Hackers

Available at alibris.com
( 4.5/5.0 ★ | 112 downloads )
-- Click the link to download --

https://click.linksynergy.com/link?id=*C/UgjGtUZ8&offerid=1494105.26
530027616716927&type=15&murl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.alibris.com%2Fsearch%2
Fbooks%2Fisbn%2F0027616716927
Hackers

ISBN: 0027616716927
Category: Media > DVDs & Movies
File Fomat: PDF, EPUB, DOC...
File Details: 12.5 MB
Language: English
Website: alibris.com
Short description: Very Good. USED.

DOWNLOAD: https://click.linksynergy.com/link?id=*C/UgjGtUZ8&
offerid=1494105.26530027616716927&type=15&murl=http%3A%2F%2F
www.alibris.com%2Fsearch%2Fbooks%2Fisbn%2F0027616716927
 Hackers

• Click the link: https://click.linksynergy.com/link?id=*C/UgjGtUZ8&offerid=1494105.2653002761671692

• Don’t miss the chance to explore our extensive collection of high-quality resources, books, and guides on
our website. Visit us regularly to stay updated with new titles and gain access to even more valuable
materials.
.
 prosperitie whych men doo se often tyme seme y wycked
folke. In whych thing I thynke also the same to be ordeyned by god,
that some mans nature is perchaunce so ouerturnyng and
importunate vnto wyckednes, that the pouertie of his houshold may
rather prouoke hym to stele, whose pouertie the goodnes of god
cureth and releueth, wyth the medycyne or remedy of mony, and
ryches. And another man perceyuing his owne conscience corrupt
with wickednes, and consyderynge wyth hym selfe his prosperitie
and welth, ferethe leste perchaunce the losse of the same
prosperitie whiche is pleasaunt vnto hym, should turne hym to
sorowe and heuines, and therfore he wyl chaunge his euyll maners
and conditions, and forsake his wyckednes, for fear to lose hys
prosperitie and riches. Prosperitie and ryches vnworthelye gotten
hathe ouer throwen other into iust destruction accordelye. Some be
permytted to haue power to ponysh, for that it shuld be an occasion
of continuaunce of exercyse in vertue to good folke, and a
ponyshment to the wycked folke. For as there is no concorde or
agremente betwene good folke and wycked folke, euen so the
wycked folke cannot agre emongest them selfe. And why not ? For
all wycked folke do vary of them selfe by theyr wyckednes, that
rendith their conscience, and doo often tymes suche thynges, that
when they haue done, they themself do iudge that they oughte not
to haue bene done. For whyche cause that hye God causeth
prouydence of god, hath often shewed a gret myracle so that
makethe3 '° wycked folke, hath made wycked folke good folke. For
when wicked good, that some wycked folke do se that they suffer
wronges of the wicked, they being moued with enuy and hatred of
theyr wronges and hurtes, haue returnyd vnto the fruyte of vertue,
that is to sai vnto goodnes, when they do studye to be vnlyke vnto
the wicked whom they haue hated. Truely it is onely the power of
god (to whome also euyll thyngs be good) when he in vsynge of
those euyles, choseth oute theffecte of some goodnes, that is to say,
when god turneth euyll to good. For order bindeth together all
thynges, soo that what thyng departeth from the reson and order
appointed to the wycked, the same thing must nedes fall into some
other order, that is to saye : of the good, soo that nothinge be lefte
to folyshnes, or oute of order in the kyngdome of gods prouidence
or ordynaunce. The strong god hath done al thyngs in the world,
when he sawe and behelde m
 Many thynges seme euyl to mans iudgemet that be good to
gods prouydence y4 dysposeth all things for the beste. before all
vvorldes. And certes it is not lawfull for men eyther to comprehende
with their wit, or to declare with ther spech all the causes of gods
workes : It is sufficient onely to behold thys that the same God, the
maker of all natures, ordaynyng all things, disposeth them to good.
And whyles that he hastethe to retayne and kepe the thynges that
he hath made into his similytude and lykenes, that is to saye : in
goodnes, he excludeth all wyckednes from the bondes of hys
commenaltye of thys world, by order of necessite of destenie :
whereby it happeth, that the euyl that men do thynke to abound in
the world if thou considerest Gods prouidence, that disposeth all
thynges, thou shalte perceyue that there is no euyll at all any where.
But I se well nowe, that thou being of late sore burdned, wthe wayte
of thys difficulte question, and also weryed with the prolixitie or
length of my reason, lokest for som swetenes of verses or metyr.
