
With: lack of point targets. The tanks generally operated with a
1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol round, often canister during patrols, pre-loaded in the tube.
2x NCO w/M1911 Pistol The tank’s gun would only have to be pointed in the general
3x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol direction of the target. The gunner’s controls could be
3x Loader w/M1911 Pistol overridden and control given to the tank commander who
3x Driver w/M1911 Pistol essentially assumed the role of gunner and tank commander,
using tracers from the coaxial machine gun to aim.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

For night time work, tank companies were only 5x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
authorized five searchlights. These were initially visible 5x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
light only types, but replaced under an official MTOE with 5x Driver w/M1911 Pistol
the 23” Xenon searchlight during the late 1960s. These
searchlights, designated AN/VSS-1, provided both visible As with the US Army, each tank also carried two .45-caliber
and infrared light, allowing the use of infrared driving and M3 submachine guns to be used by the crew. Modifications
observation equipment. to the tank’s machine gun arrangement were also not
With the habitually under-strength nature of units in uncommon among Marine Corps tanks. Also like US Army
Vietnam, tanks would also operate with only three crew M48A3s, Marine Corps M48A3s were initially equipped
members instead of the normal four. These tanks were with searchlights providing visible light only, and again
organized in the same fashion as the light section in the not for all tanks. These were similarly replaced by the
platoons, though the company’s commanding officer and AN/VSS-1 during the late 1960s.
executive officers could assume command of the tanks. Some variation in the overall organization existed as
Attrition among the M48A3 fleet in armor and cavalry units well. For a period the companies of the 1st Tank Battalion
also led to the deployment of a small number of older took one tank from each of their three platoons and one
M48A2 tanks with gasoline-powered engines being deployed from the company headquarters to form an additional four-
as replacements. tank platoon. The organizations of these platoons would
have been identical to the standard organization, less one
USMC Medium Tank Company, Tank tank and its four-man crew.
Battalion
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 USMC Anti-Tank Company, Tank
US Marine Corps medium tank companies were organized Battalion
almost identically to their US Army counterparts. The Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
company featured a slightly larger headquarters element For deployment to Vietnam, two reinforced anti-tank
and therefore had slightly more personnel overall. companies were task organized from the 1st and 3rd Anti-
The company consisted of a Company Headquarters Tank Battalions and attached to the 1st and 3rd Tank
and three tank platoons. The company headquarters Battalions. A normal anti-tank company from these battalions
had two M48A3 tanks, including one with an M8 dozer would have included a Company Headquarters and three
blade, and an M51 recovery vehicle, as well as additional anti-tank companies.
wheeled vehicles. The reinforced company consisted of a Company
The rest of the company was formed around the three Headquarters and four anti-tank platoons. The company
tank platoons, each with five M48A3 tanks. headquarters had various wheeled vehicles to support its
administrative functions.
Tank Platoon The rest of the company was formed around the four
5x M48A3 Patton anti-tank platoons, each with five M50A1 Ontos anti-tank
vehicles.
With:
1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol Anti-Tank Platoon
4x NCO w/M1911 Pistol 5x M50A1 Ontos

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 Unit Organizations

With: entire Marine Infantry Regiment. To this end, each of

1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol the four platoons in the Amtrac Company had ten
4x NCO w/M1911 Pistol LVTP5A1s.
5x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
5x Driver w/M1911 Pistol Amtrac Platoon
10x LVTP5A1
The platoons themselves were more or less identical to the
platoons in a standard anti-tank company. With:
The Ontos itself was a relatively unique piece of 1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol
equipment, featuring six 106mm M40 recoilless rifles 9x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
mounted externally on either side of the vehicle. In the 10x Driver w/M1911 Pistol
center a single .30-caliber M1919A4 machine gun was 10x Assistant Driver w/M1911 Pistol
provided for the vehicle commander, who doubled as
the gunner. During the Marine Corps’ time in Vietnam, no major
The Ontos saw action only briefly in its intended role changes were made to the organization of the Amtrac
during Operation Power Pack in the Dominican Republic Companies. However, the nature of the mission meant that
in early 1965. In Vietnam, it was used primarily as Amtracs were utilized in moving smaller units than might
support weapon for taking on point targets such as have otherwise been intended.
fortified enemy emplacements or using its firepower to Also, the Amtracs themselves were found to have serious
help break ambushes. deficiencies when used on protracted overland missions.
Having been designed to provide armored protection
USMC Amphibian Tractor for Marine Infantry coming ashore during amphibious
Company, Amphibian Tractor operations and to assist in movement in the general vicinity
Battalion of the beachhead, the vehicles were not designed to
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 withstand many hazards they faced, including mines.
As noted in the US Military Infantry section, the US Marine The fuel for the LVTP5A1 and its associated vehicles was
Corps did not have infantry units with organic armored stored under the floor of the troop compartment, making
transport. This transport was provided, when necessary, by a mine blast almost certain death for its occupants. As a
separate Amphibian Tractor (Amtrac) units. result, Marine Infantry being transported often chose to
Each Amtrac Company consisted of a Company ride on top, with additional protection coming from
Headquarters and four Amtrac platoons. The company sandbag walls erected on top of the vehicle.
headquarters had a large number of vehicles, including The vehicle’s only defensive weapon, a single .30-caliber
four LVTP5A1 Amtracs, an additional three configured M1919A4 machine gun, was mounted in an enclosed
with extra radios as mobile command posts, and a single cupola. Cramped conditions and limited visibility (as with
LVTR1A1 recovery vehicle based on the same chassis. the cupola on the M48A3) often led to this machine gun
Amtrac units were organized to carry Marine Infantry being removed and mounted on top. Locally fabricated gun
units of the next highest level. That is to say, an Amtrac shields were sometimes added, as were additional machine
Platoon was able to move a Marine Infantry Company, guns on the upper deck. In some cases units mounted
an Amtrac Company was able to move a Marine Infantry 106mm M40 recoilless rifles scrounged from other units
Battalion, and the an Amtrac Battalion could move an on top of the Amtracs.

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Specialized Armor Units M113A1 armored personnel carriers and M106A1 4.2”
US Army Airborne Tank Company, mortar carriers, taking on the guise of a reinforced
Separate Airborne Brigade Armored Cavalry Squadron (to be discussed in the
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 following section). It retained a single platoon equipped
A single separate Airborne Tank Company, Company D, with the M56.
16th Armor, deployed to Vietnam in 1965 with the 173rd
Airborne Brigade (Separate). This unit was inactivated in Airborne Tank Platoon
Vietnam in August 1968. The Airborne Tank Company, 6x M56 Scorpion
either as part of the Armor Battalion of the Airborne
Division of the time or as a separate company attached to a With:
separate Airborne Brigade, had much more in common 1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol
with the US Marine Corps’ Anti-Tank Company than with 5x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
the US Army’s other Tank Battalions. 6x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
Although organized essentially the same as other tank 6x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
battalions, with a Company Headquarters Section and 6x Driver w/M1911 Pistol
three Airborne Tank Platoons, the unit was equipped with
a completely different type of vehicle, the M56 Scorpion. As with the Marine Corps’ M50A1 Ontos, the M56
The headquarters section also had no additional M56 Scorpion was used for infantry support rather than its
vehicles, unlike the additional tanks found in traditional intended role in Vietnam.
tank companies. The rest of the unit was reformed around two platoons
of five M113A1s and a mortar platoon with four M106A1s.
Airborne Tank Platoon Between its deployment and its inactivation, D/16th
5x M56 Scorpion Armor’s M113A1s and M106A1s received the same
additional armor and weapons fits as did those in
With: Mechanized Infantry and Armored Cavalry elements. In
1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol addition, some of its M113A1s were also fitted with M67
4x NCO w/M1911 Pistol recoilless rifles in the troop commander’s position to
5x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol provide additional firepower.
5x Loader w/M1911 Pistol What is perhaps most interesting is that D/16th Armor
5x Driver w/M1911 Pistol was not reorganized with the M551 Sheridan light tank.
This tank was intended to replace the M56 Scorpion in
The M56 was essentially a tracked self-propelled anti-tank airborne tank elements (among other roles) and D-16th
gun, an open-topped vehicle mounting a 90mm gun, with Armor had been authorized it as a replacement for its
only a front shield to protect the crew from enemy fire and vehicles. Sources suggest that the M113A1 was seen as
the elements. providing greater utility in the theater by those in charge of
For Vietnam, D Company, 16th Armor was reorganized. this decision. Regardless, in the end D/16th Armor was
It exchanged the majority of its fifteen M56 vehicles for inactivated a year before the first M551s came to Vietnam.

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 Unit Organizations

US Army Artillery Battery machine gun (M45F mount on M20 trailer), a 2 1/2-ton
(Automatic Weapons, Self prime mover, and a four-man crew.
Propelled and .50-caliber
Machine Gun), Artillery 6x Firing Section (.50-caliber Machine Gun)
Battalion (Automatic Weapons, 4x M55 Quadruple Machine Gun
Self-Propelled) 4x 2 1/2-Ton Truck
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
While it turned out that US ground forces in South With:
Vietnam were never attacked by enemy aircraft, the North 4x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
Vietnamese Air Force presented a viable enough threat 4x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
that air defense assets were deployed. These included 4x Sight Setter w/M1911 Pistol
Self-propelled Automatic Weapons Air Defense Artillery x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
Battalions equipped with the M42A1 Duster tracked
anti-aircraft vehicle. Each squad was also authorized a single M60 machine gun,
These battalions were organized on paper as having a generally mounted on the prime mover, and an M79
Headquarters and Headquarters Battery and four Firing grenade launcher, generally stored on the prime mover.
Batteries. Each Firing Battery was organized around a The lack of air threats and the M42A1’s considerable
Battery Headquarters, a Communications Section and two firepower quickly led it to be utilized in less traditional
Firing Platoons, each with eight M42A1 vehicles. roles. Self-propelled automatic weapons battalions found
themselves detaching firing batteries or Firing Sections
Firing Platoon (Automatic Weapons, Self-Propelled) (with only two M42A1s) for protection of fire bases and
8x M42A1 Duster convoy escort. Battalions rarely operated as a whole.
.50-caliber Machine Gun sections were also utilized
With: individually for base defense and convoy operations. For static
1x Officer w/M1911 Pistol base defense, the weapon was often set up at a prepared firing
7x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
A US convoy under armored escort.
8x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol (Piers Brand)
8x Sight Setter w/M1911 Pistol
16x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
8x Driver w/M1911 Pistol

According to the established doctrine Air Defense Artillery

Battalions of various types, including the Self-Propelled
Automatic Weapons Battalions, were to have an Air
Defense Artillery Battery (.50-caliber Machine Gun)
attached to them on operations. In Vietnam this was the
case as well. These batteries on paper were organized
around a Battery Headquarters and six Machine Gun
Sections, each with four Machine Gun Squads. Each
machine gun squad had a M55 quadruple .50-caliber

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AMBUSH VALLEY

position, including inside sand bag revetments, behind metal that the vehicles became both unwieldy and overburdened.
fencing, or on top of concrete bunkers. The increased maintenance demands and continued
For convoy operations, the weapon was often set up on vulnerability to mines and other heavy weapons meant
the cargo bed, to allow firing on the move. This was done that there were constantly shortages of critical repair parts
by either removing the M45F from the trailer and fixing it or the trucks themselves.
to the cargo bed or simply removing the wheels from the The continued shortcomings of the armored M151s
trailer and mounting the entire system on the cargo bed. showed a need for a purpose built armored vehicle,
The M60 machine gun was often fixed to a rail behind the especially for convoy escort. After exploring the potential of
driver’s cabin while one of the other crewmen kept watch a variety of vehicles, the V-100 Commando was chosen to
with the grenade launcher. be evaluated. A commercial offering from the Cadillac
Hazards experienced on these types of operations led to Gage company, the V-100 was already in service with the
improvised armor being fitted around the driver’s cabin in Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and had proven to have
the form of an armored windscreen and armored doors. significant utility on improved roads and in urban areas.
The cargo bed generally was left unmodified to allow for In 1967, Military Assistance Command Vietnam
full traverse of the turret. diverted six V-100 vehicles to the 18th Military Police
Instances of further unique modifications also existed. At Brigade for evaluation. Training was provided by the ARVN
least one example can be found of an M45F mounted in the and the initial vehicle documentation was entirely in
rear cargo area of an M548 tracked cargo carrier. In another Vietnamese, in a rare instance of the US Army adopting a
case, an M45F was mounted on an improvised powered raft, piece of equipment after the South Vietnamese.
utilizing pontoon bridge sections, for operations in the The V-100 in US Army service was designated as the
Mekong Delta. Such modifications were uncommon. XM706. Its main armament, tailored to the ARVN, was two
.30-caliber M37 machine guns. This ammunition not being
Miscellaneous US Army readily available in the US Army’s logistical system in South
Armor Vietnam and was changed to two 7.62mm M73 machine
While more traditional armored units were out in the field guns. The resulting vehicle was designated as the XM706E1
fighting, a wide array of unarmored, improvised armored, and later standardized as the M706.
and armored vehicles were being used by elements of the In service with the Military Police, the vehicles were
US Army for less glamorous missions like convoy and VIP often deployed as necessary by higher headquarters to units
escort, patrolling around installations, and static defense of in need. Vehicles often operated in at least pairs, but in
installations and critical infrastructure. some cases were deployed individually to guard facilities or
Officially this task fell to elements of the Military Police. other infrastructure. Crews often added a wide array of
MP elements were authorized varying numbers of M151 additional weapons onto their M706s. Additional machine
1/4-ton trucks and M60 machine guns. Improvised mounts guns over the driver’s position, at the rear hatch, and on
were quickly developed and these “Gun Jeeps” were heavily top of the turret were common. Some units attached
utilized in the aforementioned roles. miniaturized versions of the M18 Claymore directional
Their vulnerability led to the fabrication of improvised anti-personnel mine on their vehicles to help deter
armor from armor plate and sandbags, eventually leading ambushes. These “Claymorettes” were a product of various
the development of a standardized armor kit for the M151. experimental counter ambush systems developed by the
Standardized pedestal mounts were also authorized. The US Army’s Land Warfare Laboratory and the Advanced
weight of all the additional armor and weaponry meant Research Projects Agency.

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 Unit Organizations

Demands for the vehicles and operational attrition

remained high for the M706 despite it being a vast
improvement over the armored M151s. Military Police units
found themselves hard pressed to provide resources for all
convoys in Vietnam. Transportation elements, denied
requests for organic vehicles like the M706, therefore turned
to improved armor, worthy of mention here. Initially the
vehicles mirrored the gun jeeps used by the Military Police
units. M37 3/4-ton trucks, referred to as “Gun Beeps” were
also used. These trucks featured a wider array of weapons,
salvaged from any sources available to the transportation
companies, including at least one instance of an M134 A gun truck swings into action! (Piers Brand)
“Minigun” mounted on an armored M37.
The project of providing hardened vehicles for convoy other associated equipment, and mounted on the truck’s
escort quickly led to the development of provisional escort cargo bed. These vehicles were in some cases supplied with
elements in transportation units, along with larger “Gun the supplemental armor kits and all had the additional gun
Trucks” based on the M35 2 1/2-ton and M54 5-ton truck mounts. In some cases three .50-caliber machine guns
families. The basic gun trucks fell into three groups. were mounted.
The first were the initial armor, which consisted of little These vehicles joined those provided by the
more than a sheet metal box on the truck’s cargo bed and in aforementioned Artillery Batteries (Automatic Weapons, Self-
some cases armor for the driver’s compartment. Machine Propelled and .50-caliber Machine Gun) in escorting convoys
guns, generally 7.62mm M60s or .50-caliber M2s were all over Vietnam. Generally convoys had a number of escorts
mounted in the rear compartment. A second type of truck determined by their size, but the basic hardened convoy rule
offered a variation on this theme, but fabricating a smaller was to have a lead gun jeep or beep and one at the tail, with a
box on the truck bed, with roughly the same number of gun truck in the middle of the convoy and one second to last.
weapons. Additional types of weapons were mounted on
the vehicles depending on what could be scavenged, US Air Force Armor
including at least one instance of an M129 40mm automatic The US Air Force initially deployed an array of armed
grenade launcher and instances of M134 “Miniguns.” wheeled vehicles, primarily 1/4 Ton “Jeep” types, such as
Vehicle crews also carried a wide array of unauthorized the M151 to assist with base defense. These vast majority of
personal weapons. the over forty M151s to be part of each Combat Security
By 1969–70, the proliferation of rocket propelled Police Squadron were equipped with pedestal mounted
grenades and other hollow-charge weapons had become so M60s for exactly this purpose.
great that units began to experiment with layers of armor to While these vehicles provided Combat Security Police
provide some protection against these types of weapons. with increased and mobile firepower to react they were
The overall construction of the trucks was unchanged. found to be insufficient in the face of the ferocity of enemy
At around the same time, a more radical design also attacks on facilities. The 1968 offensive beginning on the eve
appeared. By using the increased load carrying capacity of of the Vietnamese New Year, known as Tet, brought home
the M54 trucks, M113A1 hulls were salvaged, stripped the need for more immediate firepower and protection for
of engines, tracks, drive sprockets, idlers, road wheels, and Combat Security Police.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The original Operation Safe Side experiment had also not available above company level for operations. In fact,
included a total of three M113A1 armored personnel carriers, like infantry elements, in the US Army, Armor Battalion
which were utilized as mobile bunkers and transport for Headquarters and Headquarters Companies were eventually
reaction elements. In the aftermath of Tet, the US Air Force split into two elements, a smaller Headquarters/Combat
ordered a number of M113A1s for bases across South Support Company and a Service Company for maintenance
Vietnam and elsewhere in the region. and other logistical concerns.
Delays in delivery led the Air Force to source a total of In the US Army, armor battalion assets shared some
sixty XM706E2 vehicles as an interim substitute. These commonalities with their infantry counterparts. The battalion
vehicles were similar to the XM706 and M706 armored cars had a Mortar Platoon and a Ground Surveillance Section and
supplied to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and the US Reconnaissance Platoon, both similar to infantry battalion
Army. The difference was that the E2 variant featured an scout platoons. The ground surveillance section was identical
open central parapet, with two weapons mounts forward and to that in infantry battalions, and was also eventually reduced
two to the rear. In practice, a .50-caliber machine gun was to only two radar teams with the AN/PPS-5. The mortar
often mounted forward and a 7.62mm M60 machine gun platoon had a platoon headquarters and four M106A1 4.2”
was mounted to the rear. In some cases, the XM174 40mm mortar carriers.
automatic grenade launcher was sourced from the base’s The armor battalion reconnaissance platoon was
Combat Security Police Squadron, or a 23” Xenon searchlight organized on paper more along the lines of a reduced
was mounted to provide direct illumination at night. strength armored cavalry troop (discussed in the following
By 1969, the US Air Force had managed to deliver section). It had a platoon headquarters, a scout section,
thirty-two M113A1s for use in Vietnam, leading to mixing a tank section, and a rifle squad. On paper the scout
of the two types as the debate raged on as to which was section had four M114 scout vehicles, while the platoon
more suited to the service’s needs in-theater. By the end of headquarters had an additional M114. The rifle squad was
the conflict a number of both types were still being utilized. carried in an M113A1 armored personnel carrier, while the
In practice it generally appears that these vehicles were tank section was issued two M41A3 light tanks. In Vietnam,
operated in pairs, with control of the assets being the the Army approved the replacement of all M114 vehicles
prerogative of the Combat Security Police Squadron with M113A1 vehicles. These were eventually authorized
Headquarters. They were often assigned to the so-called the additional armor kits and weapons found in other units.
Security Alert Teams, who had the job of acting as a The M41A3 light tanks were not issued and appeared to
reaction element to any sign of danger. The various other have been replaced by M113A1s, effectively providing an
armed wheeled vehicles also remained in service. additional scout section.
The armor battalion also featured elements not found in
Above Company Level infantry battalions. Besides the obvious changes in the
Tank and other armored companies, both in the Army and maintenance and logistical requirements, armor battalions
the USMC, like their infantry counterparts, often had also had an armored vehicle launched bridge section. The
elements attached to them from higher headquarters. In many section had two AVLBs. These were initially based on the
cases these were elements organic to their parent battalion M48A2 hull, but later vehicles based on the M60 Patton II
headquarters element. In the case of Infantry, however, these were deployed. The M60 AVLB and the M728 Combat
elements came primarily in the form of additional firepower. Engineering Vehicle (CEV) were the only two M60 based
In armored units, these elements also had to do with mobility. vehicles deployed to Vietnam. Lack of a major armored
That is of course not to say that additional firepower was threat in Vietnam meant that the decision was made to

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 Unit Organizations

deploy the M60 and its successors to Europe to counter the Cavalry in the US Army has been extremely dynamic in
Soviet armor threat rather than send them to Vietnam. its intended roles and missions and in its organization since
The US Marine Corps tank battalion differed more the end of World War I. By the time the US Army deployed
noticeably from its Army counterparts than infantry units. to Vietnam, it had left the Pentomic force structure of the
Its Battalion Headquarters and Service Company contained 1950s and entered into a new force structure referred to
no mortars, AVLBs, or organic reconnaissance elements. It as the Reorganization of Army Divisions (ROAD). Under
included an additional tank section with two more M48A3 the ROAD force structure, each Division was to have an
tanks, along with an M51 recovery vehicle. The USMC was organic cavalry squadron. Separate brigades were also
the only service to field the M51, based on the M103 heavy authorized organic cavalry troops.
tank. The US Army fielded the M88 medium recovery At around the same time, the US Army also changed
vehicle and the M578 light recovery vehicle. The USMC its understanding of how units were to be designated. Under
also had an organic flame tank platoon. The platoon had the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS), the regiment
three sections, each with three M67A2 flamethrower tanks, was no longer a tactical unit. Regimental headquarters were
based on the M48A3 tank. all placed under the control of the Department of the Army,
The USMC Amtrac Battalion Headquarters and Service with an authorized personnel strength of zero. The companies
Company also contained a unique asset. In addition to of the regiments were redesignated as Headquarters
containing twelve more LVTP5A1s, another three configured and Headquarters Companies (or Headquarters and
as command vehicles (as in the Amtrac companies), and an Headquarters Batteries or Troops depending on the unit type)
LVTR1A1 recovery vehicle, there were eight LVTE1s. The of newly activated battalions (or squadrons in the case of
LVTE1 was an engineering vehicle based on the LVTP5A1. It cavalry), drawing their lineage and honors from the parent
featured a massive front plow for clearing its way physically regiment, but assigned to Divisions irrespective of the other
for mine fields. In addition to the turreted machine gun elements of the regiment.
of the LVTP5A1, it also boasted the ability to launch two Why does this matter? Firstly, the only exception to the
rocket-propelled mine-clearing line charges. The experience redesignation of units under CARS was the Armored
with the turreted machine gun was the same, and the LVTE1s Cavalry Regiment, which remained a tactical unit.
featured similar modifications to the LVTP5A1. Divisional cavalry squadrons and separate cavalry troops,
however, were subject to the CARS system. In effect, some
US Army Cavalry Units Cavalry Regiments were broken up and some remained
Cavalry is unique in name to the US Army if not necessarily as coherent entities.
being unique to that service in function. Cavalry has Secondly, to add to potential confusion, in August 1921,
historically acted in a wide variety of roles including the US Army had constituted and activated an entire cavalry
acting as a scout element for various command echelons, division, the 1st Cavalry Division. With the outbreak of
a mobile element capable of performing flanking or World War II, this unit was converted to an infantry division
reaction operations, or as an independent unit to perform and sent to the Pacific theater. It retained its name, however,
harassment of enemy forces. After the horse-mounted and would continue to do despite never returning to a true
cavalryman ceased to be an element of the US Army, cavalry organization ever again.
cavalry units went through numerous transitions, before it By 1965, the 1st Cavalry Division had been reorganized
was finally decided to organize cavalry units using either as an entirely new type of unit, an Airmobile Division. It
infantry or armor TOEs, a policy that helped solidify its retained its name, however, being formally designated the
unique position. 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile). Under CARS, a battalion

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AMBUSH VALLEY

or squadron’s parent regiment only represented the unit M114 scout vehicles and the tank section was to have had
which it drew its lineage and honors from, not necessarily three M41A3 light tanks. An additional M114 was provided
being representative of its current organization. Thus, the for the Platoon Commander. The support squad had a
infantry elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile), single M106A1 mortar carrier, while the rifle squad was
contained units such as the 1st Battalion (Airmobile), mounted in an M113A1 armored personnel carrier.
7th Cavalry and the 1st Squadron (Air), 9th Cavalry, one For Vietnam, an MTOE was issued that saw the
being an infantry battalion, the other being the Division’s replacement of all M114s with M113A1 armored personnel
cavalry squadron, neither being related in terms of unit carriers and the three M41A3s with two M48A3 tanks.
organization, but both having parent cavalry regiments. This required the substitution of the M578 recovery vehicle
In short, Cavalry in the US Army can be confusing. with an M88, as the M578 was not capable of recovering
The units covered in this section are divisional cavalry the M48A3 tank.
squadrons and separate cavalry troops, the armored cavalry The M113A1s were further configured with additional
regiment (of which one was deployed to Vietnam), and the weapons and armor, initially referred to as the Armored
massive variations among these units. Airmobile infantry Cavalry Assault Vehicle (ACAV) configuration, though it
units are described in the section on US Army infantry. was later applied to M113A1s in other units as well. The rifle
squad’s M113A1 was also upgraded to this standard. The
Division and Brigade configuration included belly armor to help the vehicle
Cavalry Units withstand mine strikes, gun and side shields for the track
US Army Armored Cavalry Troop, commander, and rear shields and mounts for two additional
Cavalry Squadron, Infantry and 7.62mm M60 machine guns.
Infantry Division (Mechanized)
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 Scout Section, Armored Cavalry Platoon
Armored Cavalry Troops of divisional armored cavalry 4x M113A1 ACAV
squadrons found in infantry and mechanized infantry
divisions were identical. These were also identical to those With:
found in armored divisions, but since no elements of any 2x NCO w/Rifle
armored divisions were deployed to Vietnam, this has been 2x Asst. Squad Leaders w/Rifle
omitted from the section title. 4x Scout Observer w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt.
The armored cavalry troop was comprised of a Troop AP:1/AT:0)
Headquarters and three Armored Cavalry Platoons. The 4x Scout Driver w/Rifle
Troop Headquarters featured a ground surveillance section,
featuring two M113A1s with the AN/PPS-5 radar. These Tank Section, Armored Cavalry Platoon
were later removed in an official MTOE change. The Troop 2x M48A3 Patton
Headquarters also had two additional M113A1 ACAVs,
plus an additional carrier and an M578 recovery vehicle in With:
a maintenance section. 2x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
Each platoon included a Platoon Headquarters, a Scout 2x Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
Section, a Tank Section, a Support Squad, and a Rifle 2x Loader w/M1911 Pistol
Squad. On paper the scout section was to have had four 2x Driver w/M1911 Pistol

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 Unit Organizations

Support Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon operation for tank crews closely followed the modifications
1x M106A1 w/4.2” M30 Mortar for tank crews in tank companies, as noted in the previous
section. Cavalry troops operated as coherent units on
With: operations or could split off individual platoons for smaller
1x NCO w/Rifle missions. Entire squadrons rarely worked together.
1x Mortar Gunner w/M1911 Pistol The support squads were also often removed from the
1x Asst. Mortar Gunner w/M1911 Pistol platoons and concentrated in improvised batteries at squadron
1x Ammo Bearer w/Rifle level. The relative engagement distances encountered in
1x Driver w/Rifle Vietnam eventually led to an official MTOE decision to
replace the M106A1 with the M125A1 mortar carrier,
Rifle Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon equipped with the lighter 81mm M29 mortar. However, units
1x M113A1 ACAV were sometimes reissued M106A1s to replace lost M125A1s.
1x APC Driver w/Rifle Beginning in 1969, another major change began for
divisional cavalry units. The first M551 Sheridan light tanks
With: appeared in-theater at this time, eventually replacing the
1x NCO Squad Leader w/Rifle M48A3s in all the squadrons. The M551 had been specially
2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle designed to replace the M41 light tank and the M56 self-
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) propelled anti-tank gun.
4x Rifleman w/Rifle The tank was equipped with a 152mm combination
gun-missile launcher intended to give it better firepower
Each tank also carried two .45-caliber M3 submachine guns against enemy armor. A lack of enemy armor in Vietnam
to be used by the crew. As with infantry units, personnel led to many tanks being modified to a so-called “Two Box”
equipped with “rifles” would have had either M14s or configuration. In this configuration missile stowage and
M16A1s. Personnel equipped with “automatic rifles” would firing components were removed from the tank to make
have either had M14 Modified or M16A1s Airborne units, room for additional 7.62mm and .50-caliber machine gun
along with Airmobile units and Army Special Forces had ammunition. For Vietnam, a gun shield for the tank
been authorized the M16A1 beginning in 1964. Other
M551 Sheridan Tank. (Piers Brand)
infantry units retained the mix of the M14 and M14
Modified rifles until. By June 1966 sufficient M16A1s had
been made available for all units deploying to Vietnam.
Units already in Vietnam had also been transitioning from
the M14 to the M16A1.
The organization above represents the paper organization
with the basic modifications in the TOE to the major
equipment. In practice, further fluctuations were common.
Firstly, as in mechanized infantry units, the rifle squad
quickly became a mounted element, often reduced in size.
In the case of cavalry units, it was often added to the
scout section as an additional scout vehicle. The concept of

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commander was also developed. In some cases a dual division beginning in 1968. The 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne
.50-caliber machine gun mount was installed at the tank Division, which also deployed to Vietnam in 1968, was
commander’s position or a mount for a machine gun was similarly airborne in name only.
installed at the loader’s position. With the exception of the major differences in
equipment found in these cavalry troops, the organization
US Army Cavalry Troop, Cavalry itself remained relatively identical. The troops remained
Squadron, Airborne and organized around a troop headquarters and three cavalry
Airmobile Division Or Separate platoons. Each of the platoons had a platoon headquarters,
Brigade (Light) scout section, mortar squad, and rifle squad, with the tank
It is worth mentioning immediately in this section that section being replaced by an anti-tank section.
according to the paper TOE, the Airborne Division’s On paper, scouts were mounted in 1/4-ton M151 trucks,
Cavalry Squadron on paper was supposed to mimic that each with a 7.62mm M60 machine gun. Another M151 was
of the Infantry and Armored Divisions, with the sole found in the platoon headquarters. The anti-tank section
exception of the M41A3 light tanks being replaced by M56 had two M151C weapons carriers, each with a 106mm M40
self-propelled anti-tank guns. However, the official field recoilless rifle. The platoon’s 81mm M29 mortar and rifle
manuals on the subject clearly state those operational squad were carried in 3/4-ton M37 trucks. The 81mm
requirements could see the replacement of the squadron’s mortar was not capable of being fired from within the truck
tracked vehicles with wheeled vehicles if it was deemed as was the case with the M106 and M125 mortar carriers.
more appropriate.
So, for Vietnam, the cavalry troops of the airborne Scout Section, Cavalry Platoon
division’s cavalry squadron were organized on the same lines 4x M151 w/7.62mm M60 Machine Gun
as that of the airmobile division’s cavalry squadron and
separate cavalry troops found in separate light infantry With:
brigades. Any distinction became entirely moot with the 2x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
conversion of the 101st Airborne Division to an airmobile 2x Asst. Squad Leaders w/M16A1 Rifle
4x Scout Observer w/M16A1 Rifle
Airmobile! (Piers Brand)
4x Scout Driver w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt.
AP:1/AT:0)

Anti-Tank Section, Armored Cavalry Platoon

2x M151C w/106mm M40 Recoilless Rifle

With:
1x NCO w/M1911 Pistol
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
2x Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle
2x Loader w/M16A1 Rifle
2x Driver w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)

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 Unit Organizations

Support Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon US Army Air Cavalry Troop,

1x M37 w/81mm M29 Mortar Cavalry Squadron, Infantry,
Infantry Division (Mechanized),
With: Airborne Division, Airmobile
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle Division, or Separate Brigade
1x Mortar Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle (Light)
1x Asst. Mortar Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle After 1965, the Air Cavalry Troop had become an organic
1x Ammo Bearer w/M16A1 Rifle component of the divisional cavalry squadron in infantry,
1x Driver w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) mechanized infantry, airborne, and armored divisions. In
the airmobile division the divisional cavalry squadron had
Rifle Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon three air cavalry troops and only a single cavalry troop. The
1x M37 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) (Separate) had a separate air
cavalry troop attached to it between August 1971 and June
With: 1972, when it departed Vietnam.
1x NCO Squad Leader w/M16A1 Rifle The air cavalry troop contained a Troop Headquarters,
2x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle Operations Section, Aeroscout Platoon, Aerorifle Platoon,
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. and Aeroweapons Section. The original paper
AP:1/AT:0) configuration dating back to 1963 had separated the
2x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle Aeroscout Platoon into two Aeroscout (Light) sections
and a single Aeroscout (Heavy) section. Each light
Airborne and Airmobile Divisions had been designated in Aeroscout section had four OH-13S helicopters, with
1964 as being priority for the conversion from the M14 rifle another two in the platoon headquarters. The heavy
to the M16A1 rifle. The first separate light infantry brigade section was to be
to deploy to Vietnam, the 196th, converted to the M16A1 equipped with four
before deploying in 1966. After 1966, all incoming units armed UH-1B
would have had the M16A1 rifle. helicopters. The
As with the armored cavalry troops, cavalry platoon Aerorifle platoon
mortars were often grouped in provisional batteries at troop had a
level. The prime mover was often substituted for an
additional M151, as was the M37 authorized for the rifle
squad. The rifle squad, of a smaller size according to the
TOE for cavalry troops, was often reorganized as an
additional scout element, combined with the additional
vehicle from the mortar squad. The two anti-tank carriers
were also often converted to scout element, with the
M40 recoilless rifles left at base or left in storage before
deployment, following the trend for other units deploying Specialist
(E4), 173rd
with this weapon.
Airborne
Brigade,
1968

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platoon headquarters with five UH-1D helicopters, and Beginning in 1966, the UH-1C began to replace the
four Aerorifle squads. The Aeroweapons platoon had an UH-1B as the helicopter in the Aeroweapons platoons.
additional four armed UH-1B helicopter. Weapons were also widely variable. Aviation units across
By 1966, the heavy section had been merged with the the board experimented with a plethora of weapon systems
Aeroweapons section to form an Aeroweapons platoon. and combinations. For the OH-13S, the M2 armament
Generally the helicopters were broken into two sections of subsystem with two 7.62mm M60Cs was the norm. One
four aircraft. Later organizational changes provided two or both guns were often removed and manned by the
additional armed helicopters in a platoon headquarters. crew chief from the helicopter’s cockpit. Grenades and
The Aerorifle platoon also often had the lift helicopters split improvised bombs might also be carried.
into a separate lift section. For the UH-1B/C, the M16 armament subsystem, which
featured four 7.62mm M60C machine guns and bomb
2x Aeroscout Section, Aeroscout Platoon racks for two seven-tube rocket pods were made available
4x OH-13S w/M2 armament subsystem. beginning in 1965. An improvement to this system,
replacing the M60Cs with two 7.62mm M134 “Miniguns”,
With: designated the M21, began being fielded in late 1966,
2x Officer w/M1911 Pistol becoming the most widespread of the systems. The M3
2x Warrant Officer w/M1911 Pistol subsystem, with twenty-four tube rocket pods on either side
4x Crew Chief w/M1911 Pistol of the helicopter saw continued use. The M22 subsystem,
with three AGM-22B guided anti-tank missiles mounted
Lift Section, Aerorifle Platoon on either side of the helicopter, did not see widespread
5x UH-1D w/2x 7.62mm M60 Machine Gun (Med. use for lack of appropriate point targets. Some units also
AP:3/AT:0) acquired the M5 nose turret, fitted with a 40mm M75
automatic grenade launcher.
With: When the TOE was developed for the air cavalry troop,
5x Warrant Officer w/M1911 Pistol the UH-1Ds in the Aerorifle platoon were to have been
5x Crew Chief w/M1911 Pistol equipped with the M6 armament subsystem, featuring four
7.62mm M60C machine guns. It became clear during trials
4x Aerorifle Squad, Aerorifle Platoon and exercises that the helicopters could not handle the
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
A "Hog". (Piers Brand)
2x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2x Automatic Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
3x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle

2x Aeroweapons Section, Aeroweapons Platoon

4x UH-1B/C w/M3 or M22 Armament Subsystem

With:
4x Warrant Officer w/M1911 Pistol
4x Crew Chief w/M1911 Pistol

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 Unit Organizations

Also in 1967, an improved lift helicopter, the UH-1H,

began to enter service. The biggest difference between the
UH-1D and the UH-1H, was the -1H’s improved engine,
generating three-hundred additional horsepower. The
UH-1Hs were equipped similarly to the UH-1D helicopters
in terms of defensive weaponry.
By 1969, the organization of the Aerorifle squad had
changed. The squad was reduced one member, but also
authorized an M60 machine gun.

4x Aerorifle Squad, Aerorifle Platoon

A "Slick". (Piers Brand)
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
weight of the subsystem and armed troops. Initially, 2x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
so-called “free” M60s became the solution. This involved the 2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
improvised mounting of one or two 7.62mm M60 machine 2x Automatic Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
guns to the helicopter cabin using bungee cords. This was 2x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
later officially replaced with the M23 armament subsystem,
a purpose built door-gun installation for the M60. Some No individual was assigned to the
door-gunners preferred the freedom of the bungee cord weapon. The lift helicopters were
weapons and retained this installation even after the M23s authorized only one M23 armament
were issued. subsystem according to the TOE,
Beginning in 1966, the OH-6A scout helicopter was so the understanding would
introduced to replace the OH-13S. This helicopter could have been that this
be equipped with an M134 Minigun or 40mm M129 machine gun would
automatic grenade launcher on the M27 or M8 armament have likely been mounted
subsystems respectively. In practice, these weapons were on the helicopter.
not always fitted. Some units chose to carry the crew chief However, MTOEs later
in the rear with a free M60 instead, or even in addition to authorized lift helicopters
the armament subsystem. Again, grenades and improvised an additional M23
bombs, along with additional small arms were often carried subsystem (those of which
on operations. had not already otherwise
In 1967, Air Cavalry units (along with other relevant acquired an additional
aviation units), began to receive the AH-1G attack subsystem), allowing the
helicopter. This helicopter was intended to replace the squad to utilize the weapon
UH-1B/C helicopters then in use. The first purpose built differently on operations.
attack helicopter to enter US Army service, the AH-1G
Cobra featured a turreted weapon system, with either two
M134 Miniguns, two M129 automatic grenade launchers,
Staff Sergeant, US
or one of each. In addition, it featured four stores pylons 101st Airborne
for rocket pods, gun pods, or other weapons. Division, 1965

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The Armored Cavalry With:

Regiment 3x NCO w/Rifle
In September 1966, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment 3x Asst. Squad Leaders w/Rifle
arrived in Vietnam. It would be the only armored cavalry 6x Scout Observer w/M79 Grenade Launcher
regiment deployed to the conflict. Its organization was (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
similar to that of a separate brigade combat team, with 6x Scout Driver w/Rifle
various attachments intended to help it operate as an
independent unit, including, but not limited to, engineers, Support Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon
military police, and various maintenance and logistics 1x M106A1 w/4.2” M30 Mortar
elements. By the time of its deployment, its organization
had already been modified. With:
1x NCO w/Rifle
US Army Armored Cavalry Troop, 1x Mortar Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
Armored Cavalry Squadron, 1x Asst. Mortar Gunner w/M1911 Pistol
Armored Cavalry Regiment 1x Ammo Bearer w/Rifle
At the time, the armored cavalry squadron of an armored 1x Driver w/Rifle
cavalry regiment consisted of some elements similar to
those found in a divisional cavalry squadron. The squadron Rifle Squad, Armored Cavalry Platoon
included a Headquarters and Headquarters Troop and 1x M113A1 ACAV
three Armored Cavalry Troops. Unlike the divisional
squadrons, each squadron of the armored cavalry regiment With:
also contained its own organic Tank Company and 1x NCO w/Rifle
Howitzer Battery (discussed in this chapter’s “Above Troop 2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
Level” section). 2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt.
On paper, the Armored Cavalry Troops were organized AP:1/AT:0)
in roughly the same manner as those in the divisional 4x Rifleman w/Rifle
squadrons. For Vietnam, however, by order of General 1x APC Driver w/Rifle
Westmoreland himself, the Armored Cavalry Troops of the
11th Armored Cavalry Regiment were modified to contain As in the other cavalry elements, the M113A1s were all
M113A1s only. These vehicles not only replaced the TOE brought up to the ACAV standard and the M106A1s were
authorized M114s, but also the tanks in the individual replaced by M125A1s. In the 3rd Squadron, 11th Armored
troops’ tank sections, effectively creating an additional pair Cavalry Regiment, the M106A1s were retained. Mortars
of scout vehicles in the scout section. All the vehicles were were often consolidated at squadron level as with their
equipped with the ACAV kit. The support and rifle squads divisional counterparts. In 1969, the 11th Armored Cavalry
remained unchanged. Regiment began to receive the M551 Sheridan light tank.
The two additional M113A1s that had been added to the
Scout Section, Armored Cavalry Platoon Armored Cavalry Troops were deleted and replaced by
6x M113A1 ACAV three M551 Sheridan light tanks, the official TOE allotment
for the formation.

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 Unit Organizations

US Army Air Cavalry Troop, Heavy Weapons Platoon

Armored Cavalry Regiment 4x UH-1C w/M5 Armament Subsystem
The entire 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment had only a
single Air Cavalry Troop. This unit was initially organized With:
along similar lines to that found in divisional squadrons. 4x Warrant Officer w/M1911 Pistol
However, this organization was changed very quickly after 4x Crew Chief w/M1911 Pistol
deployment to Vietnam.
The drastic modifications to the organization of the Air The 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, like its divisional
Cavalry Troop were facilitated by the fact that the counterparts, began replacing the scout helicopters in the
Headquarters and Headquarters Troops of the Armored squadron aviation sections with the OH-6A after it became
Cavalry Squadrons in the Armored Cavalry Regiment all available in 1966. It also began to replace the UH-1C
contained organic aviation sections. The decision was with the AH-1G and the UH-1D with the
made to strip the UH-1C utility helicopters from these UH-1H after they became available
aviation sections and exchange them for the scout in 1967.
helicopters in the Air Cavalry Troop. Interesting to note is
that the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment was initially Above Troop
authorized the OH-23G scout helicopter instead of the Level
OH-13S found in divisional squadrons. A wide array of capabilities
The resulting organization contained a Troop and additional firepower
Headquarters, an Operations Section, three Light Weapons were available to cavalry
Platoons (one to support each of the Regiment’s three units at squadron
squadrons), a Heavy Weapons Platoon, an Aerorifle level and above. With
Platoon, and a Service Platoon. The Aerorifle Platoon was individual troops,
organized along similar lines to the divisional Aerorifle even in the Armored
platoon, but only had four lift helicopters and no assigned Cavalry Regiment,
command helicopter. The Light Weapons Platoons each often operating
had five UH-1C helicopters with the M16 armament independently, these
subsystem, while the Heavy Weapons Platoon had four assets were often
UH-1C helicopters initially armed only with the M5 shuffled around.
armament subsystem. These helicopters were later It is also important
equipped with the M156 Multiarmament Mount to allow to note that
the use of rocket pods.

3x Light Weapons Platoon

5x UH-1C w/M16 Armament Subsystem

With:
5x Warrant Officer w/M1911 Pistol
5x Crew Chief w/M1911 Pistol PFC, 3rd Brigade,
82nd Airborne
Division, 1970

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AMBUSH VALLEY

while divisional cavalry elements had many commonalities, replaced by M113A1 ACAVs, while the same was true of the
the divisional cavalry squadron was different between vehicle assigned to the air cavalry troop’s Air Control Team.
divisions. Infantry and armored division cavalry squadrons
had three armored cavalry troops and an air cavalry troop. THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
Airborne division cavalry squadrons only had two cavalry The history of the modern state of the Republic of
troops and an air cavalry troop. As noted before, the airmobile Vietnam, better known as South Vietnam (and not to be
division had three air cavalry troops and a cavalry troop. confused with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or
Like the HHC of the mechanized infantry battalion, the North Vietnam), is tumultuous and complex. This is an
Headquarters and Headquarters Troop of the divisional extremely basic introduction with a focus toward the
cavalry squadron contained additional ground surveillance content of this supplement.
radar assets. When the decision was made to remove the The modern South Vietnamese state came into being in
ground surveillance assets from the individual troops, the 1954, after an abortive attempt by the French to maintain a
squadron’s ground surveillance section was reduced from hold on what had previously been a major foreign colony.
eight radar teams to six. Like the HHC of the tank battalion, Under the Geneva Accords that ended the fighting between
it contained an AVLB section. It was eventually authorized the French and the communist-inspired nationalist
a Flame Platoon, with four M132 flamethrower vehicles, as movement led by Ho Chi Minh, two states would be created
in the mechanized infantry battalion. from what had previously existed as the French administrative
The ground surveillance assets of the armored cavalry regions of Tonkin, Annam, and Chochinchina. The Republic
troops in the armored cavalry regiment were similarly of Vietnam in the south and the Democratic Republic of
reduced. The three armored cavalry squadrons also gained a Vietnam in the north were to be separated by a demilitarized
Flame Section with three M132A1 flamethrower vehicles, as zone centered at the seventeenth parallel, with the
opposed to the platoon of four in their divisional counterparts. understanding that a state referendum take place on
As has already been noted, the squadrons of the armored unification soon thereafter.
cavalry regiment also contained an organic tank company In the Republic of Vietnam, the government that had
and howitzer battery. The tank company was organized been established by the French, centered on a largely
identically to the companies of the tank battalion (see the ceremonial monarchy and democratic parliament became
chapter on US military armor units). Each squadron’s the official government of the state. The ineffectual
howitzer battery contained six M108 self-propelled 105mm emperor Bao Dai lasted only two years before his Prime
howitzers. In January 1967, these were exchanged for an Minister Ngo Dinh Diem managed to consolidate power
equal number of M109 self-propelled 155mm howitzers. from his opponents, dissolve the monarchy, and establish
A ten-man security detail in each battery, intended to secure an almost neo-fascist police state. Public support for
nuclear artillery rounds during operations, was deleted in reunification, which almost undoubtedly would have
Vietnam because of the units not being issued the rounds. resulted in the establishment of the communist-inspired
The Regimental Headquarters also contained its own government in the north taking control, is debatable.
organic scout section, similar to that found in infantry and However, it is clear that Ngo Dinh Diem left nothing to
armor battalion headquarters and headquarters companies. chance, corrupting the required referendum to a large
It was initially equipped with four 1/4-ton M151 vehicles, degree and ensuring the continued division of the country.
but these were exchanged for M113A1 ACAVs. In addition Ngo Dinh Diem continued to consolidate authority after
the wheeled vehicles for the three Forward Observer Teams 1956, pursuing a populist national development program,
and Battery Survey Detail in each howitzer battery were but allowing for little public dissent. That Diem was a devout

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 Unit Organizations

Catholic, a decided minority in the majority Buddhist various political actors from a potential coup. Not knowing
nation, and that nepotism was a key feature of his what might happen day to day in the government meant
government, meant that discontent with his regime quickly that unit commanders might have self-preservation on
began to soar. His violent repression of protesting Buddhist their minds, in some cases being reticent to commit their
monks during the 1960s meant that support for his regime troops to combat unless victory could be assured.
was virtually non-existent by 1963, even in the United States. Despite all the clear issues experienced, it is unfair to say
Diem was assassinated in a violent military coup in 1963, that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), or any
along with his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu, the head of the state’s of the other service branches, was outright cowardly or
secret police apparatus, and other members of his family. inept as a rule, as has been suggested in American popular
While the subsequent governments were perhaps less culture. The military forces of the Republic of Vietnam
autocratic, corruption, patronage, and nepotism remained reflected the diverse politics and culture of the country, and
a key element of South Vietnam’s political scene. Between as a result reflected all the good and the bad things about it.
the coup against Diem and the establishment of a new This chapter looks primarily at the units of the ARVN, but
government under President Nguyen Van Thieu and Prime also at those of the Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC).
Minister Nguyen Cao Ky, there were numerous coups and The quality of ARVN troops
countercoups. The government was effectively run by a varied dramatically among units,
junta formed around the Diem coup leader, Duong Van ranging from very good to very
Minh, otherwise known as Big Minh. poor. Many ARVN units were capable
The government of Thieu and Ky faced similar concerns of extremely hard fighting against a
about internal unrest, not only from the government of capable enemy.
North Vietnam, but from within its own government and The soldiers of the ARVN
military. After a decade of battling essentially form a sense have received bad press over the
of national unity and then defend it against the forces of the years, especially in wargame
North, South Vietnam found itself in a conventional civil rules, and it is hoped that
war that lasted two years and ended with the fall of Saigon the more balanced appraisal
in early 1975. Soon thereafter, South Vietnam ceased to presented here will inspire
exist, forcibly reunified with the rest of the nation. people to try playing the
From the end of the French period right up until the end Vietnam War with
of the South Vietnamese state, the military suffered greatly something other than
from the same overarching corruption and paranoia (much the usual US Forces.
of it not without reason or precedent) as the rest of the This list can be used
Republic of Vietnam. Its leadership was extremely variable. to recreate forces from
The largest of the services, the Army of the Republic early in the war to the
of Vietnam, had extremely professional units, with good final hard-fought battles
discipline and morale. It also contained units where recruits against the NVA.
might pay off their officers and never report for duty. ARVN forces have a default
Desertion remained a serious problem right up until the end. rating of troop quality Troop
Units themselves were often caught up in the political
scene, degrading their combat effectiveness. Equipment People’s Self-Defense
might be withheld or units might be found protecting Corps Militiaman, 1968

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Quality D8 and Morale D8. Players should feel free to try

out different combinations as the quality of ARVN troops
varied dramatically. This can then be further modified
dependent upon scenario or the unit a player wishes to
recreate. Some other examples of ARVN forces are:
ARVN Rangers – Veteran (D10) / Morale D10
9th Infantry Division – Poor (D6) / Morale D6*
22nd Infantry Division – Troop Quality D8 / Morale D10**

*The ARVN 9th Infantry Division is included here as

ARVN. (Piers Brand)
the ARVN itself called it the “worst division in the army”
with poor combat performance and very high desertion
rates. MAAG-V), this steadily began to change. MAAG-V was
**The 22nd Infantry Division is one of the average units further expanded to become Military Advisory Command
in the ARVN but has been given a higher Morale as it was – Vietnam (MACV) in 1965.
one of the last formations to surrender. By the early 1960s, the reorganized ARVN infantry
units reflected their United States Army counterparts of
the time. What French equipment that had remained had
ARVN Special Rules largely been replaced by US stock of World War II and
Follow the Leader Korean War vintage. By around 1963, the basic infantry
ARVN units with a Troop Quality D8 or below must company was organized on paper essentially along the
have line of sight to a leader figure or a unit leader in lines of a United States Army Infantry Company, with
order to move. If the unit does not have a leader the a Company Headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a
unit must pass a Troop Quality check in order to Weapons Platoon.
move. This does not affect their ability to fire. The rifle platoons were to include a platoon
headquarters, three rifle squads, and a weapons squad.

