Germany 2025
Germany 2025
Germany
2025
INTERNATIONAL ENERGY
AGENCY
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Germany 2025 Table of contents
Table of contents
Executive summary
Germany is at an important inflection point in its energy transition. As one era
of its energy history draws to a close, another is coming clearly into view – the move
away from nuclear, coal and Russian natural gas contrasted by the transition towards
renewables, low-emissions hydrogen, heat pumps and electric vehicles (EVs). While
the world has been buffeted by geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges in recent
years, Germany has worked hard to accelerate its clean energy transition. This report
seeks to provide Germany with timely advice on how it can progress towards its
energy and climate goals, including in three key focus areas: 1) optimising electricity
system operation; 2) decarbonising heating in buildings; and 3) expanding the role of
hydrogen in the energy system. It emphasises the need for long-term policy stability,
targeted demand creation, infrastructure development, integrated planning and
streamlined permitting to successfully advance Germany’s energy transition.
Germany’s transition is crucial not only to meet its climate goals, but also for
its energy security and economic competitiveness. It is targeting a 65% reduction
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2030 (from 1990 levels) and climate neutrality
by 2045, with the long-standing Energiewende strategy guiding the evolution of its
energy system. While this has supported a surge in renewables-based electricity
generation, which will need to both continue and grow, more work lies ahead to
decarbonise end-use sectors, such as transport, industry and buildings. Existing
strategies and supportive policy measures in these sectors will need to be matched
by a strong focus on effective, cost-efficient implementation. Given that German
consumers pay among the highest electricity prices in Europe, policy developments
will need to also be seen through an affordability and competitiveness lens, including
by ensuring that the distributional impacts are well understood and that proactive
measures are taken to manage the costs of transition measures. To ensure public
support for the transition, the government should also clearly communicate costs,
benefits and timelines.
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Germany should prioritise actions that optimise the efficiency and resilience of
its growing electricity system, such as smart meters, grids, storage and
locational pricing. As it seeks to achieve 80% renewable energy in power
consumption by 2030, faster smart meter rollout can help unlock the flexibility latent
within “behind-the-meter” assets (solar panels, heat pumps, EVs). Actions could also
be taken to facilitate distribution grid upgrades, enable access to and use of smart
meter data, and potentially allow smart meters to control distributed solar photovoltaic
(PV) supply. Germany should also jump-start an expansion of large-scale storage in
optimal locations, including by fast tracking the implementation of measures in its
electricity storage strategy and accelerating grid connections for projects. Routes for
action could include the expansion of capacity in existing programmes (frequency
response and services markets, grid booster initiative, etc.) and the adoption of new,
utility-scale storage tenders targeting optimal locations. Such efforts should be
complemented by clearer locational signals to improve system operation and reduce
the need for new grids, as the efficient use of existing grid infrastructure is crucial.
Supportive actions could include ensuring that new grid connections are in optimal
grid locations (now and in the future), and that locational signals are part of future
support rounds for generation, storage and electrolysers.
The transport sector must shift into high gear if it is to help drive Germany’s
energy and economic transition. Transport is the largest source of energy end-use
emissions and has registered only modest reductions in recent years. A broad
approach is required that incorporates all clean fuels and technologies, including
greater use of public transport. Long-term investments to upgrade public transport
infrastructure can support modal shifts away from road transport (which accounts for
95% of total transport emissions). There is also considerable potential to adopt
policies that boost EV uptake. Options include a bonus-malus tax structure that
incentivises low-emissions vehicle purchases, specific measures targeting leased
and company cars (the largest share in the German market), faster deployment of
charging infrastructure, ensuring even treatment of compliance options in Germany’s
GHG quota policy, and improving co-ordination across relevant ministries. Germany’s
incredible transport heritage and manufacturing base has the potential to be a
distinguishing asset, but this hinges on well-designed transition measures that
support its competitiveness in the clean energy economy.
A clear vision for transitioning Germany’s building stock must be coupled with
consistent communication and dependable policy signals. The Building Energy
Act provides a clear, long-term legal framework that sets targets and timelines for
renewables-based heating systems. This must be coupled with equally clear policy
signals that electricity (i.e. decentralised heat pumps) and decarbonised district
heating paired with increased energy efficiency will be the primary options to
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2
Significantly ramp up efforts to decarbonise the transport sector.
3
Clarify the role that natural gas is expected to play through the energy transition.
4
Prioritise actions to lower electricity retail prices.
5
Create clearer locational signals to improve system operation and reduce the need for
new grids.
6
Hasten the smart meter rollout to unlock the enormous potential of demand-side
flexibility and distributed generation.
7
Jump-start the expansion of large-scale storage in optimal locations.
8
Co-ordinate and advance municipal heat planning to enhance the value for
stakeholders.
9
Send clear signals that heat pumps and district heating paired with energy efficiency
will be the primary option to decarbonise heating in buildings.
10
Focus efforts to stimulate targeted, low -emissions hydrogen demand.
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Nonetheless, the changes in Germany’s energy system did not come without their
challenges. In particular, as the energy crisis drove an increase in energy prices,
German industry bore heavy costs, resulting in stalled industrial output and a growing
number of companies considering to relocate abroad. Likewise, German households
face some of the highest energy costs in Europe, especially for electricity. As German
climate targets necessitate accelerating action to cut emissions from the energy
sector, addressing competitiveness and affordability challenges will take on outsized
importance, to maintain support for the energy transition itself and to ensure a fair
distribution of the benefits and costs from the transition. Furthermore, a 2023
constitutional court ruling on climate spending in the context of debt limits could
hamstring the government’s ability to offer financial support for energy transition
measures.
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According to the Federal Environmental Agency, Germany’s emissions are below its
permitted annual emissions, reaching 649 Mt CO2-eq in 2024. The generation of
electricity and heat contributed 23% to GHG emissions in Germany. This significant
contribution is primarily due to the use of coal and natural gas in electricity generation.
Although the highest energy demand among end-use sectors is the buildings sector,
the transport sector is a larger contributor to GHG emissions, responsible for 22% of
emissions, due to its reliance on oil products. The buildings sector accounted for 15%
of total GHG emissions, while the industrial sector contributed the biggest share, 28%
in 2024.
GHG emissions decreased by 3% from 2023 to 2024. In the electricity and heating
sector, GHG emissions in 2024 fell by 11% compared to the previous year, mainly
due to a significant decline in coal-fired power generation, enabled by the steady
expansion of wind and solar power and increased electricity imports. Industry’s
emissions remained stable in 2024 compared to the previous year. The recent decline
of industry emissions was primarily driven by reduced output due to higher
manufacturing costs.
750 Transport
Industry
-65%
500
Electricity and
heat generation
250 -88% Net Target
zero Net total
0 emissions
1990 2024 2030 2040 2045
IEA CC BY 4.0
Note: LULUCF = land use, land-use change and forestry. Data for 2024 are provisional.
Sources: IEA analysis based on UNFCCC (2023); Germany, Federal Environmental Agency (2025),
Greenhouse gas emissions (Accessed 21 March 2025).
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
In the buildings sector, 2024 emissions fell by 2.4% to approximately 100 Mt CO2-eq.
This reduction was aided by higher consumer prices and mild winter weather. In the
transport sector, approximately 144 Mt CO2-eq were emitted in 2024
(-1.5% compared to 2023).
The latest 2024 projection data from the Federal Environment Agency indicates that
2030 climate targets are within reach for the first time (the 2023 forecast, in contrast,
estimated an emissions gap). On a sectoral basis, the report found that the electricity
and heat, agricultural, and waste sectors would overachieve, while the transport
sector would exceed its emissions budget by 180 Mt CO2-eq and the buildings sector
by 32 Mt CO2-eq (cumulative for the period 2021-30). This would mean that Germany
is not on track to meet its EU ESR targets for 2030.
Base
Status Targets
year
Non-ETS GHG
2005 -50%
emissions
Share of renewables
in gross final energy 21.6% 42.5%
consumption
Share of renewables
in gross electricity 52.5% 80%
consumption
Energy efficiency
-14% 2008 -26.5%
(TFEC reduction)
Note: TFEC = Total final energy consumption.
Sources: IEA analysis based on UNFCCC (2023); European Commission (2024); Germany - Final
updated NECP 2021-2030; Eurostat (2024); Germany, Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and
Climate Action (2024), Time series on the development of renewable energies in Germany.
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The 2023 Climate Action Programme outlines specific measures and actions across
various sectors – such as energy, transport, buildings and agriculture – to meet the
emissions reduction targets set by the Act. The programme also identifies funding
and financial mechanisms to support implementation of these measures. Many
initiatives within the current programme have already been implemented, including
the Germany Ticket public transport measure, the CO2-dependent truck toll,
accelerated procedures and designated areas for renewable energy expansion, and
subsidies for energy-efficient construction and renovation.
The main instrument for financing the energy transition and climate protection efforts
in Germany is the Climate and Transformation Fund (KTF). The fund was recently
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restructured in accordance with a 2023 ruling by the German Constitutional Court that
found parts of the KTF previously violated a constitutional limit on new debt of 0.35%
of annual GDP. The KTF is primarily financed by revenues from the EU ETS and the
national fuel emissions trading (CO2 pricing) system. The expenditures of the KTF
were reduced by EUR 12 billion in the 2024 budget, resulting in EUR 49 billion
available. Of the total EUR 49 billion, 40% is dedicated to supporting the heating
sector’s transition while 31% is allocated to reducing end-user energy costs (with
EUR 10.7 billion earmarked for removing the renewable energy surcharge from end
users and up to EUR 3.9 billion for electricity price compensation for energy-intensive
industries, as climate protection aid). Other key focus areas include promoting
semiconductors for digitalisation, expanding hydrogen use in industry and promoting
sustainable mobility.
18.7
Amid the 2022 energy crisis, Germany passed the so-called “Easter Package”, which
accelerated energy transition efforts as a means to tackle the energy crisis. The
central focus of the package is to increase the role of renewables in Germany’s
energy system with updated targets, measures to facilitate siting and removal of the
renewables surcharge on electricity prices.
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The Fuel Emissions Trading Act introduced a national emissions trading system for
sectors not covered by the EU ETS, such as transport and heating. During an
introductory phase, prices are fixed. They started at 25 EUR/t CO2-eq in 2021,
increased to 45 EUR/t CO2-eq in 2024 and rise to 55 EUR/t CO2-eq in 2025. After
2025, the pricing will shift to a market-based system, where prices will be determined
by supply and demand within a specified price corridor. Starting in 2027, these sectors
will fall under the EU ETS2 programme, a cap-and-trade scheme applied upstream
on fuel suppliers.
End-use sectors
The buildings sector is the largest energy consumer, accounting for 42% of final
energy consumption in 2023. Industry accounted for 30% of energy consumption
while transport made up 28%. The decline in energy demand in Germany over the
last decade has primarily come from the buildings sector. In 2023, total energy
demand was 7 500 PJ, representing a 5% reduction compared to the previous year
and 14% compared to 2008.
