Nuclear Sanctions : A trigger or a safety measure

Sanctions were meant to be the safety brake on nuclear escalation but in the
wrong hands, they have been turned into a loaded trigger. And what was once
brewing beneath the surface has now erupted in full view of this Council.
For years, we warned that Russia, China, and Iran were twisting sanctions into
political weapons. We saw Moscow and Beijing shield Tehran from accountability,
undermine every verification mechanism, and quietly feed it weapons
technology. We saw them block meaningful resolutions in this very chamber
while funnelling drones, missile components, and nuclear-enabling technology
through shadow networks.
That was the warning phase. Now comes the reality.
Through covert opps we have found that in the last six months, the so-called
“strategic partnerships” between Russia, China, and Iran have crossed every red
line. Iran is openly enriching uranium beyond the JCPOA’s limits while test-firing
delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Russian-supplied
air-defence systems and Chinese-origin drones now guard those very sites. Their
proxies in the region from the Gulf to South Asia are bolder than ever, striking at
civilian and energy infrastructure with impunity.
And why? Because they know the shield they have in this Council. They know
that every time they escalate, Moscow and Beijing will step in to veto
consequences.
These are deliberate provocations masquerading as diplomacy. The so-called
brake has been slammed in reverse, accelerating us toward the next nuclear
flashpoint.
This is no longer a theoretical risk. It is here. It is now. And when a nuclear-armed
crisis explodes in the Middle East or South Asia, history will trace it back.

1. On “US hypocrisy in sanctions”

“The United States does not deny that sanctions are a powerful tool — and yes,
they can be misused. The difference is that when the US has applied sanctions in
good faith, they have been tied to measurable conditions for removal and
subject to international oversight, as in the case of UNSC Resolution 1929 on
Iran. What we are condemning today is not the existence of sanctions — it is
Russia and China weaponizing them in bad faith to shield nuclear escalation, arm
destabilizing actors, and sabotage global security.”

2. On “Iraq 2003 and false intelligence”

“This is not 2003. These are not vague allegations. We are not relying on a
single source or speculative analysis. The covert operation we refer to involved
multi-agency surveillance, verified satellite imagery, and the interception of
encrypted logistics data tracing missile component shipments from Russian
intermediaries to Iranian facilities. We are prepared to share this intelligence
under closed-session protocols with the Council’s sanctions and verification
committees. The facts stand — and they are verifiable.”

3. On “veto abuse”
“We will not accept lectures on the veto from those who have turned it into a
protection racket for nuclear proliferators. Yes, the United States has used its
veto to defend its allies — but not to protect them from scrutiny over active
nuclear weapons development in defiance of UN resolutions. Russia and China
are shielding states caught red-handed violating the JCPOA’s limits, blocking
inspections, and threatening regional stability with nuclear-capable systems.
That is not diplomacy — that is enabling escalation.”

4. On “US nuclear partnerships and double standards”

“The United States’ nuclear cooperation agreements — such as NATO’s nuclear
sharing arrangements — operate within the transparency of the NPT framework,
under IAEA oversight, and with the explicit consent of participating states. They
are subject to formal inspection and verification regimes. What Russia, China,
and Iran are engaged in bears no resemblance to that — theirs are opaque,
unverified transfers of dual-use technology to states operating outside
compliance. The difference is legality, transparency, and intent.”

5. On “US withdrawal from JCPOA”

“Let us remember why the JCPOA was signed in the first place — because Iran
had violated its safeguards obligations and engaged in secret enrichment
activities. The 2018 withdrawal was a response to repeated violations and
ballistic missile activity in direct contravention of UNSC resolutions. But the
current escalation we are discussing goes far beyond 2018 — it is the direct
product of Moscow and Beijing enabling Tehran’s hardliners, supplying defensive
systems for its nuclear sites, and blocking this Council from even debating those
violations.”

The United States believes nuclear sanctions should be a safety brake but
when used carelessly, they can work like a trigger.
History has shown both sides of the story.
In 2010, under UNSC Resolution 1929, targeted sanctions on Iran cut its oil
exports by over 50% and blocked access to global banking. That economic
pressure brought Iran to negotiate the JCPOA in 2015. Sanctions, in this case,
worked as a brake, slowing enrichment and opening the door to diplomacy.
But the opposite has also happened.
After 2016, when new sanctions hit North Korea under UNSC
Resolution 2321, Pyongyang didn’t slow down, it sped up. Within a year, it
tested its first claimed hydrogen bomb and intercontinental missile. The safety
brake became a trigger.
The problem is not sanctions themselves but how we design them. If they are
open-ended punishments with no clear way out, they push states to double
down instead of step back.
The United States proposes a Sanctions Safety Switch, a simple three-point
reform to make nuclear sanctions a real safety measure. Every sanction must
have clear public steps for removal, an automatic review every 12
months, and a compliance reward system that restores trade or technology
access when verified progress toward disarmament is made.