Platoon HQ
Infantry Units 1x Officer w/SMG
ARVN Infantry Company, Infantry 1x NCO w/SMG
Battalion, Infantry Regiment 1x RTO w/Rifle
Troop Quality D8, Morale D6 to D10 1x Rifleman w/Rifle
The infantry forces of the ARVN came from units that had
initially been raised by the French as part of so-called 3x Rifle Squad
French Union forces. These units had by and large been 1x Squad Leader w/SMG
staffed with French officers and organized along the lines of 2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
French units of the time. With the withdrawal of French 2x Grenadier w/Rifle and Rifle Grenade Launcher
military advisers in 1956 and their replacement with a (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG – Vietnam or 6x Rifleman w/Rifle

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 Unit Organizations

Weapons Squad Rifle Squad (Fire)

1x Squad Leader w/SMG 1x Squad Leader w/SMG
2x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) 2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
2x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/Rifle 5x Rifleman w/Rifle

The terms “rifle” and “SMG” in these categories are variable, The unit structure more or less fluctuated between reduced
and can represent a variety of weapons. The SMG category organizations like those above and the paper organization
should generally represent either the M1 Thompson SMG previously noted. The infantry weapons did change. As
or the M3 SMG. Rifles could mean either the M1 Garand early as 1961, under the auspices of the US Advanced
rifle or the M1 carbine, decidedly different weapons. The Research Projects Agency (ARPA), various units in the
M1 Garand was to have been the standard issue weapon, South Vietnamese military began limited testing of the
but it was quickly found that the weapon was unsuited to Armalite AR-15 rifle. A lightweight rifle, testing concluded
the stature of the average South Vietnamese rifleman. by 1962 that it was an appropriate substitute for the
M1 carbines (and the automatic M2 variant) were much weapons available to the Vietnamese rifleman.
more popular, as were submachine guns. Rifle grenade A complex and not altogether reasonable set of factors
launchers for the M1 Garand and M1 carbines and variants meant that it took another five years before the weapon,
were made available to grenadiers. The company also had adopted by the United States military as the M16. The first
a weapons platoon with two 60mm M2 mortars, two deliveries of the weapon went to the ARVN’s sole airborne
3.5” M20A1B1 rocket launchers, and two .30-caliber infantry element and the VNMC. By the end of 1967, not all
M1919A4/A6 machine guns. regular ARVN units had converted. Similarly, around the
This paper organization suffered from casualties the same time, other weapons began to be replaced. Grenadiers
ARVN experienced in the early 1960s, as well as desertion. received the M79 grenade launcher and the M1919A4/A6
The weapons squad often ceased to exist, its BARs added to machine guns were replaced by M60s. Units still issuing the
greatly reduced squads of only eight men. Rifle grenades M20A1B1 rocket launcher might see them replaced with
do not appear to have been widely used. Without enemy the 66mm M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW).
armor or point targets it appears that the M20A1B1 was
also often not issued. A rifle company circa 1963 might ARVN forces search a hooch during a sweep
have an organization similar to the following: through a contested village. (Piers Brand)

Platoon HQ
1x Officer w/SMG
1x NCO/RTO w/SMG

2x Rifle Squad (Maneuver)

1x Squad Leader w/SMG
1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/Rifle
5x Rifleman w/Rifle

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At battalion level, infantry units had access to 81mm

M1 mortars and 57mm M18 recoilless rifles. The battalion
weapons element for a period also included the 75mm
M20 recoilless rifle, but the weapons weight and utility
led it into disuse. The M18, while declared obsolete
by the US military, continued to serve for some time in
South Vietnam.
It is also important to note that as of 1963, the Infantry
Battalion was the highest organizational level. However, by
1967, Regiments of three battalions had been formed, and
these formed into Divisions of three Regiments, following,
broadly the structure of the US Army, with the exception
of still having the Regiment as a
ARVN on an independent patrol. (Piers Brand)
tactical unit.
The jump qualified companies, were later formed into light infantry battalions.
Airborne Battalion had also They received more intense training than basic infantry
been expanded into a full units. These units would likely have had better morale than
Airborne Division. Ranger their regular infantry counterparts.
Infantry Battalions had also
been collected into Ranger ARVN Mechanized Rifle Troop,
Groups (similar in size to Armored Cavalry Squadron
Infantry Regiments), but Troop Quality D8, Morale D6 to D10
not into full divisions, Early on, armored formations of the ARVN were generally
being instead used some of the most politically charged units. After the
as reaction elements deliveries of the first M113A1 armored personnel carriers
within provinces to and M114 scout vehicles began in late 1962, civilians
reinforce more static quickly took to referring to them as “Ballot Boxes.”
regular infantry Armored Cavalry Squadrons were often tasked with
units. Both of these defense of static installations and important infrastructure.
units should have Between 1964 and 1966, two of the squadrons were held in
been broadly organized general reserve, often interpreted as protection against
along the same lines as potential coups. Squadrons did conduct other missions,
other ARVN infantry such as supporting divisions in their assigned provinces or
units, but with access detaching mechanized rifle elements to support them. They
to better resources. The also performed route security and convoy escort missions.
Rangers, initially trained as The ARVN armored cavalry squadron differed greatly
special counter-insurgency from its inception from its US Army counterparts. It
functioned more as a rapid reaction element, with both armor
Grenadier, ARVN and mechanized infantry. The squadron’s basic organization
Rangers, 1968 consisted initially of a tank troop (to be discussed under

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armored units), an armored car troop (also to be discussed arrangement. Weapons fits to the other personnel carriers
under armored units), and a varying number of mechanized between 1963 and 1966 were extremely varied. The standard
infantry troops. configuration for the M113A1 was a single .50-caliber M2
The ARVN Mechanized Rifle Troop looked very much machine gun mounted externally on top of the hatch for the
like the regular infantry company, with the addition of tracker commander. The recoil of the weapon was found to
M113A1 armored personnel carriers. It consisted of a Troop be severe for South Vietnamese gunners. The gunner was
Headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a Support Platoon. also found to be seriously vulnerable while manning the
The Rifle Platoons consisted of a Platoon Headquarters weapon. Improvised shields were quickly fitted to a number
and three Rifle Squads. No weapons squad was found in of the vehicles.
the rifle platoons, much like the reduced strength infantry In response to this, the US Army Concept Team in
companies. Vietnam (ACTIV) procured a small number of turreted
weapon systems for test by the ARVN. Three Navy 100E
Platoon HQ turrets with a single .30-caliber machine gun and nine Aircraft
1x Officer w/SMG Armament M74A turrets with two .30-caliber machine guns
1x NCO w/SMG
1x RTO w/Rifle
1x Rifleman w/Rifle

3x Rifle Squad
1x M113A1 APC

With: (not to be
1x Squad Leader w/SMG confused with
2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle the Cadillac Gage
2x Grenadier w/Rifle and Rifle Grenade Launcher T-50 used by the
(Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Australian Army)
6x Rifleman w/Rifle were supplied. The
1x Vehicle Driver turrets, like those on
the M48A3 tank and
The individual weapons and their changes mirrored that of LTVP5A1 amphibious
the ARVN infantry companies. The Support Platoon tractor were found to be
contained three 81mm M1 mortars and a section of two cramped and the weapons
57mm M18 recoilless rifles, along with four M113A1 APCs hard to load. The power of
to carry them. In practice, while the recoilless rifle teams the .50-caliber weapon
would dismount from their carrier, the ARVN devised a was also desirable. The
method of securing the M1 mortar to the floor of the turrets were eventually
M113A1, allowing it to be fired through the rear hatch, discontinued.
much like the later purpose built M125A1 mortar carrier.
Eventually, the ARVN would receive the purpose built ARVN Infantry M60
M125A1 mortar carrier and replace the improvised Gunner, 1969

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Experiments continued with the fitting of 20mm it difficult to operate. Eventually, a vehicle more closely
Oerlikon cannon, 57mm M18 recoilless rifles and other relating a miniaturized version of the tank-based AVLBs
weapons at the commander’s position, but ultimately none being utilized by the US Army was developed and put
proved to be functional replacements. At least one M113A1 into operation. Units also eventually received to some
was modified with the turret from an M8 Greyhound degree M113A1s fitted with a bulldozer blade kit for
armored car. These conversions also never entered active clearing obstacles.
service. ARVN Cavalry Squadrons did eventually receive
small numbers of M132A1 flamethrower vehicles, which ARVN Regional Force Company,
could be attached to individual units during operations. Regional Force Battalion
Ultimately, the .50-caliber machine gun was retained, Untrained (Troop Quality D6), Morale D6 to D8
and additional .30-caliber weapons were added to the sides In addition to the regular infantry units and marines,
of the hull at the rear hatch to allowed mounted infantry a each province contained a number of Regional Force (RF)
greater field of fire. All were supplied with improvised Companies. These territorial militia units had existed in
shields. This configuration predated and influenced the US various forms prior to 1964 as Civil Guard Companies, under
Army’s Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle configuration, the direct control of province chiefs. What this had meant in
which was later supplied to the ARVN replacing the practice is that they were often decidedly under-strength,
improvised kits. ill-equipped, almost untrained, and sometimes worse.
The need to clear short obstacles, often filled with water In 1964, under the auspices of MAAG-V, the Civil Guard
immediately became clear in Vietnam. The distance between was replaced by the Regional Force, under centralized control
rice paddy dikes had made it clear that the M114 scout of the authorities of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
vehicle was inadequate for the terrain. Improvised bridging What this did was make the RF into at least a more organized
equipment was also developed for the M113A1. By 1966, and reasonably trained force, with more formalized
testing had commenced of an early M113A1 AVLB. While recruitment and unit structure. The RF units remained low
useful, the initial variant was useful, the bridge protruded on the priority list for weapons and other equipment.
conspicuously from the front of the carrier vehicle, making In terms of organization, the RF Company mirrored the
reduced strength regular ARVN infantry company of the
A supply convoy with an ARVN escort (Piers
Brand) early 1960. It also consisted of a Company Headquarters,
three rifle platoons, and a weapons platoon. The rifle platoons
consisted of a platoon headquarters, three rifle squads, and
no weapons squad.

Platoon HQ
1x Officer w/SMG
1x NCO/RTO w/SMG

3x Rifle Squad
1x Squad Leader w/ SMG
1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/Rifle
5x Rifleman w/Rifle

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The company weapons platoon had a machine gun section, Later in 1969, RF Battalions were organized, which
initially with two .30-caliber M1919A4/A6 machine guns. included intelligence and reconnaissance elements. Each
It also had a mortar section that might have either two RF Battalion Headquarters and Headquarters Company
60mm M2 mortars or two 81mm M1 mortars. This varied had a Reconnaissance Team. The team consisted of two
widely from unit to unit depending on what was available. cells of three men, all with rifles.
Rifles and SMGs were as varied as they were in infantry In 1974, in an attempt to provide additional coverage
companies. Rifle squads were supposed to be issued BARs, in provinces, the Regional Mobile Group (RMG) was
but as late as August 1968, reports from MACV showed developed for multi-battalion operations. The RMG
that almost thirty percent of RF units were still without featured a headquarters element, three RF Battalions, and a
them. In 1968, the decision was made to provide the 4-tube 105mm howitzer battery organic to the formation,
M16A1 rifle, M79 grenade launcher, and M60 machine which it could call upon during operations.
gun to RF companies, as had been going on in regular
ARVN infantry units. Shortages of all these weapons ARVN Regional Force Mechanized
meant that many companies continued using the older Platoon
weapons into the 1970s. Units were generally re-equipped Untrained (Troop Quality D6), Morale D6
as a whole. Realizing a need for both mobility and firepower for
Fully automatic M2 carbines were issued as a substitute the Regional Forces, Mechanized Platoons were formed
to some units in lieu of M16A1s. Before the decision to during the early 1960s. One platoon was assigned to each
introduce the M16 to the RFs, the replacement of M1 rifles of the RF Provincial Headquarters. The vehicles and their
and M1 carbines with the M2 carbine had been planned. assigned personnel were used for a variety of purposes
Ironically, the decision to issue the M2 as a stopgap solution such as protecting vital infrastructure (like bridges), road
until more M16A1s could be secured helped achieve near opening, convoy escort, route reconnaissance, and acting
one hundred percent issue of M2s to RF units that had as a reaction element to RF elements under attack. With a
initially be slated to receive them. large number of additional riflemen, the mechanized
Initially, RF companies were used generally to conduct platoon could act in many ways like a mechanized
counter-insurgency missions within provinces, protect infantry unit.
static facilities and infrastructure, and otherwise support RF Mechanized Platoons were broken down into three
operations by regular army or friendly foreign forces in sections, a Headquarters Section, and two Combat Car
their areas of operation. Between 1971 and 1972, in order Sections. The vehicles assigned to these platoons were
to allow for more growth in the Regional Forces, a single initially obsolete hand-me-downs from friendly nations.
soldier was removed from each of the company’s nine rifle The Civil Guard had utilized a small number of Land Rover
squads, and some number from the weapons platoon and light trucks during the 1950s for this purpose. Each of the
headquarters. This allowed the formation of additional RF sections of the Mechanized Platoon had one Ford Lynx
companies, all with reduced seven-man squads. armored car and one GM C15TA armored truck. Both
In 1969, with a desire to make the RF companies more vehicles came from British Commonwealth sources.
useful for protracted military operations, the multi-company
RF elements were organized. The first of these was the RF RF Mechanized Section
Company Group. The RF Company Group headquarters 1x Ford Lynx
did not have any additional weapons. It was largely an 1x GM C15TA
administrative element to direct multi-company operations. 2x Driver w/Rifle

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AMBUSH VALLEY

With: Platoon HQ
2x NCO w/Rifle 1x Officer w/Rifle
8x Rifleman w/Rifle 1x NCO w/Rifle
2x RTO w/Rifle
By 1967, the RF had begun to receive V-100s to replace both 1x Medic w/Rifle
types of vehicles. The V-100s were configured like those of
the regular ARVN armored car troops. The Platoon as a 3x Rifle Squad
whole was allotted two M60 machine guns and a single 1x Squad Leader w/Rifle
60mm M2 mortar beginning at that time to increase its 1x Asst. Squad Leader w/Rifle
firepower. The M60s would likely have been mounted on 8x Rifleman w/Rifle
the rear decks of some of the platoon’s vehicles. While a
mortar carrier version of the V-100 existed, it was not As with RF units, the decision was made in 1968 to refit the
purchased by South Vietnam. The mortar would have had PF with modern weapons. The priority for re-equipped PF
to have been dismounted to be used. The RF Mechanized units was such, that some portion of them no doubt ended
Platoons also experienced the same shifts in their other the war with their original weapons. No heavy weapons were
weapons as other RF elements beginning in 1967 as well. found in the platoon, but as the PF platoons were employed
largely for static defense, machine guns, mortars, and other
ARVN Popular Force Platoon weapons were often locally fabricated or otherwise acquired.
Untrained (Troop Quality D6), Morale D6 Locally made 60mm mortars were known to be among the
A companion to the Civil Guard had existed between 1956 weapons used.
and 1964 in the form of the Self-Defense Corps. Initially As with RF units, PF units saw one soldier removed from
raised to protect individual villages and controlled by each of the rifle squads in a number of the platoons during
district officials, the SDC units were even less organized 1971–72 to assist in the formation of additional PF platoons
and well equipped than their Civil Guard companions. across the districts. PF platoons were never officially
Various militias and paramilitary groups initially supported grouped together into any larger unit organization.
by Diem to consolidate his power had functioned in this
capacity. In 1964, the Self-Defense Corps was transformed VNMC Infantry Company, VNMC
into the Popular Force (PF) in the same manner as the Infantry Battalion
transition from Civil Guard to the RFs. Foreign advisors Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
were assigned to territorial forces as a whole, referred to as The Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) remained one of
the RF/PF (often pronounced “Ruff-Puff ”), a term that the smallest elements of the South Vietnamese military
belied important distinctions and became common among right up until the end. Despite its size, it also remained one
US soldiers in particular. of the most highly demanded units in the general reserve,
While the reorganization did much to solidify the capable of deploying elements anywhere in the country.
structure of the PF, its small size and local focus meant that Marine Infantry came into being as an element of the
it was generally at the bottom of the priority list. Its units Vietnamese Navy (VNN) in 1954. It was formed from a
often received less training than those of the RF. With its collection of infantry units that had been developed by the
largest formation being the platoon and its mission entirely French during previous decade to allow riverine elements
focused around the defense of individual hamlets, this is to respond to attacks from the shore and pursue the enemy
not entirely surprising. or to launch outright offensive operations in the areas

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 Unit Organizations

around the Mekong river delta. Initially consisting of only 1x RTO w/Rifle
two battalions, they were redesignated as the VNMC in 1x Scout w/Rifle
1956. They were removed from the control of the VNN in 2x Corpsman w/Rifle
1961, becoming part of the aforementioned general reserve.
In this position they had the unfortunate habit of being 3x Rifle Squad
committed to the various coups and counter-coups of the 1x NCO w/Rifle
early 1960s. By 1962, the force had been expanded into a 3x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
full brigade and in 1968 was expanded into a two-brigade 3x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
division (with additional support elements also activated). 6x Rifleman w/Rifle
With the complete departure of the French in 1956,
advisory responsibility for the VNMC passed to the United The VNMC was not unlike the ARVN in terms of available
States. The US Navy and US Marine Corps sent advisors to weapons. Riflemen would similarly have been armed with
the VNN and VNMC. Like their ARVN counterparts, the a mix of M1 Garand rifles and M1 Carbines. Officers and
influence of US personnel soon became reflected in the other personnel in the platoon headquarters might also
organization and outfit of the units. The VNMC Infantry have had SMGs rather than rifles or carbines. The weapons
Battalion was smaller in overall manpower, but was platoon of the company would have had weapons similar
organized around four infantry companies, each with a to those in the ARVN, M1919A4/A6 machine guns, 60mm
company headquarters and three infantry platoons and M2 mortars, and 57mm M18 recoilless rifles. As part of the
weapons platoon, just like their USMC counterparts. The general reserve, the VNMC was a priority unit for the influx
platoons had a platoon headquarters and three rifle squads, of new weapons than began in 1967, including the M16A1
which while reduced in size compared to the USMC rifle rifle, M60 machine gun, and M79 grenade launcher. It
squad, were larger than their ARVN counterparts. appears that the M18 recoilless rifle was retained for at least
a period afterwards, in addition to the M72 Light Anti-Tank
Platoon HQ Weapon (LAW).
1x Officer w/Rifle At Battalion level, the VNMC infantry could also count
1x NCO w/Rifle on .50-caliber M2 heavy machine guns and 4.2” mortars

Design Note: VNMC Armor

The VNMC did not have any organic armored the remaining LVT4 amphibious tractors and M29
elements until around 1973, with the delivery Crab amphibious utility vehicles left over from the
of a small number of LVT5A1s. These vehicles French period were assigned to a unit of the ARVN.
were delivered with the intention of forming an The vehicles were in such a state of disrepair that they
amphibious strike capability. These vehicles were were virtually unusable. Spare parts were deemed too
eventually to have been replaced by LVTP7s, but difficult to obtain, so no action was made to move the
the end of the South Vietnamese state prevented units to the control of the VNMC.
this from happening. The VNMC therefore were habitually supported by
As early as 1956, the plan had been to develop this ARVN armored elements like those described later in
capability, but there was little impetus. At that time this chapter during operations.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

(likely the older US M2 mortar, not to be confused with the 1x RTO w/Pistol
60mm M2). The VNMC was otherwise dependent largely on 1x Driver w/M2 Carbine
other services for support. In the 1950s, the only artillery the 1x Medic w/Pistol
VNMC had organic to its organization was additional 4.2”
mortars, with these eventually being supplemented by 75mm 3x Patrol Squad
pack howitzers supplied by the US. During the mid-1960s 1x NCO w/M2 Carbine
the last of the 75mm howitzers were finally phased out and 3x Team Leader w/M2 Carbine
replaced with 105mm M101 howitzers. Advisors had tried to 1x Constable w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
retain the smaller weapons for operations in less agreeable 3x Constable w/M1 Rifle
terrain and as a weapon that could easily be moved by 2x Constable w/Shotgun
helicopters during operations, but the fact that the weapons 3x Constable w/M2 Carbine
were out of production (along with their ammunition) in the
United States-led MACV to decide to remove the weapons The 1/4-ton truck in the platoon headquarters would likely
from the organizational structure altogether. have been an M38A1 or CJ-5, a civilian equivalent. Both
of these vehicles were utilized by
NPFF Company the Vietnamese police and armed
Untrained (Troop Quality D6), Morale D6 forces. They might have been
The National Police Field Force (NPFF) was not part of the replaced later on
armed forces of South Vietnam. It was however, a relatively with M151s. The
large paramilitary organization in many ways on par with the NPFF had less of a
ARVN Regional Force. Created in 1965, it was organized to budget than the
provide additional protection to National Police elements ARVN territorial
across the country. It eventually came to provide additional units and no military
paramilitary support to a wide array of pacification operations, supply chain to receive
often teaming up with Regional Force elements or higher, to improved weapons
provide security and additional manpower during sweeps of through. As of the early
villages or civic actions of various levels. 1970s, the NPFF were still
The basic organization of the NPFF was at the company utilizing the World War II
level. In addition, a single six company battalion existed and Korean-era weaponry
as reserve force for the NPFF headquarters. The NPFF that they had originally been
Company consisted of a Company Headquarters and four organized with. Even their
Patrol Platoons. The patrol platoons were in turn broken uniforms were obtained
into three Patrol Squads. privately, resulting in a
unique camouflage pattern
Patrol Platoon HQ to the NPFF.
1x 1/4-ton truck

With:
1x Officer w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) NCO, National Police
1x NCO w/M2 Carbine Field Force, 1970

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 Unit Organizations

The Company Headquarters had an additional 1/4-ton By and large ARVN tank troops remained constant,
truck and other wheeled vehicles to help mobility, as well a with normal maintenance issues and personnel problems
pool of weapons to be issued as needed. These included two meaning that troops did not always have their full
M1919A6 machine guns and eighteen M3A1 submachine complement of tanks in working order. By the 1970s, some
guns. Riot gear and tear gas grenades and additional or Armored Cavalry Squadrons had lost their tank troops in
improved radios could also be issued as needed. NPFF order to create all tank troop squadrons as a stand in for
elements in regions with major waterways might also be future Armor Battalions.
issued boats or airboats to improve mobility. In late 1965, ARVN M41A3s were test fitted with the
twenty-three inch Xenon searchlight found on the M48A3
Armored Units tank. The program, conducted by the US Army Concept
ARVN Tank Troop, Armored Team in Vietnam (ACTIV) was to investigate whether a
Cavalry Squadron night fighting capability could be given to the ARVN tank
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 units. The program concluded with a proposal that the
As noted earlier when looking at mechanized infantry, the searchlight be added to the official ARVN TOE. It was also
ARVN Armored Cavalry Squadron included an organic noted that since the vehicle was not fitted with infrared
tank troop. Until the mid-1970s, this was the only tank driving equipment, only the vehicle commander, with
organization in the ARVN. infrared binoculars, could make use of the infrared
The troop was organized along the same lines as a US capabilities. At least two tanks were converted, but it is
Army tank company, with an identical number of tanks. It unclear how far the program went. Tanks were sometimes
consisted of a Troop Headquarters, with two M24 Chaffee fitted with the earlier visible light searchlights as they
light tanks, and three platoons. Each of the platoons had became available from American units swapping them out
five M24 tanks. for the Xenon light.
As the enemy gained access to more effective anti-tank
Tank Platoon weapons and in greater numbers, such as rocket propelled
5x M24 Chaffee grenades and recoilless rifles, ARVN tank units took to
fitting improvised “armor” to their M41A3s. Ammunition
With: cans filled with some sort of medium, mostly sand, to defeat
1x Officer w/Pistol hollow charges were common, but spare track links were
4x NCO w/Pistol also used.
5x Gunner w/Pistol
5x Loader w/Pistol ARVN Tank Company, Armor
5x Driver w/Pistol Battalion
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
The M24s had been gifted to the fledgling ARVN by the In 1971, the ARVN gained its first true Armor Battalion, the
French. They were decidedly obsolete by the early 1960s 20th Armor Battalion. The Battalion’s maneuver elements
and in dire need of replacement. In March 1965, the first were grouped into Tank Companies, with three additional
twelve M41A3 Walker Bulldog light tanks arrived. These, tanks in the Headquarters and Headquarters Company. The
out of an order of a hundred tanks, would replace the M24s Battalion, however, lacked the proper recovery vehicles or
one for one in the tank troops of the ARVN. AVLBs, severely hampering its operational capability.

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The Tank Companies were organized into a Company The III Corps ATF later detached the companies from the
Headquarters, with two M48A3 tanks, and three platoons 22nd Armor Battalion and formed them, along with other
of five M48A3 tanks. elements into sub-task forces. This was the organization the
unit followed for the better part of the next two years, until
Tank Platoon the fall of Saigon ended the conflict.
5x M48A3 Patton
ARVN Reconnaissance Troop,
With: Armored Cavalry Squadron
1x Officer w/Pistol Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
4x NCO w/Pistol Prior to 1962, the ARVN maintained Armored Cavalry
5x Gunner w/Pistol Squadrons each with two reconnaissance troops (along with
5x Loader w/Pistol a Tank Troop, discussed previously). These were more in line
5x Driver w/Pistol with traditional cavalry missions of reconnaissance and flank
security missions. These units had been equipped with a
Experience during Operation Lam Son 719 in Laos had combination of M8 armored cars, M3 halftracks, and M3
shown a greater need for infantry cooperation with armor scout cars, which were already showing their age. With the
units, and the 20th Armor Battalion was also organized with influx of new US supplied equipment beginning in late 1962,
an infantry security company. Ninety-man platoons were to the units were reorganized into new Armored Cavalry
be attached to each of the Battalion’s companies during Reconnaissance Troops, to be equipped entirely with the
operations, with the men riding the tanks to provide security. M114 scout vehicle.
Following the Nguyen Hue Offensive in 1972, the Each of the Reconnaissance Troops consisted of a Troop
formation of two additional armor battalions was accelerated. Headquarters and three Reconnaissance Platoons, each
In the case of 22nd Armor Battalion in III Corps, Brigadier with six M114 scout vehicles. The vehicles were further
General Tran Quang Khoi, commander of III Armor Brigade, broken into three carrier sections for operations.
the Battalion’s platoons were reduced in size. This was to allow
for better command and control and to allow the battalion to Armored Cavalry Reconnaissance Section
field a fourth company to improve its ability to react. Platoons 3x M114 Scout Vehicle
were reduced to only three tanks, but companies retained the
two tanks in the headquarters section. With:
3x NCO w/Rifle
Tank Platoon 3x Scout Observer w/Rifle
3x M48A3 Patton 3x Scout Driver w/Rifle

With: This organization lasted for only a very brief period. The
1x Officer w/Pistol M114 vehicle was found to be totally unsatisfactory for
2x NCO w/Pistol operations in Vietnam and had been withdrawn from service
3x Gunner w/Pistol by 1964. The troops replaced the vehicles with M8
3x Loader w/Pistol Greyhound armored cars as an interim solution. The crew of
3x Driver w/Pistol the vehicles remained the same. By 1965, US Army advisors
had recommended that the troops that had been equipped

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 Unit Organizations

with M114s be replaced by an additional mechanized rifle mounted another machine gun on the rear deck, for use by
troops in Armored Cavalry Squadrons. The armored cars the rear observer, who doubled as the vehicle’s radio operator.
would be separated into separate Armored Car Squadrons Enough V-100s, later designated XM706 by the US
(discussed in the following section). This suggestion was put Army, were acquired by the ARVN to replace the M8s one
into practice and the Reconnaissance Troops ceased to be a for one. However, the process was slow going, and there
part of the TOE. were still units using M8s as late as 1967.

ARVN Armored Car Troop, FREE WORLD ARMED FORCES

Armored Car Squadron While the South Vietnamese and United States bore the brunt
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 of the fighting between 1965 and 1971, a number of other
As noted in the previous section, the Armored Car Squadron countries deployed large military contingents. These forces
was a byproduct of the failure of the M114 scout vehicle to were deployed mostly at the behest of the United States,
perform in Vietnam. As a result, M8 armored cars were who offered large aid packages and other incentives for
substituted into the Armored Cavalry Squadrons in place of participation by its regional allies. These forces were grouped
the M114s. Eventually the decision was made to take the under the moniker of Free World Armed Forces (FWAF).
armored cars out of the Armored Cavalry Squadron and form The contributions of the combined Australian and New
them into separate units, specifically for static security, convoy Zealand forces to the conflict are well reported, as are those of
escort, road opening, and route reconnaissance missions. the Republic of Korea (better known as South Korea). The
The Armored Car Troops were organized along similar contributions of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Republic
lines to the Reconnaissance Troops. They consisted of a of the Philippines are less well known. Fear of involvement by
Troop Headquarters and three Armored Car Platoons, each the People’s Republic of China meant that the contingent from
with six armored cars. These, in turn, could be broken into the Republic of China (also known as Taiwan) was purely
two three-vehicle sections for operations. advisory. FWAF contributions peaked in 1969, with almost
70,000 personnel deployed from all six nations.
Armored Car Section Included in this chapter is a selection of descriptions of
3x M8 Greyhound units from all of the FWAF countries, with the exception
of Taiwan.
With:
3x NCO w/Rifle Australia and New Zealand
3x Scout Observer w/Rifle Two of the founding members of the Southeast Asian
3x Scout Driver w/Rifle Treaty Organization (SEATO), Australia and New Zealand
both sent military units to assist the forces of the South
In 1965, the ARVN began to receive the first Cadillac Gage Vietnamese government and the United States mission in
V-100 armored cars. These vehicles had been developed as that country. The proximity of the two nations to the
commercial venture by Cadillac Gage and were seen as a conflict led to increased concerns about the spread of
perfect replacement for ARVN M8s. ARVN V-100s were communism in the region.
equipped with a one-man turret, fitted with either two The two nations are grouped together because forces
.30-caliber M37 machine guns or a single .50-caliber M2 deployed by New Zealand were generally integrated with
machine gun and a single M37. The version with two M37s those of other countries, primarily Australia. New Zealand
became the dominant type. In addition, ARVN crews often deployed combat forces first, in May 1965, in the form of

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the 161st Artillery Battery, which was attached to the (1RAR) arrived in Vietnam, reinforced with signals and
United States’ 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). With the logistic support elements. This battalion formed the core
deployment of the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) in June of the 1st Australian Task Force (ATF) in Vietnam and was
1965, the 161st Artillery Battery was reassigned to this force. initially assigned to support the US 173rd Airborne Brigade
The ATF as a whole was subsequently assigned to support (Separate). By the end of 1965, the 173rd Airborne Brigade
the 173rd Airborne Brigade (Separate). New Zealand later had received additional US Army units to reinforce it and
deployed other combat elements, which were similarly the 1st ATF became a separate fighting force, receiving
integrated with existing Australian or American units. additional Australian units.
New Zealand infantry companies were assigned to At the peak of FWAF involvement in 1969, the 1st ATF
Battalions of the Royal Australian Regiment that had had three maneuver battalions plus additional combat
deployed to Vietnam, while the troop from the New Zealand and support units. After being detached from the 173rd
Special Air Service (NZ SAS) was assigned to the squadron Airborne Brigade, the 1st ATF assumed responsibility for
from the Australian Special Air Service Regiment (SASR). Phuoc Tuy Province in the southern portion of the country.
The abbreviation ANZAC, dating to World War I and There it operated until the beginning of the departure of
originally referring to the Australia and New Zealand Army the 1st ATF in 1971.
Corps, has been used to refer to these forces as well and will The infantry elements of the 1st ATF differed from their
be used here for clarity where appropriate. New Zealand United States and ARVN counterparts. The infantry
forces were equipped in Vietnam to match their Australian battalions were organized with most heavy weapons
counterparts and prevent any logistical issues. They were in a battalion Support Company, with individual Rifle
also organized to properly integrate with existing forces. Companies having a small weapons element organic to their
As a result, differences between contingents from the two headquarters. ANZAC Infantry Sections (what would be
countries should have been minimal. referred to as squads in the US Army are generally referred
to as sections in British Commonwealth armies), however,
ANZAC Rifle Company, Infantry had the benefit of having organic light machine guns.
Battalion, Infantry Regiment The Rifle Company consisted of a Company Headquarters
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 and three Rifle Platoons. Each of these Platoons consisted of
In June 1965, the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment a Platoon Headquarters and three Rifle Sections.

ANZAC Special Rules

Abundant Supplies unless a friendly unit within that distance is under
In Ambush Valley, all ANZAC Army units have enemy fire.
Abundant Supplies as their default setting. In game Fast Response
terms, units with Abundant Supplies gain a die ANZAC Players may re-roll any failed Troop
of Firepower. Quality check in relation to artillery requests.
Rules of Engagement This reflects the far faster response time of
ANZAC Players may not target civilian groups ANZAC artillery compared to US artillery in
or direct off-board support within 12” of them the Vietnam theatre.

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Platoon HQ service for logistical commonality. These would likely have

1x Officer w/Owen SMG later been supplanted by M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons
1x NCO w/Rifle (LAWs) as they became available in the late 1960s.
1x RTO w/Rifle Heavy weapons held at battalion level, which could be
1x Runner w/Rifle detached to individual companies during operations,
included anti-tank weapons and mortars. The battalion
3x Rifle Section (each consisting of 2 Elements) mortar platoon had access to twelve 81mm M29 mortars.
Rifle Element 1 On paper, the battalion’s anti-tank platoon could be
1x Section Leader w/Rifle equipped with either four 106mm M40 recoilless rifles or
1x Scout w/Owen SMG or Rifle eight 84mm Carl Gustav M2 recoilless rifles. Australian
1x Machine Gunner w/M60 Machine Gun (Med. forces in practice were equipped with a number of M67
AP:2/AT:0) recoilless rifles for logistical commonality
1x Asst. Machine Gunner w/Rifle with their American counterparts.
1x Rifleman w/Rifle The battalion support company
also included a Demolitions and
Rifle Element 2 Engineer Platoon (also referred
1x Asst. Section Leader w/Rifle to as an Assault Pioneer
1x Scout w/Owen SMG or Rifle Platoon), which on
3x Rifleman w/Rifle paper had access
to flamethrowers,
Rifle as used in this organization generally refers to the land mines, and
semi-automatic version of the FN FAL 50.00, designated demolition
the L1A1 Self-Loading Rifle (SLR), common to British charges.
Commonwealth armies at the time. Certain personnel,
however, like the rifle section’s scouts for instance, sometimes
replaced these with M16A1s, which became available to the
Australians through various channels from 1967. Personnel Australian
that had been equipped with the Owen SMG generally Tank Troop,
replaced these with the M16A1. Sources debate when the Tank
M79 grenade launcher became available to the Australian Squadron,
forces, but it is clear that this occurred sometime between Tank Regiment
the 1st ATF’s deployment in 1966 and 1968. One of the Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
section’s riflemen would have been assigned the weapon. In early 1968, the Australians
The Company Headquarters had two M60 machine deployed a single Tank
guns with tripods. Sources suggest that at one time it also Squadron in support of the
had three 3.5” M20A1B1 rocket launchers, though there is 1st ATF. While squadrons
no evidence that the units deploying to Vietnam had these rotated through Vietnam,
weapons. If anti-tank weapons were held at company level,
then they would likely have been 90mm M67 recoilless Grenadier, Victory
rifles, issued by the Australians over other weapons in Company, RNZIR, 1967

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only one squadron was ever deployed at a time. The to allow the squadron to operate independently, included
squadron itself evolved greatly over time to better fit the two Centurion Armored Recovery Vehicles and three
circumstances of Vietnam. M113A1 Fitter’s Vehicles, based on the M113 armored
On paper the squadron was relatively basic, consisting of personnel carrier, but fitted with a crane.
a Squadron Headquarters and four Tank Troops. Each Tank The Squadron Headquarters had two additional Mk 5/1
Troop consisted of three Centurion Mk 5/1 tanks along tanks, four M113A1 armored personnel carriers, and by
with various other support vehicles. 1970, a single M577A1 command vehicle. Two of the
M113A1 APCs were configured as standard APCs, one
Tank Troop featured the Cadillac Gage T-50 turret with two 7.62mm
3x Mk 5/1 Centurion L3A1 machine guns (L3A1 was the British Commonwealth
designation for the Browning M1919A4), while the last
With: vehicle was configured as an ambulance.
1x Officer w/Pistol The ACTIV report also noted that
3x NCO w/Pistol the squadron had at least one
3x Gunner w/Pistol additional tank being held in
3x Loader w/Pistol reserve and floated to troops
3x Driver w/Pistol in need to maintain three
functional vehicles in case
The troop’s commanding officer could take command of of attrition.
one of the troop’s tanks during operations, but the troop It is suggested in
otherwise had enough personnel to operate the vehicles. the report that the
During the conflict, the Mk 5/1 Centurions were squadron had a
modified in various ways due to the nature of the fourth tank for each
environment. The most noticeable of these was the removal troop, but it is
of the side skirt armor. While this removed a certain minimal
protection for the running gear, it also made clearing
mud and other debris much easier. The vehicle’s smoke
dischargers were also removed and it was commonplace
to add an AN/PRC-25 radio to the tank’s ammunition rack
to allow for better communication with infantry units
operating nearby or in concert with the vehicles. Private, 6RAR,
At squadron level there were also various specialized 1969
vehicles held in a Special Equipment Troop and a Light Aid
Detachment. The Special Equipment Troop contained two
Centurion AVLBs and two Centurions fitted with bulldozer
blades. By 1970, a US Army Concept Team in Vietnam
(ACTIV) report on armor organizations, which included a
survey of Australian armor units, reported that only one of
the AVLBs had been deployed or was otherwise still
operational. The Light Aid Detachment, an attached unit

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unclear whether or not this was assumed from the reserve The M113A1 armored personnel carriers had originally
vehicle noted. These reserve vehicles could also have come been armed only with the standard .50-caliber machine
from the squadron headquarters. gun at the track commander’s hatch. Improvised shields
were quickly fabricated or otherwise acquired for the
Australian Cavalry Troop, vehicles. In 1966, the decision was made to fit two of the
Cavalry Squadron, Cavalry three vehicles in each section with the M74C turret, which
Regiment had been tested by the ARVN. The turret featured two
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 .30-caliber machine guns. By the late 1960s, however,
A cavalry troop was deployed to Vietnam as part of the these had been replaced by the Cadillac Gage T-50 turret.
additional reinforcements sent to bolster the 1st ATF in late The turret could also be fitted with a combination of one
1965. By 1966, an entire squadron had been deployed. .50-caliber M2 machine gun and one L3A1. By 1970, two
Cavalry squadrons rotated through Vietnam in much the of the three vehicles in the squadron headquarters, all the
same fashion that tank squadrons did, with only one being vehicles in the troop headquarters, and the lead vehicle
deployed at any one time. in each of the troop’s sections were fitted with turrets in
Australian cavalry squadrons differed from their this configuration..
American and even Vietnamese counterparts. The By 1970, according to the ACTIV survey of armor
Australian Army of the period did not have organic units, all M113A1s in the squadron, with the exception of
mechanized infantry formations, relying on the attachment the M113A1 Fitter’s Vehicle had been fitted with turrets.
of these squadrons to infantry elements during operations Often, one of the guns would be removed and mounted
to provide additional mobility and firepower. These cavalry on top of the turret. This appears to have both made the
squadrons have been referred to as armored personnel turret less cramped and given the track commander a
carrier squadrons for exactly this reason. weapon that could be immediately used when the vehicle
The squadron on paper consisted of a Squadron not buttoned up.
Headquarters, three Cavalry Troops, and a Support Arms The Squadron’s Support Arms Troop initially had only
Troop. When deployed to Vietnam, squadrons received three 81mm mortar carriers and an M113A1 armored
additional elements to help them operate independently in personnel carrier as a command vehicle. The mortar
the form of a Light Aid Detachment and an Administrative carriers had their 81mm M29 mortars and crews supplied
Troop. from infantry units, making it unclear whether the
Each of the squadron’s troops were further broken down vehicles were converted from regular M113A1 APCs
into a Troop Headquarters, with two M113A1 armored like early ARVN types, or were purpose built M125A1
personnel carriers, and three Cavalry Sections, each with mortar carriers.
three M113A1s. By 1970, the Support Arms Troop had been expanded
to include two additional Armored Personnel Carrier
Cavalry Section Sections, each with three M113A1s with T-50 turrets, and
3x M113A1 Armored Personnel Carrier five Armored Command Vehicle Sections, each with a
single M577A1 command vehicle equipped with a single
With: M60 machine gun. The APC Sections were used to
3x NCO w/Pistol reinforce individual troops during operations, while
3x Gunner w/Pistol the ACV Sections were attached to infantry battalion
3x Driver w/Pistol headquarters as needed.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

The Squadron also had three M113A1s and an of its regiments, plus a Republic of Korea Marine Corps
M577A1 in the Squadron Headquarters, plus four (ROKMC) brigade. Also proposed was the dispatch of a
M113A1 Fitter’s Vehicles in the Light Aid Detachment. Republic of Korea Air Force (ROKAF) fighter squadron to
The Fitter’s Vehicles sometimes deployed with individual provide air support to the deployed forces. This portion of
troops during operations after 1968, to provide an the deployment was later scrapped.
immediate in the field maintenance capability. By November 1965 the ROKA and ROKMC elements
had been deployed to Vietnam, stationed in Qui Nhon and
The Republic of Korea Cam Ranh Bay respectively. As part of the US–ROK
The staunchly anti-communist Republic of Korea agreement the troops were paid and equipped by the US.
(more commonly known as South Korea) had first tried Their facilities had also been constructed and provided for
to send advisors to South Vietnam in the 1950s, but had them by the US and elements of the US Army provided
seen their offer rejected due to American pressure. An transportation (mostly in the form of helicopter lift
agreement was finally reached and the first troops began support) and logistical support where appropriate.
deploying in mid-1965. At the time these forces consisted In late 1966, the Republic of Korea increased its
of noncombatant elements, primarily construction contribution to two divisions, with the second headquartered
engineers, to help rebuild areas affected by the conflict at Ninh Hoa. The Korean forces earned a largely positive
as part of ongoing pacification programs. However, the reputation among their US Army counterparts. Their forces
need for additional troops in Vietnam and a desire for included at least a percentage of veterans of the Korean War
increased foreign allied involvement led the United and the skirmishes that followed. Senior US leaders did
States to talks with the South Korean government for suggest, however, that their Korean counterparts were often
combat troops. inflexible, preferring to plan and conduct operations “by the
In June 1965, it was announced that talks between the book,” rather than adapt the methodology to Vietnam. Still
two countries had resulted in an agreement to send one in terms of enemy body count, an important contemporary
division of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA), less one statistic, the Korean forces excelled.

ROK Special Rules

Abundant Supplies Ambush the Ambushers
In Ambush Valley, all ROK units have Abundant Any ROK unit that moves into cover and is out of
Supplies as their default setting. In game terms, line of sight of enemy units may go hidden. They
units with Abundant Supplies gain a die of may then use the Ambush rule to engage enemy
Firepower. units. ROK units that are hidden in ambush may
Cache Hunters not be spotted unless an enemy unit is within
Any ROK unit rolling to find hidden caches may Optimum Range.
add +1 to the die roll to represent the excellent Hard fighting
ability ROK troops displayed in discovering enemy All ROK units gain +1 die in close assaults to
stores during the Vietnam War. represent both their innate close combat skill and
their sheer ferocity when fighting a communist foe.