In the recast Energy Efficiency Directive (EED), the European Union agreed to reduce
final energy consumption in the European Union as a whole by at least 11.7%
compared to projections of the expected energy use in 2030, supported by indicative
country targets. Since 2023, Germany has a dedicated Energy Efficiency Act that
contributes to implementing the EED. It sets the “energy efficiency first” principle and
establishes efficiency targets for primary and final energy consumption for 2030. The
targets require a reduction of 26.5% in final energy consumption and 39.3% in primary
energy consumption, both compared to 2008. In its updated National Energy and
Climate Plan, however, Germany concludes that there remains a gap to achieve the
2030 target and significant additional efficiency measures are needed.
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-14% Transport
8 000
-26.5%
6 000 Industry
4 000
Buildings
2 000
Total TFEC
0
2008 2013 2018 2023 2030 target
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Notes: Industry includes manufacturing and other sectors (agriculture, construction, mining and
quarrying). It does not include refinery and non-energy use (fuels that are used as raw materials
and are not consumed as fuel or transformed into another fuel).
Source: IEA (2025), World Energy Balances.
Buildings
Buildings represent around 19% of direct, energy-related GHG emissions in Germany
in 2022. Residential buildings accounted for 75% of the energy consumption in
buildings in 2022. Within this sector, 63% of the energy is used for space heating,
which still relies heavily on fossil fuels, primarily natural gas and oil.
Germany’s building stock is large, with 19.4 million residential units and 2 million
non-residential buildings. Moreover, its building stock is relatively old (68% built prior
to 1978, before the first ordinance on thermal insulation of buildings took effect) and
renovation rates are low. Ownership is heterogeneous, with a roughly even split
between owner-occupied and tenancy buildings (giving it one of the lowest home
ownership rates in Europe).
Decarbonising heating is crucial for achieving climate targets, and in recent years
Germany has taken several steps toward this end, including with a new Building
Energy Act and Heat Planning Act to provide clarity on the role for renewable energy
in heating. Heat pumps and district heating are the main options for replacing gas and
oil boilers. By 2030, Germany aims to have an 80% share of renewables in electricity
generation and 50% renewable and recycled heat in district heating. The federal
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government also provides support for investments in clean heating technologies. With
measures implemented so far, Germany is making significant progress on energy
efficiency and climate mitigation, reaching around 40% emissions reductions in
buildings between 1990 and 2022. However, challenges remain to speed up the
transition (see Focus Area 2).
Space heating
Water heating
Appliances
Cooking
Lighting
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy End-uses and Efficiency Indicators.
Germany’s Building Energy Act contains requirements for the energy quality of
buildings and the creation and use of energy certificates. A 2022 amendment to the
Act raised the energy performance standard for new buildings, limiting primary energy
consumption in new buildings to 55% of a reference building, thereby promoting
energy-efficient heat pumps over traditional boilers. The Building Energy Act also sets
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a target of 65% renewable energy in the heat supply for new buildings, which also
applies to existing buildings (in stages and with certain exceptions; see more in Focus
Area 2).
District heating
District heating produced from renewable energy and waste heat is one of the main
options for replacing fossil fuel boilers in densely populated areas. It can be a cost-
and resource-efficient solution, mainly in densely populated areas where centralised
heating solutions are more practical and economical. Around 15% of Germany’s
apartments and 6% of residential buildings are connected to district heating networks,
and in the three largest cities – Berlin, Hamburg and Munich – district heating supplies
one-third of buildings. However, the adoption of district heating systems has
plateaued over the past decade. Germany has no price regulation for district heating
and municipalities rarely implement obligations to connect and use, which means that
the technology must be competitive with other heating options in terms of cost,
convenience and environmental benefits to attract consumers (see Focus Area 2).
Industry
Germany has a large industrial sector, with more than a quarter of its energy
consumption attributed to electricity. However, the sector remains heavily reliant on
fossil fuels, which accounted for 59% of its energy use in 2022 (of which natural gas
accounted for 34%). As one of Europe’s leading steel producers, Germany has a well-
established basic metals subsector, which is the main coal consumer in the industrial
sector. The country manufactures a wide range of steel products used in construction,
automotive, machinery and other industries.
Germany’s chemical industry is one of the largest in the world, producing a wide range
of chemicals, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology products. It is the second-largest
energy consumer in Germany’s industrial sector, accounting for 22% of the total
energy consumption in the sector. The chemical industry primarily uses natural gas
and electricity to power its operations.
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The German refining industry is crucial for supplying energy and raw materials to
various sectors. Emissions in this sector result from the extensive use of oil, which is
processed into numerous products, including gasoline, diesel, jet fuel and various
petrochemicals.
Other subsectors also contribute to high energy demand and related emissions,
including the non-metallic minerals, paper, food and tobacco, and machinery industries.
The non-metallic minerals industry, mainly driven by cement and glass production, is
increasingly using more bioenergy to reduce emissions. In 2012, bioenergy accounted
for 18% of energy use, which increased to 27% by 2022. Biofuels, such as biomass and
biogas, are being used as alternative fuels in cement kilns.
The Energy Efficiency Act aligns with EU energy efficiency targets and aims to reduce
final energy consumption by 26.5% by 2030 compared to 2008 levels. The main
measures stipulated in the Act for industry to achieve these targets include conducting
regular energy audits, integrating certified energy management systems, and
reporting on energy consumption and efficiency improvements.
The federal government also offers EUR 1 billion in annual funding to promote energy
and resource efficiency in the commercial sector (EEW). The funding is offered along
modules that cover a range of measures from energy-efficient technologies such as
pumps, air compressors and electric motors to action to generate process heat from
renewable energy sources and electricity.
To prevent carbon leakage and help German industry maintain competitiveness, the
government offers several support mechanisms to address electricity costs, including
an electricity price compensation for indirect carbon costs as part of the EU ETS and
an electricity tax reduction for companies in the manufacturing sector. The permanent
removal of the Renewable Energy Act levy on electricity also offered price relief for
manufacturers.
The federal government plans to establish the economic, legal and political framework
conditions for CCUS in Germany under a Carbon Management Strategy, for which
key points were established in 2024. Following a broad-based stakeholder dialogue
with representatives from civil society, academia and industry, the government has
agreed on removing current barriers blocking the use of CCUS and focusing public
funding on hard-to-abate emissions, mainly in industry.
6 Hydrogen or
ammonia
4
2 Cement
0
2026 2028 2030
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Includes all operational, under construction and planned CO2 capture facilities with an
announced capacity of more than 100 000 t per year or 1 000 t per year for direct air capture
facilities.
Source: IEA (2024), CCUS Projects Explorer.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Transport
Transport is the third-largest energy-consuming sector in Germany, accounting for
approximately 20% of total energy demand. Although its energy demand is less than
that of the industry and buildings sectors, its GHG emissions are higher because it
remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with 95% of its energy demand coming from oil
products. In fact, nearly a quarter of Germany’s total GHG emissions come from the
transport sector, which have not registered significant emissions reductions in the
past few decades. The Federal Climate Action Act required that the transport sector
reduce its GHG emissions to 85 Mt CO2-eq by 2030, representing a 45% reduction
from 2022 levels (recently changed to a non-binding target). Therefore, further efforts
are necessary to achieve more rapid GHG reductions in the sector.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Sources: IEA (2024), Emissions Factors and IEA (2024), Energy End-uses and Efficiency
Indicators.
Passenger transport accounts for 70% of energy consumption in the transport sector,
making it the leading GHG emitter among end uses. Cars using gasoline and diesel
are the predominant mode of passenger transport in Germany. Buses used in public
transport are mainly powered by diesel, while rail transport consumes most of the
electricity used in passenger transport.
EU CO2 standards for vehicles apply in Germany. For light-duty vehicles, relative to
a 2020 baseline (95 g CO2/km), new cars must see a reduction of 15% in 2025, 55%
in 2030 and 100% in 2035 (when all new car sales must be zero-emissions).
Heavy-duty vehicles must register reductions of 15% by 2025, 45% by 2030, 65% by
2035 and 90% by 2040.
Passenger
transport
Freight
transport
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy End-uses and Efficiency Indicators.
In Germany, EVs account for around 24% of sales. At the beginning of 2020, EV sales
started to rise, primarily driven by an increase in the environmental bonus, designed
to promote EV adoption. The programme offered up to EUR 4 500 for EV purchases,
which supported the deployment of an estimated 2.1 million EVs since 2016 (at a cost
of EUR 10 billion). The policy shift boosted the share of EV sales from 3% in 2019 to
14% in 2020. Sustained policy support from the government contributed to EV sales
growth in subsequent years, peaking at 31% of total car sales in 2022.
However, since the subsidy programme ended, the trend has slowed down. The
government’s announcement of the phase-out of incentives for plug-in hybrid electric
and a reduction of incentives for battery electric vehicles starting on 1 January 2023
created a pull-forward effect. This led to a rush of purchases before the incentives
were reduced, and a subsequent decline in market penetration in 2023. In December
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15%
0%
Feb
_
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
Dec
Jan
Jul
The government put forward a plan to address charging infrastructure for EVs. The
2023 Charging Infrastructure Master Plan II set out the timetable for expanding
charging infrastructure over the next few years. It comprises 68 measures across
funding, empowering communities, universal availability, integration into the power
grid, charging at buildings and heavy commercial vehicles. This Plan was designed
to close the gap between electric mobility and power grids, expanding the charging
infrastructure for heavy commercial vehicles and mobilising private investments.
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Alongside the Master Plan for charging infrastructure, the government also has an
explicit strategy for commercial vehicles. The Overall Approach to Climate-Friendly
Commercial Vehicles shows how measures can be implemented in a targeted
manner. As a result, the co-funding of battery and fuel cell electric commercial
vehicles has been undertaken. Additionally, a tender for construction and operation
of the fast-charging infrastructure for heavy-duty vehicles officially started in
September 2024. The initial network will comprise around 350 locations with
4 200 charging points along motorways.
Finally, rail and public transport also offer considerable emissions reduction potential
for passenger transport. Germany has made progress since the last IEA Energy
Policy Review in upgrading its rail infrastructure and promoting more public transport.
Notably, the introduction in 2023 of the “Deutschlandticket”, which set a
EUR 49 introductory price (increasing to EUR 58 from 2025) for a monthly public
transport ticket that applies throughout Germany, has proven popular (up to about
13 million users per month). However, results continue to lag potential as rail and
public transport often remain costlier and less convenient from a consumer
perspective. As such, additional solutions to promote rail over road and air transport
can be beneficial, drawing on successful measures in other countries.
The Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport also promotes cycling and walking with
various funding and financing programmes, including an increased budget allocation
in the 20th legislative period of up to EUR 2.91 billion by 2030 for the promotion of
cycling.
20
15
10
0
2012 2023
Germany EU27 The Netherlands
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Global EV Data Explorer.
