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Nano Weapons

The document discusses the potential military applications of nanomaterials, highlighting their ability to enhance soldier survivability and develop new weapons and surveillance technologies. It raises concerns about the implications of these technologies on existing arms control frameworks and international humanitarian law, emphasizing the need for monitoring and regulation. Recommendations include assessing military uses of nanomaterials, fostering dialogue, and considering the ethical and safety implications of such advancements.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
16 views6 pages

Nano Weapons

The document discusses the potential military applications of nanomaterials, highlighting their ability to enhance soldier survivability and develop new weapons and surveillance technologies. It raises concerns about the implications of these technologies on existing arms control frameworks and international humanitarian law, emphasizing the need for monitoring and regulation. Recommendations include assessing military uses of nanomaterials, fostering dialogue, and considering the ethical and safety implications of such advancements.

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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Nanoweapons

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Nanomaterials have the potential for significant and diverse
DISCUSSION PAPER| NOV 2017 impacts on human society.1 Better energy storage, more rapid
computations and lower power consumption are but a few innova-
tions that can lead to considerable improvements in devices and
products.2 Nanomaterials also have potential applications in the
military and security sectors. Suggested developments include
garments designed to increase soldier survivability3 and camou-
flage against thermal detection,4 as well as new weapons and
surveillance technologies.5

This bulletin provides an introduction to possible military uses of

Nanoweapons nanomaterials and suggests some areas of concern, notably:

x Novel or poorly understood mechanisms of harm and new ways of


applying force (e.g. using genetic markers as a tool for targeting)
may challenge existing values, norms and instruments (e.g. the
principle of humanity, the prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks
and superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or on blinding
laser weapons).
Discussion paper for the Convention on x At a conceptual level, certain developments could fall between
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) the boundaries of multilateral weapons control instruments. This is
because the use of nanomaterials can challenge the distinctions
and categorizations by which regulatory instruments and control
Geneva, November 2017 regimes are articulated (e.g. between conventional weapons and
weapons of mass destruction).
Article 36 is a UK-based not-for-profit organisation working to promote public x At a practical level, certain developments may negatively impact
scrutiny over the development and use of weapons.* disarmament and arms control. For example, nanomaterials or
nanodevices (e.g. metal-less firearms, miniaturized weapons) may
www.article36.org
info@article36.org
escape existing verification techniques. This may lead to a loss of
@Article36 trust in the effectiveness of multilateral weapons control regimes
in securing international peace and security.

Based on this, the paper recommends that High Contracting Parties


to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW):

x monitor developments in nanotechnologies and assess how


potential military uses of nanomaterials may challenge existing
restrictions or prohibitions on weapons, or impact national and
human security, peace and international security, arms control and
disarmament;
x examine the how certain effects from nanomaterials should be
considered in relation to existing Protocols of the CCW and make
national interpretations where appropriate;
x explicitly include reference to nanomaterials in ongoing work,
including in relation to weapons reviews in line with Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, and promote a
precautionary approach to risks that such materials may present;
x cooperate with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and other relevant bodies,
to ensure that nanomaterials are addressed by the legal regime
appropriate to their effects;
x foster open dialogue and information exchange about military
uses of nanomaterials and their potential impacts.

What are nanomaterials?


The prefix ‘nano’ means one thousand millionth of a metre (1 nm
= 10-9 m).6 Nanoparticles occur naturally in the environment, such
*
This paper was written by Maya Brehm. The author gratefully acknowledges
the input of Kobi Leins, who provided comments on an earlier draft.
as in volcanic ash, and in some man-made substances, such as

