Wess Spanish Armada Page: History, Highlights, Myths, and Muddles

Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada

The Spanish Armada encounter of 1588 was undoubtedly an important and fascinating battle. However, even today it is fre uently surrounded by common myths and confusions that date bac! to "ictorian #ra days. The battle itself was followed by 1$ years of land and naval war between #ngland and Spain in which the Spanish were mostly successful and renewed their control over the high seas, a basic fact that many te%ts and popular accounts often fail entirely to mention. Spain retooled its navy and shipped three times as much silver in the 15&'s as before. The Spanish invasion force, moreover, was never referred to (by )hilip or anyone else in Spain* as the +,nvincible Armada-. medical resources on the Spanish coast were mobili/ed with surprising rapidity and effectiveness to tend to sic! and wounded returning sailors in 1588, suggesting that the Spaniards very much were prepared for

the potential failure of the Spanish Armada and run0ins with rough weather. These are 1ust a few of the common myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada battle. a list of the +Top 1'- myths is compiled and tac!led below. Please feel free to quote from, print, and cite the text belo as, +Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada, historys most confused and misunderstood battle, by Wes !lm, Har"ard !ni"ersity personal ebsite, !#$: http:%% &people&fas&har"ard&edu%'ulm%history%sp(armada&htm, ) *++,& (1a) Myth: The defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588 was a decisive victory for the Eng ish that mar!ed Eng and"s tri#mph in its war with Spain$ Spain never again tried to and forces in Eng and after that, fai ed in its %id to end Eng ish %#ccaneering against Spanish treas#re ships, and cha enged Eng and on y on and, not at sea$ (1%) -act: &a se on a co#nts$ The Spanish Armada confrontation was not at a decisive' it was mere y an ear y sea %att e in a ong, intermittent, %#t often grinding and and nava war %etween Eng and and Spain that asted from ./0/ #nti .1+,$ As (" disc#ss %e ow, Spain defeated 2ngland in most of the land and na"al battles after the Armada and won a favora% e treaty in 1)*+$ Spain, in fact, dispatched three more Spanish Armadas in the 15,*s that were dispersed %y storms$ &#rthermore, in 15,5, the Spanish, in fact, did succeed in landing troops in western Eng and, where they attac!ed and %#rned severa towns %efore disem%ar!ing, as wi %e detai ed %e ow (myth -1*a)$ .f a the common Spanish Armada myths, this one/the fai #re to even ac!now edge the most %asic, incontroverti% e fact of the war that was waged %etween Eng and and Spain after the Armada/has a ways stric!en me as the most p#00 ing$ (t"s a!in to teaching the history of the 1S 2ivi 3ar and ha ting at the &irst 4att e of 4# 5#n in 18)1, or disc#ssing the Second 3or d 3ar and stopping at the &a of &rance in 1,+*, witho#t mentioning the 4att es of 6idway, E A amein, 7#ada cana , or the 898ay :ormandy invasion at a ; A gross y mis eading, terri% y incorrect impression of the conf ict is there%y imparted$ The !ey here is to recogni0e that the Spanish Armada was mere y one battle, an ear y one in a ong war' this simp e fact is often #nrecogni0ed and #nac!now edged, contri%#ting to many of the other common myths$