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 Unit Organizations

ROKA Rifle Company, Infantry 2x Machine Gunner w/M1919A6 Machine Gun (Med.
Battalion, Infantry Regiment AP:1/AT:0)
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 2x Asst. Machine Gunner w/M1 Carbine
The organization of ROKA infantry units reflected the 2x Anti-Tank Gunner w/M20A1B1 Rocket Launcher
organization of the US Army as it had existed in the early (Med. AP:1/AT:2(M)
1950s prior to either the Pentomic organization or that of 2x Asst. Anti-Tank Gunner w/M1 Carbine
the early 1960s. The battalion level organization, however,
more or less shared the same basic components of US Army ROKA infantry units in the early and mid-1960s were also
units of the Vietnam era, having a Headquarters and equipped with weapons from the Korean War era. When
Headquarters Company, a battalion Weapons Company, first deployed in 1965, ROKA infantry units were still
and three Rifle Companies. equipped with these weapons. Under the agreement with
Each of these Rifle Companies had a company the US governing the deployment, however, they were
headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a Weapons Platoon. quickly reequipped with current US weapons. By 1967,
The Rifle Platoons were further broken down into a Platoon Korean infantry were carrying the M16A1 rifle, M79
Headquarters, three Rifle Squads, and a Weapons Squad. grenade launcher, and M60 machine gun in place of
existing weapons. The M16A1 rifle replaced both the
Platoon HQ M1918 BAR and the M1 carbines as well. Between 1965 and
1x Officer w/M1 Rifle 1967, there was some overlap in the weapons, leading to
1x NCO w/M1 Rifle instances for example of Korean infantry carrying M1 rifles
1x RTO w/M1 Rifle and M79 grenade launchers.
3x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle The rocket launchers in the weapons squad appear to have
disappeared just as the 90mm M67 recoilless rifles did in
3x Rifle Squad (each consisting of 2 fireteams) their US Army counterparts, as did the 57mm M18 recoilless
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle rifles in the company weapons platoon. The company
weapons platoon also had three 60mm M2 mortars.
Fireteam 1 The weapons company at battalion level contained an
1x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle additional eight M1919A6 machine guns (later replaced
1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR with M60s) and six 81mm M1 mortars. Reflecting the
(Lt. AP:1/AT:0) earlier style of organization, heavy anti-tank weapons, such
1x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/M1 Rifle as the 106mm M40 recoilless rifle, .50-caliber M2 heavy
1x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle machine guns, and 4.2” M1 mortars, were all held at the
regimental level. These weapons were deployed to units in
Fireteam 2 need, but generally used to secure static facilities and other
1x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle strong points, just like their US Army counterparts.
1x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and M7 Rifle Grenade
Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) ROKMC Rifle Company, Infantry
2x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle Battalion, Infantry Regiment
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
Weapons Squad Just as ROKA unit organization in some ways reflected the
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle influence of the US Army, the ROKMC unit organization in

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AMBUSH VALLEY

some ways reflected that of the US Marine Corps. The most guns at company level. It is unclear whether the ROKMC
important distinction between the two organizations was units deployed with the rocket launchers given the US
that the ROKMC infantry battalions only had three rifle experience, but they no doubt disappeared from regular
companies. Otherwise the organization was extremely operations just like anti-tank weapons in US units. The
similar, with the battalion level weapons being concentrated M1919A4 machine guns were replaced with M60 machine
in the battalion’s Headquarters and Service Company. guns as ROKMC units began to receive the replacement
Each of the three infantry companies had a Company weapons previously noted.
Headquarters and three Rifle Platoons. Each company had Six 106mm M40 recoilless rifles and eight 81mm M1
an organic platoon sized weapons element, but it is unclear mortars were held at battalion level. The recoilless rifles
whether this was ever made technically separate from the likely took up the role of protecting static positions as
Company Headquarters. The Rifle Platoons were further they did in the ROKA units deployed to Vietnam. Heavier
broken down into a Platoon Headquarters and three Rifle mortars and .50-caliber M2 machine guns were held at
Squads, just like their USMC counterparts. brigade level.

Platoon HQ The Kingdom of Thailand

1x Officer w/M1 Rifle The contribution of the Kingdom of Thailand in Vietnam
1x NCO w/M1 Rifle is decidedly underreported in most western histories.
1x RTO w/M1 Rifle This is immediately interesting given the final size of the
3x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle contribution and even more so given that it represented a
major departure from past precedent on the part of the
3x Rifle Squad (splits into three fireteams) Thai government. The government of the modern Thai
1x NCO Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle state had historically been extremely reticent to enter
3x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle regional conflicts or otherwise intervene in the affairs of
3x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and Rifle Grenade Launcher its neighbors.
(Lt. AP:1/AT:0) The instability of the region after the departure of the
3x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) French meant that Thailand represented a major non-
3x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle communist power in mainland Southeast Asia. Participation
in the conflict in Vietnam with major Western powers such
Just like the ROKA, the ROKMC infantry units deployed as the United States helped to cement this position, largely
to Vietnam quickly began to be refitted with modern US by generating increased military aid to the country.
weapons. By 1967, the same shift that had happened in What started with the deployment of a small advisory
ROKA units from the M1 rifle and rifle grenade launchers group in 1964 had expanded to a brigade-sized task force
to the M16A1 rifle and M79 grenade launcher had largely by January 1968. The organization that became known as
occurred. Of note, however, is that since the Republic of the Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force (RTAVF) included
Korea forces were integrated as a whole into the logistics its own organic artillery, engineer, and aviation elements.
system of the US Army as part of the agreement, web gear Also, a number of M113A1s were utilized, organized into
and other accessories reflected a US Army influence in three armored cavalry troops. By 1969 the force had been
Vietnam, rather than that of the USMC. redesignated as the Royal Thai Volunteer Force (RTVF;
The ROKMC had three 60mm M2 mortars, three 3.5” representing the contributions of other Thai military
M20A1B1 rocket launchers, and eight M1919A4 machine services, such as the Royal Thai Navy) and totaled over

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 Unit Organizations

eleven thousand personnel, including six infantry battalions, Each of the Rifle Companies was broken down into
three artillery battalions, and various support units. a Company Headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a
Weapons Platoon. Each of the Rifle Platoons had a Platoon
Headquarters, three Rifle Squads, and Machine Gun Squad.
Royal Thai Army Special Rules
No Air! Platoon HQ
The Royal Thai Army rarely requested close air 1x Officer w/M1 Rifle
support during their stay in Vietnam. They would 1x NCO w/M1 Rifle
not request fixed wing air support during an 1x RTO w/M1 Rifle
engagement and only employed it when contact 5x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle
had been broken off and the troops moved away.
While helicopter gunships were used for close
3x Rifle Squad (each consisting of 2 fireteams)
support, fixed-wing aircraft saw little use in the
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle
close support of Thai units, their commanders
generally preferring to have their men at least three
Fireteam 1
kilometers away from any such attacks! To reflect
1x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle
this, a player using Royal Thai Army forces must
1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
discard any Fog of War cards that provide extra air
1x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and M7 Rifle Grenade
support unless it is provided by rotary wing aircraft.
Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/M1 Rifle

RTA Rifle Company, Infantry Fireteam 2

Battalion, Infantry Regiment 1x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 1x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and M7 Rifle Grenade
Thailand has historically been fiercely independent, being Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
essentially the only nation in the region to remain 2x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle
independent during the periods of both European and
American colonialism. To this end, the Thai government Weapons Squad
had sought military advice and resources from various 1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle
sources over the years. As a result of the prevailing 1x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and M7 Rifle Grenade
relationship between the Thai government and the United Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
States, the Royal Thai Army infantry units of the early 2x Machine Gunner w/M1919A6 Machine Gun
1960s featured organizations that reflected influence from (Med. AP:1/AT:0)
the US Army. 2x Asst. Machine Gunner w/M1 Rifle
Thai infantry battalions were organized similarly on 3x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle
paper to South Korean Army units, reflecting a perhaps
dated US Army organization. This revolved around a The company Weapons Platoon had three 60mm M2 mortars
Headquarters and Headquarters Company, which contained and three 57mm M18 recoilless rifles. It also had four more
various weapons element (not separated into a separate own grenadiers assigned to it. The Battalion’s Headquarters and
company), and three Rifle Companies. Headquarters Company included Machine Gun, Mortar, and

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Recoilless Rifle Platoons. Combined these platoons included become the Philippine Civic Action Group – Vietnam
six M1919A4 machine guns, three 81mm M1 mortars, and (PHILCAG-V) was in large part because of an generous aid
three 75mm M20 recoilless rifles. Some units in Thailand package offered by the United States in addition to already
were still using the M1917A1 machine gun at battalion level. healthy amounts of aid already being given under programs
Units deploying to Vietnam were initially slated to such as the Military Aid Program.
receive the M16A1 rifle to replace their M1 rifles and PHILCAG-V’s final force structure included a single
M1918 BARs. However, an ongoing insurgency in northern security battalion and an artillery battery, to provide
Thailand had led to the issuing of these weapons to infantry support and protection to its facilities and the work of
units already engaged in combat domestically. A lack its construction engineer battalion and medical and
of additional weapons for the US Military Assistance dental group. PHILCAG-V also redeployed back to the
Command – Vietnam (MACV) to issue to the incoming Philippines before many of the other foreign participants,
Thai troops as per the agreement, led to a compromise. beginning its departure from Vietnam in late 1969.
While additional M16A1s were requested for eventual issue
to Thai troops, those troops would be issued the M2
carbine, which became the standard issue small arm. By the Philippine Special Rules
end of 1967, the requisite M16A1s had been issued, along Follow Me
with M79 grenade launchers and M60 machine guns. It is Philippine units always require line of sight to
unclear whether the RTAVF units deployed to Vietnam a leader model in order to advance towards
with their anti-tank weapons, but these would no doubt the enemy.
have eventually been supplanted by other weapons, such as Hearts & Minds
the M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW). Philippine units built good relations with the local
people and often had good intelligent sources.
The Republic of the To represent this, a Philippine player can force
Philippines his opponent to reveal all his Booby Trap cards at
Unlike the contributions of Australia, New Zealand, the the start of the game.
Republic of Korea, and the Kingdom of Thailand, those of
the Republic of the Philippines were intended to be geared
toward civic action and pacification support. However, Philippine Army Rifle Company,
unlike the mainly advisory contingent from the Republic Infantry Battalion Combat Team
of China, Filipino forces deployed with a significant Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
security element and were authorized various pieces of Though not spelled out in the various sources, the largest
heavy equipment to protect their bases and operations. formation in the Philippine Army during the period of the
The reasons for Filipino deployment itself fall conflict Vietnam was the independent Infantry Battalion
somewhere in the middle of the other contingents. Combat Team. It stands to reason that the force deployed to
President Ferdinand Marcos had made it clear he was Vietnam would have at least been based in principle on this
opposed to the deployment of any combat forces. This no organization. However, it is important to note that the
doubt was in part because of an ongoing set of domestic volunteer nature of the deployment and the pay increase of
insurgencies, combined with the relatively small size of the doing so attracted large numbers of personnel from elite
Filipino military. The decision to deploy what would later units in the Philippines, including the fledgling Philippine

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Army Special Forces. This might have had an effect on the The Company Weapon’s Platoon on paper had three 81mm
quality of troops deployed with PHILCAG-V, though it had M1 mortars, two 75mm M20 recoilless rifles, and two
a decidedly detrimental effect on the elements of the 3.5” M20A1B1 rocket launchers. What made the Battalion
Philippine Army that did not deploy to Vietnam. Combat Team different from its US Army counterparts was
Showing the historical influence of the United States that the battalion level Combat Support Company was
military, which dated back to before World War II, the designed to allow the unit to operate as an independent
infantry component of the Battalion Combat Team was entity. It included a larger selection of heavy weapons that a
organized essentially along the same lines as the US Army US Army battalion level weapons company, consisting of
Infantry Battalion. It consisted of a Headquarters and four 4.2” M1 mortars, ten 81mm M1 mortars, three 106mm
Headquarters Company, a Combat Support Company, and M40 recoilless rifles, and three .50-caliber M2 machine guns.
three Rifle Companies. Each of the Rifle Companies was It is unclear whether PHILCAG-V’s security battalion
further broken down into a Company Headquarters, a had the M20 recoilless rifles and M20A1B1 rocket
Weapons Platoon, and three Rifle Platoons. Each of the launchers at company level. At least eight 4.2” M1 mortars
Rifle Platoons had a Platoon Headquarters, three Rifle and the heavier recoilless rifles were deployed or otherwise
Squads, and a Weapons Squad. provided and used for static base defense. As part of the
agreement governing the deployment of troops, the soldiers
Platoon HQ of PHILCAG-V received M16A1s, M79 grenade launchers,
1x Officer w/M1 Rifle and M60 machine guns upon deployment replacing the
1x NCO w/M1 Rifle weapons that would otherwise have been issued.
1x RTO w/M1 Rifle Above battalion level, PHILCAG-V received through
the US Military Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV)
3x Rifle Squad seventeen M113A1 armored personnel carriers, which it
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle used for static defense and patrolling, as well as security
2x Fireteam Leader w/M1 Rifle during operations. It was also authorized two M41 light
2x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) tanks for the protection of its headquarters element.
2x Grenadier w/M1 Rifle and M7 Rifle Grenade PHILCAG-V’s organic artillery battery also received six
Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) 105mm M101 howitzers through MACV.
2x Rifleman w/M1 Rifle
SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES
Weapons Squad (splits into three Weapon Teams) If the conflict in South Vietnam could be said to have been
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Rifle primarily an infantryman’s war, then it was also in large part
2x Machine Gunner w/M1919A6 Machine Gun (Med. an unconventional war. Before the early 1970s, when the
AP:2/AT:0) conflict took on a decidedly high intensity appearance, a
2x Asst. Machine Gunner w/M1 Rifle counter-insurgency strategy was being attempted. It was
1x Anti-Tank Gunner w/M20A1B1 Rocket Launcher also being constantly revised. A large component of the
(Med. AP:1/AT:2(M) counter-insurgency fight revolved around new theories and
1x Asst. Anti-Tank Gunner w/M1 Rifle tactics and units to carry them out. In some cases they were
2x Ammunition Bearer w/M1 Rifle based off older concepts. In some cases they were virtually
new. In almost all cases, there had been little opportunity
prior to test them in an actual conflict.

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Special Forces originated in the US Army in the early While the term Special Operations Forces as it is known
1950s, at the time seen in many ways as the successors to today did not exist in the Vietnam time frame, it is a term
the World War II-era Ranger units of the US Army and the that best encompasses the units that will be discussed in this
combined US-Canadian 1st Special Service Force. It was section. These units were primarily fielded by the United
also seen as incorporating tasks that had been conducted States and the Republic of Vietnam, but contributions were
by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), like the training also made by Australia and New Zealand. This section will
and organization of resistance and stay behind forces in explore the various different groups that are applicable to the
enemy occupied areas. The Central Intelligence Agency conflict in Vietnam.
(CIA), which had in part grown out of the OSS, had
devoted serious energy in the late 1940s and early 1950s to US Army Special Forces
the support of anti-communist resistance groups in Europe. A Detachment, B Detachment or C
While US Army Special Forces had effectively missed Detachment Special Forces Group
the Korean War, they were ready and able for new conflicts. Elite (Troop Quality D10 to D12), Morale D12
They quickly became integrated into US military assistance US Army Special Forces personnel (also known as the
programs. In Vietnam, with the US taking over for the Green Berets after their distinctive headgear) had been in
French in 1956, it was only a matter of time before Special Vietnam as early as 1957. Their mission generally entailed
Forces became integrated with the work of the new Military training and advising various elements of the South
Assistance Advisory Group there. US Army Special Forces Vietnamese military, most notably the South Vietnam
personnel became part of MAAG-V in 1957 and quickly Special Forces, and the management of various paramilitary
set about the creation of a South Vietnamese Special Forces training programs being conducted in country. In 1962, the
element. What they established was almost identical in decision was made to incorporate the Civil Irregular
organization. In many ways this interaction and the Defense Group (CIDG) program (discussed later in this
deployment of US Army Special Forces and other groups section) into the paramilitary programs under the umbrella
to other nations in the region fueled a health special of US Army Special Forces. Civic actions, often conducted
operations tradition in most Southeast Asian militaries that with the support of other US Army or ARVN units, were
persists to this day. also conducted by US Army Special Forces personnel.
While provisional organizations were established later
US Special Forces. (Piers Brand) to expand Special Forces activities into the realm of border
security, intelligence gathering, and psychological warfare,
the A Detachment (sometimes referred to as an A Team)
itself was not generally used as a tactical unit. Elements of
it might be found in the field with the command elements
of ARVN or CIDG units, but the organization of the team
was tailored more to its advisory mission rather than to
commando raids or similar activities.
An A Detachment consisted of twelve personnel, which
could be split into two separate elements because of a
duplication of basic skills. The A Detachment was supposed
to have personnel capable of training friendly forces in
most basic military skill sets.

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A Detachment gathering unit. The need for dedicated reconnaissance

2x Officer w/Rifle formations to search and locate the elusive insurgent in
1x Operations Sergeant w/Rifle Vietnam had led to the creation of a Reconnaissance
1x Intelligence Sergeant w/Rifle Commando (abbreviated Recondo) school by Military
1x Heavy Weapons Leader w/Rifle Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) in 1966. The US
1x Light Weapons Leader w/Rifle Army started sending personnel to this school very soon
1x Medical Specialist w/Rifle thereafter. By 1967 divisions, separate brigades, US Army
1x Asst. Medical Specialist w/Rifle Vietnam, and I and II Field Forces had been authorized
1x Radio Operator Supervisor w/Rifle Long Range Patrol elements of varying sizes.
1x Radio Operator w/Rifle The difference in the organization was how many patrol
1x Engineer Sergeant w/Rifle platoons the company had in addition to its Company
1x Engineer w/Rifle Headquarters, Operations Sections, and Signal Platoon.
Separate brigades had one platoon, divisions and US Army
All personnel, not counting the commanding and Vietnam had two platoons, and field forces had three or
executive officers noted, were NCOs. The standard four platoons.
weapon was initially to be that of the forces they were Each Platoon consisted of a Platoon Headquarters and
training, and in most cases prior to 1964, this was an M1 eight Patrol Teams. Each patrol was intended to operate as
Carbine or M1 or M3 SMG. Special Forces were among an independent entity for long range reconnaissance and
the units given priority for issue of the M16A1 when it intelligence gathering purposes.
began being issued in 1964, which became the standard
individual weapon. Platoon HQ
A Detachments were subordinated to either B or C 1x Officer w/M16A1 Rifle
Detachments, depending largely on their assigned mission. 1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
The B and C Detachments represented intermediate
higher headquarters elements intended to offer better 8x Patrol
command and control to A Detachments in the field, 1x Patrol Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
which would, generally, be operating independently. 1x Asst. Patrol Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
B Detachments and C Detachments were highly variable 2x RTO w/M16A1 Rifle
in the number of units assigned to them and should not 1x Senior Scout Observer w/M79 Grenade Launcher
really be seen as the same as platoons or companies. (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
C Detachments might have a B Detachment and separate 1x Scout Observer w/M16A1 Rifle
A Detachments assigned to them.
Various grenades, as well as M18 Claymore command
US Army Infantry Company, detonated mines were also carried by teams. Ranger units
Ranger also experimented with CS gas grenades and sound
Veteran (Troop Quality D8 to D10), Morale D10 suppressors for rifles. In some cases, the XM177E1 or
While even individual battalions had a reconnaissance XM177E2 “submachine guns” were substituted for the
element, in most cases this was intended to function more M16A1 rifle. 66mm M72 Light Anti-Tank Weapons (LAWs)
as an immediate scouting force, acting in concert with its were sometimes carried, but their utility was debatable given
parent formation, rather than an independent, information the mission.

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For specific operations a larger team might be formed lumped together here, the two units had distinctly
from multiple patrols. These so-called “heavy” LRP teams separate missions.
would have had ten to twelve individuals. They were Scout Dog Platoons were primarily intended to detect
utilized most often to capture enemy personnel for hidden threats, such as booby-traps or hidden enemy
interrogation or to neutralize specific targets. To assist in personnel, or other points of interest, such as hidden tunnel
the ambush a heavier weapon, such as a 7.62mm M60 entrances. Experimental training was later developed for dog
machine gun, might be utilized. teams intended to detect mines or tunnels. Combat Tracker
Generally not all teams in a company would be deployed Platoons and Detachments, on the other hand, were intended
at any one time, allowing the others time to rest in between to reestablish contact with the enemy.
missions or to provide backup in case of an urgent need. The US Army’s Scout Dog Program was deactivated after
Teams would be inserted in various ways, with the the Korean War. Despite this, unit organizations for the
helicopter insertion appearing to have been very popular. Infantry Platoon, Scout Dog continued to be updated to
Ladders and rappelling gear allowed the insertion of teams match the development of new force structures. As a result,
into areas where the helicopter might not be able to though no Scout Dog Platoons were active, there was an
physically land. False insertions by other helicopters might available TOE under which to organize them when the
be used to disorient or confuse enemy in the area. After program was reactivated in 1965. Two platoons would be
locating a potential target, rangers might call in artillery assigned to each division heading for Vietnam, and a single
support or air strikes to eliminate it or a larger operation platoon would be assigned to each separate brigade. The US
might be mounted to try and catch the enemy unawares. Army also trained platoons for the USMC and the ARVN.
Scout Dog Platoons was organized around Platoon
US Army Infantry Platoon, Headquarters and four Scout Dog Squads. The initial TOE
Scout Dog; Infantry Platoon, used had only three squads. Each Scout Dog Squad had six
Combat Tracker; and Infantry enlisted dog handlers and six scout dogs. Technically, the
Detachment, Combat Tracker TOE called for personnel to be equipped with just the
Veteran (Troop Quality D8 to D10), Morale D10 M1911A1 pistol. However, with units operating out in the
The US Army fielded two types of working dog units field, it quickly became apparent that this was inadequate.
in Vietnam in addition to the sentry dog units used by M16A1 rifles were acquired for all members of the platoon,
the Military Police. The PAVN and the PLAF had proven before finally becoming the authorized individual weapon.
themselves masters of camouflage and all sorts of different Unlike the Scout Dog Platoons, the Combat Tracker
strategies were considered to be better able to ferret out the Platoons and Detachments, initially called Combat Tracker
enemy. The US Army had experience using scout dogs in Team (CTTs), came out of discussions with the British about
the Pacific Theater during the World War II and in Korea. their experience in Malaya. Similar units had been used to
More recently British and other Commonwealth forces in great effect there. In the end, the training of the first CTTs
Malaya and elsewhere in Southeast Asia had used dogs to was conducted by members of New Zealand Special Air
fight insurgents. Service (NZSAS) at the British Jungle Warfare School, then
The Scout Dog Platoon and the Combat Tracker located in Malaysia.
Platoon/Detachment are in this section if only because Based on the organization used by the British in Malaya,
the latter were first trained in secret and not formally the US Army developed a concept of CTTs made up of two
acknowledged for almost two years after their deployment five-man teams, consisting of a NCO as team leader, dog
in 1966, as well as the nature of the training itself. Though handler and dog, a visual tracker, and two cover men, all

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Historical Note: LRRP, LRP, and Ranger

Initially, the provisional units established were Company E, 75th Infantry – 9th Infantry Division
referred to as Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol Company F, 75th Infantry – 25th Infantry Division
(LRRP) units. When these elements were officially Company G, 75th Infantry – 23rd Infantry
authorized in 1967, they were more formally Division (Americal Division)
designated as Infantry Companies, Long Range Company H, 75th Infantry – 1st Cavalry Division
Patrol (LRP). This type of unit had been developed (Airmobile)
in the early 1960s as a Corps-level asset for V and Company I, 75th Infantry – 1st Infantry Division
VII Corps in Germany. Company K, 75th Infantry – 4th Infantry Division
In January 1969, the decision was made to Company L, 75th Infantry – 101st Airborne
reactivate the 75th Infantry Regiment as the parent Division (Airmobile)
regiment for all the Long Range Patrol companies. Company M, 75th Infantry – 199th Infantry
In addition, these units would be designated as Brigade (Separate) (Light)
Infantry Companies, Ranger. All the pre-existing Company N, 75th Infantry – 173rd Airborne
units were reflagged as companies of the 75th Brigade (Separate)
Infantry Regiment. While this referenced the Company O, 75th Infantry – 3rd Brigade, 82nd
commando infantry units of the World War II and Airborne Division
Korean War eras, the new ranger units remained Company P, 75th Infantry – 1st Brigade, 5th
tasked with their reconnaissance mission. The Infantry Division (Mechanized)
companies and the units to which they were
Personnel assigned to these units were not actually
attached are as follows (the companies assigned to
required to have gone through the official US Army
V and VII Corps in Germany became Companies
Ranger training program. Only those that had were
A and B; there was no Company J):
authorized to wear the Ranger tab on their
Company C, 75th Infantry – I Field Force shoulder. However, the units did have a black beret
Company D, 75th Infantry – II Field Force and 75th Infantry Regiment beret flash authorized.

armed with M16A1 rifles. The initial concept was to attach 4x Scout Dog Team
two CTTs of ten men each to each division and one such 1x Team Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
CTT to each separate brigade. In February 1968, an MTOE 1x RTO w/M16A1 Rifle
based on the Scout Dog Platoon was authorized, becoming 1x Dog Handler w/M16A1 Rifle
the Infantry Platoon, Combat Tracker. This unit replaced 1x Visual Tracker w/M16A1 Rifle
the two individual CTTs in divisions and consisted of a 1x Scout Observer w/M16A1 Rifle
Platoon Headquarters and four Scout Dog Teams.
The CTT assigned to separate brigades used a further
Platoon HQ modified organization, the Infantry Detachment, Combat
1x Officer w/M16A1 Rifle Tracker, which only had two teams, and no headquarters
1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle element. The lead NCO in one of the teams was also
1x Clerk w/M16A1 Rifle assigned the mission of leading the detachment.

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US Navy SEAL Platoon, Task Force 116, along with the joint US Navy–US Army
SEAL Team Mobile Riverine Force, conducted a wide array of missions
Elite (Troop Quality D10 to D12), Morale D12 in the southern portions of South Vietnam, attempting to
The US Navy first created its Sea, Air, and Land (SEAL) disrupt the movement of enemy personnel and supplies.
Teams in January 1962. While it has expanded since, during It was during the conduct of these missions that the US
the era of US participation in Vietnam, there were only two Navy realized a prime opportunity to utilize the capabilities
SEAL Teams, SEAL Team One on the West Coast (located of the SEALs. By February 1966, a group of three officers
at the USN facilities in Coronado, California) and SEAL and fifteen enlisted personnel from SEAL Team One had
Team Two on the East Coast (located at the USN facilities deployed to Vietnam. Assigned to Task Force 116, this
in Little Creek, Virginia). By the end of the conflict, eight group included SEAL Team One’s commanding officer, the
platoons had rotated through South Vietnam. only instance in SEAL history where the commanding
When first organized, SEAL Teams were given the officer has accompanied a platoon into a combat zone in
broad and largely undefined mission of conducting an operational capacity.
unconventional warfare (or counter-guerilla warfare) in SEAL Platoons themselves consisted of sixteen
a maritime environment. Largely a product of the personnel, including one officer and fifteen enlisted
fascination of US President John F. Kennedy with personnel. In Vietnam, however, the deployed platoons
unconventional warfare units, the US Navy appears to were broken up into independent detachments, generally
have been largely unclear about how to utilize its new of half strength or less. Detachments were assigned to each
force early on. The first operational mission of the SEALs of the elements of Task Force 116, with the exception of the
was to send a detachment to train counterparts in South Upper Mekong River Patrol Group (TF 116.5), the PBR
Vietnam (discussed later in this section). Support Group (TF 116.7), the Helo Support Group (TF
Otherwise it was unclear what the SEALs were capable 116.8), and the Special River Support Group (TF 116.9).
of and how that capability could be effectively applied. Part Initially the missions assigned to SEALs were primarily
of the issue was that SEALs drew their initial personnel from concerned with reconnaissance. SEALs were often
Navy Underwater Demolition Teams, who had a history dispatched to establish listening posts for up to a week.
themselves of raiding, reconnaissance type missions, and Missions themselves might be conducted by groups of
other special operations. The training program provided three or four SEALs. Operational elements might be
initially to members of the South Vietnamese Navy was augmented by Kit Carson Scouts (discussed later in this
in fact based on UDT training. The SEALs would finally section) or similar personnel. Later ambushes, prisoner
subsume the UDTs and missions like beach reconnaissance snatches, and similar unconventional missions added to
in 1983. the SEAL repertoire. SEAL Teams participated heavily in
In December 1965, the US Navy established Operation attempts to locate and liberate US and allied prisoners
Game Warden. Game Warden followed a MACV as part of Operation Bright Light. SEAL personnel also
determination that infiltration of men and materiel via acted as advisers to their South Vietnamese counterparts
the Mekong River, its tributaries, and the other canal and to units like the Provincial Reconnaissance Units
systems in IV Corps and the Rung Sat Special Zone were (both discussed later in this section) and might conduct
of a greater concern than that down the coast of Vietnam operations with them.
or across the Gulf of Thailand from Cambodia. The US The fact that the SEALs were developing new tactics and
Navy created Task Force 116 to conduct the operation of doctrine throughout their time in Vietnam meant that they
interdicting enemy movements in the targeted areas. were also almost constantly trying new equipment. While

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Historical Note: HAL-3 and VAL-4

Task Force 116, and by association the SEAL units in inserting or extracting teams, or attacking targets
Vietnam, received support from two of the more unique identified by them.
naval aviation units in Vietnam. The first of these was In 1969, another aviation unit was added to those
Helicopter Attack Squadron (Light) Three (HAL-3), operating in support of Operation Game Warden.
commissioned in April 1967, after a long period of Light Attack Squadron Four (VAL-4) had similar origins
training with elements of the US Army’s 145th Combat to that of HAL-3. The US Navy had observed the USMC
Aviation Battalion. Nicknamed the Seawolves, it initially usage of the OV-10A Bronco aircraft and had become
received a number of hand-me-down UH-1Bs from the very interested in acquiring its own element equipped
US Army, equipped with the M16 armament subsystem. with the type. Twenty aircraft were acquired from the
This subsystem consisted of four 7.62mm M60 machine USMC in January 1969 and crews immediately began
guns and stores racks generally fitted with two seven-tube training in the US. By March 1969, eight aircraft had
2.75” rocket launchers. HAL-3 later received a number of been deployed to South Vietnam.
UH-1Cs fitted with the M21 armament subsystem, which Like HAL-3, the US Navy was interested in the
replaced the four M60 machine guns of the M16 with two capability VAL-4 could provide, but did not immediately
7.62mm M134 “Miniguns.” By the end of the conflict, have logistical support mechanisms in place. Its primary
HAL-3 had received a number of UH-1M gunships from aviation assets were on its carriers off the coast of
the US Army, along with HH-1K search and rescue and Vietnam. The primary armament of the VAL-4 aircraft,
UH-1L utility helicopters from its parent service. nicknamed the Black Ponies, consisted of the aircraft’s
While the Navy saw HAL-3 as an important element of internal armament of four 7.62mm M60 machine guns
Operation Game Warden, it did not have a large logistical and 2.75” and 5” rockets. SUU-11/A series gun pods
system in place to support such a unit. As a result, HAL-3 were acquired from the US Air Force, each with a single
often scrounged for weapons and other equipment for its 7.62mm GAU-2/A series “Minigun.” 20mm gun pods
helicopters, leading to unconventional armament like the Mk 4 Mod 0 were also used.
configurations. .50-caliber M2 machine guns or 7.62mm The accident on the USS Forrestal in 1967 involving
M134 “Miniguns” were often fitted at the doors. If these a 5” Zuni rocket had led to their use by carrier aircraft
weapons were fitted, the gun components of the fixed being severely restricted. As a result, VAL-4 proved to
armament subsystems were often removed. Heavily be a prime dumping ground for excess 5” rockets, with
modified M60 machine guns were also used. A wide array the weapon becoming an important part of the VAL-4
of individual weaponry was also carried by HAL-3 crews. arsenal. Also, the US Navy had tested the CBU-55/B fuel
Helicopter doors (both for the cockpit and main cabin) air explosive cluster bomb and found it to be unsuited to
were often removed to cope with the heat and humidity. use by high performance aircraft. These weapons were
HAL-3 deployed nine detachments throughout the also passed to VAL-4.
Task Force 116 area of operations, including small VAL-4 aircraft operated primarily out of Binh Thuy
detachments operating from converted Tank Landing and Vung Tao in support of Game Warden operations.
Ships (LSTs) in areas of the river itself. These helicopters These included supporting SEAL teams engaged with
were sometimes called in to support SEAL operations, enemy forces or attacking targets identified by them.

most special operations units had access to a wide array of Still, perhaps the individual weapon most associated
individual weapons and equipment, the SEALs tested a with the SEALs was the 5.56mm Cadillac Gage Stoner 63A.
dizzying array of arms, especially considering the overall size Designed by Eugene Stoner, the developer behind the
of the force. Various submachine guns, some of the earliest Armalite AR-10 and AR-15 rifles, the Stoner 63 series was
variants of the Colt CAR-15 family, silenced pistols and rifles, intended as a modular weapon system. It was designed to
automatic shotguns, and semi-automatic grenade launchers be rapidly converted from rifle, to carbine, to automatic
were utilized. Silenced shotgun shells and napalm grenades rifle, to light machine gun, all without major effort. It had
were also tested, along with captured enemy weapons. been tested in a variety of configurations by US Army

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Special Forces and the USMC. Both the US Army and the armor-piercing rifle rounds), in the form of ceramic plates
USMC found the weapon promising. Senior leaders of both around what passed for the craft’s pilothouse, engine, and
services, however, found little interest in converting to the fuel tank. The boats were initially armed with two 7.62mm
weapon, having just adopted the M16 series as the standard M60 machine guns, but later boats were fielded equipped
infantry arm. The SEALs, however, found the weapon to be with .50-caliber M2 machine guns and 40mm automatic
adaptable to their needs, specifically a desire for greater grenade launchers of various types. Crew members might
ammunition capacity. They adopted a variant designated also have 57mm M18 or 90mm M67 recoilless rifles in
the Mk 23 Mod 0, which combined the belt-fed capability addition to standard personal weapons. Boats similar in
of the light machine gun variant, with the overall length of size and configuration to the LSSC, referred to either as
the standard rifle variant. Known to the manufacturers as the Strike Assault Boat or SEAL Team Assault Boat (and
the Stoner 63A Commando, it also featured a special heavy both known by the acronym STAB), were also evaluated
fluted barrel. in the 1970s.
Also, as part of Task Force 116, SEALs enjoyed the The MSSC was another shallow-draft boat, but far larger
support of other elements of the Task Force, as well as that and with a higher profile than the LSSC. It was designed
of the Mobile Riverine Force. SEALs were transported in for the movement of larger forces (up to a full SEAL
watercraft operated by both of these forces. However, it Platoon) and to be able to provide greater support to
eventually became clear that the support requirements of engaged detachments. At base it provided four weapons
the SEALs necessitated dedicated units. In 1967, the US mounts. A common armament was to have two 7.62mm
Navy established Mobile Support Teams Two and Three M60 machine guns and two .50-caliber M2 machine guns
(MST-2 and MST-3). These were based in part off of on either side of the craft. In some cases additional weapons
Mobile Support Team One, which had been created in like the breach-loaded 60mm Mk 4 Mod 0 mortar or
1964 to support clandestine missions being conducted by 7.62mm M134 “Minigun” might be mounted in addition
the South Vietnamese Coastal Security Service (discussed to the existing weapons.
later in this section). The HSSCs, of which only two were built, were converted
MST-2 and MST-3 were dispersed in detachments to from LCM6s that had initially been made available to
support SEAL Detachments throughout the Task Force 116 the MSTs. They appeared similar to the Armored Troop
area of operations. Staffed by personnel taken from SEAL Carriers of the Mobile Riverine Force. They functioned as
Platoons, they were initially equipped with watercraft command ships, mobile bases, and similar purposes, and
generally used by UDT elements. These craft proved to be had a top deck that allowed helicopters to land to deliver
largely unsuited to SEAL operations. supplies or personnel, or extract casualties. HSSC-1,
By May 1967, the decision had been made to create a stationed at Nha Be, had a single breach-loaded 81mm Mk
specially designed group of watercraft for SEAL operations. 2 Mod 0 mortar, a 7.62mm Mk 21 Mod 0 machine gun, a
This would include the Light SEAL Support Craft (LSSC), 7.62mm M134 “Minigun,” and five .50-caliber M2 machine
Medium SEAL Support Craft (MSSC), and Heavy SEAL guns at various positions. On its top deck it mounted a
Support Craft (HSSC). The first of these craft to arrive 106mm M40 recoilless rifle. HSSC-2, stationed at Nam Can,
in Vietnam was the LSSC in June 1968. The HSSCs also had a Mk 2 Mod 1 mortar instead of the Mk 2 Mod 0, which
appeared in 1967, while the MSSCs appeared in 1969. featured a .50-caliber M2 machine gun on top of the mortar
The LSSC craft was a small low-profile shallow-draft tube. It also had four 7.62mm M60 machine guns instead of
assault boat with water-jet propulsion like the PBR. It had a single 7.62mm Mk 21 Mod 0. It otherwise had the same
very limited armor (rated at being able to defeat .30-caliber weapons fit as HSSC-1.

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The SEALs continued operations until December 1971, However, depending on the mission at hand, a half
when the last Platoon redeployed to the US. SEAL advisors squad of four to six men or close to full platoons of twelve
continued their work with the South Vietnamese and other to fourteen men might be used. Through 1968, the most
units until March 1973. common missions for divisional reconnaissance Marines
was to conduct either localized reconnaissance patrols in
USMC Force support of operations or what became known as “Stingray
Reconnaissance Company Patrols,” where reconnaissance patrols would attempt to
and USMC Reconnaissance locate enemy units and then call in artillery or air strikes. In
Company, Reconnaissance certain cases Stingray Patrols set up improvised listening
Battalion, Marine Division posts, sometimes with heavy armament (including
Veteran (Troop Quality D8 to D10), Morale D10 .50-caliber machine guns and 60mm mortars) to fight off
The USMC deployed two types of reconnaissance units enemy attacks. A US Navy Corpsman or artillery forward
to South Vietnam and it is important to separate the observer might be attached to such an operation to provide
two quickly to prevent any undue confusion. During additional support. Generally Stingray Patrols remained in
the Vietnam era, each Marine Division had its own the field for around a week at a time.
Reconnaissance Battalion, intended to provide a tactical After 1968, senior USMC
support to the division and its associated units. While leaders began to look at the
it operated reconnaissance teams in many ways similar utilization of divisional
in organization to US Army LRRPs, its mission was reconnaissance assets.
more akin to US Army divisional cavalry units. Force While Stingray Patrols
Reconnaissance elements, detached to the divisions from continued to operate,
the III Marine Amphibious Force Headquarters, had a some divisional
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering mission more units began
akin to US Army LRRPs. conducting
However, once in South Vietnam, the line between the smaller three- or
two units quickly became blurred because of increased four-man patrols with
demands for reconnaissance assets to help locate an elusive the objective of
enemy, the potential proximity of the enemy to friendly units, gathering intelligence
and the overall nature of the counter-insurgency mission. and observing enemy
Divisional Marine Reconnaissance Battalions were movements and
organized initially around a Headquarters and Service dispositions. Similar patrols
Company and four Reconnaissance Companies. However, using the standard six-man
by 1968, the 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, 1st Marine team (half a squad) were
Division had gained a fifth reconnaissance company, E also conducted. The
Company, because of the high demands for their services. standard organization for
The Companies themselves had a Company Headquarters such a team circa 1969 was:
and three Reconnaissance Platoons. E/1st Reconnaissance
Battalion was reinforced with a fourth company. A
Marine Sergeant,
Reconnaissance Platoon had a Platoon Headquarters and 1st Recon Battalion,
two Reconnaissance Squads of twelve men. 1965–66

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Marine Reconnaissance Team South Vietnamese Luc

1x Officer/NCO w/M16A1 Rifle Luong Dac Biet (LLDB)
1x RTO w/M16A1 Rifle Veteran (Troop Quality D8 to D10), Morale D10
3x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle As was noted in the chapter on the Republic of Vietnam, the
1x Corpsman w/M16A1 Rifle South Vietnamese military often suffered from the political
intrigue that was a feature in the daily functioning of the
One of the team members might also have a 40mm M79 government. Its special military elements and intelligence
grenade launcher, while basic individual weapons might community were no exception, and perhaps were even more
include more specialized weapons like silenced submachine intertwined in the political arena.
guns and rifles, XM177E2 “submachine guns,” or sniper The Luc Luong Dac Biet (LLDB), essentially Special
rifles. Forces, was in fact created as a byproduct of politics within
These operations, sometimes referred to as “keyhole,” the administration of Ngo Dinh Diem. The LLDB was formed
were very much in line with the missions being undertaken in March 1963 from units that had previously been trained
by the two Force Reconnaissance Companies of the III by the United States for the purposes of border security and
Marine Amphibious Force. The Force Reconnaissance reconnaissance, including cross-border operations into Laos
Companies were organized similarly to the companies of and North Vietnam. They were also to help US Army Special
the divisional reconnaissance battalions, but with more Forces personnel in the CIDG program.
platoons and fewer men per platoon. A Platoon had three The units that had existed before were directly subordinate
Reconnaissance Teams, each with four Marines. Teams to Diem through the Presidential Liaison Office and had
could be combined and often were, being used as reaction earned a reputation as Diem’s personal “palace” guard.
forces or for larger operations like their US Army In addition to their assigned mission, they were also used to
counterparts. Force Reconnaissance Marines generally consolidate Diem’s political position, engaging dissident
received additional training, such as SCUBA and airborne groups and paramilitary entities that Diem had courted early
qualification, to allow them to conduct their beach on to help in his rise to power.
reconnaissance mission. The creation of the LLDB did little to change this.
Reconnaissance Marines, both from divisional battalions The LLDB was still subordinate to the Liaison Office and
or Force Reconnaissance Companies, were generally Diem utilized them during his crackdown of Buddhist
inserted by helicopter. However, they might also be monks. The training and morale levels indicated reflect
deployed on foot (or moved part of the way by vehicle) or by this nature of the LLDB. Its professional qualities, in the
watercraft, depending on the environment. Limited use was early 1960s they were especially suspect, despite the high
even made of the OV-10A aircraft, with its cramped cargo degree of additional training. Discipline problems were
compartment and rear door removed, to parachute Force common and Diem even had a number of essentially
Reconnaissance Teams. irregular companies formed and added to the LLDB to
Most reconnaissance Marines, both assigned to divisional help in what might be called euphemistically an internal
and Force reconnaissance elements, were redeployed with security role. Their commanding officer, Lieutenant
the bulk of USMC units beginning in 1969. However, Colonel Le Quang Tung was among those executed during
reconnaissance Marines remained deployed in Southeast Asia the coup against Diem.
as part of other joint service or combined special operations In the wake of the coup the Liaison Office was dissolved
programs, or as advisors to groups like the Provincial and the LLDB reorganized. Its reconnaissance and cross-
Reconnaissance Units (discussed later in this section). border missions were reassigned to a separate entity called

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the Liaison Service, a perhaps ironic name given the rush to and other special operations elements to conduct cross-
dissolve Diem-era institutions. The LLDB subsequently border operations, leading to their deployment effectively as
became entirely focused on the paramilitary training role, an elite reaction element. After fleeing the initial onslaught of
mirroring the organizational structure and broad mission the Ho Chi Minh Campaign in I Corps, SMS reconnaissance
of the US Army Special Forces in Vietnam. Its units were teams were utilized to scout for North Vietnamese units.
organized into A, B, and C Detachments that were almost These units would have been influenced by elements of
identical to those found in the US Army Special Forces MACV-SOG. The relationship between the SMS and the
Group. The organization of the US Army Special Forces A previous LLDB, which participated in numerous special
Detachment presented earlier in this chapter can be taken reconnaissance projects within South Vietnam, would also
as a rough equivalent to the LLDB A Detachment. have influenced unit organization. The reconnaissance team
In this new position, the LLDB exercised nominal structure for many of these units was similar. Reconnaissance
control over the CIDG program and worked with its US teams would likely have numbered anywhere from six
Army counterparts in the conduct of various in-country to twelve men. The six-man US Army Ranger Patrol is in
reconnaissance operations (discussed later in this chapter). many ways functionally equivalent to the basic organization
Like the US Army Special Forces A Detachment, LLDB A of those used by MACV-SOG. It would make sense that
Detachments were also not intended to operate as tactical SMS reconnaissance elements would be similarly organized
units. However, personnel might accompany other units on and equipped.
operations in an advisory or other leadership capacity. Units were also organized into provisional platoons and
With the end of the CIDG program in 1971, the LLDB companies to act as reaction elements. These would likely
was disbanded and its personnel folded into other special have been formed by grouping expanded SMS reconnaissance
operations units in South Vietnam, most notably the Special teams into platoons to be used as commando infantry. A forty
Mission Service. to fifty-man platoon would not be unreasonable, as this
was the size of the similar reaction elements utilized by
South Vietnamese So Cong MACV-SOG. For a more in-depth discussion of such units,
Tac (Special Mission see the sections on MACV-SOG.
Service)
Veteran (Troop Quality D10), Morale D10 South Vietnamese Lien Doi
The So Cong Tac, translated as the Special Mission Service Ngoui Nhia (LDNN) and So
(SMS), was formed in large part to provide the South Phong Ve Duyen Hai
Vietnamese with the ability to make up for the departure (Coastal Security Service)
of Military Assistance Command – Vietnam’s Studies and Veteran (Troop Quality D10), Morale D10
Observation Group (MACV-SOG), which is discussed later While the Lien Doi Ngoui Nhia (LDNN), literally
in this work. They do warrant mention at this point, translated as “soldiers who fight under the sea,” and the So
however, because of their participation in the final battles in Phong Ve Duyen Hai, translated as the Coastal Security
South Vietnam. Service (CSS) were very distinct entities, they cannot easily
In late 1972, the SMS had been given a tactical be discussed separately. From the very beginning of their
responsibility in I Corps in the northern part of South relative existences they were inseparably linked.
Vietnam. It spanned from the city of Hue to the In 1961, the South Vietnamese Navy (VNN)
Vietnamese–Laotian border. The dwindling resources of the established an underwater demolition and salvage type
South Vietnamese military hampered the ability for the SMS unit, trained in Taiwan, and in large part modeled after

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the US Navy Underwater Demolition Teams. This unit While the CSS inherited the Biet Hai commando teams,
was named the LDNN. the LDNN was left without the immediate capacity to
Soon thereafter, a unit of maritime commandos was conduct special operations. Its interaction with US Navy
organized under Ngo Dinh Diem’s Presidential Liaison Office. SEAL elements quickly began to change this. By 1967, the
These commandos, referred to as Biet Hai by the South LDNN had established its own Special Sea Unit, or Hai
Vietnamese and Sea Commando Teams by their US trainers, Kich, generally referred to as the LDNN SEALs. Prior to
were to conduct raids and other missions against North 1971, the Hai Kich operated extensively with their US
Vietnam as part of Operation Plan 34A. This operation counterparts, engaging in similar reconnaissance, ambush,
intended to use maritime raiders and coastal interdiction of and search and destroy type missions.
supplies both to North Vietnam and to insurgents in the After 1971, the LDNN was expanded into a full group,
south, to soften the political position of the DRV. Lien Doan Ngoui Nhia (with the same acronym, LDNN).
The size and composition of Biet Hai teams varied Among its components was a full SEAL Team, consisting of
widely from mission to mission. Individual swimmers a number of platoons, each with two officers and twelve
equipped only with limpet mines were dispatched into enlisted personnel. These teams were deployed throughout
North Vietnamese harbors, while raiding parties of as many South Vietnam to conduct intelligence gathering and
as thirty individuals might be formed. These raiders, often reconnaissance operations, interdiction of enemy supply
targeting port infrastructure, would utilize regular infantry chains, ambushes, and defensive patrols. For larger operations
weapons, including in some cases 57mm M18 recoilless teams of eighteen to twenty men might be formed from
rifles. Biet Hai commandos were recruited from services multiple platoons.
other than the VNN, including the ARVN and the VNMC. LDNN weapons, while perhaps not as varied as their US
A unit of civilian agents was also formed. Non-Vietnamese Navy counterparts, were more varied than even other South
ethnic minorities were also utilized for the program, but Vietnamese special operations units. Most notably, the
had largely been purged by the mid-1960s. LDNN utilized a relatively large number of 40mm XM148
The Biet Hai experienced a similar reorganization after grenade launchers, the predecessor to the 40mm M203
the coup against Diem. Temporarily co-located with the launcher, intended to be fitted below a standard M16A1
LDNN at Da Nang, they continued operations effectively rifle. XM177E2 “submachine guns” and the full South
under LDNN control. In 1964, the Technical Service was Vietnamese arsenal of other personal weapons would also
formed (this became the Strategic Technical Directorate have been available to SEAL elements.
after 1968), effectively acting as the South Vietnamese
counterpart to the US Military Assistance Command – ANZAC Special Air Service
Vietnam’s Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG). Troop, Special Air Service
One of its many components was the CSS. Squadron, Special Air
In 1965, the CSS took control of the missions against Service Regiment
North Vietnam, while the LDNN took responsibility for Elite (Troop Quality D10 to D12), Morale D12
amphibious special operations in the south. The CSS The term ANZAC is used here as note of the fact that while
continued conducting interdiction missions along the initially only elements of the Australian Special Air Service
coast, even in the latter stages of the war. As the fighting Regiment (SASR) were deployed, New Zealand later
intensified in the south, the CSS was in certain cases deployed a single troop from the New Zealand Special Air
directed to support other services in their operations there, Service (NZSAS) to assist in the overall mission. It was
rather than against targets in the north. integrated with the Australian elements already in country.

