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Journal of Political Marketing

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Political Marketing
a b
Heather Savigny
a
Department of Politics and International Studies
(POLSIS) , ERI Building, Pritchatts Road Edgbaston,
Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
b
University of Birmingham , Edgbaston,
Birmingham, B15 2TT, UK
Published online: 25 Sep 2008.

To cite this article: Heather Savigny (2003) Political Marketing, Journal of Political
Marketing, 3:1, 21-38, DOI: 10.1300/J199v03n01_02

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 Political Marketing:
A Rational Choice?
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Heather Savigny
University of Birmingham, United Kingdom

ABSTRACT. Political marketing is a relatively new approach to ana-

lysing political activity that draws upon management marketing assump-
tions to describe political behaviour. These assumptions are explicitly
grounded in neoclassical economic assertions about behaviour. In politi-
cal science these assumptions are utilised by orthodox rational choice
theory. Thus, political marketing can be located within this perspective.
Rational choice provides a series of analytic models through which onto-
logical implications can be derived, and predictions made. Yet, the polit-
ical marketing approach seeks to build upon orthodox rational choice
accounts, by introducing a normative element to this perspective, pre-
scribing the internalisation of these assumptions in order to achieve the
desired objective. Further, this normative aspect claims that the adoption
of marketing improves the democratic process. However, rational choice
is an analytical ‘toolkit’ which does not seek to make normative claims.
Indeed, normative arguments are inconsistent with rational choice,
which seeks to provide a scientific, value-free approach to political anal-

Heather Savigny is a tutor in Politics and a doctoral candidate, Department of Poli-

tics and International Studies (POLSIS), ERI Building, Pritchatts Road, University of
Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham, B15 2TT UK (E-mail: heathersavigny@hotmail.
com). She also has a publication in Politics (2002) entitled ‘Public Opinion, Political
Communication and the Internet.’
The author would like to thank Colin Hay for his invaluable support and encourage-
ment, likewise the same thanks are extended to Dave Marsh, Mick Temple and
Dominic Wring, without all of whom this article would not have been possible. The au-
thor would also like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their very constructive and
useful comments on an earlier draft of this piece.
Journal of Political Marketing, Vol. 3(1) 2004
http://www.haworthpress.com/store/product.asp?sku=J199
 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.
10.1300/J199v03n01_02 21
 22 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

ysis, and, consequently, the analytical and normative aspects of political

marketing need to be rendered explicit and such normative aspects chal-
lenged. [Article copies available for a fee from The Haworth Document Deliv-
ery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH. E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com>
Website: <http://www.HaworthPress.com> © 2004 by The Haworth Press, Inc.
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All rights reserved.]

KEYWORDS. Political marketing, rational choice theory, management

marketing, voter abstention

INTRODUCTION

New Labour in Britain swept to office in 1997 and was reelected in

2001 having successfully embraced and utilised marketing techniques.
Likewise a growing body of literature is acknowledging the signifi-
cance of marketing and its application in the political arena. This litera-
ture has provided comprehensive descriptions of the marketing of
candidates and political parties, both in the US (Newman, 1994; 1999)
and in Britain (Scammell, 1995; Lees-Marshment, 2001), claiming to
demonstrate how the successful use of marketing can enable the candi-
date/party to achieve their key goal (win the election). The existing lit-
erature diverges in that there are both empirical descriptions of electoral
campaign practice (in demonstrating how marketing techniques have
been applied; see, for example, Newman, 1994; Wring, 1996; 2001)
and normative assertions (that marketing is healthy for democracy)
(Kotler & Kotler, 1999) and should be used to inform political action
and conflations of the two which not only show how political marketing
is used, but also emphasise its positive normative assertions (Kotler &
Levy, 1969; Harrop, 1990; Scammell, 1995; Lees-Marshment, 2001).
Theoretically, political marketing can be demonstrated to have its
roots in orthodox rational choice theory, and is able successfully to de-
scribe contemporary electoral behaviour. However, it mistakes evi-
dence consistent with its account as a normative defence of its contribu-
tion to democratic practice. Rational choice uses reason, raising analyti-
cal ontological questions. This is entirely distinct from normative
approaches. Political marketing models provide a framework through
which to describe political actors behaving in a manner consistent with
rational choice assumptions. However, as political marketing is rooted
within rational choice, then it may be necessary to be wary of conflating
 Heather Savigny 23

