INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
G. Mishra
Introduction
An important and common axiom of Indian Philosophy is that any
given object of knowledge is determined by a process of knowledge,
mānādhinā meyasiddhih. All objects of knowledge can be subsumed
under the individual (jīva), the world (jagat). Since objects of knowledge
correspond to the means by which we come to know them, means which
are under the direct command of the mind, knowledge necessitates an
enquiry into the mind (māna) prior to an investigation of an object
(meya). Epistemological tools are designed to determine the nature and
status of objects as well as metaphysical realities. In Indian Philosophy,
the technical term used in this context is pramana, meaning, a means or
source of knowledge. The generic term for epistemology in Sanskrit is
thus pramāna-vicāra.
Why should we begin with pramāna-vicāra? Questioning the way
knowledge is obtained is necessary prior to investigating and attempting
to determine the nature of objects and phenomena. This is done through
establishing the means of knowing, technically named pramāṇa. Any
claim to knowledge must be supported by authority, which is pramāṇa.
The Mimāmsaka claim about the existence of heaven (svarga) is based on
the authority of Vedic revelation (Sruti-pramāna). The claim of the
presence of a fire on a mountaintop, where smoke alone is seen, is based
on the authority of inference (anumāna-pramāna). In fact, any claim to
knowledge must be grounded in some pramāṇa. The word pramāṇa may
be analysed as: Prama-karanam pramanam (that which is a means to
2
knowledge is known as pramāṇa). The knowledge obtained through a
pramāṇa is called pramā.
The term jñāna is often coined with the same meaning as pramā,.
However, strictly speaking, jñāna means cognition and does not always
denotes--as in the case of pramā--valid knowledge. If Pramā always
refers to valid knowledge, Jñāna does not. The latter may indicate valid,
invalid or doubtful knowledge (samsaya-jñāna, asamsaya-jñāna,
viparyaya-jñāna). The number of pramāṇas varies from school to school.
For the materialist school (Cārvāka), perception (pratyakùa) is the sole
accepted source of knowledge. Buddhist and Vai÷eùika schools accept
two pramāṇas, perception and inference (Anumāna). The traditions of
Sāmkhya and Yoga accept the latter two pramāṇas as well as testimony
(Sabda). The Nyāya school accepts the last three and comparison
(upamana) too. In Purvamīmāmsā, the teacher Prabhakara accepts the
above four pramāṇas and adds postulation (arthāpatt). The teacher
Bhāñña accepts a sixth pramāṇa called non-cognition (anupalabdhi). The
Advaita school of thought also accepts these six pramāṇas but only from
the viewpoint of empirical reality (vyavahāre bhāññanayaþ). The
Visistādvaita and Dvaita schools of Vedanta accept three pramāṇas,
perception, inference, and testimony, which include Sruti and Smrti
texts).
Each of the above school discusses, at great lengths, the reasons for its
accepting or rejecting certain means of knowledge. The interpretive and
reasoning tools that the Mīmāmsa and the Nyāya school provide
respectively, are particularly relevant to the study of scriptures and thus,
for that of all schools of Vedanta.
3
In interpreting texts, one must consider the law of parsimony, that is to
say, the economy in the use of words. When violated, it may lead to
fallacies (doùas) named lāghava (too narrow) or gaurava.1
Different views with regard to the definition of pramā:
1. In Buddhism - pramā corresponds to the western pragmatic theory of
truth/knowledge.
2. In Nyaya - pramā parallels the correspondence theory of truth.
3. In Samkhya- pramā relates to the coherence theory of truth.
4. In AdvaitaVedanta - none of the above.
The Buddhist view - A true cognition is one which leads to successful
activity (arthakriyakaritvam). This view is reminiscent to the pragmatic
theory of truth of William James. This view is fallacious since a cognition
which leads to successful activity, may turn out to be false. For instance,
we all mistakenly perceive the sun as rising and thus proceed to act.
Every case of successful activity is thus not correlated to a true cognition.
