2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 17

investment projects in local infrastructure tailored for the BRI. But it also
engenders polarization, as India fears being side-lined in its own region
by the economic and political consequences of the BRI.
In that perspective, the acceleration of China’s posture in the region,
has been both a factor of unity and polarization, and overall it is arguably
one of the primary drivers behind the emergence of a new Indian Ocean.
It has unified the different shores of the Indian Ocean—Africa, the Gulf,
South Asia—through the implementation of its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI). A vast—and still uncertain—network of economic corridors and
port infrastructures, the BRI strengthens the connectivity between states
of the Indian Ocean and Beijing.
But it is still unclear to many whether these economic projects of the
BRI have to be factored in within the context of China’s growing military
assertiveness or if the process should be understood the other way around.
The major naval investments of China, its gunboat diplomacy in the South
China Sea, the construction of its first overseas military base in Djibouti,
alongside increased military cooperation with small states in the Indian
Ocean, are all signals of a departure from the past rhetoric of China’s
peaceful rise. In this perspective, both the revised naval posture of China
and the BRI epitomize the new ambitions of Xi Jinping in the region and
globally.
Against that backdrop, this chapter will detail the gradual but fast
emergence of China as an Indian Ocean actor. It will analyse Beijing’s
objectives and strategies in the IOR as well as their impact as China has
become at the same time a unifying and a polarizing factor. Largely absent
from the Indian Ocean until 2008, China has now built a military base
in Djibouti, while increasing significantly its naval presence in the area.
The Indian Ocean leg of the BRI will be examined in this context in
order to explain how China has turned the IOR into a security complex,
generating a series of realignments in the process.

China’s Evolving Naval

Presence in the Indian Ocean
China has not officially articulated its interest or strategy in the IOR.
Beijing’s communication about its presence in the region oscillates
between the claims of the right to the status of an “Indian Ocean
State” because of Heng Tze voyages in the region, as was asserted by
a Chinese representative during the 2018 Indian Ocean Conference in
18 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

Colombo and the denial of an existing Chinese “strategy” in the region.

China’s presence and intentions in the Indian Ocean are therefore best
understood as part of Beijing’s larger maritime ambition and strategy.

Maritime Concerns and Responses in China’s Defence White Papers

As stated by Indian scholar Raja Mohan, “China’s Indian Ocean strategy
must also be seen as driven by Beijing’s sense of its own rise and its
strategic imagination as a natural global power” (Mohan, 2012). This was
reflected by the evolution of the ten defence white papers that China has
released since 1998 to explain its national defence policy. Each of them
indicated a new step in Beijing’s naval build-up and overseas positioning.
All of them have to be examined in parallel with China’s economic rise
and its subsequent capacity to build up its military apparatus.
Its 1998 defence white paper was indeed in sharp contrast with the
latest such document, stating that “China does not station any troops
or set up any military bases in any foreign country” (States Council of
the People’s Republic of China, 1998). On the contrary, the last defence
white paper, released in 2019, insisted on the need “to safeguard China’s
maritime rights and interests; to safeguard China’s security interests in
outer space, electromagnetic space and cyberspace; to safeguard China’s
overseas interests; and to support the sustainable development of the
country” (State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of
China, 2019), openly assuming the existence of a PLAN base in Djibouti.
In between those two documents, other defence white papers essen-
tially marked the progress in advancing China’s capabilities for naval
warfare. The 2000 defence white paper which stated that the navy had
“such arms as the surface, submarine, naval aviation, coastal defence and
marine corps, as well as other specialized units” (Information office of
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2000) was the first
indication that China had acquired the capability of offshore defensive
operations. The 2002 defence white paper indicated that China had not
only nuclear-powered submarines but also nuclear counter-attack capa-
bilities and specified the primary duties of the naval forces (Information
office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2002).
The following two papers, released respectively in 2004 and 2006 insisted
respectively on the enhancement of naval capabilities in both weaponry
and equipment (Information office of the State Council of the People’s
Republic of China, 2004) as well as the gradual “extension of the strategic
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 19