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The Australian SASR contingent arrived in 1966 along the SASR Patrols also developed improvised mounts for
with the various other units sent to reinforce the 1st attaching them to their L1A1 rifles. M16A1 and L1A1 rifles
Australian Task Force (ATF). The three squadrons of the were sometimes modified in the field to have shortened
SASR rotated through Vietnam during the period of barrels, and the SASR also experimented with modifying
Australia’s engagement in South Vietnam. The deployment of the firing mechanism of the L1A1 to allow for automatic
No. 4 Troop, NZSAS began in December 1967, as part of an fire. Silenced submachine guns, like the L34A1 Sterling,
increased New Zealand commitment. The NZSAS elements along with shotguns of various types could also be found,
were integrated with the Australian elements, creating an depending on the mission.
effectively reinforced SASR Squadron, sometimes referred Like US Army Rangers, the size of the Patrol could be
to as a Sabre Squadron. expanded depending on the nature of the mission. A ten- to
By 1968, the Sabre Squadron had some fifteen SASR twelve-man patrol might be utilized for an ambush or
Patrols divided unevenly among three SASR Troops. The prisoner snatch operation. Reconnaissance in force type
SASR Patrols were utilized in much the same way as US operations were also conducted with
Army Long Range Patrols and interacted regularly with patrols between fifteen and twenty,
these US Army units to share lessons learned and other but these were uncommon. The
information. Similarly to their US Army counterparts, the large number of personnel was
SASR Patrols were never all out in the field at any one time, found to be incapable of moving
to maintain a health reserve and allow for down time large distances undetected.
between missions.
Individual SASR Patrols were generally five men strong, SPECIAL
organized along similar lines as the US Army Rangers. A PROGRAMS
five-man patrol might be organized as follows: In addition to the
special operations
SASR Patrol forces themselves, a
1x Patrol Leader w/L1A1 SLR Rifle number of special
1x Pointman w/Owen or F1 SMG programs also warrant
1x RTO w/Owen or F1 SMG mention in this
2x Scout w/L1A1 SLR Rifle section. Only those
that pertain generally
The SMGs were only utilized until M16A1 rifles began to to Vietnam specifically
be acquired in 1967. M79 grenade launchers also began are mentioned here.
being acquired at the same time. The weapons varied from There were many more
Patrol to Patrol, depending on the nature of the operation. specialized programs
As they became available, under-barrel grenade launchers throughout the region.
became very popular with the SASR. The XM148 was in
use by 1968 and some XM203 had been acquired by 1970.
The XM148s continued to be used even after the XM203s
appeared, and in some cases almost all the members of a
Patrol Member,
Patrol might have one or the other attached to their rifle. 4 Troop NZSAS,
Though designed for, and used on the M16 series of rifles, 1970

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These programs warrant mention because many had concern were along Vietnam’s highland borders with Laos and
specialized units developed and organized for them. Most Cambodia. The population in these areas was almost entirely
them also involved more than one of the entities mentioned made up of non-Vietnamese ethnic groups.
above, making it difficult to simply connect them with a In 1961, an experimental paramilitary program was
specific organization. In general these programs revolved developed and suggested to the leadership of the Rhade
around concepts of unconventional warfare, designed tribe, one of the larger highland tribes. At the village
to keep insurgents in South Vietnam on edge, often by of Buon Enao, a combined civic action and self-defense
essentially conducting a guerilla war against them. Deep program was started that involved the training of volunteers
reconnaissance, paramilitary border protection, and direct into paramilitary units to defend the village complex.
action against the “Viet Cong Infrastructure” as it was The initial experiment was a resounding success and it soon
referred to, were all missions intended to strip advantages expanded beyond the Buon Enao complex and beyond
from guerilla fighters in Vietnam. The success of most is the Rhade.
debatable and no attempt will be made here truly explore The working concept was that the South Vietnamese LLDB
the positive and negative attributes, which could easily would be in charge of the program, but their close working
fill separate volumes for each program mentioned in relationship with US Army Special Forces meant that it was
this section. effectively a combined project from the beginning. The limited
capability of the LLDB early on and their usage for Diem’s
The Civilian Irregular personal purposes meant that early on US Army Special Forces
Defense Group (CIDG) units were in some cases conducting the program without
Program any LLDB presence at all. With the activation of Military
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 to D10 Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV) in 1962, the
decision was made to have that organization take charge of
US participation in the program, by that point known as the
CIDG Special Rules CIDG Program.
Divine Blessing Throughout the program, LLDB participation would be
Personnel often wore quasi-religious amulets in the nominal. Cultural differences and historical animosity
belief that these would protect them. To represent between the low-land Vietnamese and the highland tribes
this, a unit of CIDG troops may re-roll the first meant the Vietnamese were often reluctant to be part of the
failed morale test in a game. project. The highland tribes for their part had many of
Follow Me the same feelings, seeing little practical difference between
Units always require line of sight to a leader model in the government in the south and the government in the
order to advance towards the enemy. north. Promises by the Republic of Vietnam had largely
gone unfulfilled making the tribes distrust the government,
while the government was reticent of the arming of large
The Civilian Irregular Defense Group (CIDG) Program in numbers of what it saw as potential insurgents on its
South Vietnam was an outgrowth of a number of attempts to borders. Highland tribes did create formal movements
deny insurgents control of areas deemed insecure by the South seeking various concessions from the government, the
Vietnamese government, or otherwise deny their access largest being the Unified Front for the Struggle of Oppressed
or movement through such areas. By and large the areas of Races, known by its French acronym FULRO.

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In September 1964, tensions boiled over and CIDG groups was included in every yearly MACV Command
personnel revolted, stating that they had joined FULRO’s History report through 1969.
cause, and killing numerous South Vietnamese personnel. Continued US Support for the CIDG program prevented
US personnel were disarmed and essentially held as it from being completely disbanded. Though initially
hostages by the CIDG units, but were unharmed. The US intended more for localized defense, by 1965 it had reached a
Army Special Forces personnel would later act as point where it had become an important offensive component
intermediates for the negotiated settlement at the end of for conducting border surveillance and interdicting enemy
month. In October, representatives of the highland tribes movements. The switch to a more offensive focus had come
brought a list of grievances to Pleiku, where they presented with the reorganization of the program under MACV in 1962,
them to representatives of the Republic of Vietnam. Various under what was called Operation Switchback. US Army
changes were subsequently implemented, but did little to leaders were put in charge and felt that an offensive mission
ease tensions for good. The South Vietnamese military would be more effective than simply securing their villages.
purged many non-Vietnamese from its ranks in the Through 1965, the basic organization of the CIDG
aftermath of the revolt. A section of relations with tribal program was a company size paramilitary unit, variously

Historical Note: Non-Vietnamese Ethnic Groups

The majority of the participants in the CIDG Often referred to as ethnically Chinese (sometimes
program came from a large number of diverse they are referenced outright as “Nung Chinese”),
highland tribal groups that have historically lived the Nung belong to a language group that is
in the mountainous border regions between more related to low-land Lao and the Thai
Vietnam and Laos and Cambodia. During the than to the Han.
conflict, and even today, the common term The Chinese affiliation appears to center on
when discussing them as a whole is Montagnard, the fact that the Nung are most closely related
a French word meaning mountaineer or mountain to a set of groups living in the Sino-Vietnamese
man, which does little to articulate the various border areas. This is a conflation of ethnicity
and largely different tribes. and nationality. While the Chinese government
The US Army published an anthropological recognizes over forty different ethnic groups inside
survey of non-Vietnamese ethnic groups in 1966, China, it is the majority Han and the groups related
Department of the Army Pamphlet 550-105, in to it that are interpreted as the ethnic Chinese.
which it identified eighteen different tribes and By and large the Vietnamese have had a
numerous other groups. Included among those distrustful relationship historically with ethnic
other groups are the Khmer (the ethnic majority minorities within their borders, especially the
in Cambodia), who also participated in large part highland tribes. This is made worse by an at times
in the CIDG program. patronizing and racist view of the highland groups.
Not included in the US Army pamphlet are the It continues to be a pertinent issue to this day.
Nung, who deserve some mention here because Tensions between dominant ethnic groups and
of their almost mythological status with regards to ethnic minorities are common to most of the
US special operations forces personnel in Vietnam. nations of Southeast Asia.

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referred to as the CIDG Company, Light Guerilla Company, concept of operations for the CIDG program as a whole.
or Camp Strike Force. These units were intended for the In 1966, MACV directed the formation of battalion size
protection of their established base camps and the areas in the Mobile Strike Forces, commonly referred to as MIKE
immediate vicinity. This was an evolution of the initial CIDG Forces. Initially, these battalions were assigned one to each
concept. Though variation between units was common, a Corps Tactical Zone. A fifth MIKE Force was also created
typical CIDG Company would have consisted of a Company essentially for the protection of the 5th Special Forces
Headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a Weapons Platoon. Group (Airborne) headquarters at Nha Trang, but was also
Each Rifle Platoon had a Platoon Headquarters and three utilized as a reserve force. Each battalion had any number
Rifle Squads. of MIKE Force Companies, generally from two to five.
However, the II Corps MIKE Force had seven companies in
Platoon HQ 1967, and variation between units was high.
1x Officer w/M1 Carbine The MIKE Force Company was similar to the earlier
1x NCO w/M1 Carbine CIDG companies, but moved some assets from the company
1x RTO w/M1 Carbine weapons platoon into a weapons squad in each of the three
1x Medic w/M1 Carbine rifle platoons. It also had an organic Reconnaissance Platoon,
1x Rifleman w/M1 Carbine a type of unit that had in many cases been added to previous
CIDG companies. It still featured three rifle platoons and a
3x Rifle Squad weapons platoon. The Rifle Platoons had the three Rifle
1x Squad Leader w/M1 Carbine Squads as with regular Camp Strike Forces, but added the
1x Asst. Squad Leader w/M1 Carbine w/Rifle Grenade aforementioned Weapons Squad.
Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Platoon HQ
2x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/M1 Carbine 1x Officer w/M2 Carbine
3x Rifleman w/M1 Carbine 1x NCO w/M2 Carbine
1x RTO w/M2 Carbine
Officers and NCOs might alternatively be armed with 1x Medic w/M2 Carbine
either .45-caliber M1 or .45-caliber M3 submachine guns.
The .30-caliber M1 Carbine also eventually began to 3x Rifle Squad
replace the M1 carbine. The weapons platoon was supposed 1x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine
to have three machine gun squads, each with a .30-caliber 1x Asst. Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine w/Rifle Grenade
M1919A6 light machine gun, and three mortar squads, Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
each with a 60mm M2 mortar. It was not uncommon for 2x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
CIDG companies to beunder-strength and without many 2x Asst. Automatic Rifleman w/M2 Carbine
of their intended support weapons. Additionally, two or 4x Rifleman w/M2 Carbine
three US Army Special Forces personnel from the A
Detachment associated with the particular company would Weapons Squad
accompany it out on any operations. 1x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine
The Camp Strike Forces were not ideally suited to 2x Machine Gunner w/M1919A6 Machine Gun (Med.
extended duration combat operations outside of their AP:2/AT:0)
assigned areas. This did not fit into the new, more offensive 2x Asst. Gunner w/M2 Carbine

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4x Ammunition Bearer w/M2 Carbine 3x Reconnaissance Squad

1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. 1x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine
AP:1/AT:0) 1x Chief Scout w/M2 Carbine
3x Scout w/M2 Carbine
With the dispersion of the M1919A6 machine guns to the 1x Rifleman w/M2 Carbine
Rifle Platoons, the Weapons Platoon retained only the three
60mm M2 mortars. A 3.5” M20A1B1 rocket launcher By the end of 1966, the MIKE Force Companies had again
(Med. AP:1/AT:2(M) was also supposed to be held in been modified, removing the Weapons and Reconnaissance
the Weapons Platoon Headquarters. The Reconnaissance Platoons entirely. A single 60mm mortar was retained in
Platoon consisted of a Platoon Headquarters and three the Company Headquarters. To try and make up for the
Reconnaissance Squads. loss of firepower, the Asst. Squad Leader in each Rifle
Squad was issued an M79 grenade launcher.
Platoon HQ Also in late 1966, a number of similar companies were
1x Officer w/M2 Carbine formed around a slightly different mission. The Mobile

Historical Note: The Eagle Flight

The term Eagle Flight was used to refer to platoon observer might also be included in the lead
size heliborne reaction elements that were developed helicopter. The “Eagle” would be escorted by
first within the ARVN with the help of US advisors. anywhere from four to six UH-1A/B gunships.
The reaction element was later adopted within the UH-1A/B helicopters were quickly found to be
CIDG program in late 1964 as a method of assisting unsuitable for carrying large numbers of troops.
Camp Strike Forces under attack in II Corps. The Eagle Flight developed by the CIDG Program
The Eagle Flights that were utilized between 1963 in II Corps existed from late 1964 through at least
and 1964 by the ARVN were in many ways related 1965, and involved a reduced size formation, with
to elements of what at that time was known as “Sky two sections each with three squads. The squads
Cavalry” in the US Army. Eagle Flight operations had only six personnel assigned to them, as this
helped further refine various concepts being tested had been determined to be a more reasonable
by the US Army that eventually led to the Aerorifle load for the available helicopters.
Platoon of Divisional Cavalry Squadrons. The experience of the CIDG Program’s Eagle
The initial organization for Eagle Flights was Flight led to certain capabilities being part of the
four ten-man squads (a standard ARVN rifle MIKE Forces that were subsequently developed.
squad, less one rifleman) with what was described MIKE Force personnel were trained in airmobile
as “preponderance of automatic weapons,” to tactics, with the idea being to move entire
include light machine guns if available, all loaded companies by helicopter. MIKE Force personnel
into four troop carrying helicopters. At the time were also jump qualified, with four known airborne
these might have been CH-21 series helicopters operations being conducted. C-130 series aircraft
or UH-1A/B helicopters. An artillery forward were used as the transports during those missions.

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Guerilla Force (MGF) Companies were formed at the Reconnaissance Platoon had two Reconnaissance Sections,
direction of US Army Colonel Francis J. Kelly, with the each with two Reconnaissance Squads, for a total of four
intent of using guerilla tactics like the PAVN and the PLAF. Reconnaissance Squads.
Formed from CIDG elements, the lightly armed MGF
Companies were intended to be deployed on missions Reconnaissance Squad
lasting up to two months, resupplied by air, conducting hit 1x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine
and run raids on insurgent units and base areas. MGF 1x RTO w/M2 Carbine
Companies were led by an A Detachment. 1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher
MGF Companies looked similar to the MIKE Force 1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
Companies of late 1966, but retained a Reconnaissance 1x Rifleman w/M2 Carbine
Platoon. An MGF Company consisted of a Company 1x Medic w/M2 Carbine
Headquarters, three Rifle Platoons, and a Reconnaissance
Platoon. Each of the Rifle Platoons had a Platoon By the end of 1967, the MGF Companies had ceased
Headquarters and three Rifle Squads. operations. Difficulties in supporting the units without
leading to their detection and other operating issues meant
Platoon HQ the program was viewed with at best mixed results. Generally
1x Officer w/M16A1 Rifle missions did not last as long as intended either, often due to
1x Deputy Platoon Leader w/M16A1 Rifle increased enemy pressure on the MGF units after their
1x NCO w/M2 Carbine detection. The MGF units were subsequently disbanded and
1x Platoon Medic w/M2 Carbine their personnel integrated into MIKE Force units.
2x Interpreter w/M2 Carbine In 1968, regiment-sized Mobile Strike Force Commands
(MSFC), affiliated with a US Army Special Forces B
3x Rifle Squad Detachment were formed. At that time, MIKE Force
1x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine battalions were standardized around a three company
1x Medic w/M2 Carbine organization, with the companies modified slightly yet
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) again. MSFCs controlled generally between two and five
1x Automatic Rifleman w/M1918 BAR (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) MIKE Force battalions, and a Reconnaissance Company,
3x Rifleman w/M2 Carbine formed in part from the reorganization of company level
reconnaissance units.
The company commanding officer, company intelligence The new MIKE Force Companies were organized
and communications specialists, platoon leaders, and the around a Company Headquarters and four Rifle Platoons.
reconnaissance section leaders were all US Army Special The Rifle Platoons each had a Platoon Headquarters, three
Forces personnel. All other personnel were from the CIDG Rifle Squads, and a Weapons Squad as they had had since
program. In the organizations provided here, personnel late 1966.
equipped with M16A1 rifles should be taken as US Army
Special Forces, while those with other weapons are CIDG. Platoon HQ
The Company Headquarters had a Machine Gun Squad, 2x NCO w/Rifle
which included two 7.62mm M60 machine guns, and 1x RTO w/Rifle
included a grenadier with an M79 grenade launcher. The 1x Medic w/Rifle

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3x Rifle Squad with a single 60mm M2 mortar, along with a

1x Squad Leader w/Rifle Reconnaissance Section with a Section Headquarters and
1x Asst. Squad Leader w/Rifle three Reconnaissance Squads.
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
7x Rifleman w/Rifle Section HQ
1x NCO w/Rifle
Weapons Squad
1x Squad Leader w/Rifle 3x Reconnaissance Squad
1x Asst. Squad Leader w/Rifle 1x Squad Leader w/Rifle
1x Machine Gunner w/M60 Machine Gun (Med. 2x Scout w/Rifle
AP:2/AT:0) 1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2x Asst. Gunner w/Rifle 2x Rifleman w/Rifle

Other supporting elements were similarly reduced. The Units equipped with rifles could be equipped with M2
Company Headquarters had a four-man Mortar Section, carbines or M16A1 rifles. In 1967, CIDG units, as nominal

Historical Note: Airboats

Airboats, which had been used for some time in two additional crew manning individual weapons,
the Florida Everglades for hauling tourists, had one being an M79 grenade launcher. With CIDG,
been tested by the US Army Concept Team in US Army Special Forces, LLDB, and NPFF members
Vietnam. The first units had arrived in October often taking part in airboat operations, the other
1964 and ACTIV had concluded that the craft individual weapons could vary greatly.
might prove of use for both regular US Army units Also, while the intended crew of an airboat was
and US Army Special Forces personnel operating four, but in practice it appears that a total of three
in IV Corps. While there was some interest from were more common. For operations the craft could
regular US Army elements, the creation of the be broken down into two three craft sections or
joint US Army–US Navy Mobile Riverine Force smaller, depending on the nature of the mission.
generally obviated the need for smaller, less At least one craft in each section had a radio.
protected craft like airboats. In the case of full platoon operations, the lead
US Army Special Forces on the other hand took section might have two radios, one for the section
great interest in the craft as a way of getting CIDG leader and one for the platoon leader. Each airboat
and MIKE Force personnel around. Previously, was armed most commonly with a .30-caliber
various small boats, procured locally or imported, M1919A6 machine gun. Other weapons, like
had been used to provide paramilitary forces with the .50-caliber M2 machine gun might be fitted.
additional mobility in the region. The 57mm M18 recoilless rifle, 106mm M40
The Airboat Company had four Airboat Platoons, recoilless rifle, and 40mm XM174 automatic
each with six Airboat Squads. Each airboat was to grenade launcher were tested, but found to be
have a crew of four: an airboat pilot, gunner, and unstable when fired from the light craft.

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members of the South Vietnamese military, began to receive converted into a new type of unit under the ARVN Ranger
replacements for the World War II and Korean War-era Command, being designated as Ranger Border Defense
weapons that they had been using. Though M79 grenade Battalions, essentially becoming ARVN Ranger Battalions.
launchers had already worked their way into the organization, During the process old animosities flared up and some
M16A1 rifles and M60 machine guns began to replace the units had to be entirely disbanded because of their refusal
M2 carbines, M1918 BARs, and M60 machine guns that had to join the ARVN. Perhaps the best known example of
previously been issued. However, the issuing of equipment continued issues between highland tribes and Vietnamese
was slow going, and some units still had not entirely authorities came almost at the very end. At the beginning
converted to the new weapons by the beginning of 1969. of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, the Ranger Border
Mixed equipment was common, with US Special Forces Defense Battalion at Buon Ma Thuot chose not to alert its
personnel often equipping the units under their command superiors of PAVN movement in the area. This has been
with whatever could be easily acquired, to include weapons seen as a contributing factor to the rapid fall of I Corps to
captured from encounters with the PLAF and the PAVN. the PAVN.
The CIDG program continued into the early 1970s, but
not for long. Even initially, the CIDG program had Projects Delta, Sigma,
envisioned itself as essentially being a means to an end. The and Omega
units created While it was made clear that dedicated cross-border
under it operations would not be discussed in this volume, it is
were to be important to note that Project Delta’s origins lie in the
eventually cross-border activities later taken up by MACV’s Studies and
integrated Observation Group (MACV-SOG), which are discussed in
more formally the sections dealing with covert operations in Laos and
into the Army Cambodia. Project Delta, the first of the so-called “Greek
of the Republic Letter Projects,” tasked with special reconnaissance, first
of Vietnam began as a relatively small training operation for LLDB
(ARVN). As what commandos bound for Laos. That mission, codenamed
became known as Leaping Lena, had been effectively run by the US Central
Vietnamization came into Intelligence Agency, with the support of both US Army
full swing this process Special Forces personnel and the LLDB. By the end of 1964 it
became more accelerated. had been classified as a failure.
Camp Strike Forces were However, the US Army Special Forces personnel and
either converted into their LLDB counterparts had gained valuable experience in
ARVN Regional Force reconnaissance patrolling and related tasks. They had
Companies or entirely begun training other elements, including members of the
disbanded. MIKE regular US Army. The need for reconnaissance elements
Forces units were in Vietnam has already been made clear. Quickly, the
either disbanded or US Army and USMC units had various reconnaissance
elements already out in the field, most were tasked with
NCO, Project Delta, 5th missions relevant to tactical operation. MACV lacked a
SFGA, 1964 ground reconnaissance element with a mission of providing

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more substantial information on enemy dispositions. the CIDG Program, Project Delta was in many ways only
Project Delta proved to be a perfect fit. nominally under LLDB command. In fact, the Project is often
By 1965, MACV had directed Project Delta to begin known by the US Army Special Forces B Detachment
conducting a wide array of intelligence gathering and assigned to it, B-52. By the end of 1968, the entire organization
specialized reconnaissance tasks within South Vietnam included a Headquarters Section, twelve roadrunner teams
and in the immediate border areas. This included prisoner (for trail watching missions), twelve reconnaissance teams (for
snatches, trail watching (involving small teams looking for traditional deep reconnaissance missions), along with a
infiltrating insurgent units or supplies), the direction of air security company (staffed by Nungs from the CIDG program
strikes and artillery fire (and post-strike assessments), as and including a specialized bomb damage assessment
well as traditional deep reconnaissance type missions. platoon). Its reaction force was the ARVN 91st Airborne
Project Delta also had its own reaction elements in case an Ranger Battalion (later 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion).
immediate strike was necessary to catch enemy units out The roadrunner teams consisted of five CIDG personnel.
in the open. These personnel would be lightly armed, intended to
Project Delta, like the CIDG Program, had been created as observe but not engage enemy personnel. Reconnaissance
a South Vietnamese-run, US-advised operation. However, like Teams were assigned four US Army Special Forces personnel

Historical Note: ARVN 91/81st Ranger Battalion (Airborne)

and 81st Ranger Group (Airborne)
The history of the ARVN Airborne Ranger Battalion Following the conclusion of those operations it was
follows that of the LLDB to a degree. It was created expanded to six companies, and returned to its mission
specifically for Project Delta and placed under the of support Project Delta. However, fear of further
command of the LLDB in 1964. At that time it consisted insurgent attacks led to two companies being assigned
of four companies, organized essentially as a reinforced to the LLDB Headquarters in Nha Trang.
ARVN Ranger Battalion. All of its personnel were jump With the LLDB disbanded in December 1970, the
qualified. A large number of the personnel had been 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion was expanded into
drawn from non-Vietnamese ethnic groups as well. the 81st Airborne Ranger Group, consisting of a
After the mutiny in late 1964, the unit was staffed Headquarters Company, Reconnaissance Company,
entirely by Vietnamese personnel. and seven Exploitation Companies, in part modeled
Its existence, even within the ARVN itself was little after those utilized by MACV-SOG. It was placed
known until the Tet Offensive in early 1968. The LLDB under the direct command of the head of the ARVN
Headquarters at Nha Trang was protected by elements of Intelligence branch.
the 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, who subsequently While organized to continue conducting its border
joined the fight to drive the insurgents out of the city. surveillance and cross-border missions, it was
While successful, the unit suffered heavy casualties. increasingly utilized as an elite infantry formation.
After a four month retraining cycle, in which its During the Nguyen Hue Offensive, the unit participated
designation was changed to the 81st Airborne Ranger in the fighting at An Loc. It participated in some of
Battalion, it was deployed to Saigon to help in operations the last fighting in I Corps during 1975, before being
in the city and its suburbs against remnant insurgents. attached to the ARVN’s 18th Division in the last month
One common theory for the change was that ten (nine of the conflict. Under that command it was sent to Xuan
plus one) was an unlucky number, while nine (eight plus Loc, where heavy fighting and casualties effectively
one) was a lucky number. dispersed the unit.

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and six LLDB personnel. However, varying numbers of While all the “Greek Letter” projects were generally
personnel might actually be sent out on individual missions. more focused on South Vietnam than cross-border
Generally the team leader and the assistant team leader operations, they did overlap to a degree with the missions
carried radios. Personnel might otherwise be armed with a being conducted with MACV-SOG. Project Delta remained
wide array of individual weapons. a combined entity under the direction of MACV until it
The Security Company was organized similar to a reduced stopped operations in 1970 as part of the general standing
strength CIDG Camp Strike Force. It had no heavy weapons. down of such programs and the conversion of the CIDGs
While one of its missions was securing the Project Delta into regular ARVN. Projects Sigma and Omega continued
compound at Nha Trang, it was often used as a small reaction to operate into 1971 and 1972, but by the end of 1967, both
force in of itself. The Bomb Damage Assessment Platoon had been integrated with MACV-SOG.
assigned to it could function similarly to an Eagle Flight, and
was often utilized on missions like securing aircraft crash sites. Intelligence Collection
By 1966 its training mission had also been separated and and Exploitation (ICEX) and
the MACV Recondo School established. This school the Phoenix / Phung Hoang
trained members of various elite units from different Program
services and nations. The participation of the US Army It is almost impossible to talk about what is generally
Special Forces personnel in Project Delta and LRP known as the Phoenix Program without getting into a deep
personnel being trained at the MACV Recondo School discussion ranging from its practical utility to its ethical
meant that senior US Army leaders were aware of the useful considerations. One might hope that people can agree the
intelligence being garnered by it. Phoenix Program was morally ambiguous, regardless of
By the end of 1966, two additional projects had been whether one feels that the program’s ends justified the
established to provide a similar, if less expansive capability means. This section will try to present the history of the
to the US Army in Vietnam. Project Sigma was attached to program as objectively as possible.
the US Army’s I Field Force, while Project Omega was Ironically, Phoenix comes out of the determination in
assigned to II Field Force. Each of the projects had a US 1966 that the conflict in Vietnam could not be won by
Army Special Forces B Detachment affiliated with them. conventional fighting alone. It was a component of a larger
Project Sigma was led by B-56, while Project Omega was so-called “pacification” strategy devised by Robert Komer,
led by B-50. then a member of Lyndon B. Johnson’s National Security
Each was organized around a Headquarters Section, a Council and a former analyst for the Central Intelligence
Reconnaissance Platoon, and a battalion sized Reaction Agency (CIA). Komer was eventually tasked with the
Force. The Reaction Forces was organized similarly to implementation of his ideas through an arm of Military
a MIKE Force Battalion. The Reconnaissance Platoons Assistance Command – Vietnam (MACV), called Civil
included eight roadrunner teams and sixteen reconnaissance Operations and Revolutionary Development Support
teams. These were smaller in size than their Project Delta (CORDS or MACV-CORDS). Komer’s CORDS interacted
counterparts. Roadrunner teams assigned to Projects heavily with the CIA during the course of its existence.
Sigma and Omega only had four CIDG personnel, while CORDS spent most of its existence being maligned by
reconnaissance teams had two US Army Special Forces both the MACV leadership and the South Vietnamese
personnel and four CIDG personnel. These two projects government. General Westmoreland was famously said to
were entirely under the command of the US Army and had have remarked that he would have already won the war had
no LLDB participation. he not had to divert so many resources to CORDS and

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pacification. Still, CORDS tried to do its work, engaging in By the end of 1966, Komer and other members of
a Revolutionary Development Program (discussed in the CORDS were working on what was initially termed
following section) with the South Vietnamese government “Intelligence Collection and Exploitation” (ICEX). ICEX
and attempting to win the proverbial “hearts and minds” of began first as a plan to create a coordinating staff to filter
the South Vietnamese people. intelligence from all sources in South Vietnam in an attempt
If there was one thing, however, that frustrated all to locate and identify individuals, arrest or otherwise
elements of the counter-insurgency effort, it was the ability neutralize them, and interrogate those arrested for useful
of the insurgents to blend in with the population. The now information leading to further action.
classic work On Guerilla Warfare, attributed to Mao Tse Some have suggested that Komer was dissatisfied with
Tung, speaks of the guerilla swimming freely in the ocean simply establishing such a staff and preferred the creation
of the people. Various attempts had been to drain this sea. of a more direct action style organization. Regardless, ICEX
Moving the rural population into specially developed as it developed remained at base essentially a coordinating
“fortified hamlets” had proven difficult, if not counter- element for existing resources. It maintained effectively a
productive. Identifying and neutralizing the guerilla set of coordinating elements through South Vietnam to
became the focus of Komer and his associates. maintain lists of potential members of the so-called “Viet

Historical Note:
The Revolutionary / Rural Development Program
Robert Komer’s pacification strategy involved a and localities. One RDC was established for
component known generally as Revolutionary each province.
Development. After 1970 it was sometimes referred During the demonstration entertainment would
to in the contemporary US government literature be provided, along with what might technically be
as Rural Development, no doubt because of the termed “white propaganda” for the benefit of the
interesting connotations of using the word government. It might also involve the interview
“revolutionary” in what was for the US an of the locals in an attempt to identify insurgents or
anti-Communist struggle. register people for the receipt of government services,
The Revolutionary Development Program at base for military service, or for participation in local
can be described as one that sought to integrate civil militia organizations. Elements to take note of local
and military operations into a concerted effort to grievances and maintain a national census were also
consolidate and reinforce public support in the South often included. Members of the RDC would otherwise
Vietnamese government. This in part involved the study the quality of life with the intention of reporting
conduct of civic actions, generally medical in nature, back to the central government.
by regular military units in enemy controlled areas, While RDCs generally teamed up with local military
as a show of the power of the central government or paramilitary organizations, they also included their
and the potential benefits it offered. own organic militia element to provide localized
It also involved the actions of the Revolutionary security. Each RDC, generally regardless of size,
Development Cadre (RDC), an organization contained a Militia Platoon, with three eleven-man
of variable size, which would conduct elaborate Militia Squads. These Squads would be organized
demonstrations through South Vietnam’s provinces similarly to those in PF Platoons or NPFF Companies.

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Cong Infrastructure” (VCI) and dispersed agents, possibly It was also technically supposed to be primarily the
affiliated with the CIA, to interrogate captured persons. responsibility of the National Police, the National Police
Otherwise, the physical holding of prisoners and the Special Branch, and the National Police Field Force. In
administrative elements were left to CORDS supported practice, village sweeps were conducted by combined task
South Vietnamese committees at national, regional, and forces of US military elements, members of the South
provincial levels. Vietnamese Armed Forces, and the South Vietnamese
By 1969, the program had been made public and support National Police. Often these operations were combined
for it had come under the responsibility of MACV. At with Revolutionary Development civic actions.
this time, the name Phung Hoang (meaning Phoenix In addition, specialized Provincial Reconnaissance Units
in Vietnamese) was applied to it. It is hard not to read anything (PRUs) were formed in each province. These units had first
into the stated intentions to convey a sense of rebirth in South appeared as part of ICEX in 1966 to give the program a
Vietnam by using the Phoenix as the symbol of the program. direct action component directly assigned to it. The PRUs
Technically, the program was known by its Vietnamese name, were staffed by civilians and entirely paid for and equipped
as the program was supposed to be South Vietnamese- by the US. Most of the funding came from the CIA. Advisors
administered, if US-advised. If the relationship was anything from various US military branches, including the US Navy
like that in the CIDG program or other special operations SEALs, the USMC, and the US Army were assigned to the
programs, the South Vietnamese authority was nominal. PRUs, and often conducted operations with them. Members

Historical Note: The Chieu Hoi Program

Chieu Hoi translated from Vietnamese to mean formed into company sized Armed Propaganda
“Open Arms,” and was the name given to the Teams (APT) to be utilized as necessary within
South Vietnamese program by which amnesty assigned provinces. Their specific mission was
could be given to insurgents who defected to the to either act independently or accompany other
South Vietnamese government. The term for such military or paramilitary units and attempt to
a defection was to “rally,” with those participating induce other insurgents to rally to the government.
either being referred to as “ralliers” or as “Chieu An APT Company consisted of a Company
Hoi.” Those who rallied were often utilized for Headquarters and three APT Platoons. Each of
specialized purposes. the platoons had a Platoon Headquarters and three
The US military accepted Chieu Hoi as APT Squads. Each of the squads had seven men
specialized scouts, who might know an area in and were intended to provide localized security for
greater detail or have a better understanding of the since public address element of the platoon.
enemy tactics or dispositions. The program was The platoons were not intended for combat
referred to as the “Kit Carson Scouts,” after operations, but personnel were issued .30-caliber
the 19th century American frontiersman. The M2 carbines. The platoon leader and assistant
program began in 1966, created by the USMC, platoon leader were issued .45-caliber M1
but eventually expanded to include the US Army. submachine guns. Each platoon also had access
Chieu Hoi were also utilized as propaganda tools to a single M1918 BAR and a single M1919A6
in the same way South Vietnamese defectors were machine gun for operations where greater hostile
utilized in North Vietnam. In some cases they were presence might be expected.

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of PRUs might be former insurgents who had “rallied” to of communist-inspired insurgents against the French and
the government or members of non-Vietnamese ethnic their colonial forces. These rebels, known popularly as the
groups, in addition to Vietnamese civilians. Viet Minh, had come into being resisting the Japanese
While the size of the PRU itself varied from province to occupation of what had been French colonial possessions in
province, it had developed a basic organizational structure Southeast Asia.
by 1967. Each PRU had one eighteen-man Team for each Their leader, the unimposing, but charismatic Ho Chi
district in the province. The Tay Ninh PRU for instance had Minh had agitated for increased rights for those in French
five PRU Teams. Each of the Teams was broken into three colonies prior to World War II. He returned to the region
six-man Squads, with the senior Squad Leader doubling as shortly before the outbreak of hostilities, running afoul of
the Team Leader. Chinese Nationalist authorities, already engaging their own
PRU Squads operated in much the same fashion as domestic communist-inspired insurgency.
reconnaissance teams, generally being tasked with The Japanese invasion, however, prompted the
surveillance of potential VCI targets, prisoner snatches, government of Chiang Kai Shek to release Ho Chi Minh.
ambushes, and similar missions. In areas under insurgent The Nationalist Chinese gave their blessings to his plans
control, PRU members would often wear similar clothing for resistance in the areas then encompassing French
and carry similar weapons. In addition to weapons being Indochina. Their hope was that Ho Chi Minh’s resistance
used by the enemy and those in the US military and South would prove to be a thorn in the side of the Japanese,
Vietnamese supply chains, PRUs often utilized an array leading to a need for them to divert resources further south.
of less common weapons, including civilian pistols and The US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), a precursor to
revolvers, non-standard submachine guns like the Carl the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had similar beliefs
Gustav M/45 (also known as the “Swedish K”), and anything and actively support Ho’s group.
else that might be available through the CIA. With the end of World War II, Ho Chi Minh’s
The Phoenix Program continued until 1973, when, as organization attempted to establish an independent
part of other obligations under the Paris Peace Accords it Vietnamese government, but found that the British
was completely folded in with the National Police. occupation forces in the south had no intention of allowing
this. The British sought to immediately neutralize Ho and
THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF his organization. They went so far as to rearm Japanese
VIETNAM AND THE NATIONAL prisoners of war to assist in the operation.
LIBERATION FRONT While the insurgents were dispersed, they were not
The history of the modern state of the Democratic Republic destroyed or broken. The Nationalist Chinese forces in
of Vietnam, better known as North Vietnam (which later occupying the north were indifferent to the activities of the
reunified with the southern portion of the country to form communist-inspired rebels, being far more concerned about
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam), is just as complex and the coming storm in China. They made no serious efforts to
nuanced as that of the short lived South Vietnamese state. derail Ho’s activities and in some cases enterprising units sold
As in the chapter on the Republic of Vietnam, this weapons to his organization. By the time the French returned
introduction should be viewed as extremely brief, intended they quickly found themselves engaged with the Viet Minh.
to give a basic background for purposes of the primary After almost a decade of combat, they suffered a major defeat
content of this volume. in 1954 that effectively drove them out of the country.
As with the South Vietnamese state, the North After the Geneva Accords split the region into two
Vietnamese state came into being in 1954, after the success nations along the seventeenth Parallel as noted in the

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chapter on the Republic of Vietnam, a mass migration After 1965, the DRV began sending larger numbers of
occurred. Those in the north wishing to travel south were regulars from its own army to help replace casualties and
allowed to do so and vice versa. This was also supposed to shortly thereafter was infiltrating entire units. These units
allow for the evacuation of remnant insurgents in the south operated in concert with those of the PLAF, but had
to the north, as per the agreements. However, military independent command structures, a reality never fully
elements remained in the south and went to ground, in grasped by contemporary intelligence sources. After the
many ways to protect against the possibility of irregularities disastrous outcomes of the PLAF offensives in late 1967 and
in the referendum on reunification. This turned out to be early 1968, culminating in the events surrounding the Tet
an important decision. holiday in February 1968, the People’s Army of Vietnam
Those in the south soon formed the National Liberation (PAVN; better known as the North Vietnamese Army or
Front (NLF), and its associated military wing, the People’s NVA) began to take the dominant role.
Liberation Army (PLA). Later the PLA was renamed as the After the war and reunification, at least some members
People’s Liberation Armed Force (PLAF). Both of these of the NLF and veterans of the PLAF found that there
organizations are commonly known as was very little space in the new administration for them and
the Viet Cong. While receiving a left the country, becoming outspoken critics of its leaders.
certain level of administrative and Current Vietnamese histories conspicuously leave out the
technical support from the DRV, the contributions of the NLF, and those in the south in general,
NLF did truly exist as a separate to the overall cause of reunification, co-opting the western
entity. It had similar, but not perception that the NLF and the authorities in the North
identical goals to the DRV had been inseparable entities.
government. Between 1956 While the NLF and the PLAF in the south conducted their
and 1965 it recruited guerilla war and in many ways paved the way for the eventual
most of its force locally in reunification, in the North the forces that had ousted the
South Vietnam French were consolidated and formed into more traditional,
and managed regular military units. The PAVN made modernization a
the majority of major goal for their new army and quickly began to source
its logistics by military aid and advisory assistance from friendly communist
itself. The powers. By the 1970s, Vietnam had one of the most extensive
DRV’s Central air defense networks in the world and had transformed from
Office in South a primarily light infantry force to a largely mechanized,
Vietnam (COSVN) combined arms army. The fighting that occurred first in 1972
was not even during the Nguyen Hue Offensive (known to most Americans
established until 1959, though as the Easter Invasion) and in 1974 during the Ho Chi Minh
technically the PLA did not Campaign that led to the end of the South Vietnamese state,
appear until 1960. The authorities reflected a mid to high intensity conventional conflict as
in the DRV always looked for opposed to a guerilla insurgency.
ways to keep the NLF and PLAF This chapter will examine the differences between the
at arm’s length. PLAF and the PAVN, as well as explore hypothetical and
typical unit organizations. Most western sources, both
NVA Infantryman, 1968 contemporary and otherwise, have very sparse details on

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the tactical organization of either fighting force. This into regiments. So called “artillery” battalions, independent
appears to have been in part because of habituallyunder- battalions with what would be considered heavy weapons
strength enemy forces, a high degree of variability, and the (such as heavy machine guns, mortars, recoilless rifles) in
mix of PLAF and PAVN elements in the field. a contemporary western army were also formed. In 1949,
the first PAVN division was officially formed, integrating
THE PEOPLE’S ARMY OF infantry and heavy weapons elements. By the early 1950s,
VIETNAM a so-called heavy division had been formed. These heavy
The People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN) was originally the divisions included battalions of artillery along the
name given to the military wing of the Viet Minh, who previously stated definitions, as well as sappers, who could
fought against the French. After the Geneva Accords that be used for a wide variety of tasks.
divided the region, it became the regular army of the new A study done by the US Army Combat Developments
DRV. As an entity, the modern day PAVN still trace their Command (CDC) in 1966 on the nature of a potential guerilla
history to the military forces of the Viet Minh. army threat to the US Army in the 1970–75 timeline clearly
Like the PLAF that followed, the Viet Minh’s military stated its focus as potential enemy forces in Southeast Asia.
forces were divided into two general types, a regular The force it described appears to be modeled on the Viet
military force and a territorial force, the latter broken into Minh “Heavy” Division that appeared in the early 1950s. Even
various levels with different responsibilities. The regular by the fall of Saigon in 1975, the PAVN infantry force had
military force was initially grouped into battalions and then changed little, so this is not necessarily inaccurate.

PAVN Special Rules

Ambush! enemy. To represent this, NVA units may ignore all

NVA forces may make use of the Ambush rules. Morale results other than Pinned. In other words,
Lack of Initiative an NVA unit that is Pinned twice will suffer no
Any NVA unit that does not have either an attached further adverse effects and will not Fall Back.
leader or a clear line of sight to a leader must make Forward for the Cause
a successful Troop Quality check in order to move. NVA Forces may push on regardless of casualties.
Units that fail may not move but may still fire. This NVA Players may elect to ignore wounded and
is to represent the lack of Initiative and the effect leave them behind. The models are removed as per
that loss of leadership had on NVA forces. KIA figures and the unit does not count as having
Battle Plan dependents. However, a Morale check must be
Due to having to operate by a fixed battle plan, taken each time the unit abandons casualties. If the
NVA forces always lose one Initiative die per phase unit fails, its Morale is broken and it is removed
to represent poor communications and the from play as it disperses back into the countryside.
adherence to a pre-battle plan, often regardless of This rule may be considered optional and may be
the present circumstance. used at the players’ discretion, assuming both players
Determined to Win agree. If players elect not to use this, NVA forces
NVA Forces are hardened to the struggle against the follow the normal casualty rules in Force on Force.

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While cadres from the PAVN were sent south to help Platoon HQ
organized and advise the PLAF in the early 1960s, the 1x Officer w/Pistol
DRV leadership was also making both the regularization 1x RTO w/Rifle or Carbine
and modernization of the PAVN itself a priority. By the
end of the 1950s, cadres were sent to the Soviet Union 3x Rifle Squad
and China for training concerning armored vehicles 1x Squad Leader w/SMG
and their tactics. Similarly, traditional light and medium 6x Rifleman w/Rifle or Carbine
tube artillery elements were grouped under a new 1x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
artillery command.
After years of fighting a low intensity conflict in the Individual weapons would have been available to the PAVN
south alongside the PLAF, in 1972, the full capabilities of from a wide variety of sources. Its arsenal would have
the PAVN flowed into South Vietnam as part of the included the Soviet World War II-era Mosin-Nagant
Nguyen Hue Offensive. The largely mechanized force of carbines, SKS carbines, and later the AKM assault rifle
tanks and traditional artillery, along with the PAVN staple (classified in the Soviet Union as a submachine gun), as well
of infantry, was blunted in large part because of the weight as their Chinese equivalents, along with common US types
of American firepower coupled with a lack of experience such as the M1 rifle and M1 carbine. Submachine guns
in combined operations. When the Ho Chi Minh ranged from the Soviet PPSh-41 and PPS-43 and their
Campaign began in 1974, the PAVN had learned much, Chinese equivalents, to the locally fabricated K-50M. The
keeping up the pressure on the ARVN until Saigon was K-50M was a derivative of the Chinese copy of the PPSh-41.
finally captured in 1975. US M1s and M3s, French MAT-49s, and even Swedish Carl
Gustav M/45s and German MP-40s might be found as well.
PAVN Infantry Company, After 1965, however, the stockpile would likely have
Infantry Battalion, been largely of Soviet or Communist Chinese origin. The
Infantry Regiment issue of an individual rocket propelled grenade or other
Troop Quality D8, Morale D10 similar weapon would likely have been as available in the
While the methodology behind the TOEs presented in the PLAF. Weapons such as the RPG-2 (known locally as the
CDC study is not entirely clear, they reflect, at least in B40) and much later the RPG-7 would have likely been
overall manpower, the infantry battalion described in supplemented by lighter recoilless rifles like the US 57mm
both contemporary and more recent secondary sources. M18 and the Chinese copy, the Type 36.
These are all based around battalions with a total strength The company weapons element would have had
of some four hundred to six hundred personnel, somewhere between two and three 60mm mortars, such as
with three Infantry Companies and a Heavy Weapons the Chinese Communist Type 31, and two or three light
Company, along with a Battalion Headquarters and machine guns. Soviet RPDs, RP-46s, and DPMs, along with
various support elements. their Chinese equivalents were popular. More medium or
The Infantry Company, generally between one hundred heavy machine guns (heavy in a traditional sense, these
and one hundred and twenty personnel, is broken into a would be weapons like the Soviet SGM) would be found in
Company Headquarters, three Infantry Platoons, and a varying numbers in the battalion’s weapon element, along
Weapons Platoon. The Infantry Platoons have a Platoon with heavier mortars, such as the Soviet 82mm M1937, and
Headquarters and three Infantry Squads. The platoon 57mm recoilless rifles. 75mm recoilless rifles and 12.7mm
organization from the CDC study is as follows: DShK machine guns would be found at regimental level.