empirical accounts with normative prescriptions for behaviour. Indeed,

if political marketing is to remain consistent with its rational choice ori-
gins then it is necessary to separate the normative and analytical aspects
of this approach. First, this paper will outline the basic assumptions of
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the political marketing approach, before linking those assumptions ex-

plicitly to orthodox rational choice. Furthermore, it will assess the im-
plications and limitations of adopting these key assumptions. Finally, it
will address the normative element of political marketing, by question-
ing the impact of such assumptions upon the character of contemporary
democracy, and in particular as the way the political marketing litera-
ture fails to address the central paradox of the rational choice theory
upon which it is premised: that it is rational not to vote.

PERSPECTIVES IN POLITICAL MARKETING

While there is no one comprehensive definition of political market-

ing, it is broadly accepted that the activity of politics has become in-
creasingly informed by techniques associated with marketing (Lock &
Harris, 1996; Scammell, 1999). As Reid argues, ‘the problem of getting
elected is essentially a marketing one’ (1988); the political campaign
manager and the marketing manager are assumed to face similar issues
(Butler & Collins, 1994: 19). The political marketing literature has been
extended to cover ‘where, why and how a party positions itself in the
electoral market’ (Harrop, 1990: 277). This literature describes how po-
litical actors (individuals and organisations) utilise marketing tools and
techniques in order to achieve their principal goal (to win elections).
These methods are undertaken so that the ends of political actors (par-
ties/candidates) may be advanced, but this is done ‘in response to the
needs and wants of selected people and groups in society’ (Newman,
1999: xiii). These groups of selected people are assumed to be consum-
ers, or voters. The definition has been broadened to incorporate party
behaviour outside of election campaigns, suggesting that marketing is a
continual process, reinforcing the notion of a permanent campaign, and
subsequently provides for description of party and candidate behaviour
within the context of electoral competition and throughout the cycle of
government (Newman, 1994; Lees-Marshment, 2001). Despite this, the
primary emphasis is on the use of marketing to achieve the objective of
winning elections. Whether the campaign extends outside of the tradi-
tional election campaign period or not, the ultimate goal is assumed to
be the same: to win the next election.
 24 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

Empirically, existing literature describes how marketing techniques

and tools have been adopted in electoral competition. An organisa-
tion/party/candidate may adopt marketing techniques at two levels: at
the mechanistic level, whereby tools such as advertising and mail shots
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are used, and at the level of strategy, whereby marketing becomes an under-
lying philosophy, informing and influencing behaviour (O’Shaughnessy,
1999). The existing literature provides models through which political
activity is described. At the mechanistic level, the 4 Ps of marketing are
used to analyse election campaigns, focusing on the product, promotion
of this product, placement or distribution through communications net-
works and price–in relation to the process of voting (Newman, 1994;
Wring, 1997, 2001). Marketing techniques such as market research are
used to inform product development (Kotler & Kotler, 1999). Others
highlight the centrality of the process of exchange that occurs between
the political actors and the environment within which they operate
(Lock & Harris, 1996: 28). Models have also been produced based on
the so-called marketing concept (Kotler & Levy, 1969) to political can-
didate behaviour in the US (Shama, 1976; Newman, 1994) and political
parties in Britain (Lees-Marshment, 2001).
Some of the models outlined describe the evolution of marketing
practice in electoral campaigns and beyond, using the product, sales and
market orientation concepts to describe how political organisations
have adapted their behaviour in a manner consistent with the prescrip-
tions of the marketing literature (Shama, 1976). Newman (1994) inte-
grates both techniques and orientation in his account of American
Presidential campaigning, whereas Smith and Saunders (1990) note
how marketing can inform other political activity. Similarly, Butler and
Collins provide a conceptual framework of political marketing, isolat-
ing structural characteristics, which incorporate the product (person/party/
ideology), the organisation (amateurism, negative perception of mar-
keting, dependence on volunteers) and the market (ideologically
charged, social affirmation, the counter-consumer). This is combined
with process characteristics that define ‘rules of the game,’ procedures
and systems that condition marketing activities (style versus substance,
advertising and communications standards, news and media attention,
political polls and tactical voting) (1994: 21). These approaches use the-
oretical frameworks to trace the process of electoral campaign strategy,
using techniques and insights from management marketing literature.
Subsequently, these models effectively describe the use of marketing
techniques in the contemporary political environment and contribute
significantly to existing accounts of observable political behaviour.
 Heather Savigny 25