(<a) Myth: The defeat of the Spanish Armada was the %eginning of Eng and"s contro of the high seas$ Spain never recovered from the Spanish Armada fiasco and re in=#ished contro of the ocean anes to the Eng ish$ Eng and"s stat#s as mistress of the seas wo# d %e #ncha enged for cent#ries as the 4ritish Empire grew in si0e, and the va#nted Eng ish navy co# d trace its dominance of the sea anes to the Spanish Armada"s defeat in 1588$ (<%) -act: .ne of the most common statements a%o#t the Spanish Armada, and one that is tota y fa se$ Spain recovered =#ic! y from the Armada de%ac e and defeated Eng and on and and at sea in m# tip e mi itary engagements in the decade fo owing the Spanish Armada$ ((n fact, an Eng ish Armada sent in 158,, the year after the Spanish Armada, s#ffered a cr#shing defeat against Spain, >#st as its Spanish co#nterpart did against Eng and in 1588$) .ne of the most important conse=#ences of the Spanish Armada was that it a tered ass#mptions a%o#t nava warfare, since the Eng ish at 7rave ines had opted for sma er, rapid y re oading, more mane#vera% e ight coasta defensive ships in p ace of the heavy ocean9going ga eons with sing e9firing cannon (fo owed %y sei0e9and9grapp e tactics) #sed %y Spain$ The most eager st#dents of the Eng ish nava innovations and tactics were? the Spaniards$ @hi ip"s post9Armada s=#adrons were m#ch more agi e and nim% e than those prior to it$ The Spaniards deve oped and imp emented an efficient convoy system that ena% ed them to ship three times as m#ch go d and si ver from the Americas after the Spanish Armada than %efore it/indeed, Spain transported more precio#s meta s in the decade of the 15,*s than in any other; Eng and"s %#ccaneering sea dogs were no onger a% e to raid Spanish treas#re transports effective y, a fact that was #nderscored %y the comp ete fai #re of a privateering eApedition %y Sir Bohn Caw!ins and Sir 6artin &ro%isher in 158,915,* against Spanish shipping$ &#rthermore, %oth Bohn Caw!ins and Sir &rancis 8ra!e/the most famo#s of Eng and"s privateering pirates/were !i ed in a disastro#s raid against Spanish America in 15,5, a m# ti9pronged attac! against Spanish co onies in the Americas that was anticipated and #tter y cr#shed %y Spanish defenses, one of the worst defeats that the Eng ish navy wo# d ever s#ffer$ Spain"s post9Armada navy was retoo ed and eApanded, and Spain r# ed the waves for most of the 1)**s' in contrast, %y the ast year of the reign of D#een E i0a%eth ( in 1)*E, Eng and remained re ative y wea! as a sea power, and its maritime strength d#ring the ear y years of the St#art 8ynasty (Bames ( and 2har es ( in the ear y 1)**s) grew on y grad#a y

and ha ting y$ 3hen Spain was fina y rep aced as a nava %e wether in the ate 1Fth cent#ry, it was the 3utch who ass#med the mant e of dominant sea power, defeating Eng and in severa Ang o98#tch 3ars of the ate 1)**s$ .n y in the mid4.5++s does Eng and tr# y emerge as the nava power contro ing the sea anes, after victories in consec#tive Ang o9&rench wars (inc #ding the famo#s -rench and 6ndian War with the Treaty of @aris in 1F)E, the victory that fina y ena% ed Eng and to dominate :orth America and spread its empire on a g o%a sca e)$ (Ea) Myth: Spain was ec ipsed as a great power fo owing the Spanish Armada, sin!ing into inso vency and rapid dec ine, whi e Eng and %ecame rich, prospero#s, and powerf# $ (E%) -act: Spain definite y did not s ip into insignificance fo owing the Armada defeat$ As noted a%ove, Spain in fact defeated Eng and on and and at sea in n#mero#s %att es of the decade after the Spanish Armada and retained s#%stantia inf #ence over affairs in E#rope and the Americas we into the 1)**s$ 2r#shing de%t aff icted both Spain and 2ngland as a res# t of their war' %y the c ose of E i0a%eth ("s reign, the Eng ish were near y GE,***,*** in de%t and had so d offices and crown ands to avoid s ipping f#rther, and Spain"s @hi ip (( had dec ared severa %an!r#ptcies in para e $ (n addition to the eAor%itant eApenses in the conf ict against Spain, the Eng ish were dragged into a draining, cost y, inconc #sive g#erri a war against (re and from 15,+91)*E ed %y an (rish ord named C#gh .":ei , the Ear of Tyrone$ Hate E i0a%ethan Eng and a so s#ffered crop fai #res, famines, and p ag#es that engendered severe poverty in m#ch of the co#ntry$ 6ost important y, the contin#ation of the war with Spain drained Eng ish financia reso#rces and hindered trade, eaving a severe financia %#rden for the St#art !ings of the ear y 1)**s$ This de%t, in con>#nction with the St#arts" prof igacy, wo# d contri%#te to the crisis %etween monarch and @ar iament which ca#sed the Eng ish 2ivi 3ar of the mid91)**s, a partic# ar y %itter and % oody conf ict that wo# d sp it the nation$ As for Spain, the nation was event#a y cripp ed in the ate 1)**s %y interna corr#ption, fai #res in its monarchica system/ mar!ed %y fee% e r# ers with a propensity to p ay favorites and ind# ge prodiga y in festivities / and severe inf ation ca#sed in part %y its precio#s meta s shipments from the :ew 3or d$ Cowever, in a mi itary sense, the most decisive defeats it s#ffered were in the 4att es of 5ocroi and @assaro against the -rench in the E* Iears" 3ar (1)1891)+8), not the Eng ish$ (t was these

