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 HANDBOOK

of the

ORGANISATION TODT (OT)

MIRS/MR-OT/5A5
LONDON
March 19kb

.1
 GE R MAN Y

OT EINSATZGRUPPEN, AUTUMN 1944

SCALE 1:4,000,000 OR 63-13 MILES TO I INCH
MILES 5O O SO IOO I5O MILES

Boundaries of Einsatzgruppen LI T H U A N IA
" " Rustungsinspektionen

" •> Riisfcungskommandos

Number of Einsatz£ruppe

" " Rustungsinspektion

International Boundaries 1937

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Handbook of the OT M I R9/ M ft - OT/5/45.

 ERRATA

(1) Page i, Table of Contents, Part IB should

read pp. 16-24 (not 16-124).
(2) Chart 10 (8) will be found to precede
Chart 10 (1).
 TABLE OP CONTENTS

(See also LIST OP PARAGRAPH TITLES, pp. iv f f • )

TEXT
i ••$

MAP OP OT AREAS IN GERMANY (EINSATZGRUEPEN AND E$mT?&&]

ry

FOREWORD
pp. 1-2

BASIC PACTS ABOUT THE ORGANIZATION TQDT

pp. 3-4

Part I HISTORY OP THE OT (paras 1-22)

pp. 5-24

A. 1938 to D-Day (paras. 1-14)

pp. 5-16

B. After D-Day (paras 15-22) pp. 16-124

Part I I ORGANIZATION, ADMIMISTHATIQH AND OISRATION pp, 25-115

(paras 23-106)
A. Organization (paras 23-31)
pp. 25-42

(a) "Permanent" Organisation (paras 24-31)

pp. 25-32

("M "Current" Organization (paras 32-39)

pp. 32-38

(c) Structure of OT HQ*s on various levels

(paras 4O-42)
PP. 38-42

B. Chain of Command and 11Q Sections (paras 43-46) pp. 42-45

C. Tasks and Methods of Operation (paras 47-53) pp» 45-52

(a^ Activities of the OT (paras 47-48} pp, 45-49

ib J Methods of Operation (paras 49-50; pp. 49-51

(c; Construction Specifications (paras 51-53) PP. 51-52

D. Finns and Contracts (paras 54-65)

PP. 53-74

(&) Pirms (paras 54-60)

pp. 53-60

(b) Contracts (paras 61-65) pp» 6o-74

S. Personnel Administration Policy (paras 66-68) PP. 75-76

P. Service Brashes of the OT (paras 69-85) pp. 76A-89

Supply (para 69) PP. 76A-77

Transport (para3 70-75) pp, 77-84

Signals Communications (para 76) PP 84

Health and Medical Services (paras 77-78) pp. 85-86

Security Administration and Units (paras

79-85)
pp. 86-89

Go Liaison (para3 86-106)

pp. 90-115

a) Military Liaison (paras 36-91)

pp. 90-100

b) Economic Liaison (para3 92-93)

pp. 100-101

Political Liaison (paras 94-95)

pp. 101-105

Operational Liaison (paras 96-97)

pp. 106-108

(e) List of Liaison Agencies (paras 98-106)

pp. 108-115

Part III PERSONNEL (Paras 107-157)

pp. II6-I64

A. Composition of Personnel (paras 107-114)

pp. 116-120

B. Classification of personnel (paras 115-128)

pp. 121-134

(a) General Classification (para 115)

pp. 121-122

(bj Construction Personnel (paras 116-124)

pp. 122-131

(c; Administrative personnel (paras 125-128)

pp. 131-134

 raining (paras 129-332)

pp. 135-137

D. Uniforms, Insignia, Personal Equipment and

Decorations (paras 133-136)

pp. 137-141

E. Pay, Allowances, Allotments, Insurance, Benefits

and Deductions (paras 137-157)

pp.

a^ Introduction (para. 137)

pp. 141-142

b) OT-Eigenes Personal (OT Organic Personnel)

(paras, 138-139)
pp. 143-144

c) Firmenangehflrige (OT Firm Personnel)

(paras 140-144)
pp. 145-153

d) Zugewiesene Auslftnder (Forced Foreign Labour)

(para 145)
PP. 153-156

e) Special Regulations Affecting OT Pay

(paras. 146-157)
PP. 157-164

Part IV MANPOWER (paras 158-185)

pp. 165-181

A. General Manpower Statistics and Occupational Percentages

g
(paras 158-160))

pp. 165-166

B. Regional Manpower Recruitment and Allocation

(paras 161-185)
pp. 166-181

a) German Manpower (paras 161-167)

pp. 166-170

b) French Manpower (paras 168-173)

pp. 170-177

c) Belgian and Dutch Manpower (para i74)

p. 177

Englishmen In the OT (para 175)

p. 177

Norwegian and Danish Manpower (para 176)

p. 177

Italian Manpower (para 177)

pp. 177-178

Spaniards in the OT (para 178)

p. 178

Baltic Manpower (para 179)

p. 179

Russian Volunteers (para 180)

P. 179

Balkan Manpower (paras 181-182)

pp. 179-180

Ostarbeiter (para 183)

p. 180

m Colonials (para I84)

p. 180

n Zwangsarbeiter (Forced Labour) (para 185)

pp. 180-181

Part V ORDER OP BATTIB

pp. 182-227

ANNEXES

A. CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS
pp. A1-A15
B. PERSONAL DOCUMENTS OF THE OT
pp. Bl-Bll

C. OT PERSONALITIES
pp. C1-C78
D. OT FIRMS
pp. D1-D20
E. ABBREVIATIONS
pp. E1-E9

F. DEFINITION OF TE3MS USED IN THE OT

pp. F1-F27

G» OT BIBLIOGRAIHr
pp. G1-G2

H. DAS DIENSTBUCH (PAY AND IDENTITY" BOOK)

pp. H1-HH

CHARTS
For Text9 see:

1. General Organization of the OT IIA

2. OT HQ Structure on Varioui Levels I I Ac

OT Mobile Units as Activated for the Seventh Army IA13

3

(18 May 1944)

4a. OrganizSferiy %f Sfciw t>T& ^ ^to^&nfef 1944) IlAa2k

4b. •Current11 Organization of Amt Bau-OTZ IIAb32

5a. Organization of an Einsatzgruppe HQ (Example: HAa26

EGW comprising France, Belgium and the

Netherlands in Summer 1944)

5b. "Current" Organization of an Einsatzgruppe HQ H£b34

(Example: EG Deutschland V, comprising the

Rhine region)

5c • Organization of an Einsatz HQ in Germany IIAJ>35

6a. Organization of an Oberbauleitung HQ in German IlAa28

Occupied West (June 1944)

6b. "Current" Organization of an Oberbauleitung HQ tn II£b36

Germany

7* Organization of a Frontfflhrung (OBL Level) in IIXBo

German Occupied West (June 1944)

6* Status of the German Building Industry in the HDa

Reich Economic System.

9* Personnel Administration of an OT-finn or OT-firm IIIBb & IIDa

Combine (Arge)
10. Ihsigaia of Hanky Brassards and Occupational HID
Shoulder Patches
1* C o l l a r I n s i g n i a and Chevrons of E^/CR's and NCO's
2. C o l l a r I n s i g n i a o f Higher NCOfs
3* C o l l a r Patches for Officers (Ftthrer and Stabsfflhrer)
4* C o l l a r Patches for Officers (HBhere Ffihrer)
5* Brassards Worn on Left Upper Arm above Swastika Brassard
6. S p e c i a l i s t I n s i g n i a Worn on Lower Right Arm
7* Branch of Service I n s i g n i a Worn on Lower Right Arm
8. C l a s s i f i c a t i o n I n s i g n i a Worn on Left Upper Arm below
Swastika Brassard, here shown i n Colour denoting
Construction Branch

11. Organization of an OT-finn HQ (Example: IHBb & IIDa

Arbeitsgemeinschaft (Arge) S c h i f f e r )

TABIES For t e x t , s e e :

I C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of OT Personnel according to m i l i t a r y

and OT Service Status HIB

II Construction Personnel IIIBb

I l i a Comparative Table of OT Ranks IHB
n i b Comparative Table of NSKK-OT Ranks IHB & IIEfe
IIIc Comparative Table of OT Transport Personnel IIIB & HFb
(Legion SEEER and NSKK)
IV OT Ranks and Equivalent Assignments, Uniforms and HID
Insignia
7 Classification of OT Personnel according to IIIA & JIB
Nationality
Via OT Manpower Data: Calling up for National Labour
Service in France by Classes
 VIb OT Manpower Data: Labour Conscription IVB
Ifeasures i n Prance for the Benefit of the OT
Vic OT Manpower Data: National Labour Conscription IVD
Regulations in Germany and in Genaan Occupied
Europe (under Over-all Control of G3BA.
Fritz SAUCKEL)
VId OT Manpower Data: Estimate of Manpower IVD
Distribution in German Occupied Europe on
6 June 1944
Vie OT Manpower Data: Estimate of Present Manpower IVD
Distribution i n Germany

PLATES
I NCO in OT-Dienst Uniform Wearing Overseas Cap facing p* 138
II NCO in OT-Dienst Uniform Wearing Mountain Cap facing p. 138
LIST OF PARA(5UBI TITI£S
(inasmuch as the followingparagraph titles are listed independently

of the Table of Contents, a few explanatory words have, in some

cases, been added for the sake of logical sequence)

No* Page

!• Definition 5
2. Fritz TGDT»s Career to 1938 5
3. Westwall (Siegfried Line) 6
4. Fritz TODT 1939 - 1941 7

5* War Employment of the OT 7

6. OT 1940 - 1941 8
7* SHEER*s Innovations 8
8. OT 1942 - 1943 10
9» SHSER's Career 10
10, Comparison of TQDT with SHSER 11
11. OT Construction Activities 1942-1943 12
12» OT in the West before D-Day 12
13* Preparations for Allied Landings 13
14* Evacuation of the OT from France 15
15* Manpower and personnel in Autumn 1944 16
16. Effects of Allied Landing 17
17. "OT Special Brigades" reported in October 1944 19
18. Evaluation of OT "Special Brigades" 19
19. Ant Bau-OTZ 20
20. Significance of Front-OT 21
21. HITLERfs Decree of 24 August 1944 22
22. SEEER*s Decree of 16 October 1944 22
23» Introduction to OT organization 25
24. "Permanent Organization11 The OT High Command 25
25* "Permanent Organization" Chain of Command 26
26. "Permanent Organization" Einsatzgruppe (EG: Area Control
Staff, Army Group Level) 26
27» "Permanent Organization" Einsatz (E: Area Control Staff,
Army Level) 28
28. "Permanent Organization" Oberbauleitung (QBL: Basic OT
Construction Sector and Administrative 33 29
29» "Permanent Organization" Bauleitung (BL: Sub-sector of
an OBL) 30
30. "Permanent Organization" Abschnittsbauleitung (ABL:
Local Supervisory Staff) 31
31* "Permanent Organization" Baustelle (Construction Site) 31
32. "Current Organization" The OT High Command 32
y^. "Current Organization" Chain of Command 35
34* "Current Organization" Einsatzgruppe (EG: Area Control
Staff, Army Group Level) 35