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 Unit Organizations

The DShK was generally treated as an anti-aircraft weapon, Headquarters and three Sapper Squads, each might only have
being used for defense against enemy helicopters, rather four to six personnel assigned to it.
than for supporting infantry.
Platoon HQ
PAVN Sapper Company, 1x Officer w/Pistol
Sapper Battalion 1x Sapper w/Rifle or Carbine
Troop Quality D8, Morale D10
The Vietnamese term Dac Cong has generally been translated 3x Rifle Squad
as “sapper,” and that is the term that will be used here for 1x Squad Leader w/SMG
consistency. It is perhaps more accurately translated simply 1x NCO w/SMG
as “special task.” Sapper in the doctrine of the PAVN 4x Sapper w/Rifle or Carbine
encompasses units that could be tasked with traditional
combat engineering tasks like breaching This organization, from the 1966 CDC study, is described
minefields, to more special operations tasks as for the platoons of what was at the time referred to as
like raids on enemy facilities or demolition of the divisional engineer company. The lack of radio in
critical infrastructure. In this way these units the Platoon Headquarters belies the special nature of
more closely represented an entity like the the unit and the likelihood that the
British Long Range Desert Group of individual squads would be
World War II or similar organizations conducting independent missions.
rather than simply a combat Individual weapon variety would
engineering element. likely have been on par with regular infantry,
Despite their flexible and but sapper units would have likely had
specialized nature, sappers were priority for equipment. They would also have
organized into regular units access to land mines, including locally fabricated
within the PAVN. The most types and improvised booby-traps, explosives for
common of these were demolitions work, and even flamethrowers like the
battalions, with three sapper Russian LPO-50. The support element of a Sapper
companies and a support company Battalion might also have some number of 60mm
with various heavier weapons. In some mortars, rocket propelled grenades, or recoilless rifles
cases independent regiments or groups for use on specific operations.
would be formed for specialized Furthermore, despite their organization into
missions, including sappers tailored for coherent units, sapper support would have been
mission in riverine environments. Each made available to units at virtually all levels, from
company could range in strength from division down to company, depending on the
fifty to seventy personnel. Like regular nature of the operation. Units might be specifically
infantry units, PAVN sapper elements organized for a raid on an American base or the
were habituallyunder-strength. The destruction of an infrastructure target like a bridge.
company would be broken into three A study conducted by the US Air Force of air base
separate platoons, with between fifteen to
twenty personnel each. With a Platoon NVA Infantryman, 1975

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defense in Vietnam following the conflict detailed a barriers. Each of the assault cells also had explosives for
“typical” sapper raiding party. It consisted of an assault demolitions work and grenades. The second assault cell
element, along with a security element, a reserve element, was described as having a fourth cell, for fire support.
and a fire support element.
Penetration Cell
Security Element 2x Sapper w/AK47
3x Sapper w/AK47 2x Sapper w/Wire Cutters
1x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
2x Assault Cell
Reserve Element 3x Sapper w/AK47
11x Sapper w/AK47 1x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
1x Sapper w/Machine Gun (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) Fire Support Cell
1x Sapper w/AK47
The security element also had land mines at its disposal 1x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
to help prevent counter attacks, while the reserve element
had addition shaped charges in case some of the main As with the penetration cell in the first assault team,
assault cells were neutralized. The fire support element Bangalore torpedoes or similar explosives were available.
had two 60mm or 82mm mortars and a radio. The assault The assault cells similarly had explosives and grenades.
element was broken into two unequal groups, the first In both teams, the amount of explosive charges and
one with three cells. grenades could vary widely – from thirty-five to seventy
charges depending on the size and nature of the target.
Penetration Cell The fire support cell had only its individual weapons.
2x Sapper w/AK47
2x Sapper w/Wire Cutters PAVN Armor Company,
Armor Battalion, Armor
Assault Cell 1 Regiment
3x Sapper w/AK47 Troop Quality D8, Morale D8
2x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) Prior to the Nguyen Hue Offensive, the usage of armor
in the form of tanks and armored personnel carriers by
Assault Cell 2 the PAVN in South Vietnam was extremely limited,
3x Sapper w/AK47 especially compared to operations in neighboring Laos.
1x Sapper w/RPG-2 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) The incidents at Lang Vei in 1967 and Ben Het in 1969
were more or less isolated.
Sappers used to penetrate the defenses of major In 1971, the PAVN had finally expanded their armor
installations often stripped down to nothing in order to force to the point where organized regiments could be
allow them to better avoid getting snagged on trip wires, formed. Regiments were based around three maneuver
in barbed wire, or otherwise alerting defense personnel to battalions, each with three companies. In most regiments
their presence. The penetration cell also had Bangalore the common organization was to have two battalions of
torpedoes or similar explosives to help breach any tanks and one battalion of armored personnel carriers.

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 Unit Organizations

Design Note: PAVN Artillery

By the early 1970s and the Nguyen Hue offensive, the would have contained a heavy weapons (or “artillery”)
PAVN had organized more traditional artillery units battalion, with around nine 75mm recoilless rifles,
with heavy towed howitzers and field guns. However, nine 82mm mortars, and twelve 12.7mm machine
for the majority of the conflict, the PAVN and the PLAF guns, each in their own company. Later independent
both had relied more heavily on indirect fire support artillery regiments with three companies of a single
from mortars (ranging from 60mm to 120mm), weapon type, including 120mm mortars, were formed.
recoilless rifles (57mm and 75mm), and artillery Rocket artillery battalions were also formed along
rockets (ranging from 107mm to 140mm). .50-caliber or the same lines. Individual companies would have a
12.7mm machine guns would also have been treated like number of launchers depending on the size of the
artillery, though used for air defense. Smaller 70–75mm weapon, commonly twelve 107mm launchers, six
howitzers were rarely used. This largely owed to the 122mm launchers, or sixteen 140mm launchers.
need for the weapons in use to be portable, so that units The term launcher should be understood loosely.
could quickly move from their firing positions to avoid A rocket braced on a wooden cross, pile of rocks, or
hostile forces responding to their strikes. in a trench could suffice. Rocket artillery units often
The heavy divisions that had appeared within the set up launch sites with timed launching equipment,
Viet Minh by the end of the war against the French leaving before the rockets were even fired.

However, in practice it appears that the organization of Tank Platoon

armor regiments was extremely flexible. Only at company 3x T-34/85
level did units have unified equipment. A battalion
equipped with tanks might have two companies of Soviet With:
T-34/85s and one of PT-76s for instance. Soviet T-54Bs 1x Officer w/Pistol
and Chinese Type 59s and 63s were also available. By the 2x NCO w/Pistol
1970s, the Soviet BTR-50 and Chinese K-63 armored 3x Gunner w/Pistol
personnel carriers were most common. 3x Loader w/Pistol
A tank battalion would have some thirty-eight tanks, 3x Driver w/Pistol
while APC battalions would have between thirty and
thirty-five vehicles. Based on the general contemporary APC Platoon
practice of both the United States and the Soviet Union to 3x BTR-50
hold some number of tanks in both the Battalion and
Company Headquarters, it can be assumed that each With:
company had around twelve tanks or eleven armored 1x Officer w/Pistol
personnel carriers. This would allow for three platoons 2x NCO w/Pistol
of three in each case, with two or three vehicles in the 3x Gunner w/Pistol
Company Headquarters. A hypothetical tank and APC 3x Driver w/Pistol
platoons from the Nguyen Hue Offensive or Ho Chi
Minh Campaign might look like the following:

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AMBUSH VALLEY

companies equipped with M41A3 light tanks and M113A1

APCs might have been seen. Some of these vehicles were
taken back by the retreating PAVN after the Nguyen Hue
Offensive for extensive testing as well.

THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION

ARMY AND PEOPLE’S
LIBERATION ARMED FORCE
In 1960, the leadership of the NFL determined that the
time was right to begin the creation of guerilla units
capable of offensive military operations, with the mission
of liberating South Vietnam from its existing government
to allow for reunification. The creation of such elements
would then lead to the development of a traditional
armed force, following a school of thought clearly
influenced by Chinese Communist leaders, most notably
Viet Cong fighters attempt to overrun a
US LZ. (Piers Brand) Mao Tse Tung.
The name initially given to this force was the People’s
Units equipped with either the Soviet PT-76 or Chinese Type Liberation Army (PLA), but this was changed soon
63 light tanks would have had deleted the gunner position, as thereafter to the People’s Liberation Armed Force
the vehicles only had three crew (the vehicle commander (PLAF). For purposes of simplicity, the term PLAF will
doubling as the gunner). Infantry were not mechanized in be used here. To the United States and other Free World
the sense that they were in the US Army. However, APC Armed Forces, the PLAF became known by the popular
battalions would have supported PAVN infantry during title Viet Cong, a corruption of the term for “Vietnamese
assaults, keeping infantry up with the tanks, which had been Communist” used by the South Vietnamese government
a serious problem during the Nguyen Hue Offensive. to refer to the insurgents.
Also, during both the Nguyen Hue Offensive and the The PLAF, ironically much like the South Vietnamese
Ho Chi Minh Campaign, South Vietnamese armor was government forces, were organized around three levels.
captured and immediately pressed into service. Provisional One of these was a full military force, generally referred

Design Note: Other PAVN Armor

While tanks and APCs were organized into armored layers during the Ho Chi Minh Campaign. These
elements, air defense units also received self-propelled vehicles helped keep up the pressure on the ARVN,
anti-aircraft vehicles during the 1970s. Both the ZSU- allowing PAVN armored units to cross rivers and
57-2 and ZSU-23-4 were deployed, along with the other terrain obstacles faster. Armor units had
lighter BTR-40A. sprinted ahead of their support during the Nguyen
The PAVN also made serious use of tracked Hue Offensive, which has often cited as one of the
artillery tractors, GSP ferries, and MTU-20 brigade reasons for its general failure.

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 Unit Organizations

to as the “Main Force” in western literature, while the ambushes at night. They were generally poorly armed and
other two were militia levels, one regional (like the equipped but possessed excellent field-craft and made
South Vietnamese Civil Guard and Regional Forces) cunning use of traps and ambushes. To represent these
and one localized to individual villages (like the South troops Ambush Valley rates them as Irregulars with a Troop
Vietnamese Self Defense Corps and Popular Forces). Like Quality D6 and Morale D8.
the RF and PF forces, western literature, including Local Force units also receive D8 “Booby Trap” cards at
contemporary documentation, generally lumped the two the start of the game unless the scenario specifies otherwise.
latter categories into a single entity, referred to as the All Local Force units are classed as “Poorly Supplied”
“Local Force.” and lose 1 Firepower die.
Available contemporary US sources show a decided lack
of information on the actual disposition and nature of the Viet Cong Main Force
PLAF. The 1966 CDC is much more representative of a ‘Main Force” units were full-time guerilla fighters who
PAVN force, as it would be decidedly generous in its conducted full scale operations against South Vietnam.
allotted equipment for the PLAF. A study drafted by the They were better equipped and often well trained when
US-South Vietnamese Combined Intelligence Center compared to Local Force units. They would often be trained
Vietnam (CICV) in 1967 grouped all insurgents essentially by an NVA advisor and were capable of mounting sustained,
into the two categories already noted. The existence of more large-scale ambushes on enemy forces. In Ambush Valley,
or less regular PLAF units conducting military operations these troops are rated as Irregulars with a Troop Quality of
according to a larger strategy was not even mentioned. D8 and a Morale D8+. Main Force units also receive D6
So what was the nature of the PLAF? From most of the “Booby Trap” cards at the start of the game unless the
sources readily available it seems likely that the PLAF fell scenario specifies otherwise.
right into the middle of the CDC and CICV studies. It was
an almost entirely infantry force, with various types of
light artillery to support it. It was not at all mechanized.
While it had units organized up to division level by 1965,
whether these units ever operated at this level, or even at
battalion level, is debatable. Units were habituallyunder-
strength and likely never reflected the western unit
organization terms given to them. Force estimates by US
and South Vietnamese intelligence for both PLAF and
PAVN units show that rarely did any two units have the
same manpower at any one time. What might be referred
to as a PLAF regiment likely looked more like a reinforced
battalion, even according to whatever passed for an
official organization.

Viet Cong Local Force

The “Local Force” units would be best described as part-
time guerillas. They would often work on their farms and VC Irregular,
fields during the day and carry out small operations and 1962

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AMBUSH VALLEY

the departure of the French, though it has already been noted

that the current official Vietnamese history glosses over this
among other things. They did bring with them the unit
organization of the PAVN.
While PLAF units might be smaller in size, such as
companies closer to one hundred personnel, the overall
organization of the battalion remained largely the same.
Logistics and other support elements would have been
decidedly smaller at battalion and regimental level, and the
capability of the signals troops likely was less than their
PAVN counterparts. The companies themselves appear to
have remained organized around a Company Headquarters,
three Infantry Platoons, and a Weapons Platoon. One can
refer to the platoon organization in the PAVN section.
Main Force VC man an HMG during a
prepared ambush (Piers Brand) Weapons would have varied greatly in the PLAF,
especially during the period from 1956 to 1965. Weapons
could have come from captured Japanese, French, or US
sources (or American weapons captured from the French),
Design Note: Tougher VC? or from weapons supplied through North Vietnam from
We also tested a variant of this rule that allowed the Soviet Union, Communist China, or elsewhere. The
VC models to be “ok” on a roll of 5+. This works Soviets and the Communist Chinese both shipped stocks
particularly well if you want to give the US player of captured weapons of German and Japanese origin to
a really rough time of it and will certainly make Vietnam. The Communist Chinese could have supplied US
for a very hard fight. weapons captured by its forces during the Chinese Civil
While perhaps not suitable for use in every War and in the Korean War. The Chinese also successfully
game, the improved survival roll is a nice way of copied the US 57mm M18 and 75mm M20 recoilless rifles.
portraying truly hardened fighters willing to fight Heavy weapons like this might have been omitted entirely
to the last man… Or to just give your mates at company level from PLAF elements, though mortars
playing the US a nasty surprise! would likely have existed to some degree regardless.
After 1965, however, the weapons would likely have
better reflected the Soviet and Chinese Communist
PLAF Infantry Company influences on the PAVN and their supply chain. Still, the
(“Main Force” and “Local desire to limit the capability of the PLAF by the North
Force”), Infantry Battalion, Vietnamese leadership would no doubt have limited the
Infantry Regiment degree to which newer weapons were allotted to PLAF units.
Untrained (Troop Quality D6), Morale D8 The organization should broadly hold for the upper tier of
While separate in important ways, the PLAF was organized PLAF territorial units as well, much as does the ARVN Rifle
by elements infiltrated from North Vietnam to South Company to the ARVN RF Company. The only difference
Vietnam. Many of these people had come from South would be the likelihood of less sophisticated weapons, fewer
Vietnam originally during the period immediately following heavy weapons, and a lower priority for other equipment like

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 Unit Organizations

VC Special Rules
Ambush! only use Reaction Fire (unless they used Defensive Fire
Viet Cong forces may make use of the Ambush rules in prior to receiving casualties).
the main section. Tunnels
Booby Traps Viet Cong players may make use of tunnel systems as
Viet Cong forces can field Booby Traps. detailed in Tunnel Spots.
Lack of Initiative Reinforce!
Any VC unit that does not have either an attached leader A Viet Cong force may receive reinforcements as the
or a clear line of sight to a leader must make a successful game progresses. This is scenario specific, but will
Troop Quality check in order to move. Units that fail may generally involve a roll against a set insurgency level
not move but may still fire. This is to represent the VC’s designated by the scenario.
characteristic lack of Initiative and the effect that loss of The VC player must roll equal to or lower than the
leaders had on Viet Cong forces. Even those seen as elite Insurgency Level on a D6 to receive reinforcements.
units, such as the Suicide Squads that attacked the US Roll on the scenario’s Reinforcement Table to determine
Embassy during Tet, suffered from this problem. what kind of reinforcements arrive.
Poor Communications If reinforcements do arrive, roll a D6 to determine which
Due to the virtual lack of communications and the need Tunnel Spot each reinforcement unit will arrive from,
to pre-plan operations, Viet Cong forces may never hold unless alternate arrival points are indicated by the
the Initiative. Any force playing against a Viet Cong force scenario.
will always be classed as the Aggressor. On a roll of 6, the VC player may choose any specified
The Elusive Foe entry point or swap the unit for any group of civilians on
Viet Cong units that are stationary and in cover may the tabletop.
not be spotted by enemy forces unless they are within No rolls for reinforcements are made until at least one
a spotting unit’s Optimum Range. VC units that are round of fire has been exchanged with VC units (in other
moving, in the open or firing within line of sight are words, if no fire was exchanged in Turn 1 of a scenario,
spotted immediately. no reinforcements are rolled for at the beginning of
Viet Cong units may always make use of ‘out-of-contact” Turn 2 – no reinforcements will arrive until the turn
movement unless stated otherwise in the scenario. after VC units are taken under fire during a scenario).
Victory through Blood This is intended to simulate the lack of Viet Cong
Viet Cong forces do not follow the normal rules for communications and the fact that their men often
casualties. The VC were adept at removing their headed towards the sounds of gunfire.
wounded and dead from the battlefield, often as they fell. Fight another day
Due to this unorthodox approach to CASEVAC, Viet Viet Cong units that are subjected to a “Pull Back”
Cong units don’t roll for their casualties on the First Aid Morale result must make an immediate Troop Quality
table. Instead, roll a single D6 for each casualty as it is check. If the unit fails the test, it disperses into the jungle
taken. On a roll of “6” the models is OK and is placed to fight another day. Any troops that leave the battlefield
back into the line. Any other result indicates that the in this manner are not counted for Victory Points by an
model is removed. These modified casualty results enemy force.
represent both wounded fighters and those carrying Out of Contact Movement
dead and wounded away from the battle. To reflect their local knowledge of the terrain, Viet Cong
Viet Cong forces never count as having dependents; units may always make use of out of contact movement
however VC units who take casualties in a turn may unless the scenario states otherwise.

radios. These units, while they might have been organized At the lowest level, organization was probably sparse,
into independent regiments by district, likely operated on the same lines as the South Vietnamese Self-Defense
independently at the company level, without support of any Corps, which it mirrored. A 1966 US Department of
kind from a higher echelon. Defense pamphlet on the Viet Cong talked about the

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Design Note: PLAF Armor

The PLAF effectively conducted the entirety of their seems this was a fallacy intended largely to integrate
war with no armor. However, it is worth noting that the NLF cause with that of the PAVN.
provisional elements were established by the PAVN in The provisional elements, equipped at least in part
1973 after the Nguyen Hue Offensive, placed under with the BTR-60PB wheeled armored personnel
the control of what was then referred to as the carrier, were attached to the PAVN 26th Armor
“Provisional Military Government of South Vietnam.” Regiment (also known as the M-26 Regiment) near
This was supposed to mean that the vehicles were the South Vietnamese–Cambodian border.
under the control of the NLF and the PLAF, but it

self-defense forces being organized PAVN created various sapper training elements, leading
in platoons of three to four to the formation of PLAF sapper companies and
squads, each squad having battalions. Due to a lower amount of available manpower
twelve or so individuals, but and the desire of the PAVN to decidedly limit the capacity
capable of operating as a six-man of the PLAF independent from them, the PLAF Sapper
half-squad or a Battalions often had only two or three companies
three-man cell. and fewer heavy weapons. As with the PLAF infantry
The membership elements, the size of the companies would likely have been
of these self- closer to the lower end of the PAVN spectrum, with
defense elements around fifty personnel. Smaller teams to conduct specific
represents a group operations would have been task organized just like their
that truly fit the PAVN counterparts.
anecdotes about Viet Also, while the PLAF sapper elements might have been
Cong who were farmers by tasked with very similar missions to the PAVN counterparts,
day and guerillas by night. the degree of training might have also been severely limited.
Training facilities in secret camps could have provided basic
PLAF Sapper instruction, but little else. What might have been done
Company, over the course of a number of years in the North some
Sapper secondary sources suggest could have done in as little as two
Battalion weeks in the field in South. Therefore in game play terms,
Troop Quality D8, Morale D8 the Trained quality of PLAF sapper elements might be
As part of their technical exchanged for Untrained depending on the determination
assistance to the PLAF, the of the players or for any scenario.

Local Force
VC, 1967

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 A NOT SO SECRET WAR –
LAOS & CAMBODIA
The history of most of the nations of Southeast Asia is in suppressing the operation of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and
linked in some way, and linked to that of larger regional not doing anything to help the overall situation.
entities such as China and India. Laos and Cambodia This is, however, not entirely true. While it is accurate to
following the end of World War II were still colonies within say that the US was largely focused on the operation of the
French Indochina. Despite not being as visible as Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh Trail by 1965, this had not always been the
they were very much involved in the conflict between the case. In fact, one of the first meetings between outgoing US
French and the communist-inspired Viet Minh insurgents. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and incoming President
Factions supporting a similar communist revolution in John F. Kennedy in January 1961, as part of the transition,
both Laos and Cambodia appeared, as did those oriented to dealt specifically about the situation in Laos, not Vietnam.
the political right, but still favoring independence from Initially, there was the possibility that Laos might have been
France. Those favoring an attempt at neutrality in the the focus of US attention in the region, situated strategically
broader conflict formed a third grouping. between US ally Thailand and the People’s Republic of
The French counter-insurgency campaign in Indochina China. This was not to pass, however.
touched all Laos and Cambodia, as well as Vietnam. Dien The US attention paid to Laos became known as the
Bien Phu, where the fate of the French was effectively “Secret War,” which also affected Cambodia, which was the
decided, sits fewer than 10 miles from the Laotian border. subject of a “secret” bombing campaign between 1969 and
The French had in fact chosen it as a strategic location 1970. This phrasing reflects that the US government did a
between the two, after the Viet Minh launched incursions very good job keeping these actions a secret from their own
into Laos in 1953. After the Geneva Accords, there remained people, until the release of the so-called Pentagon Papers in
a sizeable contingent of North Vietnamese forces in Laos,
who supported the Laotian communist insurgents and NVA troops escorting supplies on the Ho
began construction of a series of infiltration routes south. Chi Minh Trail. (Piers Brand)

This network became commonly known as the Ho Chi

Minh Trail. The Trail, which included everything from
improved roadways with fully staffed way stations to dirt
path, was expanded into Cambodia as well.
It is this supply network, which provided sanctuary and
seemingly unending support for the NLF and its forces in the
South, as well as elements of the PAVN in all three nations,
that is generally the focus of any discussion of Laos and
Cambodia from the American perspective. This was perhaps
the case at the time, with military leaders in both Laos and
Cambodia complaining about the short-sightedness of their
American counterparts, who they felt were only interested

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1971. The governments of Laos and Cambodia were well involvement in Laos titles the first chapter “Everybody’s
aware of what was going on, as was the government of North Pawn,” which accurately reflects the history of Laos.
Vietnam, with numerous protests being made in the media The Geneva Accords in 1954 declared Laos neutral.
and to international organizations, with little in the way However, the French were allowed initially to maintain two
of meaningful responses. Similar protests of violations of garrisons in the country. The Lao People’s Liberation Army
Laotian and Cambodian neutrality by North Vietnam were (LPLA, also referred to as the Pathet Lao) and their North
often made by the US, with equally ineffectual responses. Vietnamese allies also maintained de facto control over
Behind the deep morass of code words, secret large portions of the country’s north. Both realities were a
unconventional units, and secret organizations within portent of things to come.
organizations, the conflicts in Laos and Cambodia took on a The United States further complicated the situation by
brutal and conventional character. A far more complicated taking on the responsibility for the entire defense budget of
and factionalized political and military situation than the Laotian government in 1955. In spite of this fact, the
existed in South Vietnam came into being in both countries. Geneva Accords determination of Laotian neutrality meant
In the end, the so-called Domino Theory that influenced that no official military advisory entity could be established
US policy in the region to a degree came true only for Laos in the country. In its place, an organization known as the
and Cambodia. While the world focused on the fate of South Programs Evaluation Office (PEO) was established within
Vietnam, Cambodia fell to the forces of Pol Pot in May 1975, the US Embassy, and various advisory and self-defense
and by August 1975, the Pathet Lao had established control programs were initiated with the help of US Army Special
in Laos. The concern that other countries in the region Forces elements and the CIA.
would similarly fall to communist-inspired insurgencies Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma was determined to
proved to be unfounded. maintain Laotian neutrality, however, and made it clear he
would allow no foreign bases in the country except for the two
LAOS existing French garrisons agreed to under the Geneva Accords.
This history of the state known as Laos realistically dates In 1956, he met with Ho Chi Minh and then immediately
from the decision by the French to grant a degree of visited Saigon, seeking to publically show his commitment.
autonomy to that element of their Indochina colonies in His replacement in the middle of 1958 by the more hard-line
1949. Laos was to be the test case for increased autonomy anti-communist Phoui Sananikone precipitated the first of
for the authorities in Cambodia and the Vietnamese regions. many crises in the country.
Prior to the French colonial period, Laos had existed Phoui sought the departure of the North Vietnamese and
generally as a collection of essentially feudal principalities. the integration of LPLA forces into the national army. Though
The largest of these, the Kingdom of Lan Xang, the “Land of these actions appeared in line with Souvanna’s neutralist
a Million Elephants,” is the entity to which the Laotian state policies, Phoui then allowed the establishment of South
traces its history. The flag of Laos prior to the government Vietnamese and Nationalist Chinese consulates in the capital
of the Pathet Lao incorporated symbols reflecting this in 1959. He also declared that the actions of North Vietnam
connection. Lan Xang and the other minor kingdoms meant that the Geneva Accords and Laotian neutrality were
generally spent their existence either under the direct null and void and banned the political party associated with
control of foreign powers such as the Vietnamese Empire, the LPLA, the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo Lao Hak Sat). North
Siam (what is now Thailand), and the Chinese, or essentially Vietnam had already begun construction of the Ho Chi Minh
subservient to them. The official CIA history of their Trail in Laos as events in response to the situation in South

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 A Not So Secret War – Laos & Cambodia

Vietnam. It had become clear that the any political settlement the parties. Under what became known as the Second
of the issue of unification there, as prescribed under the Coalition, the various parties continued to fight in the
Geneva Accords, would not produce the desired results. countryside. As part of the various political agreements,
Phoui also received the power to rule by decree for a year Military Assistance Advisory Group – Laos (MAAG-L) was
and imposed an increasingly aggressive and draconian policy shut down in 1962. Other foreign entities were also
regime. Displeasure from the military quickly led to rumors supposed to depart Laos and respect its neutrality. The US
of a coup and under the advice of many close to him, Phoui reformed an entity similar to the PEO, known as the
resigned. The King of Laos, a largely ceremonial figure, Requirements Office, and the Pathet Lao’s benefactors also
appointed a caretaker until a replacement could be selected. remained in the country.
Before that could happen, however, then Captain Kong In effect the three Laotian political factions attempted
Le, head of the elite 2e Bataillon Parachutiste, disgusted with to maintain parallel authorities. Faced with incursions by
what he saw in the government and their abandonment the PAVN and the LPLA, the right-leaning Laotian
of neutrality, launched his own coup. This coup in 1960 government answered with its own escalation. The CIA
precipitated a more serious crisis than had the previous began actively raising an essentially independent irregular
political disagreement in the country. Kong Le took with him force from the Hmong ethic group and
a portion of the government’s forces to form his Forces eventually other foreign “volunteers”
Armee Neutraliste (Neutralist Armed Forces or FAN). If were added to the mix. The neutralists
Kong Le’s plan had been to return to neutralism and stop the split into left and right leaning
killing of Laotian by Laotian, he failed almost immediately. factions. Kong Le had more or less
General Phoumi Nosavan, who had been at odds with Phoui, returned to the right-leaning
was still quick to oppose Kong Le’s coup, and fighting erupted fold by 1964, after it became
in and around the Laotian capital Vientiane, including clear to him that the PAVN
a violent artillery duel between the two forces. Kong Le’s and LPLA were seeking
anti-foreign rhetoric, including anti-American statements, to undermine his forces.
led the US to back Phoumi. His forces remained
This was the situation that the US found in Laos when nominally independent.
John F. Kennedy became President in January 1961. One of Other neutralist forces
his first actions was to establish an overt Military Assistance often changed sides because
Advisory Group for Laos to replace the PEO. The situation of similar apparent betrayals.
remained tense. Sensing the weakness in Laos, the PAVN In 1966, a political falling out
and their Pathet Lao allies launched a major attack on the between Kong Le and other
provincial capital Nam Tha in northern Laos, dealing a members of the government, and a
major defeat to the government. In addition, though Kong mutiny by other neutralist factions,
Le had effectively surrendered to Phoumi, he refused to join his forces caused him to depart into
the interim government that had been established. exile in France. In 1969, his FAN was
The US hoping for stability in a political settlement, placed directly under the control of
pressured Phoumi to form a government with the Neo Lao Laotian government forces.
Hak Sat, as well as the Neutralists under Kong Le, with
Souvanna Phouma named as prime minister. Souvanna, a
neutralist, was seen as a person who could hopefully unify Pathet Lao Officer, 1975

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By the 1970s, the conflict in Laos had reached a critical Though the ANL was supposed to be part of a semi-
point. The regular Laotian army, the Forces Armee independent Laos, its units were still commanded by French
Royales (Royal Laotian Army or FAR) had largely ceded officers. In addition, a number of Laotian battalions had been
the fighting responsibilities to Hmong irregulars and organized separately into the French Union Army, also
foreign fighters. These forces were not enough to repel the commanded by French officers. These units differed only in
major offensives being launched by the PAVN, from name. The French Union Army units were termed Bataillon
which the LPLA had become indistinguishable. In 1971, Chasseur Laotiennes (BCL). This literally translates to Laotian
the South Vietnamese launched a limited incursion into “Hunter” Battalions, but is more accurately termed Laotian
Laos, similar to that launched into Cambodia in 1970. Light Infantry Battalions. The ANL units were termed
The campaign, known as Lam Son 719, initially went well, Bataillon Infanterie Laotienne (Laotian Infantry Battalions or
but PAVN counterattacks eventually routed the South BIL). Both units were organized around a five company
Vietnamese forces. In early 1973, a ceasefire was declared, model that had more in common with French units prior to
but not before a massive surge in fighting as the PAVN World War II than of the French units that were deployed to
attempted to consolidate their holdings before it went Indochina in the 1940s and 1950s.
into effect. In 1961, the FAL was renamed as the Forces Armee
The US supported irregulars were folded into the FAR, Royales (Royal Armed Forces or FAR), also known as the
though this change was largely administrative. Foreign Royal Laotian Army. The units of the FAL passed
fighters were disbanded. With the Paris Peace Accords seamlessly into the new FAR.
signed, the US was looking to exit from Southeast Asia as a
whole. Though a coalition government was again formed in ANL/FAL/FAR Infantry Company,
1974, it was clear that it was only a matter of time. With no Infantry Battalion
outside support to respond to the violations of the ceasefire Troop Quality: D8, Morale: D6
agreements, the government began to collapse. Protests
soon filled the capital and brought the government down,
paving the way for the LPLA to take control. In August Laotian Special Rules
1975, they effectively took over the country and by Confident (after 1968 they suffer from Low Confidence
December 1975 they had dissolved the monarchy, the last and are classed as Irregulars)
vestige of the previous state. Divine Blessing
Personnel often wore quasi-religious amulets in the
UNIT ORGANIZATIONS belief that these would protect them. To represent this,
a unit of Laotian troops may re-roll the first failed
The Armee Nationale
morale test in a game.
Laotienne, Forces Armee
Fragile
Laotienne, and Forces
Laotian units suffer from “Shrinkage.” Any rolls of ‘1”
Armee Royales
during morale tests automatically remove a figure.
When the French granted Laos greater autonomy in 1949,
this included the right to form a nominally independent
army. This Armee Nationale Laotienne (Laotian National
Army or ANL) existed until 1959 when it was renamed the The BCL and BILs were organized to include a Headquarters
Forces Armee Laotienne (Laotian Armed Forces or FAL). and a Battalion Command Company, three Infantry
Both of these entities were almost entirely infantry centered. Companies, and single Heavy Company (also referred to as a

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Weapons Company in translation). Each Infantry Company The Laotian relationship with the French Union Army,
had three Infantry Sections (roughly equivalent to US Army which had its own relationship with the United States,
platoons in size), along with a Weapons Section. meant that these forces were initially equipped with French
Each Infantry Platoon had three Rifle Groups (roughly weapons of World War II vintage, such as the MAS-36 rifle,
equivalent to US Army squads in size). A normal Group MAT-49 submachine gun, and FM-24/29 machine gun.
organization would have been around twelve men. A These would be steadily replaced with an influx of
typical organization for a French-style Rifle Group would American weapons of the same vintage, including M1 rifles,
be as follows: M1 carbines, M1A1 submachine guns, M1918A2 Browning
Automatic Rifles, and M1919A4 and A6 machine guns.
Rifle Group Heavier weapons such as the M1919 machine guns and
1x Group Leader w/Rifle recoilless rifles would have been held in the Battalion’s heavy
1x Asst. Group Leader w/Rifle company or the company’s weapon section. These were
1x Machine Gunner w/Machine Gun (Med. AP:2/AT:0) notably in short supply during the French period in
1x Asst. Machine Gunner w/Rifle Indochina. In 1953, a new type of unit, entirely under control
3x Ammunition Bearer w/Rifle of the ANL had been formed, called the Bataillon Leger
4x Rifleman w/Rifle Laotienne (Laotian Light Battalion or BLL). These had also
1x Rifle Grenadier w/Rifle and Rifle Grenade been translated as Laotian Light Infantry Battalions. The BLLs
Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) differed most notably from the BCL/BIL units in that they did

Historical Note: Armor in the FAR

The FAR did inherit some small number of armored A total of four such Squadrons were eventually
vehicles from the French. These were mostly scout raised, more or less organized along the same lines.
cars, armored cars and halftracks of American M20 armored utility cars were also known to have
manufacture. The first formal unit to utilize these been used. These Squadrons were later grouped into
vehicles was raised with French assistance in 1953. the 1st Armored Regiment, being comparable to a
The 1st Laotian Reconnaissance Squadron consisted US Cavalry Squadron in size. Infantry companies
of Squadron Headquarters and four identical were often detached from territorial battalions to
Reconnaissance Platoons. The term Squadron was provide support for the Squadrons, who were
more in line with the French definition, with the unit mainly tasked with route security and convoy escort
being comparable in size to a US Army Company or missions, as well as static defense. Little effort was
Troop. Each of the Squadron’s four platoons had four made to acquire new vehicles and logistical problems
1/4-ton Jeeps, an M3 Scout Car with a .50-caliber M2 were common. A small number of Cadillac Gage
machine gun and two .30-caliber M1919A4 machine V-100 armored cars were acquired by 1973 to make
guns, and an M8 armored car. The Squadron also had up for attrition. These included open topped versions
halftrack equipped with an 81mm mortar (possibly a and those fitted with the one-man machine gun
purpose built M21 Motor Mortar Carriage) and turret. Some of the open top vehicles were used
access to 57mm M18A1 recoilless rifles. as mortar carriers, replacing the halftracks.

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not have the Heavy Company. A similar four company by the French in Indochina to describe various task forces.
structure, lacking a heavy weapons element, had also been These units, assigned to one of Laos’ Military Regions, were
used in the raising of the first Bataillon de Parachutistes generally two to four battalions in strength, akin to a US Army
Laotienne (Laotian Parachute Battalion or BPL) in 1951. Regiment of the World War II or Korean War eras.
After 1954, the Laotinne moniker was dropped from the In 1968, the decision was made to disband all the GMs
unit moniker (BILs and BPLs becoming BIs and BPs in the FAR, with independent battalions forming the basic
respectively) and the BCL term was dropped entirely. The maneuver unit of the army. By the late 1960s, the FAR
units remained effectively unchanged when the FAL became began to see an influx of new infantry weapons, as had
the FAR in 1961. Battalions in Laos could be broken into one happened in Vietnam. The new supplies of M16 rifles, M60
of two categories, those that were to be used on mobile machine guns, M79 grenade launchers, and other weapons
operations (which included the BPs), and those that were generally went to elite units or irregular formations. As had
intended for territorial defense. In the latter case, the battalions been the case in Vietnam, some units were still using older
were generally broken up into individual companies, weapons by 1975.
each assigned to a separate garrison, with the battalion The GMs reappeared in 1970, first among the irregulars
headquarters being located at one as a command post for the described in the next section, but were later expanded back
entire unit. The operational battalions were grouped into into the regular FAR. The independent battalions had
Groupement Mobiles (Mobile Groups or GMs), a term used proven to be decidedly ineffective in what little combat they

Historical Note: Commando Raiders, Special Commandos,

and FAR Divisions
In 1969, the first of what would become known as were to receive specialized training similar to that which
Commando Raider Teams was formed in Laos’ Military had been provided for existing Commando units.
Region 3 (MR3). Sent for airborne and other specialized The training cadre for 2nd Strike Division had
training in Thailand, the unit was used for raids included graduates of US Army Special Forces training
throughout the country and even across the borders in the US. With the division established, these personnel
with North Vietnam and Cambodia. Three more formed the core of the Special Commando (SPECOM).
companies of this type were formed in Military Region 5 This unit consisted of three airborne reconnaissance
(MR5), the capital zone, during that year, known simply companies, capable of deploying a number of twelve-
as MR5 Commandos. Similar units were formed man reconnaissance teams, and a Weapons Company.
elsewhere in Laos. Though airborne trained, these As the situation in Laos deteriorated following the
independent companies more often utilized helicopter end of the 1973 ceasefire, the 2nd Strike Division
support, shuttling all over the country. suffered increasing casualties. By 1974 the decision was
In 1971, plans were developed for the eventual made to convert the seriouslyunder-strength brigades
establishment of two light infantry divisions in Laos. into independent BPs again. These BPs were combined
The first was to be a basic infantry division, while the with the remnants of SPECOM, which became an
second was termed a “strike” division. In 1972, these independent BP, to form a parachute brigade. This unit
units were established, with the remaining independent was used by right leaning members of the government to
BPs being formed into its second brigade of the 2nd try and quell the communist demonstrations in 1975
Strike Division. The elements of this strike division that brought the government down.

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engaged in. By the end 1975, the regular units of the FAR The term “irregular” is often used to describe a number of
were still rarely committed to battle, being generally used entities that fought on behalf of the Laotian government
for territorial defense, in some cases being better described against the Pathet Lao and the PAVN. Of the various irregulars
as a personal guard for their commanders. units, perhaps the best known were those recruited from
members of the Hmong ethnic group. Other ethnic minorities
The Hmong Irregulars in Laos were also recruited. The first formal program was
Troop Quality: D8, Morale: D8 initiated with help from the US CIA in beginning in 1958, and
was similar in scope to that of the CIDG program and its
predecessors in developed later on for use in Vietnam.
Hmong Special Rules These units were broken into one of two categories
Divine Blessing similar to those found in the CIDG program. A
Personnel often wore quasi-religious amulets in the paramilitary territorial defense entity, intended to organize
belief that these would protect them. To represent this,
Hmong villagers into a force to resist communist
a unit of Hmong troops may re-roll the first failed
infiltration was termed the Auto Defense de Ordinaire
morale test in a game.
(ADO), which translated literally as Ordinary Self-Defense.
Fragile
ADO militiamen could be seen as comparable to the Self-
Hmong units suffer from “Shrinkage.” Any rolls of “1”
during morale tests automatically remove a figure. Defense Corps that existed at that time in Vietnam.
Irregulars Another unit, intended for offensive action, was termed the
Hmong count as irregular forces. Auto Defense de Choc (ADC), translating literally as
Tank Shock “Shock” Self-Defense. These units were more similar to the
Units with this attribute must make a morale test when CIDG Camp Strike Forces. The ADO was not technically
any enemy tank is in line of sight. If it fails the unit part of what was then the ANL, while the ADC was.
is pinned. In both cases, the relationship between these forces and
the Laotian government existed more as a formality, in

Historical Note: The Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit

The Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit (PARU), protect against communist infiltration. The PARU were
technically an entity assigned to Thailand’s Border said to operate in 10-man teams.
Patrol Police (BPP), had been the established in Thailand The organization of the PARU can be seen as perhaps
in the early 1950s by the CIA as part of a number of the starting point for the ADO/ADC militias in Laos and
US supported programs to help stem a communist the CIDG program in Vietnam. PARU advisors played
insurgency in the north of that country. The PARU’s a similar role during the conflict in Laos. The PARU
name and official subordination to the BPP were remained one of the most secretive units in the region
elaborate covers for the unit’s true purpose. Trained and for some time. A secret 1968 study conducted by the
organized along the lines of the US Army Special Forces, Institute for Defense Analyses described the PARU and
the PARU’s primary mission was that of training and their function, but suggested that no US aid was being
organizing forces in northern Thailand, which would given to the organization.

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keeping with the country’s stated neutrality. The units were or BV). The latter organization remained tasked with its
funded and supplied by the CIA and their organization and localized defense role, being integrated with other such units
training was carried out by CIA field operatives and already in the FAR. The ADC and ADO slowly disappeared
members of the Thai Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit during the 1960s, with both ceasing to exist formally in 1969.
(PARU). ADO/ADC weapons included an essentially These SGUs consisted of five one-hundred-man
standard assortment of basic infantry weapons then being companies, which were still intended to operate primarily as
provided to US allies throughout Southeast Asia. M1 independent units. The addition of a fifty-man headquarters
carbines formed the bulk of these weapons, mixed with element allowed for larger operations to be conducted. The
some M1A1 and M3A1 submachine guns. Larger recruits primary mission of the ADC and these new SGUs was that
might be given an M1 rifle or an M1918A2 Browning of harassing the PAVN along their Ho Chi Minh trail, in
Automatic Rifle, and a small number of 57mm M18A1 order to disrupt their activities. Presenting a reversal to the
recoilless rifles were also distributed. situation in Vietnam, SGUs performed hit-and-run style
In 1963, a decision was made to try and establish units guerilla operations against regular PAVN forces in Laos.
that looked and could be deployed more like traditional The structure of a force would often be mission dependent.
military formations. Battalion sized formations were created Half-companies might be used for small raids. Small ten- to
from the ADC and termed Special Guerilla Units (SGU). The twelve-man units were utilized for road watch purposes
ADO would also be converted into similar battalion size and other special missions, such as deep reconnaissance,
entities, known as Bataillons Volontaire (Volunteer Battalion mining, sensor emplacement (discussed later), and tapping

Historical Note: Airmobile Irregulars

As part of the establishment of irregular forces in Laos, operations. The Air America helicopters were not armed.
the CIA had also established a supply chain for them. Crews, however, did carry personal weapons.
Supply of the irregulars was in large part by air, with The US Air Force also directly participated in the
the bulk of such operations being conducted by private airmobile assaults by Laotian irregulars, as well as the
contractors. These contractors were mainly linked to the insertion of action teams and other similar forces. The
CIA itself, and perhaps the best known is Air America. USAF’s 21st Special Operation Squadron, known by its
Air America was by far the largest, but it was only one call sign “Knife,” conducted these operations using first
of a number of entities operating in the region. In Laos, a mixture of CH-3Cs and CH-3Es and later CH-53Cs.
however, it did have by far the largest helicopter fleet. In some instances Air America and 21st SOS helicopters
This was put to use not only for supplying Lao irregulars, were utilized together, such as the movement of all of
but also for conducting airmobile assaults. Air America’s 31 GM to the Sala Phou Khoun road junction in 1973.
fleet included a wide mix of types, but its helicopters In 1971, as part of the deployment of the Thai
mainly consisted of Sikorsky S-58s and S-58Ts. A number irregulars described later, a small number of UH-1M
of Bell 204 and 205 types were also used, and later on Air helicopters armed with the M21 armament subsystem
America received CH-47 and CH-54 helicopters bailed were bailed from the US Army, though it unclear to
from the US Army. The bailing of US military aircraft to whom. These helicopters were maintained by Air
Air America for periods was not uncommon, with the America in Thailand and supported the Thai irregular
USAF also bailing a number of types of aircraft to the battalions. Known by their call sign, “White Horse,”
airline in the 1960s and 1970s for use in its various these aircraft had no national identification markings.

