FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 6517 December 6, 2006

MARCOS V. PRIETO, complainant,

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is an administrative complaint filed by Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, against respondent Judge
Ferdinand A. Fe, both as a member of the bar and bench, and respondent Atty. Oscar B. Corpuz as
a member of the bar, for dishonesty, serious misconduct prejudicial to the integrity and dignity of the
Judiciary under Section 27, Rule 138 and Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court relative
to the latter's actuations in the handling of Civil Case No. 1081-BG entitled, Yolanda M. Roque v.
Atty. Marcos V. Prieto, et al. and Civil Case No. 1518-BG entitled, Yolanda Marquez Roque v. Atty.
Marcos V. Prieto, et al.

Complainant implies that not only did the respondent lawyer had free access to the records of Civil
Case No. 1081-BG through the help of respondent Judge, he was also given the liberty to copy what
perhaps would help him in his quest to win the case.

Invoking the principle of res ipsa loquitor, complainant objects to the fact that Civil Case No. 1518-
BG was raffled to the respondent Judge, who was the former counsel of the plaintiff therein in Civil
Case No. 1081-BG. Another reason for his objection is that, allegedly, some paragraphs in the
complaint in Civil Case No. 1518-BG were obviously copied from Civil Case No. 1081-BG wherein
the complaint was prepared by respondent Judge in his capacity as then lawyer of herein
complainant (plaintiff therein). Complainant claims that the foregoing constitute misconduct which
imply malice or wrongful intent, not just mere errors of judgment. He insists that the fact that
respondent Judge will try the case upon a complaint in which the plaintiff was his former client and
which complaint was copied from the complaint he himself prepared does not speak well of his
intention as to the disposition of the case.

Complainant maintains that the act of respondent Judge in allowing the respondent lawyer to copy
the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG and to present it to court as the latter's work does violence
to Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a judge should
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence. Complainant also asserts that in
placing his signature in the complaint not written by him, respondent lawyer committed deceit, which
serves as a ground for his disbarment.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of this Court referred the instant
administrative case to Court of Appeals Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof.
Pursuant thereto, Justice Salonga set the case for hearing on 13 December 2005, and directed the
complainant and the respondents, and their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit
documents relevant to the complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the complainant and the respondent Judge, after the marking and
offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they would not be adducing any
further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period of thirty (30) days within which to
simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted for resolution.

On 13 December 2005, complainant filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other
hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his Memorandum
on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga summarized the facts as follows:

In October 1992, Salud Andrada Marquez ("Marquez") mortgaged six (6) parcels of land to
the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc., one of which is a parcel of land with an area of
Twenty Two Thousand Five Hundred Ninety Nine Square Meters (22,599 sq. meters) located
at Calumbaya, Bauang, La Union covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. FP-
15344 under a Free Patent granted on 5 July 1989.

Failing to pay her debt, the bank foreclosed the mortgage. On 2 August 1993, the mortgaged
properties were sold at public auction the highest bidder of which was the petitioner.
Consequently, OCT No. FP-15344 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. T-40223 was issued in the name of the petitioner.

In the meantime, petitioner, through his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O.
Prieto, mortgaged the aforesaid properties to Far East Bank and Trust Company.

Seeking the nullification of the mortgaged and the consequent transfer of the mortgaged
properties in the name of the petitioner, Roque, Marquez' daughter, filed a complaint
docketed as Civil Case No. 1081-BG with the RTC Branch 67, for Declaration of Nullity of
Contracts with Damages against said petitioner, the Rural Bank of Luna, La Union, Inc. and
Far East Bank and Trust Company. Respondent judge, then a practicing lawyer, was
retained by Roque as her counsel of record in said case and was the one who drafted said
complaint.

On 18 August 2000, the RTC Branch 67, through then Presiding Judge Jose G. Pineda,
issued an order dismissing the case on the ground that Roque was not a real party in
interest since her right of action has still to ripen upon the death of her mother.

On 8 November 2001, respondent judge was appointed as the presiding judge of RTC
Branch 67. By reason of his appointment, he completely severed all his professional
relationships with his clients, including Roque, and turned over or relinquished all case
records of his office to said clients.