IV
 Page
35. "Current Organization" Einsatz (E. Area Control
Staff, Army Level
36. "Current Organization" Oberbauleitung (OBL: Basic
Construction Sector and Administrative HQ 37

37* "Current Organization" Bauleitung (BL: Sub-sector of

an OBL 38

38. "Current Organization" Abschnittsbauleitung (ABL: Local

Supervisory Staff) 38

39. "Current Organization" Baustelle Construction Site 38

40. Nomenclature of OT Units 38

41* Structure of OT Headquarters 39

42» Functions of OT Headquarters 40

43* Chain of Command in EGW 42

44* Chain of Command in Russia 44

45* Chain of Command in the Balkans 44

46» Chain of Command in Germany 44

47* A c t i v i t i e s of the OT in General 45

48. Activities of the OT according to location 45

49« "Stationftreinsatz" or Static Method of Operation 49

50. "Mobileinsatz" or Mobile Method of Operation 50

31* Standardisation of assembly parts 51

52. Technical Data

52

53» Present State of Research

52

54» Definition, Origin and Development of OT-Firms

53

55« Organization of OT-Firms

54

56* Firm Reports and Records

56

37* Construction Programme, Material and Equipment

58

58* Foreign Firms i n Occupied Europe, Summer 1944­ 59

59* German Building Associations and Corporations

60

60. Current Status of German OT-Firms 60

61. General Contract Regulations 60

62. Relation between the OT and Contracted Parties in

Legal Matters
61

63. T^ypes of Contracts 62

64* Main types of Contracts

63

65. Samples of Leistungsvertrag (Efficiency Output Contract)

63

66* Multiple factors involved in OT personnel administration

75

67* Adaptations of policy to local and immediate situations

75

68. OT personnel administration defined in terms of Ion.

range policy
76

69. Services of Supply 76A

70. NSKK-Transportbrigade TCDT and early SFEER Transport

organizations
77

71* Legion SFEER

78

72. Transportgruppe TQDT 80

73» Other Transport Organizations 83

71K Requisitioning of Private Vehicles 83

75* lypes of Motor Vehicles 83

76* Signals Communications Services 84

77* Medical Services 85

78* Sanitary Conditions 86

79. Rechts-und D i s z i p l i n a r s t e l l e (Legal and Disciplinary

Sub-section)
80* Schutzkommando (Security Guard)
8U SS-Verbindungsfahrung (SS-CT Liaison)
82. Feldgendarmerie (Military Police)

83* SS-Polizei Regiment TCDT (SS Police Regiment TODT)

84. Technische Nothilfe (Technical Bnergency Corps)

85. Sicherheitsdienst (SD: Security Service)

06. Wehrmacht-OT (Germany) Liaison

87» Army-OT Administrative Channels of Liaison

88. Army-OT Operational Channels of Liaison

89. Air Force-OT Liaison

90. Navy-OT Liaison

91. SS-OT Liaison

92. Economic Liaison, German Agencies

93. Economic Liaison, Collaborationist Agencies

 94* Political Liaison, German Agencies _ _. _

95. Political Liaison, Collaborationist Agencies lO5
96. Operational Liaison, German Agencies 106
97. Operational Liaison, Collaborationist Agencies 108
98. List of Wehrmacht-OT Agencies 108
99. List of Air Force-OT Agencies 109
100. List of Navy-OT Agencies 110
101. List of Economic Liaison Agencies, German 110
102. List of Economic Liaison Agencies, Collaborationist 111
103. l i s t of Political Liaison Agencies, German 111
104. List of Political Liaison Agencies, Collaborationist 113
105. List of Operational Liaison Ager»ies, German 114
106. List of Operational Liaison Agencies, Collaborationist 115
107. Composition of personnel. Early period: 1938/39 116
108. DAF/Prontftthrung 117
109. "Mobile" period: 194O/42(a) 117
110. "Mobile" period: 1940/42(b) 117
111. "Stable" period: 1942/44 118
112. Current developments (Front-OT, OT Legion&re, Special
Brigades, Russian Units) 119
113. Composition of OT personnel, with the exception of
Manual Labourers, in an OBL sector U9
114. Other special units in the OT 120
115* Classification of OT personnel 121
116. Supervisory Field Staffs, under Normal Conditions 122
117* Modifications in Supervisory Field Staffs due to shortage
of German Personnel 123
118. The New Chain of Command in the Supervision of Labour 124
119. The Arbeitsbereitschaft 128
120. Specially guarded Formations 128
121. Hundertschaft and Abteilung 128
122. Bautrupps (Construction Detachments) and Arbeitstrupps
(Labour Detachments) 129
123. Front-OT Brigades, Regiments, Battalions and Companies 129
124. Personal Lager (Camps) 130
125. Referat Frontfflhrung (Front Area Personnel Section)
Definition, Origin and Development 131
126. Referat Frontftthrung. Present Organization and Functions 133
127. Referat Technik (Technical Section) 134
128. Einsatz, Einsatzgrappe and Amt Bau-OTZ 134
129. Military Training 135
130. Schools for Leadership Training and other Schools 135
131. Special Unit Training (Schutzkoianando) 137
132. Trade Training in the OT 137
133. Uniforms 137
134* Insignia 138
135. Personal Equipment 139
136. Decorations 140
137. General Pay principles 141
138. OT-Eigenes Personal pay Principles 139
139. Pay Scales 143
140. Pay Classifications 144
141. Firmenangestellte Wage Scales 145
142. Tariffs for Firmenangehfirige in France I48
343. Tariffs for Frontarbeiter 151
144, Miscellaneous Tariffs 152
145. Pay tor Forced Labour 153
146» List of Pay Additions 157
147. OT-Sold for Employees 157
148. OT-Sold for Workers 159
149. Frontzulage (Front Line Allowances) and Leistungslohn
(Pay for Output) *159

150. Overtime 159

151* Srschwerniszulage (Allowance for Dangerous Work) 160

152. Lohnausfallentschadigung (Compensation for Time Lost

other than througi Worker's fault)

153. Leistungszulage (Special Premiums)

154. Lohnnebenkosten (Allowances)

155» Miscellaneous Deductions and Allotments

156* Rations Lodging and Clothing Allowances 163

157* Urlaub (Leewe) I64

158. General Manpower Statistics 165

159* Occupational" Percentages 165

160, Women 166

I6l» German Manpower 166

162. Firmenangehorige (OT-Firm personnel) 167

163» QT-Eigenes Personnel (OT Organic Personnel) 167

164. Military and Manpower Priority Status of OT German

personnel 167

165« Enlistment Procedure 168

166. Processing of Recruits 169

Discharge and Withdrawal from the OT 169

Integration of French Industry and Manpower into the

German System 170

169. Regulations governing Manpower Recruitment In France 171

170. Three Phases of German Manpower Policy in France 171

171» AJction Frankreich 173

172. G-erman Counter-Intelligence Organization of the GBAF 176

173 • Conclusion 176

174* Belgian and Dutch Manpower; Age Groups and Emphasis

on Racial Kinship 177

175* Englishmen in the OT: Guernsey, Jersey and Alderney

Islands 177

176. Proportion of Norwegians and Danes in the OT and their

Assignments 177

177» Italian manpower; Fascists and Anti-Fascists 177

178. Spaniards in the OT; "Insurgents" and "Republicans" 178

179* Baltic Manpower; Proportion and Status 179

190. "Vlassov* Russian Units 179

181» Balkan Manpower; Collaborationist 179

182* Balkan Manpower; Enemy 180

183. Ostarbeiter Hilfswillige and Others 180

184. Indo-Chinese and North Africans 180

185. Communists, Partisans, Jews, Special Convict Units 180

vii

 FOREWORD

Just as an OT construction unit completed a specific mission

somewhere in Europe, permission to begin work on it promptly arrived

from Berlin.

05ie above incident is cited' not so much in a spirit of

facetious ness, but to illustrate in a striking manner, the

administrative complexities inherent in a para-military organisation

of the size and extent of OT, as it has evolved over a period of

5 years. Up to only about 6 months ago, the Organisation Todt

was active in every country of continental Europe except Sweden,

Switzerland, Spain, Portugal arri Turkey.

A basic reason for the ponderousness of OT administrative

machinery was the fact that the Nazis intended to use the

Organisation as a wedge in the regimentation of labour as part of

the "New Order11 in a post-war Europe. Long range plans of this type

require stabilisation, and stabilisation involves administration.

In this connection the OT trained and harboured a small army of

collaborationists, who, already employed as leaders of foreign labour

units within the OT, were groomed for political leadership of

European labour with the advent of the "final Nazi victory".

A considerable number of these men have evacuated with OT into

Germany.

As to OTfs post-war tasks in the reconstruction of Europe,

grandiose plans were made for it; captured German- documents reveal

visions of express highways radiating from BERLIN to the Persian Gulf

through BAGHDAD, and along the Baltic coast to link up with a

highway through Finland and to run the length of Norway. A system

of canals was to link the Mediterranean and the Atlantic through

southern France, as part of a communications scheme connecting

BORDEAUX with the Black Sea. # Part of this programme had already

been put into execution, notably in Norway and the Balkans.

QT?*s comparatively high wages, bonuses, allowances, allotments,

and the relative safety it offers, in contrast to combat service in

the Armed Forces, were, and still are, very attractive to the Geraan

male faced with the alternate choice. In fact supervisory

assigiments in OT were generally reserved for Old Party Fighters,

Party members with influential connections, and more recently for older

SS members in rapidly increasing numbers. High officials especially,

are, with few exceptions, members of the original staff or Nazi

technicians which the Party formed as soon as it came into power, and

which is represented at the present time by Hauptamt Technik of the

NSDAP, headed by Fritz TODT until his death, and now headed by SFEER.

The result is that while OT is administratively a Ministry agency

and not a^arty formation, in proportion it harbours at least in its

permanent administrative staff, possibly more ardent Nazis than a

regular formation of the Party.

If the picture as outlined above has given the impression that

nepotism and administrative lag vitally impaired OT's operational

efficiency, its record of past performances should serve to dispel

the notion. It has carried out in the space of a little over five

years, the most impressive building programme since Roman times.