depth for offshore defensive operations” (Information Office of the State

Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2006). Both insisted on the
enhancement of capabilities in integrated maritime operations.
Interestingly, the navy was given a new and unprecedented importance
in the 2008 white defence paper. The long, almost four pages develop-
ment contrasts with the sober one or two paragraphs that were dedicated
to the corps in previous documents. Yet the level of details given to the
PLAN development in the document is less significant than the context in
which it does take place. In 2007 China had surpassed the US as a leading
exporter (Brewster, 2018). It also had to witness the first multinational
naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal.
2008 was a landmark. It did see the organization of the Olympic
Games in Beijing, a political triumph for the authorities, but Chinese
performances were not limited to the stadium. 2008 was also the year
of the most consequential financial crisis since 1929, surpassed only
in 2020 by the economic consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic.
China’s leadership (among others) interpreted the crisis as a sign of the
decline of the West, an opportunity to seize but also the beginning of
a period of harsh competition, a trend underlined by the 2008 white
paper which argues that “struggles for strategic resources, strategic loca-
tions and strategic dominance have intensified”, suggesting moreover
that the PLAN should develop “capabilities of conducting cooperation in
distant waters” (Information Office of the States Council of the People’s
Republic of China, 2009). It was also in 2008 that China decided to send
a naval contingent for anti-piracy mission in the Gulf of Aden (Mohan,
2012).
Subsequent defence white papers were all variations on this need to
operate further away from its own shores in order to protect China’s over-
seas interests. The defence white paper of 2010 insisted notably on the
development of capabilities to conduct operations in distant waters and
the building of both shore infrastructures and surface logistical platforms
allowing the PLAN to operate far away from its domestic bases (Infor-
mation Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
2011). The 2012 document coincided with the launching of China’s first
aircraft carrier Liaoning (Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, 2013). The PLAN had entered a new phase.
Indeed the 2015 white paper, which reiterated the PLA’s assign-
ment “to safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests” and the
need for the PLAN to “gradually shift from ‘offshore water’ defence to
20 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

the combination of offshore water defence with ‘open seas protection’”

(Information Office of the State Council of the People’s Republic of
China, 2015), clearly stated China’s intention to “seize the strategic initia-
tive in military competition” (Information Office of the State Council
of the People’s Republic of China, 2015). Unsurprisingly it preceded
only by a few months the beginning of China’s ambitious modernization
programme of its armed forces.

The Determinants of China’s Presence in the Indian Ocean

There is also a body of writing by Chinese scholars and former offi-
cials, which enumerate China’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean,
although mostly in general terms. Zhou Bo, from the PLA Academy of
Military Science, states for example that “China has only two purposes
in the Indian Ocean: economic gains and the security of the Sea lines of
Communications” (Zhou, 2014). China’s outreach to the Indian Ocean
is indeed a strategic consequence of its economic performances. However,
this hardly accounts for the totality of China’s involvement in the region.
Chinese motivations for entering the Indian Ocean, as well as Beijing’s
ultimate objectives in the region, are still partly uncertain. If its economic
motivations—China’s dependence over Middle Eastern and African oil—
are obvious, other factors are still, to some extent, a matter of speculation
and best apprehended through China’s positioning in the area. Even then,
perceptions of Chinese global objectives influence the interpretation of
Chinese intent in the area and make the understanding of its regional
policy a highly subjective and complex endeavour.
Although China’s maritime trajectory in the Indian Ocean has been
largely determined by its economic rise, its naval outreach to the IOR is
not exclusively a consequence of that growth. China entered the Indian
Ocean, even though in a modest way, before any economic require-
ments compelled it to do so. The People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
conducted its first port visits to Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka
between 16 November 1985 and 19 January 1986, demonstrating the
PLAN capability to operate in the Indian Ocean Region, long before
China became an economic power. However, the next port calls in the
region did not take place before the mid-1990. China had then become
a net oil importer.
China’s energy imports rely heavily on the freedom of navigation in
the Malacca Strait. China became a net oil importer in 1993 and has
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 21

been growing ever since. China is today the largest importer of energy in
the world. More than half of its oil imports come from the Middle-East,
Africa and Southeast Asia, and about one fifth of the imported crude
oil travels through the Malacca Strait. Moreover, besides energy, rising
demand for resources such as fisheries, and raw material—minerals and
metals but also agricultural raw materials like natural rubber, raw cotton
and various fibers—but also trade which grew exponentially after China
joined the WTO in 2001, increased the country’s dependence on the
high seas. In China’s perception, entering the Indian Ocean was only
one part—though an essential one—of protecting its domestic economic
development.
In this context, the term “Malacca dilemma” appeared in a 2003
speech by President Hu Jintao to a Chinese Communist Party conference,
in which he contrasted China’s growing dependence on the Indian Ocean
and the Malacca Strait with US dominance on both the region (Mohan,
2012) and the Strait itself. Moreover, in China’s perception, its “Malacca
dilemma” was exacerbated by the Strait’s geographic conditions, piracy
activities as well as India’s “Look East” policy and strengthening of its
naval power (Li, 3:4, 2017). Indeed, in June 2012, the US and Singa-
pore agreed on the US deployment of littoral combat ships in Singapore
(Li, 3:4, 2017). India, on the other side had started building its own
defence networks in the area in the early 1990s as part of its “Look East
policy”, establishing in 2001 its East Naval Command in the Andaman
and Nicobar islands to monitor maritime activities in the area west of
the Malacca Strait and initiating a rapprochement with the US which led
both countries to cooperate in the Indian Ocean. Interestingly, if this
emerging cooperation was a way for the US to counterbalance China’s
growing influence, India was too cautious in its approach to China to be
anything but ambivalent at best, refuting any idea that it might act as a
counterweight to Beijing and refusing to be considered as such.
These developments made China’s trade increasingly vulnerable to any
disruption in the area. They also contributed to Beijing’s perception that
the two main obstacles to its increased presence in the Indian Ocean
would not only be the US, but India as well. Hence the need for Chinese
decision-makers to build naval forces capable of protecting its sea lines of
communication and to look for ways to bypass the Malacca Strait, both
of which had subsequent implications for the perception of China’s role
and intentions in the Indian Ocean.
22 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