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of communication lines. These were sometimes referred to as

Action Teams. Historical Note:
In 1970, Brigadier General Soutchay Vongsavanh, then Irregular Armor
Chief of Staff of Irregulars in Laos’ Military Region 4 (MR4) In 1969, Hmong irregulars launched Operation Kou Kiet
in the FAR, began to reorganize the SGUs into GMs and in the Plain of Jars, overwhelming the PAVN forces there.
otherwise reorganize the SGUs themselves. His decision This resulted in the capture of a large amount of usable
military equipment, including a small number of
precipitated the reestablishment of GMs in the regular FAR
armored vehicles and heavy artillery pieces. General
units in MR4 and subsequently in the rest of the FAR. He
Vang Pao’s irregulars in Laos’ Military Region 2, which
was named as head of MR4 in 1971. As before the GMs
had conducted the operation, operated a small number
throughout Laos were organized with between two and
of BTR-40 personnel carriers and early model PT-76
four battalions. A weapons company for the GM as a whole amphibious light tanks for a period afterwards.
was also to have been formed, though not all GM had them.
The reorganized units, named Bataillon Gujerrier
(Guerilla Battalion or BG), consisted of a Battalion
Headquarters and three Rifle Companies. Each Rifle irregulars received payment from the Laotian government,
Company consisted of a Company Headquarters and three as they were technically part of the FAR, as well as a
Rifle Platoons. Each of these Rifle Platoons consisted of a CIA stipend, making it a lucrative opportunity. As foreign
Platoon Headquarters, two rifle squads, and a weapons squad. support began to dwindle in 1973, so did the ability of the
Each of the rifle squads had nine men, one of whom was a Laotian government to hold off the Pathet Lao and the
grenadier, to be equipped with an M79 grenade launcher. PAVN. Years of neglect for the regular FAR became quickly
The Platoon’s Weapons Squad also had nine men, and apparent and the recruitment of younger and younger
included another M79 grenade launcher, as well as a 60mm Hmong, rapidly approaching what might be known today
mortar and a light machine gun (either an M60 or an as child soldiers, put the various elements of the FAR a
M1919 type). Each of the three companies was supposed distinct disadvantage. In the end, many Hmong used their
to have access to one 57mm M18A1 recoilless rifle. M72 US and Thai contacts to flee the country, the airlifting of
Light Anti-Tank Weapons would have been issued as refugees in 1975 being one of the many signs of the end of
available to counter increasing PAVN armor encountered the Royal Laotian state.
after 1969. The GM’s Weapons Company was to have
provided additional support in the form of four 81mm The Thai Unity Battalions
mortars, four 4.2-inch mortars, and four 75mm M20 and Other Irregulars
recoilless rifles. The M20 could also be used in the indirect Though the Hmong units perhaps the best known, other
fire role as a pack howitzer. ethnic minorities and other forces were also nominally
The Hmong and the other irregulars described in the integrated into the FAR and its predecessors. Some of
next section were responsible for the majority of the actual the first of these included former soldiers of the Republic
fighting against the Pathet Lao and the PAVN as the of China in the early 1960s. These soldiers had fled the
conflict progressed. The official CIA history describes advances of communist forces in China and retreated
Laos as the antithesis of the so-called “Vietnamization” into Southeast Asia. From Burma they had attempted an
program. In Laos, irregulars and foreigners took on the invasion of southern China, and had established bases there
major burdens, and often siphoned off the best equipment for resupply from Formosa. In 1960, the People’s Liberation
and leadership from the regular FAR. In addition, Hmong Army attacked those bases and drove them further into

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Southeast Asia. Though the government in Taipei agreed had with Laos had already made them ideally suited to US
to repatriate these forces in 1961, many of them refused, support projects, with the PARU already being noted.
having started new lives in Burma and elsewhere. Those Deploying regular Thai forces had been considered for some
who remained engaged in a sort of banditry, harassing local time prior, but the decision was made to label them as
villages and security forces, and generally being a nuisance volunteers and integrate them into the FAR as a layer
to the Burmese, Thai, and Laotian governments. These of protection against intervention by China’s People’s
elements later became heavily implicated in the narcotics Liberation Army. The Thai units, which deployed with their
trade in the region. own artillery support, were designated as Bataillons
While the Thai and Burmese authorities sought to Commando (Commando Battalions or BC). The BCs were
suppress them, the Laotian government, looking for formed into GMs, in certain cases mixed with other
additional forces in the early 1960s, integrated a number of irregular forces. The BCs were initially organized around
them into the FAR, designating them as Bataillon Speciales the original five hundred and fifty-man SGU model.
(Special Battalions or BS). Organized like other FAR An earlier program, known as Project Copper, had been
battalions, the BS were formed into a Groupement Mobile intended to provide volunteers from Cambodia. It appears
Speciale (GMS) in 1960 and were used that this was the product of wishful thinking on the part of
to counter Kong Le’s coup. In 1961, the regime of Lon Nol in that country, as the battalions
the GMS was combined with a suffered from major morale problems. Three battalions had
number of other specialized been formed by January 1971, and by the end of the spring
military formations, they had all been repatriated to Cambodia. No doubt the
which became known need for additional forces to face the escalating conflict in
as the Directorate of that country was also a factor. All the Thai volunteers were
National Coordination repatriated as part of the 1973 ceasefire agreement, taking
(DNC). Termed a police their artillery with them.
organization, the
DNC enjoyed a Covert Operations in Laos
reputation similar In 1963, it was determined that responsibility for support of
to the LLDB under Diem in operations in Laos previously controlled by the CIA would be
South Vietnam. In 1965, passed to MACV. This determination referred mostly to
its commander Siho cross-border operations directed out of Vietnam and
Lamphouthacoul was Thailand, rather than to the recruiting and training of
expelled from Laos and the irregular forces in Laos, which continued to be conducted in
DNC, including the GMS, part by the CIA. Responsibility for operations into Southern
was disbanded. Laos was transferred by the end of 1963. Facilities and forces
In 1971, as part of Project already created as part of the fledgling CIDG program would
Unity, battalions of Thai be used to provide the required manpower and other
“volunteers” were also deployed resources, and most importantly, no US nationals could
to Laos. The historical and accompany any covert operation across the border.
linguistic connection Thailand Intervention by regular forces of the Vietnamese government
was likewise restricted. To control these and other missions,
Thai Forward Air Guide, 1971 a new entity was created under MACV, taking over from the

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largely CIA staffed Combined Studies Division, which had the area of operations where the missions were conducted.
already ceded many of its responsibilities within Vietnam Initially, the launching points for operations were the CIDG
to MACV in 1962 as part of Operation Switchback. The camps along the South Vietnamese–Laotian border. Some of
new entity was named the Military Assistance Command, the first missions were bomb damage assessments of air
Vietnam – Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG or operations in southern Laos, which had been codenamed
just SOG). In March 1965, cross-border operations into Laos Tiger Hound.
from Vietnam were placed entirely under the purview of The structure of the reconnaissance teams varied greatly.
MACV-SOG. A study conducted in 1969 of SOG operations described the
The first mission taken on by SOG in Laos was that of initial teams as consisting of three US personnel and six to
Leaping Lena, already mentioned in the introduction to eight indigenous personnel, taken from the CIDG program.
special programs in Vietnam. Though determined to have The number of indigenous personnel was considerably more
been a failure, the project provided valuable lessons learned varied, and two US personnel leading reconnaissance teams
and by 1965, a decision had been made to expand cross- was far more common.
border operations into Laos, initially with support from South A wide selection of weapons and equipment was also
Vietnam. It was hoped that later some support would be utilized, including a mix of US military weapons and gear,
offered by either the Laotian government or irregulars in Laos. captured enemy kit, and commercial items obtained both
The codename initially applied to ground operations in locally and outside of the theater. Uncommon weapons
Laos was Shining Brass. This term was also used to refer to included the 9mm Browning Hi Power pistol, 9mm Carl

Historical Note: Military Assistance Command, Vietnam –

Studies and Observation Group
The Military Assistance Command, Vietnam – numbers. The Ground Studies Group, which
Studies and Observation Group (MACV-SOG), conducted the cross-border ground operations,
often euphemistically referred to as the was known as OP 35.
“Special Operations Group,” is one of the most By 1968, there were eight divisions and thirteen
interesting organizations to have come out the studies groups. These included such diverse
US participation in the conflict in Southeast Asia. missions as electronic and signals intelligence and
The name is generally associated with the psychological warfare, in addition to the direct action
cross-border ground operation, such as deep missions. SOG also became the major provider of
reconnaissance, but it bears mentioning that resources to what became the Joint Personnel
SOG was a far more varied organization. Recovery Center, which had the mission of locating
SOG, having taken over control for a variety of and attempting to secure FWAF prisoners or remains
programs, many of them started by the CIA, had in the region. It also became the prime benefactor
five branches in 1965: Administration, Intelligence, of its South Vietnamese counterpart, the Strategic
Operations, Logistics, and Communications. In Technical Directorate (STD). With the inactivation
1967, this structure changed to that of divisions, of the LLDB in 1971, the STD became the main
and by 1967 the various operational sections had provider of unconventional warfare support in
been renamed as studies groups and assigned South Vietnam.

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Gustav M/45 submachine gun (including variants with Command and Control North (CCN) conducted the
integral suppressors), and captured 7.62mm AKM rifles majority of missions into Laos, while Command and Control
and RPD machine guns. Some RPD machine guns were Central (CCC) also participated, deploying forces from
modified with barrels shortened back to the weapon’s gas Kontum in Vietnam’s central highlands. CCC deployed
block for faster handling. 5.56mm M16A1 rifles and forces into both Laos and Cambodia, being positioned in the
XM177E2 submachine guns and similar weapons utilized tri-border region. The detachments included a Command
by other elite US forces were more common, however. Section, two Mobile Launch Teams, a Reconnaissance
In 1966, a decision was made to raise battalion size Company, the two Reaction Companies, a Security
exploitation forces to support SOG reconnaissance teams. Company for local defense, and a Radio Relay Section. The
These units, it was hoped, would provide extra support to number of reconnaissance teams varied between the three
exploit intelligence by the reconnaissance elements or to detachments (Command and Control South operated solely
provide a reaction element to assist in extracting them. The in Cambodia). The two reconnaissance companies consisted
reconnaissance teams were codenamed Spike Teams, while of approximately forty indigenous personnel with US
the reaction elements, initially recruited from Nung leadership, broken into a Company Headquarters and three
members of the CIDG program, were Rifle Platoons. In both cases, the forces could be readily
codenamed dependent on the level to tailored to the mission at hand. The Mobile Launch Teams
which they were deployed. A battalion oversaw the coordination of assets during the insertion and
size unit was referred to as a Haymaker extraction of forces from operations.
Force, a company size unit was On 1 March 1967, Shining Brass was renamed Prairie
referred to as Havoc Force, and a Fire. It is unclear why the change was made, but it
platoon size unit was referred to did coincide with a shift to more direct action missions.
as a Hornet Force (also referred The nature of cross-border actions shifted from mainly
to as Hatchet Force). intelligence to what was termed Seeking, Locating,
Political and operational Annihilating, and Monitoring (SLAM). The SLAM concept
concerns made battalion size of operations had reconnaissance teams actively develop
deployments virtually unheard targets for air and artillery strikes, as well as direct action by
of. When the organization of organic reaction forces. Reconnaissance teams, as a result,
SOG’s Command and Control also participated in the emplacement of sensors to detect
Detachments were developed enemy activity. The main target of these operations was the
beginning in 1966, the disruption of the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.
organization only included In November 1968, Short Term Roadwatch and Target
two reaction companies. Platoon Acquisition (STRATA) teams were placed under the control
size deployments were by far of OP 35 Ground Studies from OP 36 Airborne Studies.
the most common. In Laos, only These units, some of which were subsequently infiltrated
three multi-platoon deployments into Laos, were tasked with locating targets of opportunity
occurred between 1966 and 1971, for air or artillery strikes, similar to the SLAM concept. They
all in 1970. consisted entirely of indigenous personnel. An inability
to devote additional resources to their training and a
Captain, US Army Special
Forces, Project 404, subsequent drop in morale, led to these units to be returned
1972 to OP 36 in July 1969.

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Historical Note: Operation Igloo White

Operation Igloo White is the most common which became redesignated Muscle Shoals. The
codename associated with a complex assortment of myriad of codenames increased with the further
anti-infiltration operations, primarily in Laos. The redesignation of the Muscle Shoals as Igloo White
basic concept had been developed with assistance in 1968 and Muscle Shoals, having become the term
from an independent science and technology for the entire project, was redesignated Duel Blade.
organization known variously as the Jason Resources for the project were designated as Duck
Division, the Jason Group, the Jason Committee, or Blind and then as Duffel Bag in 1968.
just Jason. This entity was associated with the In the end the SPOS barrier never materialized
Advanced Research Projects Agency. Secretary of and was entirely canceled in 1968. As part of Duel
Defense Robert McNamara had become intrigued Blade, the SPOS would be replaced by coordination
with the idea of a physical infiltration barrier in of air and artillery strikes and naval bombardment,
1966, as a replacement for the costly and not a complete reversal of the original plan. The use of
entirely effective bombing campaign then being sensors was expanded, and while they had initially
directed at the Ho Chi Minh Trail. been intended primarily for aerial placement,
Jason proposed a combination of electronic a number of small units for emplacement by
sensors with a traditional physical barrier. reconnaissance teams or regular forces were
This became known in 1967 first as Illinois City, developed. These were used not only along the
which lasted for a month, and then as Dyemarker. Ho Chi Minh Trail, but also in Vietnam. In South
In late 1967, the physical barrier (known as Vietnam, what became termed the Ground Tactical
the Strong Point Obstacle System or SPOS) System was used to protect against PAVN and
was separated from the sensor component, PLAF mining and booby-trapping teams.

In 1969, the Earth Angel Program was also initiated, reconnaissance teams, using tracking techniques along with
seeking to make use of defectors, ralliers, and volunteers to dogs, similar in many ways to US Army combat tracker units.
seek out enemy forces. Teams, initially envisioned to consist As Vietnamization took over in South Vietnam, MACV
of two to three individuals, would be dressed in enemy also began transferring responsibility for its cross-border
uniforms and equipped with appropriate weapons and gear operations. The STD had already formed almost identical
before being infiltrated into hostile territory. Teams were later organizations to those of SOG and had been conducting some
expanded to a size comparable with reconnaissance teams. mixed operations with SOG personnel. In general, SOG
Generally, the results from Earth Angel teams were not personnel were less than impressed with the performance of
inspiring. The infiltration of American organizations and their South Vietnamese counterparts. In 1971, investigative
other intelligence gathering by the North Vietnamese meant journalist Jack Anderson discovered and compromised the
that such agents were often quickly detected and eliminated. SOG codenames for operations in Laos and Cambodia.
This had been the experience with agent insertions in North A desire to disassociate from the cross-border operations
Vietnam and reflected the experiences MACV had with combined with Vietnamization saw Prairie Fire become Phu
the Leaping Lena Program back in 1964. In addition, the Dung. On 20 April 1972, MACV-SOG was inactivated and its
PAVN had formed units specifically tasked to counter responsibilities passed entirely to the South Vietnamese STD.

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Historical Note: Infiltration

Though ground and airborne infiltration were require five slicks and four gunships. In all cases a
no unheard of, insertion of reconnaissance teams command and control element would be present
and other SOG elements was most often done by in the form of either a command and control
helicopter. Helicopter and other aviation support helicopter or Forward Air Controller (FAC).
were supplied to SOG from all the major service It was also suggested that fixed wing aircraft used
branches, as well as the Vietnamese Air Force. for escorting helicopters, primarily by the USAF,
While the very nature of insertion of SOG such as the A-1 Skyraider, could be substituted for
elements required that they be varied and gunship helicopters.
unpredictable, there were basic rules that were Insertions would be made at one of a number of
followed. In 1970, MACV published a guide possible locations determined beforehand. False
for the use of helicopters in conjunction with insertions might be made at the other locations.
reconnaissance teams broadly. Rope ladders and rappelling gear might be used to
It detailed requirements for six-man teams, insert, while extraction might be done via either
twelve-man teams, and thirty-two-man the McGuire Rig or the STABO Harness. These
exploitation forces. In the case of both six and latter two pieces of equipment were designed
twelve-man teams, four transport helicopters specifically for the extraction of reconnaissance
or “slicks” were suggested. Three gunships teams in hot landing zones and in both cases
were suggested for six-man teams and four for allowed personnel to be extracted without
twelve-man teams. The exploitation force would having to land.

The Pathet Lao benefactors, who directly advised many of their units,
In 1950, Prince Souphanouvong, half-brother to Prince operated a large number of units with a mixed Laotian
Souvanna Phouma, established a left oriented parallel and Vietnamese composition, and determined the overall
authority in opposition to the Laotian state established by strategy in the country.
the French. His followers, previously part of the Lao Issara Attempts were made during the first coalition to
(Free Lao), an entity formed at the end of World War II to integrate Pathet Lao forces into the national army, with little
resist the French authorities, subsequently formed the Neo success. In 1965, the Lao People’s Liberation Army was
Lao Issara (Free Lao Front). His organization subsequently formed as the military wing of the Laotian communist
took the name Pathet Lao, meaning Land of Lao, becoming party, but that point known as the Lao Patriotic Front (Neo
the first organization to use this term. Lao Hak Sat or NLHS). These entities both continued to be
His forces fought directly with the Viet Minh against referred to as the Pathet Lao. With Kong Le’s coup and the
the French and Laotian authorities. Some even went so far rise of the neutralists, those who leaned to the left were
as to say that they had been entirely created by the Viet integrated into the overall PAVN/LPLA order of battle.
Minh. Whatever the case, the relationship proved to be a Though not to trivialize the participation of Laotians in
deep and long lasting one. By 1975, outside observers felt the conflict, the LPLA was almost entirely organized by the
that it was relatively obvious that Laotian communist North Vietnamese and equipped through them or from
forces were inseparable from their North Vietnamese similar sources. The units that were not were not directly

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organized by the North Vietnamese or their advisory A third group were those formed by political and military
elements, were organized similarly, if not identically. The elements who felt that Sihanouk was too complacent with
structure and composition of those units described earlier the leftists in the country, which also at their most extreme
is entirely suitable for their Laotian counterparts. The sought his overthrow and the replacement of his regime
relationship between the PAVN and the LPLA was much with a more hardline anti-communist one. Sihanouk
like that between the PAVN and the PLAF, fostering referred to those on the left as the Khmer Rouge (Red
a similar dependence, with the PAVN always keeping Khmer) and those on the right as the Khmer Bleu (Blue
the other at arm’s length. After the fall of the Royal Khmer). He made no distinction of the myriad factions
Laotian Government, the number of Vietnamese in Laos making up both categories, and in the West the term
remained high. Khmer Rouge was similarly adopted.
Whether or not Sihanouk was truly interested in his
CAMBODIA country’s neutrality is a matter for continued debate, but
Cambodia found itself in the aftermath of World War II what is certain is that initially he sought to make the most
in a very similar situation to Laos. It too was drawn into of it. Initially, he sought relations, and more importantly
the conflict between the French and forces struggling for aid, from every country willing to give it. The United States
independence in its Indochina colonies. As with Laos, was one of his primary benefactors until 1963, when he
it too was granted a certain degree of autonomy prior to rejected further assistance from them, along with South
the 1954 Geneva Accords, and the French went so far as Vietnam and Thailand. The primary reason for this is
to grant Cambodia full independence in 1953. Prince again a matter for debate. However, it was no doubt
Norodom Sihanouk, who had struggled politically against influenced by with competing territorial claims with South
the French for increasingly greater autonomy was named Vietnam and Thailand, a real or perceived shift to the left
as head of state. He would rule as King until 1955, at which politically on the part of Sihanouk, pressure from the
time he relinquished that title, but retained political control. North Vietnamese and their benefactors, and that the fact
Cambodia, like Laos, had also been a battleground that the United States was covertly supporting elements of
between the French and Viet Minh. As in Laos, after the the Khmer Bleu who had taken up residence in Thailand.
Geneva Accords were agreed upon, Cambodia was declared Diplomatic relations between the United States and
to be neutral, and as in Laos, the Viet Minh and communist- Cambodia were served entirely in 1965.
inspired Khmer insurgents remained. Unlike in Laos, Whatever the reasons for the political disputes, it had
historical distrust and animosity between the Khmer and become clear by that point that Cambodia could not
Vietnamese made such relationships tense. Attempts to escape the escalating conflict in Vietnam. The Ho Chi
foster cooperation between the South Vietnamese state and Minh Trail had already extended from Laos in Cambodia
Cambodia encountered similar tensions. and in 1966, Sihanouk granted the North Vietnamese
These realities meant that in 1954, Sihanouk found access to the port of Sihanoukville. The Americans later
himself in control of a country divided into three basic termed this and other portions of the Ho Chi Minh Trail
categories. The first was of political and military elements in Cambodia as the Sihanouk Trail. In exchange, the North
that supported him, generally those in the Cambodian Vietnamese offered no support to the various factions of
government and national military. The second were the Khmer Rouge. This proved to be an important
political and military elements that were left leaning, which consideration when Sihanouk began to attack elements of
sought at their most extreme sought his overthrow and the the Khmer Rouge, beginning with the suppression of a
replacement of the monarchy with a communist state. peasant uprising in 1967.

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In 1968, a member of the Kampuchean Communist for medical treatment, the Cambodian National Assembly,
Party known by the nom-de-guerre Pol Pot formed the with the backing of the military, removed him as head of
Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea (RAK). The RAK, state in a no confidence vote. They subsequently installed
better known in the West by the term Khmer Rouge, began Lon Nol, who had been named Prime Minister in August
a campaign against the Sihanouk regime. By 1969, the 1969, as head of state. Lon Nol quickly renamed the country
nature of the conflict had changed because of outside as the Khmer Republic and similarly renamed the military
intervention. The United States had begun a bombing as the Forces Armees Nationales Khmere (the Khmer
campaign of known North Vietnamese base areas in National Armed Forces or FANK). Lon Nol reopened the
Cambodia. The campaign served only to drive the elements country to the United States and their military aid. Elements
of the PAVN deeper into Cambodia, bringing them into of the Khmer Bleu, most notably the Khmer Serei (Free
conflict with the Cambodian government. The military had Khmer), an anti-Sihanouk group in Thailand, were also
pleaded in the past with Sihanouk to allow them to take the integrated into the political and military structure of the
offensive against the various outside elements in their new republic.
country. In the middle of 1969 he instructed the head of the In 1970, the US and South Vietnam also launched a
Forces Armees Royales Khmere (the Royal Khmer Armed combined operation into what were referred to as the
Forces or FARK), Lon Nol, to take the offensive against the “Cambodian sanctuaries.” These PAVN base camp areas
Vietnamese. By June 1969, Sihanouk announced in a press along the border had been the target of a covert bombing
conference that his country was at war with Vietnam. campaign in 1969, codenamed Menu (the targets themselves
Growing domestic displeasure with Sihanouk, who was were codenamed Breakfast, Dessert, Dinner, Lunch, Snack,
seen by many as having sold out the country to the and Supper). The ground operation consisted of a number of
Vietnamese, remained despite the new named operations, and became known to the US Army as
offensive. The largely demoralized FARK the Sanctuary Counteroffensive. It succeeded in disrupting
fared badly in their initial operations PAVN activities, but it also succeeded in driving these
against the PAVN. In early 1970, while elements and Khmer insurgents deeper into Cambodia.
Sihanouk was in France The FANK found itself entirely unsuited to take on these
hardened elements. The Cambodian incursion was also
limited in nature, lasting around two months, after
Khmer Rouge
Fighter, 1969 which US and South Vietnamese forces returned across
the border.
Though the FANK rapidly expanded between 1970 and
1975, it remained ill-suited to take on the disciplined and
well equipped PAVN. Prince Sihanouk also continued to
exert his influence, forming a government in exile and an
umbrella political organization for those opposed to the
coup. The Front Uni National du Kampuchea (National
United Front of Kampuchea or FUNK) declared by
Sihanouk provided a unifying force for a disparate set of
political actors. The RAK renamed itself the Cambodian
People’s National Liberation Armed Forces (CPNLAF) and
with support mainly from China, where Sihanouk initially

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set up his government in exile, they grew exponentially. From the outset, the FARK and its associated institutions
By 1973, there was the suggestion that they had in fact been were heavily influenced by the French. French advisors
able to take on the burden of the fighting against Lon Nol’s were inserted into the Cambodian Ministry of Defense and
regime from the PAVN. elsewhere. The FARK was also primarily an infantry force,
The Khmer Republic struggled to maintain the balance, with the bulk of its manpower being in the Armee Royales
but as the United States departed from the region, the same Khmere (Royal Khmer Army or ARK).
issues present in Laos and South Vietnam became apparent A small Air Force (Aviation Royales Khmere or AVRK)
in Cambodia. With the loss of military aid and support, the and Navy (Marine Royales Khmere or MRK) were also
CPNLAF surged forward. By May 1975, the CPNLAF had included in its overall order of battle. The AVRK and MRK
taken the capital Phnom Penh. numbered fewer than two thousand personnel each. The
AVRK was small enough to be nominally under the control
UNIT ORGANIZATIONS of the ARK. Most of its personnel assigned to it were close to
The Forces Armees Royales Prince Sihanouk. Patronage in the ARK and its lack of activity
Khmere led to it being derisively referred to as the Royal Flying Club.
Though Cambodia and its military remained firmly within After the departure of the French from the region in
the purview of the French Union until 1953, by 1946, it had 1954, the new Cambodian state sought military aid from the
effectively gained its own military. The vacuum left by the United States. A Military Assistance Advisory Group was
defeat of the Japanese and the inability of the French to established for Cambodia (MAAG-C) in 1955. By 1963 that
quickly provide law and order, meant that by the end of 1945, time the United States had delivered almost ninety-million
Khmer had already been being formed into provisional dollars in military aid. In November 1963, Sihanouk
military units. voluntarily discontinued the acceptance of US military aid
On 20 November 1946, under the Franco-Khmer and ejected non-diplomatic personnel from the country.
Military Convention, the autonomous state of Cambodia The FARK, who had been attempting to transition to a
had gained a right to oversee its territorial integrity and structure more in line with the United States military under
form a nominally independent military. Its responsibilities the direction of MAAG-C, suddenly found that the transition
to the French Union remained and the units of its new had effectively been halted. They also began receiving new
military were initially under the control of the French supplies from the People’s Republic of China. The FARK had
Union Army. The Cambodia armed services were obliged also paradoxically received aid from the Soviet Union prior
to support French operations in the region in exchange for to 1963 and continued to do so thereafter. A French military
a French responsibility to defend Cambodia. The French mission would remain in Cambodia until 1971, and the
retained responsibility for overall maintenance of order in French delivered limited military aid to the FARK during the
Cambodia. 1960s, despite protests from the US.
Khmer units previously assigned to the French Union In all, the FARK acquired a confusing and logistically
Army were transferred to a new entity, the Forces Armees frustrating arsenal from numerous sources. It also remained
Royales Khmere (Royal Khmer Armed Forces or FARK). largely structured along French lines, in many ways dating
As had existed in Laos, the units in the French Union Army back to the organization of that military prior to World
had been termed Bataillon de Chasseur, while those in the War II. The infantry elements of the FARK were almost
FARK had been termed Bataillon de Infanterie. After being entirely tasked for regional defense and Sihanouk’s various
integrated into the FARK, the French units also became interpretations of neutrality meant that the FARK conducted
Bataillon Infanterie. very few operations for the majority of its existence.

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carbines, and their Chinese equivalents. Old French 7.5mm

FARK Special Rules MAS-36 or even British .303 Enfields might also have been
Divine Blessing found in some units early on. Similarly, the Machine Gun in
FARK personnel often wore quasi-religious amulets in the Group might have been a US .30-caliber M1918 BAR or
the belief that these would protect them. To represent this a Soviet 7.62mm RPD (or a Chinese equivalent). The Group’s
a unit of FARK may re-roll the first failed morale test in a grenadier might also have been issued a standard rifle, acting
game. as an additional rifleman instead of the intended role.
Shrinkage The same issues that plagued the Rifle Groups existed at
FARK units suffer from the rules for Shrinkage. all other echelons. The French themselves had had to cut
Follow Me down the number of support weapons in their units because
Units always require line of sight to a leader model in of shortages during their time in Indochina. A medium
order to advance towards the enemy.
machine gun or two of one type or another (such as a US
.30-caliber M1919A4 or a Soviet 7.62mm SGM) might have
been found at the Company level, along with 60mm mortars
When Sihanouk did decide to engage Khmer from one or more sources. At Battalion level, additional
Communist elements (the Khmer Rouge as he called them) machine guns, larger 81mm or 82mm mortars, and in some
in 1967, the FARK found itself woefully unprepared for any cases lighter recoilless rifles (generally 57mm) might be
sort of offensive action. The overall conditions of morale found. In general, ARK units were under-strength and
in the FARK were among the many reasons for Sihanouk’s poorly supplied.
overthrow in 1970.
The Forces Armees
ARK Infantry Company, Infantry Nationales Khmere
Battalion Following the ouster of Sihanouk in March 1970, the armed
Troop Quality D8, Morale D6 forces had quickly been renamed the Forces Armees
The ARK had initially absorbed units straight from the Nationales Khmere (Khmer National Armed Forces or
French Union Army, and quickly inherited the French FANK). Under the direction of President Lon Nol, the FANK
organizational structure that came along with them. Also, as a whole embarked on a wide ranging set of expansions.
while the French Army itself changed and modified the Lon Nol imagined an expanded and modernized FANK
structure of its units in Indochina between 1946 and 1954, at least on par with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam
the battalions of the ARK remained largely organized along (ARVN). It has been suggested that Lon Nol, often cited as
the original organization, similar to the experience in Laos. letting himself be carried away by personal emotions, may
The basic battalion structure described for the ANL should have been almost delusional in his expectations of the FANK,
be consulted for the ARK as well. which he suggested might have swelled to some six-hundred
Unlike the ANL, the FAL, and the FAR, the FARK issued thousand personnel.
a wide array of individual weapons with little to no The FANK his new Khmer Republic inherited from
standardization, even down to the Rifle Group level. Weapons the previous regime was relatively small, with most of its
came from old French stocks, as well as military aid from the eighty-five thousand personnel being assigned to the Armee
United States, Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of Nationales Khmere (Khmer National Army or ANK). The
China. Rifles might include US .30-caliber M1 rifles and M1 Khmer Air Force (KAF) and the Marine Nationale Khmere
carbines, Soviet 7.62mm AK47/AKMs assault rifles and SKS (Khmer National Navy or MNK) both numbered fewer than

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two thousand personnel each, having changed little under guerillas. Further complicating this was the varied nature
the Sihanouk regime. of the FANK arsenal, made more complex with the
Lon Nol had established the authorized strength of introduction of new US supplied weapons and equipment.
the new FANK at over two-hundred thousand personnel, At the same time frustration in the US over continued
double its existing strength. By July 1970, the FANK had involvement in the conflicts in Southeast Asia was boiling
reached this goal in various creative ways. The majority of over. While military aid had been approved for the Khmer
the increased strength came from the integration of Khmer Republic, there was to be no official advisory mission. The
Serei insurgents and ethnic Khmer from South Vietnam only unit established was the Military Equipment Delivery
into the FANK. The ethnic Khmer from South Vietnam Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), which had the intended
had served in the regular ARVN, the ARVN territorial mission of simply facilitating the delivery and integration of
forces, as well as in the CIDG program. US military aid into the FANK and otherwise monitoring
The integration of these forces, again primarily into the its distribution.
ANK, led to a complicated and confusing force structure. US personnel were so heavily restricted from being in
Units were organized under French structures inherited Cambodia that they could not conduct major training
from the FARK, US and South Vietnamese force structures, programs inside the country. The US Army Vietnam
as well as ill-defined unit organization of the Khmer Serei Individual Training Group (UITG) was established in

Historical Note: Ethnic Khmer in South Vietnam

The traditional home of the Vietnamese ethnic group is the their complex history on the Vietnam-Cambodian border.
area around Red River Delta, in the northern part of what However, a need for a pro-Western military presence in the
is Vietnam today. Prior to the 13th century, the southern areas under their influence led to their integration into the
portions of the country belonged to the Kingdom of Champa CIDG program. The agreements allowed some measure of
and the Khmer Empire. The Kingdom of Champa was autonomy. Negative experiences cooperating with the
entirely absorbed into the Vietnamese state, while only the regimes in North and South Vietnam meant that the group
Mekong Delta region was taken from the Khmer Empire. seemed generally willing to fight Vietnamese of any stripe
The Vietnamese regarded the south in many ways as who wandered into their territory. Ethnic Khmer also
a backwater of the empire and the Khmer agitated at various served in the regular ARVN.
times for reintegration with the Khmer Empire or at least Fear of a rebellion among the Khmer Krom with the
greater autonomy. Ethnic Khmer in Vietnam themselves fall termination of the CIDG program and the need for
into a Khmer sub-category, referred to as Khmer Krom. personnel to staff the expanding FANK, led to the
In the post-World War II environment the group formed repatriation of these elements and other ethnic Khmer units
an organization to advance their aims, called variously the to Cambodia.
Front de Lutte du Kampuchea Krom or Front de Liberation Ironically, ethnic divisions between the Khmer Krom and
du Kampuchea Krom, meaning either the Front for the Khmer in Cambodia sprang up quickly. Adding to this was
Struggle of the Khmer Krom or the Front for the Liberation the fact that the Khmer Krom units, some of the most
of the Khmer Krom, both known by the acronym FLKK. In experienced and well training in the FANK, were generally
official US histories the group was referred to as the Khmer used to spearhead attacks, suffering the bulk of the
Kampuchea Krom, allowing the usage of the acronym KKK, casualties in early operations. In 1972 one of the FANK’s
and added to the generally derogatory perception of the Khmer Krom units mutinied and was disbanded. Following
organization and its members. this and the stories reaching Khmer Krom in South
US and South Vietnamese authorities generally viewed Vietnam, the recruiting of additional members of the
the FLKK as a collection of bandits or criminals, despite already depleted ethnic group became virtually impossible.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

South Vietnam for the purposes of training FANK infantry ANK Infantry Company, Infantry
battalions. Run jointly by US Army Vietnam and Military Battalion, Infantry Division and
Assistance Command – Vietnam, the UITG was staffed Separate Infantry Brigade
primarily by members of the US Army Special Forces, but Troop Quality D8, Morale D6
also by members of the US Marine Corps, and elements of While FANK infantry elements initially carried over the
the ANZAC contingent. In Thailand, the US Army’s 46th unit organization of the FARK, they were quickly
Special Forces Company (Airborne), which had been reorganized into standardized battalions according to a new
established to help train Thai forces for deployment to TOE. The new TOEs was developed with the help of US
Vietnam, was tasked with training the fledgling Khmer advisors and combined elements of standard US infantry
Special Forces. battalions, ARVN infantry battalions, and the MIKE Force
By the end of 1970, however, there had been some success elements of the CIDG program in South Vietnam.
in unifying the organization of the FANK, though the brigade Logistical and recruitment issues led to the authorized TOE
remained its largest unit. By 1973, twelve of the thirty-two strength being smaller than any of the units it was based
brigades then active were formed into four new divisions, the on. The battalion soon became the default structure for all
others remaining independent. The divisions integrated FANK infantry units, including the Bataillons Parachutiste
armor and artillery elements, which had previously been (Parachute Battalions).
organized in entirely separate half-brigades (also known as The new battalions consisted of a Headquarters and
demi-brigades, a holdover from the FARK). Headquarters Company and three Infantry Companies.
The morale of the FANK was perhaps better than the Each of the Infantry Companies contained a Headquarters
FARK in the years leading up to the demise of the Section, Mortar Section, and three Infantry Platoons. The
Sihanouk regime. It was still plagued with desertions, Platoons were further broken into a Platoon Headquarters
ghost troops, corruption of various types at various levels, and three Infantry Squads.
and other major issues. Heavy casualties and mounting
defeats, along with the effective termination of US Platoon HQ
military aid no doubt worsened the situation by 1974. 1x Officer w/Rifle
Morale and experience levels for FANK forces indicated 1x NCO w/Rifle
should be used as a guide and modified as players agree 1x RTO w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
and see fit. This section covers with relevant units across 1x Medic w/Rifle
the FANK’s service branches.
3x Rifle Squad (divides into two fireteams & one MG team)
1x Squad Leader w/Rifle
FARK Special Rules
2x Fireteam Leader w/Rifle
Divine Blessing
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
FANK personnel often wore quasi-religious amulets in the
5x Rifleman w/Rifle
belief that these would protect them. To represent this, a
unit of CIDG or FANK may re-roll the first failed morale
1x Machine Gunner w/Machine Gun (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
test in a game. 1x Asst. Machine Gunner w/Rifle
Follow Me 1x Ammunition Bearer w/Rifle
Units always require line of sight to a leader model in order
to advance towards the enemy. The TOE called for all personnel equipped with a rifle to be
issued the 5.56mm M16A1 rifle. The machine gunner was to

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 A Not So Secret War – Laos & Cambodia

have a .30-caliber M1919A6 machine gun. However, the The logistical strain on FANK units is obvious, but was not
FANK arsenal included a vast and diverse array of weapons. made necessarily better with the first batches of US aid. To help
Weapons inherited from the FARK had mainly been supplied arm the rapidly expanding ANK, the US military shipped
by the Soviet Union or China. In addition, before Sihanouk thousands of Soviet, Chinese, and even French weapons
had terminated the aid agreement with the United States captured in South Vietnam to Cambodia. In addition,
various World War II and Korean War-era infantry weapons sympathetic or opportunistic South Vietnamese officials were
had been delivered. The French had also transferred stock to later discovered to have been selling older US stock to the
the Sihanouk regime. Cambodians, writing the shrinkage off as combat losses, which
Down to the squad level units might be equipped with a were later replaced by US aid shipments to that country.
mix of weapons, including but not limited to US .30-caliber If the issue of basic infantry weapons appeared overly
M1 rifles and M1 Carbines, 7.62mm Soviet AK47/AKMs confusing, the issue of heavier support weapons was
assault rifles and SKS carbines, Chinese clones of Soviet more unified. Each infantry company had two 60mm M2
weapons, and maybe even older French weapons like the mortars in its Mortar Section. At battalion level, additional
7.5mm MAS-49. Officers and NCOs might have sub- support was provided by three 81mm M1 mortars in the
machine guns like the US .45-caliber M3. Machine guns Headquarters and Headquarters Company’s Mortar Platoon.
like the 7.62mm Soviet RPD and its Chinese clones were Each battalion had its own Reconnaissance Platoon as well.
also used, with the US .30-caliber M1918 BAR sometimes Some Soviet or Chinese 82mm mortars might be found at
substituted in the role. Also, while the M16A1 rifle and that level as well.
M79 grenade launcher were supplied to the FANK, there The Platoon, with its Headquarters and three
are no records of the M60 machine gun being delivered (at Reconnaissance Squads, was intended to act as scouts for
least not in substantial quantities). the rest of the battalion.

Historical Note: MNK Marine Rifle Battalions and KAF Air

Rifle Battalions
Under the FARK, the Marine Corps of the MRK had been Also, in January 1971, an attack by North Vietnamese
limited to some four Marine Rifle Battalions, generally Dac Cong destroyed virtually all the aircraft of the
assigned to static defense of key naval installations. By the KAF in a spectacular raid on Pochentong Airbase. The
end of 1973, the Marine Corps of the FANK had expanded increasing threat of similar strikes against the KAF as it
to nine battalions, with the intent of creating a force that received new aircraft to rebuild itself led to the creation
could be deployed on offensive operations. of Air Rifle Battalions, again using the standard infantry
The additional manpower for these battalions was battalion TOE. It is likely that the under-strength KAF
supplied by the ANK, who also provided the training. battalions removed elements like the reconnaissance
The units were further organized around the same platoon from the TOE and placed the heavy weapons
TOE as the ANK infantry battalions. While there was allotted in fixed defensive positions.
training in riverine operations involving the insertion Both services suffered similarly from the logistical
and extraction of troops from watercraft, the elements issues already noted. There appears to have been little
of the Marine Corps were generally committed to uniformity or priority in the distribution of new weapons
ground battles as additional infantry. between the three services as well.

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Platoon HQ squadrons was similar in strength to a US Army Armored

1x Officer w/Rifle Cavalry Squadron.
1x NCO w/Rifle The Squadrons themselves were intended to both provide
1x RTO w/Rifle an armored reconnaissance capability and in the case of
1x Medic w/Rifle those assigned to infantry divisions, mobility for infantry
units. Issues in using armored elements in concert with
3x Reconnaissance Squad infantry in general hampered the effective employment of
1x Squad Leader w/Rifle the squadrons.
2x Team Leader w/Rifle Each of the three Combat Troops had five M113A1
2x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) armored personnel carriers.
5x Rifleman w/Rifle
Combat Troop
Above battalion level, individual units might be able to call 5x M113A1
upon additional mortar support or recoilless rifles, of either
57mm or 75mm caliber. These weapons again might have With:
been either supplied by the United States or inherited from 1x Officer w/Rifle
the various suppliers of the FARK. 2x NCO w/Rifle
3x Track Commander w/Rifle
ANK Mechanized Squadron, 5x Gunner w/Rifle
Infantry Division and Mechanized 5x Vehicle Driver w/Rifle
Regiment Armored Brigade
Troop Quality D8, Morale D6 In the Troop, one M113A1 was designated as the Troop
Along with the reorganization of the FANK infantry Commander’s vehicle. Under the TOE, he was also to have
elements, the mechanized capabilities were also expanded access to a quarter-ton truck with a radio. Of the four
beginning in 1973. By 1974, eight mechanized squadrons remaining vehicles, two were fitted with the ACAV Kit A,
had been formed, one in each of the ANK’s infantry while the other two were fitted with the ACAV Kit B. The
divisions, and four assigned to a Mechanized Regiment in vehicles with Kit A featured the .50-caliber M2 machine gun
the ANK’s I Armored Brigade. and initially two M60 machine guns. Difficulties in obtaining
The naming of all the armored formations in the ANK M60 machine guns led to the modification of the mounts to
reflected the confusing mix of French and American style unit accept the M1919A6 machine gun. The vehicles with Kit B
nomenclature that remained in the new Khmer Republic. also had a .50-caliber M2 Machine Gun, but in the rear they
Advisors often added to the confusion by using American also mounted a 106mm M40 recoilless rifle on the right side.
terms to describe ANK units designated under a French An M1919A6 machine gun was fitted to the other side.
influenced system. Mechanized Squadrons, organized around The Mechanized Squadron’s Support Troop included
Headquarters and Service Company, three Combat Troops, another M113A1 with Kit A, armed like those in the Combat
and a Support Troop, had an authorized strength more in Troops, along with three M106A1 4.2-inch mortar carriers.
line with a US Army Armored Cavalry Troop. American The Headquarters and Service Company had an additional 5
advisors often referred to them as such when reporting. The M113A1s, armed like those in the Combat Troops, but with
Mechanized Regiment, I Armored Brigade with its four the armored shields, and an XM806 recovery vehicle.

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 A Not So Secret War – Laos & Cambodia

The paper TOE for the Mechanized Squadron in reality its elements were widely dispersed in platoon
eventually ceased to be relevant as combat losses for the sized packages, used often for convoy escort and road
units multiplied. By March 1975, one month before the fall opening. Such elements had four or five vehicles of mixed
of the Khmer Republic, the average number of combat types, including actual half-tracks and armored cars.
ready M113A1s available to each of the eight squadrons was Examples include: three M3 half-tracks and an M8 armored
down to between twelve and fifteen vehicles. An emergency car, three M3 half-tracks and two M20 armored utility
shipment of forty-five additional vehicles in March 1975 vehicles, and five M3 half-tracks. The Tank Regiment,
did little to alleviate the problems, as the replacement tracks with its squadron of M24 light tanks and its squadron of
arrived without gun shields, radios, and other necessary AMX-13 light tanks was similarly dispersed.
equipment. Only twenty-five of the vehicles were made In the case of both the Armored Reconnaissance
operational before the fall of Phnom Penh. Regiment and the Tank Regiment, the logistical strain of the
various types of vehicles and weapons, their age, and the
ANK Armored Brigade general difficulty obtaining replacement components meant
The ANK’s I Armored Brigade was an outgrowth of the that these units never had their authorized compliment of
Armored Demi-Brigade that had existed under the ARK. vehicles and rarely had all their available vehicles operational.
It was the sole operator of the ANK’s armored elements One report, circa 1972 showed that of the twelve AMX-13
until the decision in late 1972 to form infantry divisions tanks available to the ANK, ten were operational, and of the
with organic mechanized squadrons. Even after that, the seven M24s, only four were operational. The I Armored
bulk of the ANK’s armored elements remained under the Brigade also had five M8 Howitzer Motor Carriages in
control of the Brigade. inventory, of which one was operational.
Prior to the organization of the Brigade’s Mechanized By 1974, however, due to attrition, maintenance
Regiment, it consisted of an Armored Infantry Support difficulties, and a lack of spare parts and relevant
Regiment, an Armored Reconnaissance Regiment (sometimes ammunition, the units had effectively become local security
referred to as the Motorized Regiment), and a Tank Regiment. for the Armor School at Das Kanchor. The light tanks were
The Armored Infantry Support Regiment had three believed to be completely non-operational by that point.
infantry battalions. These armored infantry battalions were
initially organized under the territorial infantry battalion FANK Special Forces A
TOE intended for fixed location units. The battalions were Detachment and B Detachment
assigned mechanized sections equipped with modified M3 By 1971 the decision had been made to train a Khmer
half-tracks inherited from the French. These vehicles had Special Forces element along the lines of the US Army
the rear tracks replaced by a traditional truck axel, making Special Forces organization. The training was conducted in
them more accurately armored trucks. These vehicles were Thailand by the 46th Special Forces Company (Airborne)
often mistaken for M3 scout cars, which they broadly of the US Army, which had previously been the training
resembled and which the ANK had a number as well. The similar organizations within the Thai armed forces, as well
easiest way to tell the two apart was the dual wheels on the as Thai forces destined for South Vietnam.
rear axles and the machine gun mounts over the cabs found By October 1971, a Special Forces Headquarters element
on US half-tracks, but not on the M3 scout car. had been established, designated as a C Detachment, along
The Armored Reconnaissance Regiment, or motorized with 1 Special Forces Group (Airborne), a unit of reinforced
regiment, was organized on paper into two squadrons, but platoon size consisting of a B Detachment and six A

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Detachments. Training of a second group began in 1972. Between 1972 and 1974 the Khmer Special Forces found
Each of the A Detachments was intended to be organized themselves engaged in traditional reconnaissance missions
similar to a US Army Special Forces A Detachment. and reaction operations, including clearing Khmer Rouge
rocket teams from the Phnom Penh suburbs. Elements of the
A Detachment Khmer Special Forces were also utilized as a counter-coup
2x Officer w/Rifle force in Phnom Penh and as security details for President
1x Operations Sergeant w/Rifle Lon Nol, further degrading their ability to perform their
1x Psyops Officer w/Rifle intended mission.
2x Weapons Sergeant w/Rifle By January 1975, the Khmer Special Forces had been
2x Intelligence Sergeant w/Rifle responsible for the training and organization of a single
2x Medical Sergeant w/Rifle one-hundred-man militia unit in the Lower Bassac Region
2x Communications Sergeant w/Rifle to act as partisans. As the situation deteriorated, most of
2x Engineering Sergeant the Khmer Special Forces were ordered to assist with the
1x Supply Sergeant, E7 defense of the capital.

While the intended mission of the Khmer Special Forces Covert Operations in
was the training and organization of paramilitary elements Cambodia
in the Cambodian country-side, the potential value of In May 1967, approval was granted to MACV-SOG to begin
this was not readily understood by the FANK leadership. conducting cross-border operations into Cambodia. The
The Khmer Special Forces were effectively controlled by rationale provided was that the tri-border area specifically had
President Lon Nol with orders often originated with the become of greater importance for the PAVN. Since PAVN
President himself. Scarcity of resources in the FANK as a operations in Cambodia were outside the responsibility of
whole led the General Staff to be wary of diverting them to reconnaissance elements tasked for efforts in Laos, these
such a unit, leaving the Khmer Special Forces severely efforts could effectively be circumvented by the PAVN.
under-funded and under-equipped. The primary focus of these operations was to detect enemy

Historical Note: FANK Para-Commando and Reconnaissance

Battalions
In an attempt to free the Khmer Special Forces from While both units were staffed by 1974, the General
the reaction and reconnaissance missions, the decision Staff ’s reluctance to change priorities away from the
was made in 1974 to raise two new units. The new regular army infantry units left them without critical
Para-Commando and Reconnaissance Battalions resources. By January 1975, the Para-Commando
were technically assigned to the Khmer Special Battalion still had no weapons or radios. The
Forces Headquarters. The initial personnel for the Reconnaissance Battalion was only partially armed
Para-Commando battalion came from sixty mostly and also had no radios. With the exception of the
ethnic Cham, who had been sent to the Airborne personnel trained in Indonesia, neither unit had
Commando School at Batu Djadjar in Indonesia. conducted any specialized training.
The personnel were completely outfitted, less weapons, In the end, the personnel of both units were ordered
web gear, and similar equipment, by the Indonesians along with the rest of the Khmer Special Forces to the
before their return. defense of Phnom Penh.