1
depleted uranium. What is new is the ability to deliberately create, x Nano-implants in soldiers, brain-machine interfaces and manip-
manipulate or modify nanomaterials for specific ends.7 This is of ulation of biological processes, for example to reduce fatigue, in-
interest because at nanoscale (below 100 nm)8 matter exhibits crease reaction time or alter perceptions, emotions or thoughts.23
different reactive, optical, electrical and magnetic properties than at
macroscale. Possible adverse effects and risks
Nanomaterials also present profound challenges. Chemical, bio- It has been argued that nanotechnologies may offer ‘[w]hole new
logical and physical properties merge at nanoscale, making some classes of accidents and abuses’.24 Aside from wider social and
traditional regulatory distinctions uncertain. Furthermore, some ethical issues,25 key military and security concerns regarding the use
materials are toxic at nanoscale even if their macro counterparts are of nanomaterials include:
not.9 Much has been written over the last decade about the regula-
tion of nanotechnologies in general, but comparably little attention x Novel biochemical agents or toxic substances that can be difficult
has been paid specifically to military applications and weapons.10 to detect and counter, and enhanced delivery mechanisms, as
well further miniaturization, could make the use of biological,
This bulletin considers possible applications of nanomaterials for chemical or nuclear weapons more feasible.26 An additional con-
military or security purposes, including weapons and combat sys- cern relates to the possibility of using genetic markers to target
tems where one or more parts is manipulated artificially, or causes specific groups or individuals.27
harmful effects, at nanoscale. x Some nano-enhanced technologies may affect strategic stability,
for example by giving a distinct advantage to the offence. This
Current state of play may weaken belief in deterrence, raise the risk of escalation and
accidental war and lead to an arms race.28
The total global, private and public, investment in nanotechnology x Certain military applications of nanotechnologies can undermine
research and development has grown rapidly since the early 1990s,11 existing control regimes and mechanisms by calling into question
but research by the military remains mostly out of the public domain, categories and boundaries around which regulations are articu-
although some states, including China, Germany, France, India, lated. The use of nanomaterials can challenge legal definitions of
Israel, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, the UK and the USA are prohibited weapons or acts,29 thresholds based on calibre, quan-
publicly investing in nanotechnologies for military purposes.12 tity, size or weight of an item,30 the distinction between conven-
tional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and between
The literature cites a large array of potential military applications of ammunition/munitions and their means of delivery.31 The difficulty
nanotechnologies, claiming advantages related to better detection of detecting nano-engineered materials and devices (e.g. novel
and surveillance as well as improved stealth and camouflage, cost- chemical agents or metal-free small arms) challenges transfer and
and fuel-efficiency, increased accuracy of weapon delivery and scal- proliferation controls and verification mechanisms.
ability of weapon effects, the greater destructive force of weapons x Nanoapplications offer the potential for inexpensive, ubiquitous
as well as materials better able to withstand force. The bullet points and pervasive surveillance and intrusive methods of data gather-
below provide a partial list of some of the developments utilizing ing, raising both human and national security concerns.32
properties of nanomaterials (which may be at different stages from x Nano-engineered surveillance devices and weapons, potentially in
concept to development):13 large quantities, would likely be within the reach of individuals or
groups (whether commercial or politically organized), due to easy
x sensors that allow for improved reconnaissance, better sensory access to raw materials and knowledge, and because there is no
capabilities of weapons and munitions,14 and the detection, re- need for large production facilities.33
duction and elimination of biological or chemical agents, or trace
quantities of explosives;15 Another key concern is that very little is known about the short- and
x pervasive, distributed nanoscale sensor nets with computational long-term effects of nanomaterials and the possible negative and
and wireless communication abilities (‘smart dust’), potentially as unintended side effects for humans and the environment.34 Nanopar-
components of an autonomous weapon system;16 ticles are able to traverse the gastrointestinal tract and lungs, and
x missiles, artillery projectiles or mortar rounds with reduced mass, cross cell walls and the blood-brain barrier. Their unique charac-
greater destructive force, increased penetration capability, tailored teristics may lead to unusual toxic effects that are different from
energy release, smaller size or improved accuracy;17 those seen at a larger scale, and can complicate their detection and
x lighter and smaller firearms made of nanofibre composites with removal from human tissue, the air, water or soil.35 Nanoparticles
low or no metal content, and ‘self-steering’ bullets equipped with interacting with cells can disrupt cellular structures and/or processes
optical sensors;18 essential for cell survival and induce DNA damage, which can lead to
x means of weapon delivery with reduced drag and increased cancer or genetic abnormalities in reproductive cells.36 Risks may be
payload and range,19 nano-enhanced miniaturized munitions, gender- or generationally differentiated.37
including for UAVs (drones), and nano- and micro-combat robots,
enabling swarming;20 Governance and regulation
x improvements in solid-state and electric laser systems, making
them mobile and readily deployable as a weapon;21 A number of existing regulatory frameworks constrain military uses
x novel chemicals and biological agents (potentially self-replicat- of nanomaterials. These include weapon-specific treaties already in
ing);22 place such as the 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol, the 1972 BWC and