Germany could also take greater advantage of the emissions reduction potential that
sustainable biofuels can bring to its transport sector. Sustainable biofuels can play a
particularly important role in decarbonising harder-to-abate transport sectors such as
trucking, shipping and aviation, but have also proven to hold considerable potential
to lower emissions from light-duty vehicles in the near term before electrification
becomes more mainstream. In particular, sustainable biofuels could bring cost
advantages relative to more expensive options such as e-fuels. Meanwhile, electric
trucks are gaining momentum globally, led by the People’s Republic of China
(hereafter, “China”), and EU CO2 standards for heavy-duty trucks targeting a 90%
emissions reduction by 2040 will further support growth in coming decades. In
Germany, as of April 2024, electric vehicles accounted for 2.1% of the commercial
truck fleet.
Electricity
Despite significant growth in renewables, the German electricity system remains
reliant on fossil fuels. Renewable electricity generation has increased substantially in
the past decade, with wind growing by 137% and solar by 95% between 2013
and 2023. By 2023, renewables accounted for 52.5% of gross electricity consumption
and reached 54% in 2024. However, fossil fuels still contributed to nearly half of
electricity generation in 2023, with coal making up 30% and natural gas 16%. Nuclear
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energy accounted for 6% of electricity generation in 2022, but the German nuclear
fleet was completely shut down in 2023.
Continued reliance on fossil fuels made electricity and heat generation the largest
contributor to energy-related GHG emissions in Germany, accounting for 39%
in 2022. Decarbonising electricity is, therefore, crucial for Germany to achieve its
climate targets. While Germany has a plan to exit from coal no later than 2038, natural
gas plants are expected to play a continued role in the power sector. A previously
planned Power Plant Strategy, which aimed to hold auctions for 12.5 GW of new
hydrogen-fired and natural gas-fired plants that could later (2035-40) be converted to
run on hydrogen, was set aside in November 2024. However, the government still
plans to implement a capacity mechanism by 2028 to support additional dispatchable
capacity, including power plants, storage and demand response.
Germany is located in the centre of the European electricity market and therefore
well-connected with its neighbours, including Austria, Belgium, Czechia, Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden and Switzerland. Recent
additional projects include NordLink (1.4 GW capacity), which became operational in
2021, connecting Germany with Norway’s system. The NeuConnect Interconnector
(1.4 GW of capacity) between Germany and the United Kingdom is due to come
online in 2028.
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2025), Electricity Information.
There are four transmission system operators (50Hertz, TenneT, TransnetBW and
Amprion) in Germany with responsibilities for distinct control areas, though the entire
country falls under a single wholesale bidding zone. It also has around
870 distribution system operators (DSOs) of varying size. Both wholesale and retail
electricity markets in Germany are competitive. On the wholesale market, utilities can
procure electricity under long-term contracts or on future or forward markets.
Germany’s future markets are among the most liquid in Europe. Short-term contracts
are traded on various spot markets, the most liquid of which are the day-ahead and
intraday markets. Utilities also compete in retail markets, and both household and
industry end users are free to choose from different suppliers on either fixed or
variable pricing structures.
Fuels
Oil
Having only limited domestic production, Germany imports its crude oil from a
diversified pool of countries. Russian crude oil imports, which accounted for 34% and
25% of total national imports in 2021 and 2022, respectively (along with refined
product imports), were almost entirely cut and replaced in 2023, mainly by increased
imports from the United States, Norway and Libya.
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Crude oil and oil products net trade by country in Germany, 2019-2023
Crude oil net imports (kb/d) Oil products net trade (kb/d) Other
1 800
Netherlands
1 500 Belgium
1 200 UK
Kazakhstan
900
Libya
600 Norway
300 US
Russia
0
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Net trade
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2025), Oil Information.
Germany houses Europe’s largest refining capacity, with 15 oil refineries. In this
regard, its downstream oil industry plays an important role in security of supply,
supplying end users and in job creation and regional economic development. The
sector is also instrumental for supplying the petrochemicals industry. Based on a
reduction in demand due to the economic situation, refining capacity is expected to
drop from 101 Mt in 2023 to 90 Mt in 2025.
Naphtha Buildings
and other
Electricity and
Other gasoil heat generation
Motor gas International bunkers
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Oil Information.
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Natural gas
Natural gas is a significant part of Germany’s energy mix, accounting for 26% of final
energy consumption in 2022, primarily used for electricity generation and heating in
buildings. Domestic production of natural gas is limited, meeting only 6% of demand
in 2023. It has been declining over the years, from 8.7 bcm in 2015 to 4.4 bcm
in 2023, with a heavy reliance on imports to meet demand.
The natural gas price crisis following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caused domestic
demand in Germany to drop by 18% from 2021 to 2023. In response, Norway
emerged as Germany’s primary supplier of natural gas, while liquefied natural gas
(LNG) imports were quickly ramped up, accounting for 8% of total imports in 2023.
80 US (LNG)
60 Netherlands
40 Belgium
20 Norway
0 Russia
2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2025), Natural Gas Information.
With an annual capacity of 5 bcm, the Floating Storage and Regasification Unit at
Wilhelmshaven became the first German LNG terminal to start operations in
December 2022, providing a rapid response to supply diversification. Other important
LNG projects include the ENERGIE terminal in Mukran, which received its operating
licence in mid-2024 and will supply up to 13.5 bcm of natural gas into the German
pipeline network, and the Brunsbüttel land-based terminal, which is being developed
to provide long-term LNG import capacity and aims to begin regular operations as
early as 2027. The government expects land-based terminals to be converted to
receive imports of hydrogen and its derivatives over time. The requirements for this
conversion were legally formulated in the 2022 LNG Acceleration Act, which sets
clear timelines (end of LNG imports by the end of 2043) and specific technical
specifications for the conversion to hydrogen.
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With around 40 gas storage facilities holding more than 24 bcm, Germany has the
largest natural gas storage capacity in the European Union. The onset of Russia’s
war of aggression against Ukraine and the cessation of Russian gas deliveries via the
Nord Stream 1 pipeline necessitated the rapid filling of these reservoirs to prevent a
gas shortage. The storage facilities are particularly important for energy supply during
the winter months, as they help meet peak demand in cold weather and thus
contribute to energy security. Current law requires gas storage facilities to be 80% full
by 1 October, 90% full by 1 November and 40% full by 1 February.
Natural gas prices in Germany doubled following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The
ongoing geopolitical crisis and resulting disruptions in Europe’s natural gas market
have strained both households and industries. While there has been a slight
downward trend in prices over the past few months, competition in the gas market
remains crucial for achieving further reductions as procurement conditions improve.
Additionally, diversifying supply sources with LNG could help stabilise end-user
prices, but Germany remains exposed to international market conditions for gas.
100
50
0
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Residential users Industrial users
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy Prices.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Coal
Although on a downward trend, the share of coal in Germany’s total energy supply
in 2023 remains high, at 18%. Over a quarter of electricity came from coal-fired
generation, as the government targets to phase it out of the generation mix by 2038.
Germany is a lignite coal producer. In 2023, the volume of production was over
100 Mt, representing three-quarters of coal supply. The remainder is imported, in the
form of hard coal. Russia was the largest importer until 2022, but imports fell by 96%
in 2023. Instead, Germany now mostly imports coal from the United States, Australia
and Colombia. Production has almost halved in the past ten years, reflecting a shift
in the supply mix.
Recommendations
1. Ensure long-term policy and regulatory stability
to support a secure and affordable clean energy
transition as the key engine of German economic
growth.
As energy prices have risen in recent years, the argument that energy transitions
undermine affordability and competitiveness has gained traction in the German public
debate. In reality, however, there is an increased urgency for an energy transition, not
only to address the climate imperative. Notably, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the
ensuing energy crisis served as stark reminders of risks related to fossil fuel
dependency. At the same time, the energy transition also provides an opportunity for
German industry to gain competitive advantages in the clean energy industries of the
future. Toward this end, amid the 2022/23 energy crisis, the German government
correctly recognised that an acceleration of the energy transition offers the best longer
term opportunity to regain competitiveness while bolstering energy security and
keeping energy costs low. A number of strategies have been put in place to advance
the energy transition, including plans to decarbonise the heating sector, expand
renewable generation capacity, establish a national carbon pricing system and
accelerate hydrogen development. The next stage of Germany’s energy transition will
be to support affordable electrification, underpinned by sectoral roadmaps that also
clarify technological alternatives where electrification is not feasible. To realise the
tremendous opportunities that the energy transition will bring Germany, continuity in
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the policy and regulatory environment will be crucial to providing a stable, long-term
investment environment. The government should continue to progress the future
electricity market design proposals and ensure that there is a clear and stable
investment framework for renewable electricity generation and supporting
technologies as coal is phased out over the coming years. Likewise, long-term
stability in funding and price signals will also be necessary to support certain
technologies, including heat pumps, district heating and electric vehicles. Germany
should also ensure sufficient, strong backing to energy-related research and
innovation to maximise opportunities for industrial competitive advantages. Clear and
transparent communication on the costs, benefits and time frames of the energy
transition will also help ensure public support for the energy transition and the policies
that support it.
In the road transport segment, EVs are expected to play the largest role in
decarbonisation. The government concludes that to meet the sector’s climate target,
basically all new cars should be electric by 2030. However, Germany removed its
previous purchase incentives for EVs at the end of 2023, following the court ruling on
KTF funding, and EV sales have recently slowed down. The government should
provide alternative long-term budget-neutral measures to accelerate EV uptake, for
example, a bonus-malus tax structure for vehicle purchases that incentivise sales of
low-emissions alternatives over fossil fuel vehicles. New measures should target not
only privately purchased cars, but also leasing and company cars, which account for
the majority of cars in the German market. EV sales should be complemented by
faster deployment of charging infrastructure, building off the Charging Infrastructure
Master Plan (and ensure sufficient planning co-ordination with the electricity system).
Germany should also explore options to increase the role of sustainable biofuels in
transport. While its GHG quota policy is an effective way to increase the share of
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Germany could benefit from a broader strategy on the role of natural gas in the energy
transition, including time frames and expected prices, to underpin its policies
supporting the development of renewable energy. Such a strategy should also
address the financial impacts of decommissioning natural gas infrastructure that
cannot efficiently be repurposed, to avoid such impacts from creating the wrong
incentives for future-proof investments.
On the demand side, while Germany has recently developed a clear roadmap to wind
down natural gas dependency in its buildings sector through heat pumps and district
heating, the industry and power sectors still face uncertainty on the role of natural gas
through the energy transition. The industry sector, in particular, is facing growing
threats to competitiveness, in part stemming from high natural gas costs. A more
concerted effort to promote energy efficiency and electrification (see the
recommendation on lowering electricity prices) in the short term, along with increasing
the penetration of hydrogen and CCUS in the longer term, represent viable pathways,
but at present, the continued dependency on natural gas remains without a clear end
in sight (though the EU ETS will erode its role over time). Additional clarification on
the natural gas exit ramp for the industry sector, including time frames, would provide
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In the power sector, unlike coal, Germany does not have a discrete policy or roadmap
to exit from natural gas generation, though the target of 100% fossil-free generation
by 2035 suggests that the exit will need to take place over the coming decade. The
EU ETS will be the primary driver for declining natural gas generation. At the same
time, these plant closures (alongside rising demand) are raising concerns about
generation adequacy. The government’s previously planned Power Plant Strategy
attempted to address this issue by tendering 12.5 GW of new natural gas-fired power
plant capacity that could later run on hydrogen. In this way, the construction of new
hydrogen-ready gas-fired capacity could avoid a fossil fuel lock-in that is not at odds
with the electricity generation target, as long as the fuel switch takes place on time.