and defeats that most severe y enfee% ed Spain as a E#ropean power, ena% ing the &rench to rep ace Spain as E#rope"s dominant nation d#ring the reign of Ho#is J(K$ (+a) Myth: The 4ritish Empire/in the sense of the ong9term sett ement and co oni0ation of distant overseas territories/was initiated fo owing the defeat of the Spanish Armada, since sett ement was now fina y opened #p to the Eng ish and other northern E#ropeans$ (+%) -act: :ot %y a ongshot$ .nce again, we have to remem%er that the war dragged on #ns#ccessf# y for Eng and after the Spanish Armada, and the co#ntry"s reso#rces and seafaring vesse s had to %e spared for the conf ict against Spain$ The fai #re of the Eng ish Armada in 158,, an Eng ish9 ed eApedition to Spain and @ort#ga , fr#strated attempts to %rea! Spain"s nava power, and the materia , financia , and h#man cost of this defeat prevented eApeditions to :orth America/ pro%a% y contri%#ting to the fai #re of the 5oano!e 2o ony in what is now Kirginia in the 1nited States, which had %een attempted in the 158*s %#t from which there were no s#rvivors$ 3hen the Treaty of Hondon in 1)*+ officia y ceased hosti ities %etween Spain and Eng and (the treaty having %een signed %y Eng and"s Ling Bames (, who had s#cceeded E i0a%eth in 1)*E), Eng and ac!ed a permanent sett ement in the Americas or anywhere e se$ (t was on y after this negotiated peace that Eng and was fina y freed to %egin co oni0ation, fo owing on the hee s of Spain, @ort#ga , and &rance$

7he $ost 8olony at #oano9e

(5a) Myth: Spain"s Ling @hi ip (( craved nothing ess than the who esa e con=#est of Eng and with the Spanish Armada, and the anneAation of the is and co#ntry as a co ony of :ew Spain$ Eng and wo# d have %een converted into a 2atho ic nation and, had the Spanish Armada %een s#ccessf# , we"d a %e spea!ing Spanish today$ (5%) -act: @hi ip (( had re ative y modest goa s with the Spanish Armada and never intended to Mcon=#er Eng and, et a one convert the Eng ish pop# ace to 2atho icism en masse or compe them to spea! Spanish$ As ( disc#ss in more detai %e ow in this artic e"s main teAt, @hi ip"s center of attention was on the 2uropean 8ontinent/in fact, his principa enemies were the @rotestant re%e s from the provinces of the :ether ands, then a part of Spain, as we as @rotestant &rench C#g#enots and @ort#g#ese nationa ists who opposed @hi ip"s anneAation of @ort#ga in 158*$ Eng and was more periphera to @hi ip"s scheme, and his o%>ective with the Armada was chief y to stop Eng and from interfering with @hi ip"s centra aims e sewhere/name y, to cease Eng ish mi itary and financia s#pport of the 8#tch ins#rgents (whom the @rotestant Eng ish had %een assisting considera% y) and to ha t Eng ish %#ccaneer attac!s on Spanish treas#re ships$ @hi ip certain y did see! to win to erance for Eng ish 2atho ics and restore them to a more eAa ted stat#s %#t, as disc#ssed in the teAt, conditions in Eng and since Cenry K((("s %rea! with 5ome had rendered it virt#a y impossi% e for @hi ip or anyone e se to have forced Eng and to convert %ac! into a 2atho ic co#ntry$ There was no via% e 2atho ic rep acement for the @rotestant E i0a%eth ( since 6ary D#een of Scots had %een eAec#ted in 158F$ 6oreover, Spain"s pro% ems in the :ether ands, the ogistica iss#es posed %y Eng and"s ocation as an is and nation, and the eAperience of Spain"s invading armies on the 2ontinent c ear y indicate that even an entire y s#ccessf# Spanish Armada invasion in 1588 wo# d have had itt e c# t#ra effect on Eng and$ ()a) Myth: (n the 4att e of 7rave ines, the chief confrontation %etween the Eng ish defensive f eet and the Spanish Armada, the Eng ish won a st#nning #nderdog victory, having %een o#tn#m%ered and o#tg#nned %y the vast y more imposing Spanish Armada f eet$ ()%) -act: The Eng ish were neither o#tn#m%ered nor o#tg#nned at the 4att e of 7rave ines, as is so often c aimed$ There was a ro#gh parity in the si0es of the f eets' Spain had more %# !y ga eons, %#t Eng and had more tota ships in the water$