Yet subsequent development should have led China to adopt a more

cautious approach as external and littoral powers alike, intended to
develop cooperative interactions with Beijing in the region. China did
enter the Indian Ocean with the blessing of some Western powers willing
to engage with Beijing and thus to contribute to China’s socialization
into international norms of behaviour. Even India did officially acknowl-
edge to some extent the legitimacy of China’s presence in the Indian
Ocean when the two countries agreed to work together to tackle piracy
in the Gulf of Aden, during the visit of then Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao
(Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, 2010). Indeed China
did participate in anti-piracy operations, although in its own separate way,
and essentially to protect Chinese ships. It did patrol the Gulf of Aden
and the Arabian Sea, dispatching twenty four naval contingents between
2008 and 2016 (Brewster, 2018). By the time it did open its base in
Djibouti, supposedly to support its anti-piracy operation, piracy was no
longer a major threat in the area. Perceptions about China’s presence in
the Indian Ocean started to change dramatically. China had always stated
that its intentions were peaceful and its leaders justified its military build
up, including its naval one, by defensive needs as well as their willingness
to contribute to world stability. In reality it only managed to create a new
security dilemma.

The Indian Ocean: From the String

of Pearls to the Belt and Road Initiative
Subsequent developments were an attempt to integrate these different,
although complementary, logics. The Indian Ocean segment of China’s
Maritime Silk Road was more than a network of port infrastructures and
various facilities in the Indian Ocean. It was an attempt at reshaping
regional dynamics (Brewster, 2018).
Chinese investments in the Indian Ocean Region did not start with the
BRI. Nor were they exclusively determined by energy security concerns.
In order to develop its remote—and quite peripheral—provinces of
Xinjiang, Tibet and Yunnan, it needed to reconnect them to the global
economy and therefore to the sea. Both concerns led to the build up in
the Indian Ocean of the famous “String of Pearl” which was supposed
to be later articulated with three major corridors, one linking Kashgar in
Xinjiang to Gwadar in Pakistan, one linking Lhasa to Calcutta and a last
one connecting Yunnan to Southeast Asia through Myanmar.
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 23

The term “String of Pearls”, coined by US defence contractor Booz

Allen Hamilton and used for the first time in 2004 in a report enti-
tled “Energy Futures” was a geopolitical theory about China’s supposed
intentions in the Indian Ocean. It did refer to the facilities that China was
trying to establish along its Indian Ocean shipping routes, from China’s
mainland to Port Sudan on the Red Sea, via Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, the Maldives and Pakistan. Although the facilities built or devel-
oped by China were civilian, it was often assumed that they were part
of a longer scheme under which China would increase its military pres-
ence in the area in order to protect its commercial routes but also project
power overseas. Chinese officials and analysts alike, have always denied
such objectives, claiming instead that China had only peaceful intentions
(Zhou, 2014).
The idea that China was trying to establish permanent footholds in
the Indian Ocean soon became a defining feature of the debate regarding
China’s perspectives in the region and a symptom of China’s growing
influence in the area. Many analysts in the US and even more so in India,
saw the concept as a way to challenge either US hegemony, or Indian
position in the region, reflecting more in the latter case India’s own inse-
curities. Others though, including in China, remained sceptical about the
rationale of trying to secure China’s energy supplies essentially through
military means (Mohan, 2012).
The tone of the debate changed with the launch of the Belt and Road
Initiative announced by President Xi Jinping during an official visit to
Kazakhstan and Indonesia in September and October 2013. The initia-
tive aimed officially at the integration of the region into a cohesive
economic area through building infrastructure, and broadening trade.
It was to be a “win–win” endeavour for participating countries and was
welcome in many states desperate for foreign investments. In the Indian
Ocean, Chittagong in Bangladesh, Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in
Sri Lanka, Kyaupkyu in Myanmar, Malacca in Malaysia or Mombasa in
Kenya, already part of the “String of Pearls”, became the symbols of the
new, all-encompassing policy. But in 2017 the inauguration by China in
Djibouti of its first ever naval base abroad, was perceived by regional
and non-regional actors alike (with the exception of China’s traditional
partners) as a revealing factor. China had finally unveiled its geopolitical
ambitions.
In this context, China’s planned economic corridors took a special
significance. Thousands of kilometers from the sea, western China did not
24 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