It has developed methojds of standardization and rationalisation in

construction to an extent and on a scale heretofore unattempted.

The speed with which it effects air raid damage repairs on vital

communication systems is indeed impressive.

-1­
 To-day PT is indispensable in any protracted resistance
the Nazis may^&itend to offer. Their experience in making the
most of terrain in the building of field fortifications, in the
building of underground tunnels, depots of a l l kinds, hide-outs,
shelters, in fact, of regular subterranean living and operating
quarters of vast proportions, i s unique* OT personnel l e f t
behind in Allied-occupied territory are ideally fitted for
sabotage on vital plants and factories*
I t i s , however, as a post-war p o l i t i c a l organisation that OT
presents the greatest potential danger* Its officials are, with
few exceptions, not only early and ardent Nazis belonging to either
the SS or SA, but have been leaders of men for many years* They
have extensive foreign collaborationist connections in practically
every country of Europe, beside being in touch with those who were
evacuated by OT into Germany* They know through liaison the methods
of SD, Kripo, Gestapo, and Gehelme Peldpolizei. Their connections
with high officials of the SS and SA. are both intimate and of long
standing* Above a l l , their standing in the Party, combined with
their technical qualifications, will earn them the confidence of
Nazi leaders in any plans for a last-ditch resistance*
In regard to the book i t s e l f , i t s contents attempt to give as
comprehensive a description of the administration and operation of
OT as a study of available documentary material would allow* It is
as up-to-date as can reasonably be expected of a basic reference
book, especially in view of the rapidity with which the current
situation is changing* Finally the book should prove equally
useful either in the event of a decision to employ OT's capabilities
in some form or another for the reconstruction of the devastated
parts of Europe, or in the event of a decision to demobilise the
Organisation in i t s entirety* The l i s t of OT personalities
(Annexe c) will* i t i s hoped, prove particularly useful from a
counter-intelligence aspect*
 BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE ORGANISATION TODT
1» OT i s not a Nazi Party organization. I t i s a Reichsbehflrde

(a Government agency). The exercise of i t s administrative and

executive authority, therefore, i s a governmental (ministry)

function.

2. OT personnel i s c l a s s i f i e d by the German Government as m i l i t i a ;

i t s German personnel and some of i t s foreign volunteers have the right
to bear arms and r e s i s t enemy action. They have furthermore rendered
the same oath of l i f e l o n g personal loyalty to HITLER as the regular
army s o l d i e r .

3* OT's war assignment may be defined as the Construction Arm of the

Wehrmacht; as such i t s a c t i v i t i e s were, until very recently, spread
over a l l of German occupied Europe. At the present day i t exercises
functional control oVer Army, Air Force and Navy construction agencies
and f a c i l i t i e s including equipment.

4* In addition to the above assignment, the OT had working agreements

with the governments of Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary.
5* OT's chief i s the Reichminister for Armament and War Production

Dr. Albert, SPEER. In his capacity as head of the OT, he i s

responsible d i r e c t l y to HITLER. On 24th August 1944, he also took

over the building administration inside Greater Germany. Since this

date OT has assumed control over a l l phases of construction inside

Greater Germany.

6. OT's central administrative headquarters and highest echelon i s

the Amt Bau-OT. Zentrale in Berlin. I t s chief i s Ministerial

Direktor Dipl. Ing. Xaver DQRSCH. He i s responsible only to SPEER.

7« OT's fundamental characteristic i s the co-operation between the

German Building Industry and the German Government. The Building
Industry furnishes the technical part in the form of individual
building tfirms, with their s t a f f s and equipment-. The government
furnishes the manpower and material. These two elements, government
and industry, are fused under OT control.
8. The above arrangement was evolved by Prof. F r i t z TODT for the

specific task of completing the 'Siegfried Line 1 , i n May, 1938.

I t was so successful that the personnel remained as a permanent

construction organization for the German Armed Forces.

9» The executive of an OT-Firm has a dual function; as the

contractor he takes care of h i s own i n t e r e s t s ; as a f u l l y paid
o f f i c e r i n the OT he takes care of OT's i n t e r e s t s .
10. Germany at present i s divided into an operational area comprising
8 Einsatzgruppen (Area Control S t a f f s , Army Group l e v e l ) sub-divided
into 22 Einsatze (Area Control S t a f f s , Army l e v e l ) .
11. OT authorities claim to have d i r e c t l y employed a force of a
m i l l i o n and a half of both German and Non-German personnel at i t s
period of greatest expansion, May 1942 to May 1943- Indirectly
OT may have benefited from the labour of over two m i l l i o n men and
women. At the present time i t i s estimated that the OT controls
personnel numbering approximately 1,000,000 inside Greater Germany.

12. The German personnel of 0T never exceeded 350,000. Due to

manpower shortage, the increasing demands of the Wehrmacht and
industry, the estimate before D-day was not over 75QOO and
l e s s . At the present time i t i s estimated at approximately

-3­
UNCLASS

13* The two "basic types 6_ _t Sonare (1) mobile (ifebiler Einsatz)
(2) static, (stationarer Einsatz).
14* The Oberbauleitung (abbreviated OBL) i s the basic administrative
HQ for the operational sector of the static type of operation.
15» The entire trend at the present is to give a high potential
mobility to a l l OT construction units (firms and personnel), thus
ensuring a transformation of static to mobile type of operation on
short notice*
16. OT's forward echelon (OT-Front) normally does not go beyond the
area immediately behind the front lines. Usually i t operates in the
zone of communications.
17* The number of foreign workers in OT construction units may not be
larger than can be controlled by an irreducible minimum of German
supervisory personnel (firm engineers, foremen, e t c . ) . This minimum
is about 10 percent of the total personnel in rear areas, and 25 percent
in the forward areas,
18. The transport f a c i l i t i e s for OT are provided by three originally
separate organizations; the NSKK-Transportbrigade SH2ER, NSKK-Transport­
brigade TQDT and the Legion SH3ER, unified in 1942 under the Term
NSKK-Transportgruppe TGDT, now known as Transportkorps SPEER.
19» Although not a Nazi Party organization OT is under the political
control of the Allgeraeine SS with an SS Liaison officer in every
echelon. Since May 1944, this control has been tightened by the
inclusion of additional ss personnel in key positions throughout the OT.

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 PART I

HISTORY OF THE OT

A. 1938 to D-Day

1. Definition
The OT has been variously defined "by the enemy. ' Hitler called i t
"an organisation entrusted with the execution of construction tasks
playing a decisive role in the war effort". Fritz TQDT, i t s founder,
proudly referring to i t as "a task force", and deprecating the
gradual increase of administrative routine, said on one occasion:
"We are called Organisation Todt without ever having organised11.
The German Supreme Command, as early as 1940, stated officially
that members of the OT were to be regarded as "Miliz" (militia; for a
definition of the present military status of OT, see Table i).
The Organisation in one of i t s circulars termed itself Ma body
charged with military construction for defensive purposes"•
2. Fritz TCDT's Career to 1938
In May 1938, the Army Itortress Engineers had been working on
the S i e v e d line, or West Wall as i t is now called by the Germans,
for two years without any prospect of completing i t in time to fit
into the Nazi military schedule. The General Inspektor fttr das
deutsche Strassenwesen (Inspector General of German Headways)
Dr. TOOT, was the man picked to take over the job from the Anqy.
Fritz TODT was born on 4th September 1891, in PFORZHEIM, Baden.
He obtained the decree of Dr. Ing. (Doctor of Engineering) from the
Munich Technical Institute and entered the imperial Army in 1914,
as Lieutenant of the Reserve. Be transferred to the Air Force,
was wounded in August 1918 in air combat, received the Iron Cross,
and the Order of the House of Hohenzollern, but s t i l l held the rank
of Leu tenant at the conclusion of World War I. Shortly after, he
entered the employ of the construction firm, Sager and Woe me r
at MUNICH, a concern specializing in road and tunnel construction,
and became i t s manager. He joined the Nazi Party as early as 1922,
soon won HITLER'S friendship and confidence, and was one of the
founders of the Nationalsozialistischer Bund deutscher Technik
(Nazi League of German Technicians) which then used the SS training
school at FLASSENBURG near KUIMB.ACH as a training and research
institute. (The school has since been appropriated by the OT as
an indoctrination centre for its ranking personnel). The League
was especially concerned with opening new industrial fields including
those of the armament industry, leading to the economic independence
of the Reich and to the solution of the unemployment problem.
TCIDT, for instance, wrote a paper about 1930 entitled, Proposals
and Financial Hans for the Qnployment of one Million Men.
The project as outlined in substance was a plan for a Reich
highway system, incidentally, said to have been based on a similar
study issued by the German Ministry of Economics as early as 1923*
On 28th June 1933* & state-owned public corporation was established
by Cabinet decree under the t i t l e of Reiohsautobahnen (Reich Highway
System) and a permanent administrative office with the t i t l e of
General Inspektor f&r das deutsche Strassenwesen (inspectorate
General of German Roadways) was established simultaneously and put under
the direction of TQDT. The corporation was set up as a subsidiary
of the Reichsbahn (State Railways) which exercised parental control,
over i t . The German Armed Forces, however, retained general powers
-5­
of control over i t s plans, which were exercised through Fritz TQDT
as the Generalinspektor fQr das Deutsche Strassenwesen. Tbe above
arrangement allowed the railway authorities to see to i t that the
projected highway system would not conipete with railway traffic and
l e f t control over decisions of strategy to the Supreme Command.
The Reichsaiitobahnen became operative in August 1933 with an i n i t i a l
capital of £0,000,000 Reichsmarks. Its staff was composed of a
small number of administrative officials and engineers. m June
1933, i t ceased to be a corporation and became a government
departenent,with a staff mainly provided by the Reichsbahn. Later
in June 1941, the Reichsbahn relinquished the greater measure of the
administrative control over the Reichsautobahnen, and the latter
became independent as far as internal organisation was concerned.
The original programme was completed in December 1938, with the
building of a super highway net-work of some 2,f>00 miles.
3. Westwall (Siegfried Line)
TQDT took over the construction of the Siegfried Line on
28th May 1938. He used the same technical staff which had
directed the construction of the by then practically completed
highway system: a combination of personnel of the Inspectorate
General of German Roadways and technical representatives of
building firms. He established OT's headquarters at WE3SBADIN,
leaving the Organisation administratively, however, under the
Inspectorate General. Most of the manpower working on the hi^wra/
system was likewise gradually transferred to the Siegfried Line.
In fact 0T began l i f e as the successor to the Reichs autobahnen
project. In view of the urgency of the political situation,
operational methods were greatly intensified, and co-operation
between the construction industry and the government, close as i t
had been in the case of the Autobahnen, became even closer in
the case of the 0T. TODT himself enjoyed the confidence of the
construction industry because of his official position and
undoubted executive abilities; moreover, he had an extensive
acquaintance among its leading executives and was personally
well-liked. When, therefore, he proposed a programme which, in the
space of a l i t t l e over two months, would provide a 24 hour working
schedule for over a half-million men and one third of the entire
German construction industry, the reaction of the latter was
extremely favorable. The prospect of gainful employment and the
patriotic aspects of the task were at least equally effective as
persuasive factors. In addition to what was invested by the
construction industry in the form of technical and clerical
staffs, and skilled mechanical labour and equipment, the government
provided rolling stock such as freight cars and lorries lent to the
0T by the State Railways and the Postal Ministry. Of the half
million manpower, about 100,000 'consisted of the nArmy BPortress
Engineer personnel which had been working on the Wall when TQDT
took over, assisted by about an equal number of RAD (Reich Labor
Service) personnel. The other 300,000 was drawn for the most
part from the civilian manpower which had constructed the super
highway system. Thus the 0T was operationally launched. Apparently
HITLER himself gave the organisation its present name when, in
a speech on the Nazi 1938 anniversary celebration (6th September)
in NUREMBERG, he referred to the gigantic construction enterprise
as the "Organisation Todt".
The bulk of the work on the Siegfried Line was considered
completed early in 1940 - just before the Campaign in the West.
OT's methods of construction, which even then depended a good deal
on standardisation, had been an unqualified success. Over 14,000
bunkers were built and 189,000,000 cubic feet of concrete were
poured into the "Wall" in a l i t t l e over a year and a half. The work
had been carried out during a period of political turmoil: i t began
d
^ ^ ^ °f the 3l ±n
^ ^ of the
MUNICH Pact, not quite
-6­
3 months after the annexation of Austria, and i t drew to completion
in Septentoer 1939, when Poland was attacked.