This indicates that hydrogen will play a role in Germany's future power system but
clarification is needed to what extent, given other competing uses in the next ten
years, raising some questions around the viability of hydrogen-ready gas plants.
Moreover, a broader look at adequacy is needed to include other flexibility options
such as industrial demand response, storage and interconnections (see
recommendations on electricity), which may displace the need for additional
generation capacity. While gas plants might very well continue to play a role in grid
balancing beyond the 2035 time frame, investors need more long-term clarity on the
future role of natural gas in the electricity mix. With this in mind, the government
should move ahead with the future electricity market design proposals, including a
capacity mechanism, and explain how these planned capacity auctions might impact
the need for additional dispatchable generation capacity (see the electricity section
for more details).
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Focus areas
1. Electricity system optimisation
Germany is making impressive strides in its energy transition, rooted in its
Energiewende strategy from 2010 that laid the groundwork for an energy system
transformation early on. Nowhere is this progress more evident than in the electricity
sector, where Germany has witnessed a rapid shift away from fossil fuels and nuclear
toward renewable energy. Recent measures to accelerate the country’s permitting
system for renewables as well as the attractive incentives for investments in
renewable installations have been a lynchpin of the successful shift, and Germany
continues to benefit from strong growth in both wind and solar power.
Nonetheless, the energy transition has not come without its costs. A number of
nuclear closures have been concentrated in the energy-hungry southern states, while
most wind power is located in the resource-rich northern regions, creating a regional
supply-demand imbalance that has led to pronounced grid congestion and hefty
associated costs. The costs have contributed to high consumer prices for electricity
that serve as a disincentive for electrification and could erode public support for the
energy transition.
Load growth
According to the System Development Strategy, gross electricity demand in Germany
is expected to grow to more than 950 TWh in 2035 and up to 1 100-1 300 TWh
in 2045 (relative to 525 TWh in 2023). Industry demand is expected to grow from
214 TWh to 250-320 TWh in 2035 and 300-400 TWh in 2045. These numbers are
based on comprehensive long-term scenarios covering the electricity, gas and
hydrogen systems.
Generation
Germany’s electricity mix has already experienced transformative changes in recent
years, driven by the overarching Energiewende strategy. In particular, the country’s
nuclear capacity completely closed in 2023, and coal-fired generation capacity
experienced a marked reduction. At the same time, the country has seen a major
surge in renewables capacity, notably wind and solar PV. New renewables capacity
will be the main driver to underpin the country’s target to source 80% of electricity
from renewable sources by 2030 and 100% by 2035. The government estimates that
the target will translate into a requirement for 600 TWh of domestic renewable
electricity by 2030 (relative to 2022 volumes of around 245 TWh), from the following
sources: onshore and offshore wind, solar PV, imported electricity, and power plants
using green hydrogen. At the same time, clarity on the pathway to exit from fossil
fuels is also needed.
Coal
While coal remains a significant part of the German electricity mix, its capacity has
fallen by 34% since 2012. Its share of the 2023 generation mix stood at 27%,
compared to 46% in 2012. The decline to date has mainly been driven by market
conditions and EU ETS prices. The German government’s goal is to phase out
coal-fired generation by 2038 at the latest, though it expects EU ETS prices to push
an exit sooner.
plays in certain regions, whereas Germany closed its last hard coal mine in 2018.
Relative to 15 GW each of lignite and hard coal capacity in 2022, the plan calls for
8 GW of remaining hard coal and 9 GW of lignite by 2030, both winding down to zero
by 2038 at the latest. The government reached a separate agreement with the
industrial and coal-producing region of North Rhine-Westphalia and coal plant
operator RWE to phase out lignite-fired generation by 2030. The plan calls for regular
reviews every three years to determine whether the final exit date can be brought
forward to 2035.
Natural gas
In contrast to coal, natural gas has maintained its share in Germany’s generation mix,
averaging around 15% over the past decade. Notably, as variable renewables have
assumed a dominant role in the fuel mix, natural gas has played an increasingly
critical role in balancing the grid. In fact, Germany saw growth in natural gas
generation capacity of 11 GW over the period 2010-23. Natural gas is also the
predominant fuel (accounting for around half) in co-generation plants. Moreover, the
permanent closure of the final nuclear plant and forthcoming coal closures are
expected to increase reliance on natural gas for electricity generation in the short
term. The government committed to introduce a capacity mechanism to support
investments in dispatchable capacity.
Renewables
The growth of renewables in Germany’s electricity system is a clear success story for
the country. Impressively, for the first time, Germany saw renewables produce more
than half of power generation in 2023.
Early growth in the sector was driven by the Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG),
which in 2000 established 20-year feed-in tariffs along with guaranteed grid
connectivity and preferential dispatch. An EEG surcharge on electricity consumers
financed the subsidies. As costs escalated, the support programme shifted in 2017 to
one based on competitive auctions. Today, the auction system continues to produce
strong results for renewables capacity growth, as cost reductions and favourable
terms will support the sector’s expansion in the coming years too.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
200 40%
Other renewables
100 20%
Share of renewables in
0 0% electricity generation
2006 2012 2018 2024 2030 (right axis)
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Other renewables includes hydro, bioenergy and geothermal.
Sources: IEA (2024), World Energy Balances and IEA (2024), Renewable Energy Progress Tracker.
Wind
Onshore wind has to date experienced the strongest growth based on favourable
economics, though future expansions will be constrained by available funding under
the EEG as well as limited locations for new installations. In this context, the
repowering of older, smaller facilities to upgraded wind parks with larger capacities is
expected to be a notable source of growth. Nonetheless, the sector continues to see
strong growth, with the Federal Network Agency (BNetzA) auctioning 12 GW of
capacity in 2024, and the November auction receiving a record number of bids
(1.5 times oversubscribed). The improved auction outcomes in 2024 relative to 2023
were partly attributable to permitting reforms the government undertook to implement
EU emergency regulations on permitting that call for a provision to override public
interest opposition to accelerate wind projects. Overall, the government targets an
expansion of onshore wind capacity to 115 GW by 2030 and up to 160 GW by 2040
(relative to 61 GW in 2023).
Beyond onshore wind, offshore wind represents an important growth opportunity that
may require additional policy or regulatory support to be realised. The government
has targets to realise 30 GW of offshore wind capacity by 2030, 40 GW by 2035 and
70 GW by 2045 (relative to 8.9 GW as of June 2024), based on competitive auctions
outlined under the Offshore Wind Energy Act. Amendments to the Act further support
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Solar
Solar PV is also a central pillar of Germany’s goal of meeting 80% of electricity
production from renewable sources by 2030. Revisions to the EEG in 2022 included
a target to achieve a total capacity of 215 GW by 2030 (from around 83 GW in 2023).
The country has experienced a renewed surge in solar PV investments in recent
years, notably rooftop solar. As a result, despite being far from a sunny country,
Germany has positioned itself as a leading country for solar power. The country’s
solar growth has been driven both by auctions for installations larger than 1 000 kW
of capacity and by support schemes such as feed-in tariffs for smaller, decentralised
systems.
The 2022 revisions to the EEG also included higher feed-in tariffs for rooftop solar
installations, which have led to a pronounced boom in investments. The government
also simplified grid connection requirements for residential systems, further
supporting their growth. More recently, in 2024, the government passed Solar
Package 1, based on the BMWK’s 2023 Solar Strategy, which included higher feed-in
tariffs for commercial and industrial projects. It also simplified rules and improved
incentives for balcony solar installations (including to facilitate installations by tenants)
as well as community solar projects. Importantly, the favourable conditions for rooftop
solar have been matched by swelling popularity for solar technology, especially
following the energy crisis in 2022.
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In response to the energy crisis due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the German
government in 2022 took the decision to do away with the surcharges on electricity
supply to households to finance support for renewables. The EEG surcharge (which
made up around a fifth of consumer prices) had led German consumers to pay among
the highest electricity prices in Europe. Instead, renewables support measures are
now being covered by the general state budget. The removal of the surcharge will not
only provide relief to German households (estimated savings are roughly
EUR 200 per household annually) but also help bring down the relative cost of
electricity vis-à-vis fossil fuels to promote greater electrification, especially in heating
and transport.
0.1
Taxes, levies and
other surcharges
0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on German Association of Energy and Water Industries, BDEW
electricity price analysis March 2025 (Accessed: 31 March 2025).
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
UK
Italy
Germany
France
Spain
OECD
Korea
Sweden
Canada
Finland
USA USD/MWh
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy Prices.
In 2024 the government brokered a deal with power suppliers to cap prices for certain
large businesses, but such types of temporary support measures are not sustainable
over time. Moreover, a constitutional court ruling on debt limits will further hamper the
government’s ability to offer public support to mitigate price impacts. In fact, a 2023
government proposal to subsidise electricity prices was eventually scrapped following
opposition from the Ministry of Finance and the court ruling. Rather, Germany will
need to address economic inefficiencies in its electricity system and optimise its
utilisation to bring down overall costs while ensuring security of supply. A clear plan
for bringing down system costs will not only support needed investments across the
electricity system, it will also provide clarity to German industry and support a
continued, strong industrial sector.
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Electricity prices
Reduced supply of Russian gas following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine led to
unprecedented electricity prices in 2022. Wholesale electricity prices in Germany
peaked in August 2022 at 699 EUR/MWh, more than five times the price in August
2021. In response to the crisis, Germany accelerated the deployment of renewable
energy projects as part of a broader strategy to reduce reliance on imported fossil
fuels, supported by the European Commission’s REPowerEU plan. Since the peak in
electricity prices in the third quarter of 2022, the share of solar and wind generation
has increased by 45%. These measures, along with the diversification of gas supply
(and a softening of gas prices), have contributed to the reduction in wholesale prices
since 2022. The surge in renewables generation has also led to an increase in price
variability. The number of periods of negative electricity prices during periods of high
output has increased, exacerbated by the inflexibility of traditional power plants,
especially nuclear and coal-fired plants, to be easily turned off or ramped down.
Negative electricity prices signal the need for more flexibility in the system and
encourage shifts in consumption patterns. They can also serve as a deterrent to new
investment in power generation if investors perceive a risk of insufficient returns.
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on ENTSOE (2024), Transparency platform, collected through the Real-
Time Electricity Tracker.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
South
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Bubble size indicates the annual electricity consumption per federal state.
Source: IEA analysis based on data from the statistical offices of the German federal states and
LAK Energiebilanzen.