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 A Not So Secret War – Laos & Cambodia

infiltration and provide warning to friendly outposts along the reconnaissance focus meant that reconnaissance teams were
border. The original codename for operations in Cambodia sometimes split in half for operations with as few as six
was Daniel Boone. personnel. There were no such deployments until 1970.
The restrictions placed on units in Cambodia, launched There were more multi-platoon deployments into Cambodia
from CCS and CCC were more stringent than those for Laos than Laos, however, with three in 1970 and nine between
had been initially. No more than three reconnaissance teams 1971 and April 1972.
could be in Cambodia at any one time, and they could only Jack Anderson also compromised the Salem House
be inserted on foot. Extraction by helicopter was to be utilized codename, and again with the Vietnamization of the
only in emergency situations and air support had to be used cross-border operations into Cambodia, the codename was
only for immediate defense of teams. The relationship changed to Thot Not. As in Laos, SOG continued to work
between the US and the Sihanouk government meant that with the STD, as well as Khmer Special Forces, until it was
not only did teams have to avoid detection by the PAVN, but disbanded on 20 April 1972.
were also instructed to avoid contact with Cambodia civilians
or military. They were authorized to destroy PAVN materiel The Khmer Rouge
and capture PAVN prisoners for interrogation. As has already been noted, the term Khmer
The restrictions were modified in August 1967, by Rouge is a blanket term, which does not
splitting the Daniel Boone area of operations into two zones. appreciate the various groups that
Zone Alpha, consisting of the region from the tri-border Sihanouk applied it to, or the similarly
area to Route 13 in Cambodia, would have no restrictions in varied groups that were grouped
the number of missions that could be conducted at once. together under the term by Lon Nol
However, only one mission could be launched per day per and his allies. It is, however, a useful
thirty-day period and no more than five per thirty-day term when talking broadly about
period could be helicopter insertions. No helicopter these entities.
insertion into Cambodia was to be more than ten kilometers While Pol Pot only formed
from the border. Operations into Zone Bravo, from Route 13 his RAK in 1968, left oriented
to the Gulf of Siam, would be considered on a case by case movements had maintained
basis and required approval from Washington. The primary armed elements since the
mission remained intelligence collection. end of World War II.
Publicized association between operations in Cambodia The Viet Minh
and the Daniel Boone codename led to it being changed to had organized
Salem House in 1969. The Earth Angel Program already a Cambodian
mentioned was also conducted in Cambodia beginning in counterpart in the Khmer
1969. After the coup in 1970, SOG also supported airborne People’s Liberation Armed
reconnaissance teams nominally under the control of the Forces (KPLAF) after the end of
Khmer Special Forces. This program was codenamed World War II. This entity fought
Cedar Walk. with the Viet Minh against the
The elements assigned to the Daniel Boone area of French, and a portion of them were
operations were organized like those assigned to the Prairie repatriated to North Vietnam as part
Fire area of operations. The restrictions placed on operations
meant that reaction forces were rarely employed. This pure Khmer Rouge Commander, 1975

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AMBUSH VALLEY

of the Geneva Accords. Sihanouk had derisively referred to groups opposed to Lon Nol. At the Canton Conference a
these individuals as the Khmer Viet Minh. vision had been laid out for the FUNK that envisioned the
The nature of Cambodia’s relationship both with the formation of three divisions entirely trained and equipped
Khmer Rouge and with the North Vietnamese until 1967 by the Chinese. The North Vietnamese established training
meant that there was little if any major conflict. The lack of camps along their border with Cambodia for the training of
direct support from the North Vietnamese as part of their FUNK personnel as well. Pro-Sihanouk groups in the
relationship with Sihanouk meant that Khmer Rouge were FUNK, known as the Khmer Rumdo and the revived
mainly driven underground. After the rebellion in Khmer Viet Minh largely filled these camps and had North
Battambang in 1967, these organizations appeared again, Vietnamese advisors. Pol Pot’s CPNLAF allied itself closer
garnering numerous new recruits and outside support. This with the Chinese.
only increased as the relationship between the North In all cases, the forces were organized along the models
Vietnamese and Sihanouk soured and foreign intervention in utilized first by the Chinese during their revolution and then
Cambodia increased. It was this environment that gave rise to by the Viet Minh and the North Vietnamese. The various
forces like the RAK. The ouster of Sihanouk in 1970 and the factions Khmer Rouge divided their troops into the same
establishment of the FUNK provided the impetus for a more categories of “local” and “main” forces. They similarly used
formal military entity to be formed, with the RAK forming a mix of weapons acquired from their benefactors and taken
the dominant faction, and renaming itself the CPNLAF. from the forces of the Khmer Republic. As with the LPLA,
Sihanouk had formed the FUNK and his exile one should not hesitate to use the organizations provided
government in China in 1970 during a conference of various for the PAVN and the PLAF with regards to these forces.

Khmer Rouge Special Rules

Ambush! Determined Fighters

Khmer Rouge forces may make use of the Ambush rules The Khmer Rouge were a committed and well supplied
in the main section. insurgency. To represent their hard fighting and
Lack of Initiative commitment to the cause Khmer Rouge units don’t roll for
Any Khmer Rouge unit that does not have either an their casualties on the First Aid table. Instead, roll a single
attached leader or a clear line of sight to a leader must D6 for each casualty as it is taken. On a roll of ‘5+” the
make a successful TROOP QUALITY check in order to models is OK and is placed back into the line. Any other
move. Units that fail may not move but may still fire. result indicates that the model is removed. These modified
The Elusive Foe casualty results represent both wounded fighters and those
Khmer Rouge units that are stationary and in cover may carrying dead and wounded away from the battle.
not be spotted by enemy forces unless they are within a Khmer Rouge forces never count as having
spotting unit’s Optimum Range. Khmer Rouge units that dependents, however units who take casualties in a turn
are moving, in the open or firing within line of sight are may only use Reaction Fire (unless they used Defensive
spotted immediately. Fire prior to receiving casualties).

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 VEHICLES LIST
NEW VEHICLE ATTRIBUTES Players may elect to use such weapon fittings if they wish.
Tin Can – +1 to all rolls on the damage table by weapons For ease of play balance, we suggest that they replace the
with two or more firepower dice main weapon, though Recoilless Rifles would often be seen
Exposed Gunner – The gunner only receives +1 defense in addition to the .50 cal. If you wish to use both we suggest
die when firing. only allowing players to fire one per turn.
Restricted Fire MGs – MGs may fire either to the front,
rear or relevant side of the vehicle. Thus an ACAV engaging FREE WORLD VEHICLES
a target to its front will get 7D firepower for all its weapons. M113 Variants
While if it engages a target to one side, it will only get 5D A number of M113 variants were used during the Vietnam
firepower. This represents the limited fire arcs of the MGs War. In most cases these were simply fitted with different
mounted on the hull sides. weapon options, and the most widely used are repeated
Protected Gunner – All gunners receive +3 defense dice here. Note that the armor values stay the same, only the
when fired upon due to the added armor shields around weapon options differ.
their positions.
Tertiary Weapon – This weapon maybe fired instead of
other weapons secondary weapons. It is fired separate to
Design Note
the main gun and may fire once per turn. The weapon does During the war, many other weapons were
not suffer from the “Restricted Fire” attribute. fitted to M113s. These included the 75mm
Improvised Armor – M113s may be allowed to apply Recoilless Rifle, Grenade Launchers and
improvised armor, often sandbags and screens to help Miniguns, often scavenged from downed
reduce hits from RPGs. If this is employed, the Tin Can helicopters. To offer added protection some
attribute is negated for all hits from light and medium crews even carried add-on armor to help
class weapons. against mines and RPG attacks. Attributes such
Up-Gunned – Some ACAV crews went to extreme as Improvised Armor and Up-Gunned are used
to represent these rarer models.
measures to fit weapons scavenged from various sources.
Recoilless Rifles and Miniguns were all fitted to ACAVs.

FREE WORLD SOFT-SKIN VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Users Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Armor Crew Attributes/Notes
Gun Jeep / Gun S W US Army 1 x M60 1D8 1D6 1D6 1D6 3 Exposed Gunner
Beep (AP:2/AT:0)
Armoured 1D8 1D8 1D8 1D8 Tin Can (Armored
Version version only)

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AMBUSH VALLEY

FREE WORLD LIGHT VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Users Firepower MGs Crew Notes/Attributes
Armor Armor Armor Armor
M26 Chaffee L T ARVN/Cambodia/ 75mm M6 3D 3D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 4
Light Tank Laos (AP:3/AT:3(M)
M2HB (Hvy.
AP:4/AT:1(L)
M1919A4E1 (Med.
AP:2/AT:0)
M41 Walker L T ARVN 76mm M32 3D 4D8 3D8 2D8 1D8 4
Bulldog Light (AP:3/AT:3(M)
Tank M2HB (Hvy.
AP:4/AT:1(L)
M1919A4E1 (Med.
AP:2/AT:0)
AMX-13 L T Cambodia 75mm Cannon 3D 3D8 2D8 2D8 2D8 3
(AP:4/AT:3(M) AA-52
MG (Med. AP:3/AT:0)
M50A1 Ontos L T USMC 6 x 106mm Recoilless 2D8 1D8 1D8 1D8 3 May fire twice per turn
Rifles (AP:4/AT:3(M) untill all six barrels are
M19A4 Commander’s used. It must them
MG (Med. AP:3/AT:0) retire from the table and
pass a TQ test to return.
Fire or Move
M56 Scorpion L T US Army 90mm M56 (Med. 2D8 4 Fixed gun and shield
AP:4 AT:3(H) solid cover to front only
M113 / M106 / L T US Army/USAF/ 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 2 Tin Can
M125 / M577 ARVN/PHILCAG-V/
ROK/Cambodia
M113 ACAV L T US Army/ARVN/ M2HB (Hvy. 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3
ROK/Cambodia AP:4/AT:1(L)
2 x M60 (Med.
AP:3/AT:0)
M113 w/ Turret L T ARVN/Australia Twin .30 MG (Med. 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 2 Tin Can,
AP:4/AT:0) Restricted Fire
M113 FSV L T Australia Turret Mounted 3D 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3 Tin Can
76mm L5 Cannon
(AP:4/AT:3(M)
Commander’s L3A1
MG (Med. AP:3/AT:0)
M132 "Zippo" L T US Army/ARVN Flamethrower 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3 Tin Can,
(AP:10/AT:10(M) Intimidating Weapon
M114 L T ARVN M2HB (Hvy. 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3 Tin Can,
AP:4/AT:1(L) Exposed Gunner
M551 Sheridan L T US Army 152mm M81E1 3D 3D8 2D8 2D8 2D8 4
AR/AAV (AP:5/AT:4(H)
M73 (Med.
AP:2/AT:0)
M2HB (Hvy.
AP:4/AT:1(L)
LVTP5A1 L T USMC M1919E1 MG (Med. 3D8 2D8 2D8 2D8
AP:3/AT:0)
M3 / M5 L W ARVN/Cambodia/ M2HB (Hvy. 1D8 1D8 1D8 1D6 3 50 Cal M2 on ring
Halftrack Laos AP:4/AT:1(L) mount Tin Can
2 x M1919A4E1 Restricted Fire
(Med. AP:2/AT:0)

M8 Greyhound L W ARVN/Cambodia/ 37mm 1D8 1D8 1D8 1D8 3 Exposed Gunner

/ M20 Scout Laos cannon/M1919A4
(AP:4/AT:1(L)
M2HB (Hvy.
AP:4/AT:1(L)
V-100 / M706 L W US Army/USAF/ Twin .30 or 7.62mm 3D 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3
Commando ARVN/Laos MG (Med. AP:4/AT:0)

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 Vehicles List

M42 Duster L T US Army Twin 40mm M2A1 2D8 1D8 1D8 1D8 4
SPAAG (Hvy. AP:6/AT:3(M)
M60 (Med.
AP:3/AT:0)
M163 VADS L T US Army 20mm M168 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 4 Tin Can
(AP:6/AT:2(M)
Gun Truck L W US Army Quad M2HB (Hvy. 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D6 2+ Tin Can,
AP:8/AT:3(L) Restricted Fire
Twin M60
(AP:4/AT:0)

FREE WORLD MEDIUM VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Users Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Armor Crew Notes/Attributes
M728 CEV M T US Army 165mm M35 demo 3D 4D8 3D8 2D8 1D8 4 Intimidating Weapon,
(AP:6/AT:4(H) Advanced Sensors (IR)
LVTH6A1 M T USMC 105mm M49 (AP:4/ 3D8 2D8 2D8 1D8 4
AT:3(H)

FREE WORLD HEAVY VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Users Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Armor Crew Notes/Attributes
M48A2/A3 H T US Army/USMC/ 90mm M41 (Hvy. 3D 4D10 3D10 2D10 1D10 4 90mm APERS round
Patton MBT ARVN AP:4/AT:3(M) 6D vs troops in
M2HB (Hvy. open/light cover (TQ
AP:4/AT:1(L) Test for availability),
M73 (Med. Safe Haven,
AP:2/AT:0) When M2HB is
mounted internally -1
TQ penalty to fire
M67A2 "Zippo" H T USMC M7-6 Mech. 4D10 3D10 2D10 1D10 4 When M2HB is
Flamethrower mounted internally -1
(AP:10/AT:10(M) TQ penalty to fire,
M2HB (Hvy. Heavy Hitter,
AP:4/AT:1(L) Safe Haven
Centurion Mk H T Australia 20 Pounder QF 3D 5D10 3D10 2D10 1D10 4 Heavy Hitter
5/1 MBT (AP:5/AT:5(H)
L3A1 (Med.
AP:2/AT:0)

PAVN VEHICLES
PAVN SOFT-SKIN VEHICLES
Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Armor Crew Notes/Attributes

GAZ-46 L W Some with LMG (Lt. 1D6 1D6 1D6 1D6 1+ Amphibious
AP:2/AT:0)
ZiS-485 L W Some with LMG (Lt. 1D6 1D6 1D6 1D6 1+ Amphibious
AP:2/AT:0)

PAVN LIGHT VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Armor Crew Notes/Attributes

PT-76 Light L T 76mm D56T 3D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3 Tin Can
Tank (AP:3/AT:3(M)
SGMT (Med.
AP:2/AT:0(L)
Type 63 Light L T 85mm Type 62-85 3D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 3 Tin Can
Tank (AP:4/AT:3(H)
Type 59-T (Med.
AP:2/AT:0)

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AMBUSH VALLEY

PAVN MEDIUM VEHICLES

Front Side Rear Deck
Name Class Type Firepower MGs Armor Armor Armor Crew Notes/Attributes
Armor
T-34/85 M T 85mm ZiS-S-53 3D 4D8 2D8 2D8 1D8 4 Tin Can
Medium Tank (AP:4/AT:3(H)
DT (Med.
AP:2/AT:0(L)
T-54/T-55 MBT M T 100mm D10T 3D 4D10 3D8 2D8 1D8 4 Deathtrap
(AP:4/AT:3(H) SGMT
(Med. AP:2/AT:0)

ZSU-57-2 M T Twin 57mm (AP:5/ 2D8 2D8 1D8 1D8 6

AT:3(L)

VC under fire, 1967

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 SCENARIOS
SCENARIO 1: FIRST WITH attackers made it over the fence. However on the east side
HONOR of the camp CSF Company 122 was completely overrun.
The Defense of Camp Nam Dong, 6 July 1964 The defense now centered on the mortar pits, which were
Detachment A-726, part of 7th SFGA, took up residence in
continuously firing two HE, then two WP followed by one
Camp Nam Dong at the end of May 1964. The 12 USSF illumination round. Individual VC were making their way
team and an attached Australian SAS advisor would be through the camp from all directions and being shot down
tasked with defending the camp with 60 Nungs and threeright at the edge of the mortar pits.
Striker Companies. With the camp built on unsuitable This close quarter fight raged until 06.00 hours when
terrain, and the local district chief suspected on being in
a flare ship finally arrived allowing the mortars to
league with the VC, things were to be difficult from the start.
concentrate of firing HE only. With this the VC began
Added to this were open fights between the Vietnamese and
to withdraw and re-supply packages were dropped to the
the Nungs in the camp, which on the eve of the VC attack
defenders. At 08.00 hours a Civil Guard company arrived
degenerated into an actual firefight , though the USSFat the camp, having been ambushed twice on its way and at
personnel stopped this before any casualties were caused.
10.00 hours the USSF and CIDG B-Team arrived, flown in
With only the USSF and the Nungs on alert at the time
on USMC helicopters.
of the attack, the Strikers having turned in for the night, VC
Two USSF and the Australian advisor were killed in the
infiltrators are suspected to have slit the throats of a
attack and a further seven of the Americans were wounded.
six-man outpost just outside the camp as the attack began.
The Strikers lost heavily with 120 killed or wounded and
At 02.26 hours, the first enemy mortar rounds hit the camp,
many more having fled or joined the VC. The bodies of 62
setting a number of buildings ablaze. Rounds began to land
VC were found in the camp, but it is believed as many as
almost continuously and were soon joined by grenades three times that were killed with an even larger number
being thrown in from outside the wire.
One of the first buildings destroyed was the
Communications Room and with that gone, Nam Dong had
no means of communicating with the outside world.
Captain Roger Donlon, commanding A-726, decided to
fight it out with the VC and hold the camp as it seemed the
only way in which they could survive. Very soon the fighting
raged around the camp, with the Americans and the Nungs
manning the mortar pits and positions along the inner
perimeter. Mortar rounds and 57mm Recoilless Rifle rounds
were landing in the perimeter almost incessantly and soon
VC sappers were encountered inside the inner perimeter.
Small VC infiltration attacks came from all directions
but the main attack struck from the southeast. Over 100 VC
attacked in waves but their attack was halted by three
Americans and a handful of Nung soldiers. Not one of the CIDG Striker, 1964

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AMBUSH VALLEY

wounded. A crater analysis team counted over 1000 mortar

craters on the camp after the battle. Captain Roger Donlon
was awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions at the camp
and became the first US serviceman to receive the award
for his service in Vietnam.

Scenario Information
Duration of Game: 8 Turns
Initiative: US/CIDG has initiative for the duration of
the game
Special Conditions:
 Asymmetric Engagement.
 Although the battle was fought at night, constant
illumination by the mortars negates these effects for
this scenario.
 Shrubs and tall grass do not block LOS but units
can hide in it. Also counts as terrain for purposes of
being Exposed.
 Various crates and boxes should be scattered around
to act as improvised cover. All should be placed with
in the wire and generally south of the mortar pits to
allow open ground between the wire and the pits.
Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests
Table Size: 2’ x 2’
 M1: 60mm Mortar position +2 Cover dice for troops
inside, Building Strength 4D8
 M2: 81mm Mortar position +2 Cover dice for troops
inside, Building Strength 4D8 US/CIDG Victory Points
 M3: 81mm Mortar position +2 Cover dice for troops  Each mortar pit held at end of game: 10pts
inside, Building Strength 4D8
 TH: USSF Team House (on fire, may not be entered) US/CIDG Force
 CB: Stacked Concrete Blocks +2 Cover dice for troops US/CIDG Basic Attributes
using them as cover, Building Strength 3D6 Initiative Level: N/A
 H: Huts not on fire, may be entered and provide +1 Confidence Level: High
Cover dice for troops inside, Building Strength 4D6 Supply Level: Normal
Body Armor: N/A
US/CIDG Mission Troop Quality/Morale: Varies see below
You must hold the mortar pits at all costs for the camp
to survive. US/CIDG forces may set up anywhere within the inner
perimeter (within the wire).

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 Scenarios

Captain Roger Donlon w/M16 (TQ/Morale: D12/D12)

3 x USSF Personnel w/M16s (TQ/Morale: D10/D10)
3 x USSF Personnel w/M16s (TQ/Morale: D10/D10)
3 x USSF Personnel w/M16s (TQ/Morale: D10/D10)

4 x Nung Fighters w/M1 Carbines (TQ/Morale: D8/D10)

4 x Nung Fighters w/M1 Carbines (TQ/Morale: D8/D10)
4 x Nung Fighters w/M1 Carbines (TQ/Morale: D8/D10)
4 x Nung Fighters w/M1 Carbines (TQ/Morale: D8/D10)

1 x Weapons Team with one USSF Sgt w/M16

(TQ/Morale: D10/D10), Nung Gunner w/M1919A1 LMG
and Assistant Gunner w/M1 Carbine (TQ/Morale: VC Assault! (Piers Brand)
D8/D10). (As long as the USSF Sgt is unwounded all dice
type used by this weapons team may be D10s as he directs defences, many of which are still occupied. To represent
the fire of the machine gun.) this ad-hoc and unorganised attack, at the start of the
game the VC player will roll 6 times on the following
Players may wish to represent the crews and mortars if they table to see the units with which he will start the game.
wish but they play no part in this scenario, as they are too These units then roll for hotspot entry points to see
busy maintaining the barrage of fire to be involved with the where they start.
close defence of the positions. It is up to the above forces to
hold off the attack inside the inner perimeter.
REINFORCEMENT TABLE
Roll 1D10
1 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/Carbines
VC Mission 2 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/Carbines
Your only objective is to capture the enemy mortar pits and 3 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/Carbines
finally silence the camp defenses. 4 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/SMGs
5 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/SMGs
VC Victory Points 6 1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 4 x Sappers w/SMGs
1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 2 x Sappers w/satchel
 Each Mortar pit captured: 10pts 7
charges and pistols
1 x VC Leader w/SMG and 2 x Sappers w/a Bazooka
8
VC Force and pistols
VC Basic Attributes 9 1 x VC Leader w/Pistol and 6 x Sappers w/Carbines
1 x VC Leader w/pistol and two-man Sapper Team w/a
Initiative Level: N/A (Irregulars) 10
M1919 LMG (counts as Weapons Team)
Confidence Level: Confident
Supply Level: Normal Each turn the VC player will automatically receive 1D6
Body Armor: N/A reinforcement rolls from the table. These are again assigned
Troop Quality/Morale: D6/D10 positions via the hotspot.
If a 6 is rolled for a hotspot, the VC Player can choose
The VC player’s forces all arrive in bits and pieces as they which hotspot the unit arrives at. Additionally, each roll
make their way through the outer perimeter of the camps of 6 indicates that a single mortar round impacts a

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AMBUSH VALLEY

randomly determined US/CIDG unit with a firepower perimeter’s Echo Sector. While the Sappers and soldiers of
attack of AP:4/AT:0. This may even occur during initial the Viet Cong 269th Main force Battalion eventually
unit placement at the beginning of the game! affected a breech and captured Bunker 051, the vigorous
defense provided by the bunker’s occupants and timely
Special Rules radio reports from watchtower Tango 4 held up the
Outgunned assaulting troops for a precious 32 minutes, thus giving the
Fire groups armed with M16s may add one extra firepower 377nd Combat Security Police Squadron time needed to
die to represent their higher rate of fire over groups armed form a defensive line and seal off the penetration.
with M1 carbines. Holding 051 came at a high cost: Four of the five
occupants of the bunker gave their all.
Captain Roger Donlon
Any US/CIDG unit within 6” of Captain Donlon are treated
as if they have a Morale of D12. Donlon may attach himself This scenario is dedicated to the initial six
to any unit for firing purposes as long as he is within 2” of defenders of Gate 051. They are:
one of its team members. Bunker 051
Sgt. Louis H Fischer, KIA
Crossing the Wire Sgt. William J Cyr, KIA
To cross the wire at any point other than the open sections, Sgt. Charles E Hebron, KIA
VC troops must end their move in contact with it. On the Sgt. Roger B Mills, KIA
following turn a successful TQ check allows them to move TSgt. Billy M Palmer, WIA
over the wire at Tactical movement rate. If the VC group Tower Tango 4
fails, they are deemed to be hung up in the wire and may A1C Alan D. Tucker
not move. Hung units can only use Reaction Fire for the
turn. They may try again the following turn.
Scenario Information
SCENARIO 2: ENEMY AT Duration of game: 8 Turns
THE GATE Initiative: The Viet Cong have Initiative for the duration of
Ton Son Nhut, 31 January 1968 – “Tet” the game
Located on the northwest side of Saigon and with a Special conditions:
perimeter stretching over 20 Kilometers Ton Son Nhut  Sappers arrive in a civilian taxi driving south down
Airbase was a major command and logistics Node. Prime Highway 1 at the beginning of Turn 1. The taxi
Minister Ky and his Family as well as such noted figures as cannot be fired on until it has stopped to unload
Gen. Westmorland called TSN home. A building called its passengers.
“The Pentagon East,” a massive structure containing air  Turns 1–6 are night, turn 7 is dawn and turn 8 is full
conditioned offices for 4000 people was located at Ton light.
Son Nhut, as was MACV Headquarters.  After turn 2 power is lost to flight line security
At 0321 hours on the 31st of January, 1968, automatic lighting and Night Fighting rule is in effect, neither
weapons fire erupted all around the perimeter of the side has NOD.
massive base. It seemed heaviest on the Eastern side. Twelve Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests
minutes later, at 0332 hours, the true blow struck Western Table Size: 4’ x 4’

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 Scenarios

US Force
US Basic Attributes
Initiative Level: N/A
Confidence Level: High
Supply Level: Normal
Body Armor: Flak Jackets
Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8

Located in Bunker 051

1 x Leader w/M16 and Slap Flare
2 x Riflemen w/M16 and Slap Flares

Bunker 051 Rooftop MG Position (Weapon Team)

1 x Gunner w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT0)
1 x Assistant Gunner w/M1911A1 pistol

In Tango 4 Tower
1 x Rifleman w/M16

VC Mission
Blow a gap through the concertina wire and perimeter
fence! Capture or destroy Bunker 051! Control East West
High Speed Runway by having an unsuppressed Cell in
physical contact with the runway!

VC Victory Points:
 Breach the Concertina Wire: 2pts.
 Breach the Perimeter Fence: 3pts.
US Mission  Capture or Destroy Bunker 051 by turn 4: 10pts.
Hold bunker 051 and Tango 4 Keep the East and West high-  Capture or Destroy Bunker after turn 4: 5pts.
speed Runways clear of VC.
VC Force
US Victory Points: VC Basic Attributes
 If both wire and fence are not breached: Victory! Initiative Level: N/A
 Hold 051 Bunker till turn 4: 5pts Confidence Level: Confident
 Hold 051 bunker beyond turn 4: 10pts. Supply Level: Poor
 Keep VC from reaching Runway by turn 4: 5pts. Body Armor: N/A
 Keep VC from reaching Runway by Turn 5 and Troop Quality/Morale: Sapper Cell: D8/D10; VC Main
beyond: 10pts Force Cells: D6/D8

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Sapper Cell Breaching the Wire and

1 x Leader w/AK47 and 1 x satchel charge Perimeter Fence
1 x Sapper w/AK 47 and 1 x satchel charge To blow a breach in the base’s concertina wire defenses or
2 x Sappers w/AK47 and Bangalore Torpedo perimeter fence, a Sapper unit must begin and end its turn
1 x Civilian Taxi (Soft Skin, unarmed) in contact with the wire and may take no other action.
If the unit Reacts to an enemy unit by firing or moving,
2 x Main Force Command Cells, each with: the breaching attempt fails. Further attempts to breach the
1 x Leader w/AK47 obstacles may be undertaken on following turns.
2 x Runners w/AK47
SCENARIO 3: SHUTTING THE
6 x Main force Rifle Cells, each with: BARN DOOR
3 x Riflemen w/AK47 Ton Son Nhut, 31 January 1968 – “Tet”
The valiant efforts of Bunker 051 disrupted the Viet Cong’s
3 x Main Force Support Cells (Weapon Team Bonus), time table by 32 minutes, long enough for the TSN base
each with: defenders to form a weak, U-shaped perimeter with the
1 x Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) open end facing the beleaguered 051 gate of E sector.
2 x Riflemen w/AK47 Elements of a South Vietnamese Airborne Battalion and
some M24 Chaffee light tanks from Air Vice Marshal Ky’s
1 x Main Force Support Cell (Weapon Team Bonus) personal defense force manned the north side of the
1 x Gunner w/RPD (Med. AP:2/AT:0) perimeter. Echo sector’s quick reaction Team and 2 M151
2 x Riflemen w/AK47 mutts mounting M60 Machine guns held the base of
the U. The Southern arm of the U was held by US Army
Special Rules Task Force 35, comprised of cooks, clerks and other rear
Building Construction area personnel.
Bunker 051 has a building strength of 6D10. It is a The unexpectedly ferocious fighting at the gate played
Reinforced Fortification with a +4D Cover bonus havoc with the Viet Cong’s rigid command and left it
The MG position on Bunker 051’s roof has a building hopelessly disrupted and on the verge of collapse. The
strength of 3D8. It is Fortified Cover with a +3D Cover bonus. savaged VC breaching battalion shifted north and south to
Tower Tango 4 has a building strength of 3D8. It is open the way for a fresh exploitation battalion. This move
Fortified Cover and offers a +3D Cover bonus. left two of the breaching battalion’s companies in positions
in and around the cemetery in the northwest corner of
Grass and Brush Echo sector and another hunkered down in and around the
The perimeter fence is over grown with vegetation it battered and bloody 051 bunker.
provides concealment but not cover. In the safety of an abandoned village across Highway
The High grass inside the base perimeter provides One, the VC exploitation prepared for a victorious thrust
concealment but not cover. into the center of Ton Son Nhut. Before they could move
Free world Body armor provides Bonus Die against out, however, an American armored cavalry troop pulled
explosive weapons only. up the Highway, cutting off their axis of advance and the
Slap flare use and effect as per pages 11–12. breaching battalion’s line of retreat.

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 Scenarios

Commanded by Capt. Virant, C Troop, 3rd Sqd, 4th

cavalry had placed itself in such a critical location that the
enemy had no choice but to throw everything it had into
dislodging or destroying it. Within minutes its lead Platoon
ceased to exist. B troop of the same squadron was directed
off the Highway between the enemy occupied village and
the Vintexaco Factory complex and assaulted the rear of the
vill, meanwhile the Air Cav troop was positioned to cut off
any enemy retreat. The 3rd Platoon of C troop crashed
through the TSN perimeter fence and pulled up behind the
TSN defenders to launch a counter attack.

Scenario Information
Duration of Game: 8 Turns
Initiative: The US CAV Force has Initiative for the duration
of the game
Special conditions:
 Asymmetric Engagement.
Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests
Table Size: 4’ x 4’

US/ARVN Mission
Eliminate all enemy inside Echo sector perimeter by turn 6
or recapture the 051 bunker by turn 4.

US/ARVN Victory points

 Recapture 051 Bunker by turn 4: 10pts
 Secure Cemetery by turn 7: 10pts Echo QRT
 Every VC KIA: 1pt
 Every VC captured: 2pts HQ Squad
1 x Squad Leader w/M16
US/ARVN Force 1 x RTO w/M16
US/ARVN Basic Attributes
Initiative Level: N/A Fireteam 1
Confidence Level: High 1 x Team Leader w/M16
Supply Level: Abundant 3 x Riflemen w/M16
Body Armor: Standard (1D) – effective against explosive
attacks only Fireteam 2
Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8 1 x Team Leader w/M16
3 x Riflemen w/M16

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AMBUSH VALLEY

MG Team (Weapons Team Bonus) 1 x M151 Mutt with Pedestal mounted M60 MG
1 x Gunner with w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0) (Echo sector NCOIC)
1 x Assistant Gunner w/M16 Crew served MG (Med. AP:3/AT:0)
See Vehicles for stats.
1 x M48A3 (Elements of 1st Platoon, C Troop, 3-4th
Cavalry) Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8. VC Mission
See Vehicles for stats. Hold the positions you now occupy at all costs!

ARVN Airborne VC Victory Points

 Each American KIA /WIA: 1pt
HQ Squad  Hold Bunker 051 by end of turn 4: 10pts
1 x Squad Leader w/M2 Carbine  Hold Cemetery by end of turn 7: 10pts
1 x RTO w/M2 Carbine
1 x Runner w/M2 Carbine VC Force
1 x Grenadier w/M79 GL (Lt. AP1/AT0) VC Basic Attributes
Initiative Level: N/A
ARVN Airborne Squad Confidence Level: High
1 x Squad Leader w/M16 Supply Level: Poor
1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Body Armor: N/A
1 x Gunner with w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0) – Troop Quality/Morale: D6/D8
Not a Weapon Team
4 x Riflemen w/M16 Remnants 2nd Company VC Regiment 271
(Deployed in Cemetery)
1 x M24 Light Tank (Elements of Air Marshall Ky’s
personal defense force) Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8 HQ Squad
See Vehicles for stats. 1 x Leader w/AK47
1 x Runner w/AK47
Task Force 35
6 x Rifle Cells, each with:
HQ Squad 3 x Riflemen w/AK47
1 x Squad Leader w/M14
1 x RTO w/M14 RPK Support Cell
1 x Gunner w/RPK (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
Fireteam 1 2 x Rifleman w/AK47
1 x Team Leader w/M14
3 x Riflemen w/M14 RPG Support Cell
1 x Grenadier w/RPG7/B40 AK47 (Med.
Fireteam 2 AP:2/AT:1(M)
1 x Team Leader w/M14 1 x Loader w/AK47
3 x Riflemen w/M14

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 Scenarios

PKM Weapons Cell (TQ D8 & Weapons Special Rules

Team Bonus) The Battlefield
1 x Gunner w/PKM (Med. AP:2/AT:0) VC units (other than those in the cemetery) receive a +1
1 x Ammo Bearer w/AK47 cover die to represent the scrapes they dug out and the
cover found behind both the raised non paved perimeter
Recoilless Rifle Weapon Cell road high speed runway aprons.
57mm RR (Hvy. AP:3/AT:2(M) VC in the 051 bunker and cemetery receive a +2 Solid
1 x Gunner Cover Dice to represent the cover provided by the partially
1 x Loader w/AK47 destroyed 051 bunker and burial mounds and tombstones
1 x Ammo bearer/Security w/AK47 found in the cemetery

Remnants of 1st Company VC 271 Regiment Vehicle Substitutions

(Deployed in Bunker 051) If a model of an M24 Lt tank if not available in your scale,
you may either proxy it or substitute ACAV instead.
1 x Leader w/AK47
VC Ammo Shortage
3 x Rifle Cells Any time an RPG/B40 or Recoilless Rifle is fired after Turn
3 x Riflemen w/AK47 4, roll a D6. A 1 indicates that the weapon is out of ammo
and may not fire for the remainder of the game.
Support Cell 1 (No Weapons
Team Bonus) 57mm Recoilless Rifle
1 x Gunner w/M60 GPMG The 57mm RR team may move or fire as part of a Reaction
(Med. AP:2/AT:0) Test or Activation. The team cannot make Rapid Moves.
1 x Assistant Gunner
w/AK47 SCENARIO 4: DONG NAI RIVER,
2ND JUNE 1969
Support Cell 2 (No Long Khanh Province, 1 June 1969
Weapons Team Bonus) On 1 June 1969, Alpha and Bravo Companies of 1st
1 x Grenadier Battalion, 8th Cavalry were conducting a search for an
w/RPG7/B40 (Med. enemy supply centre in the Long Khanh province. This
AP:2/AT:1(M) and AK47 was the first time US troops had been in the area since
1 x Loader w/AK47 1965. That afternoon they cleared a large bunker complex
and found many fighting positions and a substantial
weapons cache. In the evening, they moved out in search
of a nearby crossing point on the shores of the Dong Nai
River, where they would strongpoint and cross after
destroying the bunkers.
Under the cover of night, NVA forces re-occupied the
Main Force VC, bunker complex with a company of troops and prepared
1968 to engage the US forces at dawn on 2 June. Their presence

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AMBUSH VALLEY

was revealed when Bravo Company scouts found more

bunkers and moved in to search them before crossing
the river. As Alpha Company advanced on the bunker
complex they came under heavy fire and took a number
of casualties. As the GIs took up a defensive position and
called for supporting fire, the NVA managed to shoot
down a “Loach”.
Bravo Company moved in to support Alpha Company.
Several of their platoons came into heavy contact with
enemy bunkers as they pushed forward to recover friendly
casualties. As the US units came under intensive fire from
RPGs, HMGs and sniper fire, their attack slowed and they
fell into defensive positions, digging in while artillery and
gunships pounded the enemy bunkers. As night fell the US
troops could hear the sounds of spades and picks from the
NVA lines and presumed that the enemy was digging in for
a last stand the next morning. During the evening, errant
rounds from a Spooky gunship tragically fell into the US
positions, causing further casualties.
On 3 June, US troops began the day with a “mad
minute.” Every soldier fired his weapon towards the enemy.
There was no return fire from the enemy positions. After a Scenario Information
cautious advance towards the bunker complex, it was found Duration of Game: 10 Turns
unoccupied. The NVA force had melted away during the Initiative: US for the entire game as the NVA remained
night, leaving one body floating in the Dong Nai River. static in their bunkers.
Later investigation at the site found that the sound of the Special Conditions: None
NVA troops digging had actually been from burial parties, Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests
not efforts to strengthen their position. Special Assets: NVA receive 1D3+1 Booby Trap Cards
The US lost 10 killed and over 20 wounded in this small Table Size: 4’ x 4’
action, typical of the frustrating firefights of Vietnam.  US Forces start south of the blue US Start line.
During the battle the US troops also had to contend with  NVA bunkers may be placed anywhere north of the
watching the “Freedom Bird” flights leaving Bien Hoi, red line.
taking home cargos of US troops whose time in Vietnam
had ended, while those on the ground struggled to survive. 2nd Platoon Mission
This scenario recreates efforts by Bravo Company’s 2nd You must try to recover any US bodies in the area to your
Platoon as it tried to recover several fallen soldiers of Alpha immediate front. Expect heavy resistance from enemy
Company. bunkers.

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 Scenarios

2nd Platoon Victory Points 3rd Squad

 Each recovered US body: 10pts. Fireteam Alpha
 Each bunker “Knocked-out’: 5pts. 1 x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
2nd Platoon Force 1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2nd Platoon Basic Attributes 1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
Initiative Level: N/A 2 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
Confidence Level: High
Supply Level: Normal Fireteam Bravo
Body Armor: Standard (1D) – effective against explosive 1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
attacks only. 1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
Troop Quality/Morale: D10/D10 1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
1 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle
1st Squad
Fireteam Alpha NVA Mission
1 x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle Your only objective is to cause as many casualties on the US
1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle forces as possible.
1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle NVA Victory Points
2 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle  Each KIA: 8 pts.
 Each Seriously Wounded: 4 pt.
Fireteam Bravo  Each Lightly Wounded: 2 pt.
1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) NVA Force
1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0) NVA Basic Attributes
1 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle Initiative Level: N/A
Confidence Level: Confident
2nd Squad Supply Level: Normal
Fireteam Alpha Body Armor: N/A
1 x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8
1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle
1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Bunker 1 (Fortified +3 Defense)
1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle HMG Weapons Team
2 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle 4 x NVA and DShK MG (Hvy. AP:3/AT:1(L)

Fireteam Bravo Bunker 2 (Fortified +3 Defense)

1 x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle MMG Weapons Team
1 x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) 4 x NVA and SGM (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
1 x Automatic Rifleman w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
1 x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle

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AMBUSH VALLEY

Bunker 3 (Fortified +3 Defense) Body Recovery

MMG Weapons Team A US unit must make contact with a US body in order to
4 x NVA and SGM (Med. AP:2/AT:0) recover it. Once it has the body the unit counts as having a
Dependent and must fall back towards their starting line.
Bunker 4 (Fortified +3 Defense) Once there they may “drop-off ” the fallen soldier and
Type 36 Recoilless Weapons Team return to the action. US squads may also drop off their own
4 x NVA and RR (Hvy. AP:3/AT:2(M) wounded when in this area as it is deemed that the
company command and medic are in this vicinity.
Bunker 5 (Improved +2 Defense)
NVA Cell 1 Knocking Out Bunkers
6 x NVA w/AK47 As the NVA forces are static and occupy bunkers, a bunker
is deemed to be knocked-out if all its occupants are killed
Bunker 6 (Improved +2 Defense) or seriously wounded.
NVA Cell 2
5 x NVA w/AK47 Leaving Bunkers
1 x NVA w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) NVA cells, not Weapons Teams, may leave their bunkers
during the game if they wish. If the bunker they leave is
Bunker 7 (Improved +2 Defense) unoccupied at the end of the game, US forces score VPs as
NVA Cell 3 if it was “knocked-out”. Each bunker may only hold one
5 x NVA w/AK47 NVA unit at any time.
1 x NVA w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
Spider Holes
Bunker 8 (Improved +2 Defense) Elimination of these does not count towards Victory Points.
NVA Cell 4
5 x NVA w/AK47 SCENARIO 5: BINH MA
1 x NVA w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) MARKETPLACE
Phouc Toy Province, 7 June 1969
Bunker 9 (Improved +2 Defense) The town of Binh Ba was comprised of rectangular brick
NVA Cell 5 and tile homes inhabited by approximately three-thousand
5 x NVA w/AK47 local farmers and rubber plantation workers. It was situated
1 x NVA w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) just north of Nui Dat, occupied by the 1st Australian Task
Force. In attempts to prove they could move freely in the
3 x Spider Holes (+2 Defense) each containing region, the Viet Cong D440 Provincial Mobile Battalion,
1 x NVA Soldier w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0). with a company of NVA from the 33rd NVA Regiment,
occupied Binh Ba with help from the Binh Ba and Ngai
Special Rules Giao Guerilla Squads.
On the morning of 7 June, a reaction force comprised of
Bunkers Delta Coy 5RAR, with armor from B Squadron, 1 Armored
Fortified bunkers have a building strength of 4D10 and APCs from B Squadron from 3 Cavalry under the
Improved bunkers have a building strength of 4D8 command of Major Murray Blake approached the village.

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 Scenarios

After an initial volley of RPGs from the now dug-in

defenders, the Australians reached the edge of the village,
led by Centurion tanks and followed by their infantry
in APCs.
The Australians fought their way into the village
marketplace, losing three of the four Centurions in this
initial attack to close range RPG-7 fire. The infantry fought
in close support of the tanks, clearing out the defenders
while the tanks provided often point blank fire. This game
recreates the initial assault towards the marketplace.
The real battle lasted for several more days as the
Australians fought to dig the enemy out in close urban
fighting. Despite the nature of the fighting, the Australians
sustained only one man killed and 10 wounded while the
enemy lost at least 107 killed. The battle was a major
victory for the Australian forces and was one of only
five battle honors awarded during the Vietnam War to
Australian units.

Scenario Information
Duration of Game: 12 Turns
Initiative: Australian Force has Initiative for the duration Australian Assault Force
of the game Australian Basic Attributes
Special Conditions: None Initiative Level: N/A
Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests Confidence Level: High
Special Assets: Supply Level: Normal
 Australians receive a single attack by a Bushranger Body Armor: Standard (1D) – effective against explosive
Helicopter (count as “Helicopter Gunship” as per attacks only.
main rules page 106). The Australian player may call Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D10
this attack at any time and on any turn they wish.
Once its attack is made, the helicopter leaves the area. 4 x Centurion MK5/1 Tanks
Table Size: 4’ x 6’
4 x M113A1s with Cadillac Gage turrets
Australian Mission
You must push forward and clear out all enemy positions Platoon HQ
on the way to the village marketplace. 1 x Officer w/M16
1 x NCO w/SLR
Australian Victory Points 1 x RTO w/M16
 Each building cleared: 5pts. 1 x Runner w/M16
 Each tank/APC reaching the Marketplace: 5pts. 1 x Medic

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AMBUSH VALLEY

3x Rifle Sections each Supply Level: Normal

Rifle Element 1 Body Armor: N/A
1 x Section Leader w/M16 Troop Quality/Morale: Varies, see below
1 x Scout w/M16
1 x Machine Gunner w/M60 GPMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0) NVA Units (TQ/Morale: D8/D10)
1 x Asst. Machine Gunner w/SLR NVA Squad 1
1 x Rifleman w/SLR 1 x Squad Leader w/SMG
6 x Rifleman w/AK47
Rifle Element 2 1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)
1x Asst. Section Leader w/SLR
1x Scout w/M16 NVA Squad 2
3x Rifleman w/SLR 1 x Squad Leader w/SMG
6 x Rifleman w/AK47
VC/NVA Mission 1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)
Your only objective is to cause as many casualties on the
Australian forces as possible and knock out their tanks. NVA Squad 3
1 x Squad Leader w/SMG
VC/NVA Victory Points 6 x Rifleman w/AK47
 Each KIA: 4 pts. 1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)
 Each Seriously Wounded: 2 pt.
 Each tank/APC immobilized or knocked-out: 5 pt. VC Units (TQ/Morale: D6/D10)
VC Squad 1
VC/NVA Force 1x Leader w/SMG
VC/NVA Basic Attributes 4 x Guerilla w/Rifle
Initiative Level: N/A 1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)
Confidence Level: Normal
VC Squad 2
An NVA mass assault! (Piers Brand) 1 x Gunner w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2 x Guerilla w/Rifle
1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)

VC Squad 3
1x Leader w/SMG
4 x Guerilla w/Rifle
1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)

VC Squad 4
1 x Gunner w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
2 x Guerilla w/Rifle
1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M)

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 Scenarios

VC Squad 5 During its turn a unit may enter the tunnel and reappear the
1x Leader w/SMG following turn from any other “Tunnel Spot” as per normal
4 x Guerilla w/Rifle rules. Units may also shelter in the “tunnels” but at a rate of
1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) one unit per “tunnel-spot” in operation. “Tunnel-Spots” may
be negated as per usual.
VC Squad 6
1 x Gunner w/RPD (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Optional Rules
2 x Guerilla w/Rifle Booby Traps
1 x Guerilla w/B40 (Med. AP:2/AT:1(M) The VC force receives 1D6-1 Booby Trap Cards.

VC 75mm RCL Team (Weapons Team) SCENARIO 6: THE LONGEST

75mm M20 Recoilless (Hvy. AP:3/AT:2(M) and three FIGHT
crewmen An Loc, 1972
The battle for An Loc was the longest fight of the PAVN’s 1972
VC MMG Team (Weapons Team) Nguyen Hue Offensive, also known as the Easter Offensive.
Maxim MMG (Med. AP:2/AT:0) and three crewmen Beginning effectively on 5 April 1972, the PAVN forces laid
siege to An Loc, the capital of the province
Special Rules of Binh Phouc. The siege ended some
House Clearing 66 days later with a resounding victory
In order to clear a house an Australian Infantry element must for the ARVN over the North
move through the structure. Keep a running total of the Vietnamese forces. Timely
houses cleared as play continues. If the house is re-occupied reinforcements, the successful
it can be cleared again, scoring points for a second time. use of aerial resupply, and
the intervention of United
Mouse-Holes States air power helped turn
Australian troops may “mouse-hole” buildings occupied by the tide in the favor of
the enemy. To do so a unit must start the turn in contact with the ARVN.
the wall. On a successful TQ test a hole is blown in the wall The Nguyen Hue Offensive
and the unit may move through at Tactical rate. Treat this as was marked by a much greater
Breaching into a Hostile Building as described on pages 60–61 use of PAVN armor than had
of Force on Force. previously been seen. At An Loc,
the PAVN sought to use their
Ambush heavy armor to force their way
All VC/NVA units may deploy in ambush positions if they into the city on numerous
start the game in cover or in a building. occasions. Although at first
ARVN troops seemed to suffer
Tunnels a little “tank shock” initially,
The VC/NVA player may place 5 “tunnel Spots”. These
Patrol Member,
represent the trenches and tunnels hastily dug to cover 3 Squadron SASR,
movement, they must however be placed inside a building. 1969

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AMBUSH VALLEY

they soon learned to deal with the enemy armor using M72 ARVN Mission
LAW anti-tank rockets, with the local teenagers from the You must defend this sector of An Loc against enemy
Regional Forces setting an example. attack. All units must deploy in buildings or defence points.
The ARVN were further helped by the fact that the PAVN At least two units must deploy in the main command
had little experience with high intensity combined arms bunker at the crossroads.
warfare, and often sent their tanks in with little, if any, infantry
support. The urban environment provided numerous ARVN Victory Points
opportunities for ambush and the ARVN were successful in  Each Tank Destroyed: 5pts.
knocking out numerous PAVN tanks.  Each NVA Soldier KIA: 3pts.
In the face of this stubborn resistance, the North
Vietnamese launched several assaults on the besieged town. ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade
The city was subjected to massive North Vietnamese artillery Force
barrages in an attempt to subdue the defenders. Each attack ARVN Basic Attributes
was beaten back, often with the assistance of US close air Initiative Level: N/A
support. Attempts to cut off An Loc were also unsuccessful, Confidence Level: High
with the defenders holding out until sufficient reinforcements Supply Level: Normal
could be deployed. Heavy losses were inflicted on the PAVN Body Armor: Standard (1D)
units involved. Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D10
This specific scenario represents just part of the defense Note – The ARVN forces had a large number of M72 LAW
against one of the attacks launched on 5 May 1972 by the rockets available at An Loc. To represent this any ARVN
PAVN’s 5th Division. infantry unit or Weapons Team may fire an M72 at an
armored vehicle. However, if a unit rolls a 1 or 2 for its
Scenario Information reaction test during the attack then it has run out of LAWs
Duration of Game: 10 Turns and may not fire one again for the rest of the game. Only
Initiative: Test for Initiative each turn the units deployed in the crossroads bunker are immune to
Special Conditions: this rule as the bunker has a stock of LAW rockets ready
 ARVN Forces must deploy in buildings. for use.
 NVA Forces enter on Turn 1 from east table edge
Fog of War: Generated normally by Reaction Tests Platoon HQ
Table Size: 4’ x 4’ 1x Officer w/M16A1 Rifle
 1: Command Bunker (heavily fortified bunker with 1x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
firing apertures in all directions, may hold up to ten 1x RTO w/M16A1 Rifle
figures) +3 defense dice
 2, 3, 4, 5: Strong Points (fortified buildings, may hold (On turn 5 the ARVN player receives a Forward Air
up to ten figures) +2 Cover dice Controller (FAC) at the Command Bunker. The Officer
 All other buildings give solid cover. The terrain should counts as the FAC for the turn and he may automatically
consist of various full and ruined structures and plenty call in one air attack on an enemy unit. If the officer is killed
of urban debris to give cover. However the areas in or wounded by turn 5, this may not be utilized. The attack
front of positions 2 & 4 should be left relatively free may only be used once on turn 5.)
from cover.