2
the 1993 CWC). Together, these instruments ban nanomaterials of application of the ‘no data, no market’ principle,55 whereas others
known toxic chemicals or biological agents, as well as nano-sized promote the development of regulations or meta-regulatory tools to
devices designed to deliver them,38 except where intended for prophy- ‘help ensure the technology achieves its potential for good’.56 The
lactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.39 A strong argument can public (scientific) debate on potential risks and hazards has, how-
also be made that the legal bans on biological and chemical weap- ever, largely ignored military uses of nanomaterials. Although states
ons extend to nanomaterials with novel properties that affect life pro- have a legal obligation under IHL to review the compatibility of new
cesses in ways analogous to known toxic chemicals and pathogens.40 weapons, means or methods of warfare with their international legal
It has also been argued that using nanoparticles whose physical obligations,57 such reviews suffer from well-known limitations and
properties or accumulation in the human body injure at the cellular lack of implementation. There are also many open questions about
level without biochemical action, or nanorobots that are programmed their effectiveness when it comes to nano-enhanced weapons, means
to do this, may fall foul of the prohibition in international humanitari- or methods of warfare.58
an law (IHL) on the use of poison and poisoned weapons.41
Many consider, therefore, that prompt action is required to govern the
Furthermore, questions have been raised as to whether nanomateri- potential risks of nano-enhanced weapons and other military uses of
als that are not readily detectable or removable from human tissue nanomaterials. Proposals include:
are compatible with the letter and spirit of 1980 CCW Protocol I,
which prohibits the use of weapons that primarily injure by non-de- x the creation of a new treaty or an arms control regime to devise
tectable fragments;42 whether miniaturized missiles and similar explo- limits and verification methods;59
sive projectiles run counter to the prohibition on the use of exploding x amendments to existing instruments, notably the CWC and the
bullets;43 whether nano-enhanced lasers raise issues under CCW BWC, or clarification of their provisions;60
Protocol IV on blinding laser weapons;44 whether small armed robots x clearer guidance and transparency for weapon reviews;61
undermine the effectiveness of existing strictures on landmines;45 and x and the development of guidelines and scientific protocols to
whether a nanodevice that is designed to kill or injure and functions promote self-regulation by states and scientific communities.62
unexpectedly when a person performs an apparently safe act, such
as breathing, violates the prohibition on booby traps.46

IHL also limits the use of nano-enhanced weapons, means and meth-
ods of warfare. Fighters are protected against weapons, means or
methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnec-
essary suffering or that render death inevitable,47 as may be the case
with nanomaterial-induced health effects. Civilians ‘enjoy general
protection against dangers arising from military operations’,48 which
would include, for example, protection from hazardous nanoparti-
cles released into the environment as a result of the degradation of
armour or as components of surveillance networks. They are also
protected against attacks employing a method or means of combat
whose effects cannot be limited as required by IHL, for example, due
to the release of hazardous particles.49 Precautions must be taken
against such effects, including in the choice of weapons and targets,
so as to minimize the danger to civilians.50

Additional restrictions derive from states’ duties under international


human rights and environmental law. Everyone is protected, at all
times, against discriminatory targeting practices51 and acts of geno-
cide,52 which may be facilitated by the ability to target at the DNA
level. In light of the release of potentially hazardous nanoparticles
during security or military operations, states must take measures to
effectively protect the rights to life, health and food.53 In this regard,
measures to prevent environmental damage, including in armed
conflict, will be particularly important. Nanotechnology-enabled
surveillance possibilities call for measures by states to protect the
right to privacy.54 States should also anticipate that the difficulty
of detecting nanomaterials or nanodevices is likely to exacerbate
existing accountability challenges, especially where applications are
tested on or used among populations that have limited recourse
against their effects.

Given the potential for serious negative consequences, it is widely


accepted that a precautionary approach is essential. Views diverge,
however, on what that implies in practice. Some argue for a strict