(Fa) Myth: The 4att e of 7rave ines was a titanic c ash on the high seas, one of the argest and most eAtraordinary nava %att es in history$ The Eng ish ships inf icted heavy damage on the Spanish Armada vesse s whi e s#ffering itt e of their own, sin!ing a arge n#m%er of Spain"s ships and forcing the Spaniards to f ee$ (F%) -act: The Spanish Armada %att e at 7rave ines itse f was definite y not a titanic nava c ash, %#t a short, inconc #sive, rather antic imactic enco#nter %etween two arge f eets, %oth of which committed ma>or % #nders and neither of which damaged each other significant y$ (t"s tr#e that the Spanish Armada ca#sed itt e damage to the Eng ish ships, %#t then, neither did the Eng ish ships ca#se m#ch harm at a to the Spanish f eet, as disc#ssed in the main teAt %e ow$ (t was an #n#s#a y ferocio#s Septem%er At antic storm as the Spanish vesse s were ro#nding the tip of (re and, that damaged andNor san! most of the Spanish Armada ships that did not ret#rn to port, either direct y or in compe ing the vesse s to %each on the roc!y (rish coast$ 6ost of Spain"s cas#a ties from the Spanish Armada invasion res# ted when sai ors died of or were incapacitated from disease and eApos#re, not from %att e wo#nds$ (n any case, most of the Spanish Armada ships did manage to ret#rn to port in Spain or @ort#ga $ 6any of the ost ships had a ready %een in a state of disrepair, whi e @hi ip (("s cr#cia At antic c ass vesse s/the most seaworthy in the Spanish Armada and designed for oceanic traversa , the !ey to Spain"s :ew 3or d empire and the new y con=#ered @hi ippines archipe ago in the @acific .cean/ ret#rned to the (%erian @enins# a arge y intact$ (n fact, eAce ent seamanship was disp ayed %y %oth the Eng ish and Spanish sides in their enco#nter, and it is =#ite remar!a% e that the Spaniards did not s#ffer greater osses considering the #nremitting y powerf# storm they had enco#ntered$ (8a) Myth: The Spanish Armada was d#%%ed Mthe (nvinci% e Armada (Ha Armada (nvenci% e) %y an overconfident, swaggering Ling @hi ip (( of Spain and his advisors, having %een so nic!named since they a ass#med that the Armada was so strong that it co# d never %e defeated %y the Eng ish$ (8%) -act: This ta e is repeated with %ewi dering fre=#ency/and it"s #tter y, a%so #te y fa se$ The Spanish Armada was never, ever referred to %y Ling @hi ip or his Spanish ministers as Mthe (nvinci% e Armada (MHa Armada (nvenci% e)' this term was an Eng ish invention, not a

Spanish one, #sed %y Eng ish historians who ater descri%ed the %att e, yet the term is fre=#ent y attri%#ted to the Spaniards incorrect y$ (n fact, the rapid mo%i i0ation of Spanish reso#rces #pon the ret#rn of the Armada ships to har%or in Spain #cid y demonstrates that the Spaniards had %een very m#ch prepared for the Armada"s potentia fai #re$ @op# ations in coasta towns were rapid y drafted and =#ic! y responded to aid the often in>#red and seasic! sai ors' food s#pp ies, hospita %eds and e=#ipment, and physicians were immediate y and efficient y m#stered for the Spanish Armada"s crews, saving h#ndreds of ives$ (,a) Myth: The Eng ish s#ffered %are y any cas#a ties at a in the Spanish Armada enco#nter, ce e%rating their victory with great reve ry fo owing the depart#re of the Armada f eet from Eng and"s coasta waters$ (,%) -act: The Eng ish themse ves s#ffered tho#sands of cas#a ties among their sai ors in the Spanish Armada engagement d#e to eApos#re and o#t%rea!s of infectio#s disease, and the %att e"s aftermath was characteri0ed not %y ce e%ration %#t %y finger9pointing, infighting, and %itter protestations when many sai ors were not compensated for months$ (1*a) Myth: After the Spanish Armada"s fai #re to invade Eng and, the Spaniards were never a% e to s#ccessf# y and troops on Eng ish soi $ This was a contin#ation of Eng and"s ong and remar!a% e defensive tradition, in which no hosti e mi itary force has ever s#cceeded in anding troops on the territory of the Eng ish is and main and since the :orman 2on=#est$ (1*%) -act: :ot true; The c aim that Eng and has never s#ffered a hosti e anding since 1*)) is repeated with eAtreme fre=#ency' and it a so happens to %e inacc#rate$ That"s %eca#se in 15,5, a Spanish force ed %y 8on 2ar os de Ames=#ita managed to achieve >#st that, even tho#gh the Spanish so diers had not intended s#ch a anding initia y$ Ames=#ita"s sma force had %een patro ing the waters of the Eng ish 2hanne when they enco#ntered a scarcity of pota% e water$ :avigating the ro#gh and fic! e winds in the 2hanne , Ames=#ita"s troops were % own ashore near 2ornwa on the western Eng ish coast$ The Spaniards easi y intimidated or defeated oca mi itia resistance and set fire to m#ch of @en0ance and s#rro#nding oca ities whi e p #ndering the ham ets for whatever vict#a s, na#tica aids, and freshwater s#pp ies