Political marketing approaches assume that political parties/candi-

dates operate in a political market. They therefore seek to sell their
product to a consumer. To market an organisation means that a product
is refined and redesigned to meet consumer demand in order that an or-
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ganisation may achieve its objective. The political ‘product’ is vari-

ously regarded as the party (Scammell, 1995; Lees-Marshment, 2001),
the candidate (Shama, 1976; Kotler, 1975; Mauser, 1983), the cam-
paign platform (Newman, 1994: 10), person/party/ideology (Butler &
Collins, 1994), policies, communications or images (Reid, 1988), a ser-
vice (Harrop, 1990: 278), or a brand (Smith & Saunders, 1990; Smith,
2001). However, while all these factors may comprise the political
‘product,’ it is arguable that what political actors seek to ‘sell’ is a per-
ception of that product. Marketing is used as a series of persuasional
techniques deployed in competitive situations to construct and reinforce
image (Harrop, 1990: 279), to ‘create an illusion that the “product”
meets the desires or aspirations of the consumer’ (Scammell, 1995: 20).
This product, or the illusion/image of a product is promoted in the polit-
ical marketplace to the consumer.
Despite the acknowledgement of five markets in political election
campaigns (voters; activists and interest groups; the media; party or-
ganisation; donors and financial contributors [Kotler & Kotler, 1999:
4-5]), there is consensus within the literature that the consumer at the
centre of the political marketing process is the citizen (Butler & Collins,
1994: 19) or the voter (Lock & Harris, 1996: 28). Voting is viewed as a
buying process (Reid, 1988: 36). The point at which the exchange (cen-
tral to the marketing concept) occurs is the point at which the elector ex-
changes their vote and purchases the political product (Farrell & Wortman,
1987: 297; Wring, 1997: 1133). This purchase is made on the day of the
election (Newman, 1994: 10; Lees-Marshment, 2001). Therefore, polit-
ical marketing seeks to describe how political actors attempt to sell their
product to the consumer on the day of the election. However, underly-
ing this description is a series of key assumptions that implicitly inform
the analysis. It is these underlying economic foundations that will be
made explicit.

ORTHODOX RATIONAL CHOICE

The use of economic assumptions of behaviour to inform political

analyses is nothing new. Rational choice theory adopts the methodol-
ogy of economics, and seeks to explain the behaviour of individuals, be-
 26 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

ginning with the assumption that individuals are rational actors. Rational
choice provides a method through which actors are assumed to opti-
mally adapt to their circumstances and pursue the rational course of ac-
tion available to them. Anthony Downs’ seminal work on electoral
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competition in 1957 is the starting point for concepts and methods de-
rived from economics to explain political behaviour. Downs drew from
Hotelling’s (1929) work to offer the insight that political parties or can-
didates could be described as behaving in a manner analogous to busi-
ness and that voters could be regarded as consumers. Party leaders were
also assumed to be rational actors, motivated by the desire to maximise
votes in order to gain office. Policy substance was only assumed to be
important in terms of its effect on popularity. Politicians were assumed
to identify voter preferences in order to seek to incorporate them into
party programmes. This would be done so that popularity and hence
votes would be maximised. In a two-party system, with both parties
seeking to accommodate preferences of as many voters as possible, this
would suggest the convergence of electoral programmes, as parties con-
verged around the median voter. Downs also assumed that voters are ra-
tional actors who choose between parties or candidates based upon the
costs and benefits to them of the policy programmes on offer. Models
based upon economic assumptions assume that political actors present
choices to rational individuals. Choices made by individuals in the mar-
ket reveal their preferences; this assumption is made in respect of both
voters and political actors. While there are several major assumptions
that underpin this model, three are regarded as central: voter prefer-
ences are invariant and predetermined; parties are united, single actors;
and political actors’ central goal is to gain or retain office (Wellhofer,
1990: 15).
The Downsian model, premised upon assumptions of micro-eco-
nomic/neoclassical economic accounts of individual rational behav-
iour, predicted party convergence around the median voter in a
two-party system, as electoral platforms became similar in order to at-
tract the maximum number of votes, in order to win elections. One diffi-
culty, however, was that if all actors were assumed to behave in a
manner that was consistent with their own self-interest, and to assess the
costs and benefits of each course of action, was that the costs of voting
(in time spent collecting information and the in the act of voting) far
outweigh any potential benefits (in that an individual vote is highly un-
likely to make any difference). This problem remains at the centre of or-
thodox rational choice theory: it is rational to abstain from voting.
 Heather Savigny 27