3
15 N. Pala and A. N. Abbas, ‘Terahertz Technology for Nano Applications’, B.
END NOTES Bhushan (ed.) Encyclopedia of Nanotechnology, 2016, 4070; M. Sadeghi et al,
‘Decontamination of Chemical Warfare Sulfur Mustard Agent Simulant by ZnO
1 E.g., The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, July 2004, Nanoparticles’, 6(3) International Nano Letters (1 September 2016), https://link.
‘Nanoscience and Nanotechnologies: Opportunities and Uncertainties’, p. 5, https:// springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs40089-016-0183-x.pdf.
royalsociety.org/~/media/Royal_Society_Content/policy/publications/2004/9693. 16 A. Ananthaswamy, ‘March of the Motes’, New Scientist, 23 August 2003;
pdf; M. C. Roco and W. Sims Bainbridge (eds), ‘Societal Implications of Nanoscience TheNanoAge.com, ‘Military Uses of Nanotechnology’, http://www.thenanoage.com/
and Nanotechnology’, NSET Workshop Report, National Science Foundation, military.htm.
2001, p. 3, http://www.wtec.org/loyola/nano/NSET.Societal.Implications/nanosi. 17 E.g., J. Altmann and M. Gubrud, ‘Anticipating Military Nanotechnology’, IEEE
pdf. Nanotechnology is not a single industry or discipline, but rather ‘sets of Technology and Society Magazine, Winter 2004; Paschen et al, Nanotechnology:
enabling technologies applicable to many traditional industries’. It is therefore more Summary; ‘US Air Force Invests in Western New York Technology; Grants
appropriate to speak of nanotechnologies (J. Schummer, ‘Identifying Ethical Issues of NanoDynamics™ Contract for Nanostructured Tantalum’, Nano Tsunami, 29 August
Nanotechnologies’, H. A. M. J. ten Have (ed.) Nanotechnologies, Ethics and Politics, 2005, http://www.voyle.net/Nano%20Defence%202005/Defence%202005-0012.
2007, p. 87, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001506/150616e.pdf). htm.
2 See, e.g., The Project on Emerging Nanotechnologies, ‘Inventories’, http://www. 18 Altmann, Military Nanotechnology, 85; T. Lewis, ‘US Military’s Self-Steering
nanotechproject.org/inventories. Bullets Can Hit Moving Targets’, Live Science, 28 April 2015, https://www.livescience.
3 ‘U.S. Scientists Design Smart Underpants That Could Save Lives’, Reuters, 10 June com/50648-darpa-self-steering-bullets.html.
2010, http://uk.reuters.com/article/oukoe-uk-underpants-health/u-s-scientists-design- 19 E.g., A. Lang et al, ‘Shark Skin Drag Reduction’, B. Bhushan (ed.), Encyclopedia
smart-underpants-that-could-save-lives-idUKTRE6591C920100610. of Nanotechnology, 2016), 3639.
4 B. Kim et al, ‘Patternable PEDOT Nanofilms With Grid Electrodes for Transparent 20 Altmann, Military Nanotechnology, pp. 93–95; Altmann and Gubrud,
Electrochromic Devices Targeting Thermal Camouflage’, 2(1) Nano Convergence ‘Anticipating Military Nanotechnology’, p. 36. On nanorobotics, generally, see S. Tsuda,
(October 2015), https://doi.org/10.1186/s40580-015-0051-9. ‘Nanorobotics’, B. Bhushan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Nanotechnology, 2016.
5 In particular, J. Altmann, Military Nanotechnology: Potential Applications and 21 H. Nasu, ‘The Future of Nanotechnology in Warfare’, The Global Journal, 4 July
Preventive Arms Control, 2006, Chapter 4. 2013, http://www.theglobaljournal.net/article/view/1132/.
6 Nanowerk, ‘Nanotechnology Frequently Asked Questions’, http://www.nanowerk. 22 M. E. Kosal, ‘Anticipating the Biological Proliferation Threat of Nanotechnology:
com/nanotechnology_frequently_asked_questions.php. Challenges for International Arms Control Regimes’, H. Nasu and R. McLaughlin (eds),