that they co# d find$ Event#a y the Eng ish %egan to m#ster a professiona army and s#mmon nava forces #nder Sir &rancis 8ra!e and Sir Bohn Caw!ins, %#t the Spanish managed to evade their adversaries when Ames=#ita"s force decamped and ret#rned home to the (%erian @enins# a/ after ho ding a traditiona 2atho ic 6ass on Eng ish soi $ The rest of this essay f eshes o#t the materia s#mmari0ed a%ove with greater detai and a more in9depth pict#re of the conditions s#rro#nding the Spanish Armada c ash and its aftermath$ (ntended as a companion to the Eng ish Armada artic e, this piece c#ts thro#gh the myths and ays o#t the facts of the Spanish Armada %att e, sti significant in n#mero#s respects as disc#ssed %e ow, %#t in ways far more s#%t e and intricate than are genera y appreciated$ Please feel free to quote from, print, and cite this essay as, +Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada, historys most confused and misunderstood battle, by Wes !lm, Har"ard !ni"ersity personal ebsite, !#$: http:%% &people&fas&har"ard&edu%'ulm%history%sp(armada&htm, ) *++,& The Spanish Armada Sets Sai (nto the 3aters of Cistorica 2onf#sion
2hances are yo#"ve %een eAposed to the Spanish Armada incident in yo#r history c ass$ The %road o#t ines, wide y fami iar, are that Spain"s Ling @hi ip (( sent a arge f eet of ships to rende0vo#s with professiona Spanish so diers, ed %y the 8#!e of @arma$ The com%ined f eet was to sai against E i0a%ethan Eng and in 1588, with the aim of invading the is and co#ntry, yet the Spanish Armada was never a% e to disem%ar! on Eng ish soi $ Enco#ntering resistance from Eng ish nava defense forces ed %y the i!es of Sir &rancis 8ra!e, the Armada %eat an escape path aro#nd the northern coasts of Scot and and (re and, where it enco#ntered a ferocio#s At antic storm and s#ffered heavy damage and cas#a ties %efore ret#rning to ports in the (%erian @enins# a$ So far, so good$ 4#t why did Ling @hi ip dispatch the Spanish Armada in the first p aceO 3hat were his war aimsO 3hat act#a y transpired d#ring the nava enco#nter %etween the Eng ish and Spanish f eetsO 3as there a raging %att e, or arge y a m#t#a avoidance of com%atO 3hat happened after the ArmadaO Cow did Eng and respond to it, and how did Spain ad>#stO 6ost important y, what were the short9term and ong9term effectsO They"re pro%a% y not what yo# thin!, %eca#se the ore of the Spanish Armada confrontation has attracted one inacc#racy after another over the years, to the point that descriptions of the most %asic detai s of the %att e"s pre #de, cond#ct, and aftermath are reg# ar y gotten wrong, and f#ndamenta aspects of the conf ict/especia y the %itter nava and and war waged %etween Eng and and Spain in the decade after the Spanish Armada/are omitted entire y, to the point that many Armada acco#nts are downright inacc#rate and mis eading$

The Spanish Armada %att e is, indeed, one of the most fre=#ent y conf#sed and thoro#gh y misrepresented historica incidents one can find' n#mero#s facets of the %att e, from the Armada"s war aims, to its nava composition, to its eAperiences on the high seas, to the enco#nters of the Spanish ships with the Eng ish and 8#tch sai ors are reported incorrect y not on y on 3e%sites %#t even in many teAt%oo!s$ @erhaps %eca#se it was so c ose y intertwined with patriotic fee ings in Eng and (especia y d#ring the imperia Kictorian period, from which m#ch of the contemporary Armada historiography stems origina y), the mytho ogy of the Spanish Armada story has often intr#ded on the facts, and this artic e is an attempt to de%#n! the most egregio#s of these misconceptions and set the record straight$ &or a more detai ed eAamination of the ca#ses eading #p to the Spanish Armada, the state of E#rope prior to its a#nch, and the fascinating aftermath of the %att e/ which invo ved a war waged on m# tip e continents %etween the nava and and forces of the Spanish and Eng ish/p ease read my accompanying essay on the Spanish Armada and a itt e9!nown, %#t pivota Eng ish co#nterattac! against Spain and @ort#ga in 158,, which met with a disaster simi ar to its Spanish co#nterpart the year %efore$