Upon the demise of Marquez on 9 August 2002, Roque, who had now acquired by way of
succession her mother's right of action to pursue the annulment of contracts executed over
the property formerly covered by OCT No. 15344, engaged the legal services of respondent
lawyer.
Thus, on 5 January 2004, respondent lawyer, as Roque's counsel, filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Contracts, Reconveyance of Property, and Damages against
petitioner, his attorneys-in-fact Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, the Rural Bank of
Luna, La Union, Inc. and Far East Bank and Trust Company, Inc., now merged with the Bank
of the Philippine Islands, before the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union.

On 7 January 2004, the case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1518-BG, was raffled to the
respondent judge. On 8 January 2004, RTC Branch 67, through Atty. Jeovannie C. Ordoño,
its Branch Clerk of Court, issued summons to the defendants. The summons and copy of the
complaint was duly served upon the petitioner on 20 January 2004.

Going over the individual case folders of the newly raffled cases to his court, respondent
judge came across Civil Case No. 1518-BG and discovered that the plaintiff therein was
Roque, his former client. Immediately, without going over the allegations of the complaint,
the respondent judge issued an Order dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the
case and ordered that the record of said case be transferred to the Regional Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union, Branch 33 ("RTC Branch 33").

On 27 January 2004, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC Branch 67 transmitted the entire
record of Civil Case No. 1518-BG to RTC Branch 33 through its Clerk of Court, Atty. Richard
T. Domingo, which was duly received by the latter.

On 30 January 2004, petitioner separately filed with the RTC Branch 67, an Objection to
Competency and his Answer to the Complaint. Since the records thereof were already
transmitted to RTC Branch 33, RTC Branch 67's Branch Clerk of Court had said pleadings
forwarded thereto. Since then, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG have been
conducted by RTC Branch 33.

In an Order dated 22 April 2004, after the parties therein filed their Answers and the issues
having been joined, Presiding Judge Rose Mary R. Molina-Alim of RTC Branch 33 set the
case for pre-trial conference and ordered the submission of the parties' respective pre-trial
briefs.

On 24 May 2004, petitioner filed with the RTC Branch 33 an Amended Answer together with
the Authority given by his co-defendants Antonio O. Prieto and Monette O. Prieto, in his favor
to appear for and in their behalf, and their Pre-Trial Brief.

In a Resolution dated 28 September 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court
referred the instant administrative case to the undersigned for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety (90) days from receipt thereof. A copy of the said Resolution
was received by the undersigned on 18 November 2005.

Pursuant thereto, in an Order promulgated on 21 November 2005, the undersigned set the
case for hearing on 13 December 2005 directing the petitioner and the respondents, and
their witnesses, if any, to appear before her and to submit documents relevant to the
complaint.

During the scheduled hearing, the petitioner and the respondent judge, after the marking and
offering of their respective documentary evidence, manifested that they will not be adducing
any further evidence. Upon their motion, they were given a period thirty (30) days within
which to simultaneously file their Memoranda, after which the case will be deemed submitted
for resolution.
 On 13 December 2005, petitioner filed his Memorandum. The respondent judge, on the other
hand, filed his Memorandum on 18 January 2006 while the respondent lawyer filed his
Memorandum on 20 January 2006.

In her report, Justice Salonga recommended the dismissal of the complaint against respondents,
and that complainant be admonished for filing the frivolous complaint.

A reading of the records of this case clearly shows that the present administrative case is
unfounded, as it is devoid of factual and legal basis. Stripped of all its verbosity, petitioner's
allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents should be treated for what
they really are, mere allegations founded on speculation and conjecture. In this connection, it
must be stressed that in administrative proceedings, the burden of proof that the
respondents committed the act complained of rests on the complainant. Failing in this, the
complaint must be dismissed.