7 B. Bhushan, ‘Nanotechnology’, B. Bhushan (ed.), Encyclopedia of New Technologies and the Law of Armed Conflict, 2014, p. 163.
Nanotechnology, 2012; K. Leins, ‘Regulation of the Use of Nanotechnology in Armed 23 J. Thorpe et al, ‘Maintaining Military Dominance in the Future Operating
Conflict’, IEEE Technology and Society Magazine, n.d. Environment: A Case for Emerging Human Enhancement Technologies That Contribute
8 International Organization for Standardization, ‘ISO TC 229: Nanotechnologies’, to Soldier Resilience’, Small Wars Journal, 13 July 2017, http://smallwarsjournal.com/
https://www.iso.org/committee/381983.html. ‘An upper limit of 100 nm is commonly jrnl/art/maintaining-military-dominance-in-the-future-operating-environment-a-case-for-
used by general consensus, but there is no scientific evidence to support the emerging-huma; K. Leins, ‘Shining a Regulatory Spotlight on New Lasers: Regulation
appropriateness of this value’ (European Commission, Recommendation of 18 October of the Use of Nanolaser Technologies in Armed Conflict’, 56 Jurimetrics (Spring 2016)
2011 on the definition of nanomaterial, 2011/696/EU, §8) 266–68; P. Tucker, ‘A Breakthrough in the Checkered History of Brain Hacking’,
9 According to Schummer, ‘Identifying Ethical Issues of Nanotechnologies’, p. 85, Defense One, 1 July 2014, http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/07/
‘national regulations for chemicals, consumer products and work safety disregard the breakthrough-checkered-history-military-brain-hacking/87709/.
size- and shape-dependence of properties and focus solely on chemical composition. 24 The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, ‘Nanoscience and
This means that a substance could, for instance, pass the required toxicity tests for Nanotechnologies’, §28.
new chemicals if the tests are performed on large particles, even if small particles of 25 There is concern that advances in nanotechnologies will exacerbate existing
the same substance are toxic’. biases and inequalities and ‘precipitate a redefinition of the concepts of normalcy,
10 There is no agreed definition of a ‘nano-(enhanced) weapon’. The term sometimes disability, health, and disease, and may challenge the very concept of human dignity’
refers to ‘objects and devices using nanotechnology … that are designed or used (International Bioethics Committee (IBC), Report of the IBC on the Principle of Non-
for harming humans’. It can also designate devices that cause harmful effects Discrimination and Non-Stigmatization, 3 June 2014, p. 25, http://unesdoc.unesco.
in nanoscale, though some scholars limit the category to those whose ‘effects org/images/0022/002211/221196e.pdf).
characterise the lethality of the weapon’ (H. Nasu and T. Faunce, ‘Nanotechnology 26 Altmann, Military Nanotechnology, pp. 101–103; ‘Nanotechnology Paves Way
and the International Law of Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano- for New Weapons’, Jane’s Chem-Bio Web, 27 July 2005, http://www.hartford-hwp.
Weapons’, 20 Journal of Law, Information & Science (2009–2010) 21, 23. com/archives/27a/317.html; Kosal, ‘Anticipating the Biological Proliferation Threat
11 Several indicators can be used to assess research and development in of Nanotechnology; A. Gsponer, ‘From the Lab to the Battlefield? Nanotechnology
nanotechnologies, for example, the number of patent filings, the development of sub- and Fourth-Generation Nuclear Weapons’, 67 Disarmament Diplomacy, (October–
areas or the number of citations. See, e.g., M. C. Roco et al (eds), Nanotechnology November 2002), http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/dd/dd67/67op1.htm.