Therfore take thys drafte, whereby when thou arte refreshed, and
stronger, thou mayst ascende into hier questions. Phylosophye
speaketh after the maner of the Poetes which do fain that the sters
and sonne drowneth them selues in the seas. Philosophy. If thou
wylt behold wyselye the ordynaunce of god in thy pure mynde and
thought, loke vpon the altitude of the hygh heuen, for there the
sterres do kepe their olde course and Concorde by the iust bande of
thynges. For the sonne moued with his redde fier and hete letteth
not the cold copas of the mone, nor the sterre called the beare (that
turneth his swift courses about the north pole, beyng neuer washed
in the depe Occean sea) couetethe to drenche hys flames in the
same sea, seinge other sterres to be drowned therin. And the sterre
Hesperus, that is to saye, Venus, sheweth always by euen courses of
tyme, the late darkenes, that is to saye, the nyghte. And the sterre
called Lucifer, bryngeth agayne the cleare daye. Euen soo the loue
euerlastynge of gods prouidence, makethe the enterchaungeable
courses of the sterres. And by suche mutuall concorde, troublesome
warre and varians, is expulsed from the mouths of the sterres, that
is to saye : from the regions celestiall that beareth the sterres. Also
this concord tempereth the foure elementes by equal maners that
the moist elements that stryueth with the dry elementes, doo geue
place and suffer the drye planetes at certayne tymes. And that the
cold elementes agre with the hote 112.
 planetes. And that the fier beinge the lyghtest elemet, haue
the higher place and the heuye earth, the lower place, and rest
beneth by the heuynes of the same. By the same concord and The
sterres by like causes, the yeare floryshyng with flowers geueth
swete byThey/selfe, sauours. And y hote sommer ripeth the corne.
And the but by god, Autumne (loded w appels) cometh again. And
the droppyng uauntes oberayne moisteth the wynter. This
temperans of gods prouidence, dy^te at ,, norysheth and bringeth
forth all thynges, that bearethe lyfe in and comthe world. The same
temperaunce taking awaye the thynges aun ementethat be made,
hydeth them and bereueth them of there beinge, and drownethe all
thynges, that be brought forth and borne, with the last death. And
whiles these thynges be doing, the hye maker of things that is to
saye : almyghty god, sytteth vnmouable hymselfe, and rulethe all
thynges, and turneth and moderateth the orders of thyngs, being of
himselfe a kynge by his wyse gouernaunce, a lord by power of
creatyng all thyngs, the fountayne of all goodnes, the begynnyng of
al thynges, the lawe binding all thynges, and the wise iudge, of
equitie and iustyce, rewarding euery man accordyng to his desert,
which god moueth al thynges to go fourth, and likewise restraining
al things stoppith the from their course, and establysheth for a tyme,
thinges mutable and wanderynge by their nature. And All thynges
except that god callyng backe the ryght progressions and
gouernedaby groundes of thyngs, constraineth and reuocateth al
thyngs god in comagaine into a due compas and course, the thinges
that the stede- of s'eedes, fast order of his prouidence nowe
contayneth, beinge seperate ?pryn.gfthh from the fountayne of their
begynnynge, shoulde fayle and come and of the to nought. Thys
fountayne is the continuall loue of all thyngs j^Wkewys!" that haue
life. And all thinges desireth to be kept w the ende of thefyre of
good, for els they could not otherwayes endure, excepte that
ayre"and of all thynges being turned agayne by loue, do come
agayne to the the ^re fyre begynnynge, that is to say : to god that
gaue them their being and made them. Philosophye. Seist thou not
nowe what foloweth all these thynges that I haue sayd ? BOE. I say
what thinge foloweth ? Phi. All fortune is good without dout. Boe.
And howe can it be soo. Phi. Vnderstande thus, that all fortune
whether it be good or "3 Q
 All maner of fortune rewardeth exerciseth or cor-' recteth,
and if it be referred to God, it is good, and yf it be referred to any
other thig it is good or euell, according as it is felte and taken. euylL
is geuen either to rewarde or exercyse good folke, or for thintente to
ponyshe and correcte euyll folke. And so all fortune is good that
appereth eyther to be iuste or profytable. BOE. I saye it is a verye
true reason. And yf I do consider the prouidence of god, or destinye
whych thou taughtest a lytle before, thy sentence is knyt together
with stronge resons. But let vs (if it please the) nomber this opinion
or sentence, emongest those thynges that thou diddest allege a lytle
before, were not to be thought of any man. Phi. And wherefore.
BOE. For that the commen speche of men dothe muche mystake the
talke of fortune, saying often that some mens fortune is very euyll.
Phi. Wylt thou therefore that I returne a lytle to the speche of the
commen people, so that I seme not to digresse ouermuch from the
vse of the people. BOE. I saye do as it shall please the. PHI. Dost
thou not iudge all thyng good that profyteth. Boe. Yes. P. The
fortune that dothe exercyse or correct, doth good. Boe. I saye I
graunt the same. Phi. Then is al fortune good. Boe. What ells?
Philoso. But this fortune that exerciseth, is the fortune of such that
be sette in vertue and do stryue agaynst vyce : but fortune that
correcteth, is of suche that declyning from vyce, do chose and take
the way of vertue. BOE. I cannot denye it. PHILOSOPHI. But what
sayest thou, of plesaunte fortune, that is geuen to good folke for
rewarde, doo the comme people iudge the same wicked fortune ?