enjoy the easy access to global markets. Neither could it attract significant
foreign investment. The corridors were therefore logical extensions to the
oceans (Garver, 185, 2006).
Chinese thinking about linking the Yunnan province to the Bay of
Bengal emerged in the mid-1980s. Chinese development planners under-
stood that new transport infrastructures were key to the development
of provinces such as Yunnan. In 1989, Myanmar abandoned its tradi-
tional policies of economic isolationism but its governance and human
rights record kept it isolated from most western countries. China saw an
opportunity and shut down the armed insurgency led by the Burmese
Communist Party. The Myanmar government welcomed its involvement
in the modernization of its transport infrastructure. China modernized
the road between Kunming and Mandalay, and set up the Irrawaddy
corridor (by the name of the Irrawaddy river used by the corridor), a
combination of roads, river, rail and oceanic harbour, linking Kunming
to the port of Kyaukpyu on the Ramree Island. The Irrawaddy corridor
saved over a week for transport to and from Yunnan and the sea (Garver,
185, 2006). In 2018, China and Myanmar started negotiations for a new
phase of transport infrastructure building between the same two cities
but with new roads and speed trains, aimed at furthering the economic
integration between the two countries, the China Myanmar Economic
Corridor (CMEC) (Hammond, 2018).
Similarly, the strategic partnership between Beijing and Islamabad did
offer China the perspective of an additional strategic outlet on the Indian
Ocean. China’s decision, in 1964 to build the Karakoram Highway,
linking its Xinjiang province to Pakistan aimed at outflanking India’s posi-
tion on the Kashmir dispute. In the early 2000s, the modernization of
the highway was supposed to facilitate economic integration and allow an
increasingly globalized China to access Pakistan’s market while consol-
idating China’s strategic position vis-à-vis India. As part of an effort
to make Kashgar a hub for Central Asia and the subcontinent, China
considered plans to move the Xinjiang rail network into Pakistan (Mohan,
2012).
The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), launched on April
20, 2015 during Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan did nothing other than
formalized projects which had been discussed for almost two decades. The
CPEC was conceived as a set of transport infrastructure projects linking
the Xinjiang province to the Indian Ocean through Pakistan. It did
include the upgrading of the road between Rawalpindi and the Chinese
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 25

border, the construction of a highway between Lahore and Karachi as well

as the renovation of the railway between Peshawar and Karachi which
was supposed to be extended to Kashgar at a later stage. In the mean-
time, China completed the building of the first phase of the Gwadar port,
in Balochistan, in 2016. On November 13, 2016, Nawaz Sharif, Prime
Minister of Pakistan, along with the Army Chief, flagged off the first
ship from Gwadar that was carrying a consignment from China (Rajesh,
2018).
Both corridors contributed to the perception that China was up for
more than economic infrastructure. That both the CPEC and CMEC
did create tensions in Pakistan and Myanmar respectively, because of
a perceived loss of sovereignty is irrelevant here. They increased the
impression that the progression of China on its periphery was irresistible
and access to the Indian Ocean inevitable. Because the initiative initially
displayed a sense that China’s rise was unstoppable, it also triggered
unexpected reactions in the region. As observed by US analyst Nilanthi
Samarayake, it did incentivize India to pursue increased naval presence
and capabilities, and heightened the concerns of the smaller regional
states about the effect of Chinese projects in their countries and focused
unprecedented attention by major powers on their national interests in
the Indian Ocean (Samaranayake, 14:2, 2019).

The Looming Military Dimension

With regard to the previous considerations, it has been obvious to many
analysts, Indians in particular, for some time, that China had a real
interest in an increased military presence in the Indian Ocean. The
Indian Ocean Region contributes about 20% of China’s international
trade in value terms, in large part because of its dependence on energy
and raw material over the Middle-East and Africa. It can be reasonably
argued that the BRI demonstrates that China is seeking dominant access
and influence through a new geographical contextualization of what
Indian analyst Raghavendra Mishra calls “Nareland” (Natural Resources
Land) (Sakhuja & Chan, 2016), that the factors of geo-economics are
the driver for its politics and security policy. But, it remains unclear
whether China intends to replace traditional great powers like the US,
by positioning itself as a viable alternative strategic partner. The extent
of this military presence, the nature of the activities that China intends to
conduct, the pace of its military build up, remain uncertain. A decade ago,
26 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

