G.R. No.

102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,​

vs.​
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova
was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by
Judge Manuel E. Autajay. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at ​
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy
secondary to hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its
Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the
Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission
of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not
extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor
1
General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be
resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is
based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General
arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes
both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the
2
Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal
case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should
die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguish his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same
issue posed therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal
responsibility and his civil liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory
construction is unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the
offender occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of
the term "final judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or,
is it a judgment which is final and executory?

We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
heretofore transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in
part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias,
solo cuando a su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia
firme" under the old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Española, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado
por las partes litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales
concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when
judgment is such that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed — "en condena
determinada;" or, in the words of Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes — "una verdad legal."
Prior thereto, should the accused die, according to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni
delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as Judge Kapunan well explained, when a
defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any determination by final
judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the simple
reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421.
Senator Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp.
859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles
72 and 78 of that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already
enforceable. This also brings to mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or
when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly
waived in writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive
conclusion: The term final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond
recall. Really, as long as a judgment has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that
defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the
right to institute a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of
necessity, cover "both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November
9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs. Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal
Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan observed that as "the civil
action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found guilty, the
death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated,
supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is
sought to be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the
criminal action and let the civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby
we will be called upon to clamp civil liability in a case where the source thereof — criminal liability —
does not exist. And, as was well stated in Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R. ​
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit,"
which solely would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

3
This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case was adopted by the Supreme Court in the
4
cases of People of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., People of the Philippines v. Jaime
5 6
Jose, et al. and People of the Philippines v. Satorre by dismissing the appeal in view of the
death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that
there is as yet no final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability
of the said accused-appellant Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code;
Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717, citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G.
4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino
7 8
Polinar and Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals ruled differently. In the former,
the issue decided by this court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who
died before final judgment is extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore
against his estate. It was the contention of the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the
accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal and civil liabilities resulting from the offense,
in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years
after the revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code
establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct
from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action
shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated
without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced
separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability
under Article 89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated
differently, where the civil liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the
extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death
supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does not apply in instant case wherein the civil
liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but from a civil contract of purchase
and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged
with estafa could likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said
accused had swindled the first and second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of
sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while the death of the accused herein extinguished his
criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding
the extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following
9
ratiocination: Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court requires the dismissal of all money
claims against the defendant whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First
Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard
on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In
such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall be included in the title of the
case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-accused should
be substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was
that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of
obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together
with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

10
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. departed from this
long-established principle of law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and
convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's
death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the
extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such
claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal
import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire
appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's conviction despite dismissal of the criminal
action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution
of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because
his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan,
which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to
indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the
absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People
and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs.
Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although
he has no criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil.
583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego
insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate
jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising
from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him,
thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that
purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10) days of the names and
addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has a duly
appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased
insofar as the civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).

11
Succeeding cases raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in
Sendaydiego; in other words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a
civil liability solely anchored on the criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of
the entire appeal due to the demise of the accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in
Sendaydiego impels us to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly
instituted in the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and
no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of
evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere
in its text is there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's
civil liability ex delicto when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an
alternative and separate civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a
criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are
instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the
criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of
evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the
survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of
whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the
accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in ​
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of
the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this
matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability
therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed
claims for civil liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted
with the criminal, as one filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but
merely a separate civil action. This had the effect of converting such claims from one which is
dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an entirely new and separate one, the
12
prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal proceedings. One would be
hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be borne in mind that in
recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal action,
rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to
render fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every
person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal
action due to death of the accused pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of
the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal
liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal
action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action
cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true,
would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and
is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which
is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil
action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego resolution of July 8,
1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action
referred to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to
authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under
Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July
8, 1977 notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is
13
the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable.

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a
determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's
conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article
30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of
the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We
reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on
the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the
Sendaydiego resolution of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court
made the inference that civil actions of the type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims,
the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction
by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:

"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the
court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in
Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him
by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this
course taken in Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which,
relying on the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication
therefrom that where the civil liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already
passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the
Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction thereover despite the extinguishment
of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement, which has been followed in
the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should be set aside
and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither
authority nor justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together
with and as part of criminal actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion
from the latter category of an ordinary civil action upon the death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21,
Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. "What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5
14
of Rule 86, are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may
15
include even the restitution of personal or real property." Section 5, Rule 86 provides an
exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses,
expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or
implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an
ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2)
allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it
should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the
accused pending finality of his conviction.

Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto
desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to
16
Section 1, Rule 111 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action,
this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The
source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the
same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law,
result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed
17
against the executor or administrator of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. — No
action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced
against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest
therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to
person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.

18
This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala where we held that, in recovering damages for
injury to persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same
must be filed against the executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not
against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for
funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, judgment for money and claims
arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed, refers only
topurely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as
the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of
the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same
19
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the
same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts

c) Quasi-contracts

d) . . .

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor
may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of
the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil
action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal
21
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
22
apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas
extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e.,
rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 209387

ERWIN LIBO-ON DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,​

vs.​
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search warrants,
are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy should not be so
literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the safety of the traveling public.

1 2
For resolution is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision dated September 28,
3 4
2012 and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City. The Court of
5 6
Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Judgment finding petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of possessing unlicensed firearms under Commission on Elections
7 8 9
Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 during the 2007
10
election period.

11
Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming
12
back and forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of
13
the Cebu Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the
14 15
floor with a porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket.

Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning
16
machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz’s
17
bag.

18
Cutie Pie Flores (Flores) was the x-ray machine operator-on-duty on May 11, 2007. She saw the
19
impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms inside Dela Cruz’s bag. Upon seeing the
suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel Archie Igot (Igot) who was the
20
baggage inspector then.
 21
Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag. Dela Cruz answered Igot in the
22
affirmative and consented to Igot’s manual inspection of the bag.