Boe. No truelye, but iudgeth it good, as it is in dede. P. What sayest
thou of the other fortune that is euyll and sharpe, and restrayneth
wicked folke by iuste ponyshment, do the commen people esteme it
good. Boe. I saye that they do iudge the same most wretched of all
thynges that maye be thoughte. Phi. Take hede therefore lest that
we folowynge the opinion of the commen people, haue not
concluded a thyng gretely, not to be thought of them. Boe. What is
that. P. Certes of these thinges that are graunted it fortuneth that of
them that be other in professing of vertue, or in thencrese or vertue,
or in optaynyng of vertue, al maner of fortune (what soeuer it be) is
good. But all maner of fortune is euell to them that remayne in
wickednes, whych thing the commen people do not so iudge and
take it. Boe. That is true, although no man dare confesse the truth
there of. Phi. Why so ? A wyse man ought not to be greued, whe
misfortune happeth no more then a strong man to disdaine or to be
moued 114
 with angre, when alarum or tumult of warre ryseth. For to
bothe, the same difficultie to stryue agaynst fortune, is the matter,
that is to saye : to the one whych is the strong man it is a cause to
optayne renome, to the other, which is the wyse man, it is a cause
to confyrme hys wisedom or vertue. For therefore it is called vertue,
by cause it, stryuing agaynst vice, with all force, is not ouercome
wyth vyce or aduersitie. Nor certes you that be set in the increase or
waye of vertue haue not come to abounde in pleasurs and to
continue in lustes of the fleshe. For then you do sowe and plant a
verye sharpe conflyct or battell, with all fortune. Therfore lest that
eyther wicked Strthta^ fortune oppresse you, or good fortune
corrupte and hurte you, myddle behold you the meane betwene
both with fyrme, and stedefast power vices that be and strength. For
certes al that is vnder the mene vertu or e*trem.f: for aduersitie
putpasseth the meane vertue, dispiseth vertue, or is vicious, and
teth a man in hath no rewarde of his trauell or laboure. For it lyeth
in your prosperite"' owne power, what fortune you had leuer haue,
that is to sai : to causeth pretake what fortune ye wyll. For all
fortune that semeth sharpe boktenes. *" or euyll (yf it do not
exercyse the good folke, or correct and chastyce the wicked folke) it
greueth or ponysheth. Paris the son Kynge Pria^. mus of Troy,
Philosophy. staie awaye Quene HeAgamenon the sonne of Atrydes
beynge aduenger of wronges, layn. the w!fe done vnto his brother
Menelaus the kynge, held warre tenne neiaus"gande yeares together
agaynste the Troyans, and the citie of Trove, and J^P' her fs , J his
concubyne, dyd reuenge (with destruction) the chambers of his
sayde brother for ye whiche Menelaus defiled, that is to say : he
reuenged the rauishynge of batten betwixt hys brothers wyfe,
named Queene Helayne, that was taken awaye 'he Grekes, by Parys
and by hym carnally knowen, whych Helaine was kept a"Si SOq th°t
vp in his brothers chamber. Whyles that the said Agamenon
Troyewasdisi i rt,oi i TkT r • troied and the desired to sprede and
sette fourth the Sayles and Nauye of the Troyans. grekes. And
bought or optayned prosperous wyndes (that before Whs ye wynd
were contrarye vnto him) with the bloud of his owne doughter, theS
Grekes3 C kylled for a sacrifyse vnto the goddes for the same, he
putteth and wolde not J j a r serue theyr of the fatherlye loue, that
he bare to hys sayde doughter, and the shippes : Agapryest being
sad or sory, to sacryfyce her (as y custome then was) ^rTse'hi
cutteth her throte for to haue a prosperous wynde of the goddes
owne doughin y iourney or viage, against Priamus, and the Troyans.
Ulixes the' goddes^o1 named Itacus lamented that he had lost his
felowes, whome the hauea good and prosper115 ous wind.
 UlixesaGreke cruell giaunt Poliphemus, lying in his greate
caue, or den, had from the seage deuoured and swalowed downe
into his empty bely. Neuertheles of Troy, was uiixes beynge wrothe
for the same, had some comfort agayne of taken, and his J ° ' & J
felowes de- his sorowes when he had put out the saide gyauntes
eye, as he Poiyphemon, was m slePe- Hercules is accounted noble
and renoumed, for the a Gyaunte great trauayles he toke in hys
tyme, for he ouercame the proude one eye. Centaures, he kylled the
cruell Lyon, and toke awaye hys skynne, TheCentaures, j^g strake
and droue awaye the byrdes with hys arrowes, he toke were
halfmen, J J J half Beastes. awaye the golden apples from the
dragon, with the hed of metall, were named tnat watched and kepte
them. He drue Cerbarus fro hel with a Harpies threfolde chayne. He
ouercame Diomede and gaue his fleshe vnto gyns faces and ms cart
horse for meate, he slewe the serpent Hidra and brent dystroyed the
hjs Venym, he toke awaye the home from the floude Achelous,
coutrey about , them. euen from his forehed, and made hym hide
his face for shame porterof ^ w'tmn his bankes, he slew the gyaiit
Antheus on the costes of place called Libie. And also Cacus y gret
monster, that trobled the kyng hurt'e the y Euander. The same
Herculus slewe y huge bristled bore, that coStrye al fouled the
shoulders of hym with his fome, whych shulders had Diomede is a
borne the fyrmament as the poets do fayne. And last of all he k^lfd'
bare vppe with his shoulders (and neuer bowed his necke therat)
and made his the sayd fyrmamente. And so he deserued heuen, as a
reward them.a Hydra °f n's laste laboure and trauell. Then go you
now that be was a serpente stronge thether as the hard and
dimculte way of the gret example manye heades, of Hercules ledeth
you, that is to saye the waye of vertue. O you and wha one slothfull
men brought vp or geuen vnto plesures or ease, whye another do
you turne your backes and forsake vertuous trauayle, to resist
AcheiouJ1'' v'ce w^*1 virtue, for the man that hath ouercome the
plesures, was a flood y* and desyres of the worlde, hath deserued
heuen for his reward. could chauge it selfe into a Bull with Here
endeth the fourthe boke. one home, andintodyuers other formes.