4. F r i t z TODT 1939 - 1941

TODT was appointed General Bevollmachtigter far die Rebelling

der Bauwirtschaft (Plenipotentiary General for the Regulation of the
Construction Industry) "by GOERING on 9th December 1938* HITLER
appointed him Gene r alma jo r in the Luftwaffe on 19th October 1939*
Other appointments followed: in recognition of his uncommon ability
to adapt adequate technical methods to meet the problems involved in
co-ordinating war production- and of his Party standing- he was
appointed Generalinspektor far Sonderaufjraben des Vierjahresplanes
(Inspector General for Special Tasks of the Pour Year Plan) in
February 194O» A few weeks l a t e r he was given the post of
Reichsminister fttr Bewaffnung und Munition (Reich Minister for
Armament and Munitions)* In the summer of 1941 he was appointed
Generalinspektor far Wasser und Energie (Inspector General for Water
and Power) putting him in charge of the programme projected for
.waterways, installations, bridges, hydro-electrical power and water
supply systems (a field in which TGDT himself had previously shown
considerable i n t e r e s t ) . His standing in the Party had already
been acknowledged by his appointments, to the rank of SA-Obergruppen­
ftihrer to the post of Leiter des Eauptamts far Technik (Chief of
the Technical Department of the Nazi Party)*, and to the office of
Reichswalter des NSEDT (National Chairman of the Nazi League of
German Technicians). Finally TODT became a Reichsleiter (Menfter of
Nazi Party Supreme Directorate.) In the field of learning he had
been awarded the honorary degree of Professor Extraordinarius.

5. War Employment of OT

I t i s not at a l l unlikely that OT's role as a para-military

organisation performing the tasks of a self-contained, heavy duty
and highly mobile Engineer Corps was foreseen by the Nazis in their
preparation of military plans. Very probably Dr» TCDT had been
charged with the formulation of such plans for some time. At any
rate, the OT was promptly put on a war footing in September 1939 >
on the outbreak of war and the Organisation was officially declared
to be Wehrmaohtsgefolge (Army Auxiliary Body). There were, accordingly,
two basic organisational changes. One was the establishment of the
administrative OT Frontftthrung (Front Area Personnel Section) which
took over the b i l l e t i n g and messing of personnel, tasks formerly
performed by the DAF (Deutsche Arbeitsfront - German Labour Front)
and which consolidated a l l aspects of personnel management in i t s
hands. The other was the change-over from voluntary enrollment
of construction firms to their conscription into the OT. Both firms
and their staffs became subject to this conscription and formed
the nucleus of OT mobile units. OT's f i r s t operational test came
in the 1940 campaign in the West. I t s primary task then was to
restore conmunications in the wake of the advancing German Armies
assuring thereby the flow of supplies to the front lines. This
type of operation was performed by mobile, specialized units
consisting of OT firms and comprising their c l e r i c a l and technical
staffs, and the worker element assigned to the firms by OT. ' The unit
carried two designations: one was that of OT Finnen-Einheit (OT
Firm Unit) usually contracted to OT Einheit or simply Einheit.
Thus the term Einfaeit in the OT has become synonymous with OT-Fira
or concern which i s contracted to OT. The other designation for

x With the Party rank of Oberbefehlsleiter, approximating that

of Generalmajor.

-7­
OT units was that of Bautrupps (Construction Detachments), a
survival of the tenn given to the Army Construction units "before
the OT came into existence. It indicates the fact that it was
these troops -which the new Organisation was expected to replace,
especially in a more or less fluid military zone. The above
kind of operation became one of the two basic types of OT's
employments: mobiler Einsatz (Mobile Commitment or Operation).
The other type, is the stationflrer Einsatz (Static Commitment or
Operation).
6. OT 1940 - 1941
As the military situation fcecame stabilised in the West, evidence
of a similar process of stabilisation became apparent in the OT.
Most of the construction work in the West, from the end of the French
Campaign to late in 1941, was on coastal installations along the
Channel and the Atlantic, from Belgium to Brittany. The entire area
was called Einsatzkttste West (Coastal Operational Area WEST). The
OT administrative HQ was at LORIENT and controlled a number of
construction sectors strung along the coast* Administrative control
by the LORIENT HQ was none too strong; administrative control
from BERLIN was s t i l l weaker. The QT Zentrale (Central OT HQ)
at BERLIN had not yet been established and the official name of the
Organisation s t i l l was Inspektor-General des Strassenwesen, OT.
Fritz TCDT by 1941* however, had long outgrown, the OT, and such
administrative co-ordination as existed was provided by the
autonomous corporate Wirtschaf tsgruppe Bauindustrie (Economic Group:
Construction Industry) which issued directions to OT firms.
The result was that influential OT Firms in the West coalesced and
formed a firm hierarchy, making a bid for control of the Organisation.
OT-Firms reaped a golden harvest during the period from autumn 1940
to early spring 1942. Long term projects of dubious priority and
doubtful value were begun and abandoned. Large numbers of f i c i t i t i o u s
personnel were carried on p a y r o l l s inasmuch as the Reich Government
granted premiums to firms for each worker recruited by their efforts.
Not only was centralised administration on the part of OT weak during
that period, but OT's operational sphere was limited to Army projects.
The Air Force and the Navy, while they took advantage of OT's
proximity for operational liaison, made separate contracts with
individual firms for the construction of their projects. Construction
of such coastal installations as submarine bases and such installations
as landing fields for the Air Force comprised a considerable part
of the military construction programme in the West from 1940 to
1942. Consequently large firms like Strabag (contraction for
Strassenbau Aktien Gesellschaft or Road Construction Company) either
worked exclusively for the Air Force or the Navy, or they contracted
only part of their personnel to the OT and kept the rest of their

personnel outside of the OT in their capacity as private firms.

The West (France, Belgium and Holland) i s drawn upon as an example,

but the above situation was also basically applicable to Norway and
Denmark. On the other hand, the military situation in Russia during
the first year of the war in the East (1941), was too operational to
allow any centralised administration there, l e t alone administration
from BERLIN.
7» SFEER's Innovations
Fritz TQDT died on 8th February 1942, in an aeroplane accident,
survived by his wife, a son and a daughter. He was succeeded in all
his functions by Prof. Albert SHEER. Shortly afterwards, a new
basic policy made i t s e l f f e l t . It consisted of a series of internal
moves all tending toward co-ordination within, and centralisation of,
the Organisation. The central HQ at Berlin, OT-Zentrale or OTZ,
was established about that time, and i t s full official name became
-8­
Generalinspektor far das Strassenwesen. OTZ. At the head of i t ...
(and s t i l l i s ; Minis terialdirektor DORSCH. Another move was the
establishment of a uniform basic pay tariff (to become effective
1st January I943) for a l l OT worker personnel, equalling, except
for those wages paid to forced labour, Wehrmacht basic pay.
In addition a new and elaborate scale of bonuses, allowances,
compensations and allotments was drawn .up, and Dr. SCHMELTER was
appointed Sondertreuh&nder der Arbeit fur die QT (Special Labour
Trustee for the OTJ. A third move was the gradual tigitening of
central control over OT-Firms, including issuance of a uniform type
of contract between the OT and i t s firms.

A fourth move is discussed in some detail below* I t was an

attempt at greater organisational co-ordination within the various

German occupied t e r r i t o r i e s in Europe, that i s , the West (France,

Belgium, Holland), Norway and Denmark, Russia and Finland, the

Balkans. (The OT did not become active in Italy on a large scale

until the autumn of 1943* The f i r s t OT area pf any size within

Germany proper, the Ruhr area, was not established until about

1st May 1943)* !Chis move, part of the general trend toward

stabilisation, already begun late in 1941 in the West in the form of

Einsatzgruppe West* was undertaken on a comprehensive scale by OTZ,

but never became a reality in the occupied territories with any

degree of uniformity. The organisational scheme was, with minor

variations, to establish administrative levels in the following order:

OT Zentrale, Berlin (OTZ: Central OT HQ)

Einsatzgruppe (EG: Area Control Staff, Army Group level)

Einsatz (E: Area Control Staff, Army level)

Oberbauleitung (OBL: Basic OT Construction Sector

and Admin. HQ)

Bauleitung (BL: Sub-Sector)

Abschnittsbauleitung (ABL: Local Supervisory Staff)

Baustelle (not abbreviated; Construction Site)

!Ehe scheme established a consistent chain of command in the

organisation, but the inconsistent manner in which i t was applied,
was so common in formerly occupied Europe, that i t became an utterly
unreliable guide to the status of an OT operational area. Most of the
confusion resulted from the fact that the term Einsatz had been
indiscriminately used for sectors, irrespective of size, in which
the OT had committed itself to operational activities. Many of these
so-called Einsatze, some of them merely local construction s i t e s ,
retained their original designation because of the impracticability
of re-organisation within their area. Others persisted in clinging
to their original designation even after a change of status had been
ordered in their case by the OTZ. One fact did, however, emerge
from this attempt at co-ordination: the Oberbauleitung (OBL)
definitely became the basic operational sector of the OT. *

Ti» various moves toward administrative co-ordination and

centralised control culminated in an edict issued by HITLER (through
the Reich Chancery) on 2nd September 1943> containing four clauses;

1# The Reichsminister fttr Bewaffnung und Munition SIEER, i s

head of the OT. He i s under the Ftthrer's direct orders
and is responsible only to him. (The Ministry has since
been changed in name to that of Reichsuiinisterium far
Rttstung und Krieg3produktion» (Reich Ministry -for Armament
and War Production and now commonly referred to as the
SPEER Ministry).
* The above outline of OT organisation is intended to i l l u s t r a t e
the inconsistences arising from adaptation to local conditions over
a vast area over a long period of time, even in the face of a determined
attempt afc co-ordination. The subject is further developed in tko
Chapter on Organisation (IIA).
 __ n be committed to work by order of its chief

anywhere in Greater Germany and in annexed or occupied

countries.