The Nyaya view- More or less, Nyaya sees knowledge in a way that is
suggestive of the correspondence theory of truth.2
A true cognition is that in which a given object is cognized as it is and at
the place which it actually occupies (yatra yadasti, tatra tasya anubhavaþ
pramā). In the West, philosophers who belong to the school of realism
have also formulated this theory. This formulation is not without
difficulties. How can there be real correspondence between knowledge
and objects? Similarity or correspondence between two objects outside of
1
. ativyapti, avyapti asambhava-rahitatvam laksana-laksanam.
2
. Visistadvaita gives its own formulation of prama as yathavasthittta-vyavahara-
anugunam jnanam prama.
4
ourselves is possible, even two ideas can be compared. But how can
knowledge and an object be compared when knowledge is only subjective
and the object solely objective. No comparison is possible between these
two.
The Samkhya view - Coherence theory of truth.
A cognition is true if it coheres with the cognition of others - there
should be concurrence between the cognitions of a given object (sa§vāda)
- or if it coheres with a system of knowledge which one already has. In
the latter case, the question may be asked as to how there can be
agreement between two things when they are not seen simultaneously. In
the case of knowledge cohering with a previously acquired knowledge,
there is no guarantee that the latter is true. If, at some point, the already
obtained knowledge were to be found untrue and thus negated (bādhite
sati), then what would the criterion for testing the truthfulness of the new
knowledge be?
Because of this defect, Advaita posits unsublatability (abādhyatvam) - a
cognition is true if it remains unsublated--as the sole reliable criterion to
determine true knowledge. Advaita also posits that in addition to being
abādhyatvam, the knowledge needs to be anadhigatatvam, that is, of a
new and unique object. The most frequently used example that illustrates
abadhyatvam is the rope-snake. The knowledge of a rope-snake is not
true because it becomes sublated when it is correctly apprehended as a
rope. When a person perceives a rope in lieu of a snake, he thinks "This
is a snake," "this," temporarily assumes the form of a snake until the
knowledge of the snake as a rope arises. Upon the realization that "this"
was and is nothing but a rope, the false apprehension of the snake is
definitely canceled. As a result of the erroneous cognition of a snake,
5
various physical and psychological reactions ensue, i.e., fear, shivers,
etc., (bhayakampanadikam). The outcome of the correct cognition is the
subsiding of all these reactions. These two cognitions cannot coexist, the
latter sublating the former. The subsequent cognition is called bādhaka
jñānam. It is worth keeping in mind that although the initial cognition is
proven not true, its actual content (visaya) was always the snake. What is
thus removed, by the correct and final apprehension of the rope, is the
false idea of its being a snake. Cognition itself can never be sublated but
its being apprehended as something other than it is. Thus, sublatibility
(bādhyatva) solely applies to cases of erroneous perceptions.
From the standpoint of our ordinary experiences, however, since the
cognition of the world is never sublated, it may be argued that the world
of plurality is true! This is a false assessment; the cognition of the world
does get sublated when, for instance, one cognizes the state of dream.
One has to verify the truth about this assertion for himself or herself.
Advaita holds that the knowledge of the ultimate reality is a unique
cognition which is not subjected to elimination. Since it is ever-enduring
and unalterable, its content must be true. This unique and permanent
knowledge about which Sruti speaks, has been vouchsafed by those who,
with a pure mind, have realized and are established in such knowledge.
According to Advaita, the attainment of this unique knowledge is the goal
of the Upanishadic inquiry.
Instances of sublation
-All cases of erroneous perception in waking and dream. The
perceptual experiences in both dream and waking are taken to be true
during the entire course of these states. Sublation occurs in one and the
same state. The rope-snake becomes the rope. Here, the rope-snake, an
6
apparent object (Pratibhāùika-vasthu) is sublated or contradicted by a
valid-pramāṇa.
- All cases of waking objects. All waking objects suffer sublation
and are, therefore, false. All cognitions of waking objects are
proven false at once when the transition from dream to waking or
from waking to dream occurs, both cognition and cognitum being
eliminated.
For Advaitins, the waking state does not enjoy any privileged status. This
does not mean that there is no difference between the false phenomena
occurring in the waking alone (mirages, etc) and the falsity of both the
contents of waking and dream objects.
The objects belonging to the waking level are called empirical objects
- vyāvahārika vastus. They seem to last longer than the objects that
pertain to the dream state pratibhasika vastus, yet they are still false
mithyā because they do not endure.