Antheus was a gyaut, that beynge werye with fighting wold recouer
strengthe by touching ye groud. Cacus was a gyaunt that robbed,
and dystroyed the countrye. 116
 THE FYFTE BOOKE. Philosophy. f"HEN philosophy had
spoken and turned the discourse of her talke to handle and intrete of
other maters more expedient and mete to be knoen. Then Boecius
sayde : O Philosophy, thy exortacion is rightelye made and by
aucthoritie most worthy. And I do proue and perceyue it true in
dede, that the question of the deuyne prouydence (that thou
spakest of a lytell before) is enterlaced wyth manye other questions.
But I do aske the whether that thou thynkest that chaunce is any
thing at all, and what it is ? Phi. I doo make hast to perfourme the
dete of my promys and to open vnto the, the way wherby thou
maist be brought againe vnto thy country, that is to saye, vnto
blessednes or perfyt felicitie, but albeit that these thynges that thou
askest of chaunce be very profitable to be knowen, yet they be
turned a lytell from the way of our purpose. And it is to be feared
lest that thou being weryed by erronious wayes, or straunge
questions mayst not be sufficient ne strong of thy selfe to attayne
vnto the ryght way. BOE. Feare thou not that, for it shalbe greate
quietnes vnto me, to knowe those thynges that I chyfely delyghte in,
and it is not to be doughted of the thynges that shall folowe, when
that all the circumstaunce of thy disputacion shall therewithall
appere vnto me, without any dought. Phi. I wyll consent to thy
desire, and doe saye and affyrme that if any man wyl define that
hap is a chaunce, comming of sodeine mouing, and by no certayne
coniunction of causes, that then chaunce is no thing at al, and I do
iudge that then it is but a vayne saying besydes the signification of
the thing that we do spek of. For can there be left anye place to foly,
or vanitie, where as god settethe 117
 Nothing commeth of nothinge, in comparyson to a
pertyculer cause that supposeth a matter, but in comparyson
toGod,whiche is the cause vniuersall of all thynges, it is otherwyse
for he made al thinges of nothing. The diffinicio of hap or chauce of
fortune. all thinges wisely in good order ? For it is a true saying, that
nothynge, is of nought, whych saying no olde manne hath denied at
any time, howe be it they haue not put the same proposycion as a
certayne grounde or foundacion, by god, the fyrste creator of
thynges, but of a materiall subiecte, that is to saye : of the nature of
all reason. For yf any thyng shold come of nothyng, it shuld seme to
be rysen of nought. And if this thyng maye not be done, then is it
not possible that happe or chaunce be anye such thing y I haue
defyned a lytle before, that is to say : that chaunce shuld come of
sodayne mouing without any coniunction, or knytting of causes. Boe.
I saye what than ? Is there nothing that may iustely be called eyther
chaunce or fortune? Or is there anye thyng (although the commen
people, knoweth it not) whervnto those wordes of chaunce and
fortune do agre. PHI. My Arystotle speketh thereof, in his boke of
phisike, and defynethe the same both bryfely and nere the truthe,
by reson. BOE. I saye after what maner ? Phi. As often as anye
thinge is done for the cause and intente of some other thing, and
then happeth another thinge for some other causes, then the thyng
that was intended or that was loked for, the same is called chaunce
or happe. As if a manne in digginge the grounde for thentent to tyll
the felde, fyndethe a pece of gold dygged vp, certes the same is
thoughte to come by chaunce. But yet it commethe not of noughte.
For it hathe proper causes, whereof the fyndynge thereof (beyng
sodayne and not loked for) semethe to haue wrought and made
such chaunce and happe. For if the digger or tyller, of the felde, had
not digged the ground and the hider of the golde, or mony, had not
hid the same in the same place the gold had not bene founde.
Therefore these be the causes of fortunes hap or chaunce, by cause
it commethe, by causes metynge and encountrynge or commyng
together sodenly and not by any meane, intent or expectation, of
the worker. For nether he that hyd the gold, nor he that tylled the
ground intented that the same gold shoulde be founde. But as I
sayde it happed and came so to passe, that he digged ther as the
other had hyd the golde. Then it is lawefull to defyne chaunce and
happe to be a thyng vnloked for, commynge of causes, that be done
for some other thynge or purpose. But the same fatal order
procedynge from the ineuytable knyttyng together, or coniunction of
causes, .118
 that descendeth from the fountayne of godes pfouiddhce.