"Port Police Officer Adolfo Abregana [(Officer Abregana)] was on duty at the terminal of the Cebu
23
Domestic Port in Pier 1-G when his attention was called by . . . Igot." Igot told Officer Abregana
24 25
that there were firearms in a bag owned by a certain person. Igot then pointed to the person.
26
That person was later identified as Dela Cruz.

27
Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag was then inspected and the following
items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman’s book; other personal items;
28
and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper
29
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative.

30
Dela Cruz was then arrested and informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was
31
also informed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information dated November 19, 2003, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act
32
No. 8294 for illegal possession of firearms:

Criminal Case No. CBU -80084

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 p.m. in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with the deliberate intent and
without being authorized by law, did then and there possess and carry outside his residence one (1)
Cal. 38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number; one (1) .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum
revolver without serial number; one (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial
number and four rounds of live ammunitions for cal. 38 without first securing the necessary license
to possess and permit to carry from the proper authorities.

33
CONTRARY TO LAW.

Subsequently, another Information was filed charging Dela Cruz with the violation of Commission on
34
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881:

Criminal Case No. CBU 80085

That on or about the 11th day of May 2007, at about 12:45 in the afternoon, which is within the
election period for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, in the City of Cebu, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then
and there possess and carry outside his residence the following:

One (1) cal. .38 Simith [sic] & Wesson revolver without serial number;

One (1) cal. .22 Smith & Wesson Magnum revolver without serial number;

One (1) North American Black Widow magnum revolver without serial number and four (4) rounds of
live ammunitions for cal. 38.

35
CONTRARY TO LAW.

36
Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

After trial, Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City found Dela Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in
37
relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No. CBU 80085. Dela Cruz
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one (1) year with disqualification from holding public office
38
and the right to suffrage.

According to the trial court, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dela
39
Cruz committed illegal possession of firearms. It proved the following elements: "(a) the existence
of the subject firearm and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
40
license or permit to possess the same." The prosecution presented the firearms and live
41
ammunitions found in Dela Cruz’s possession. It also presented three (3) prosecution witnesses
42
who testified that the firearms were found inside Dela Cruz’s bag. The prosecution also presented
a Certification that Dela Cruz did not file any application for license to possess a firearm, and he was
43
not given authority to carry a firearm outside his residence.

The trial court also held that the search conducted by the port authorities was reasonable and, thus,
44
valid:

Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course
45
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.

The trial court did not give credence to Dela Cruz’s claim that the firearms were "planted" inside his
46
bag by the porter or anyone who could have accessed his bag while he was buying a ticket.
According to the trial court, Dela Cruz’s argument was "easy to fabricate, but terribly difficult to
47
disprove." Dela Cruz also did not show improper motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses
48
to discredit their testimonies.

49
The trial court dismissed the case for violation of Republic Act No. 8294. It held that "Republic Act
No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the person arrested
50
committed ‘no other crime.’" Dela Cruz, who had been charged with illegal possession of firearms,
was also charged with violating the Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No.
51
7764.

The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Consolidated Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 7764 in relation to Section 261 of BP Blg. 881 in Criminal Case No.
CBU-80085, and hereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment for a period of one (1) year, and to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage.

While Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for Violation of RA 8294 is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly,
the cash bond posted by accused therein for his provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled and
released to said accused.

The subject firearms (Exhs. "H", "I" & "J"), and the live ammunitions (Exhs. "K to K-2"") shall,
however, remain in custodia legis for proper disposition of the appropriate government agency.

52
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

53
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s Judgment. It held that the defense failed
to show that the prosecution witnesses were moved by improper motive; thus, their testimonies are
54 55
entitled to full faith and credit. The acts of government authorities were found to be regular.

56
The Court of Appeals did not find Dela Cruz’s defense of denial meritorious. "Denial as a defense
has been viewed upon with disfavor by the courts due to the ease with which it can be
 57
concocted." Dela Cruz did not present any evidence "to show that he had authority to carry
outside of residence firearms and ammunition during the period of effectivity of the Gun Ban [during]
58
election time." The prosecution was able to prove Dela Cruz’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed January 27, 2010
Consolidated Judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12 of Cebu City in Criminal Case
CBU-59434 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs on accused-appellant.

59
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)

60
Dela Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
61
Resolution dated August 23, 2013.

62 63
Dela Cruz filed this Petition on November 4, 2013. In the Resolution dated December 9, 2013,
this court required respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, to submit its Comment on
64
the Petition. Respondent submitted its Comment on March 6, 2014, which this court noted in the
65
Resolution dated March 19, 2014.

66
Dela Cruz claims that he was an on-the-job trainee for an inter-island vessel. He was
67
"well[-]acquainted with [the] inspection scheme [at the] ports." He would not have risked placing
prohibited items such as unlicensed firearms inside his luggage knowing fully the consequences of
68
such an action.

According to Dela Cruz, when he arrived at the port on May 11, 2007, he left his luggage with a
69
porter to buy a ticket. "A considerable time of fifteen minutes went by before he could secure the
70
ticket while his luggage was left sitting on the floor with only the porter standing beside it." He
claims that someone must have placed the unlicensed firearms inside his bag during the period he
71
was away from it. He was surprised when his attention was called by the x-ray machine operator
72
after the firearms were detected.
Considering the circumstances, Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against
73
warrantless search:

In petitioner’s case, it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of his
luggage, he had no actual intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in
all honest belief that when his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing
incriminating would be recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the
examination of his luggage. . . . [H]e believed that no incriminating evidence w[ould] be found. He
knew he did not place those items. But what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a
considerable time interval lapsed, creating an opportunity for someone else to place inside his
74
luggage those incriminating items. (Emphasis in the original)

Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz’s right to unreasonable search and
75
seizure, thus warranting his conviction. Dela Cruz was "caught in flagrante delicto carrying three
(3) revolvers and four (4) live ammunitions when his bag went through the x-ray machine in the
76
Cebu Domestic Port on May 11, 2007, well within the election period." The firearms were seized
77
during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.