IMPLICATIONS FOR POLITICAL MARKETING

By placing emphasis upon the marketing concept (Shama, 1976;

O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Newman, 1994; Lees-Marshment, 2001), the
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marketing mix (Wring, 1997; Newman, 1994), product life cycles (But-
ler & Collins, 1999; Shama, 1976), and market segmentation (Reid,
1988; Smith & Saunders, 1990), political marketing literature locates it-
self directly within the managerial school of thought, which is explicitly
driven by economic values (Sheth et al., 1988; 22-5). As above, eco-
nomic assumptions that underpin the analysis of behaviour emphasise
rationality. Behaviour is means-ends, in that means are rationally
adopted to satisfy given ends. Analysis is a theoretical exploration of a
given set of conditions through which actors seek to achieve their objec-
tives. They are assumed to behave rationally, and this modelling en-
ables the generation of hypotheses and the deduction of outcomes, in
order that predictions may be made. Analysing entrepreneurs as rational
actors assumes a knowledge of conditions which guide behaviour and
therefore provide the norms and guiding principles which determine the
behaviour best suited to achieve the given end, to maximise utility
(Godelier, 1972: 31). Furthermore, the consumer is assumed to maxi-
mize his/her own utility in a rational manner. Preferences are regarded
as fixed, transitive, expressed and identifiable. Indeed, preferences are
conflated with, and assumed to represent material interests.
Political marketing analysis implicitly accepts the economic founda-
tions of the marketing literature, yet fails to make these assumptions ex-
plicit and assess their implications. Explicitly rejecting behaviouralism
(Lees-Marshment, 2001: 5) as lacking in the analytical clarity or predic-
tive capacity of a more formal approach and explicitly premised upon
economic assumptions (Scammell, 1999: 726, 739; Lees-Marshment, 2001:
694; Newman, 1994; Butler & Collins, 1999: 55), political marketing en-
dorses the positivist epistemological position of rational choice theory.
Methodologically, political marketing proceeds in the same manner as
rational choice: it begins with a set of simplifying assumptions to pro-
duce a generic model from which propositions are deduced, then tested
against empirical evidence to establish the validity of the (retrospec-
tive) predictions (Butler & Collins, 1994; Lees-Marshment, 2001: 705).
Despite the parsimony of these assumptions, it is their applicability and
testability that are assumed to establish the validity of the theory (con-
sistent with the Downsian view, 1957: 21). Lock and Harris argue that
political marketing has to ‘develop its own predictive and prescriptive mod-
els if it is to inform and influence political action’ (1996: 23). Modelling
 28 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

based upon simplified assumptions enables the generation of hypothe-

ses and prediction.
Subsequently, the adoption of the political marketing literature of the
assumptions of the managerial school of marketing thought is explicitly
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driven by economic assumptions (Sheth et al., 1988: 22). This means