"whych dysposeth and setteth all thynges in theyr places, and
tymes, makethe that causes do runne together and come together
accordyng. Philosophy. The floudes called Tygrys, and Eufrates do
sprynge vp together as one fountayne, out of the holownes or
rockes of the hylles, or bankes of the countrye of Achemenye called
Perthie, where as the people doo fyght fleyng and do cast dartes
backeward, and stycketh them in the brests of their enemyes that do
pursue them. And a none they the sayde floudes doo deuide them
self in sondre. And yf they do ioyne them selfe together agayne, into
one course and mete, then muste those thyngs come together that
both waters bryngeth with them at there metinge. And the shippes
and blockes that be raised and plucked vp with the floudes wil mete
together, and the waters being mixed together in flowyng wyll
wrappe in such thynges as they haue founde by chaunce of fortune,
whych beyng varyable, the low countrye, or ground, and the fluxible
order of the rennyng or flowyng water, or streme ruleth. Euen so
fortune that semeth to go at lybertye, without anye gouernment,
suffreth rule, or is ruled and goeth by the selfe same lawe and order
of goddes prouydence or purueyaunce. Boecius. I do very well
perceyue and knowe the same, that is to say : that chance and
fortune standeth by gods prouidence. And I do graunt that it is euen
so as thou sayest. But I would know whether there be anye lybertie
of oure fre wyll in this order of causes, that cleueth so faste together
in them selfe, or els whether that the chaunce or necessitie of
destenye constraynethe and kepethe in the mocions or effectes of
mans thought ? Phi. Certes there is libertie of fre wyll and there was
neuer any resonable nature, that is to saye : naturall vnderstandyng
but it had lybertye of fre wyll. For the thyng that hath reson
naturally, hath iudgement whereby it maye descerne euery thing and
knoweth of it selfe thynges to be eschewed or 119
 desyred. And the thynge that any man demeth to be
desired, he foloweth : But he escheweth the thing that he demeth to
be eschewed. Wherfore in all thynges wherein reason is, therein is
alsoo lybertie to wyll or not to wyll. But I doo not determyne that
thys lybertye to wyll, or nyll is equall or lyke in al thynges. For in
hyghe and diuine substaunce, that is to say in aungeles, is bothe
infallyble iudgemente, incorruptyble wyll to euyll, and redye power
to doo thynges desyred, but it behoueth that mens soules be more
free, when they kepe them selfes in the contemplacion of goddes
mynde and wyll, and they be lesse free when they slyde into bodyes
humayne, that is to saye, whe they behold worldly thyngs. And they
be yet lesse fre, when they be gathered together into erthly mebers
or affects. But yet the most extreme bondage of the soules, is when
they be geuen to vyce and synne, and haue fallen from the
possession or grounde of their own proper reason or
understandynge. For after that they haue turned away ther eyes of
reason and vnderstandyng fro the light of the hygh and perfyt truth,
to inferor and darke thynges, that is, to worldelye,and carnall
thynges, anone they be blynded with the cloude of ignoraunce, and
be troubled with myscheuous affectes and passions, wherevnto
when they do come, and thereto consent, they do increase the
bondage that they haue brought them self into. And they be in
maner as prysoners, kept from their owne proper libertie. All whyche
thynges, neuerthelesse the sight of goddes prouydence that seyth
and beholdeth all thynges, from hys eternitie or euerlastyng godhed,
disposeth al thyngs predestinate, according to their desertes, seith
all thynges and hereth all thynges. Philosophye. Homere a man of
swete eloquece discrybeth that the son is cleare, and pure of lyght.
Which sonne neuerthelesse cannot breake thorough and shyne into
the depe bowels, of the earth, nor botome of the sea, with the light
of his beames. The maker of the great worlde, whyche is god, is not,
nor seith after that sort. For he (by his knowledge) percethe all
thynges, lokyng from aboue. And the earthe resysteth not hym by
any gretnes thereof. The darke night letteth him not with her blacke
cloudes. But in the instant or moment of a thought, he seith 1 20
 thynges present, thinges past, and thinges to come Whyche
god forasmuche as he seith and beholdeth al thyngs, thou alone
mayste call hym the verye true sonne. Boecius. Beholde nowe am I
confounded agayne withe a more dyfficulte dought then I was
before. Phi. What dought is that ? truelye I do thynke that I doo
perceyue nowe wherewithall thou art troubled. Boe. I saye it semeth
to repugne gretlye, that god knoweth all thynges, before, and that
there is anye libertie of fre wyll. For yf god seith all thynges before,
and that he maye not be deceyued, then must that thyng happen
and come to passe, that godes prouidence, sawe before to come.