First off, the allegation of the petitioner to the effect that the respondent lawyer, through the
intervention and assistance of the respondent judge, had free access to the court records
Civil Case No. 1081-BG fails to find evidentiary support. Without more, petitioner deduced
that the court records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG were made available to the respondent
lawyer at the instance of the respondent judge simply because relevant and substantial
portions of the complaint filed by the latter were re-written and adopted in Civil Case No.
1518-BG. Bare and conclusory as it is, the said allegation deserves scant consideration.

Emphatically, the mere fact that respondent lawyer had adopted relevant and substantial
portions of the complaint filed by the respondent judge does not in any way bespeak of any
illegal or unethical practice on his part.

For one, the respondent lawyer could have easily read and gained access to the case record
of Civil Case No. 1081-BG. As can be gleaned from the records, respondent judge had
already turned over and relinquished his case records of Civil Case No. 1081-BG to Roque
after his appointment to the bench on 8 November 2001. Since she intended to re-file the
case against petitioner, it is expected, if not necessary, for Roque to give the records of the
previously dismissed complaint to her newly retained counsel. What is more apparent is the
right of Roque and the respondent lawyer, as her retained counsel, to request access to the
court records for their reproduction or certification.

For another, a perusal of the complaints separately and successively filed by the respondent
judge and the respondent lawyer belies petitioner's claim that the latter merely copied,
verbatim or otherwise, the original complaint. True, some allegations contained therein were
substantially retained by respondent lawyer. However, these allegations are essential and
crucial to the cause of action of Roque against the petitioner. Aside from the fact that there is
hardly a number of ways to construct a sentence, petitioner cannot plausibly claim that
respondent lawyer is legally restrained from retaining or rewriting sentences earlier
constructed by the respondent judge.

More importantly, petitioner's assertion that respondent judge allowed the respondent lawyer
to copy the complaint in Civil Case No. 1081-BG is unfounded. Aside from the petitioner's
mere say so, there is not even an iota of evidence to support this assertion. It is all too
obvious that there is a dearth of evidence that would in any way prove petitioner's accusation
against the respondents.
In the same vein, petitioner's inference that respondent judge intended to try Civil Case No.
1518-BG is a blatant fabrication. The records of the case refute this. Reading his petition, it is
evident that petitioner cunningly attempted to mislead this court to believe that respondent
judge is still conducting the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG and had refused to
inhibit himself therefrom. His intent to deceive this court to achieve his end to vex and harass
the respondents is undeniable.

As asserted by the respondent judge, petitioner cannot feign ignorance in this regard. He is
well aware that the respondent judge already issued an Order dated 23 January 2004
inhibiting himself from the case and ordering the transmission of the record of said case to
the RTC Branch 33. In fact, petitioner has been actively participating in the proceedings of
said case before the RTC Branch 33 prior to the institution of the instant administrative case
as he had already filed several pleadings therewith.

If truth be told, the allegations in the instant petition was ingeniously written to deliberately
and maliciously withhold and suppress the fact that the respondent judge had already
inhibited himself from taking cognizance of Civil Case No. 1518-BG and that the records
thereof had in fact been transmitted to RTC Branch 33.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that the instant administrative case in itself is frivolous,
calculated merely to harass, annoy, and cast groundless suspicions on the integrity and
reputation of both the respondents. The only piece of evidence that the petitioner has offered
in support of his claim is his bare assertions, which certainly deserves scant consideration. It
must be emphasized that a mere charge or allegation of wrongdoing does not suffice.
Accusation is not synonymous with guilt. There must always be sufficient evidence to
support the charge. This brings to the fore the application of the age-old but familiar rule that
he who alleges must prove his allegations.

Counter-Petition Against the Petitioner

Adopting the above-findings made in the petition against the respondents, there is merit in
the separate counter-petitions filed by the latter to hold the petitioner administratively liable
for filing an unfounded and frivolous suit.

As already stated, petitioner's allegations in support of his complaint against the respondents
are baseless, as they are mere allegations founded on pure speculation and conjecture.
Sans evidence, his petition was purposely written to mislead the Court and cast a doubt on
the integrity and dignity of the respondents. Petitioner made the said administrative case as
a vehicle to unduly harass or otherwise prejudice the respondents. Worse, in selfishly
satisfying his own desire to vex the respondents, he had tarnished the integrity of the entire
judiciary and the bar.