3« Glauses 1 and 2 also apply to all transport organisations

assigned to the OT.

4. The head of the OT will issue directives for the internal

organisation of the OT.

At the same time the OTZ was removed from under the Inspectorate

General of German Roadways and became an office in its own right

within SPEERfs Ministry.

8. QT 1942 - 1943

Internal re-organisation was not the only change which the OT

underwent during a period from May 1942 to late 1943* The status of

the Organisation itself was revised so that it was included within the

priority scheme of war production which by the winter of 1943/44 had

encompassed the entire resources of the production machinery of

Germany and occupied territory and to the highest degree that in

Western Europe. During this period of stabilisation on the Western

Front, the greater part of the OT lost its character as a para-military

engineer corps and became, in essence, a defense industry, constructing

not only military installations, but becoming more and more involved

in the repair of air raid damage to vital communications and essential

war production plants, and in the construction of new and extensive

underground depots, factories and other subterranean installations.

It can therefore be pointed out that, from* the economic standpoint

the OT became subject to the policies dictated by two public figures.

One is the policy dictated by Albert SFEER in regard to the

comparative priority in supplies allotted to the various armament

industries, including OT's great constructional tasks such as the

Atlantic Wall begun in May 1942* The other is the policy dictated

by SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Fritz SAUGKEL the Generalbevollm&chtigter

fur den Arbeitseinsatz (Plenipotentiary-General for Manpower Allocation)

in regard to comparative priority in manpower allotment. SFEER

and SAUCKEL are at present the two dominant personalities in

German war economy.

9. SPEER's Career

Professor Albert SPEER's background and career, except for his

lack of military experience, is reminiscent of that of Fritz TQDT.
Like TODT's, SPEER's early career was in the field of construction.
But, whereas TODT's special interest lay in methods of engineering
technique, SHEER's early i n t e r e s t , was in architectural planning and
ornamentation. He was born 19th March 1905 in MANNHEIM, Baden and
attended the Technical Institutes at KARLSRUHE, MJNCHEN, and BERLIN.
He obtained his engineering degree (Dipl. Ing.) from the l a t t e r , and
stayed on for three years as a research student and faculty assistant.
SPEER joined the Nazi Party comparatively late in 1932, and formed a
personal friendship with both HITLER and GOERING. HITLER, as is
well known, prides himself on his proficiency as an architect.
In fact, he is known to have made suggestions for the plans of what
is SPEER's best known work to the outside world - the reconstruction
of the Heichskanzlei.
Two of SEEER's early appointments in the Party are that of Leiter,
Amt "Schflnheit der Arbeit" (Chief of the Bureau "Beauty of Labour")
of the Strength Through Joy Movement (a branch of the German Labour
Front) which involved the architectural ornamentation of public
buildings and that of Unterabteilungsleiter der Reiphspropacrandaleitung
technische and ktlnstlerische Aus^estaltung von Grosskuhdj>ebungen
-10­
(Chief of the Sub-section "Technical and Artistic Arrangements for ^y
Public Mass Danonst rat ions and Official Meetings" of the Reich
Propaganda Ministry). Another early appointment was to the newly
created office cf the General Bauinspekteur der Reichshauptstadt
(Inspector General of Construction for the Reich Capital). Although
this office was mainly concerned with the remodelling of BERLIN from
an aesthetic point of view, i t represented an important increase
of SPEERfS functions and powers. For one thing, i t led to the
creation of the Baustab SEEBR (Construction Staff SEEER). For another,
i t put SEEER in control of the Binnenflotte or Inland Waterways Fleet,
which he promptly renamed Transport-Flotte""sF!EER,

I t was, however, not until the outbreak of war, and through his
contact with GOERING, that his stature as a functionary began to
increase appreciably, and eventually placed him in a position to become
TCDT's successor, i f not actually his rival, during the former's
lifetime. Bie Baustab SEEER was enlarged to form a construction
organisation of somewhat over 100,000 men, specialising in construction
of airports and airport installations within Germany, The number of
NSKK (National SozialistischeKraftfahr Korps or National Socialist
Motor Corps) Units, or NSKK-Baustab SEEER as they were called, which
had always provided transportation for the organisation, were likewise
increased and renamed the NSKK Motor Transport Standarte SEEER (NSKK
Motor Transport Regiment SPEER). As already mentioned, on T0DT'S death
on 9th February 1942, SEEER inherited not only the leadership of the
0T but also a l l of the former's Party and government offices and
functions. The most Important of these numerous government functions
i s naturally that of head of the "SEEER Ministry11 or Ministry of
Armament and War Production, (which under swwHfr underwent a
re-organisation during the summer and autumn of 1943, and another
in the late summer of 1944)* He i s besides a member of the Zentrale
Planting (Central Planning Board), the functions of which are comparable
to that of a War Bconony Cabinet responsible directly to GGERING
under the Four Tear Plan. His most important Party rank i s that of
Reichsleiter (Member of the Nazi Party Supreme Directorate). To
return to the 0T, SPEER incorporated his Baustab into the
Organisation when he took over i t s control. Most i f not a l l , of the
original NSKK Motor Transport Standarte SPEER was attached to the
DAK (Deutsche Afrika Korps) and to the Army units in Russia. It is
nevertheless from the transport aspect that SPEER*s name has becomd
most prominently connected with OT: the various stages by means of
which the Legion SHhlfiK (the present transportation unit of the 0T)
was created, are described in the section on Services (II F b)»
The Transportflotte SPEER, was likewise attached to the 0T and performs
similar services in bringing up supplies by waterways to coastal
and canal sectors of the Organisation.

10. Comparison of TQDT with SPEER

In a comparative estimate of the two men, Fritz TQDT and Albert SEEER,
there i s a decided temptation to describe the former in favourable
terms at the expense of the l a t t e r . TCDT, was from a l l accounts,
a dynamic personality, impatient with administrative regulations.
One might almost say that he executed a job by executing i t . He had
the true technician's a b i l i t y of adapting the method of execution to
the nature of ths operation. Without detracting from TQDT's
a b i l i t i e s in this respect, SEEER obviously i s a s k i l l e d p o l i t i c i a n .
His a b i l i t i e s as an organiser seem to be on the administrative,
rather than on the operational, s i d e . He i s said to be a good judge
of men as far as picking executive assistants i s concerned. Whether
any one man, however, even of TCDT's stature, could have met
Germany's c r i t i c a l problem of war production with anything l i k e the
efficiency with which at one time TQDT b u i l t the Siegfried Line i s
quite problematical.

-1V
11. OT Construction Activities 1942 - 1943

As to the OT's activities from May 1942 to autumn 1943* broadly

speaking, they were concerned with defensive construction, e.g. the
Atlantic Wall in the West, the Ost-Wall in the £ast, coastal
fortifications in Norway and Jutland, and with the beginning of
underground installations in Germany proper. Diversion of OT
personnel and equipment from the above activities to the repair of
Allied air raid damage in Western Europe including G-ermany proper
(Einsatz Ruhrgebiet) began in the summer of 1943 and had reached the
culminating point by the spring of 1944•

12. OT in the West before D-Day

The intensity of Allied air-raids in the winter and spring of

1943/44 caused a series of re-adjustments in OT a c t i v i t i e s in the West,
particularly in NW France. Related in chronological order, these
re-adjustments form a pattern of OT operation under pressure. I t not
only provides a documented record of the OT's a c t i v i t i e s in anticipation
of D-day; at the same time i t may be assumed to hold good, in general,
in regard to i t s present operations in Germany.

First of a l l , as a reaction to increased Allied bombing, the

SPEER Stab fCLr die Ruhr (SPEER Special Staff for the Ruhr Area under
DipL Ing. SANDER with HQ at ESSEN), was established in July 1943 in
order to co-ordinate the activities of the agencies engaged in rescue,
salvage, repair and reconstruction work in the Ruhr and Rhine valleys.
Besides the OT, the Wehrmacht, the DAP (German Labour Front) and Industry
were represented on this staff. OT's task was "to adjust i t s resources
to individual conditions". As part of this "adjustment", an
QT Bergnann Kbmpanie (Miners* Company) was created and incorporated in
the QT. Einsatz Ruhrgebiet (OT Einsatz Ruhr Area). I t s function was
to use the skill and experience of i t s personnel in rescuing people
and salvaging property after a i r - r a i d s . I t s members belonged to the
OT, but their wages continued to be paid by the mine owners. They
were housed in barracks and kept almost continuously on the a l e r t .
They came from a l l parts of Germany, mostly, however, from the Rhineland
and Westphalia. In most mining d i s t r i c t s , each mine had to release one
man of i t s rescue service to work wit ft the OT. Previously these men
had been part of the Selbstschutz (Civilian Self-protection Organisation).
A report dated January 1944, mentioned the OT Bergungsregiment aPiSflb
(Rescue and Salvage Regiment SPEER) which was formed late in 19439 and
which worked f i r s t in the Ruhr District and subsequently in bomb-
damaged locations throughout the Reich. Consisting almost exclusively
of German personnel, i t used equipment especially developed for
reconstruction and salvage operations and was also equipped with
steam-shovels, derricks, dredges, etc. At present, the OT in the Ruhr
and Rhine valleys continues to carry out these tasks. Manpower for
the OT in these bomb saturated areas of the Reich i s obtained from
prisoner of war personnel in Germany, especially Russian.

In work of a technical and strategic nature, such as repairs to

communications systems in large c i t i e s , OT skilled personnel is under
the over-all direction of the Technische Nothilfe, or TENO, (Technical
Baergency Corps). Members of TENO, while at work directing repairs
for the resumption of normal activities, are at the same time on the
alert for signs of sabotage and incipient uprisings.