Wherfore if that godes prouidence knoweth before by hys godhead,
not onely mennes actes, and dedes, but also their counsayles and
wylles : Then shal there be no lybertye, of frewyll nether can there
be any other dede or any wyll, but suche as gods prouidence (that
cannot be deceyued) hath before knowen and perceiued. For if they
might be wrested or altred otherwyse then they be forsene or
purueyed, then shoulde there be no fyrme or stedefaste prescience
or foreknowledge of god, of thynges to come but rather an
vncertayne opinion. Whych thing to beleue and thynke of God, I
iudge it vnlefull and wycked. Nor truely I allowe not that reason, that
some men do thinke therby to dissolue or assoyle the knotte, and
dought of the sayde question. For they doo affyrme and saye, that
somethynge is to come to passe therefore, for that the prouidence
and forknowledge of god, saw before, that it is to come, but rather
contraryewyse, that the same thynge, that is to come, cannot lye
hyd, and vnknowen vnto goddes prouidence. And by the same
meanes it behouethe, that thys thynge, that is concluded of
chaunce, slydeth into the cotrary part, that is to say : that lyke is
concluded of gods prescience or forknowledge as of chaunce. Nor
certes it is not of necessitie that those thynges do happen that be
purueyed or forsene of god, but that it behoueth of necessitie that
those thinges that ar to come, be purueyed or foresene of god. As
though men serched for what cause prescience is, whether it be the
cause of necessitie of euerye thinge 121 R
 to come, or whether the necessitie of thinges to come, be
the cause of prescience or purueyaunce of god. But I do laboure to
declare the same thynge, that is to say : that the chaiice of thynges
before knowen, is necessarye, howe soeuer the ordre of causes
standeth. All thoughe that it semeth not, that prescyence or
forknowledge bryngeth in necessytie of betydyng, or happynge of
thynges to come. For yf anye man sytteth, it behoueth that the
opinion of hym is true that thinkethe that he sytteth. And lykewyse
agayne on the other parte, yf the opynyon be true of anye man, that
for bycause he setteth it must nedes be of necessitie, that he
sytteth, then is there necessytie in both. For in the one is necessitie
to sytte, and certes in the other is necessitie of truthe. But anye man
sytteth not therefore, for bycause the opinion of hys sytting is true.
But rather the opynyon of syttynge is trewe : for that it chaiiced
before that some man dyd sytte. And so for as moche as the cause
of the truth, procedeth and commeth of the other parte, that is to
say : of sitting, and not of the true opinion, yet notwithstandyng
there is a commen necessitie in both. So then it apperyth to make
lyke reasons of gods prouidence and of thinges to come. For
although thinges be therfore puruayed, bycause they be to Origene,
dyd come, yet certes they happen not therefore because they be
Saint Paule to purueyeci_ Neuertheles it behoueth of necessitie that
eyther the Romanes r j j sayth. things to come be purueied of god,
or els that the thynges shalfnofbee purueyed of god, do hap and
come to pas. Which thing alone is therfore, bi- sufficient to destroye
the lybertie of fre wyll. But howe peruerse cause God , ... 111 knew
it shuld a thynge or erronious is thys nowe, that the chaunce of
temporall ^e'h UMbhCaUSe things be thoughte or sayd to be the
cause of the high prescience therfore god or fore knowledge of God.
But what other thinge is it to thynke forelt^was6' that S0^
purueyeth thynges to come therefore, bycause they be done. to
betyde or come, then to thinke that the thyngs, that sometyme haue
chaunced, be the cause of the high prouidence or purueyaunce of
God. Herevnto I adde these thynges as for example, when that I do
knowe that there is any thing, it is of necessitie that y same thing is.
And so when I haue knowe that any thing shall happen, it behoueth
of necessitie that the same thing come to passe. So then it
folowethe, that the chaunce of things knowen before they chaunce,
cannot be eschewed or auoyded. Ferthermore if any man esteme
any thing to be otherwise then it is, it is not onelye no knowledge or
science, but it is a false or fallible 122
 opinion, farre dyuers, and contrarye from the truth of
knowledge or scyence. Wherefore yf anye thyng be so to come, that
the chaunce thereof is not certayne and necessary, howe maye that
thinge be knowen before that it shall come, for as scyence or
knowledge, is not myngled wyth falshed, euen so the thynge that is
conceyued by science or knowledge, may be none otherwyse then it
is conceyued. For that is the cause that science or knowledge
wanteth lyinge. For it behoueth that euery thyng be euen so as
science or knowledge comprehendeth and affirmeth it to be. What
shal I saye than ? After what maner knoweth God all thynges before,
to come, that be vncertayne ? For yf he do think assuredlye that the
same thynge shall come, that is also possyble not to come or
happen, he is deceyued, which thing is not onely vnlawefull and
wycked, to thynke, but also to speake of god. But if that god so
knoweth, as things be, so they shal come to passe. And that he
knoweth also eyther that the thynges may be done, or may not be
done. What is that prescience or fore knowledge that
comprehendeth nothyng certayne ne stable ? Or what dyffer-
Thyresyus was ethe thys fore knowledge from the folyshe prophecy
of Thiresy j^nancTv'i the profysiar that sayd : whatsoeuer I shall say,
eyther it shalbe, yeares a woor it shall not be ? Or els what is the
dyuine prouydence better knewe the than mans opinion, if it demeth
thyngs vncertayne as men doo, pleasures of r , . , . . ,„.,.,. bothe-
And of whose ludgement the chaunce is vncertayne ? But if nothinge
iuno for his may be vncertayne wyth hym that is the most sure
fountaine of ludgemente of J j j j women, made all thinges, then is
the chaunce certayne of suche thynges, that hym biynde, he shall
