Donations
Concept of donation.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby one person gives gratuitously a
thing or right to another, who must accept it.
Kinds of donations.
Donations, according to its purpose or cause, may be categorized as: (1) pure
or simple; (2) remuneratory or compensatory; (3) conditional or modal; and (4)
onerous.
A pure or simple donation is one where the underlying cause is plane
gratuity. This is donation in its truest form. On the other hand, a remuneratory or
compensatory donation is one made for the purpose of rewarding the donee for
past services, which services do not amount to a demandable debt. A conditional
or modal donation is one where the donation is made in consideration of future
services or where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges
upon the donee, the value of which is inferior than that of the donation given.
Finally, an onerous donation is that which imposes upon the donee a reciprocal
obligation or, to be more precise, this is the kind of donation made for a valuable
consideration, the cost of which is equal to or more that the thing donated. (Rep.
v. Silim, 356 SCRA 1, G. R. No. 140487, April 2, 2001).
Form of donation of real property.
The donation of a real property, which is a solemn contract, is void without
formalities stated in Article 749 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The Law requires that the donation of a real property must be made in a
public instrument. Otherwise, the donation is void. A deed of donation
acknowledged before a notary public is a public document. The notary public shall
certify that he knows the person acknowledging the instrument and that such
person is the same person who executed the instrument, acknowledging that the
instrument is his free act and deed. The acceptance may be made in the same deed
of donation or in a separate instrument. An acceptance made in a separate
instrument must also be in a public document. If the acceptance is in a separate
public instrument, the donor shall be notified in writing of such fact. Both
instruments must state the fact of such notification. (Quilala vs. Alcantara, 422
Phil. 648 [2001]; DECS vs. Del Rosario, et. al., G.R. No. 146586, January 26, 2005;
Uy v. Uy, G.R. No. 227460, December 5, 2019, Caguioa, J.)
Donation of purchase money must be in writing.
The Contract is one of loan, not a donation, if there was a contract to sell
over a property owned by the GSIS but due to failure to pay the amortization, she
sought for financial assistance from her brother who paid the balance. The
contention that there was payment out of generosity, hence, there was a donation,
is not correct.
There was no compliance with the formal requisite that it be in writing,
hence, there can be no donation. She never presented a copy of the written
agreement evidencing the same. In Moreño-Lentfer v. Wolff, 484 Phil. 552 [2004], it
was said that a donation must comply with the mandatory formal requirements
set forth by law for its validity. When the subject of donation is purchase money,
Article 748 of the NCC is applicable. Accordingly, the donation of money as well
as its acceptance should be in writing. Otherwise, the donation is invalid for non-
compliance with the formal requisite prescribed by law. (Carinan v. Sps. Cueto,
G.R. No. 198636, October 8, 2014, Reyes, J.)
Distinctions between donations inter vivos and donation mortis causa.
(a) Donations mortis causa take effect upon the death of the donor, while
donations inter vivos take effect immediately or during the lifetime of
the donor;
(b) In donations mortis causa, ownership is conveyed upon the death of
the donor, while in donations inter vivos, ownership is conveyed
before his death;
(c) In donations mortis causa, it is void if the transferor survives the
transferees, while in donations inter vivos, it is valid if the transferor
survives the transferee;
(d) Donations mortis causa are basically revocable; donations inter vivos
are not revocable as a rule;
(e) Donations mortis causa require compliance with the requirements of a
will; donations inter vivos merely require compliance with Arts. 748
and 749, NCC.
Designation of donation as mortis causa not controlling.
The designation that it is a “Donation Mortis Causa” is not controlling. If a
donation by its terms is inter vivos, this character is not altered by the fact that the
donor styles it mortis causa (Concepcion v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823 [1952]).
In Austria-Magat v. Court of Appeals, 426 Phil. 263, 375 SCRA 556 (2002), it
was held that “irrevocability” is a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea of
conveyances mortis causa, where “revocability” is precisely the essence of the act.