that the political marketing literature relies heavily upon, and can be lo-
cated within, orthodox rational choice theory. It is these assumptions
that need to be rendered explicit: political marketing accepts the same
basic premises as orthodox rational choice accounts of electoral compe-
tition. Rational choice prescribes behaviour in order to achieve aims; it
does not prescribe what those aims or end goals should be (Elster,
1986:1). Political marketing prescribes behaviour in order to enable po-
litical actors to achieve their end goal (win elections). In order to maxi-
mise their utility (vote maximise/win elections) the political marketing
literature suggests that political actors need to adopt marketing strate-
gies. Rationality is means-ends, in that certain strategies (means) are se-
lected instrumentally in order to satisfy given ends–marketing strategies
are selected to enable political actors to win elections. As rational
choice theory provides a method of actors’ optimally adapting to their
circumstances, so political marketing provides a set of tools and tech-
niques to enable political actors to adapt within a given environment,
which they cannot change.

DOWNS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

The political marketing literature suggests, congruent with Downsian

assumptions, that parties behave like businesses, competing for votes in
an arena that is analogous to a commercial marketplace (Downs, 1957).
There are only two kinds of actors assumed, voters and parties, and they
operate within a minimally specified context (rules of the electoral
game). Consistent with this minimal specification of context in rational
choice, the key components of the political market are: ‘the existence of
a mass electorate; competition between two or more parties for the
votes of this electorate; and a set of rules governing this competition’
(Gamble, 1974: 6). In Downs’ spatial model of party competition, par-
ties are assumed to compete around the centre ground for the median
voter. Indeed, as demonstrated by Hay, Downs’ model may well pro-
vide an accurate description of New Labour’s electoral tactics (1999),
reinforced by their emphasis upon outputs, as an electoral strategy,
rather than ideology (Temple, 2000). In the US, following the 1994 US
midterm elections, the Democrats, following advice from strategist
 Heather Savigny 29

Dick Morris who is widely accredited with providing Clinton with the
ideas and strategies behind the Democrats’ centrist move, or ‘triangula-
tion,’ similarly can be argued to have behaved in a Downsian manner by
pursing centrist strategies, converging around the median voter (Morris,
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1997).
Although the potential for electoral destruction is assumed to prevent
the parties becoming too close to each other, the problem remains that
‘the closer that parties become ideologically, the more people’s votes
are liable to turn on something other than voting’ (Barry, 1978: 105).
Within the political marketing literature, this point is adopted by
Lees-Marshment who argues that it is not ideology that wins party elec-
tions, but the party that is most adept at marketing (2001). Policy sub-
stance within the political marketing perspective is only regarded as
important in terms of the effect upon party image. This would suggest
that political marketing again fits with the Downsian assumption that
‘parties pursue policies in order to win elections, rather than win elec-
tions in order to pursue policies’ (Downs, 1957: 28). In two-party sys-
tems political actors are not directly motivated to give voters the
policies or product that they want, rather they offer the ‘product’ as a
means to achieve their primary goal–to maximise votes and win elec-
tions. As has been noted, substantive policy debates are less likely to be
the focus of marketing (Butler & Collins, 1994: 27). Scammell argues
that ‘policy discussion is related not to intrinsic merits or national inter-
est, but to potential effects on party images’ (1995: xii). In emphasising
the importance of image, political marketing implicitly accepts the or-
thodox rational choice assumptions about voter ‘rationality.’ Downs ar-
gues that the costs of acquiring information are greater than the benefits
derived from voting. Therefore, voters make their choices based upon
ideologies or in political marketing terms, brand images, saving them-
selves the costs of gathering detailed information about policy stances
(1957: 98). Political marketing endorses this position, emphasising
style over substance, image over policy content (Harrop, 1990: 279).
This is done in order to appeal to voters who are assumed to cast their
vote affectively.
Arguably then, in assuming that voters behave rationally, and seek an
image to guide their vote, image (and perception of that image) is the
product that the political actor seeks to sell. For example, at the 1997
election, a perception that New Labour in Britain was competent to
manage the economy, in the face of the Conservatives’ perceived in-
competence, combined with the electorate’s perceptions of Tory
‘sleaze,’ were considered to be key factors in New Labour’s success
 30 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