According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted
78
by airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures.

Records are also clear that Dela Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and
79 80
seizure. The trial court found that Dela Cruz voluntarily gave his consent to the search.

81
Dela Cruz’s claim that his bag was switched is also baseless. The witnesses categorically testified
that Dela Cruz was "in possession of the bag before it went through the x-ray machine, and he was
82
also in possession of the same bag that contained the firearms when he was apprehended."

Dela Cruz raised the lone issue of "whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding [him] guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged despite the failure of the prosecution to establish his
83
guilt beyond reasonable doubt[.]"

The issues for resolution in this case are:

First, whether petitioner Erwin Libo-on Dela Cruz was in possession of the illegal firearms within the
meaning of the Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881;
Second, whether petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and

Lastly, assuming that there was no waiver, whether there was a valid search and seizure in this
case.

We deny the Petition.

The present criminal case was brought to this court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The penalty
imposed on petitioner by the trial court is material in determining the mode of appeal to this court. A
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 must be differentiated from appeals under Rule 124,
84
Section 13 involving cases where the lower court imposed on the accused the penalty of
85
reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or, previously, death.

86
In Mercado v. People:

Where the Court of Appeals finds that the imposable penalty in a criminal case brought to it on
appeal is at least reclusion perpetua, death or life imprisonment, then it should impose such penalty,
refrain from entering judgment thereon, certify the case and elevate the entire records to this Court
for review. This will obviate the unnecessary, pointless and time-wasting shuttling of criminal cases
between this Court and the Court of Appeals, for by then this Court will acquire jurisdiction over the
case from the very inception and can, without bothering the Court of Appeals which has fully
completed the exercise of its jurisdiction, do justice in the case.

On the other hand, where the Court of Appeals imposes a penalty less than reclusion perpetua, a
review of the case may be had only by petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 where only
87
errors or questions of law may be raised. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

It is settled that in petitions for review on certiorari, only questions of law are reviewed by this
88
court. The rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 is
based on sound and practical policy considerations stemming from the differing natures of a
question of law and a question of fact:

A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or
jurisprudence to a certain set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question
of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the
query invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the
existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances as well as their relation to each other
89
and to the whole, and the probability of the situation.
Concomitantly, factual findings of the lower courts as affirmed by the Court of Appeals are binding on
90
this court.

91
In contrast, an appeal in a criminal case "throws the whole case open for review[.]" The
underlying principle is that errors in an appealed judgment, even if not specifically assigned, may be
corrected motu propio by the court if the consideration of these errors is necessary to arrive at a just
92
resolution of the case. Nevertheless, "the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process, it being merely a statutory privilege which may be exercised only in the manner provided for
93
by law[.]"

II

Petitioner argues that the firearms found in his bag were not his. Thus, he could not be liable for
possessing the contraband. Key to the resolution of this case is whether petitioner possessed
firearms without the necessary authorization from the Commission on Elections. Petitioner was
charged under special laws: Republic Act No. 8294 and Commission on Elections Resolution No.
7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

The law applicable is Section 2(a) of Commission on Elections Resolution No. 7764, which provides:

SECTION 2. Prohibitions. During the election period from January 14, 2007 it shall be unlawful for:

a. Any person, including those possessing a permit to carry firearms outside of residence or place of
business, to bear, carry or transport firearms or other deadly weapons in public places including any
building, street, park, private vehicle or public conveyance. For the purpose firearm includes airgun,
while deadly weapons include hand grenades or other explosives, except pyrotechnics[.]

Section 261(q) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 states:

Section 261. Prohibited Acts. – The following shall be guilty of an election offense:

....

(q) Carrying firearms outside residence or place of business. – Any person who, although
possessing a permit to carry firearms, carries any firearms outside his residence or place of
business during the election period, unless authorized in writing by the Commission: Provided, That
a motor vehicle, water or air craft shall not be considered a residence or place of business or
extension hereof. (Par. (l), Id.)

This prohibition shall not apply to cashiers and disbursing officers while in the performance of their
duties or to persons who by nature of their official duties, profession, business or occupation
habitually carry large sums of money or valuables.
For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, we will examine three (3)
points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for
x-ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner’s bag and
called the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve,
and seize the firearms and ammunition.

III

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port
personnel—the x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine
94
station. With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is
different from that imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities.

95
In People v. Marti, the private forwarding and shipping company, following standard operating
procedure, opened packages sent by accused Andre Marti for shipment to Zurich, Switzerland and
96
detected a peculiar odor from the packages. The representative from the company found dried
97
marijuana leaves in the packages. He reported the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation
98
and brought the samples to the Narcotics Section of the Bureau for laboratory examination.
99
Agents from the National Bureau of Investigation subsequently took custody of the illegal drugs.
Andre Marti was charged with and was found guilty of violating Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise
100
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.

101
This court held that there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained
against the accused was not procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized
102
government agencies. The Bill of Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it
103
cannot be invoked against the acts of private individuals:

If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if
it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of
the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by
private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
104
government.
Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private
105
persons are not covered by the exclusionary rule.

To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this case was committed by private or
public persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure of the Philippine Ports Authority.

Port security measures are consistent with the country’s aim to develop transportation and trade in
conjunction with national and economic growth. In 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority was created
106
for the reorganization of port administration and operation functions. The Philippine Ports
Authority’s Charter was later revised through Presidential Decree No. 857. The Revised Charter
provided that the Authority may:

after consultation with relevant Government agencies, make rules or regulations for the planning,
development, construction, maintenance, control, supervision and management of any Port or Port
District and the services to be provided therein, and for the maintenance of good order therein, and
107
generally for carrying out the process of this Decree.