Proof + defending points

UNSC Resolution 1929- https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/683939?
ln=en&v=pdf
UNSC Resolution 2321-
https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/s/res/2321-%282016%29
1. Double Standards Question
Question: The U.S. applies sanctions on Iran and North Korea but not on nuclear
states like Israel or India. Isn’t this selective?
Rebuttal:
Sanctions are not about punishing who has nuclear weapons, but about stopping
dangerous and illegal behavior that threatens peace. Israel and India have never
threatened to wipe another country off the map or armed proxy groups for
regional wars. Iran and North Korea have done both while violating UN
resolutions. That is the difference.

2. Trigger vs. Safety Question

Question: Sanctions have coincided with Iran speeding up its nuclear program.
Are sanctions triggering escalation?
Rebuttal:
Without sanctions, there would be no cost to breaking rules. Sanctions raise the
price of dangerous behavior and buy the international community time to
respond. Iran’s acceleration is a political choice, not a forced one. If sanctions
were lifted with no change in behavior, the threat would grow faster.

3. Humanitarian Impact Question

Question: Sanctions hurt civilians more than leaders. How do you justify that?
Rebuttal:
U.S. and UN sanctions are designed to target military, nuclear, and leadership
sectors — not food or medicine. Humanitarian trade is allowed, but in Iran’s case,
its own leadership blocks or mismanages those supplies for political gain.
Blaming sanctions for this is ignoring the regime’s own choices.
4. Consistency Question (JCPOA)
Question: Why did the U.S. leave the JCPOA in 2018 when Iran was in
compliance?
Rebuttal:
The JCPOA only covered part of the threat — Iran’s declared nuclear program —
and ignored ballistic missiles, secret enrichment sites, and proxy wars. Leaving
the deal allowed the U.S. to push for a stronger agreement that covers all
nuclear and regional threats, not just one piece.

5. Escalation Risk Question

Question: Sanctions push states toward rival nuclear powers. Isn’t that
dangerous?
Rebuttal:
Those alliances existed long before sanctions. Sanctions do not create that risk —
unchecked nuclear programs do. Without pressure, rogue states would not seek
compromise, and their ties with rivals would still grow for strategic reasons.

6. Alternative Tools Question

Question: Why not use security guarantees or regional pacts instead of
sanctions?
Rebuttal:
We are open to talks, guarantees, and pacts — but only with partners who
negotiate in good faith. Sanctions keep pressure on while diplomacy works.
Without them, there is no incentive for violators to sign or honor any deal.