Research Directions for Societal Needs in 2020: Retrospective and Outlook, 2010, 27 Altmann and Gubrud, ‘Anticipating Military Nanotechnology’, p. 36; Leins,
pp. xlii–xlvi, http://www.wtec.org/nano2/Nanotechnology_Research_Directions_ ‘Regulation of the Use of Nanotechnology in Armed Conflict’, 47; Mark Wheelis, ‘Will
to_2020/Nano_Resarch_Directions_to_2020.pdf. For data, see OECD, ‘Tapping the New Biology Lead to New Weapons?’, Arms Control Today, July 2004, https://www.
Nanotechnology’s Potential to Shape the Next Production Revolution’, OECD, The Next armscontrol.org/act/2004_07-08/Wheelis.
Production Revolution: Implications for Governments and Business, 2017. 28 Altmann and Gubrud, ‘Anticipating Military Nanotechnology’, p. 38; M. E. Kosal,
12 For a recent overview, see J. Altmann, ‘Preventing Hostile and Malevolent ‘Military Applications of Nanotechnology: Implications for Strategic Security I’, PASCC
Use of Nanotechnology: Military Nanotechnology After 15 Years of the US National Final Report, p. 65, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=767053.
Nanotechnology Initiative’, M. Martellini and A. Malizia, Cyber and Chemical, Biological, 29 Nanomaterials can be used to induce changes in the human body that challenge
Radiological, Nuclear, Explosives Challenges: Threats and Counter Efforts, 2017), the bans on blinding laser weapons, biological and chemical weapons. See, e.g.,
pp. 52–56. See also A. de Neve, ‘Military Uses of Nanotechnology and Converging Leins, ‘Shining a Regulatory Spotlight on New Lasers’.
Technologies: Trends and Future Impacts’, Center for Security and Defence Studies, 30 Consider, e.g., the definitions of conventional armaments and equipment in
Royal High Institute for Defense, Focus Paper 8, n.d., https://www.yumpu.com/ the 1990 Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the weight-based definition
en/document/view/23516906/military-uses-of-nanotechnology-and-converging- of prohibited explosive projectiles in the 1868 St Petersburg Declaration or weight
technologies-; M. Berger, ‘Military Nanotechnology – How Worried Should We Be?’, restrictions on the production of scheduled chemicals in the CWC. See Altmann and
Nanowerk, 13 November 2006, https://www.nanowerk.com/spotlight/spotid=1015. Gubrud, ‘Anticipating Military Nanotechnology’, p. 36.
php. 31 See, e.g., M. Bolton and W. Zwijnenburg, Futureproofing Is Never Complete:
13 According to, Rain Liivoja, Kobi Leins and Tim McCormack, ‘no nanotechnology- Ensuring the Arms Trade Treaty Keeps Pace with New Weapons Technology,
derived weapons appear to be in production as yet’ (R. Liivoja et al, ‘Emerging International Committee for Robot Arms Control (ICRAC) working paper, October 2013,
Technologies of Warfare’, R. Liivoja and T. McCormack (eds), Routledge Handbook of p. 4.
the Law of Armed Conflict, 2016, p. 618). For recent estimates of the time of potential 32 J. van den Hoven and P. E. Vermaas, ‘Nano-Technology and Privacy: On
introduction of selected military applications, see Altmann, ‘Preventing Hostile and Continuous Surveillance Outside the Panopticon’, 32(3) Journal of Medicine and
Malevolent Use of Nanotechnology’, p. 58. Philosophy (2007).
14 H. Paschen et al, Nanotechnology: Summary, Working Report no 92, Office of 33 The Royal Society and The Royal Academy of Engineering, ‘Nanoscience and
Technology Assessment at the German Bundestag July 2003, p. 7, https://www.tab- Nanotechnologies’, §28.
beim-bundestag.de/en/pdf/publications/summarys/TAB-Arbeitsbericht-ab092_Z.pdf. 34 M. Schillmeier, ‘What ELSA/I Makes Big and Small in Nanotechnology Research’,