knowe before assuredly shall come. madehym'to Wherefore there is
no libertie in the counsayles and actes of prophesye. mankynde, that
the deuyne thoughte (that loketh vpon all things Tne knowwithout
errour of falshed) knytteth and byndethe in, vnto one ledge of God, ,
,,T, ... ... . , , is euer certain chaunce. Whyche thinge when it is once
receyued and graunted, and trewe. that is to saye : that there be no
fre wyll, then it appereth howe great fall destructyon or hurt
folowethe, of all humayne thynges, that is to saye, of thynges
appertaynyng vnto mankynde. For ah vertues the in vayne, rewardes
be ordeyned for good folke, and ponysh- and vyces do ment, for
wycked folke when that no fre and voluntary mouyng electioofgood
of mans thought, or corage hath deserued the same rewarde or
pon/sshemenf payne. And the same thyng shoulde then seme most
wycked, and rewarde, that nowe is iudged most iust and best, that
is to say ether to fremacte ^ y oonvshe wycked folke or to reward
good folke, the whych folke g°°d or eUyii , , and yf fre wyll ther
owne proper wyll hath not enforcyd, to eyther one or other, be taken
away, 123
 then is there that is to saye : nether to good nor euyll, but
the certayne tion, nor act necessitie of thynges to come,
constraineth them therto. Then nor dede. shuld there be nether
vyces nor vertues, but rather a myxte and indiscrete confusyon of all
desertes of the good and euyl folke. And nothyng may be thoughte
more wycked then the same, whe that all order of thyngs is dyrified
and taken of and from gods prouydence, and that it is lawefull for
mans counsails or wylles to do nothyng, that is to sai that mankynde
hath no power to wil or do any thyng but as it is constrayned. And
so it cometh to passe that all our vyces be referred vnto god the
author of al good thinges, that is to say, then god is to be blamed
for our vyces sith that he constrayneth vs by necessity to do them.
Therefore is there no reson or meane, why to trust in god or to
praye to god. For why should anye man eyther trust in god or pray
to god when the order of destenye that cannot be altred knytteth
together al thinges that men desyre. Therefore then the same onely
reward betwene God and men shuld be taken away that is to saye,
to hope and to praye. For truely by meanes of iuste humilitie we
deserue the inestimable rewarde of gods grace, and that is onely the
way that is to vnderstand, by hope and prayer, wherby it semeth
that men may speke with god, and to be vnyte and knytte by reason
of supplication and prayer, to the clere lyght, that is to say : to god
before that they optaine theyr request. Whych hope and prayer
beyng receyued and graunted, yf they seme to haue no strength, by
necessitie of thynges to come, what thinge is there, whereby we
may be knytte, and cleue faste, to that prynce of thynges, that is to
saye to god ? Wherefore it must nedes be that mankynde beyng
seperate and vnioyned from hys fountayne or begynnyng whych is
god, doo fayle and come to nought, as thou saydest a litle before.
Philosophy. What varyable cause hath seperate the bands of thyngs,
that is to saye of gods prouydence, and of fre wyl ? what god hath
appointed so great warres and strife betwene these two very true
thynges, that they both be so deuyded in sundre that they beyng
mynged will not be coupled together. Is there any discorde or
varyance in true thynges. They do cleaue together certayne and
fyrme one with another. But mans mynde, drowned and 124
 ouercome wyth the blynde members of the body, cannot
(by the fyer or lyght of the soule oppressed by the bodye) knowe
the subtyll coniunction or ioynyng together of things. But why
burneth the soule with so great desyre to fynde the sygnes of
truthe, that lye hyd. Do the mynde know the thynge, that she
(beynge carefull) desyrethe to knowe ? Who desyreth or laboureth
to knowe the thynges that, he knowethe all redye ? And if the
mynde knowethe not the thynge that it desyreth, wherefore seketh
she beyng blynde and ignoraunt, that is to saye : why sekethe she
the thing that she knoweth not, when she seith it ? What man
knowyng nothyng, wissheth or desireth any thing ? Or whoo can
folowe thynges that be not in his thought ? And althoughe he seke
for suche thynges where shall he fynde them ? What man can
knowe the fourme of the thynge founde and is ignoraunt of the
same ? But when the soule loketh vpon the profounde hygh thought,
that is to say : vpon god, then it knoweth the summe or effecte and
all thynges together vnyuersall and perticuler. But nowe while the
soule is hydde in the cloude or shadow of the body, and members of
the same, it hath not holy forgotten it selfe, but kepethe the
vniuersall knowledge of thyngs, and leseth y perticuler knowlege of
things, Therfore whosoeuer sercheth to know true thynges, he is in
the habyte of nether of them, for nether he knoweth all thynges nor
hath vtterly forgotten all thynges, or is not all ignoraunt, but
remembreth the summe or effecte of all thynges. Whyche effecte he
retaynyng, counsayleth with hym selfe, and calleth to remembraunce
depelye by studye, thynges before sene or knowen, to thintente that
he maye ioyne the partes or thynges that he hath forgotten, to those
partes or thynges, that he hath reserued and kept styll in hys
memorye. Phylosophy. Then sayd Philosophi : this questyon of
goddes prouydence is olde, and greatly moued, and disputed of
Marcus Tullius, when he deuydeth dyuynacion, that is to saye : in his
boke of dyuynacions, and thou thy selfe hast, long and vtterly
sought for the same but yet it hath not ben any wher suffycyently
and firmely determyned of any of you at this day. And y cause of y
darknes or diffycultie therof, is for that the mouyng of mans reason
can not be applyed vnto the symplicitie, or purenes of goddes 125
 The sygne that wyne is in any place to sell, is not the cause
of sellynge but a synge of sellynge. prouydence, that is to saye :
mans reason can not comprehend the thynge that god seyth.