The Philippine Ports Authority was subsequently given police authority through Executive Order No.
108
513, which provides:

Sec. 2. Section 6 is hereby amended by adding a new paragraph to read as follows:

Section 6-c. Police Authority – The Authority shall have such police authority within the ports
administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions and attain its purposes
and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the functions of the Bureau of Customs and other
law enforcement bodies within the area. Such police authority shall include the following:

a) To provide security to cargoes, port equipment, structure, facilities, personnel and documents:
Provided, however, That in ports of entry, physical security to import and export cargoes shall be
exercised jointly with the Bureau of Customs;

b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons and vehicles, as well
as movement within the port of watercraft;

c) To maintain peace and order inside the port, in coordination with local police authorities;

d) To supervise private security agencies operating within the port area; and

e) To enforce rules and regulations promulgated by the Authority pursuant to law. (Emphasis
supplied)

In 1992, the Cebu Port Authority was created to specifically administer all ports located in the
109
Province of Cebu. The Cebu Port Authority is a "public-benefit corporation . . . under the
supervision of the Department of Transportation and Communications for purposes of policy
110
coordination." Control of the ports was transferred to the Cebu Port Authority on January 1,
111
1996, when its operations officially began.

In 2004, the Office for Transportation Security was designated as the "single authority responsible
112
for the security of the transportation systems [in] the country[.]" Its powers and functions
included providing security measures for all transportation systems in the country:

b. Exercise operational control and supervision over all units of law enforcement agencies and
agency personnel providing security services in the transportation systems, except for motor
vehicles in land transportation, jointly with the heads of the bureaus or agencies to which the units or
personnel organically belong or are assigned;

c. Exercise responsibility for transportation security operations including, but not limited to, security
screening of passengers, baggage and cargoes, and hiring, retention, training and testing of security
screening personnel;

d. In coordination with the appropriate agencies and/or instrumentalities of the government,

formulate, develop, promulgate and implement comprehensive security plans, policies, measures,
strategies and programs to ably and decisively deal with any threat to the security of transportation
systems, and continually review, assess and upgrade such security plans, policies, measures,
strategies and programs, to improve and enhance transportation security and ensure the adequacy
of these security measures;

e. Examine and audit the performance of transportation security personnel, equipment and facilities,
and, thereafter, establish, on a continuing basis, performance standards for such personnel,
equipment and facilities, including for the training of personnel;

f. Prepare a security manual/master plan or programme which shall prescribe the rules and
regulations for the efficient and safe operation of all transportation systems, including standards for
security screening procedures, prior screening or profiling of individuals for the issuance of security
access passes, and determination of levels of security clearances for personnel of the OTS, the
DOTC and its attached agencies, and other agencies of the government;

g. Prescribe security and safety standards for all transportation systems in accordance with existing
laws, rules, regulations and international conventions;

h. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the DOTC, issue Transportation Security
Regulations/Rules and amend, rescind or revise such regulations or rules as may be necessary for
113
the security of the transportation systems of the country[.] (Emphasis supplied)
The Cebu Port Authority has adopted security measures imposed by the Office for Transportation
Security, including the National Security Programme for Sea Transport and Maritime
114
Infrastructure.

The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in
this case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be
considered agents of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel
during routine security checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

115
In People v. Malngan, barangay tanod and the Barangay Chairman were deemed as law
116
enforcement officers for purposes of applying Article III of the Constitution. In People v.
117
Lauga, this court held that a "bantay bayan," in relation to the authority to conduct a custodial
118
investigation under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, "has the color of a state-related
119
function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights[.]"

Thus, with port security personnel’s functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to
port security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and
inspection in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

120
In People v. Suzuki, the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport
121
Terminal." He was "bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying
122
a small traveling bag and a box marked ‘Bongbong’s piaya.’" The accused "proceeded to the
‘walk-through metal detector,’ a machine which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the
123
presence of metallic substance or object." "Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm
sounded, signifying the presence of metallic substance either in his person or in the box he was
124
carrying." When the accused was asked to open the content of the box, he answered "open,
125 126
open." Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then found inside the box. Suzuki
argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a certain Pinky, whom he had sexual
127 128
relations with the night before. He did not know the contents of the box.
This court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to the
prohibition against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security
129
procedure:

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the
search conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his
constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting
tops, appellant is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without
a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana
obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against
130
appellant. (Citations omitted)

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or
property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which
expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport
security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected
to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical
searches are conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such
searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests
involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are
often notified through airport public address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that
they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional
protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport
131
procedures. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

132
This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People. This court in Sales upheld the
validity of the search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic
133
Airport—now Terminal 1 of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.

Port authorities were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines
134
for inspection of passengers’ bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of
firearms in the bag, the port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner’s bag.
Notably, petitioner did not contest the results of the x-ray scan.

IV
Was the search rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion—when the baggage
inspector opened petitioner’s bag and called the attention of the port police officer?

We rule in the negative.

The port personnel’s actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers
and vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine.

The presentation of petitioner’s bag for x-ray scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of
whether to present the bag or not. He had the option not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned
or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual inspection upon showing of probable cause that a
crime is being or has been committed are part of reasonable security regulations to safeguard the
passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable cause is:

reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to

induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to
the existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be
135
searched.

It is not too burdensome to be considered as an affront to an ordinary person’s right to travel if

weighed against the safety of all passengers and the security in the port facility.

As one philosopher said, the balance between authority and an individual’s liberty may be confined
within the harm that the individual may cause others. John Stuart Mill’s "harm principle" provides:

[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him
happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even right. These are good
reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but
not for compelling him, or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the
conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to produce evil to someone else.
The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that which concerns
others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over
136
himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.

Any perceived curtailment of liberty due to the presentation of person and effects for port security
measures is a permissible intrusion to privacy when measured against the possible harm to society
caused by lawless persons.

V
A third point of intrusion to petitioner’s right to privacy occurred during petitioner’s submission to port
security measures. This court should determine whether the requirements for a valid waiver against
unreasonable searches and seizures were met.

After detection of the firearms through the x-ray scanning machine and inspection by the baggage
inspector, Officer Abregana was called to inspect petitioner’s bag.