In January 1944* an order prescribed that employees of OT firms

be organised into training units for r i f l e and pistol practice.
The units were termed Wehr- und Ausbildungsgemeinschaften (Defence
and Training Units), and elaborate regulations concerning their
training programme were laid down. The programme, however, f e l l
through, mainly owing to lack of f i t personnel.
 Persistent bombings of Prance by the Allied Air Forces, especially
of V-sites and lines of communications, created a restive atmosphere
among OT personnel in the affected areas. The lowered morale,
facilitated desertions amidst the confusion following bombing attacks,
and reduced periods of productive work. The cumulative effect was to
lower output to a c r i t i o a l point. Contributing to all this, was the
acute shortage of transportation fuel and the disruption caused in the
general transport system, which affected OT movement of supplies and
personnel.

Consequently, early in 1944* in danger areas, the OT authorities

had already decided to continue construction work on only the most
essential type of installations, such as, for example, V-sites, and to
leave essential repair work, such as v i t a l communication links to
mobile Katastropheneinsatz (Major emergency crews). Damage to
secondary communications had to be left unrepaired. In line" with the
above policy, therefore, as soon as work in bomb-target areas was
considered completed, OT personnel was shifted to construction work
on the Atlantic Wall where i t could work under more favourable and
stable conditions.

13» Preparations for Allied Landings

Mobile Emergency Bautrupps, (Construction Crews), which were

characteristic of the early days in France, when OT was restoring
communications during the 1940 Campaign in the West, were then
re-activated to cope more effectively with air raid damage. In May
1944> preparations in anticipation of Allied landings really gut under
way, as far as OT's tasks were concerned. Work on the Atlantic Wall
was s t r i c t l y limited to completing whatever local construction had
already been in progress, especially to camouflgaging and clearing of
fields of f i r e . On May 18th orders were issued by the G-erman Seventh
Army changing the composition of the entire OT in i t s command area,
to mobile units. There units were to serve a two-fold purpose.
One was to aid the army engineers both in the battle zone and rear
areas; the other was to function as emergency air-raid salvage and
repair crews. (A3 things turned out, after the invasion, a l l of
OT's resources in NW France were employed exclusively on the second
of these purposes, the repair of air-raid damage, as outlined in an
order signed by von RUNDSTEDT on June 18th, 1944;» The administrative
organisation of the OberbauleituAgen (OBL), however, remained
the same, even after the invasion when their IIQ's were shifted. The
firms, however, became the operational units in the field, each firm
being responsible for feeding, billeting and paying i t s entire
personnel including the Non-German labour units.

Liaison between the Army and the OT was established through the
Qebietsingenieur, (Army District-Liaison-Engineer to an OBL).
The OT units were at this time divided into 5 main categories:

type 1

Festung3bautrupps (Fortress Construction Detachments). This was

the most advanced OT echelon inasmuch as i t stayed with the
army units defending the coastal fortresses such as ST.MALO, BREST,
and ST. NAZAIRS. I t consisted of three special types of
components: Construction, Harbour arid Power supply units.
These sub-units were placed at the disposal of the Festungs
Kommandeur (Fortress Commander).

Type 2»

Bautrupps (Construction Detachments) in the battle zone and zone

of communioations. These were OT's forward echelon, mobile
units which were to work under the direction of army engineers.
 In case of Allied landings. In the meantime, according to an

order of the Seventh Army Hdhere Fionier Kommandeur (Chief

Engineer), their tactical disposition was to be arranged by

Festungs Pionier Kommandeur XIX (Fortress Construction Engineer

Commander XIX) of that area* These construction units

contained many types of special components such as bridge

construction, highway construction, demolition, mine clearing,

motor vehicle repair, munition handling, railway construction

and general construction units* One railway construction

unit in BREST was put directly under the Transportoffizier

(Transport Officer).

Bautrupps (Construction Detachments) in rear areas* Uhese units

were placed at the disposal of the General Ingenieur West (Chief

Engineer of Army Group West)* They contained the following

special components: railway and general construction, power

supply and guard units*

Type 4*

Bautrupps (Construction troops) for German Air Force* They

were placed at the disposal of the GAP, through liaison with

the Chief Engineer of Army Group West* They consisted of the

following components: motor repair, bridge construction,

general construction units*

Type 5»

Nachachubtruppa (Supply troops) in the battle zone. Remaining

IexclusivelyGerman) personnel were formed into armed labour

groups attached to Divisional and Seventh Army supply units*

Type 6*

Arbeitatrupps (labour Detachments) in rear zone* Remaining

"reliable" non-German personnel were formed into un-armed

labour detachments and under German guard evacuated to new

zones* They were assigned work at supply installations (such as

the construction of unloading ramps) in the rear areas, and were

placed at the disposal of the Chief Supply Officer of the

Seventh Army* Rieir German personnel were* if possible, to be

supplied with small arms*

NSKK Transport Units* These were attached partly to Army Supply,

partly to OT. The 12 companies of the four battalions so formed,

were to be supplied with one or two machine guns each*

On 18th June, as has already been mentioned, a general order was

issued by von RUNDSTEDT by which OT units were exclusively assigned

to tasks of air-raid salvage and repair work* This order did not

materially affect the mobile organisation of OT. as described above*

Some changes in the chain of command did occur, however, owing to the

fact that the area of activity was to be well in the interior* Only

local French labour, not subject to evacuation, was to continue work

on the Atlantic Wall* Repairs on highways, bridges were to be carried

out under the direction of Army Fortress Engineers in liaison with

the Feldkommandantur (Military Regional Command)* For the repair

of railway bridges, tracks and stations in areas subject to enemy

infiltration, the Konunandeur d* Eisenbahnbaupioniere - West

(Commander of the Railway Construction Engineers of Army Group West)

was responsible. Repair work could be carried out either under the
direction of Army Railway Engineers or of OT engineers.

For repair work on railway tracks and stations in the rear areas,
such as the transportation zones LTLLE, PARIS-NCKD, PARIS-WEST,
BCfiDEAIJX and LTONS, the Chief Engineer of Army Group West was
responsible. OT worked on these repairs in conjunction with the
Chef des Hauptverkehrsdienst (chief Traffic Officer) of the Wehrmacht
in Prance who supplied the technical personnel, both German and French.
The repair of aerodromes was also the responsibility of the Chief
Engineer of Array Group West. On this work, OT worked in conjunction
with the Luftwaffe Feldbauamt (GAP Field Construction Bureau).

Salvage work on the waterways, on the other hand, was undertaken

by the French and* Belgian Waterways Authorities under direction of the
German Chief Traffic Officer. If repairs were necessary, they would
be undertaken by the OT, at the request of the Chief Traffic Officer
and by command of the Chief Engineer of Army Group West.

Military Regional Commanders were charged with:

1. Inspecting the scene of damage together with OT engineers

and the appropriate Army Administrative Officer, such as
the Traffic Officer in the case of railway damage;

2. Sending reports on the damage and the requirements for

repair measures to the MilitSr Befehlshaber Frankreich (CbnEaanding
General of France)

3. Providing the OT with manpower on apriority basis in the

case of air-raid damage repair;

4* Conscripting the locally unemployed in France so as to co-ordinate

the supply of manpower over the entire region.

14. Evacuation of the OT from Prance

Evacuation of OT foreign personnel to the rear areas in case

of invasion was left to the individual field divisions stationed in

the corresponding OT sectors. The order of priority was as follows:

1. German female personnel,

2. German male personnel,

3. Foreign volunteers,

4. Skilled foreign labour necessary to carry out building

projects planned by the military authorities, and

5. *' Unskilled foreign labour, including French colonials in private

industries and French inductees into the French compulsory

labour groups.

Order of priority in regard to equipment was:

1. Dredges and steamshovels.

2* Locomotives*

3* Rails.

-15­
 F a c t o r s m i l i t a t i n g a g a i n s t complete evacuation of f o r e i g n
OT personnel were:

1* Lack of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n fuel.

2. Belated evacuation p l a n s ,

3» Ignorance of date of i n v a s i o n .

4» Ignorance of A l l i e d t a c t i c a l plans*

5* Low p r i o r i t y r a t i n g of f o r e i g n personnel i n the evacuation

schedule.

6m Unwillingness of a majority of f o r e i g n personnel t o be

evacuated.

7« Difficulties arising from b a t t l e conditions,,

One factor favouring complete evacuation:

1. The concentration of Allied landings at one point which gave

OT personnel in other areas a chance to get away.

Transportation was provided only for priority German personnel

such as women, officials and employees in key positions. Otherwise
German personnel able to walk was assigned to the supervision of march
columns. Material was transported by t r a i n . The evacuation plans
were circulated on the 18th to the 20th May throughout coastal areas
- in Prance. Moreover the commanding generals of the individual sectors
were empowered to order a partial evacuation, ifs in their judgment,
Allied landing were a feint or a diversion.

The foreign personnel were the l a s t to be evacuated. Portions

of i t were intercepted by the Allied advance across BRITTAHT
and in the CHERBOURG peninsula. There were forced night marches.
Most French personnel, comprising about 35/£ of a l l foreign workers
in the West, deserted at the f i r s t opportunity. The total OT
personnel in the West almost certainly numbered less than 300*000?
of which about 85,000 were French. I t is likely that the Germans
managed to evacuate toward the Reich border between 100,000 ­
150,000 non-German workers, especially as, excepting in Normandy,
they encountered l i t t l e Allied interference.

B» After D-Day

15. Manpower and Personnel in Autumn 1944

SPEER, in a confidential declaration made on 9th November 1944*

stated that the 0T had 850,000 workers at i t s disposal inside Germany,
and that this number was expected to be increased to approximately
1,000,000 men in the near future, most of the increase to consist
of Hungarian Jews. I t was not expected that the 3^1£)0,000iieirk,
necessary for carrying out the construction programme contemplated at
the time would be reached. As can be gathered from these figures, the
0T has been assigned an all-important role in German plans for
continuation of total warfare.

Composition of 0T personnel at the present time, can be described

in general terms only. I t is estimated that of i t s approximately
300,000 foreign workers in Einsatzgruppe West (EGW), the Organisation
managed to evacuate about one third. Such personnel as was lost during
the process, mostly French, Belgian, Dutch and Spanish, has been
replaced by new forcible levies of^Hungarians, Slovaks, Czechs, and
Italians. I t is furthermore estimated that the proportion of foreign
personnel to Germans remains at least as high as 75 percent. As to"'

the disposition of the mentioned manpower, little is known beyond

the fact that it is apparently a basic OT policy to allocate foreign

personnel as far away as possible from their homeland.