(Dunleavy, 1997). Indeed, New Labour sought to ‘sell’ that perception

of competence through the reverse promotion of identification. Rather
than voters identifying themselves with parties, political actors seek to
produce the perception that they now identify themselves with the voter
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(e.g., New Labour seeking to target and identify themselves with

‘Mondeo man’ in 1997, and ‘Mrs. Mortgage’ in 2001). The commod-
ity/product subsequently becomes image, or more significantly, percep-
tion of that image. Ideology, policy, leadership and party organisations
become tools in establishing that image. Thus, paradoxically, while not-
ing the use of marketing techniques to inform the activity of politics, the
political process itself potentially becomes increasingly depoliticised. It
is the (appearance of the) accommodation of as broad a range of consen-
sual expressed preferences as possible, in order that political actors may
achieve their objectives, which is the function of political marketing.

LIMITATIONS OF POLITICAL MARKETING

The political marketing literature makes a series of assumptions in

respect to the preferences of the electorate and the context in which ac-
tors find themselves, both of which are consistent with the assumptions
made within orthodox rational choice. While these simplified assump-
tions may be adopted to model and describe political behaviour, they
are problematic if the models are then further used to support normative
claims that political marketing improves the democratic process.

PREFERENCES

The political marketing literature makes a series of key implicit as-

sumptions in respect to preferences. Consistent with orthodox rational
choice assumptions, preferences are taken as a given. They are also as-
sumed to be fixed, expressed and identifiable. In assuming that voter
preferences are fixed, the options available to political actors in elec-
toral competition are limited. This leads political actors to pursue pref-
erence-accommodating strategies. The successful identification and
accommodation of these preferences is assumed to enable the party or
candidate to maximise their utility. Parties redesign their ‘product’ to fit
expressed voter preferences (identified through opinion polling and fo-
cus groups); the party which offers the best ‘fit’ is assumed to gain the
most votes and therefore win the election. Political actors identify what
voters want, then provide a ‘product’ that delivers on these preferences.
 Heather Savigny 31

This suggests that preferences are accommodated in order that organi-

sational objectives may be achieved. Yet, preferences may first need to
be shaped prior to being accommodated.
The political marketing literature operates upon the assumption that
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preferences are identifiable and available to be accommodated. It is un-

able to account, however, for where those preferences come from. How
are preferences formed in the first instance? Adopting this simplified
assumption of preference accommodation negates the ability of actors
with state power to pursue preference-shaping strategies (Dunleavy &
Ward, 1991: 112-44). Further, if voters are assumed to cast their vote
affectively and rationally, the information that they receive in order to
do this is provided through the mass media. It is acknowledged that the
media and politicians each have their own agenda, yet the information
through which the citizen makes his/her informed choice for whom to
vote is mediated and represented through the mass media. This provides
the media an opportunity to play a role in preference-shaping strategies,
and to define the parameters of available preferences.

Context

While the political marketing approach adds to orthodox rational

choice models in providing rich description of contemporary electoral
behaviour, it may need to be broadened in order to increase its descrip-
tive capacity. It may need to borrow from other perspectives in order to
explain where preferences and interests come from and to recognise the
constraints and opportunities afforded within the densely structured po-
litical environment in which actors find themselves operating. While
acknowledging the existence of other actors in the political market,
their role in the exchange is regarded as limited. This serves to down-
play the dynamism of the context in which political actors operate. To
assume a direct, two-way relationship between political actors and vot-
ers is to neglect the complexity of a densely structured political environ-
ment. Surely, if other actors exist in a marketplace, they too have the
potential to ‘consume’ the product, and to engage in more subtle ex-
change relationships with the producer of the product. This raises ques-
tions as to the nature of exchange with these other actors. What do they
bring to bear on the political product? How are their preferences accom-
modated? How does this conflict with accommodating voter prefer-
ences? Does this mean that the voters’ preferences ultimately are
shaped in order to accommodate the preferences of actors within the
market?
 32 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