137
The Constitution safeguards a person’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A
138
warrantless search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the
exceptions where warrantless searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless
139
search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

140
In Caballes v. Court of Appeals:

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches,
it is fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the
person involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3)
141
the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by
the port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against
a warrantless search.

In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, events must
be weighed in its entirety. The trial court’s findings show that petitioner presented his bag for
142
scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms
were detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities:

Prosecutor Narido:

Q. What did he tell you?

A. I asked him if I can check his bag?

Q. What was his response?

143
A. He consented and cooperated. I checked the bag.

It was after the port personnel’s inspection that Officer Abregana’s attention was called and the bag
144
was inspected anew with petitioner’s consent.
"[A]ppellate courts accord the highest respect to the assessment of witnesses’ credibility by the trial
court, because the latter was in a better position to observe their demeanor and deportment on the
145
witness stand." We do not find anything erroneous as to the findings of fact of both the trial court
and the Court of Appeals.

There was probable cause that petitioner was committing a crime leading to the search of his
personal effects. As the trial court found:

Given the circumstances obtaining here, the court finds the search conducted by the port authorities
reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the accused’s constitutional rights. Hence, when the
search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms and ammunitions, accused is deemed to
have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and ammunitions obtained in the course
146
of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the] accused.

147 148
Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted
authorities to search their persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from
claiming an invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In
addition, petitioner’s consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under intimidating or
149
coercive circumstances.

150
This case should be differentiated from that of Aniag, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, which
151
involved the search of a moving vehicle at a checkpoint. In that case, there was no implied
acquiescence to the search since the checkpoint set up by the police authorities was conducted
without proper consultation, and it left motorists without any choice except to subject themselves to
the checkpoint:

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied
waiver of petitioner’s right to question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the
seizure of the firearms.

While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that
"guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the
implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of setting up of checkpoints shall
be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created
under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five
o’clock in the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes
later. It was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations,
and the reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the
informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its operation. As
a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind
the instant exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists
did not have any choice but to submit to the PNP’s scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout
albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the motorist
and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As
conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of
fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to protest against the
extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was
any, could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano’s part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the
152
constitutional guaranty. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

We also cannot subscribe to petitioner’s argument that there was no valid consent to the search
because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in his bag. The
defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not automatically negate valid
consent to the search when incriminating items are found. His or her belief must be measured
153
against the totality of the circumstances. Again, petitioner voluntarily submitted himself to port
security measures and, as he claimed during trial, he was familiar with the security measures since
he had been traveling back and forth through the sea port.

Consequently, we find respondent’s argument that the present petition falls under a valid consented
search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search conducted on petitioner’s
bag is valid.

VI

The consented search conducted on petitioner’s bag is different from a customs search.

Customs searches, as exception to the requirement of a valid search warrant, are allowed when
"persons exercising police authority under the customs law . . . effect search and seizure . . . in the
154
enforcement of customs laws." The Tariff and Customs Code provides the authority for such
155
warrantless search, as this court ruled in Papa, et al. v. Mago, et al.:

The Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and Customs
Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not being a
dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk,
package, box or envelope or any person on board, or stop and search and examine any vehicle,
beast or person suspected of holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into
156
the Philippines contrary to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
(Citation omitted)
 157
The ruling in Papa was echoed in Salvador v. People, in that the state’s policy to combat
smuggling must not lose to the difficulties posed by the debate on whether the state has the duty to
accord constitutional protection to dutiable articles on which duty has not been paid, as with a
158
person’s papers and/or effects.

Hence, to be a valid customs search, the requirements are: (1) the person/s conducting the search
was/were exercising police authority under customs law; (2) the search was for the enforcement of
customs law; and (3) the place searched is not a dwelling place or house. Here, the facts reveal that
the search was part of routine port security measures. The search was not conducted by persons
authorized under customs law. It was also not motivated by the provisions of the Tariff and Customs
Code or other customs laws. Although customs searches usually occur within ports or terminals, it is
important that the search must be for the enforcement of customs laws.

VII

In violations of the Gun Ban, the accused must be "in possession of a firearm . . . outside of his
159
residence within the period of the election gun ban imposed by the COMELEC sans authority[.]"

160
In Abenes v. Court of Appeals, this court enumerated the elements for a violation of the Gun
Ban: "1) the person is bearing, carrying, or transporting firearms or other deadly weapons; 2) such
161
possession occurs during the election period; and, 3) the weapon is carried in a public place."
This court also ruled that under the Omnibus Election Code, the burden to show that he or she has a
162
written authority to possess a firearm is on the accused.

We find that the prosecution was able to establish all the requisites for violation of the Gun Ban. The
firearms were found inside petitioner’s bag. Petitioner did not present any valid authorization to carry
the firearms outside his residence during the period designated by the Commission on Elections. He
was carrying the firearms in the Cebu Domestic Port, which was a public place.

However, petitioner raised the following circumstances in his defense: (1) that he was a frequent
traveler and was, thus, knowledgeable about the security measures at the terminal; (2) that he left
his bag with a porter for a certain amount of time; and (3) that he voluntarily put his bag on the x-ray
machine for voluntary inspection. All these circumstances were left uncontested by the prosecution.

This court is now asked to determine whether these circumstances are sufficient to raise reasonable
doubt on petitioner’s guilt.

When petitioner claimed that someone planted the illegal firearms in his bag, the burden of evidence
to prove this allegation shifted to him. The shift in the burden of evidence does not equate to the
163
reversal of the presumption of innocence. In People v. Villanueva, this court discussed the
difference between burden of proof and burden of evidence, and when the burden of evidence shifts
to the accused:

Indeed, in criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only
the commission of the crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of
the person or persons responsible therefor. This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but
remains in the prosecution throughout the trial. However, when the prosecution has succeeded in
discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence sufficient to convince the court of the truth of
the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case against the accused, the
burden of evidence shifts to the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in order
164
to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case. (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted)

Petitioner failed to negate the prosecution’s evidence that he had animus possidendi or the intent to
165
possess the illegal firearms. In People v. De Gracia, this court elucidated on the concept of
animus possidendi and the importance of the intent to commit an act prohibited by law as
166
differentiated from criminal intent. The accused was charged with the qualified offense of illegal
possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion under Presidential Decree No. 1866 resulting from
the coup d’etat staged in 1989 by the Reform Armed Forces Movement - Soldiers of the Filipino
167
People. This court held that the actions of the accused established his intent to possess the
illegal firearms:

When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It
is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent
to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have
consciously intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the
very nature of things, the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal
intent; in the second (intent to perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely
and consciously.

