DAY 6 QUESTIONS

1. Discuss the constitutional provisions governing the assent to Bills by

the Governor in the light of recent supreme court judgement. (150
words, 10 marks)

The State of Tamil Nadu v Governor of Tamil Nadu saw the Supreme Court clamp
down on a Governor’s open-ended “pocket veto”, resetting the constitutional
balance under Arts 200-201.
Constitutional Provisions
• Art 200 → Governor may (a) assent, (b) return once with reasons, or (c) reserve for
President; no fourth option of silence.
• First proviso, Art 200 → if the House re-passes a returned Bill, assent is
compulsory.
• Reservation trigger → Bills diminishing High-Court powers or impinging national
interest.
• Art 201 → once reserved, the President decides; Governor acts ministerially
thereafter.
• Art 163 & Shamsher Singh (1974) → assent power exercised on Cabinet advice, not
personal whim.
Supreme-Court Observation
• Indefinite inaction is unconstitutional
• pocket/absolute veto violates the purpose of Art 200.
• Time-bound duty: Court prescribed a “reasonable” outer limit of about three
months for each decision step; delay invites writ of mandamus.
• Article 142 invoked to grant immediate assent to ten long-pending Tamil Nadu
Bills, restoring legislative supremacy.
• Expanded judicial review: State cabinets can directly approach High
Courts/Supreme Court against dilatory Governors.
 • Transparency directive: Centre & States to create real-time digital dashboards
tracking Bill movement from Assembly to Raj Bhavan to Rashtrapati Bhavan.
By converting assent from a discretionary pause into a time-bound constitutional duty, the
2025 verdict safeguards State legislatures, curbs partisan obstruction, and strengthens India’s
cooperative-federal fabric.

2. “The tuning fork of democracy and federalism is vital to the realization

of the fundamental freedoms and aspirations of our citizens.” Comment
on the statement in the light of recent instances of frequent
disagreement between elected state government and appointed
governors. (150 words, 10 marks)

The metaphor of a “tuning fork” suggests that democracy (popular

mandate) and federalism (shared sovereignty) must vibrate in harmony; if
either prong is struck out of sync, the constitutional melody of citizens’ rights and
regional aspirations falters.

Why the harmony matters

• Democracy legitimises power through elected representatives; federalism

disperses that power to reflect India’s diversity.

• Together they enable responsive policy-making (local needs)

and national cohesion (common market, security).

Discordant notes: recent Governor–State stand-offs

• Kerala 2024: Governor withheld assent to seven Bills for up to two years
before sending them to the President.

• J&K 2018: Assembly dissolved by Governor despite emergent coalition

claims.
 • West Bengal: Repeated public censure of State’s law-and-order by Raj
Bhavan.

• Kerala 2020: Request to summon special session on farm laws rejected by

Governor.

Root causes of the disharmony

• Political appointments: perception of Governors as agents of the ruling

Union party.

• Asymmetric accountability: Governors answer to the Centre, not State

electorate.

• Discretionary powers: Governors taking actions on their own claiming to

use the discretionary powers.

Consequences

• Democratic deficit: elected Cabinets face policy paralysis; public trust

erodes.

• Federal strain: overreach fuels accusations of centralisation, prompting

litigation and street protests.

• Administrative uncertainty: stalled Bills (Lokayukta, university laws)

delay welfare delivery.

What needs to done

• Codify timelines for assent, reservation and file clearance; adopt SC’s
“reasonable time” dictum.

• Merit-based, consultative selection: panel including PM, HM, LS Speaker

and State CM; fixed five-year tenure with removal only for proven
misconduct.

• Model ‘Governor’s Code of Conduct’ limiting public commentary and

mandating cabinet consultation records.
 • Provision for impeachment/recall by State Legislature as deterrent
against partisanship.

• Regular Inter-State Council reviews of Centre–State frictions to restore

cooperative federalism.

Synchronising the notes of democracy and federalism demands transparent

institutions and disciplined constitutional behaviour; without this, the vibrancy of
citizens’ freedoms and the unity of India’s polity risk falling out of tune.