Grid congestion in Germany has rapidly increased in recent years, with associated
costs more than tripling between 2019 and 2022. The issue has become a major
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
1.5
0
2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on Federal Network Agency (2024), Grid congestion management
(Accessed: 24 October 2024).
November 2023, the government introduced a “use instead of curtail” regulation that
incentivises additional electricity demand by offering excess generation to specific
consumers in certain regions facing high curtailment probabilities. Nonetheless,
curtailment challenges persist.
Solar
2 20%
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: VRE = Variable renewable energy.
Source: IEA analysis based on Federal Network Agency (2024), Grid congestion management.
(Accessed: 24 October 2024).
Transmission grid
Insufficient power grid capacity remains a notable impediment to Germany’s energy
transition. A key solution to alleviating its regional power imbalances and addressing
grid congestion is to increase transmission grid capacity, especially from the north to
the south. The government recognises the impediment and has been taking
measures to remedy it, though delays remain a bottleneck to projects.
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As in other countries, there has been strong local opposition to power lines in
Germany, in some cases manifesting as citizens’ protests mobilising large segments
of local populations. To minimise the risk of local opposition, most high-voltage direct
current lines are planned for underground construction, despite significantly higher
costs compared to overhead lines. For example, planning discussions for the
Suedlink transmission project to send wind power from the north to the south of
Germany began in 2014. Originally conceived as an overhead line project, it was
forced to shift to underground cables in the face of strong local opposition. The
change is estimated to have tripled the pipeline’s costs and led to a three-year delay.
The project is now planned for completion in 2028, though additional delays are
possible.
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Bidding zones
Unlike some other European countries with regional supply and demand disparities,
such as Norway and Sweden, Germany is not divided into bidding zones. Rather, the
entire country falls under a single bidding zone, together with Luxemburg, which
keeps wholesale prices uniform throughout the country. This situation, compared to
a situation with several bidding zones, benefits consumers in Germany’s southern
and western industrial heartlands, where most demand is concentrated, while most
wind energy is generated in the north.
The debate over splitting Germany’s bidding zone is not new as regional imbalances
have led to redispatch and curtailment measures for some time (and were also salient
in the IEA’s previous Energy Policy Review in 2019). However, political opposition to
splitting Germany into more than one bidding zone remains strong. While northern
states favour a split to take advantage of abundant wind resources that would likely
result in lower power costs (and have been frustrated by the slow pace of grid
expansions to alleviate the issue), southern and western states (Baden-Württemberg,
Bavaria, Hesse, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Saarland) are
strongly against a split, mainly due to the higher prices that might result. Moreover,
power plant closures in southern regions in recent years could exacerbate the
potential price increase that a bidding zone split would create in the south.
Germany might need to reconsider the economic efficiency of applying only a single
bidding zone across the entire country. The ongoing investigation by TSOs and the
final recommendations will be based on detailed technical assessments. Therefore,
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the government should not take a political decision to preclude any bidding zone
splits, instead heeding the advice of the review and maintaining an open mind about
the possibility of implementing differential pricing across Germany to address the
inefficiencies and hefty costs that come with grid congestion. Germany could look to
Italy’s bidding zone structure, where power producers face differentiated prices based
on generation capacity and demand (thereby still providing price signals to generation
investments), while consumer prices are levelled under a single national price.
System flexibility
Germany can also look to ramp up efforts to support flexibility measures to improve
the operational efficiency of its electricity system, including incorporating storage,
distributed resources, demand-side management (DSM) and digital upgrades.
Equally important, as EVs and heat pumps become bigger parts of the energy
transition, Germany will need to undertake major upgrades to distribution networks
and align transmission and distribution network planning.
Storage
As Germany’s power system shifts toward greater dependence on variable renewable
generation, especially in a world of 80% renewables by 2030, the country will need to
complement generation growth with flexibility resources. In this regard, storage will
increasingly become a cornerstone of the German electricity system, from both
pumped storage and batteries. Pumped storage has played a role in Germany’s
power system for a long while, though its future expansion potential is limited owing
to constraints on suitable locations. Heat storage within heat networks that are used
in combination with large-scale heat pumps can also improve flexibility in the
electricity system. In the future, hydrogen storage can also play an important role in
electricity system balancing. BMWK released an electricity storage strategy in 2023
to lay out a framework for development of the storage market in Germany on the
pathway to a carbon-free electricity sector by 2035.
storage industry organisation BVES. Around 1.8 million single-family homes had
energy storage systems in place by the end of 2024, or around 15% of the market
segment. Nonetheless, Germany will need to see still higher volumes of storage
deployed to ensure security of supply through its electricity transition, especially
utility-scale storage.
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: The planned capacity is the capacity already registered in the German market database.
Source: IEA analysis based on RWTH Aachen University (2025), Battery charts (Accessed 28
January 2025).
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Flexible demand
In addition to storage, flexible demand has an important role to play in balancing
Germany’s renewables-dominated electricity system, today and especially in the
future. To support consumer participation in the electricity market more actively, a
combination of incentives, enabling infrastructure and price signals all contribute.
DSM is still in its early days in Germany. It involves managing demand to boost the
flexibility of the system by treating demand as a service for grid balancing. The
German energy agency Dena notes that the industry sector, which consumes 44% of
the country’s electricity, offers DSM potential of around 5-15 GW. However, in
Germany, the Electricity Grid Charges Ordinance imposes a constraint on flexible
demand by offering grid fee reductions to baseload energy-intensive demand,
impeding DSM opportunities. Dena – in collaboration with state governments in
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, which have outsized exposure to the nuclear
phase-out – is carrying out pilot programmes on DSM for industry to support broader
application of DSM.
Given the impressive growth that Germany is experiencing in rooftop solar PV (plus
storage) deployment (along with EVs and heat pumps), so-called prosumers
represent an important resource that can help the country improve the flexibility of its
electricity system. However, Germany does not appear to be maximising this
potential. Notably, regulatory and bureaucratic hurdles appear to be constraints, as
does lack of information. In particular, the high regulatory burdens placed on
prosumers as designated “energy suppliers” serves as an impediment. The individual
use of aggregation services to allow consumers (and prosumers) to collectively
provide services is also limited.
Germany is also pursuing pilot projects to use demand-side flexibility from heat
pumps to bolster grid security. The German manufacturer Viessman, along with TSOs
50Hertz and TenneT, launched a pilot project to aggregate heat pump flexibility
across participating Viessman customers and offer the savings to the TSOs to
manage grids during peak loads. The pilot’s target is to incorporate 100 heat pumps.
Nonetheless, several barriers remain to widespread application, including complex
certification standards and insufficient remuneration for residential demand‐side
flexibility in system balancing and ancillary services markets.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Germany has a very high share of consumers with flat electricity tariffs, so a shift
toward time-of-use or dynamic tariffs would not only support flexibility but could also
result in direct cost savings for consumers, beyond system-level benefits.
Smart meters are a key enabler for encouraging flexibility in demand. Toward this
end, Germany has struggled with its smart meter rollout for years due to legal and
bureaucratic challenges, lagging behind many other European countries in this
regard. Digital security and privacy protection concerns, in particular, are salient in
Germany. With its decentralised energy transition, Germany is aiming to replace
large-scale generation plants with millions of renewable energy systems. This is only
possible if generation and consumption can be digitally controlled and networked
while ensuring IT security and data protection. The European Commission recently
made it clear through the Cyber Resilience Act that, in view of system risks, smart
meters must meet the highest cybersecurity requirements (classification in the “critical
category” in Annex IV). Initially, Germany had imposed a three-manufacturer rule that
required certification by at least three independent manufacturers of smart meters to
ensure competition in the smart meter market. Afterwards, a lawsuit by several
companies against a previous decision of the Federal Office for Information Security
to allow the start of the rollout led to a significant delay. Consumer protection groups
also voiced opposition to the rollout based on concerns over higher electricity prices.
To speed up digitalisation efforts, the parliament adopted a federal law in 2023 that
renews actions on digitalisation and a smart meter rollout. Importantly, the law would
enshrine the smart meter rollout timetable into law by 2030 and do away with the
three-manufacturer certification given the maturity of the smart meter market as well
as the prerequisite of an administrative decision to start the rollout. The law would
instead allow for immediate rollout of certified meters, with more sophisticated
applications allowed under subsequent updates. Costs will also be distributed in a
way that sees network operators bearing the brunt, keeping consumer fees low. It
also requires all electricity suppliers to offer dynamic pricing by 2025 (currently
required only for those supplying at least 100 000 customers). As of Q3 2024, more
than 1 million smart meters were in use in Germany, which is around four times the
level at the end of 2022.
Recommendations
4. Prioritise actions to lower electricity retail prices.
German consumers face among the highest electricity prices in Europe. Already, the
government has taken a significant and welcome step toward alleviating prices by
removing the EEG surcharge. Energy-intensive industrial consumers also receive
various forms of relief and compensation for electricity prices. Nonetheless, high
prices persist across all consumer segments. Not only do high electricity prices impact
affordability and competitiveness, but they also serve as a major obstacle for the
electrification needed to realise energy transition goals. To start, the government
could consider lowering taxes on final electricity prices to support affordability,
competitiveness and electrification outcomes.
Moreover, compared to other countries, Germany faces relatively high grid fees. This
is partly due to legacy costs of past grid expansion investments to accommodate the
shifts in power generation that the country has experienced. On top of this, regional
imbalances and still insufficient grid capacity create large inefficiencies and hefty
congestion management costs that are also reflected in grid fees. Moreover, as
Germany looks to a massive new expansion of both the transmission (including to
accommodate offshore wind) and distribution grids, over EUR 400 billion in new costs
will have to be socialised through grid charges. Therefore, a priority for the German
government should be to explore all possible options to quickly soften the impact of
grid charges on consumers, working with the regulator (which oversees grid fees).
For example, the government could consider absorbing some of the charges into the
state budget, which would help alleviate near-term challenges. Innovative frameworks
such as the amortisation account used to finance the Hydrogen Core Network could
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
be explored to finance new electricity lines too (both public and private financing). To
avoid further increases in grid costs, the IEA also encourages the government to look
at ways to use the existing grid as efficiently as possible.
The industry sector can play a role in locational flexibility. Currently, a sizeable
disincentive for flexible industrial demand (beyond structural ones) is the Grid
Charges Ordinance that offers grid discounts to large consumers for steady, baseload
demand. While removing the concession could further erode the competitiveness of
an already ailing sector, the government should still explore options to offer incentives
to these consumers to manage demand in ways that support grid-balancing needs.
Finally, locational signals can also be provided by bidding zones in the electricity
market. Having multiple bidding zones can attract new investments in areas suitable
for the electricity system and provide benefits to efficient electricity market operation
such as reduced redispatch and curtailment costs. Such a split could also present
attractive opportunities to site new green industrial facilities in more parts of Germany,
a prospect that is currently hamstrung by the prevailing configuration. Potential price
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impacts and related mitigation measures for industries also need to be considered.
