Component-I (A) – Personal details:

Prof. P. Bhaskar Reddy

Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati.

Prof. K. Srinivas
Pondicherry University, Puducherry.

Prof. K. Srinivas
Pondicherry University, Puducherry.

Prof. G. Vedaparayana (Rtd.)

Sri Venkateswara University, Tirupati
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Component-I (B) – Description of module:

Subject Name Indian Culture

Paper Name Indian Religion and Philosophy

Module Name/Title Mīmāmsā

Module Id IC / IRP / 12.1

Pre requisites Knowledge of Classical Indian Philosophy

Objectives To study epistemology, metaphysics and soteriology

of Mīmāmsā

Keywords Vedas, Karmakāṅḑa, Pramāņas, Karma, Dharma

E-Text (Quadrant-I):

1. Introduction

Mīmāmsā is also known as Pūrva Mīmāmsā and is known for its ethical action. It gives lot
of importance to ritual aspect of the Vedas. The commentators on ethical codes often
refer to the methods of Mīmāmsā for interpreting their texts and for applying them for
concrete cases. The literature on Mīmāmsā is very vast and it is mainly composed by the
sage Jaimini in his Mīmāmsāsūtras. They are written in a aphoristic style. The ideas
expounded in his work must be much older than Jaimini. The two great philosophers who
developed Jaimini’s Mīmāmsā-sūtras are Kumārila and Prabhākara who lived during 7th
and 8th centuries A.D. But one does not find any agreement between these two great
Mīmāmsā philosophers.

The Mīmāmsā advocates the philosophy of ethical action. According to this school, ethical
action is something indispensable and inescapable for every agent of action. Ethical
action according to this school is the supreme governing force of the universe. It gives
primacy to the agent of ethical action and every action performed by a moral agent is real.
Every ethical action must be the controlling and the guiding force of the universe. Then
the universe as the field of action is also real. The objective of Mīmāmsā is to defend the
above mentioned presuppositions. The ethical action, according to Mīmāmsā, is ultimate

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and it takes the place of God. In pure activism the agent of action is not given any
importance but the ethical action is something ultimate. But Mīmāmsā does not advocate
such ethical action for it gives utmost importance to the agent of action.

The central concept of Mīmāmsā is the concept of dharma. It is dharma (ethical potency
or force or power of merit and demerit) that controls and regulates the universe. It
produces for the agent of action what he or she desires and what his/her action deserves.
This is the reason why Jaimini starts his work with an aphorism, according to which ‘now
starts the enquiry into the nature of dharma.’ Mīmāmsā epistemology and metaphysics are
developed in this direction.

Although Mīmāmsā upholds ethical activism, it gives utmost importance to action as a

governing force of the universe. In fact, action in Mīmāmsā takes the place of God. It is
not a mere simple activism. It considers an individual as an agent of action and every
action is ultimately real. In pure activism the agent is not considered very important for
action is everything. This is the position advocated by Nairukta. This is not the case with
Mīmāmsā. According to this school, action determines what an agent of action attains.
The responsibility of action is fixed with the agent. The merit or demerit, the reward or
punishment is not attributed to the action but to the agent. Therefore, the agent of action is
as real as that of an action.

One of the most salient features of Mīmāmsā is its adherence to the concept of dharma. It
is dharma that controls the universe. It provides the agent of action what he desires and
what his action deserves. In other words the dharma of Mīmāmsā is to uphold ethical
action. The epistemology and metaphysics of Mīmāmsā are developed in support of this
view.

2. Epistemology

Being a philosophy of action Mīmāmsā admits the reality of the agent (individual) and his
actions. Therefore it builds its epistemology in support of realism. The contributions of
Mīmāmsā to epistemology are very significant for they are even accepted by the followers
of Śankara. Mīmāmsā accepted certain sources of knowledge (pramāņas) as valid for
they reveal the world as it is. Hearsay and rumour are not valid sources of knowledge. In
all it accepts six valid sources of knowledge. They are: perception (pratyakşa), inference
(anumāna), verbal testimony (śabda), comparison (upamāna), presupposition or
postulation (arthāpatti), and non-cognition (anupalabdhi). The Bhātta Mīmāmsā accepts all
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these, but Prābhākara Mīmāmsā admits only five but not non-cognition. It is clubbed with
perception.