Questions
CHINA – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. In 2024, UN intelligence revealed covert Chinese firms shipping high-
speed centrifuge components to Iran through third-party nations. If such
illegal transfers go unchecked, do nuclear sanctions lose their legitimacy
as a safety framework?
2. China's State-Owned Nuclear Corporation was linked to unlicensed exports
of reactor-grade zirconium to Pakistan in 2023. Can China credibly
denounce Western sanctions when it undermines safeguards with its own
proliferation network?
3. China's Digital Silk Road project involved AI surveillance infrastructure in
the Middle East, with dual-use data centers reportedly used for nuclear
R&D in Tehran. Should China's economic ventures be shielded from
sanctions if they serve military applications?
 4. Despite claiming peaceful intent, satellite imagery from 2025 showed
expansion of China’s Lop Nur test site. Should nations enhancing test
readiness while opposing sanctions be trusted in nonproliferation regimes?
5. If China denounces unilateral sanctions as illegal, how does it justify
supporting export bans on Taiwan's nuclear technology industries in
retaliation for political shifts?
6. Does China's active protection of North Korean nuclear infrastructure
through cyberspace defense constitute interference against sanctions and
IAEA frameworks?
7. China co-chaired the 2025 Asian Non-Proliferation Dialogue yet blocked
any references to sanctions enforcement. How can a self-proclaimed
leader in nonproliferation evade responsibility for enforcement
architecture?
RUSSIA – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. In 2025, Russia restarted enrichment at Novouralsk beyond civilian
thresholds, violating IAEA thresholds. Can sanctions still act as a deterrent,
or do they embolden state actors with energy leverage?
2. Russian oil-for-reactor agreements with Iran in 2024 provided Tehran
access to enriched uranium in exchange for drone technology. Are such
strategic swaps clear violations warranting automatic sanctions?
3. Russia used private military contractors to smuggle radioactive isotopes
into Libya in early 2025, according to UN Panel of Experts reports. Does
this weaponization of proxies invalidate Russia's claim to peaceful nuclear
intentions?
4. The 2023 suspension of IAEA monitors from Russian nuclear facilities was
met with no collective sanctions. Does this encourage future treaty
breaches by demonstrating inaction?
5. Russia's Rosatom continues joint research with DPRK scientists despite UN
bans. Are sanctions too fragmented to prevent such dangerous alliances?
6. Can Russia, having vetoed over 14 nuclear-related sanctions in the UNSC
since 2022, be trusted to participate in sanction policy formulation?
7. In 2024, Russian disinformation campaigns targeted the OPCW and IAEA to
undermine sanction legitimacy. Should digital interference in nuclear
governance trigger separate cyber-sanctions under WMD protocols?
LIBYA – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. After Libya’s disarmament in 2003, the 2011 NATO intervention led many
developing nations to question the reliability of Western security
guarantees. Are nuclear sanctions a bluff in the eyes of states like Libya?
2. In 2025, the IAEA traced stolen cobalt-60 from Tripoli hospitals sold to
militias in Mali. Should Libya face renewed sanctions despite lacking a
formal nuclear program?
 3. Libya's eastern ports have become key transit points for unregulated
uranium shipments to non-state actors. Should sanctions now target zones
of collapse rather than governments?
4. Despite being a disarmed state, Libya has become a radioactive trafficking
hub due to regulatory collapse. Should this justify international sanctions
on logistical chokepoints?
5. With multiple factions in Libya engaging with black-market nuclear
intermediaries, how can traditional sanctions mechanisms adapt to
stateless proliferation threats?
6. In 2024, the Benghazi National Authority was caught purchasing
radiological source materials from Sudan. Should individual militias within
failed states be sanctioned as sovereign violators?
7. Libya was exempted from nuclear sanctions post-2011 despite known
trafficking. Does selective enforcement weaken the global sanctions
regime and encourage proliferation via proxies?
PAKISTAN – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. Pakistan remains outside the NPT yet maintains an expanding arsenal.
Should states outside international treaties be given de facto immunity
from sanctions despite repeated safety violations?
2. In 2023, Pakistan's Kahuta facility was linked to unreported enrichment
levels above declared thresholds. Should sanctions be imposed for non-
transparent nuclear expansion?
3. Pakistan's refusal to sign the FMCT while increasing plutonium production
at Khushab raises alarms. Should this trigger automatic sanctions under
the IAEA Additional Protocol norms?
4. The AQ Khan network's legacy continues through black-market
intermediaries. Does Pakistan deserve exemption from sanctions despite
ongoing risks from its internal proliferation channels?
5. In 2024, Pakistan deployed tactical nuclear weapons along its eastern
border. Does nuclear brinkmanship justify preventive sanctions under UN
frameworks?
6. Pakistan collaborates with China on unsafeguarded reactors. Should
bilateral cooperation outside the NSG framework be grounds for
multilateral sanctions?
7. In 2025, Pakistan threatened to respond to Indian troop mobilization with
"full-spectrum deterrence." Are such statements grounds for sanctioning
nuclear rhetoric as a destabilizing diplomatic tool?
IRAN – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. Iran has breached the JCPOA uranium enrichment limits repeatedly since
2022. Is there any remaining justification for delaying comprehensive
sanctions?
 2. In 2024, IAEA inspections found undeclared nuclear activities at Fordow.
Should discovery of concealed infrastructure automatically lead to
snapback sanctions?
3. Iran’s ballistic missile tests continue despite UN restrictions. Should
missile-nuclear linkages be enough to trigger WMD-category sanctions?
4. Tehran has deepened military nuclear collaboration with North Korea.
Should cross-regional proliferation partnerships trigger coordinated