In the present case, a distinction should be made between criminal intent and intent to possess.
While mere possession, without criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession
of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the
part of the accused. Such intent to possess is, however, without regard to any other criminal or
felonious intent which the accused may have harbored in possessing the firearm. Criminal intent
here refers to the intention of the accused to commit an offense with the use of an unlicensed
firearm. This is not important in convicting a person under Presidential Decree No. 1866. Hence, in
order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the decree, it is sufficient that the accused had no
authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same, even if such
possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.

Concomitantly, a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot

be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon, such as
Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed.

Coming now to the case before us, there is no doubt in our minds that appellant De Gracia is indeed
guilty of having intentionally possessed several firearms, explosives and ammunition without the
requisite license or authority therefor. Prosecution witness Sgt. Oscar Abenia categorically testified
that he was the first one to enter the Eurocar Sales Office when the military operatives raided the
same, and he saw De Gracia standing in the room and holding the several explosives marked in
evidence as Exhibits D to D-4. At first, appellant denied any knowledge about the explosives. Then,
he alternatively contended that his act of guarding the explosives for and in behalf of Col. Matillano
does not constitute illegal possession thereof because there was no intent on his part to possess the
same, since he was merely employed as an errand boy of Col. Matillano. His pretension of
impersonal or indifferent material possession does not and cannot inspire credence.

Animus possidendi is a state of mind which may be determined on a case to case basis, taking into
consideration the prior and coetaneous acts of the accused and the surrounding circumstances.
What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in the range of action. It is not controverted that
appellant De Gracia is a former soldier, having served with the Philippine Constabulary prior to his
separation from the service for going on absence without leave (AWOL). We do not hesitate,
therefore, to believe and conclude that he is familiar with and knowledgeable about the dynamites,
"molotov" bombs, and various kinds of ammunition which were confiscated by the military from his
possession. As a former soldier, it would be absurd for him not to know anything about the
dangerous uses and power of these weapons. A fortiori, he cannot feign ignorance on the import of
having in his possession such a large quantity of explosives and ammunition. Furthermore, the place
where the explosives were found is not a military camp or office, nor one where such items can
ordinarily but lawfully be stored, as in a gun store, an arsenal or armory. Even an ordinarily prudent
man would be put on guard and be suspicious if he finds articles of this nature in a place intended to
carry out the business of selling cars and which has nothing to do at all, directly or indirectly, with the
168
trade of firearms and ammunition. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

The disquisition in De Gracia on the distinction between criminal intent and intent to possess, which
is relevant to convictions for illegal possession of firearms, was reiterated in Del Rosario v.
169
People. This court ruled that "[i]n the absence of animus possidendi, the possessor of a firearm
170
incurs no criminal liability."

In this case, petitioner failed to prove that his possession of the illegal firearms seized from his bag
171
was "temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession[.]" As put by the trial court,
petitioner’s claim that anyone could have planted the firearms in his bag while it was unattended is
172
flimsy. There are dire consequences in accepting this claim at face value, particularly that no
one will be caught and convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
Courts must also weigh the accused’s claim against the totality of the evidence presented by the
prosecution. This includes determination of: (1) the motive of whoever allegedly planted the illegal
firearm(s); (2) whether there was opportunity to plant the illegal firearm(s); and (3) reasonableness of
the situation creating the opportunity.

Petitioner merely claims that someone must have planted the firearms when he left his bag with the
porter. He did not identify who this person could have been and he did not state any motive for this
person to plant the firearms in his possession, even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the
firearms.

However, this court is mindful that, owing to the nature of his work, petitioner was a frequent traveler
who is well-versed with port security measures. We cannot accept that an average reasonable
person aware of travel security measures would leave his belongings with a stranger for a relatively
long period of time. Also, records show that petitioner had only one (1) bag. There was no evidence
to show that a robust young man like petitioner would have need of the porter’s services. The
defense did not identify nor present this porter with whom petitioner left his bag.

VIII

The trial court was correct when it dismissed Criminal Case No. CBU-80084 for violation of Republic
Act No. 8294, otherwise known as illegal possession of firearms. Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294
provides:

SECTION 1. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to
read as follows:

SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less than
Fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Emphasis supplied)

173
Agote v. Judge Lorenzo already settled the question of whether there can be a "separate
174
offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition if there is another crime committed[.]"
In that case, the petitioner was charged with both illegal possession of firearms and violation of the
175
Gun Ban under Commission on Elections Resolution No. 2826. This court acquitted petitioner in
176
the case for illegal possession of firearms since he simultaneously violated the Gun Ban. This
court also held that the unlicensed firearm need not be actually used in the course of committing the
177
other crime for the application of Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294.
 178
Similarly, Madrigal v. People applied the ruling in Agote and held that Section 1 of Republic Act
No. 8294 is express in its terms that a person may not be convicted for illegal possession of firearms
179
if another crime was committed.

IX

We note that the trial court imposed the penalty of imprisonment for a period of one (1) year and to
suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Under Section 264
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, persons found guilty of an election offense "shall be punished with
imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years and shall not be subject to
180
probation." The Indeterminate Sentence Law applies to offenses punished by both the Revised
181
Penal Code and special laws.

The penalty to be imposed is a matter of law that courts must follow. The trial court should have
provided minimum and maximum terms for petitioner’s penalty of imprisonment as required by the
182
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Accordingly, we modify the penalty imposed by the trial court.
Based on the facts, we deem it reasonable that petitioner be penalized with imprisonment of one (1)
183
year as minimum to two (2) years as maximum.