2.1. Perception ( pratyakşa)

It is a direct form of knowledge obtained through senses and mind. The senses come into
contact with the objects, mind with senses, and the ātman with mind. When mind and
senses come into contact knowledge arises. Otherwise the ātman as such is
consciousness. The internal objects such as pains and pleasures are known directly by
mind without the aid of any sense organ. To this extent one does not find much difference
between the doctrines of Nyāya and Mīmāmsā. Similarly, the distinction between
indeterminate (nirvikalapa) and determinate (savikalpa) forms of perception is also
accepted by Mīmāmsā. In the case of indeterminate perception the object perceived is not
conceptualised therefore its identity is not known. But in the case of determinate
perception the object perceived is conceptualised therefore its identity is known to the
perceiver. In other words, in the indeterminate form of perception the knowledge of
universal is not involved whereas in the determinate form of perception the knowledge of
the universal is involved.

2.2. Inference(anumāna)

The Mīmāmsā theory of inference is akin to that of Aristotle’s. In Indian epistemology, the
inference covers only syllogistic reasoning but not the entire thought process. In Indian
logic in general the major premise has to be accompanied by an example. The major
premise as a universal proposition is a true induction. The universal relationship between
the middle and major terms is that cause and effect, whole and part, substance and
quality, class and individual. Mīmāmsā admits two forms of inference. They are: 1.
inference for oneself and, 2. inference for others. In the first case there is no need to state
all the premises.

2.3.Comparison (upamāna)

One does not deliberately compare two objects. Mīmāmsā does not use comparison for
this purpose. It is a spontaneous cognitive process in which one observes similarity
between two objects. When a person sees a water buffalo for the first time he makes an
effort to see the similarity between it and a bison. This similarity makes him remember a
bison. Such a memory is neither voluntary nor involuntary. It is the observed similarity that

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takes one back to his memory to show a relation between two objects, namely, one that is
being perceived and the one which was perceived in the past. Similarity is not an object of
inference for it does not involve any syllogism. Therefore, the cognition of similarity is a
special kind of cognitive process in that the mind has the inbuilt capacity to identify
similarities between objects.

2.4. Postulation or Presupposition (arthāpatti)

This is another important source of knowledge. We posit something in order to make a

particular unit of cognition complete. We admit a fact or principle for explaining an
undeniable fact. Take the case of Newton’s explanation of gravitational pull by seeing a
falling apple. Our understanding of a given fact becomes incomplete without accepting the
truth of something unobserved. That something unobserved is postulated or presupposed.
This is also a spontaneous cognitive process of human mind. For instance, we observed a
person being fat, but person does not eat during the daytime. Then we presuppose that
the person in question compensates it during night-time for otherwise he or she cannot be
fat. So postulation is a distinctive kind of cognition by way of which we obtain the
knowledge of the world.

Kumārila Bhatta recognised two forms of postulation. They are: 1. the postulation to
explain something observed and, 2. postulation for making the meaning of the words
intelligible. In the first case what is postulated may be observed or unobserved. The
second kind of postulation is the postulation of meaning of a word. When metaphors are
used in a sentence like “He is a cunning jackal”, it is not that he is an animal but his
behaviour is identified with the behaviour of jackal in the sense he is very diplomatic. Here
the word ‘jackal’ is understood for diplomacy to make the sentence intelligible.

2.5. Non-Cognition (anupalabdhi)

This source of knowledge is popularly known as non-apprehension or non-cognition. It

should not be interpreted as the absence of knowledge but it is the cognition of the
absence or negation of an object. When someone says that ‘There is no television in this
room’, the person in question is obviously referring the an object, which is not present
there. Thus such knowledge can be treated as the knowledge of absence. However, one
must have mentally or conceptually imagined a television before its non-existence. In the
world of plurality several things exist. We not only perceive the things that do not exist too
alongside those things that exist. Therefore, the knowledge of absence becomes the part
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our scheme of knowledge. But Prabhākara rejects it on the ground that absence is not a
positive entity. Therefore one cannot have a cognition of what does not exist. Instead he
brings it under the category of inference (anumāna).