The Spanish Armada and the 6i itary .%>ectives of @hi ip ((

The first and most common myth pertains to the Spanish Armada"s war o%>ectives as perceived %y Ling @hi ip ((, the vigoro#s, devo#t, and doctrinaire 2atho ic Spanish r# er from the powerf# Caps%#rg fami y$ Some acco#nts care ess y s#ggest that @hi ip craved nothing ess than a con=#est of Eng and, an anneAation of the is and co#ntry into the growing rea m of :ew Spain$ This is ref ected in the oft9repeated throw9away comment a%o#t how M(f it hadn"t %een for 8ra!e et a $ defeating the Armada in 1588, we"d a %e spea!ing Spanish today$ This conc #sion is patent y ridic# o#s$ &or a the f o#rishes and post#ring associated with the mission, Ling @hi ip"s o%>ectives in the MEnterprise of Eng and were comparative y modest' a%ove a , he was see!ing Eng ish noninterference in what he considered to %e interna Spanish affairs, cessation of mi itary and financia s#pport for the re%e io#s 8#tch provinces (then constit#ting a province of Spain) %eing the primary %one of contention$ @hi ip a so so#ght to c amp down on the Eng ish privateers, the Msea dogs and crafty pirates of renown, so as to prec #de their attac!s on Spain"s go d and si ver treas#re transports and other economic interchanges with its co onia empire in the 2ari%%ean and the American continenta andmass$ Spain and Eng and had in fact %een virt#a y a ies (against &rance) prior to 15)<, when the Eng ish 2aptain Bohn Caw!ins/ with the event#a s#pport of E i0a%eth and mem%ers of the roya privy co#nci /%ro!e into the transat antic s ave trade, then a tight y g#arded Spanish9@ort#g#ese monopo y$ At the time, Spain eApected E#ropean s ave traders to its vast :ew 3or d Empire to pass thro#gh a port in Spain (typica y Sevi e) as a way station to the Americas$ Spanish officia s acted as midd emen, s!imming off a hea thy c#t of the profits the merchants garnered from their trading in h#man cargo, a financia corn#copia which the Spaniards" were oath to forfeit' in their eyes, Caw!ins was a sm#gg er$ 8espite initia misgivings a%o#t Caw!ins" endeavors, D#een E i0a%eth and her advisory @rivy 2o#nci soon gave direct s#pport to him, investing in his voyages, s#pp ying ships and sai ors, and reaping a share of the profits$ (Caw!ins" chief s aved trading vesse , the Bes#s of H#%ec!, was a roya grant$) Caw!ins" perceived sm#gg ing irritated Spanish viceroya a#thorities, c# minating in the San B#an de 1 #a incident in 15)8, in which a sma s ave9trading f eet #nder 8ra!e and