many expected China to develop its presence slowly, and were sceptical
about China’s intention to build up bases.
But the PLAN developed its military presence in the Indian Ocean
at a faster pace than expected. It deployed a nuclear submarine in the
Indian Ocean for the first time in 2013 (Flynn, 2014), a move followed by
two ports visits to Sri Lanka by a conventional submarine and its support
ship in 2014. The conduct of evacuation operation in Yemen, and the
opening of a base in Djibouti in 2017, indicate that China intends to play
a significant role in the area. It has also struck agreements giving it access
to bases and ports in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka and,
together with Russia, has conducted naval exercises with South Africa and
Iran, respectively in November and December 2019 (Upadhyaya, 2019).
Moreover, the ongoing build up of three aircraft carriers, initiated in
2015, demonstrates that over the past years, China has systematically
chosen the maximalist option in the build up of its naval capabilities. This
represents a significant departure from the gradual, incremental process
that characterized China’s approach to international relations since Mao’s
death. The PLA has acquired the rapid-reaction capabilities required
to support the BRI and more generally, safeguard China’s citizens and
interests. Whether it has other ambitions remains an open question.
Joshua T. White, former Senior Advisor and Director for South
Asian Affairs at the US. National Security Council, argues that the
PLAN pursues “five meta-mission objectives” in the Indian Ocean: “1)
conduct non-combat activities focused on protecting Chinese citizens and
investments, and bolstering China’s soft power influence; 2) undertake
counterterrorism activities, unilaterally or with partners, against organiza-
tions that threatens China; 3) collect intelligence in support of operational
requirements, and against key adversaries; 4) support efforts aimed at
coercive diplomacy towards small countries in the region; and 5) enable
effective operations in a conflict environment” (White, 2020). China
intends to hold at risk US or Indian assets in the event of a wider conflict
and develops its ability to deter, mitigate, or terminate a state-sponsored
interdiction of trade.
White also points the deployment of a number of surface assets such as
guided missiles cruisers, destroyers, frigates, large amphibious transports
docks an emerging fleet of even larger amphibious assault ships, as well
as support and auxiliary vessels, while the PLA Air Force is expanding
its long range airlift fleet (White, 2020). Although there is still some
discrepancy between the missions the PLAN has been asked to pursue and
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 27

its actual capabilities, the latter are definitely consistent with the stated
objectives and constitute already a significant force. Moreover, if they
are consistent with non-combatant operations, questions can be raised
about the nature of the threat they are supposed to address. Counter-
piracy, for example, is no longer a major issue in the Gulf of Aden.
This did not prevent China from deploying a guided missile destroyer
(The Taiyan), as well as a frigate (The Jingzhou) as well as some 690
naval personnel, during the COVID 19 crisis, for the protection of ships
and vessels passing through the region, at a time when the Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau’s reported zero hijacking during the preceding
two quarters (Kumar, 2020).
Although they publicly maintain the fiction that China’s naval presence
is solely in the interest of the common good and the legitimate defence
of Chinese interests, officials and experts are increasingly open about
the fact that if the US can maintain overseas bases, then so can China.
Counter-piracy has indeed been an alibi for China to justify its presence
on distant shores and train its blue water navy. Interestingly the PLAN
has routinely deployed diesel-electric submarines (SSK) in the Indian
Ocean, officially for counter-piracy operations, but in reality, according
to French analyst Iskander Rehman, to both accustom its submariners
to distant sea lane protection and surface group defence, as well as
to gain a better understanding of the Indian Ocean complex environ-
ment, and map the northern Indian Ocean underwater topography “with
future submarine operations in mind” (Brewster, 2018). They may have
also assessed the vulnerabilities of underseas cables (White, 2020). The
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) deployed in the Indian Ocean in
December 2019 (Shukla, 2020) are meant to perform the same kind of
tasks. Both submarines and UUVs provide China with intelligence about
the operations conducted by the other navies in the Indian Ocean.
Such activities are not exclusive to the PLAN and have been performed
by other navies in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere. But they are a
clear indication that China’s actual intentions go far beyond its stated
limited objectives. They also indicate that China seems to look increas-
ingly towards establishing some form of geostrategic parity (Mahadevan,
2014).
28 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

Changing the Nature of the Strategic

Issue in the Indian Ocean
China’s military build up in the Indian Ocean, although the most spec-
tacular, is only one facet of Beijing’s attempt to change the strategic
landscape in the Indian Ocean. Most of the debate on maritime security in
the IOR has been framed in terms of freedom of navigation and focused
essentially on the protection of the Sea Lines of Communication. But,
although this is a legitimate concern, everyone, including China, has a
stake in maintaining international shipping.
China has obviously no interest in risking the interruption of the flow
of energy from the Middle-East and Africa. It is, however, blurring the
lines. Most of the port infrastructures it is building in the Indian Ocean
are dual-use facilities, which can be utilized for both commercial and
military purposes, which make them useful vectors of influence or even
control when massive debts are turned into equity. The impact of the
so-called “debt trap strategy” has been so far limited to Sri Lanka with
the port of Hambantota but could be extended. The calculation may
be different for marine-based resources extraction, whether it is fishing,
seabed mining or oil and gas extraction but China follows the same
pattern of action, advancing its geostrategic interests, through various
economic activities.
No other activity illustrates the geostrategic dimension of these
economic activities as well as fisheries. No country has utilized fishing
for geostrategic gains like China has. And although the phenomenon is
more obvious in the South China Sea, fisheries have been a very effi-
cient instrument of China’s penetration of the East African littoral and
the South-west Indian Ocean. A relatively recent example illustrates the
point.
On September 5, 2018, China and Madagascar signed a framework
agreement on the blue economy, during the Forum on Sino-African
Cooperation, held in Beijing. Worth $2.7 billion the agreement was
concluded for ten years. It covered five essential areas for the Mala-
gasy fishing economy: the construction of shipyards, the development of
fishing, the creation of aquaculture farms, control of illegal and illegal
fishing and the creation of maritime training centres (Cherel & Hussenot-
Desenonges, 2019). However, 700 million dollars were to be devoted
over three years to the exploitation of the fishery resources of Malagasy
territorial waters, in return for Chinese investments. 330 Chinese trawlers
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 29