Therefore, Germany should adopt an open-minded approach and take evidence-
based decisions regarding a potential bidding zone split.
2 000 District
heating
1 500
Bioenergy
1 000
Oil
500
Natural gas
0
2012 2022
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy End-uses and Efficiency Indicators.
Replacing fossil fuels in heating also improves energy security. High dependence on
natural gas became an apparent energy security and affordability concern during
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the following energy crisis. As a response to the
energy crisis, Germany took several steps to prevent gas shortages, including
developing new LNG and regasification infrastructure and implementing short-term
energy-saving measures. Relying too much on fossil fuel imports has proven both
risky and costly, and Germany is now taking additional steps towards decarbonising
its heating systems, through both legislation and subsidies.
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Complementing the new Buildings Energy Act, the government introduced the Heat
Planning Act, which also came into force in January 2024. The Act requires
municipalities and regions to develop municipal heating plans that lay out how to
make their local heating infrastructure climate-neutral, including where district heating
solutions would be efficient. Large cities with more than 100 000 inhabitants have until
30 June 2026 to provide these plans, while smaller towns have a later deadline of
30 June 2028. A simplified heat planning procedure is possible for municipalities with
fewer than 10 000 inhabitants. With this new legislation, Germany goes further than
what is required in the EU Energy Efficiency Directive, which requires cities with
populations over 45 000 to develop heating and cooling plans.
The overall framework, which sets clear targets and timelines for transitioning heating
systems to low-emissions options, is a major accomplishment. Given that households
typically use their heating systems for more than two decades, clarity on long-term
legal expectations will help steer purchase decisions in the right direction. Likewise,
the policy guidance provided by the two pieces of legislation also gives signals to the
heat pump industry and district heating companies to undertake investments to ramp
up capacity, infrastructure and supply chains.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Despite the challenges in getting the new regulation in place, it is still an achievement.
Compared to the initial proposal, the final act will not achieve the same emissions
reductions by 2030, but it sets Germany on the long-term transition toward carbon
neutrality by 2045. However, heat pump sales and investments in district heating
networks must accelerate, and recent market developments show lagging uptake.
The government needs to focus on getting the right incentives in place for investments
in new heating equipment and infrastructure while building trust with the population
to participate in the energy transition. Moreover, the government will also need to
more clearly communicate to the public the impact of fossil fuels prices from the
German carbon price (and the ETS2 from 2027), which will steadily increase the costs
of running fossil fuel boilers.
Heat pumps
Heat pump deployment has increased for several years, and it is the primary heat
source in new buildings. The market for heat pumps grew by over 50% per year
in 2022 and 2023, driven largely by record high gas prices as well as 2022 reforms to
shift green levies away from electricity prices. In 2023, around 350 000 heat pumps
were sold, and Germany is targeting 500 000 new installations per year as of 2024.
Almost two-thirds of the residential buildings built in 2023 will use heat pumps as their
primary heating source and over three-quarters of new building permits issued
in 2023 would use heat pumps.
However, recent trends show a drop in heat pump sales, and Germany is behind on
its targets. The market struggles with unfavourable electricity prices compared to
natural gas and lack of consumer confidence, partly due to the lengthy process to
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arrive at a political framework for decarbonising heating. Sales of fossil fuel boilers
increased in late 2023, as natural gas prices softened, and many people decided to
replacement existing boilers ahead of the proposed amendments to the Building
Energy Act; this trend continued in the first two months of 2024. After that, the whole
market for heating devices dropped probably due to uncertainties on the Building
Energy Act and previous pull-in effects in 2023. Recently published figures from the
Association for Efficiency and Renewable Energies for 2024 show that 193 000 heat
pumps were sold in 2024, compared to 356 000 in 2023, far short of the targeted
number of 500 000.
Thousand units
1 000
800
Heat
600 pumps
0
2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on Association for Efficiency and Renewable Energies (2025), Heating
systems: Sales fell by half in 2024 (Accessed: 30 January 2025) and Sales of heating systems
decline sharply: Heat transition stagnates (Accessed 31 October 2024).
Several potential barriers to heat pump adoption exist 1. These include high upfront
costs for equipment and installations, uncompetitive electricity prices, other non-cost
hurdles to consumer adoption (such as complexities in multi-family buildings) and
insufficient installation capacity. Germany has taken steps to address these issues,
though more systematic action will be required across all areas to improve results.
1
See Chapter 3 of IEA (2022), The Future of Heat Pumps.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Financial support
Germany supports heat pump deployment with financial incentives to address higher
upfront costs. Through the Federal Funding for Efficient Buildings, the government
provides financial support for investments in climate-friendly heating systems. A
homeowner can be reimbursed for 30-70% of the investment costs, with higher
shares for low-income households and if the replacement takes place before 2029.
As of 1 September 2024, the subsidy was available to all building owners, including
landlords of condominiums and municipalities.
Moreover, to address the split incentive challenge between tenants (who are not
incentivised to take on upfront installation costs) and landlords (who do not benefit
from lower energy bills), Germany is allowing landlords to pass through 10% of a new
heating system’s costs onto a tenant’s rent, with a limit of 0.50 EUR/m².
Even with the high efficiency of heat pumps compared to fossil fuel boilers, the price
differential between electricity and natural gas still makes gas boilers a financially
attractive option for German consumers. Even though heat pumps might have lower
total costs over their life cycle compared to gas-based heating systems, this is not
clear to consumers and does not seem to convince homeowners to make heat pump
investments today. The German Heat Pump Association wants to see a reduction of
the electricity tax to the minimum under European law to create a more level playing
field for heat pumps. Industry experts estimate that electricity prices should be no
more than 2.5-3 times those of natural gas to encourage heat pump sales.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
The growing heat pump market can bring business opportunities as well as supply
chain challenges. Supply chain bottlenecks affecting components such as copper or
computer chips can lead to increased manufacturing costs and a slower deployment
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
rate for heat pumps. However, there are also business opportunities for the German
industry that supplies heat pumps or parts used in heat pump manufacturing. Heat
pump manufacturers such as Daikin and Stiebel-Eltron as well as the country’s largest
semiconductor producer Infineon have made announcements for large investments
to expand production capacity.
Germany’s distribution grids will also require updating to accommodate heat pump
uptake. Given that the country’s heating has historically been sourced mainly from
fossil fuel boilers, local distribution grids are, in many cases, not equipped to manage
the surge in electricity demand that will come from heat pumps (combined with EVs).
As a result, forthcoming municipal heating plans will need to be co-ordinated with
DSOs to ensure a smooth integration and optimisation of demand-side resources to
manage local grids.
Renewable waste
Non-
renewable
Coal, 14%
waste, 9% 8%
Oil,
1%
While the Heat Planning Act sets a framework for clarifying the need for new district
heating systems, investors may require stronger incentives to make the necessary
infrastructure investments to realise the heating plans. In 2022, the government
launched the Efficient Heat Networks scheme to support investments in expanding
and decarbonising pre-existing district heating networks and erecting new district
heating networks that use at least 75% input from renewable sources or waste heat,
to increase the use of renewable energy and waste heat in the heat supply. In the
draft budget plans from August 2024, the government allocated EUR 3.4 billion
between 2025 and 2029 to the Efficient Heat Networks scheme. However, one
consultancy report done on behalf of the district heating industry associations claims
that the planned expansion of district heating in Germany will require EUR 43.5 billion
in investment by 2030, and needs state support of EUR 3.4 billion per year.
Furthermore, the support needs to have a long-term perspective and provide the
necessary stability for market actors taking investment decisions.
that it can use available heat sources more efficiently than individual heating systems,
including residual waste heat from industries, wastewater treatment, data centres and
other facilities. Mapping out such heat sources and the demand for heat in a country
is an important step to be able to develop resource-efficient and cost-effective heating
solutions.
With the new Heat Planning Act, German municipalities are required to present
municipal heating plans. Energy Cities, a European network, gives this legal
framework the highest score in terms of how it implements the EED requirements.
However, Germany scores lower in terms of the support framework to implement the
regulation, as it varies significantly across the country. For the heat plans to be a
successful tool in developing district heating networks and decarbonising heating,
municipalities need to have sufficient knowledge and resources. To that end, in July
2024, Germany initiated a stakeholder dialogue on heat planning with the objective
to identify measures on both the local and regional levels for enabling municipalities
to develop well-considered heating plans.
100%
No plan in
place yet
6 942
In process 50%
3 652
Plan finalised
160
0%
2024 2028
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Note: Each grid represents 1% of all German municipalities required to develop a municipal heating
plan.
Source: IEA analysis based on KWW (2025), Overview of municipal heat planning available
(Accessed 27 January 2025).
Although the heat plans are done on a municipal level, state and federal co-ordination
will also be needed to avoid sub-optimised solutions. Tools and examples from other
countries can also be used for inspiration. Denmark has done similar heat planning
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since the first Danish heat supply law in 1979, which resulted in a significant share of
district heating in residential heat supply. Germany can continue to build on the
Competence Center for Heat Transition, which is an established platform at the
federal level to support municipalities with guidelines, best-practice examples,
trainings and networking opportunities. Germany also needs to ensure that
municipalities are equipped with the necessary skills and expertise to develop
strategic heating plans.
Regulatory framework
The German district heating market has no price regulation, and consumers are
bound to natural monopoly suppliers, often on long-term contracts. While prices for
other sources of heating declined in 2024, district heating prices increased
significantly. The recent price developments in the district heating sector have led to
legal proceedings by the Federation of German Consumer Organisations and
investigations by the Federal Cartel Office.
is the Swedish Price Dialogue, which has been in place since 2011 and gathers large
shares of the district heating industry and the biggest customers to discuss price
changes on the district heating market.
Recommendations
8. Co-ordinate and advance municipal heat
planning to enhance the value for stakeholders.
With the Heat Planning Act, Germany made tremendous progress toward providing
clarity on the energy transition needed in the heating sector. In 2026-28, close to
11 000 municipalities will present plans for how to decarbonise their heating systems.
This presents a critical opportunity for the government, consumers and industry
stakeholders to take stock of the situation and take strategic decisions on policy
development and investments. It equally presents an opportunity to engage with
consumers and with citizens more actively in the energy transition. Notably, the plans
are expected to provide important bottom-up clarity on the optimal mix for energy
efficiency, electrification, district heating (including the role of waste heat) and other
direct renewable heat. The government should capitalise on this opportunity by
supporting and co-ordinating timely development of the plans at the federal level and
ensure sufficient resources for all levels of government to develop, assess (where
necessary) and implement the plans. Similarly, regional co-ordination on
implementation of the plans can be necessary for optimal resource allocation. The
heat planning should also be aligned with other energy system planning, such as
regional electricity network development plans. Following an assessment of the first
round of plans, the government might consider making the updated plans (due after
five years) more binding to drive investments. Furthermore, the government may
consider aligning the plans with existing funding schemes directed at heating
technologies and explore possibilities to use heat plans as the basis for large-scale
technology procurement. Lastly, the effort to develop the plans should also be used
as an opportunity to consider plans for cooling networks, whose needs will grow in
the coming years.