The records are unclear whether petitioner is currently detained by the state or is out on bail.
Petitioner’s detention is relevant in determining whether he has already served more than the
penalty imposed upon him by the trial court as modified by this court, or whether he is qualified to
the credit of his preventive imprisonment with his service of sentence.

184
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code states:

ART. 29. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment. – Offenders or
accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in the service of their
sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have undergone
preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of
the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners, except in the following cases:

1. When they are recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime;
and

2. When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have failed to surrender
voluntarily.
If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in
the service of his sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive
imprisonment. 1âwphi1

Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years.

Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible
maximum imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not
yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial
thereof or the proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. Computation of preventive
imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the actual period of
detention with good conduct time allowance: Provided, however, That if the accused is absent
without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio order the rearrest of the
accused: Provided, finally, That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with
heinous crimes are excluded from the coverage of this Act. In case the maximum penalty to which
the accused may be sentenced is lestierro [sic], he shall be released after thirty (30) days of
preventive imprisonment.

In case credit of preventive imprisonment is due, petitioner must first signify his agreement to the
185
conditions set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code. If petitioner has already served
more than the penalty imposed upon him by the trial court, then his immediate release from custody
186
is in order unless detained for some other lawful cause.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012
and the Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Petitioner Erwin Libo-On Dela Cruz is sentenced to imprisonment of one (1) year
as minimum to two (2) years as maximum in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. The
period of his preventive imprisonment shall be credited in his favor if he has given his written
conformity to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners in accordance with
Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and if he is not out on bail.

SO ORDERED.

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN​

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
JORGE B. NAVARRA, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONGKONG AND
SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition which Jorge B. Navarra filed questioning the Court of Appeals (CA)
1
Resolution dated July 18, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR No. 34954, which dismissed his petition due to lack
of certification against forum shopping.

The pertinent factual antecedents of the case as disclosed by the records are as follows:

Petitioner Jorge Navarra is the Chief finance Officer of Reynolds Philippines Corporation
(Reynolds), which has been a long time client of private respondent Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). On November 3, 1998, HSBC granted Reynolds a loan line of P82
Million and a foreign exchange line of ₱900,000.00. Thereafter, Reynolds executed several
promissory notes in HSBC's favor. Subsequently, Reynolds, through Navarra and its Vice-President
for Corporate Affairs, George Molina, issued seven (7) Asia Trust checks amounting to P45.2 Million
for the payment of its loan obligation.

On July 11, 2000, when HSBC presented the subject checks for payment, said checks were all
dishonored and returned for being "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds." Thus, the bank sent Reynolds
a notice of dishonor on July 21, 2000. Navarra received said notice but requested HSBC to
reconsider its decision to declare the corporation in default. On September 8, 2000, HSBC sent
another notice of dishonor with respect to another check in the amount of P3.7 Million, and
demanded its payment as well as that of the six (6) other checks previously dishonored. Despite said
demands, however, Reynolds refused to pay. Hence, HSBC filed Informations against Navarra and
Molina for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22) before the Makati Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC).

Upon arraignment, Navarra and Molina pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits then
proceeded. 1aшphi1

On April 27, 2010, the Makati MeTC, Branch 66 rendered a Decision finding both the accused
guilty of the offense charged, with a dispositive portion that reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the prosecution having proven the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, the Court finds accused JORGE B. NAVARRA and GEORGE C.
MOLINA GUILTY of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 on seven (7) counts under
Criminal Case Nos. 312262 to 312268 and hereby sentences them to pay a FINE of ₱200,000.00 for
each count or a total of P1.4 million with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Accused JORGE B. NAVARRA and GEORGE C. MOLINA are further ORDERED to pay private
complainant Hongkong Shanghai and Banking Corporation (HSBC) by way of civil indemnity the
respective face amount of the seven (7) bounced subject checks or a TOTAL AMOUNT OP ₱45.2
millions with interest at 12% per annum from date of the filing of this complaint on February 16, 2001
until the amount is fully paid and costs of suit.

2
SO ORDERED.

Navarra then elevated the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). On June 8, 2011, the Makati
RTC, Branch 57 affirmed the MeTC Decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial

Court is hereby AFFIRMED in Toto.

3
SO ORDERED.

Thereafter, Navarra filed a petition for review before the CA which was docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 34954. On July 18, 2012, the CA dismissed said petition for failure to attach a certification of
4 5
non-forum shopping. The CA likewise denied Navarra's subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Hence, the instant petition.

Navarra raises the following issues to be resolved by the Court:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

DISMISSED NAVARRA'S PETITION BASED SOLELY ON TECHNICALITIES.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT NAVARRA IS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF VIOLATION OF

BP 22.

The Court shall first tackle the procedural issue of the case. The CA dismissed Navarra's petition
for failure to comply with the requirement of certification against forum shopping. It hinged its ruling
on Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court which states:

Section 5. Certification against jorum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal

party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
 Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the
dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and
after hearing. The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice
to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall
be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct
contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions. (n)

As a general rule, petitions that lack or have a defective certificate of non-forum shopping cannot
be cured by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a reasonable need to relax the
rules on the ground of substantial compliance or presence of special circumstances or compelling
6
reasons. The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal but said
discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, having in mind the unique circumstances obtaining in each case. Technicalities, as much as
possible, must be avoided. When technicality abandons its proper office as an aid to justice and
instead becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, it deserves scant consideration from courts.
Litigations must be decided on their merits and not on sheer technicality, for rules of procedure are
used to help secure, not override substantial justice. Every party litigant must be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause. Thus, dismissal of appeals
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon since the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings
of appeals on their merits and not to apply the rules of procedure in a very rigid, technical sense. It
would be more prudent for the courts to forego a technical lapse and allow the review of the parties'
case on appeal to attain the ends of justice rather than to dispose of the case on technicality and
cause grave injustice to the parties, giving nothing but false impression of speedy disposal of
7
cases.