Caw!ins was am%#shed with heavy osses near Keracr#0, 6eAico$ (t was this =#arre over s ave9trading rights and the dip omatic contretemps of San B#an de 1 #a that a#nched the Eng ish into privateering and precipitated the economic competition that wo# d impe @hi ip in his Armada p ans <* years ater$ The Spanish monarch a so endeavored/at the very east/ to sec#re to erance for Eng ish 2atho ics, tho#gh a who esa e transformation of the is and co#ntry from a @rotestant %astion into a 2atho ic nation was a nonstarter$ 2atho ic power in Eng and had %een far too decimated %y Cenry K((( and his advisors in the ear y 15**s to %e restored even with a dramatic s#ccess %y the Spanish invasion force' monasteries had %een i=#idated, priests and %ishops had %een eAec#ted or %anished, ch#rch properties had %een sei0ed, and the peop e (most cr#cia y the aristocracy) had %een diverted from the 5oman 2h#rch to the nationa Ang ican 2h#rch instead$ @ope @i#s K had even eAcomm#nicated D#een E i0a%eth in 15F*, imp oring Eng ish 2atho ics to withho d recognition of her right to r# e, a de facto recognition that Eng and"s most prominent c asses had %ecome @rotestant$ (t is, f#rthermore, do#%tf# that the Spanish !ing intended to s#pp ant D#een E i0a%eth ( with a 2atho ic Eng ish #s#rper, as is often s#pposed, in spite of @i#s K"s papa sanction$ (t m#st %e reca ed that the on y via% e 2atho ic candidate to ta!e E i0a%eth"s p ace was 6ary D#een of Scots, %#t this p an s#ffered from the s ight comp ication of 6ary"s eAec#tion in 158F, the year %efore the Spanish Armada sai ed northward$ :o%ody e se co# d have %een insta ed on the throne and %een egitimate y accepted %y eno#gh of Eng and"s pop# ation to remain in power for more than a fortnight, and @hi ip was no stranger to this important diffic# ty$ @hi ip certain y had no intention/ et a one mi itary wherewitha /to Mcon=#er the Eng ish nation$ The oft9repeated c aim, that the Spanish Armada threatened Eng ish sovereignty, fai s to consider contemporary events: @hi ip, after a , had %een entire y #ns#ccessf# in s#%>#gating the tiny :ether ands, in which he had a ready m#stered a standing army ed %y the %ri iant and reso#rcef# fie d genera A essandro &arnese, the 8#!e of @arma$ The :ether ands had a historica (and, therefore, ega y recogni0ed) p ace within the Caps%#rg Spanish Empire since a dynastic marriage %etween 6aAimi ian ( and 6ary of 4#rg#ndy in 1+FF, and the Spaniards maintained a ong9esta% ished po itica and administrative presence in the 8#tch provinces$ &#rthermore, @hi ip co# d %esiege his 8#tch opponents %y and ro#tes as we as sea channe s, and he had the additiona s#pport of his Caps%#rg co#sins in 2entra E#rope$ (f @hi ip had fai ed to s#%d#e the determined ins#rgency in the :ether ands/where, as can %e seen, he was % essed with many advantages/it was a pipe dream to %e ieve he co# d have accomp ished m#ch at a in Eng and, a m#ch arger nation with no historica ties to the Spanish Empire or Caps%#rg r# e, no esta% ished Spanish administrative presence, and/most important y/no and ro#te$ Even had @hi ip %een mirac# o#s y s#ccessf# in the Armada"s operations against Eng and, he sti co# d not have maintained a s#fficient y arge occ#pation force in s#ch a foreign and distant nation for ong, especia y with a the added ogistica headaches presented %y an is and co#ntry and, even more important y, @hi ip"s ongoing operations in &rance, the :ether ands, (ta y, and @ort#ga on the 2ontinent itse f/which constit#ted @hi ip"s principa interest in any case$ Spanish armies s#ccessf# y stormed the capita s of n#mero#s !ingdoms in 2ontinenta E#rope, 5ome and @aris among them, not to mention overran m#ch of 7ermany and 2entra E#rope, yet these p aces did not s#dden y revert to Mspea!ing Spanish or convert to Spanish 2atho icism' indeed, the temporary Spanish mi itary s#ccess in those oca es had itt e if anything in the way of ong9term c# t#ra

impact$ Th#s a Mcon=#est of Eng and %y the Spanish Armada was simp y o#t of the =#estion, and even a 2atho ic restoration or Mregime change was i!e y a nonstarter as we $ @hi ip was f# y aware of this, and c ose ana yses of Spanish strategy and o%>ectives #cid y i #strate that the Spanish Armada, for a its fanfare, had rather moderate goa s$ Cindsight has s!ewed o#r impression of events at the time, %#t in @hi ip"s eyes Eng and was a sideshow' his prime o%>ectives were on the E#ropean 2ontinent, and a%ove a he simp y wanted Eng and to stay o#t of the way$ (As is noted in my accompanying essay, when Eng and and Spain fina y did cease hosti ities with the Treaty of Hondon in 1)*+, the Spanish ironica y did %y9and9 arge achieve their o%>ectives from the 158*s$)

Alessandro -arnese, the 3u9e of Parma .#t ine of the Spanish Armada Engagement, 1588
Even the detai s of the Spanish Armada c ash itse f are often mis#nderstood$ 6any report the Armada confrontation as a sort of 8avid9and97o iath showdown in which the vast y o#tg#nned and o#tn#m%ered Eng ish f eet mirac# o#s y managed to o#twit and sin! its Spanish adversary$ The Eng ish were, in fact, neither o#tn#m%ered nor o#tg#nned$ A tho#gh the Spanish had a greater tota tonnage of ships in the water/their %# !y ga eons ining the hori0on/the Eng ish act#a y had more craft in the %att e 0one$ They were sma er, ighter, and more mane#vera% e, e=#ipped with ong9range and rapid y re oada% e cannon that conferred a strategic and techno ogica advantage over the Spanish f eet/ prod#cts of the enhancements introd#ced %y Ling Cenry K((( and Bohn Caw!ins, the prescient Eng ish Treas#rer of the :avy who demonstrated remar!a% e s!i as a sai or and administrator a i!e$ 6oreover, a tho#gh the Eng ish f eet c osed ran!s to protect potentia rende0vo#s sites on the is and nation"s coast ines, it damaged %#t did not act#a y sin! many of the ships in the Spanish attac! force' on y three vesse s of the invading f eet were tr# y disa% ed %y the Eng ish defenses$ As 5$4$ 3ernham noted Pp$ EQ, the Eng ish sai ors and so diers Ma were a itt e dispirited, and more than a itt e s#rprised, at their fai #re to destroy the Armada in %att e$ The o#t ine of the Spanish Armada"s invasion p an was as fo ows: The approAimate y 1E* Armada ships #nder the command of 6edina Sidonia, disem%ar!ing