2.6.Verbal Testimony and Language (śabda)

This is the knowledge obtained through words. The knowledge obtained by me when a
friend of mine says “This is a raven” is the knowledge obtained not through sounds but by
words. Thus the words have two faces. On one hand they are the sounds captured by the
sense of hearing. Thus they are the objects of perception. But on the other side they
mean objects or facts other than themselves. These objects or facts are not perceived by
our hearing sense, but yet cognised by the words. The words cannot be understood by a
deaf man. But normal men without any hearing disability would certainly know what they
mean. Thus verbal knowledge becomes a distinct way of knowing. It cannot be brought
under inference. One cannot understand the meaning of the word ‘ raven’ through
inference for there is no major premise here. There is also no invariable perceivable link
between the word ‘raven’ and the object raven. Therefore, for the first time when we
understand the meaning of a word it is not through inference but through a person. But
verbal knowledge can be false like any other form of knowledge. There is a possibility that
the person who is reliable in communicating knowledge may falter at times. So the
speaker must be reliable and his interpretation must be authentic. Since the Vedas
consists of words the person who conveys the meanings of these Vedic expressions must
be a reliable one. Therefore, semantics and the philosophy of language is so important for
Mīmāmsā. Since the Vedic words are eternal so also their meanings. Words other than
the Vedic ones are conventional and therefore their meanings have been fixed
conventionally. The Veda being infallible, it does not give any scope for any unauthentic
interpretation. It is not written by any person. It is eternally present in the universe, but the
Veda is revealed to those deserving persons whose names are found in the Vedic texts.
The revelation is done through the Vedic Sānskrit which is an eternal language.

Unlike Nyāya, Mīmāmsā does not regard all the words as eternal. According to this school
the conventional ones are derived from eternal words, but they are not eternal like the
Vedic words. Also, it is held by the Mīmāmsā that there is no special word-pattern apart
from the word. The word consists of letters and every word is made of letters. So there is

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no letter pattern apart from the letter-sounds. Every word directly refers to an universal
(jāti). The particular can be referred to the word only through the universal.

2.7. Validity of Knowledge

Sometimes we get a doubt whether what we perceived is true and is there really an object
to be perceived. Knowing is a form of human consciousness, and the form of knowledge
and its nature are both forms of consciousness. We know objects only through
consciousness. Therefore we have to accept the reality of objects as they appear to some
form of our consciousness. But is it necessary that every object given to one’s
consciousness real? Therefore, there is a need to determine what forms of process of
consciousness are valid. There are immediate and mediate forms of cognition. The
doctrine of determining the different valid forms of knowledge is called the doctrine of
pramāņas. According to Kumārila, the means of cognition and its result are two different
things. But for Prabhākara they are one and same. The form of perceiving includes the
result of perceiving. If result is the same as the process, contends Kumārila, then there is
no difference between inference and perception. However, when it comes to the validity of
knowledge both Kumārila and Prabhākara admit self-validity of knowledge (svatah
prāmāņyavāda). The reliability of consciousness has to be accepted by all
epistemologists. Even if knowledge is false sometime it is not due to consciousness but
because of some external factors. Falsity is due to other reasons but not because of
perceptual processes. The doctrine of invalidity is called the doctrine of invalidity due to
other (paratah apramāņyavāda). Therefore, the truth of any cognition is revealed by the
cognition itself. The falsity of any cognition is revealed by some other cognition. A true
cognition is never made true by any other cognition, but only confirmed by subsequent
cognition. But the falsity of any cognition is not revealed through itself, but through
second cognition that contradicts it.

3. Metaphysics

The metaphysics of Mīmāmsā is fundamentally the metaphysics of ethical action.

Therefore, it is both qualitatively and quantitatively pluralistic. However, Mīmāmsā’s
interest is in the efficacy of an ethical action. The efficacy of ethical action is viewed as
God himself by Mīmāmsā. The efficacy of an ethical action is the force that creates forms
of the world. It is the controller of the world and its organizer. However, the plurality of
ātmans and the things of the world are real. The world is meant for action and is created
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by action. There is no life, no future for man without action. Action is the most important
aspect of human life. An individual makes or unmakes his destiny only through action.