Political marketing, in its implicit assumption about preferences, also

equates material preferences with interests. This has two significant im-
pacts. First, it downplays the role of the ideational in analysis. Second, it
conforms to the classic pluralist assumption of power. Here, interests
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are identifiable, agents (negating the impact of structures and the poten-
tial latent exercise of power) exercise power through observable con-
flict. In adopting simplifying assumptions, and reducing analysis to the
individual actor, this negates the broader institutional context in which
such rationality is exercised (Hay, 2002: 9). Context is crucial in under-
standing the actions of an individual. Rational choice suggests a certain
path dependence, whereby there is a rational course of action available
to an actor in a context which is taken as a given. Therefore, the political
marketing derivative also implicitly accepts that the rational course of
action available to political actors, in the contemporary environment, is
to adopt marketing strategies in order to accommodate market prefer-
ences.
Rational choice theory ‘seeks to illuminate how choices are made
within structures, the agenda sometimes stretching to the consideration
of how rational choices reproduce or transform structures’ (Ward,
1995: 84). In some respects this becomes contradictory. On the one
hand, there is the suggestion that structures define the rational course of
action available to an actor; therefore, if the structure (or context) is
known, this negates the need for agents as there will be only one given
course of action available. This can be read from the structure/context.
On the other hand, a dynamic is introduced, implying the capacity of in-
dividuals, making rational choices, to transform the structures within
which available rational choices may be made. If rational choices trans-
form structures and alter the context in which rational strategies may be
selected, this highlights the significance of ideational analysis. Reduc-
ing analysis to the material assumes that actors have a perfect knowl-
edge of the context in which they find themselves, paradoxically
reducing the role of agency. Agents’ behaviour becomes determined by
the context. To introduce ideational variables into the analysis enables
the recognition of differing motivations for behaviour, with the poten-
tial for a variation of outcomes. Moreover, it begins to enable an under-
standing of how actors are motivated, and how different motivations
may produce alternate outcomes, as opposed to the path dependency as-
sumed in rational descriptions.
 Heather Savigny 33

DEMOCRACY
In adopting the central assumptions from the management marketing
literature, political marketing claims to place the consumer/voter at the
centre of the political process. Normatively, the political marketing lit-
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erature claims that this improves the quality of democracy. In providing

the consumer with a product that they want, the political process is pre-
sented as responsive to consumer demand, which in turn is assumed to
make politicians more accountable. These premises are derived from
the management marketing literature whose central tenet is that the con-
sumer is placed at the centre of the marketing process.
Although grounded in campaigns and communications literature (for
review, see Scammell, 1999), the political marketing literature draws its
central theoretical assumptions from the management marketing litera-
ture, which emphasises the centrality of the consumer to the marketing
process (Keith, 1960; Kotler & Levy, 1969; Blois, 1989), in order to
best further the interests of the organisation (Keith, 1960). Consumer
demand impacts upon organisational behaviour as the organisation
seeks to satisfy the demands, needs and wants of its target consumer
(Levitt, 1960). This suggests a relatively equal relationship, that while
individual/organisational goals drive organisational behaviour, this is
done in response to the demands of the consumer. In political marketing
terms, this has been used to suggest an improvement in the democratic
process, political actors are assumed to be more responsive to, and ac-
commodate the preferences of the electorate. Yet, the (implicitly as-
sumed as identifiable) wants and needs of the consumer are accommo-
dated, not for the benefit of the consumer, but so that organisational
objectives may be achieved. Consumer satisfaction plays a significant
role, but this is not at the expense of organisational aims (Wring, 1997:
652). The paradox of marketing is that it is directed at the customer, but
its fundamental aim is to satisfy the interests of the producer (Sackman,
1992, cited in Wring, 1997).
However, there is also space for the organisation to manipulate the
preferences of the consumer, as the organisation may seek to shape
those wants and needs (Kotler & Andreasen, 1991; Lovelock & Wein-
berg, 1988). This is less explicitly acknowledged in the political mar-
keting literature, which suggests that marketing is used only to identify
expressed wants and needs and subsequently to accommodate them, in
order that the party (organisation) may achieve its objective (win an
election). Scammell argues that ‘marketing’s unique contribution is the
strategic concern with what the market (electorate) wants and what it
 34 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