would have been armed for this purpose for annual catches unofficially
estimated at 130,000 tons. Signed two days before the resignation of
President Rajaonarimampianina left to campaign, contested for its opaque
and oversized nature—the agreement was never made public while its
implementation would have amounted to doubling the tonnage of catches
taken annually in the Malagasy Exclusive Economic Zone, even though
Madagascar did not have the capacity for real stock assessments to be
carried out. The project very quickly encountered opposition from fishing
communities, scientists and more generally from civil society. The project
was suspended after the election of a new president.
If carried out, the agreement would have deprived Madagascar of some
precious halieutic resources, but also provided China with direct and
indirect means of control on Madagascar Exclusive Economic Zone, exac-
erbating moreover the tensions between Madagascar and France over the
Scattered islands in which water Malagasy fishermen would inevitably have
been pushed, weakening at the same time French and Western influence at
a time when China is trying to assert its influence over the Mozambique
channel.
The combination of economic concerns backed up by military means,
is not a new phenomenon. The novelty resides in the fact that the
Chinese fishing fleet is being used as a substitute for the PLAN. Chinese
fishing flotillas are acting as unofficial militias, which, used opportunis-
tically, provide China with control and influence over areas China is
preying. Similarly, Chinese fishing vessels, as well as other civilian ships,
are also used for intelligence collection. India regularly reports the pres-
ence of Chinese vessels fishing illegally near the coast of Maharashtra
while a number of studies point out that these vessels often do not keep
their Automatic Identification System (AIS) despite the fact that this is
mandatory under international law (Bhatt, 2020).
China has in fact used all categories of civilian vessels as potential
informants. Oceanographic research is one such example. It does provide
information useful to both civilian research and military planners and
China has been investing massively in the field over the past few years
(Martinson & Dutton, 2018). The bulk of China’s out of area research
activities is taking place between the First and Second chain of islands in
the Pacific but the Indian Ocean is also part of its target list. In December
2019 one such Chinese research vessel was intercepted near the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands and forced out of the territorial water by the Indian
Navy (Bhatt, 2020).
30 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

China’s Indian Ocean Diplomacy

Most of the debate about China’s diplomacy and quest for influence in the
Indian Ocean has focused on the BRI and its militarization. The debate
around the BRI is usually articulated around the so-called “Debt trap
diplomacy”, the idea that the BRI could ensnare participating countries
into so much debt that their only option would be to cede their sovereign
rights to China in exchange for its use of their infrastructure and terri-
tory (Samaranayake, 2019). Indeed the hunger of many littoral states of
the Indian Ocean for infrastructure financing greatly facilitated China’s
presence and influence in the region. Militarization on the other side, is
usually examined through the prism of great power rivalry, in particular
China–US or China–India relations.

China’s Engagement with the Smaller Indian Ocean States

China’s engagement with smaller Indian Ocean states deserves to be
examined in this context. Following the inauguration of the BRI in 2013,
China promoted its relations with four small island states, (Sri Lanka,
the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles) to unprecedented levels with
the expectation that they would “play the role of China’s natural part-
ners” (Ren, 2020). More than 50 high-level visits (ministerial level and
above) between China and the four island states have taken place since
the launching of the BRI in 2013 (Ren, 2020).
Geographically, these four island states protect the Sea Lines of
Communications. Sri Lanka and the Maldives are sitting astride the most
direct route between China and the Middle-East while Mauritius and
the Seychelles are located on the Asia-Africa sea routes. Unsurprisingly
China sees its relations with the island states as a worthwhile investment
to safeguard its energy security and economic interests.
China also sees the four island states as potential leverage points in
its competition with the US and India. Having a base on the periphery
of India would unquestionably help China increase India’s vulnerability.
China has indeed been trying to acquire facilities in the vicinity of India
for decades. In 1986, it attempted to buy one of the Maldives islands on
lease. In December 2011, China announced that it would set up its first
military base abroad in Seychelles. It never retracted from this project but
military analysts later declared that the planned facility did not amount to
a military base (Shubham, 2018). Officially, China was simply considering
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 31

seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbours in order to support its