A donation mortis causa has the following characteristics:
1. It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of
the transferor; or what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor
should retain the ownership (full or naked) and control of the
property while alive;
2. That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the
transferor at will, ad nutum; but revocability may be provided for
indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of the
properties conveyed; and
3. That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the
transferee. (Aluad v. Aluad, G.R. No. 176943, October 17, 2008, 569
SCRA 697; Del Rosario v. Ferrer, et al., G.R. No. 187056, September 20,
2010)
Donation inter vivos is immediately operative.
A donation inter vivos is immediately operative and final. The reason is that
such kind of donation is deemed perfected from the moment the donor learned of
the donee’s acceptance of the donation. The acceptance makes the donee the
absolute owner of the property donated. (Del Rosario v. Ferrer, et al., G. R. No.
187056, September 20, 2010, citing Heirs of Sevilla v. Sevilla, 450 SCRA 598 [2003])
Nature of this donation.
The Deed of Donation stated among others:
1. a property was given to the donee (EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ), his
heirs and successors;
2. the Deed of Donation or that ownership be vested on her upon my
demise.
3. if the Donee predeceases me, the same land will not be reverted to the
Donor, but will be inherited by the heirs of EUFRACIA RODRIGUEZ;
4. the donee accepted the land donated.
A donation is donation inter vivos if the donor stipulated that “if the Donee
predeceases me, the Property will not be reverted to the Donor, but will be
inherited by the heirs of the donee,” signalling the irrevocability of the passage of
title to the donee’s estate, waiving the donor’s right to reclaim title. This transfer
of title was perfected the moment the donor learned of the donee’s acceptance of
the disposition (Art. 734, NCC) which, being reflected in the Deed, took place on
the day of its execution. The donee’s acceptance of the transfer underscores its
essence as a gift in presenti, not in futuro, as only donation inter vivos need
acceptance by the recipient (Alejandro v. Geraldez, 168 Phil 404; Concepcion v.
Conception, 91 Phil. 823; Laureta v. Mata, 44 Phil. 668). Indeed, had the donor
wished to retain full title over the property, she could have easily stipulated, that
“the donor, may transfer, sell, or encumber to any person or entity the properties
here donated x x x” (Puig v. Peñaflorida) or used words to that effect. Instead, the
donor expressly waived title over the Property in case the donee predeceases her.
(Villanueva v. Branocco, G.R. No. 172804, January 24, 2011)
Effect if deed of donation provides that it shall take effect 10 years after the
death of the donor.
The donation is mortis causa.
The wordings of the deed of donation executed by the deceased clearly
expressed the latter’s desire that the donation shall take effect only after ten (10)
years after the death, there is therefore an express prohibition to alienate the
property within such period.
Furthermore, the deceased continuously possessed the property and never
let go of its ownership, enjoyed the produce, and paid the taxes thereon, until the
transfer of the property to the donees, and she did not give the title to the donees
but instead retained the same.
From those facts, therefore, it can be inferred that the true intention of the
donor is to retain ownership of the property during her lifetime, and the donees
can only enjoy possession after ten (10) years from the death of the same. (Spouses
Evelyn and Ernesto Sicad vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. 125888, August 13, 1998, 294
SCRA 183)
Donation inter vivos; when it is.
If a donation provides that it will take effect after the death of the donor;
that the donor provided that he will not dispose of it or take it away from the
donee; that he was parting with the beneficial ownership while he lived, the same
is a donation inter vivos, since the donor intended to part with his ownership
during his lifetime.
Whether the donation is inter vivos or mortis causa depends on whether the
donor intended to transfer ownership over the properties upon the execution of
the deed (Gestopa vs. CA, 342 SCRA 105; Reyes vs. Mosqueda, 187 SCRA 661). It
is clear from the donation that the donor intended to part with his ownership while
alive.
In Cuevas vs. Cuevas; 48 Phil. 68, it was said that when the deed of donation
provides that donor will not dispose or take away the property donated (thus
making the donation irrevocable), he in effect is making a donation inter vivos. He
parts away with his naked title but maintains beneficial ownership while he lives.
It remains to be a donation inter vivos despite an express provision that the donor
continuous to be in possession and enjoyment of the donated property while he is
alive.
The express irrevocability of the same is the distinctive standard that
identifies that document as a donation inter vivos. (Austria-Magat vs. Court of
Appeals, 375 SCRA 556, G.R. No. 106755, February 1, 2002).