3. “A governor should be discharging his/her duty in accordance with the

spirit of the Constitution, not just be an agent of the centre”. Discuss
the statement in the light of the role of governor in the Indian polity.
(250 words, 15 marks)

The Governor, envisaged under Articles 153-162 as the constitutional head of a

State, is meant to act as an impartial link between Union and State, not a
partisan extension of New Delhi. Persistent frictions over House dissolution, assent
to Bills and floor-test timings highlight why the post must align with the spirit—
not the politics—of the Constitution.
Constitutional mandate & duties
• Aid-and-Advice rule (Art 163, Shamsher Singh 1974): Governor normally
acts on the elected Council’s advice, using discretion only where the
Constitution explicitly permits.
• Legislative interface: Assent/return/reservation of Bills (Art 200-201);
summoning and dissolving the House.
• Executive powers: Appointment of CM, ministers (Art 164); promulgating
ordinances (Art 213) in limited, urgent situations.
• Judicial & clemency powers: Pardons under Art 161; require transparency
(Epuru Sudhakar 2006).
 Why charges of acting as ‘Centre’s agent’ arise
• Partisan House tests: Nabam Rebia 2016 and Maharashtra-2023 showed
controversial advances of Assembly sessions.
• Selective assent: Tamil Nadu Bills kept pending for years until the 2025
Supreme Court “pocket-veto” ruling.
• Frequent removals/appointments: Political churn despite B.P. Singhal
2010 stipulating that Governors can’t be ousted for ideology alone.
• Article 356 misuse: S.R. Bommai 1994 revealed how biased reports can
topple elected governments.

Recommendations by Sarkaria & Punchhi Commission

• Transparent appointment: Select from an empanelled list in consultation
with the Chief Minister.
• Fixed five-year tenure, removal only for proved
misbehaviour/incapacity to insulate from political pressure.
• ‘Code of Conduct’ spelling out norms for discretionary powers and timely
assent to Bills.
• Post-tenure cooling-off: bar Governors from active politics to uphold
neutrality.
• Annual accountability report to State Legislature; digital dashboard
tracking Bills between Assembly and Raj Bhavan.
Implementing these reforms will recast the Governor from a perceived partisan
referee into a federal umpire who safeguards constitutional values while
respecting popular mandate.

4. Discuss the essentials of the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act and

anomalies, if any that have led to recent reported conflicts between the
elected representatives and the institution of the Lieutenant Governor
in the administration of Delhi. Do you think that this will give rise to a
 new trend in the functioning of the Indian federal politics? (250 words,
15 marks)

The 69ᵗʰ Amendment inserted Article 239AA (1991), creating Delhi’s sui-generis model—
a Union Territory with a Legislature—whose design and ambiguities now sit at the centre of
frequent Centre-State tussles.
Essentials of the 69ᵗʰ Constitutional Amendment Act
• Legislative Assembly & Council of Ministers empowered to legislate/execute on
the State List except police, public order and land (Art 239AA (3)).
• Directly-elected government headed by a Chief Minister; LG normally acts on aid
& advice (Art 239AA (4)).
• Discretionary LG role to refer disagreements to the President, giving the Union a
constitutional foothold.
• Parliament’s concurrent competence over all three lists; its laws prevail on
conflict—cementing asymmetrical federalism.
Anomalies fuelling recent LG–elected-government conflicts
• Undefined “services” control: 2023 Constitution Bench upheld Delhi’s control over
transfers/postings, but an immediate Union ordinance (now Act) restored LG primacy,
creating a legislative–executive seesaw.
• Veto via “difference of opinion”: LG has stalled files—from school teachers’
postings to Mohalla Clinic panels—by routinely seeking presidential reference.
• Assent bottleneck: Multiple Bills (e.g., Delhi Lokayukta Amendment) lay pending
months in Raj Bhavan, echoing the 2025 “pocket veto” issue faced by Tamil Nadu.
• Rule-making asymmetry: The Union’s blanket rule-making power over All-India
Services postings undercuts the elected cabinet’s accountability chain.
Will this reshape Indian federal politics?
• Possible trend of central assertiveness: The 2023 Delhi Services Act and earlier
J&K reorganisation suggest a template where the Union re-enters domains lost in
court.
• Judicial counter-weight: Courts have repeatedly re-asserted “co-operative
federalism” (2018 & 2023 Delhi verdicts); States may increasingly litigate,
deepening judicial federalism.
• Political ripple effect: Other Opposition-ruled UTs/States could view LG/Governor
offices as partisan arbiters, intensifying demands for appointment reforms and
clearer federal compacts.
Unless Parliament, the Union executive and the judiciary align Delhi’s hybrid model with
transparent rules and timelines, the capital’s turf war may indeed foreshadow a more
centralised—and litigative—phase of Indian federal politics.