16. Effects of Allied

The evacuation of EGW, until D-Day the biggest and most important
of the OT Einsatzgruppen, together with the radical change in the
military situation» threw the OT inside Germany in a temporary state
of confusion. Not only was an estimated two thirds of i t s foreign
EGW personnel lost, but i t afforded German personnel the opportunity
for unsactioned transfers to other employers within OT. Conversely,
i t gave certain OT-Firms an opportunity, once they were back in the
Reich, to hold on to personnel which had been put in their charge for
evacuation purposes only.

Such a state of disorganisation did not l a s t long. By

15th July 1944* Germany had already been divided into 8 Einsatzgruppen,
22 Eins&tze? and an unknown number of Oberbauleitungen (estimated
average is three to four OBL*s to one Einsatz). Shortly afterwards
a series of directives were issued by SHEER, having the following
results:

x These eight Einsatzgruppen subdivided into 22 Einsatze, each

of which i s based on the boundaries of a Rttstungsinspektion (Armaments
Inspectorate), comprise the following areas. (Except for the Ruhr area
Einsatzgruppen were not known inside Germany until July 1944» For
greater d e t a i l , see Part V.)

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" I East Prussia and Rear Area of

Army Group North Russia.

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" I I Bamerania, Brandenburg,

West Prussia, Wartheland

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland* I I I Westphalia, Schleswig-Holstein

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" IV Hessen, Thuringia, Saxony,

Brunswick, Hanover.

Wfcrttemberg, Oberrhein,
Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" V Westmark-Mbsselland, Rhein-Main
(Hessen-Nassau)

Oberfranken, Upper Palatinate,

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" VI Lawer Bavaria, Strabia, Upper
Bavaria, Upper and Lower Danube,

Einsatzgruppe "Deutschland" VII Bohemia and Moravia, Sudetenland,

Lower and Upper Silesia.

Einstazgruppe "Deutschland" VIII Steiermark, Karnten, Tyrol,

Salzburg, Alpenvorland and
Adriatic Coastal Regions.

-17­
1* Rationalization^ on a nation wide basis a of OT-Firms» their
technical staffs and worker personnel* An allotment was made
to each of the eight Einsatzgruppen on the basis of their
individual assignments and tasks. The chiefs of the
Einsatzgruppen in turn made manpower allotments to the OBL's
within their respective apeas (Einsfitze being in essence
programne control staffs, were omitted as far as administrative
channels were concerned)*
2» Replenishment of trained German personnel. Shortage of trained
German personnel of foreman calibre and w.ith qualities of
leadership i s now partially met by training of lower grade
German OT workers. Courses being given 'after working hours.
A specialist in economy engineering, 11sent by the autonomous
economic group "Construction Industry to each QBL, acts as
efficiency expert and consultant* An intensive canvass of
suitable prospects for taking part in this training is being
made* and even foreigners are admitted, provided they are
officially classified as collaborationists. The shortage
of foremen and NCO's was also partially offset by the
acquisition of trained persomel from the Air Force and Navy
construction agencies, when, i n JUly 1944* the OT was permitted
to use their administrative f a c i l i t i e s for the purpose of
programne co-ordination. A third source of supply came from
among c i v i l servants who came into the OT as a result of the
comb-out connected with the administrative re-organisation of
Amt Bau-OTZ (for the latter see IB. 19 below). Finally a
fourth source of supply, one of mainly supervisory and
disciplinary rather than technical sub-leaders, came from the
pool of partly incapacitated members of the Armed Forces
who are regularly assigned in small groups to the OT,
particularly to the Frontftthrungen (See above IA»5)» Selected
and qualified BT labour, mostly Russian, are also detailed to
construction sites which lag badly behind schedule*
3» Premiums for efficiency. Efficient firms are awarded
priority in equipment and spare parts. Competent foremen,
especially in the case of foreigners and Fff labour, are awarded
efficiency bonuses.
4* Drawing up of a basic, irreducible programme% called
"MindestbauprogrammP This schedule is planned to draw on
Germans resources for construction to not more than 40 percent.
Construction and repair of hydro-electrical installations have
the highest priority, inasmuch as steam and electric power
must be used to replace petrol to the greatest extent practicable.
5» Reinforcement of the emergency construction crews or units,
acting as "shock-troops"* Each large OT-Finn, or combination
of smaller firms working on the same construction s i t e , was
instructed to form Sondereinsatze (Buergency Units) from amongst
their personnel, in order to deal with major breaks in
communications and damage to vital installations by Allied
bombing, both in the zone of communications and in the interior.
In connection with these duties, the units may be transported
across the boundaries of Gauarbeitsfimter (District Labour
Control Bureaux). ^ e y consist of men picked for their s k i l l
and initiative, and their equipment is likewise complete, of
the latest type and highly mobile. In the event of major
air-raids, a sufficient number of units consolidate in order
to cope effectively with the resulting problems of repair.
They are formed, however, only in case of emergency within
their sector; between such emergencies^ their personnel
:ert_ t&Jjheir normal daily assignnents at their Baustellen
BH

-18­
 .•*
(Construction Sites), in this case usual3^i|icfl|tt JIS? fy V'V'f?' •?•
Stammbaustellen (Home Construction Sites),
arrangement is a development of similar measures taken
in Prance, as described in IA 13 above.

17» "QT Special Brigades" Reported in October 1944

The recent creation of Front-OT has led to some misconceptions*

The Front-OT i s an area comprising Germany's border region and
German occupied Europe - Norway, Denmark, N. Italy, etc. - within
which OT personnel receives distinctive treatment in regard to pay,
and so forth.

The misinterpretation apparently was caused by an order of

HITIER's, 13th October 1944, for the activation of a special OT force
(Brigades) of 80,000 men to operate within the OT-Pront area in
Germany. This special force, should consequently not be confused
with-the Front-OT i t s e l f . A secondary version of the order has been
given in the paragraph below, however, inasmuch as the original
captured document has been interpreted elsewhere and i s not available.

The order signed by HITLER on 13th October, defined the scope and
purpose of the Front-OT. As the plans for it were developed, the
Front-OT was to consist of 80,000 men, equally divided between
Germany's East and West front zones. At least 25 percent of the
personnel was to be German. Units were to be militarized, that is to
say, formed into companies of 150, battalions of 600 - 750,
regiments of 3000, and brigades of 30,000. The task of the~new
formations were to be the reconstruction of damaged communications
systems, and so forth (in other words they were to be identical to those
of the emergency units previously discussed). To achieve i t s purpose
the Front-OT was to be equipped especially with mobile compressors,
cutting tools, motor rams and carpenters' tools. Basic units
(probably companies) were to be sufficiently mobile and carry enough
equipment to effectively control operation of a force three times i t s
normal strength.

18. Evaluation of 0T "Special Brigades".

This project was apparently nothing but a further development of

the so-called shock troops already mentioned, and which in turn were
merely a development of the emergency crews in France, (for which see
IA.13 above). Weighing the pros and cons of the probabilities of the
actual existence of such a formation of 80,000 men with sufficient
equipment to expand at need to a force of a quarter million, it would
surprise no one to find that Allied raids have been effective enough
to cause i t s creation. That would mean a permanent nucleus of shock
construction troops allotted in the form of two brigades comprising
together about 20,000 men to each of the 4 Einsatzgruppen comprising
Germany's eastern and western frontiers. This would in turn mean
that such special personnel has been relieved altogether of i t s former
routine duties between emergencies, and assigned permanently to
mobile emergency work. There i s , however, basis for belief that
units of this type are s t i l l administered by the various OBL's
in which they are stationed, just like ordinary 0T personnel.
In fact, their individual assignments to high priority tasks are
allotted to them by sub-section D, of the Einsatzgruppe HQ, known
as Fliegerschaden3oforfanas3nahmen (Air Raid Damage Snergency Measures)
of Referat Bau (Construction Section) in that EQ. Such allotment i s
effected through the appropriate OSL HQ which includes a similar
sub-section for Bnergency Measures.
 The project i t s e l f cannot be accepted at face value as a f a i t
accompli. There are indications that i t f e l l through, in the f i r s t
place because equipment was found to be too valuable to allow i t s
concentration in such mass, for the exclusive use of a comparatively
minor branch of the Organization; rin the second place, because present
conditions and the diversity of OT s tasks virtually preclude any
rigid regimentation which, going beyond personnel administration,
attempts to make itself felt in operational matters. Even i f the
project had been actually realized in i t s entirety, i t s t i l l should
not be assumed - as has been done - that the rest of the OT has been
dissolved. Obviously, after having been put in charge of a l l civilian
and military construction in Germany by highest authority, as discussed
in the following paragraphs, the OT was not stripped of nine tenths
of i t s personnel on practically the same day.
19. Amt Bau-OTZ
While the Reich was being divided into Einsatzgruppen, e t c . , in
preparation for the home-coming of the OT, higher policy in regard to
i t s status as a governmental agency was likewise being revised, with
the result that at present the OT i s found to be in control of all
construction inside Germany,
The first step was taken on 29th April 1944, when Amt Bau (Bureau
of Construction) in the SHEER Ministry, was placed under the official
who already was (and s t i l l is) head of OTZ, Ministerialdirektor DORSGH.
Inasmuch as Amt Bau controlled the construction and building industries
in Germany, the step effectively put OTZ on an equal footing with Amt
Bau. The reason officially given was that it was HITLER'S specific
desire that it should be made possible for the OT to "perform i t s tasks
smoothly and unfettered, also in the Reich". I t s tasks prudently were
defined as "construction work for the war production industry"• The
step was ratified by a decree of the Ftthrer, dated 24th August 1944,
placing SPEER, in the capacity of Chief of the OT, in control of all
official administrative construction agencies within Germany. In
effect, the decree by implication placed the OT in control of Amt Bau's
administrative organization. Before the intermediate steps leading
to this development are discussed, a brief outline of the history of
Amt Bau is given below.
Amt Bau was created as part of the 3FEEK Ministry, when the latter
was reorganized in the autumn of 1943» The specific decree
establishing the Bureau is dated 29th October 1943* The creation of
the office put i t s chief, the GeneralbevollmSchtigter Bau
(Plenipotentiary - General for Construction), - at that time ST03BE­
DETHLEPFSEN - on an equal footing with the chiefs of the other Bmter
(Bureaux) of the SIEER Ministry. STOBBE-DETHLEEFSEN, however, in
addition to being head of Amt Bau, also represented SH2ER in the
latter*s capacity of Generalbevollmttchtigter fttr die Regelung der
Bauwirtschaft im Raume des Vierjahresplan (Plenipotentiary-Ganeral
for the Regulation of the Construction Industry within ths Pour Year
Plan). This dual function is reflected clearly, however, in the
subordinate echelons.
Thus the Bau Bevollmachtigter im Bezirk der R&stungsinspektion
(Construction Plenipotentiary for the District of the Armament.?
Inspectorate) derived his authority from the Plenipotentiary General
(STQBBE-DETHELFFSEN) and exercised full control over the priority
programme for construction and allotment of building supplies. The
Baubeauftragte im Gau (Construction Deputy in each Parly Gau), on the
other hand, derived his authority from the Chief of Amt BAU (also
S'OBBE-DETHLERPSEN). The Baubeauftragter, acted as liaison official
between the Gauleiter in the latter*s capacity of Reichsverteidigungs­
ko-ianissar (Reich Defence Commissioner) and the Construction Plenipotentiary
-20­
of the Armament Inspectorate District in whose sphere the Party Gau
was wholly or partly situated. As for the administration of
construction within the Gau. such as e.g. the issuing of permits for
construction of a non-military "but high priority nature, or public
and Party institutes, the Deputy was subordinate to both the
Gauleiter and the Plenipotentiary, although primarily to the l a t t e r .