Perception (Pratyaksa)
1) The Buddhist view: Perception is the instrument or source through
which we cognize unique things, particulars. "Pratyakùa" is used in two
senses, as an instrument (karaṇa) and as knowledge (pramā). Buddhists
use the word svalaksaṇa to indicate particulars. Every particular has
some unique properties, which are known through pratyakùa. According
to Buddhism everything in the world is momentary "ksaṇika" (reality is
momentary). All things and phenomena are conceived to constitute a
stream or flux of endless changes. Thus, Buddhism advocates a doctrine
of universal change. Each and every object is unique, existing for a
moment. Since they are unique and momentary, there is no possibility of
comparing objects. Buddhism does not accept the concept of universals
7
as a valid category. 3 Since everything is momentary and unique, it is
through pratyaksa alone that an object is perceived. The knowledge of
momentary particulars is real but that of universals is imaginary.
Advaitins find this Buddhist view untenable:
If perception can give us the knowledge of a unique particular that is
momentary, then, that knowledge is only a sensation and cannot be an
instance of complete knowledge. True knowledge requires sensation and
interpretation of that sensation. For example, one hears a noise, a
sensation, and interprets it as a being produced by a bus horn, etc.
Pratyaksa, for Advaitins, is both sensation and interpretation. In the
process of interpretation, one always attaches some meaning to the
sensation. This interpreted sensation is impossible if phenomena and
objects are momentary. Advaitins assert that to interpret any sensation,
concepts of universals are necessary. While interpreting, one compares
the features of a particular with those of its corresponding universal. If
objects are momentary and unique, the concept of universals is
impossible and sensations alone are left for knowledge. It is their
metaphysical commitment which compels them to define pratyaksa in
such way, clearly unsatisfactory in the eyes of Advaitins.
1) Nyāya view. It is important to distinguish the earlier Nyāya view on the
topic, from that which developed later on. According to the earlier Nyāya
thinker, Gautama, the operation of the appropriate pramāṇa is required.to
gaining the knowledge of any object. This does not only involve the use
of the sense organs, but also the mind and consciousness. For the time
being we shall not differentiate between mind and sense organs and refer
to them both as "Indriya". Mind is an internal sense organ and the other
3
. The common quality possessed by individuals is what is called as the
universal - the jàti.
8
five are external. Granting that the other necessary conditions to
perception, i.e., proper light and distance, absence of obstacle, etc., are
present, cognition necessitates the contact between the indriya (in the
sense indicated above) and the object of cognition, the artha. This vital
contact between indriya and artha is called as sannikarsa.4
The view proposed by the later Nyaya follower Gangesha differs from
the above. According to the later, the definition given by Gautama
suffers the defects of being "too wide" (ativypti dosa) or "too narrow"
(avyapti dosa). For instance, to say that the knowledge that results out of
contact between senses and object is alone pratyakùa is too narrow since
this definition is applicable to anumana also; indrayarta-sannikarsam is
involved in inference also. Even in remembrance there is contact between
the senses and object.
Gangesha asserts that perception is immediate knowledge; it is the
source through which we get knowledge (Sāksat pratiti-
pratyaksajnanam). The nature of this immediate knowledge concerns
external objects like table, chair etc. (Factors involved in it and mode of
gaining this knowledge are not discussed this definition) as well as
subjective states of mind like happiness, sadness, etc, which do not
necessitate the sense-object connection.
Even though Mimamsakas and Advaitins broadly accept Gangasha s
definition of perception there are difference to be noted.
Mimamsaka & Advaita view:
From where does perception arise? What is the role of the sense organs
in immediate knowledge? Are Indriyas involved in all perceptions?
Indriyas do not function in all cases of perception.
4
. Indriyarthasannakarsa-janya jnanam pratyaksam.
9
1) Indriyakriya is present in the case of perception of external objects.
2) Indriyas are not present in the perception of subjective states. Hence,
indriyas are not the condition sine qua non for immediate knowledge.
3) Isvara, who is omniscient, does not require the use of indriyas.
4) The perception of a snake in the place of a rope is also immediate, but
is obtained through the avidya-vrtti.