Whiche prouydece . of God, yf it myght be thought, or compassed
by mans wyt, then were it vtterlye withoute any doughte at all. The
cause and reason of whiche dought, I wyll assaye and proue, at the
laste so to declare and open, when I haue fyrst answered to thy
reasons, by the which thou art moued. For I aske why thou thynkest
that the reason of them that do assoyle this, is not good nor
effectuall. The which reason, or solucion iudgeth that lybertie of fre
wyll can not be let by prescience or fore knowledge for by cause it
supposeth that prescyence is not the cause of necessytye in things
to come, takest thou any other argumente of necessitie of thynges
to come, els where, but that the thyngs that be knowen cannot
fayle, but com to passe ? Therfore yf prescience or fore knowledge
of thyngs to come putteth no necessitye in thynges to come (as thou
thy selfe diddest confesse a litle before) what, is there any cause
that voluntarye determynacions or actes of thynges be compelled to
certayne happes or chaunces ? That thou mayst the better
vnderstand by way of example what may folow, let vs suppose that
there is no prescience, should therfore the thyng (in asmuch as
belogeth therto) that commeth of fre wyll, be constrayned to come
by necessitye. Boe. No. Phi. Then lette vs suppose agayne that there
is prescience, but that it putteth no necessytie in thyngs to come,
then (as I suppose) the same lybertie of wyll shall remayne hoole
and fre from all necessytie. But thou wylt say that although
presciece is no cause of necessytie in thynges to come : yet it is a
sygne that they be to come by necessytie. Therfore by this meanes
althoughe prescyens had neuer ben : yet it may appere that chauces
of thinges to come be necessarie. For euery sygne sheweth the
thyng onely whereof it is the sygne, but yet it makethe not the thing
that it signyfyeth. Wherefore it behoueth to shewe before that some
thing happethe by necessitie, that it maye appere that prescience or
foreknowledge, is the sygne of thys necessytye or els yf there be no
necessytye, the same prescience maye not be the sygne of the
thyng, that is not. But nowe it apperethe that the profe of thys
(sustayned by stedefast reason) is not taken of signes and
outewarde argumentes, but of conuenyente and necessarye causes.
But thou mayste saye howe maye it be that the thyngs do not come,
that 126
 be purueyed to com. As though we do beleue that the
thinges y gods prouydence saw before to come, should not come.
But that we should rather iudge, though they happen or come, that
they had no necessitie of their owne nature that they shoulde come.
Whyche thynge thou mayst easely perceiue by this example, we do
se manye thynges with our eies whyles they are in doynge, as those
thynges whyche the carters seme to do in ordering and tempering of
their cartes, and such other voluntary acts after the same maner. Is
there, therefore anye necessitie in oure eyes or lokyng, that
compelleth any of the thinges so to be done ? Boe. No truly. For
theffect of a craft should be in vayne if al thyngs should be moued
by compulsion of our eyes, or by lokynge on. Phi. Than the thinges
whych (when men doo them) haue no necessitie that men do them,
And the same thynges be to come withoute necessitie, before they
be done. Wherfore ther be some thinges to come whose commynge
is quyte and fre from any necessitie. For certes I thynke no man will
say thys that those thinges that nowe be, were not fyrste before
they were done. And the same thinges although men hadde knowen
them before, yet haue they fre chaunces. For as the knowledg of
thinges presente, bringeth in no necessitie to thinges that men do,
euen soo prescience or fore knowledge of thinges to come, bryngeth
in no necessitie to those thyngs that are to come. But thou sayest
that the same thinge is to be doughted, whether there maye be
anye prescience or fore knowledge of such thynges as haue none
necessarye chaunces. For they seme to disagre or varye, that is to
vnderstande of prescience and thinges to come. For thou thynkeste
that yf thynges be knowen before they come, y of necessitye, they
must folowe and come. And, yf there be no necessitie, they might
not be knowen before. And thou thinkest that nothing may be
comprehended, by prescience, or foreknowledge of god, but it be
certayne. And if those thynges that haue vncertayne chaunces be
purueyed as thynges certayne, thou takest that for to be some
ambyguitieor doughte of opinion, and not for the truthe of scyence
or knowledge. For thou beleuest that it is agaynste the hole effectes
of science or knowledge to iudge a thyng otherwayes then the
thinge is, and in thys thou doest erre. The cause of whiche errour is
that all thinges that any man hath knowen, he thinketh that it is
knowen by the 127