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 Scenarios

1 x Gunner w/.50 Cal HMG (Hvy. AP:3/AT:1(L)

1 x Asst. Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle
(This unit must setup and remain in one of the defensive
positions)

ARVN Recoilless Rifle Weapon Team

1 x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle
1 x Gunner w/M20 75mm Recoilless Rifle (Hvy. AP:
3/AT:2(M)
1 x Asst Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle
(This unit must setup and remain in one of the defensive
positions)

NVA Mission
Your objective is to capture the main enemy command
bunker at the crossroads and knock-out several key
defended buildings on the way.

NVA Victory Points

 Each defense point captured: 5 pts.
2 x Rifle Squads each with:  Command Bunker captured: 10 pts.
1x Squad Leader w/M16A1 Rifle  Each ARVN Soldier KIA: 3 pt.

Fireteam A NVA 5th Division Force

1x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle NVA Basic Attributes
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0) Initiative Level: N/A
3x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle Confidence Level: Confident
Supply Level: Normal
Fireteam B Body Armor: N/A
1x Fireteam Leader w/M16A1 Rifle Troop Quality/Morale: D8/D8
1x Grenadier w/M79 Grenade Launcher (Lt. AP:1/AT:0)
3x Rifleman w/M16A1 Rifle 3 x T-54

Weapons Squad (Divided into two-man Weapon Teams) 2 x PT-76

2x Gunner w/M60 (Med. AP:2/AT:0)
2x Asst. Gunner w/M16A1 Rifle NVA Squad 1
1 x Squad Leader w/SMG
ARVN HMG Weapon Team 6 x Rifleman w/AK47
1 x NCO w/M16A1 Rifle 1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)

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AMBUSH VALLEY

NVA Squad 2 Special Rules

1 x Squad Leader w/SMG Mouse-Holing
6 x Rifleman w/AK47 NVA troops may “mouse-hole” buildings occupied by the
1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M) enemy. To do so a unit must start the turn in contact with the
wall. On a successful TQ test a hole is blown in the wall and
NVA Squad 3 the unit may move through at Tactical rate. Treat this as
1 x Squad Leader w/SMG Breaching into a Hostile Building as described on pages 60–61
6 x Rifleman w/AK47 of Force on Force.
1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)
Ambush
NVA Squad 4 All ARVN units may deploy in ambush positions if they
1 x Squad Leader w/SMG start the game in cover or in a building.
6 x Rifleman w/AK47
1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M) Capturing Defense Points
If a defense point is not occupied by ARVN troops at the
NVA Squad 5 end of the game, it is deemed captured for the purposes of
1 x Squad Leader w/SMG victory points.
6 x Rifleman w/AK47
1 x Anti-Tank Gunner w/RPG (Med. AP:2/AT:2(M)

SOLO & CO-OP VS. VICTOR CHARLIE

Like Force on Force before it, Ambush Valley supports solo Insurgent player – would you really want a Hot Spot in
and co-op play. We suggest that you use these rules for the middle of an open field? Or would it be better placed
engagements involving clashes with the wily VC, but with in that mangrove?
a little common sense and objectivity, they could also be The better you place the Insurgent Hot Spots, the more
used to solo play operations involving the NVA. challenging and fun your solo or co-op game will be!

HOT SPOTS IN SOLO/CO-OP VC MOTIVATION

GAMES Since there’s no player controlling the VC in a solo or co-op
We could have devised a tremendously complex method game, we’ll have to rely on some basic rules that dictate how
of randomly assigning the locations of Hot Spots at they’ll act under different circumstances.
the beginning of a game. Instead, we’ve opted to trust the All VC units and leaders are governed by a set of basic
common sense of our players. motivations. These motivations determine how they’ll act
Place the five Hot Spots on the table in logical locations when confronted by Regular movement or fire. Keeping
in the manner described in the head-to-head version these motivations in mind will help you govern VC
of the rules. Role-play a little and pretend you’re the actions properly.

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 The basic motivations for all VC units/figures are VC ACTION CHECKS
described below: As each Regular unit is activated, an
VC Leaders: Find a VC unit to join Action Check for all VC in LOS must
Leaderless VC Units: Join with a Leader or other friendly be made. Start with the nearest VC
units unit to the activated and work out
VC Units with a Leader: Join with another friendly unit or from there.
find and attack the enemy. If a VC unit has a Leader, it may
automatically make an Action Check.
VC may only make one Action
Check per turn.
Civilians
Leaderless units must
 If regular Unit is in sight move towards them.
make a successful Quality
 If no regular Unit is in sight, but a VC Unit is, Check to make an
move towards the VC Unit. Activation Check. If they
 If no Unit is in sight, will move toward the fail the Quality Check, they
nearest Regular objective. may not attempt to act again
 If combat has occurred within six inches, move until next turn.
away from it. To make the Action
 If a Civilian mob takes a casualty from Regular Check, consult the appropriate Action
fire, up the Insurgency level by 1. Lower by Check table. Start at the top of the list of
1 for casualties caused by VC. Insurgency possible Actions and work down until you
level may only be raised and/or lowered once find the motivation that seems to apply best
per turn. to the VC’s current situation:

VC Sapper, 1969

VC Leaders w/No Unit

If Regulars Move or Fire in LOS If Moving at the end of turn
 If Regulars move in LOS, Leader will  Move at full speed along safest route towards
interrupt to get out of LOS, preferably nearest friendly, leaderless unit. Join unit if able
towards a friendly unit to come into cohesion range.
 If Regulars fire at Leader, he will interrupt  If no friendly, leaderless unit in LOS, move at
to move out of LOS or into cover, preferably full speed along safest route towards a Hot Spot.
towards a friendly unit.  If within 3” of a Hot Spot and no friendly,
leaderless units in sight, take cover.

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AMBUSH VALLEY

VC w/No Leader
(Must pass Quality Check to act)  If Fired on by Regulars and VC Firepower is
<6, Interrupt to move out of LOS.
If Regulars Move or Fire in LOS  If fired on by Regulars and VC Firepower is >6,
 If activated Regular unit is a vehicle and VC interrupt to fire.
unit has a Support Weapon that would harm
If Activated at the end of turn
that vehicle, React to fire at vehicle.
 If combat occurred within 6” and unit is not in
 If not in cover and Firepower is >6, Interrupt cover, move to take cover but remain out of
to move into cover. LOS of enemy.
 If not in cover and Firepower is <6, Interrupt  If combat occurred within 6” and unit is not in
to move out of LOS and towards nearest LOS of enemy and in cover, remain in place.
friendly unit.
 If a friendly leader is in LOS, move at top
 If within double Optimum Range, roll D6: speed along safest route to come into cohesion
On a 1 or 2, interrupt to move into Optimum with leader.
Range, on a 3+ Interrupt to fire at Regulars.
 If a friendly unit is in LOS, move at top speed
 If within Optimum Range, Interrupt to fire. along safest route to come into cohesion
with unit.

VC w/Leader
If Regulars Move or Fire in LOS  If Fired on and VC Firepower is <6, Interrupt
 If activated Regular unit is a vehicle and VC to move out of LOS.
unit has a Support Weapon that would harm  If fired on by Regulars and VC Firepower is >6,
that vehicle, React to fire at vehicle. interrupt to fire.
 If not in cover and Firepower is >6, Interrupt If Activated at the end of turn
to move into cover.  If combat occurred within 6” and unit is not
 If not in cover and Firepower is <6, Interrupt in cover, move to take cover and gain LOS
to move out of LOS and towards nearest of enemy.
friendly unit.  If combat occurred within 6” and unit is in cover
 If within double Optimum Range and within LOS of the enemy, remain in place.
Firepower less than 6, roll D6: On a 1 or 3,  If no enemy unit in sight and no combat has
interrupt to move into Optimum Range, occurred within 10”, move at Tactical speed
on a 4+ Interrupt to fire at Regulars. towards nearest objective.
 If in Optimum Range, Interrupt to fire  If no enemy in sight but combat has occurred
at Regulars. within 10,” move at Tactical speed towards
 If not in Optimum Range but VC have a nearest enemy unit to gain cover and LOS
Firepower of >6, Interrupt to fire. of enemy.

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 GLOSSARY
ACAV Armored Cavalry Assault Vehicle CCS Command and Control South, part of SOG
ADC Auto Defense de Choc or “Shock” Self-Defense, CIA Central Intelligence Agency
a Laotian irregular defense organization CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
ADO Defense de Ordinaire or Ordinary Self-Defense, CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary
a Laotian irregular defense organization Development Support, also MACV-CORDS
AHC Assault Helicopter Company COSVN Central Office in South Vietnam
ANK Armee Nationale Khmere or Khmer National CPNLAF Cambodian People’s National Liberation
Army Armed Forces
ANL Armee Nationale Laotienne or Laotian CSS Coastal Security Service
National Army CTT Combat Tracker Team
ANZAC Australia and New Zealand DNC Directorate of National Coordination, a Laotian
APT Armed Propaganda Team paramilitary organization
ARK Armee Royales Khmer or Khmer Royal Army DRV Democratic Republic of Vietnam, commonly
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the South referred to as North Vietnam
Vietnamese Army EOD Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ASHB Assault Support Helicopter Battalion FAC Forward Air Controller
ATC Armored Troop Carrier, a modified landing FAL Forces Armee Laotienne or Laotian Armed
craft Forces
AVRK Aviation Royales Khmere or Royal Khmer FAN Forces Armee Neutraliste or Neutralist Armed
Air Force Forces, non-aligned forces in Laos
BP Bataillon Parachutiste or Parachute Battalion, FANK Forces Armee Nationale Khmer or Khmer
a term used by both the Laotian and National Armed Forces
Cambodian militaries FAR Forces Armee Royales, commonly translated as
BPL Bataillon Parachutiste Laotiennes or Laotian the Royal Laotian Army, see also RLA
Parachute Battalion FARK Forces Armee Royals Khmer or Khmer Royal
Armed Forces
BC Bataillon Commando or Commando Battalion
FLKK Front de Lutte du Kampuchea Krom/Front de
BCL Bataillon Chasseur Laotiennes or Laotian Light
Liberation du Kampuchea Krom or Front for
Infantry Battalion
the Struggle of the Khmer Krom/Front for the
BG Bataillon Gujerrier or Guerilla Battalion Liberation of the Khmer Krom, see also KKK
BI Bataillon Infanterie or Infantry Battalion, FUNK Front Uni National du Kampuchea or National
a term used by both the Laotian and United Front of Kampuchea
Cambodian militaries
FWAF Free World Armed Forces, the military forces
BIL Bataillon Infanterie Laotienne or Laotian allied with South Vietnam
Infantry Battalion GM Groupement Mobile or Mobile Group, a
BLL Bataillon Leger Laotiennes or Laotian Light regiment sized unit of French origin
Infantry Battalion GMS Groupement Mobile Speciales or Special Mobile
CCB Command and Control Boat, a modified Group, a part of the DNC
landing craft HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company
CCC Command and Control Center, part of SOG ICEX Intelligence Collection and Exploitation, the
CCN Command and Control North, part of SOG predecessor to the Phoenix Program

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AMBUSH VALLEY

KAF Khmer Air Force PHILCAG-V Philippine Civic Action Group-Vietnam

KKK Khmer Kampuchea Krom, see also FLKK PLAF People’s Liberation Armed Forces, the military
KPLAF Khmer People’s Liberation Armed Forces forces of the NLF, commonly referred to as
LAW Light Anti-Tank Weapon, another name for the the VC
M72 rocket PRU Provincial Reconnaissance Unit
LDNN Lien Doi Ngoui Nhai or Lien Doan Ngoui Nhai, PSDF People’s Self-Defense Force
South Vietnamese naval special forces RAK Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea,
LLDB Luc Luong Dac Biet, South Vietnamese army the guerillas led by Pol Pot
special forces RAR Royal Australian Regiment
LPLA Lao People’s Liberation Army, commonly
RF/PF Regional Force/Popular Force, two levels
referred to as the Pathet Lao
of South Vietnamese territorial forces
LRP/LRRP Long Range Patrol/Long Range Reconnaissance
RLA Royal Laotian Army
Patrol
ROKA Republic of Korea Army
MACV Military Assistance Command – Vietnam
ROKMC Republic of Korea Marine Corps
MACV-SOG See SOG
MAAG-C Military Assistance Advisory Group – RTAVF Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force
Cambodia SASR Special Air Service Regiment
MAAG-L Military Assistance Advisory Group – Laos SEAL Sea, Air, Land, a US Navy elite unit
MAAG-V Military Assistance Advisory Group – Vietnam SFG(A) Special Forces Group (Airborne)
MEDTC Military Equipment Delivery Team – Cambodia SGU Special Guerilla Unit
MGF Mobile Guerilla Force SLAM Seeking, Locating, Annihilating, and
MIKE Force Mobile Strike Force Monitoring
MRF Mobile Riverine Force, a joint US Army-Navy SMS Special Mission Service
unit formed to oversee riverine operations SPECOM Special Commando
MNK Marine National Khmer or Khmer National SOG Studies and Observation Group, also known
Navy as the Special Operations Group
MRK Marine Royales Khmer or Khmer Royal Navy SPOS Strong Point Obstacle System
MON Monitor, a heavily armed vessel converted from STD Strategic Technical Directorate, South Vietnam’s
a landing craft
counterpart to SOG
MTOE Modified Table of Order and Equipment
STRATA Short Term Roadwatch and Target Acquisition
NPFF National Police Field Force
TOE Table of Order and Equipment
NLF National Liberation Front, the South
UITG US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group
Vietnamese Communist party
USAF US Air Force
NVA North Vietnamese Army, see also PAVN
NZSAS New Zealand Special Air Service USMC US Marine Corps

PACV Patrol Air Cushion Vehicle USSF US Special Forces

PARU Police Aerial Reinforcement Unit VC Viet Cong, see also PLAF
PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam, commonly referred VCI Viet Cong Infrastructure
to as the NVA VNAF Vietnamese Air Force, the South Vietnamese
PBR Patrol Boat, River air force
PCF Patrol Craft, Fast, also known as a Swift Boat VNMC Vietnamese Marine Corps, the South
PEO Programs Evaluation Office, the US military Vietnamese Marine Corps
assistance office in Laos VNN Vietnamese Navy, the South Vietnamese Navy

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 ARTWORK REFERENCES
p.6: Operation Dewey Canyon, 1969 – by Ramiro Bujeiro, from p.80: Private, 6RAR, 1969 – by Kevin Lyles, from ELI 103: Vietnam
WAR 23: US Marine Rifleman in Vietnam 1965–73 ANZACs
p.12: The defense of Lang Vei, 1968 – by Peter Dennis, from p.95: Marine Sergeant, 1st Recon Battalion, 1965–66 – by Andy
CAM 150: Khe Sanh 1967–68 Carroll, from ELI 2: The US Marine Corps since 1945
p.19: Medevac, 1969 – by Kevin Lyles, from WAR 98: US Army p.99: Patrol Member, 4 Troop NZSAS, 1970 – by Kevin Lyles, from
Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–73 ELI 103: Vietnam ANZACs
p.21: Marine Force Recon, 1967 – by Paul Hannon, from ELI 55: p.106: NCO, Project Delta, 5th SFGA, 1964 – by Ron Volstad, from
Marine Recon 1940–90 ELI 4: US Army Special Forces 1952–84
p.26: Petty Officer 1st Class, US Navy, 1966 – by Mike Chappell, from p.112: NVA Infantryman, 1968 – by Brian Delf, from WAR 135: North
MAA 104: Armies of the Vietnam War 1962–75 Vietnamese Army Soldier 1958–75
p.31: NVA Regular, 1968 – by Mike Chappell, from MAA 143: Armies p.115: NVA Infantryman, 1975 – by Mike Chappell, from MAA 104:
of the Vietnam War (2) Armies of the Vietnam War 1962–75
p.33: US Special Forces, Recce Team Zeta, 1968 – by Mike Chappell, p.119: VC Irregular, 1962 – by Mike Chappell, from MAA 143: Armies
from MAA 143: Armies of the Vietnam War (2) of the Vietnam War (2)
p.34: The fight for Hill 861A, 1968 – by Peter Dennis, from CAM 150: p.122: Local Force VC, 1967 – by Mike Chappell, from MAA 104:
Khe Sanh 1967–68 Armies of the Vietnam War 1962–75
p.38: US Army Infantryman, 1968 – by Kevin Lyles, from WAR 98: US p.125: Pathet Lao Officer, 1975 – by Simon McCouaig, from MAA
Army Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–73 217: The War in Laos 1960–75
p.41: US Infantry taking fire, 1967 – by Kevin Lyles, from WAR 98: US p.132: Thai Forward Air Guide, 1971 – by Simon McCouaig, from
Army Infantryman in Vietnam 1965–73 MAA 217: The War in Laos 1960–75
p.42: Marine Grenadier, 1965–66 – by Andy Carroll, from ELI 2: The p.134: Captain, US Army Special Forces, Project 404, 1972 – by Simon
US Marine Corps since 1945 McCouaig, from MAA 217: The War in Laos 1960–75
p.45: USMC M60 Gunner, 1969 – by Ramiro Bujeiro, from WAR 23: p.138: Khmer Rouge Fighter, 1969 – by Mike Chappell, from MAA
US Marine Rifleman in Vietnam 1965–73 104: Armies of the Vietnam War 1962–75
p.59: Specialist (E4), 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1968 – by Ron Volstad, p.147: Khmer Rouge Commander, 1975 – by Mike Chappell, from
from ELI 31: US Army Airborne 1940–90 MAA 209: The War in Cambodia 1970–75
p.61: Staff Sergeant, US 101st Airborne Division, 1965 – by Mike p.152: VC under fire, 1967 – by Howard Gerrard, from WAR 116: Viet
Chappell, from MAA 143: Armies of the Vietnam War (2) Cong Fighter
p.63: PFC, 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, 1970 – by Ron p.153: CIDG Striker, 1964 – by Ron Volstad, from ELI 4: US Army
Volstad, from ELI 31: US Army Airborne 1940–90 Special Forces 1952–84
p.65: People’s Self-Defense Corps Militiaman, 1968 – by Ramiro p.161: Main Force VC, 1968 – by Howard Gerrard, from WAR 116:
Bujeiro, from MAA 458: Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1955–75 Viet Cong Fighter
p.68: Grenadier, ARVN Rangers, 1968 – by Ramiro Bujeiro, from p.167: Patrol Member, 3 Squadron SASR, 1969 – by Kevin Lyles, from
MAA 458: Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1955–75 ELI 103: Vietnam ANZACs
p.69: ARVN Infantry M60 Gunner, 1969 – by Ramiro Bujeiro, from p.171: VC Sapper, 1969 – by Howard Gerrard, from WAR 116: Viet
MAA 458: Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1955–75 Cong Fighter
p.74: NCO, National Police Field Force, 1970 – by Ramiro Bujeiro,
from MAA 458: Army of the Republic of Vietnam 1955–75
p.79: Grenadier, Victory Company, RNZIR, 1967 – by Kevin Lyles,
from ELI 103: Vietnam ANZACs All art is © Osprey Publishing Ltd.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY
Conboy, Ken. South-East Asian Special Forces. London, UK: Ngo, Lt. Gen. Quang Truong, ARVN. Territorial Forces.
Osprey Publishing, 1991 Washington, DC: US Army Center of Military
Conboy, Ken and Ken Bowra. The NVA and Viet Cong. History, 1981
London, UK: Osprey Publishing, 1991 Pike, Douglas. PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam. Novato, CA:
Dockery, Kevin. Special Warfare Special Weapons. The Presidio Press, 1986
Emperor’s Press, 1997 Rottman, Gordon and Donald Spaulding. Vietnam Armor in
Finlayson, Colonel Andrew R, USMC (Ret.). Marine Action. Hong Kong: Concord Publications, 2002
Advisors with the Vietnamese Provincial Reconnaissance Rottman, Gordon L. Mobile Strike Forces in Vietnam
Units, 1966-1970. Quantico, VA: History Division, 1966-70. Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2007
United States Marine Corps, 2009 —. The US Army in the Vietnam War 1965-73. Oxford, UK:
Fox, Roger P. Air Base Defense in the Republic of Vietnam, Osprey Publishing, 2008
1961-1973. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, Shulimson, Jack, Lieutenant Colonel Leonard A. Blasiol,
United States Air Force, 1979 USMC, Charles R. Smith and Captain David A. Dawson,
Fulton, Maj. Gen. William B. Riverine Operations, USMC. US Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968.
1966-1969. Washington, DC: Government Printing Washington, DC: History and Museums Division,
Office, 1985. Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1997
Grandolini, Albert. Armor of the Vietnam War: (2) Asian Stanton, Shelby. Green Berets at War: US Army Special
Forces. Hong Kong: Concord Publications, 1998 Forces in Southeast Asia 1956-1975. Novato, CA:
Larson, Lt Gen Stanley Robert and Brig Gen James Lawton Presidio Press, 1985.
Collins, Jr. Allied Participation in Vietnam. Washington, Starry, Gen. Donn A. Mounted Combat in Vietnam.
DC: Government Printing Office, 1985. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1989.
Melson, Charles D. Vietnam Marines 1965-1973. Oxford, Tolson, Lt. Gen. John J. Airmobility, 1961-1971. Washington,
UK: Osprey Publishing, 1992 DC: Government Printing Office, 1989.
Mesko, Jim. Airmobile: The Helicopter War in Vietnam. Tran, Brig. Gen. Dinh Tho, ARVN. Pacification. Washington,
Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal Publications, 1984 DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department
—. Armor in Vietnam: A Pictorial History. Carrollton, TX: of the Army, 1977
Squadron/Signal Publications, 1982 United States Government. Headquarters, Department of the
Mesko, Jim and Leroy Thompson. US Infantry – Vietnam/US Army. CMH Publication 90-23, US Army Special Forces,
Elite Forces – Vietnam. Carrollton, TX: Squadron/Signal 1961-1971. Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department
Publications, 1983 of the Army, 1989.

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 AN EXCELLENT POSITION AN EXCELLENT POSITION
One of your units has found an One of your units has found an
excellent position that affords them excellent position that affords them
unexpected protection from enemy fire! unexpected protection from enemy fire! IN A BAD SPOT
A position that seemed to offer decent
You may designate which of your units You may designate which of your units
cover turns out to be a bad spot due
has located this “excellent position.” has located this “excellent position.”
to poor construction or weird
As long as the unit stays in its current As long as the unit stays in its current
lines of sight.
position it receives an additional position it receives an additional
Defense die over and above any Cover Defense die over and above any Cover Your opponent may play this card on
or Armor dice. If the unit moves, it or Armor dice. If the unit moves, it one building or terrain feature that
loses this advantage. Other units loses this advantage. Other units would normally be considered Solid
moving into the same position will not moving into the same position will not Cover. The designated piece of terrain
receive the additional Defense die. receive the additional Defense die. no longer counts as Solid Cover for the
duration of the game.
This card may not be played on a This card may not be played on a
fortified position. fortified position.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.

FOR WHOM THE BELL TOLLS

A rumor spreads that soldiers from
your company have been injured or
IN A BAD SPOT killed in another engagement.
A position that seemed to offer decent Roll 1D6 to determine how the news
cover turns out to be a bad spot due affects your troops:
YOU’RE GROUNDED!
to poor construction or weird 1-3: Your force becomes despondent A ferocious storm blows up, grounding
lines of sight. and demoralized. Lower your force’s all air assets.
Your opponent may play this card on Morale die by one type (i.e., D8 Morale
is reduced to D6). Morale cannot be All units have their Optimum Range
one building or terrain feature that reduced to 6”.
would normally be considered Solid lowered beyond D6.
Cover. The designated piece of terrain 4-6: Your force is fired up and hungry This card is played immediately.
no longer counts as Solid Cover for the for some pay-back! Raise the Morale of
duration of the game. every unit in your force by one die type
(i.e., D8 Morale is raised to D10).
Morale cannot be raised above D12.
This card is played immediately.

BOOM!
A booby trap or mine detonates near a
randomly determined Free World unit!
Randomly determine which unit has
I’M DRY! I’M DRY! been struck by the attack. The unit
A supply snafu has left your units low A supply snafu has left your units low takes an AP:4D8/AT:2D8(M) attack
on ammo. Your force is now considered on ammo. Your force is now considered to which it may not React.
to be Poorly Supplied. to be Poorly Supplied.
The stricken unit’s Defense is
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately. determined as usual.
This card is played immediately.
Note that MWDs, Kit Carson Scouts,
or Pointmen may negate the trap.

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 BOOM! WAIT, THE COLONEL SAID WAIT, THE COLONEL SAID
A booby trap or mine detonates near a WHAT? WHAT?
randomly determined Free World unit! Radio communications is on the fritz Radio communications is on the fritz
Randomly determine which unit has and the Free World force has just and the Free World force has just
been struck by the attack. The unit received garbled orders that contradict received garbled orders that contradict
takes an AP:4D8/AT:2D8(M) attack to their mission brief. their mission brief.
which it may not React. All Free World units must remain in All Free World units must remain in
The stricken unit’s Defense is place until the end of the next turn place until the end of the next turn
determined as usual. while orders are sorted out. Free World while orders are sorted out. Free World
units may move into cover if they are units may move into cover if they are
This card is played immediately.
not already there, but no other not already there, but no other
Note that MWDs, Kit Carson Scouts, movement is allowed. They may fire movement is allowed. They may fire
or Pointmen may negate the trap. as normal. as normal.

FIRE! FIRE! FIRE! FIRE!

Your rounds have struck something Your rounds have struck something
flammable and set a structure ablaze! flammable and set a structure ablaze! WHERE’D THEY COME FROM?!
You may designate any building within You may designate any building within The VC player may make an immediate
LOS of one of your units (or anywhere LOS of one of your units (or anywhere roll on the Reinforcement Table. The
on the table if you have air support with on the table if you have air support with new unit may be placed anywhere on
offensive capabilities) and declare that it offensive capabilities) and declare that it the table, but no closer than 6” from any
is burning. Any figures in the building is burning. Any figures in the building enemy unit. The new unit may be
must immediately evacuate to a point at must immediately evacuate to a point at activated during the current turn.
least 4” from the building. They may be least 4” from the building. They may be Discard and continue play if no VC
fired on by units that are on Overwatch. fired on by units that are on Overwatch. forces are involved in the scenario.
The building is impassable for the The building is impassable for the
duration of the game. duration of the game.

THERE’S NOTHING
WATCH YOUR STEP! WATCH YOUR STEP!
A possible booby-trap or mine has been A possible booby-trap or mine has been
FRIENDLY ABOUT IT!
A randomly determined unit in your
spotted in the path of one of a randomly spotted in the path of one of a randomly
force has been struck by friendly fire,
determined Free World unit. There is determined Free World unit. There is
either from an errant aircraft or off
no time to summon EOD, so the device no time to summon EOD, so the device
target indirect fire.
must be bypassed! must be bypassed!
Randomly determine which unit has
Randomly determine the unit that has Randomly determine the unit that has
been struck. If it is an infantry unit,
spotted the explosive. Your opponent spotted the explosive. Your opponent
each figure in the unit must roll a 4+
may place a marker at least 6” from that may place a marker at least 6” from that
to avoid becoming a casualty. If a
unit and at least 4” from nearby units. unit and at least 4” from nearby units.
vehicle is struck, roll 1D10 on the
None of your units may approach None of your units may approach
Heavy Gun column of the Vehicle
within 4” of the marker. within 4” of the marker.
Damage Results chart
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately.

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 THERE’S NOTHING
FRIENDLY ABOUT IT!
A randomly determined unit in your
force has been struck by friendly fire, INCOMING! INCOMING!
either from an errant aircraft or off One of your units is struck by a random One of your units is struck by a random
target indirect fire. barrage of mortar fire. barrage of mortar fire.
Randomly determine which unit has Randomly determine the unit that is Randomly determine the unit that is
been struck. If it is an infantry unit, hit by the mortar rounds. The affected hit by the mortar rounds. The affected
each figure in the unit must roll a 4+ unit is struck with an unit is struck with an
to avoid becoming a casualty. If a AP:6D6/AT:3D6(L) attack. AP:6D6/AT:3D6(L) attack.
vehicle is struck, roll 1D10 on the This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.
Heavy Gun column of the Vehicle
Damage Results chart
This card is played immediately.

FUGAZI! SOMETHING’S MOVING

A random Free World unit has gone OVER THERE!
nuts, could be drugs or perhaps they’ve One of your units (determined
just cracked. Roll a D6 to see what’s up randomly) spots something moving in
with them: FNG the undergrowth. The unit spends the
1,2 – Paranoia reduce Troop Quality The next Free World unit to trigger a turn blazing away at the jungle and
and Morale by one die step may only Booby Trap automatically fails its Troop loses its ability to move or fire for the
move at Tactical speed Quality test and suffers the trap’s attack. rest of the turn, though it may still
3,4 – Staying put, must pass a Troop The new guy didn’t notice that it was a use Reaction Fire with a -1 die shift
Quality test to advance towards the serial trap... to Firepower
enemy or fire (may still react fire) This card is played immediately. After blazing away at the jungle,
5,6 – Fugazi! The blood is up and they a wounded pot-bellied pig emerges
are out for the kill +1 firepower die for from the area and promptly expires
the rest of the game on the trail.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.

SOMETHING’S MOVING
OVER THERE!
One of your units (determined
SNAKES ALIVE!
randomly) spots something moving in
A randomly determined Free World FRAG HIM!
unit finds itself sharing a position with Members of a randomly determined
the undergrowth. The unit spends the
a less than happy snake. The unit must unit aren’t too happy with the unit
turn blazing away at the jungle and
make a Troop Quality check. If the leader. The men have lost faith in him
loses its ability to move or fire for the
check is failed, one of the unit’s figures, completely. He now counts as a
rest of the turn, though it may still
chosen at random, is bitten by the Negative (-1) leader and his unit suffers
use Reaction Fire with a -1 die shift
snake. Place the model on its side and a -1 Morale Die Shift. Time to get a
to Firepower
roll for injuries as normal in the little surprise ready for putting in his
After blazing away at the jungle, following turn. If the check is passed, tent tonight…
a wounded pot-bellied pig emerges the unit evicts the snake without injury. This card is played immediately.
from the area and promptly expires
This card is played immediately.
on the trail.
This card is played immediately.

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 FROM ANGELS ON HIGH
A Free World officer orbiting the
WHERE ARE YOU GOING? battlefield in a helicopter thinks he’s
One of your assets (such as a Weapon got a “better perspective” than a GUNG HO!
Team, Vehicle, etc.) of your opponent’s subordinate commander on the ground. A unit of your choice is in the zone!
choice is recalled by higher command His confusing and poorly considered They’re clicking along like a well-
or are required to support a sister unit commands, passed down from on oiled machine and nothing can stand
in contact. high, have robbed your force of its
in their way!
Roll 1D6: tactical initiative.
The selected unit’s TQ and Morale are
1-2: Leaves immediately, even if Your force loses Initiative (if you had it)
raised by one die type and they are
and you cannot regain Initiative until
activated this turn. treated as if they have High Confidence
General Confusion loses interest in your
3-4: Leaves next time it activates. operation. Roll a D6 at the end of each for the duration of the turn (at the end
5-6: Agrees to stick around 1 more turn. turn. On a 5 or 6 the General has lost of the turn, all values return to normal).
Roll again at the end of your next turn. interest and you can test for Initiative on This card is played immediately.
the following turn. Otherwise, your
This card is played immediately.
opponent automatically gains Initiative.
This card is played immediately.

MAN DOWN! SHORT TIMERS

BOGGED DOWN
A randomly selected unit in your force One randomly determined Free World
A randomly determined vehicle in your
has suffered a non-combat casualty. unit has a lot of Short Timers nearing
force bogs down in mud. The vehicle is
Immediately treat the unit as if it has the end of their Tour in-country. The
immobilized and must be towed to dry
taken a casualty. Roll on the First Aid unit must make a Troop Quality test to
ground by a similar size vehicle (which
table appropriate to the unit to advance towards the enemy and takes
takes three turns of base contact with
determine the severity of the all Morale tests at –1 dice step. The unit
the immobilized vehicle).
casualty’s injuries. will never move at Rapid speed.
This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.

SHUFFLING THE STACK

Free World fast-air assets are arriving ON THE BALL!
BOGGED DOWN while those that are bingo on fuel Your force’s squad and platoon level
A randomly determined vehicle in your withdraw. FACs need some time to leaders are doing a fine job of focusing
force bogs down in mud. The vehicle is orient the new pilots to troop positions your men’s attention on the job at hand
immobilized and must be towed to dry on the ground to avoid a possible – their situational awareness is so
ground by a similar size vehicle (which friendly fire incident. amped up that it’s highly unlikely
takes three turns of base contact with Free World forces may not call for anyone will get the jump on them!
the immobilized vehicle). any further air strikes from the time Your units receive a +1 to all Reaction
This card is played immediately. this card is drawn until the end of tests for the duration of the game.
the next turn. This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately.

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 THE GOLDEN BB
This card may be played by any AT I JUST GAVE IT A GOOD SMACK!
ON THE BALL! capable weapon at the time that it An enterprising crew member is able to
Your force’s squad and platoon level engages a vehicular target. The vehicle put his mechanical skills to good use
leaders are doing a fine job of focusing engaged is automatically destroyed, and restore one of your broken-down
your men’s attention on the job at hand brewing up in such a dramatic fashion vehicles to action!
– their situational awareness is so that it raises the morale of the AT
amped up that it’s highly unlikely weapon’s force by one die type and If your Force has suffered any Fog of
anyone will get the jump on them! lowers the morale of the opposing force War induced vehicle breakdowns (not
one die type for the duration of the combat damage), this card will restore
Your units receive a +1 to all Reaction
current turn. one of them to action. Randomly
tests for the duration of the game.
determine which vehicle is repaired.
This card is played immediately. This card may be held by the drawing
player until their next AT fire at a This card may be held and played later.
vehicle, at which time it must be played.

DOWNPOUR!
A monsoon rain descends upon the
I JUST GAVE IT A GOOD SMACK! battlefield, obscuring vision and A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS
An enterprising crew member is able to muting sound. The sun breaks through the clouds
put his mechanical skills to good use
All fire is treated as if it is outside and momentarily drives away the storm
and restore one of your broken-down
Optimum Range and units more than or other negative weather effect
vehicles to action!
18” away may not be engaged at all. currently in play.
If your Force has suffered any Fog of All units on both sides may only make This card negates any weather related
War induced vehicle breakdowns (not Tactical moves for fear of drawing Fog of War or scenario effects for the
combat damage), this card will restore friendly fire. duration of the game or until a new
one of them to action. Randomly
This effect remains in play for the weather Fog of War card is drawn.
determine which vehicle is repaired.
duration of the game unless a Fog of This card is played immediately.
This card may be held and played later. War card is drawn that negates it.
This card is played immediately.

IT’S A BAD DAY TO DIE IT’S A GOOD DAY TO DIE

One of your units is seized by a sense One of your units is filled with a gallant
SORRY GUYS, WE GOT
of impending doom that fills them with disregard for their own safety and
NOTHING UP THERE FOR YOU
dread and melancholy. intense desire to “get the job done.”
Sometimes, close air support is
stretched thin and even urgent requests A randomly determined unit in your A randomly determined unit in your
cannot be met immediately. force suffers a -1 Die Shift to their force receives a +1 Die Shift to their
Morale (cannot be reduced below D6 Morale (cannot be raised above D12
If you are the VC/NVA player, play this
by this card) and loses one level of by this card) and gains one level of
card to automatically block one of your
Confidence (cannot be reduced below Confidence (cannot be raised above
opponent’s CAS strike requests. If you’re
Poor Confidence with this card) for the High Confidence with this card) for the
the Free World player, discard.
duration of the game or until countered duration of the game or until countered
This card may be held and played later. by another Fog of War card. by another Fog of War card.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.

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 SMOKE ‘EM IF YOU GOT ‘EM CAUGHT NAPPING!
The exertion of combat and the heavy Lack of sleep, heat and constant stress ‘SCUSE US, PAPA-SAN!
loads carried by the troops has taken its have taken their toll on an infantry unit A base of civilians, a farmer and his ox,
toll on an infantry unit belonging to the belonging to the non-initiative player. or a group of young girls gathering
initiative player. A randomly A randomly determined infantry unit water appear at a randomly determined
determined infantry unit which has not which has not yet failed a Reaction test board edge and begin walking towards
yet been activated must spend the (i.e., is still eligible to React) loses its the opposite board edge. The civilians
duration of the turn resting. It may ability to React to enemy units. The unit will continue across the board in a
react to enemy fire, but with a -1 die roll may react to enemy fire directed at it, straight line at 3” movement per turn
modifier to its Reaction test die-roll. but with a -1 die roll modifier to its until they exit the board or are
The unit’s firepower is halved. It may Reaction test die-roll. The unit’s dispersed by Coalition forces.
only move into cover. firepower is halved. This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.

PATROL LINK UP
WHO ARE YOU? WALTER A nearby Free World patrol has arrived BERETS COMING IN
CRONKITE? to assist you. Roll 1D8 to see who
A patrol of US Special Forces operators
A pair of civilian media types has been has arrived:
on a reconnaissance mission in the area
attached to your unit. Immediately 1-4: Two fireteams of Free World link up with the Free World force. They
place with the headquarters element or infantry with a section/squad leader
attach themselves to a unit of the Free
most senior man on the ground. They (nine personnel)
World player’s choice. They are Stealthy
must be protected at all costs and loss 5-6: A four-man Weapon Team with and have Night Eyes. Their team
of either will garner a -5 Victory Points. a Med. Support Weapon
includes a Blooper and an M60 gunner.
The pair will act as noncombatant 7-8: An AFV or two Weapon Teams They are all Advanced First Aid trained
Dependents. If they survive the as described above. and can call in air support with the
mission, their footage of your troops Choose any suitable model from your SF bonus. They have a Troop
in action adds 3 Victory Points to your collection. They may be deployed on Quality/Morale of D10/D12. They may
total. For VC/NVA forces, the pair any table edge no further than 12” from be separated from the unit to act on
represents a celebrit2y observer or another friendly element. The vehicle
their own if desired.
propaganda team. crew or infantry have a Troop
Quality/Morale of D8/D10 Confident. This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately.
This card is played immediately.

SNIPER! SNIPER!
An off-board sniper on an unrelated mission An off-board sniper on an unrelated mission
has decided to assist your force. On each has decided to assist your force. On each THAT’S A MEDAL OF HONOR
turn, you may pick one enemy unit for the turn, you may pick one enemy unit for the
off-board sniper to engage. off-board sniper to engage. RIGHT THERE...
A member of the Free World force
Roll 1D6 to determine if the sniper team is in Roll 1D6 to determine if the sniper team is in
position to effectively engage the target unit: position to effectively engage the target unit: performs an act of self-sacrificing valor
1: Sniper team can’t engage the target unit. 1: Sniper team can’t engage the target unit.
to save the lives of his comrades. This
card can be played when a Free World
2-3: Sniper team engages target w/3D10 2-3: Sniper team engages target w/3D10
Firepower. Cannot designate leaders/support Firepower. Cannot designate leaders/support
infantry unit receives multiple
weapons as casualties. weapons as casualties. casualties in a single round of fire.
4-5: Sniper team engages target w/3D10 4-5: Sniper team engages target w/3D10
The number of casualties taken,
Firepower. Can designate leaders/support Firepower. Can designate leaders/support however many there were, is reduced
weapons as casualties. weapons as casualties. to 1 (randomly roll which figure
6: Sniper has been forced to retreat. No fire 6: Sniper has been forced to retreat. No fire remains a casualty).
this turn. Discard this card immediately. this turn. Discard this card immediately. This card may be held and played later.
The off board sniper may not be fired upon. The off board sniper may not be fired upon.
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately.
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 TOE POPPER (VC) OR
MG TEAM (NVA)
Toe Popper: 3D8 Firepower against a
STOPPAGE! STOPPAGE! single model. Discard after playing.
A randomly determined support A randomly determined support MG Team: A two-man GPMG team
weapon in a randomly determined unit weapon in a randomly determined unit joins your force. It is armed with a
in your force seizes up and cannot be in your force seizes up and cannot be General Purpose Machine Gun (Med.
restored to action for the duration of restored to action for the duration of Support). The team has a Troop Quality
the game (unless the “I Just Gave it a the game (unless the “I Just Gave it a of Trained (D8) and D10 Morale.
Good Smack” card is played). Good Smack” card is played). Its Confidence and Supply Quality are
This card is played immediately. This card is played immediately. the same as the majority of your force.
It can be placed anywhere within 6” of
another friendly unit. The MG team is
a Weapons Team.

TOE POPPER (VC) OR PUNJI PIT (VC) OR OFF-BOARD PUNJI PIT (VC) OR OFF-BOARD
MG TEAM (NVA) LT. MORTAR SUPPORT (NVA) LT. MORTAR SUPPORT (NVA)
Toe Popper: 3D8 Firepower against a Punji Pit: Play against an enemy unit. Punji Pit: Play against an enemy unit.
single model. Discard after playing. Resolve as an AP:4D8 attack. Resolve as an AP:4D8 attack.
MG Team: A two-man GPMG team A maximum of 1 casualty can result A maximum of 1 casualty can result
joins your force. It is armed with a from this attack. Discard after playing. from this attack. Discard after playing.
General Purpose Machine Gun (Med. Off Board Lt. Mortar Support: Your Off Board Lt. Mortar Support: Your
Support). The team has a Troop Quality force begins receiving supporting fire force begins receiving supporting fire
of Trained (D8) and D10 Morale. from an off-board Light Mortar Team. from an off-board Light Mortar Team.
Its Confidence and Supply Quality are
the same as the majority of your force. Each turn one of your units may Each turn one of your units may
It can be placed anywhere within 6” of attempt to call down a Light Mortar attempt to call down a Light Mortar
another friendly unit. The MG team is salvo on a designated target using usual salvo on a designated target using usual
a Weapons Team. fire mission request rules. fire mission request rules.

SPIKE BOARD (VC) OR SPIKE BOARD (VC) OR

ATTACHED RPG TEAM (NVA) ATTACHED RPG TEAM (NVA) GRENADE TRAP (VC) OR OFF-
Spike Board: Play against an enemy unit. Spike Board: Play against an enemy unit. BOARD HEAVY MORTARS (NVA)
Resolve as an AP:5D8 attack. Resolve as an AP:5D8 attack. Grenade Trap: Hits all models within 2”
A maximum of 1 casualty can result A maximum of 1 casualty can result of selected target, 4D8 Firepower.
from this attack. Discard after playing. from this attack. Discard after playing. Discard after playing.
RPG Team: Your force gains a veteran RPG Team: Your force gains a veteran Off Board Heavy Mortars: Your force
RPG team. These two soldiers are RPG team. These two soldiers are begins receiving supporting fire from
experts with the RPG, one firing and experts with the RPG, one firing and an off-board Heavy Mortar Team.
the other re-loading a spare launcher. the other re-loading a spare launcher.
They have a Troop Quality of D10 and They have a Troop Quality of D10 and Each turn one of your units may
the same Morale as the majority of the same Morale as the majority of attempt to call down a Heavy Mortar
your forces. They are treated as a your forces. They are treated as a salvo on a designated target using usual
Weapon Team except when firing at Weapon Team except when firing at fire mission request rules.
enemy vehicles. enemy vehicles.

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 SPIDER HOLE (VC) OR
GRENADE TRAP (VC) OR OFF- OFF-BOARD ARTILLERY
BOARD HEAVY MORTARS (NVA) SUPPORT (NVA)
Grenade Trap: Hits all models within 2” Spider Hole: VC guerilla pops up from a
of selected target, 4D8 Firepower. spider hole to fire a burst. May target any
model of VC player’s choice with a 3D8
Discard after playing. LAND MINE – VC, NVA Firepower attack – the guerilla then
Off Board Heavy Mortars: Your force Hits all models within 3” of selected
vanishes. Discard after playing.
begins receiving supporting fire from target, AP:4D10/AT:2D10(L) Firepower.
an off-board Heavy Mortar Team. Discard after playing. Off-Board Light Artillery Support:
Each turn one of your units may attempt
Each turn one of your units may
to call down a AP:8/AT:2(M) (6” radius)
attempt to call down a Heavy Mortar
fire mission on a designated target using
salvo on a designated target using usual
the Calling for a Fire Mission rules. The
fire mission request rules.
outcome of the mission is determined
using the Resolving a Fire Mission rules.

SPIDER HOLE (VC) OR

OFF-BOARD ARTILLERY
SUPPORT (NVA)
Spider Hole: VC guerilla pops up from a MORTAR! (VC) OR OFF-BOARD LOCAL SUPPORT (VC) OR PT-76
spider hole to fire a burst. May target any LIGHT AA GUNS (NVA) LIGHT TANK (NVA)
model of VC player’s choice with a 3D8 Mortar! A VC mortar team fires a quick Local Support: VC Player gains a Main
Firepower attack – the guerilla then salvo at an enemy unit of the VC Force unit of two 3-man cells armed
vanishes. Discard after playing. player’s choice with a 4D8 Firepower with rifles, BAR and an RPG
Off-Board Light Artillery Support: attack. Discard after playing. PT-76 Light Tank: Your force has a
Each turn one of your units may attempt Off-Board Light AA Guns: Raise the PT-76 Light Tank attached. Its crew has
to call down a AP:8/AT:2(M) (6” radius) Air Defence Environment to Light. the same Troop Quality and Morale as
fire mission on a designated target using If already Light, raise to Medium. the majority of your force.
the Calling for a Fire Mission rules. The
outcome of the mission is determined
using the Resolving a Fire Mission rules.

SUICIDE SQUAD (VC) OR

MG BUNKER – VC, NVA MG BUNKER – VC, NVA SAPPERS (NVA)
The VC or NVA player may place an The VC or NVA player may place an Suicide Squad: Your force is joined by a
MG bunker anywhere on the table at MG bunker anywhere on the table at 5-man Suicide Squad armed with rifles
any time. The bunker has been cleverly any time. The bunker has been cleverly and an RPG. Their Troop Quality is D8
camouflaged and is hidden until it camouflaged and is hidden until it and they are not subject to Morale tests.
opens fire. Treat as a two-man GPMG opens fire. Treat as a two-man GPMG Sappers: Your force contains one 5-man
Weapon Team in a fortified position. Weapon Team in a fortified position. squad of Sappers armed with rifles.
Discard after use. Discard after use. Their Troop Quality is D8 and their
Morale is D10.

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