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Toward this end, the German government laid out detailed strategies and plans to
develop a hydrogen sector, covering the full range of the hydrogen value chain.
Fostering demand in key end uses will be a crucial starting point, and financial support
measures will be necessary to achieve this. Moreover, while Germany will support a
certain amount of domestic renewable hydrogen production to nurture the early years
of hydrogen development, the bulk of its consumption will need to be met by imports,
given limitations on renewable electricity supply. Therefore, creating enabling
conditions for imports, including supporting infrastructure, will be an overriding
imperative.
Germany is off to a good start and already has a detailed strategy with clear targets
and timelines. The next step for Germany is to ensure that policy measures lead to
timely investments that jump-start the hydrogen sector in the 2030 time frame. In
addition, where Germany has taken a broad stroke approach to promoting all parts of
the hydrogen value chain, it will need to take a closer look at its specific competitive
advantages in relation to other producers and end users.
In 2023, amid the energy crisis, the strategy was updated and made more ambitious
to ramp up the development of a hydrogen economy. The National Hydrogen Strategy
Update strengthened the target for domestic installed electrolyser capacity to 10 GW
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by 2030, compared to the previous target of 5 GW. The 2023 Update also outlines
goals for infrastructure, demand and regulation. In line with those goals, BNetzA
approved in October 2024 a plan for a hydrogen core network of 9 040 km pipelines
with total investment costs of EUR 18.9 billion by 2032. The Plan consists of
repurposed and new hydrogen pipelines and includes the IPCEI of the European
hydrogen programme. The update also aims to stimulate demand for hydrogen in
various end-use sectors, especially industry and heavy transport, as well as to
support Germany in becoming a leading provider of hydrogen technologies by 2030.
It also calls for the creation of an appropriate regulatory framework at the national,
European and international levels to support the development of a well-functioning
global market.
To realise the 2030 goals under the updated strategy, the government has committed
to an implementation plan along four focus areas: 1) ensuring sufficient availability of
hydrogen; 2) developing hydrogen infrastructure; 3) implementing hydrogen
applications (e.g. industry, transport); and 4) creating effective framework conditions.
As part of this effort, the government is examining current regulatory barriers and
identifying legal options for simplification and acceleration of permit issuance across
the hydrogen value chain.
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Demand outlook
Germany foresees accelerated demand growth for hydrogen by 2030 and 2045. The
2023 National Hydrogen Strategy Update forecasts that, relative to 2023 demand of
around 55 TWh, Germany’s demand for hydrogen will roughly double to 95-130 TWh
per year by 2030, and again nearly triple to 350 TWh in 2045. The figures align with
forecasts released by the National Hydrogen Council, which in 2024 upgraded its
estimate of hydrogen demand to 94-125 TWh by 2030, mainly from the steel and
chemicals industries as well as heavy-duty transport, a sizeable jump from the
previous year’s forecast.
0
Chemical Steel Other Heavy-duty Aviation Other Heat Electricity
Industry Transport .
IEA. CC BY 4.0.
Source: IEA analysis based on National Hydrogen Council (2024), Update 2024: Greenhouse gas
savings and the associated hydrogen demand in Germany (Accessed 28 January 2025).
Certain hard-to-abate end-use sectors are expected to see the strongest demand for
hydrogen. In particular, the National Hydrogen Strategy Update expects the industry
sector to be the dominant source of hydrogen demand in the 2030 time frame,
followed by transport. The strategy notes that widespread use of hydrogen is not
foreseen in the heating sector, though Germany will continue to pursue legal and
technical options to repurpose gas distribution networks for hydrogen and to develop
decentralised hydrogen boilers. The update outlines short-term (2023), medium-term
(2024-25) and long-term (up to 2030) measures to support hydrogen in each end-use
sector.
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A major cause of industrial emissions in Germany is the use of fossil fuels (especially
natural gas) in industrial processes. While electrification may be viable for lower
temperature process heat, it is either not feasible or not economical for
high-temperature applications, which is particularly salient in the steel and chemicals
sectors. Hydrogen will, therefore, play an essential role in decarbonising industrial
process heat, which is a key focus area for the government’s National Hydrogen
Strategy. Hydrogen can also be used to replace fossil fuels as feedstock in industrial
processes, such as steel production from iron ore, which conventionally uses coal to
react with oxygen molecules, resulting in process-related CO2 emissions.
The Hydrogen Strategy notes the need for financial support during the early stages
of market development along with fostering markets for low-carbon products to
encourage demand. Short-term government support measures include: financial
assistance to companies to cover the higher costs of low-emissions technologies
(e.g. via the Carbon Contracts for Difference programme), funding through the IPCEI
Hydrogen programme and support through the Federal Fund for Industry and Climate
Action.
In total, a budget of EUR 14 billion has been allocated to the IPCEI Hydrogen
programme. Until the end of 2024, after state aid approval of all four “waves” by the
European Commission, a large majority of the German projects (4 technology
projects, 24 infrastructure projects, 3 mobility projects) were awarded funding. Also,
six projects received funding based on the Climate Environment and Energy Aid
Guidelines and General Block Exemption Regulation (including four projects aimed
at converting steel plants to run on hydrogen).
Complementing the financial mechanisms, BMWK set out a strategy to support the
development of lead markets for climate-friendly basic materials (starting with steel
and cement) by establishing definitions and stimulating demand through public
procurement. Rising EU ETS prices, especially leading up to and after the phase-out
of free emissions allowances to industrial participants, will also be a major driver.
Relative to other sectors, hydrogen is expected to play a more marginal role in heating
for buildings, where more economical options exist. The National Hydrogen Strategy
Update notes that direct use of hydrogen for space heating will only take place after
2030, though hydrogen boilers or hydrogen co-generation systems might be
necessary for decentralised buildings. It also recognises that the potential for using
waste heat from electrolysers should be considered in the siting of electrolysers.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
Supply outlook
Germany has established ambitious targets for hydrogen production, but the bulk of
demand will be met by imports. The National Hydrogen Strategy Update increased
the target for domestic electrolyser capacity from 5 GW to 10 GW by 2030. The
intention of domestic production capacity is to stimulate the creation of a market for
low-emissions hydrogen and meet demand with short transport routes. Germany is
off to a good start in this regard, being one of the frontrunners in Europe from a
production perspective. Meanwhile, the National Hydrogen Council estimates that its
projected range of 2030 demand would require 39-52 GW of electrolyser capacity,
coming from either domestic sources or abroad.
In the 2030 time frame, various types of low-emissions hydrogen will be considered.
Whereas the original strategy only focused on hydrogen produced from renewable
energy, the update takes a broader technology approach, making room for other
types of low-emissions hydrogen (including using natural gas with carbon capture and
storage [CCS]) to help speed up the development of a hydrogen market. However, a
certain amount of so-called grey hydrogen (produced from natural gas without CCS)
is expected to continue to play a role in the 2030 time frame, especially in the
chemical sector. Direct financial support, however, will only be available to
renewables-based hydrogen, while other types of hydrogen would be supported in
end uses.
The government has laid out a clear plan for support measures that will help meet the
2030 electrolyser target of 10 GW. This includes support for research and
development along with direct funding for electrolysers, as well as implementation of
EU directives (notably the amended RED II) to stimulate demand and debottleneck
planning and approval processes. In particular, state tenders and the IPCEI Hydrogen
programme are expected to play large roles. Moreover, offshore wind energy
development is also expected to supply electrolyser capacity. Specifically, the Wind
Energy at Sea Act includes a provision for 500 MW of electrolyser capacity to be
tendered annually over the period 2023-38 to produce low-emissions hydrogen that
supports the electric grid.
Imports will play an outsized role in Germany’s hydrogen supply, accounting for
around 50-70% of supply in 2030, and more thereafter. In the 2030 time frame, the
government expects most hydrogen and derivatives imports to arrive via ship, while
beyond 2030, pipelines are foreseen to play a bigger role. Infrastructure development,
therefore, will be crucial to support the ramp-up of imports into Germany (see below).
The National Hydrogen Strategy calls for the development of a hydrogen import
strategy (see below), whose aim is to set up diversified import strategies and avoid
new dependencies.
In July 2024, the Federal Cabinet approved an import strategy for hydrogen and
hydrogen derivatives. A core pillar of the import strategy is to ensure sufficient
domestic demand to support production elsewhere. Moreover, the strategy also
places a strong emphasis on international partnerships, especially within the
European Union and its neighbouring countries (such as Norway, the United Kingdom
and North African countries). It also calls for the development of a trans-European
pipeline network. It notes the importance of geopolitical conditions, which underpin
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Infrastructure
One of the largest enablers of a hydrogen market will be supporting infrastructure.
Therefore, infrastructure forms a central pillar of both Germany’s hydrogen strategy
and its import strategy. The government is taking steps to accelerate the deployment
of infrastructure. A draft of the Hydrogen Acceleration Act passed in May 2024 lays
out the legal framework for accelerating the development of hydrogen production,
storage and import. It notably includes measures to streamline and fast track planning
and approval processes for hydrogen infrastructure. The Act is expected to be
adopted in the upcoming legislative term.
Pipelines
The existing gas network is a good starting place to efficiently build up hydrogen
infrastructure. The government considers repurposing of existing natural gas
pipelines to be the most cost-effective and fastest option for building out a hydrogen
network. Already, the Energy Industry Act provides a regulatory framework and
compensation mechanism for repurposing gas lines, which will be adapted based on
implementation of the EU regulatory framework for gas and hydrogen. However, the
hydrogen network will not be built to mirror the extensive natural gas network, but
rather to consider the creation and location of hydrogen hubs (with supply facilities
and offtakers) that might warrant dedicated infrastructure.
With the Hydrogen Core Network, the German government aims to connect key
hydrogen supply, demand and storage locations. In a major step forward, BNetzA,
based on a law establishing a legal and regulatory framework for the development of
a domestic hydrogen network, has approved the plan for a hydrogen core network of
9 040 km of pipelines with total investment costs of EUR 18.9 billion (including under
the IPCEI hydrogen programme) and planned construction by 2032. The core network
will consist mainly of repurposed gas pipelines (60%) and include 15 interconnection
points. The feed-in capacity would be 100 GW and the feed-out capacity 87 GW.
As a next stage, the precise construction path of the Hydrogen Core Network will be
further developed with a comprehensive network development planning exercise. It
will be carried out in an integrated process with natural gas network development
planning to account for interactions and synergies across the systems. It will also
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closely link to the planning process for electricity grids, to ensure sufficient grid
capacity for electrolysers and efficient use of hydrogen storage to provide flexibility.
If the scenarios indicate delayed demand for hydrogen and consequently that some
pipelines might be needed later than expected, a flexibility option allows BNetzA to
postpone the commissioning of individual lines that have already been approved as
part of the core network, until 2037. The flexibility option is not meant to be a
postponement of the Core Network, but rather to offer the possibility of putting lines
that have already been approved into operation later. The aim of the flexibility option
is to avoid potential vacancies and thus keep grid fees low, which is a basic
prerequisite for a successful hydrogen market ramp-up. This enables a demand-
orientated network expansion that evolves with the market ramp-up, into which
current findings and market developments can be incorporated.