3.1. Dharma

Dharma is the central issue for Mīmāmsā. It is that which supports the universe. Dharma
is that which holds plurality together. Without dharma the manifold world falls apart.
Dharma is the grandest conception of the sovereignty of ethical action. According to
Jaimini dharma is that which impels man to perform action. The followers of Jaimini,
Kumārila and Prabhākara accepted this definition without any modification. Mīmāmsā
holds that ethical action is that which answers the Vedic injunction. But what is that impels
man to resort to action? Anything good must be achieved only through action and is also
dharma. In other words action is identified with dharma in Mīmāmsā. Dharma, in other
words, brings forth the desired fruit of action. If the dharma is ethically right then the fruit
that it produces is enjoyable. If it is ethically wrong then it brings forth suffering, hence
called adharma.

Dharma is a potential force (śakti) popularly known as merit or demerit. These two are the
only good and bad qualities attributed to humans by God or society because of the kind of
actions they perform. Theistic schools like Nyāya hold that it is God who rewards or
punishes people according to their merit and demerit. But it is dharma which takes the
place of God in Mīmāmsā. Dharma as a potency is the unseen force (adŗşta). This force
resides in the ātman of the agent. It controls and determines the future life of the ātman in
this life and also in future lives. Therefore, for Mīmāmsā the doctrine of karma is the
doctrine of dharma. Both karma and dharma are associated with commandments.

Further Mīmāmsā classifies action into three kinds. They are: obligatory actions which are
to be performed by every individual because he is a man. For example, one has to repay
the debts as a householder. If every individual performs his obligatory actions towards
other men, society and universe he may not derive any special merit for that. Prohibited
actions are those that produce demerit, but their non-performance does not produce any
merit. This is the second category. The third category of actions is that the actions which
are optional. When an individual seeks some special reaward one has to perform them.

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3.2. Ātman

The Mīmāmsā admits the reality of ātman. It is something different from mind (manas),
senses and physical body. It is the same as I-consciousness (ahmadhī). This is what is
known as Brahman according to the Upanişads. There are plurality of ātmans. All of them
are responsible for their own actions. Each ātman is individual and infinite. Yet ātmans
can exist together. Consciousness is not the essential nature of ātman but arises in it
when it comes into contact with mind. Although consciousness is an adventitious quality of
ātman, according to Mīmāmsā, yet it is treated as seer, doer, and enjoyer. We cannot
attribute the qualities of seeing, doing, and enjoying to mind, senses or physical body.
Mīmāmsā holds that ātman being the subject knows the object which is independent of it.
Then there is also knowldge of object. This is possessed by ātman alone. Thus we come
to know the existence of ātman.

4. Liberation (mukti)

Mīmāmsā does not admit the role of God in liberation for it completely dispenses with the
role of God as creator. The world, according to this school, does neither have beginning
nor end. Since the Vedas are eternal there is no need for God to create them. God is not
required as a supervisor on the Earth. Of the four values of human life the first three alone
were originally accepted by Jaimini. They are: wealth (artha), enjoyment (kāma) and
righteousness (dharma). The fourth one mokşa was accepted later on by Kumārila and
Prabhākara. But later Mīmāmsākas admitted the reality of the God as the author of the
Veda and turned out to be theistic. Originally Mīmāmsā looked down upon the notion of
liberation. One has to follow the injunctions of the Veda for right ethical action. Thus man
is destined to live a life of action in every possible birth. But the ethically good would attain
heaven. But it is a state of undiluted intense pleasure and is the reward of ethically good
life. The ideal of life for Mīmāmsā is a life of continuous ethical activity and enjoyment of
its fruits.

5. Summary

Mīmāmsā is committed to the philosophy of ethical action. It abides by the karmakānda of

the Veda. Thus it is one of the most orthodox schools of Indian philosophical systems. By
following the injunctions of the Veda one resorts to pure ethical action. It is through this
action every individual attains heaven which is a state of undiluted intense pleasure.
There is nothing but action to be performed.
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