anti-piracy activities.
The four island states also have a political value for China and hold
the key to Beijing’s participation in the existing regional or subregional
organizations. Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles are
all members of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Mauritius
and the Seychelles are also members of the Indian Ocean Commission
(COI) a much smaller, yet more effective, intergovernmental organiza-
tion bringing together five francophone member states of the South-west
Indian Ocean: the Union of Comoros, France (because of La Réunion),
Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles. China is an important dialogue
partner of the IORA and an observer at COI which borders the Mozam-
bique channel.
In this perspective, and even though they vary greatly by country, trade
and infrastructure projects, as well as financial contributions to regional
organizations, have been effective vectors of Beijing’s influence. But a
careful examination of the actual relationships between China and these
states demonstrates that this influence is not the mechanical result of some
neglect by the Western or even neighbouring powers. Interestingly, China
is not a top export destination for any of these small states, all eager to
trade with the US and have a long established economic relationship with
India. However, China is the largest export destination for Sri Lanka and
the third largest for the Maldives which has also been the first small South
Asian state to sign a free trade agreement in 2017 (Samaranayake, 2019).
China’s penetration of the island states’ economies is deepest in
terms of cooperation on development for which they lack the necessary
financing, while sometimes no longer eligible for concessional assistance
thanks to their own economic success. Sri Lanka, often cited as the case
of a debt trapped country, reflects this dynamic. As the country transi-
tioned from a low to middle-income status, it lost access to concessional
resources from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
Sri Lanka had no choice but to seek commercial loans at commercial
interest rates and shorter repayment schedules to finance its infrastruc-
ture projects. In the Hambantota port project, its inability to generate
enough revenue to repay in US dollars, the country had to lease the port
for 99 years. Not all cases are obviously that dramatic but as US analyst
Nilanthi Samaranayake points out “transitioning middle-income countries
that achieve their next-step income goals, like Sri Lanka, are inadver-
tently penalized: they continue to have development priorities but have
32 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

less access to grants and concessional loan terms to finance their infras-
tructure” (Samaranayake, 2019). It is important to note in this context,
that, irrespective of the value they attach to their development projects,
smaller Indian Ocean states, in particular the island states, “usually view
China as a fall-back option and not necessarily as a partner of first choice”
(Samaranayake, 2019).
Other, more political, dimensions also have to be taken into account.
China’s political engagement with the island states is seen by the latter
as an opportunity to get better terms in their exchanges with the
larger powers. China is investing politically, economically and strategically,
patiently cultivating countries with financial vulnerabilities, thus estab-
lishing the elements of a long-term presence and influence, which other
large regional states like India are trying to counter. This emerging multi-
polarity is seen as a blessing by most island states which suddenly saw
themselves courted by all the protagonists.

Federating the Revisionist Powers of the Indian Ocean: Pakistan,

Russia and Iran
Federating the revisionist powers in the Indian Ocean around its own
agenda, even if only partially, is another dimension of China’s regional
policy. Whatever the motivations of the frustrated partners, China is keen
to pay on the existing convergences even if they do not fully coincide.
Pakistan, Russia and Iran are the three most salient examples of this
convergence.
China’s partnership with Pakistan is unquestionably the oldest Beijing
ever held in the region. Founded on a shared enmity with India, “Bei-
jing’s secretive ties with Islamabad have run closer than most formal
alliances” (Small, 2015) and has, in the early 1980s, transferred to
Pakistan the technology and materials allowing it to build its own nuclear
bomb. Indeed, because of its conflict with India, Pakistan is also seen as a
useful instrument in Beijing’s rivalry with New Delhi. China, on the other
side, is seen by Pakistan as a potential exporter of development infrastruc-
ture, a diplomatic protector, and a security guarantor, thanks to its arms
sales and diplomatic protection (Small, 2015). In spite of this, China is
cautious in its approach to Pakistan. Beijing is willing to use Pakistan as a
leverage against Delhi but does not trust Pakistan and is unwilling to let
it dictate the terms of its relationship with India. China is also unwilling
to support Pakistan’s adventurism and will protect the country only as
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 33

long as China’s own interests are not affected (Tellis et al., 2020). But,
as observed by US-based analyst Andrew Small, Pakistan now lies at the
heart of China’s potential connection between the energy rich Middle-
East and Western China, and constitutes an asset to China to navigate its
interests in the Middle-East. As a result, Pakistan is gradually becoming a
staging post for China’s take off as a naval power.
However, Pakistan is no longer China’s sole partner in the Indian
Ocean. Nor is India the only hurdle to Beijing’s ambitions in a region
where the US is still seen as a dominant power. Their common opposi-
tion to the West in general and Washington in particular has therefore led
to a growing naval cooperation between China and Russia in the Indian
Ocean.
Russia has a long history in the Indian Ocean. In the 1970s and 1980s,
the Soviet Union had constituted a clientele of littoral states in order to
reduce Western regional influence. Interestingly, this policy also included
a strong anti-China component. As a result of the Sino-Soviet split of
1969, the USSR’s strategy had aimed at completing China’s encirclement
in the South. Moscow had thus conducted a very active naval diplomacy
in the region and ensured a permanent naval presence in the Indian
Ocean, as well as a network of logistical support facilities (Delcorde,
1993).3 Subsequent attempts at a rapprochement led to ups and downs in
the relationship and were hampered by the collapse of the Soviet Union,
which the Chinese blamed on Mikhail Gorbachev. It was not until 1996
that bilateral relations started to develop significantly, when the coun-
tries announced their commitment to develop a “strategic partnership”
(Dueben, 2013). Opposition to the US gradually became the core of
their cooperation.
However, naval cooperation did not take off until 2012 when China
and Russia started holding joint naval drills in the Pacific. This was
followed in 2015, by another joint exercise in the Mediterranean Sea,
in 2016 in the South China Sea and in 2017 by yet another joint naval
drill in the Baltic Sea (Higgins, 2017). In 2019, Beijing and Moscow
decided to extend their cooperation to the Indian Ocean where they
conducted two trilateral exercises with South Africa and Iran, respectively
on November 28, 2019 (China Ministry of National Defense, 2019), and
December 27 (Westcolt & Alkhshali, 2019).