On 3rd June 1944, Amt Bau and OTZ were consolidated. While the

resultant agency, as to organization, follows ths lines of the Amt

Bau rather than that of the OTZ, most if not a l l heads of i t s

Amtsgruppen (Branches) are former OTZ departmental heads. I t can

be said, therefore, that the transformation is one in name rather than

fact, and that a l l OTZ key personnel have continued in their functions.

The next step, as already mentioned above (Para 16 foot-note)

accomplished by 15th July 1944, was the formation of the eight

Einsatzgruppen, etc. inside Germany and the establishment of the next

chain of command. The most radical feature of the latter was the

elimination of the Construction Plenipotentiaries and their staffs,

and the creation of four Baubeauftragte (construction deputies)

for each Gau, instead of one, on the staff of the Reich Defenc3

Commissioner 1 one for civilian construction permits, one for

inspection of civilian construction, one fcr air raid shelters

construction, and one to act as efficiency or economy engineer.

The reorganization of the OT in Germany was thus practically

completed about 15th July 1944* and HITLER'S aforementioned decree of
24th August of that year was therefore a ratification of an already
existing arrangement. The change in the chain of command, eliminating
the Construction Plenipotentiaries and replacing them by the
Einsatzgruppenleiter as the highest regional executive authorities,
subordinate only to Amt Bau-QTZ, was inevitable if duplication was to
be avoided. On l6th October 1944, SFEER, empowered by HITLER'S
decree, issued a series of directives defining the relative spheres of
authority of the Chiefs of Einsatzgruppen, the Chiefs of Einsatze,
and the Construction Deputies on the staffs of the Reich Defence
Commissioners (Gauleiter). Both documents are rendered in
translation at the end of this section (Paras 21 and 22). Construction
agencies of the German Air Force and Navy were taken over by the OT in
late summer 1944*

20. Significance of FrOnt-OT

There are strong indications that the pooling of a million men

in one industry, and their sudden redistribution on a rationalized basis,
disrupted the economy of those construction firms which had not been
conscripted into the OT. Such a re-allotment caused resentment on
the part of firms who lost employees attracted by the comparatively
high wages paid by the OT. The movement of masses of OT personnel,
over whom they had no control, across their administrative boundaries
disturbed the Gau Labour Control officials, as well as the Gauleiters
in their capacity of Defence Commissioners. A compromise was
consequently effected. Zones were established, which because of
their susceptibility to enemy action, were designated front zones,
and the collective area was designated Front-OT. Within this area
of highest construction priority, the OT has the status of a
military organisation, and i t s personnel, Mas Angehflrige (member)
of the Wehrmacht", commensurate basic pay plas the extra allowances,
bonuses, compensations, etc. which - with certain exceptions - OT
has been uniformly paying to their personnel working in exposed areas,
since January 1943* I t s German personnel are called Frontarbeiter,
i t s foreign personnel, OT Le^ionare. The Front-OT may also move
i t s personnel across regional labour boundaries inside the Reich
without interference from the Reichstreuhttnder fllr die Arbeit
(Reich Labour Trustees) who are SAUCKEL's regional representatives,
or from the Reich Defence Commissioners (who are also the Gauleiter).
This Front OT consists of (l) the operational zones fronting the
Allies in the West, and the Russians in the East; (2) heavily bombed

-21­
areas within the Reich; (3) Einsatzgruppe Italy; and (4)

Einsatzgruppe Wiking (Norway and Denmark)* The extent of the zone

may be changed at the discretion of the Wehrmacht. That part of

the Organization which is. not active in front zone is not designated

Front-OT, and its skilled personnel receive only such specialist pay

above their basic pay as is uniformly regulated by the Plenipotentiary

General for Manpower Allocation^ SAUCKEL) for all labour in Germany.

And inasmuch as the OT has always distinguished between Fronteinsatz

(Service performed in the operational area) and Heimatseinsatz (Service

in the zone of the interior), there is consequently no basis for-

assuming that the OT has been reduced either in sphere of authority or

in strength of personnel. Nor is there any basis for assuming that

there has been a partial dissolution of the OT. All indications

point to the contrary. It is well to remember, however, that even

in the Zone of the Interior, the OT is, in respect to manpower priority,

classified as a vital industry.

21. HITLER'S Decree of 24th August 1944

DECREE OP THE FttHRER CONCERNING THE WAR COMMITMENT CF THE

ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES FOR CONSTRUCTION 24th August 1944

(See above IB 19)

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and Chief of

Organisation Todt henceforth heads the war activities of the

Administrative Agencies for Construction. I empower him to issue

directives for the above purpose to all administrative National

Municipal construction agencies of Greater Germany and incorporated

territories. He may dispose over the personnel and facilities of

these agencies according to his Judgment.

The administrative organisation remains unchanged by thus being

placed on a war footing.

II

The d e c i s i o n s under paragraph I apply a l s o to s t a t e - c o n t r o l l e d public

corporations i n s o f a r as they have a d m i n i s t r a t i v e a g e n c i e s of t h e i r own.

Ill

The Reich M i n i s t e r f o r Armament and War Production and Chief of

the OT w i l l i s s u e , henceforth, the l e g a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e g u l a t i o n s

necessary for c a r r y i n g out and amplifying the above decree i n agreement

w i t h the P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y General f o r the Administration of the Reich

(HTMM1ER).

IV.

This decree l a p s e s at the end of the war.

Fflhrer HQ. 24th August 1944,

The Ftlhrer.
Adolf HITLER.
Reich M i n i s t e r and Chief of the Reich Chancellery, Dr. LAMMERS.

22. SFEER's Decree o f l 6 t h October 1944

FIRST EXECUTIVE CRDEE FOLLOWING THE DECREE OF THE FOHRER

CONCERNING THE WAR COMMITMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.

FOR CONSTRUCTION l 6 t h October 1944

(See above IB 19)

With reference to paragraph I I I o f the Ftthrer's Decree

Concerning the War Conmitment of the A d m i n i s t r a t i v e Agencies f o r
Construction of 24th Augu-st 1944 (Reichsgesetzblatt I, p. 207),

I order, for the territory of Greater Germany and incorporated

territories, in agreement with the Plenipotentiary General for Reich

Administration (HBtMIER), the following:

1.
The Chiefs of Einsatzgruppen of the Organization Todt may

henceforth commission administrative agencies of the Reich,

the provinces, municipalities and communes, as well as those

of state-controlled public corporations, to execute such

scheduled and projected construction as they have consented

to exempt from the Building Restrictions, (para 7 of the

31at regulation concerning the Building Restriction of

8th August 1944, (Reichs Anzeiger No. 206))

2.
They may avail themselves of the building facilities of the

Wehrmacht according to existing arrangements with the various

departments of the Armed Forces.

II

The Construction Deputies to the Reich Defence Commissioner may

group together construction agencies of the Reich, the
provinces, and conmunes, as well as those of state-controlled
public corporations, for the execution Qf construction
assignments, according to the requirements of their commitments.

The Construction Deputies will be appointed by the Reich

Minister for Armament and War Production and Chief of

Organization Todt, in agreement with the Reich Defence

Commissioners. They are subordinated to ttie Reich Defence

Comnissioners and are assigned to the executive offices of

the Reich Defence Commissioners.

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production at the same

time in his capacity of Plenipotentiary General for the

Regulation of the Construction Industry, has competence over

the Reich Defence Commissioners (through the Construction

Deputies) in the matter of directives.

Ill

1.
The Reich Defence Commissioners will (through the Construction

Deputies) examine the possibilities for combined management of

current administrative business and the reshuffling of duties

for the purpose of reducing personnel and administrative

overhead, and for putting the facilities of the public agencies

for construction to the most efficient use.

2.
The Reich Defence Commissioner may (through the Construction

Deputy) regulate at his own discretion transfers from one

agency to another of the management of current administrative

business.

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and Chief of

Organization Todt in concert with the Plenipotentiary General

of Reich Administration (KEMMLER), decides in the matter of

reshuffling of duties from the sphere of competence of one

agency to that of another. Insofar as the possibility for

the elimination of agencies is thereby created, the procedure

will be regulated by the ranking official of the eliminated

agency involved.

The Reich Defence Conmissioner in whose Gau (Party District)

the seat of the competent, regional office is situated

 has the final responsibility for measures taken in the oase

of state controlled public corporations and administrative

agencies whose spheres extend over several Reich Defence

Districts*

IV.

1. The Reich Defence Conmissioners (through the Construction

Deputies) are obliged to put all available personnel and

establishments (office buildings), equipment and diverse

installations, at the disposal of the Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen

of the Organization Todt for use in construction as named in

para* I*

2* Hie Chiefs of the Einsatzgruppen will specify their requirements

for personnel and facilities to the Reich Defence Commissioners

(through the Construction Deputies)* Should the latter,

on compelling grounds, believe themselves unable to comply

with the requirements, they must, having so informed the Chief

of Einsatzgruppe, obtain directly the decision of the Reich

Minister for Armament and War Production, which will be rendered

in concert with the Plenipotentiary General for Reich

Administration (KEMMLER)

7.

The above standing orders do not apply to administrative

agencies for construction of the Reich State Railways and the

Reich R>stal Service.

VI.

The Chief of the Einsatzgruppe in the Protectorate of Bohemia

and Moravia has no competence of direction and disposition over

the autonomous (Protectorate) officials and agencies* Liaison

will be established only through the German State Minister for

Bohemia and Moravia*

Berlin, 3.6th October,

1944.

The Reich Minister for Armament and War Production and

Chief of Organization Todt, SPEER.

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