European connections will be the priority. Following the buildout of the German core
hydrogen network in 2032, Germany’s hydrogen strategy plans for connections to
EU countries through the European Hydrogen Backbone. The first phase of the
Backbone will be underpinned by infrastructure projects financed with the IPCEI
Hydrogen framework, which includes ten German hydrogen pipelines. A planned
pipeline between Germany and Denmark is still moving forward, after the timeline was
pushed back by three years to 2031 (a first buildout is now re-scheduled for 2030).
Germany has also signed declarations of intent with the Netherlands for cross-border
hydrogen infrastructure (as well as a joint tender for hydrogen procurement through
H2Global). In addition, Germany is at various stages of discussions and partnerships
for offshore pipelines with the United Kingdom, Baltic countries and Iberian countries.
However, despite an agreement reached between Germany and Norway in 2023,
Equinor cancelled a planned pipeline to send up to 10 GW of hydrogen to Germany
annually due to insufficient demand. Germany is also thought to have considerable
potential for hydrogen storage for Europe in its vast salt caverns, together with its
sizeable natural gas storage facilities that could be repurposed for hydrogen storage.
German company Uniper is currently undertaking a trial project for hydrogen storage
in a former salt mine, with plans to expand capacity to up to 600 GWh by 2030.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
In the pursuit of efficiency, the integrated network development planning process for
natural gas and hydrogen takes place every two years. This allows for use of the
flexibility option to postpone individual pipelines of the Hydrogen Core Network to
avoid potential vacancies and thus keep grid fees at a low level, which is a basic
prerequisite for a successful hydrogen market ramp-up.
The EU Gas and Hydrogen Internal Market Package, adopted in May 2024, will further
establish the legal framework for building and financing hydrogen pipelines. To date,
there has not been an uptick in the construction of hydrogen pipelines following the
passage of a regulatory framework, though there was notable growth in planned
investments in 2024.
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Shipping
Germany also expects to receive imports from outside of Europe, by ship, especially
for hydrogen derivatives. Seaborne hydrogen derivatives will be particularly salient in
the early years before a pure hydrogen economy takes off. For this purpose, terminal
capacity to receive imports needs to be increased. Germany’s planned new onshore
LNG import terminals are also designed to accept deliveries of hydrogen derivatives.
Germany’s 2024 National Port Strategy is aligned with the National Hydrogen
Strategy and designed to upgrade the nation’s port infrastructure, which is seen as
losing competitiveness. However, industry stakeholders criticised the plan for lacking
clear targets and timelines as well as financial support to co-finance infrastructure
expansions and upgrades.
Electricity
Meanwhile, a cornerstone of domestic hydrogen production will be the availability of
renewable electricity. Toward this end, the government put renewed focus on the
framework for renewable electricity generation through 2022 updates to the EEG and
intends to follow up with additional measures to streamline and expedite permitting
processes for both generation and grid infrastructure (see Focus Area 1).
Hydrogen market development will need to closely align with the electricity system.
The National Hydrogen Strategy highlights the need for siting electrolyser capacity
where it serves the complementary needs of the electricity system to enable hydrogen
to play a key role in balancing a renewables-based power grid. While most surplus
renewable electricity is generated in northern Germany, however, the bulk of
hydrogen demand will be concentrated in industrial hubs in the south, possibly
creating a mismatch between supply and demand for hydrogen (as already exists for
electricity). Pipelines to move hydrogen from the north to the south may be no easier
to site than those for electricity, which have been riddled with setbacks, delays and
cost overruns.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
1 500 Cross-cutting
technologies
1 200
Hydrogen
900
600
Other
technologies
300
0
2016 2019 2022
IEA. CC BY 4.0
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Source: IEA (2024), Energy Technology RD&D Budgets.
I EA. CC BY 4.0.
The government is also planning to issue a strategy to plan for requisite skills for the
hydrogen buildout. The package will include measures to promote more STEM
professionals along with short-term retraining efforts for workers and medium-term
programmes to increase university funding and promote the immigration of skilled
workers (especially young professionals). Germany also plans to support
capacity-building efforts to boost education and skills development outside of
Germany, notably in sub-Saharan Africa.
Recommendations
10. Focus efforts to stimulate targeted,
low-emissions hydrogen demand.
Germany’s updated Hydrogen Strategy takes a comprehensive approach to fostering
the development of a hydrogen economy, and the H2Global mechanism and
amortisation account to finance the Hydrogen Core Network are innovative
frameworks. However, final investment decisions by potential end users are lagging
due to concerns about sufficient supply at affordable prices. At the same time,
domestic production projects are failing to materialise as they lack strong commitment
from offtakers. Additional measures are needed to jump-start investments in the
market ramp-up phase, notably in the area of demand creation.
Germany is right to focus its efforts at hydrogen demand creation on industry, where
some sectors have few decarbonisation alternatives. The government should closely
co-ordinate with the country’s industry sector to align strategies and policies with
industry expectations and plans for sectoral decarbonisation. Germany can build
upon successful existing programmes. Importantly and uniquely, Germany’s Carbon
Contracts for Difference cover not only capital expenditures but also operating
expenditures, which has been key to the programme’s successful uptake and
deployment. Germany should move forward with a hydrogen-specific carbon contract
for difference and consider allocating additional funding toward it.
The public sector could play an important role in supporting hydrogen demand by
introducing “lead markets” for climate-friendly basic materials, establishing definitions,
aligning on standards and criteria for materials produced with renewable or
low-emissions hydrogen. Public procurement tied to this could create dedicated
demand for products such as climate-friendly (“green”) or low-emissions steel and
cement in the early years of market development, when broader demand is limited,
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notably through large infrastructure spending from state entities (e.g. rail
infrastructure). The final price impact on some end-use products that use green
materials – such as cars using green steel – is limited, so standards and targeted
fiscal measures could promote more private demand too.
Germany should, in its strategies and communication to the public, maintain a clear
focus on the use of hydrogen over time, where no suitable alternatives exist, as it will
likely remain a scarce resource. In addition to its use in certain industrial sectors,
hydrogen can provide seasonal storage and much needed flexibility in Germany’s
future electricity system. At a later stage, hydrogen derivatives will play an important
role as maritime and aviation fuels. The IEA is, however, less convinced of a
significant role for hydrogen in Germany’s wider transport sector, and even less in
space heating.
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Annexes
Acknowledgements
The IEA review team visited Berlin on 25-29 November 2024 and met with
government officials and public and private sector stakeholders across the energy
sector. This report is based on information from these meetings, the review team’s
assessment of Germany’s energy policy and detailed research by the IEA. The review
team members were Wieger Wiersema (the Netherlands, team leader); Peter Deleu
(Belgium); Samantha Kagan (United Kingdom); Cecilia Kellberg (Sweden);
Philip Newsome (Ireland); Ana Maria Sanchez Infante (European Commission); and
Paolo Frankl, Divya Reddy and Oskar Kvarnström from the IEA.
Divya Reddy managed the review and is the main author of the report, with significant
support form Oskar Kvarnström. The report benefitted from reviews and insights from
IEA staff, including José Miguel Bermudez Menéndez, Elizabeth Connelly,
Chiara Delmastro, Paolo Frankl, Roland Gladushenko, Dagmar Graczyk, Timur Gül,
Rena Kuwahata, Kieran McNamara, Uwe Remme, Tiffany Vass and
Jacques Warichet. Fabian Burkard and Anders Caratozzolo designed and prepared
the energy data sections of the report, dedicated analysis, figures and tables,
supported by Jairo Plata, Alessio Scanziani, Christina Hounisen and Samuel Talbot.
Roberta Quadrelli, Zakia Adam and Stève Gervais provided support on statistics and
data. Isabelle Nonain-Semelin and Astrid Dumond managed the editing and
production processes. Clara Vallois managed the translation process. The graphic
design of the report was done by Poeli Bojorquez. Jennifer Allain edited the report.
Nicolette Groot supported the organisation of the review team’s visit.
Action for their tireless efforts co-ordinating the review visit, prompt responses to the
team’s many requests, and patience throughout the weeks leading up to and during
the review. The team also expresses its gratitude to State Secretary Berthold Goeke
and Director General Ursula Borak for their helpful overview comments to kick off the
review and to Deputy Director General Vera Rodenhoff for openly receiving the
team’s recommendations at the end of the review week.
The IEA also thanks the numerous individuals from the following organisations who
provided valuable insights for the report: Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature
Conservation and Nuclear Safety; Federal Ministry for Digital and Transport Affairs;
Federal Ministry for Housing, Urban Development and Building; Federation of
German Industries; German Chemicals Industry Association; German Steel
Association; German Association of Industrial Energy Consumers; German National
Hydrogen Council; German Renewable Energy Federation; German Association of
Local Public Utilities; German Electro and Digital Industry Association; Machinery and
Equipment Manufacturers Association; 50Hertz; Amprion; German Heat Pump
Association; Federal Association for Energy-Efficient Building Envelopes; Central
Association of German Chimney Sweeps; German Energy Consultants Network;
Federal Association of Building Energy Consultants Engineers Craftsmen; German
Sustainable Building Council; German Association of Energy and Water Industries;
German Energy Efficiency Association for Heating, Cooling and CHP; Federal
Association of German Housing and Real Estate Companies; German Association of
the Automotive Industry; German Railway Industry Association; German Aviation
Association; Federal Association for Freight Forwarding & Logistics; German
Transport Forum; Association Fuels and Energy; German Shipowners’ Association;
Elli (Volkswagen Group); Climate Alliance Germany; Foundation for Environmental
Energy Law; Agora Verkehrswende; Agora Energiewende; Wuppertal Institute for
Climate, Environment and Energy; and German Institute for Economic Research.
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Units of measurement
bcm billion cubic metres
EJ exajoule
g CO2/km gramme of carbon dioxide per kilometre
GW gigawatt
GWh gigawatt hour
kb/d thousand barrels per day
km kilometre
kW kilowatt
kWh kilowatt hour
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Mt million tonnes
Mt CO2-eq million tonnes carbon dioxide equivalent
MWh megawatt hour
PJ petajoule
TWh terawatt hour
See the IEA glossary for a further explanation of many of the terms used in this report.
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This work reflects the views of the IEA Secretariat but does not necessarily reflect
those of the IEA’s individual Member countries or of any particular funder or
collaborator. The work does not constitute professional advice on any specific issue or
situation. The IEA makes no representation or warranty, express or implied, in respect
of the work’s contents (including its completeness or accuracy) and shall not be
responsible for any use of, or reliance on, the work.
Subject to the IEA’s Notice for CC-licenced Content, this work is licenced under a
Creative Commons Attribution 4.0. International Licence.
Unless otherwise indicated, all material presented in figures and tables is derived
from IEA data and analysis.
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