sanctions among UNSC members?
5. In 2025, cyberattacks linked to Iran targeted Israeli and Gulf nuclear sites.
Does digital warfare justify sanctions under nuclear threat doctrines?
6. Iran refused to re-ratify the Additional Protocol in 2024. Should refusal to
allow robust verification invoke treaty-based sanctions?
7. Iran funds proxy groups that have threatened radiological attacks. Can
state-sponsorship of such entities be grounds for indirect sanctions under
WMD criteria?
TURKEY – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. Turkey's partnership with Russia on the Akkuyu nuclear plant lacks
transparency. Should cooperation with sanctioned entities subject Turkey
to secondary sanctions?
2. In 2024, Turkish drones were suspected of mapping Israeli nuclear
installations. Can dual-use reconnaissance justify preemptive sanctions?
3. Turkey refuses to sign the TPNW and undermines regional
denuclearization. Should opposition to disarmament norms merit sanctions
from treaty supporters?
4. The 2025 Turkish military doctrine included references to pursuing
"strategic parity" in the region. Should ambiguity in intent invite
preventive diplomatic sanctions?
5. Reports of Ankara seeking uranium enrichment technology from Pakistan
in 2023 remain unaddressed. Does intent alone justify precautionary
sanctions?
6. Turkey's support of non-state actors in Syria has allegedly enabled access
to radiological material. Can indirect proliferation prompt non-state-
triggered sanctions?
7. Ankara openly criticizes Israeli nuclear opacity while refusing international
safeguards on its reactors. Does selective criticism mask its own evasions
of accountability?
EGYPT – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. Egypt's El-Dabaa nuclear program has moved forward without ratifying the
Additional Protocol. Should sanctions target infrastructure expansion
without transparency?
 2. Egypt continues to host conferences condemning Israeli nuclear capability
while refusing to disclose its own nuclear R&D ties with Russia. Is this
hypocrisy sanctionable?
3. In 2023, Egypt allegedly imported high-grade beryllium from China without
IAEA notification. Does unsafeguarded material trade justify early-stage
sanctions?
4. Egypt's secretive defense pacts with Iran include technology-sharing
clauses. Should such ties subject Egypt to WMD-related secondary
sanctions?
5. Despite signing the NPT, Egypt has not allowed random IAEA access since
2019. Should compliance refusal activate proportional sanctions?
6. The 2025 Arab League summit saw Egypt leading anti-sanction rhetoric.
Should efforts to weaken sanction mechanisms themselves be considered
grounds for sanction?
7. Egypt invests in dual-use desalination and isotope enrichment plants
without full safeguards. Is economic development a shield for possible
covert programs?
UAE – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. Despite strong IAEA cooperation, UAE firms were caught exporting dual-
use materials to Pakistan in 2024. Should economic liberalism excuse such
breaches of nuclear export controls?
2. The Barakah reactor has raised safety concerns from whistleblowers since
2023. Should failure to address internal warnings be a trigger for
sanctions?
3. UAE's military support to Sudanese factions includes radiological gear.
Should dual-use proliferation be sanctioned regardless of political
alignment?
4. In 2025, UAE firms were accused of laundering funds used in Iranian
procurement of nuclear parts. Does financial complicity necessitate
banking sanctions?
5. UAE has refused to ratify the TPNW despite advocating regional
disarmament. Is selective adherence to norms sanctionable hypocrisy?
6. Reports of UAE backing covert Saudi enrichment efforts contradict their
nonproliferation stance. Should allied violations implicate Emirati
accountability?
7. The UAE has used its position in the Arab League to water down anti-Iran
sanction resolutions. Does regional diplomacy override enforcement
obligations?
SAUDI ARABIA – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
 1. Saudi Arabia has constructed facilities potentially capable of uranium
enrichment. Should opacity alone be a trigger for sanctions under
preventive doctrines?
2. In 2023, Riyadh threatened to develop nuclear weapons if Iran does. Are
such public threats sanctionable under anti-proliferation norms?
3. Saudi's partnership with China includes ballistic missile cooperation.
Should this non-nuclear collaboration be investigated under WMD
frameworks?
4. In 2024, whistleblower reports alleged Riyadh withheld IAEA inspectors
from a site near Al-Ula. Does refusal of access necessitate enforcement
action?
5. Saudi funding of think tanks promoting anti-sanction doctrine globally was
documented in 2025. Should influencing global norms against sanctions
be a trigger for scrutiny?
6. Reports suggest Saudi acquisition of dual-use centrifuge components from
South Africa in 2025. Does the trade alone justify sanctions?
7. If Saudi Arabia seeks a defense pact with nuclear states, should such
alignments invite sanction considerations under extended deterrence
clauses?
INDIA – Nuclear Sanctions: A Trigger or a Safety Measure?
1. India is not an NPT signatory but receives special waivers from the NSG.
Should differential treatment be re-evaluated in terms of sanctions equity?
2. In 2024, India tested a MIRV-capable Agni-V variant. Should such
advancement without binding treaty commitments face regulatory
response?
3. India continues to oppose the TPNW while enhancing its nuclear triad.
Should opposition to disarmament be sanctionable under evolving treaty
norms?
4. India’s civilian-military nuclear overlap, especially in fast-breeder reactors,
raises IAEA concerns. Does lack of separation justify scrutiny and sanction
threats?
5. India has used its nuclear shield to engage in limited conventional conflict.
Should the use of nuclear posture as political cover face diplomatic
consequences?
6. Indian firms allegedly exported dual-use items to states under sanctions,
including Iran. Does indirect proliferation warrant commercial blacklisting?
7. India has resisted CTBT ratification despite benefiting from global test
moratoriums. Does this non-committal stance merit regulatory or
diplomatic pressure?