3 Camran Bay in Vietnam, Chennaï and Mumbaï in India, Berbera in Somalia were
among those. It also tried to obtain mooring rights in Maldives and the Seychelles.
34 F. GRARE AND J.-L. SAMAAN

The exercise with Russia and South Africa involved the PLA Navy’s
type 054A frigate Weifang, the Russian Navy’s Salava-class missile cruiser
Marshal Ustinov, Kaliningradneft-class medium seagoing tanker Vyaz’ma,
and rescue tug SB-406 as well as South Africa’s Valour-class frigate
SAS Amatola, and SAS Drakensberg, a fleet replenishment ship (China
Ministry of National Defense, 2019). Behind the generic term of interop-
erability, the exercise was limited to formation maneuver, surface gunnery
exercises and helicopter cross-deck landings, and their military significance
should not be over-interpreted.
The political convergence of the three actors should not be exagger-
ated either. China-Russia cooperation in the Indian Ocean is no different
from the overall bilateral relationship which has often been described as
nothing more than a relationship of convenience. Their common and
growing interest for Africa hardly hides equally growing competition for
the African markets, ranging from the supply of nuclear-power plants to
small arms. South Africa’s military partnerships on the other side remain
predominantly with NATO and NATO members. Even the common
membership of the three countries to the BRICS cannot be seen as truly
significant in this context as the latter has become essentially an adjust-
ment mechanism of China’s bilateral relations (Bobo Lo, 2016) with each
BRICS member. If it is a useful instrument to manage potential bilateral
contradictions, it hardly reflects a common vision. Yet the trilateral exer-
cise was a political signal sent to all Indian Ocean states, to assert China
and Russia’s presence on the Mozambique channel whose strategic signifi-
cance is growing, as well as, more importantly, to demonstrate their ability
to project power in the region.
The trilateral exercise held in December 2019 by the two countries
with Iran in the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean under the code name
“Marine Security Belt” had an even more specific significance. The exer-
cise focused on joint rescue and anti-piracy operations and was presented
by the Iranian command as evidence that the “maritime security [could]
be established by the Islamic Republic of Iran and its allies and [that]
there [was] no need for the presence of foreign forces, especially Ameri-
cans, in the region” (Pars Today, 2020). China and Russia however were
more cautious in their comments.
It is unclear whether the joint drill indicated a change in China’s
Middle-East policy. Beijing’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has steadily
intensified while China has managed its relationships with Tehran very
carefully, getting politically closer but delaying Iran’s request to become
 2 THE ADVENT OF CHINA’S INDIAN OCEAN STRATEGY 35

a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and

curbing economic activities with Iran in 2019 to comply with new US
sanctions (Eurasia Review, 2020). Interestingly, China has become a
supplier of arms to Iran to which it delivers air defence systems, jet
fighters, missile boats and submarines, even though Russia remains Iran’s
first choice when it comes to arm purchases. Growing opposition to the
US, which has risen further during the presidency of Donald Trump is
the only obvious convergence between the three countries (Rajagopalan,
2019). Patiently, alone or in partnership with Russia, China mobilizes the
littoral states of the Indian Ocean which, although for different reasons,
feel they are insufficiently taken in consideration, or unfairly treated, by
the main actors of the Indian Ocean.

The Future of China’s

Presence in the Indian Ocean
China is following in the footpath of the rising powers and is expanding
its military missions to match its interests. The concerns of the Chinese
government regarding the security of the sea lines of communication
increase with the growth of its economic dependence vis-à-vis the regional
sources of energy and raw material. As a result China’s forays in the Indian
Ocean have raised alarm and triggered a series of warnings among the
littoral states as well as external actors.
China’s presence in the Indian Ocean has led to a greater milita-
rization of the region. Many littoral and non-littoral states have sought
to increase their coastal and long range defence capabilities. China, but
also India, Pakistan—all nuclear powers—and others are among them. It
is also noticeable that the most advanced naval assets are concentrated
in the North of the Indian Ocean. Over the years the Indian Ocean
has witnessed a qualitative and quantitative strengthening of submarine
forces, the development of anti-ship and land attack cruise missiles, with a
focus on traditional area denial capabilities, the implementation of better
surveillance systems (satellite, radars, UAVs), intended to increase naval
forces vulnerability and the deployment of air force able to operate against
more remote targets (French Ministry of Armed Forces, 2018). More
worrisome however is the fact that these developments take place in a
context of growing polarization, between the US and China, but also
between India and China, while traditional disputes, in particular between
India and Pakistan, or Iran and the US remain unsolved. The political