4
B. Rappert and B. Balmer (eds), Absence in Science, Security and Policy, n.d., p. 63. poorly understood, there are no internationally harmonized measurement methods,
35 IBC, Report of the IBC on the Principle of Non-Discrimination and Non- there is high uncertainty about how to test biocompatibility and appropriately model
Stigmatization, 25. environmental impacts, and there is significant controversy about whether existing
36 N.A. Lewinski, ‘Nanoparticle Cytotoxicity’, B. Bhushan (ed.) Encyclopedia of hazard and risk-assessment tools adequately account for the specific properties of
Nanotechnology, 2016; F. Nesslany and L. Benameur, ‘Genotoxicity of Nanoparticles’, nanomaterials? See, e.g., T. Seager et al., ‘Why Life Cycle Assessment Does Not Work
B. Bhushan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Nanotechnology, 2016. for Synthetic Biology’, 51(11) Environmental Science & Technology, 15 May 2017,
37 There is emerging evidence on selective placental transfer of nanoparticles, https://doi.org/10.1021/acs.est.7b01604.
raising concerns over maternal and fetal health (A. K. Vidanapathirana, ‘Use of 59 E.g., Altmann makes detailed recommendations for preventive arms control
Nanotechnology in Pregnancy’, B. Bhushan (ed.), Encyclopedia of Nanotechnology, (J. Altmann, Nanotechnology and Preventive Arms Control, Deutsche Stiftung
2016), and it has been argued that ‘[c]hildren are more vulnerable because their Friedensforschung, 2005, https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/
bodies and organs are not fully developed and their body mass is smaller, allowing document/26027/ssoar-2005-altmann-nanotechnology_and_preventive_arms_
for greater absorption of toxic substances and lifelong damaging effects’ (Women control.pdf?sequence=1); Wheelis invites consideration of ‘a new convention that
in Europe for a Common Future (WECF), Nano – The Great Unknown, Position would prohibit the nonconsensual manipulation of human physiology’ (Wheelis, ‘Will
Paper, February 2012, p. 2, http://www.wecf.eu/download/2012/April/WECF_ the New Biology Lead to New Weapons?’); Howard sketches out an ‘Inner Space Treaty’
NanoPositionPaper.pdf. (S. Howard, ‘Nanotechnology and Mass Destruction: The Need for an Inner Space
38 E. J. Wallach, ‘A Tiny Problem with Huge Implications – Nanotech Agents as Treaty’, 65 Disarmament Diplomacy (August 2002), http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/
Enablers or Substitutes for Banned Chemical Weapons: Is a New Treaty Needed?’, archive/dd/dd65/65op1.htm.); See also Pinson, ‘Is Nanotechnology Prohibited by the
33(3) Fordham International Law Journal (2009) 860–861. Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions?’
39 R. D. Pinson, ‘Is Nanotechnology Prohibited by the Biological and Chemical 60 E.g., Wallach, ‘A Tiny Problem with Huge Implications’, 861, 954.
Weapons Conventions?’, 22(2) Berkeley Journal of International Law (2004) 304, 61 E.g., Nasu and Faunce, ‘Nanotechnology and the International Law of Weaponry’,
argues that nanotechnology uses that closely resemble chemical weapons may fall 54.
under these exceptions. 62 E.g., ibid.
40 For a detailed discussion, see Wallach, ‘A Tiny Problem with Huge Implications’,
who also raises the question of whether the CWC and the BWC prohibit the
development and use of engineered viruses or nanorobots.
41 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Customary IHL study, Rules 72,
73 and 74. The dominant interpretation is that the prohibition on poisonous weapons
applies only if poisoning is an ‘intended’ (as opposed to an incidental or accidental)
injury mechanism of the weapon. See, Liivoja et al, ‘Emerging Technologies of Warfare’,
p. 619.
42 1980 CCW Protocol I. A recent Danish military manual (Militærmanual om folkeret
for danske vaebnede styrker i internationale militaere operationer, 2016, section
3.10) mentions nanotechnology in relation to that prohibition. For a discussion, see
Nasu and Faunce, ‘Nanotechnology and the International Law of Weaponry’, 22. Note,
however, that some states consider that the prohibited weapons are only those whose
‘primary effect’ is to injure by non-detectable fragments. It is also questionable whether
nanoparticles can be likened to ‘fragments’. In the view of the ICRC, weapons that
contain plastic, for example, as part of their design, are not illegal if the plastic is not
part of the primary injuring mechanism (ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rule 79).
43 1868 St Petersburg Declaration; ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rule 78.
44 1995 CCW Protocol IV; ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rule 86.
45 1996 Revised CCW Protocol II, 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; See
Altmann, ‘Preventing Hostile and Malevolent Use of Nanotechnology’, p. 64.
46 1996 Revised CCW Protocol II; ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rule 80. See Wallach,
‘A Tiny Problem with Huge Implications’, 934.
47 ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rules 70 and 72. Some states consider that a
balance must be struck between military necessity and the expected injury or suffering
inflicted on a person, and that only excessive injury or suffering violates the prohibition
of weapons that are ‘of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering’.
48 Art 51(1), Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions (API); See also ICRC,
Customary IHL study, Rule 15.
49 Art 51(4), API; ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rules 1, 17, 71.
50 Art 57(2)(a)(ii) and (3), API; ICRC, Customary IHL study, Rules 15, 17, 18, 19 and
21.
51 Art 26, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); Art 2,
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Art 2,
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination; Art 6, Universal Declaration
on the Human Genome and Human Rights; Art 11, Council of Europe Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine.
52 Art 1, 1949 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide.
53 Art 6, ICCPR; Arts 11 and 12, International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
54 Art 17, ICCPR.
55 WECF, Nano – The Great Unknown, p. 3.
56 Responsible Nanotechnologies Code Working Group, Information on the
Responsible Nano Code Initiative, May 2008. See also Swiss Federal Office of Public
Health, Precautionary Matrix for Synthetic Nanomaterials, version 3.0, 2013; European
Commission, Commission recommendation on a code of conduct for responsible
nanosciences and nanotechnologies research & Council conclusions on responsible
nanosciences and nanotechnologies research, 2009, https://ec.europa.eu/research/
science-society/document_library/pdf_06/nanocode-apr09_en.pdf;
57 Art 36, API.
58 E.g., how are potential risks and hazards to be assessed, and judgements made
about their acceptability, given that the harm mechanisms of nanomaterials are www.article36.org
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