However, even if the Court is to rule on the merits of the case, the same will still have to decide
against Navarra.

The cardinal issues involved in the present case are more legal than factual in nature, such that
the Court can duly take cognizance of and pass upon the same. Also, nothing prevents the Court
from settling even questions of fact if it deems that a review or reassessment is warranted in order to
avoid further delay or worse, a miscarriage of justice. At any rate, the factual question as to whether
the checks were issued merely as a condition for the restructuring of the obligation or for actual
payment of the loan had already been settled by the trial courts and the CA. There is no cogent
reason to deviate from the findings of said courts. Absent any proof that the lower courts' findings
8
are entirely devoid of any substantiation on record, the same must necessarily stand. 1aшphi1

There are two (2) ways of violating BP 22: (1) by making or drawing and issuing a check to apply
on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the check is not sufficiently funded; and (2)
by having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue but failing to do so to
cover the full amount of the check when presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90)
9
days.

The elements of BP 22 under the first situation, pertinent to the present case, are:

(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for
value;

(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such
check in full upon its presentment; and

(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of
funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not the drawer, without any
10
valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment.

Navarra maintains that the first element does not exist because the checks were not issued to
apply for account or for value. He asserts that the loans which HSBC had extended were clean
loans, meaning they were not secured by any kind of collateral. Thus, Reynolds had no other reason
to issue the subject post-dated checks in favor of HSBC except as a condition for the possible
restructuring of its loan. This flawed argument, however, has no factual basis, the trial courts having
ruled that the checks were, in feet, in payment of the company's outstanding obligation, and not as a
mere condition. Navarra also failed to substantiate his claim with any concrete agreement between
Reynolds and HSBC that the issuance of the post-dated checks was indeed just a condition for the
restructuring of the loan. Therefore, Navarra's uncorroborated claim is, at best, self-serving and thus,
cannot be given weight. Neither is the argument supported by legal basis, for what BP 22 punishes
is the mere issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued nor the terms
and conditions relating to its issuance. For to determine the reason for which checks are issued, or
the terms and conditions for their issuance, will greatly erode the public's faith in the stability and
commercial value of checks as currency substitutes, and bring about havoc in trade and in banking
11
communities. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum; it is simply the
commission of the act that the law prohibits, and not its character or effect, that determines whether
12
or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

When the first and third elements of the offense are present, as in this case, BP 22 creates a
presumption juris tantum that the second element exists. Thus, the maker's knowledge is presumed
from the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds. The clear import of the law is to establish a
prima facie presumption of knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions:
(1) the presentment within ninety (90) days from date of the check, and (2) the dishonor of the check
and failure of the maker to make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking days from
notice. Here, after the checks were dishonored, HSBC duly notified Reynolds of such fact and
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demanded for the payment of the full amount of said checks, but the latter failed to pay.
 The fact that Navarra signed the subject checks in behalf of Reynolds cannot, in any way,
exculpate him from liability, criminal or civil. Navarra insists that he cannot be held civilly liable since
he is merely a corporate officer who signed checks for the corporation.

Unfortunately, the law clearly declares otherwise. Section 1 of BP 22 provides:

Section 1. Checks without sufficient funds.

xxxx

Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons, who actually
signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act.

BP 22 was enacted to address the rampant issuance of bouncing checks as payment for
pre-existing obligations. The circulation of bouncing checks adversely affected confidence in trade
and commerce. The State criminalized such practice because it was deemed injurious to public
interests and was found to be pernicious and inimical to public welfare. It is an offense against public
order and not an offense against property. It likewise covers all types of checks, and even checks
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that were issued as a form of deposit or guarantee were held to be within the ambit of BP 22. For
all intents and purposes, the law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and
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the legitimate public checking account user.

When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name, he may be held
personally liable for violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who
draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that the funds are not sufficient in such bank to
meet the check upon presentment. Moreover, the corporate officer cannot shield himself from liability
on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his personal act. The general rule is that a
corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can be held civilly liable when he is
convicted. The criminal liability of the person who issued the bouncing checks in behalf of a
corporation stands independent of the civil liability of the corporation itself, such civil liability arising
from the Civil Code. But BP 22 itself fused this criminal liability with the corresponding civil liability of
the corporation itself by allowing the complainant to recover such civil liability, not from the
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corporation, but from the person who signed the check in its behalf.

Consequently, what remains to be significant are the facts that the accused had deliberately
issued the checks in question to cover accounts and those same checks were dishonored upon
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presentment, regardless of the purpose for such issuance. Furthermore, the legislative intent
behind the enactment of BP 22, as may be gathered from the statement of the bill's sponsor when
then Cabinet Bill No. 9 was introduced before the Batasan Pambansa,is to discourage the issuance
of bouncing checks, to prevent checks from becoming "useless scraps of paper" and to restore
respectability to checks, all without distinction as to the purpose of the issuance of the checks. Said
legislative intent is made all the more certain when it is considered that while the original text of the
bill had contained a proviso excluding from the law's coverage a check issued as a mere guarantee,
the final version of the bill as approved and enacted deleted the aforementioned qualifying proviso
deliberately to make the enforcement of the act more effective. It is, therefore, clear that the real
intention of the framers of BP 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
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prohibitum and thus punishable under such law.

It is unfortunate that despite his insistent plea of innocence, the Court fails to find any error in
Navarra's conviction by the trial courts for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. While the Court
commiserates with him, as he was only performing his official duties as the finance officer of the
corporation he represents, it must interpret and give effect to the statute, as harsh as it may be,
because that is the law. His best recourse now is to proceed after Reynolds, in whose behalf the
dishonored checks were issued, to recover the amount of damages incurred.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES the petition for lack of merit and
AFFIRMS the Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 66 dated April 27, 2010,
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with MODIFICATION as to the interest which must be six percent (6%) per annum of the amount
awarded from the time of the finality of this Decision until its full satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.

Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Jardeleza, J., on leave.