will bear’ (1995: 8). This strategic concern suggests that political actors
respond to the demands of their consumers (voters), and alter their prod-
uct offering accordingly. Consumers are elevated from recipients of a
political ‘product’ to partaking in its production. As O’Shaughnessy ar-
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gues ‘the essence of marketing is reciprocity: “consumers” themselves

bring something to bear on the selling: they are not passive objects and
the process is an interactive one’ (1990: 2). It is this strategic concern
and assumed impact of the voters that leads political marketing to its
claims of increased accountability and responsiveness to the voter
(Kotler & Kotler, 1999: 3).
Normatively, political marketing asserts that a market orientation
within the political arena is healthy for democracy in that there is a re-
ciprocal and dynamic relationship between parties and voters (Shama,
1976; O’Shaughnessy, 1990; Lees-Marshment, 2001). Parties are able
to achieve their goals, whilst voters benefit from a greater opportunity
to participate in the process by impacting upon the nature of the political
product (Scammell, 1995: 298). The quality of information in elections
has been argued to have improved (Harrop, 1990: 297). For critics,
however, this has led to a ‘dumbing down’ of the political process with
politics packaged for consumption, replacing informed discussion with
soundbites (Franklin, 1994). This challenges the democratic ideal of a
citizenry able to make informed judgements as to who should govern
them.
The most significant prescription of the management marketing liter-
ature is that in order to be successful, marketing must be adopted as an
underlying philosophy. For Kotler and Andreasen successful marketing
can only occur when a ‘marketing mindset’ has been adopted (1996:
37). Thus, marketing is regarded as comprising more than a set of tools
and techniques; rather, to be successful it must be viewed as a philoso-
phy that underpins the thinking and behaviour of organisations (Kotler &
Andreasen 1996: 37). Therefore, the assumptions, values and beliefs,
which underpin the marketing approach, must be internalised. At the
level of politics, this implies an internalisation of rational choice as-
sumptions by political actors in order to be successful. To advocate an
internalisation of such assumptions (as done by the management litera-
ture which informs the political marketing debate) goes beyond existing
rational choice accounts. The implication of this is that politics will be
replaced by marketing, becoming devoid of content, and embracing a
single-mindedly rationalistic/instrumental economic rationality.
 Heather Savigny 35

CONCLUSION

It can be argued that by directly locating itself within mainstream

management marketing literature the political marketing approach ac-
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cepts the economic assumptions upon which the former is premised. In

political science, these parsimonious assumptions have been applied
most notably through rational choice theory. Grounded in these as-
sumptions, economic explanations of political behaviour assume that
parties behave as businesses in a profit-seeking economy, assuming
voter preferences to be fixed, and therefore identifiable so that political
actors may accommodate them. While management marketing suggests
that shaping the preferences of the consumer comes prior to their ac-
commodation, this subtlety has been missed in the political marketing
literature, which is yet to explore (consistent with other economic de-
scriptions of behaviour) where those preferences come from and how
they arise in the first place. If other actors play a role in shaping prefer-
ences (such as the media, and other actors within the ‘marketplace’),
then they too have their own ends which they rationally pursue, and
which may well be inconsistent with the normative ideals of democratic
theory. Moreover, the utilising of such economic frameworks as heuristic
devices for describing political behaviour encourages the internalisation
of these assumptions and becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. As Harris
and Wring note, there is a perception that ‘managerialism has to some
extent replaced traditional forms of ideology as the driving force within
modern politics’ (2001: 909). If this is so, then while rational choice and
its political marketing derivative provide useful heuristic devices for
accounting for contemporary electoral behaviour, this should not neces-
sarily be conflated with the normative prescription that an internalisation
of these assumptions is (a) necessary and (b) healthy for democracy. If
actors behave in a manner that is consistent with rational choice ac-
counts then it also becomes increasingly rational for consumers/voters
to behave in a utility maximising manner. Thus, arguably, the more par-
ties behave in a ‘rational’ manner, the less ‘rational’ it is to vote. Nor-
matively, within the political marketing literature there are claims that
this process of market orientation improves democracy. However, this
has yet to be reconciled with the theoretical paradox that it is rational
not to vote, and the empirical reality of a continuing decline in electoral
participation.
 36 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL MARKETING

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