For this reason, the petitioner should be cited in contempt, as what the Supreme Court had
pronounced in the recent case of Galman Cruz vs. Aliño-Hormachuelos. Said the Court:

"Verily, this Court is once again called upon to reiterate that, although the Court will
never tolerate or condone any act, conduct or omission that would violate the norm
of public accountability or diminish the peoples' faith in the judiciary, neither will it
hesitate to shield those under its employ from unfounded suits that only serve to
disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of justice.
 The eloquent words of the late Justice Conrado V. Sanchez in Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer are enlightening:

By now, a lawyer's duties to the Court have become commonplace. Really, there
could hardly be any valid excuse for lapses in the observance thereof. Section 20(b),
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, in categorical terms, spells out one such duty: 'To
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers.' As
explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of the
lawyer to maintain towards the Court a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance.' That same canon, as corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon
lawyers to support the courts against 'unjust criticism and clamor.' And more, the
attorney's oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be 'with all good
fidelity…to the courts.' Worth remembering is that the duty of an attorney to the
courts 'can only be maintained by rendering no service involving any disrespect to
the judicial office which he is bound to uphold.'

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment. That is his
privilege. And, he may suffer frustration at what he feels is other's lack of it. That is
his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed to harden
into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to jettison the
time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. He should give due
allowance to the fact that judges are but men; and men are encompassed by error,
fettered by fallibility.

In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel, Justice Sanchez further

A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is. "like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice." His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority
of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote distrust in the administration
of justice." Faith in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine
the judicial edifice "is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people." Thus has it been said of a lawyer that "as
an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the
proper administration of justice."

Petitioner's unfounded imputations against respondents are malicious and offend the dignity
of the entire judiciary. Scandalous as his bare allegations are, the fact that petitioner
maliciously insinuated that the respondent judge allowed access to and assisted the
respondent lawyer in the filing of his complaint desecrates and mocks the integrity of the
judiciary. Equally insolent is petitioner's baseless postulations that the respondent judge
refused to inhibit himself from Civil Case No. 1518-BG purposely to give leverage to his
former client and her lawyer.

Moreover, in filing a frivolous suit against his opposing counsel, petitioner violated Canons 8
and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "all lawyers must
conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness, and candor towards their colleagues and should
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel' and commands all lawyers "to observe the
rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice."
We have reviewed the records, and after careful consideration thereof, we find the conclusions of
fact and the recommendations of the Investigator in the above-quoted report to be well-taken and
fully supported by the evidence on record, except for the penalty imposed on complainant.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint. Although no person
should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, however, this right must be exercised in
good faith.1

As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper administration of justice.
They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions that only add to the workload of the
judiciary.

A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an
instrument to advance its ends – the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final judgments. A lawyer should not only help
attain these objectives but should likewise avoid unethical or improper practices that impede,
obstruct or prevent their realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy
and efficient administration of justice.2 Canon 123 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert every effort and consider it
their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.

The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is limited to persons of good moral character
with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The right does not only presuppose in its
possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special privilege, highly
personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust.4 Thus, a lawyer should not use his knowledge
of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial processes, as the same constitutes
serious transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility.5 We cannot countenance
complainant's act of misleading this Court into believing that respondent judge was still conducting
the proceedings in Civil Case No. 1518-BG. What is evident is that even complainant was well
aware of respondent judge's inhibition therefrom. The respondent judge, in fact, issued an Order
dated 23 January 2004 inhibiting himself from the case.

In Retuya v. Gorduiz,6 respondent-lawyer was suspended for six (6) months for filing a groundless
suit against a former client in order to harass and embarrass her. In the case of Arnaldo v.
Suarin,7 complainant Atty. Arnaldo was fined P5,000.00 for filing frivolous complaint. In this case,
which we find analogous to Arnaldo, we hold that a fine of P5,000.00 will suffice.

ACCORDINGLY, the above-quoted report of Justice Salonga is APPROVED with modification as to

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, CJ Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr.,, JJ., concur.