from the port of His%on in 6ay of 1588, were f#ndamenta y intended as an escort to Eng and for the professiona , eAperienced and army of the 8#!e of @arma, which had proved its mett e in the wars on the 2ontinent (tho#gh it had, of co#rse, fai ed to s#ppress the 8#tch 5evo t entire y)$ The Spanish Armada was de ayed for two months %y scattering ga es on its northward >o#rney, %#t in ear y s#mmer of 1588 it approached the & emish coast where it wo# d pres#ma% y provide the essentia escort for @arma"s army/tho#gh the Armada wo# d %e compe ed to remain offshore, since @hi ip ac!ed a deep9water port capa% e of har%oring his h# !ing vesse s on the strategic coasts of the 8#tch @rovinces or in &rance$ This was in part d#e to riva ries with other continenta powers, %#t even more %eca#se the Armada"s si0e and composition wo# d have made har%oring in any sing e port eAtreme y diffic# t' @hi ip had a ies in 2atho ic coasta regions of northwest E#rope, %#t the architects and %#i ders of E#ropean defensive and mercanti e ports genera y did not constr#ct them the possi%i ity of a 1E*9ship, ga eon9 aden escort in mind$ Cere a one, one can see another reason why a s#ccessf# invasion of the 4ritish (s es was =#estiona% e even #nder the most optima circ#mstances of weather and propitio#s sai ing conditions: @hi ip dispatched his f eet with instr#ctions for a diffic# t rende0vo#s with @arma"s troops in the How 2o#ntries for which optima timing was of the essence, yet the Spanish !ing ac!ed a re ia% e port, and he was demanding impecca% e coordination over three cent#ries %efore the invention of radio$ .nce 6edina Sidonia had anchored his vesse s in the vicinity of @arma"s troops, he wo# d then %e compe ed to simp y wait as @arma rep ied and m#stered his own forces from their scattered positions thro#gho#t the 8#tch cana system$ A diffic# t feat no matter how a#spicio#s the conditions, and in any case 6edina Sidonia"s pro onged stand%y stat#s in the 2hanne wo# d provide a re ative y easy target for Eng ish attac!/which is precise y what occ#rred$ The famo#s Eng ish nighttime Mdispatch of the fireships/in which 8ra!e, as it is often reported (tho#gh Hord Coward of Effingham was more direct y responsi% e), set fire to severa o d h# !s aden with pitch and g#npowder, and sent them in the direction of the Armada then moored off 2a ais in &rance/convinced 6edina Sidonia to c#t anchor and ret#rn to Spain %y way of the (rish coast$ There was #ndo#%ted y an initia sense of panic among the Spanish sai ors at the sight of the smo!ing h# !s at night, acce erated %y the andward c#rrent toward the ga eons then arrayed in tight formation$ The precipitate decision %y 6edina Sidonia to c#t anchor was a so tactica y important since, no matter what the o#tcome of a s#%se=#ent confrontation, it wo# d now %e even more diffic# t to reorgani0e the provide the promised escort for @arma"s troops$ :everthe ess, the Spanish were easi y a% e to escape the Eng ish firing ine and move themse ves o#t of effective range, then regro#p for %att e formation against their Eng ish adversaries$ (n the ens#ing 4att e of 7rave ines, the on y gen#ine confrontation %etween the Eng ish and Spanish navies in the waters aro#nd Eng and, Caw!ins" improvements ena% ed the Eng ish to rapid y #n oad m#ch of their ordnance, damaging the Spanish ga eons" h# s and masts eno#gh that 6edina Sidonia decided to de ay a move to commence the traditiona grapp e9and9%oard tactics #sed %y Spanish nava forces against their opponents, as they had effective y done against the T#r!s in the 6editerranean 4att e of Hepanto in 15F1$ The Eng ish were a% e to position and fire their cannon with greater fre=#ency and from a greater range than the Spanish$ (t was a remar!a% e techno ogica and tactica advance in nava warfare and a testament to the foresight of Cenry K((( and Caw!ins, the chief architects of the rapid9fire ong9range g#n strategy (a esson that the Spanish wo# d earn we , since they wo# d soon adopt simi ar techni=#es)$ :everthe ess, there was not

m#ch tangi% y accomp ished %y the Eng ish f eet at 7rave ines against the Spanish Armada in terms of damage, sin!ing, or incapacitation of 6edina Sidonia"s force/which was sti very m#ch intact and a gen#ine menace after the 7rave ines enco#nter$ The Spanish f eet proceeded in order y formation o#t of the %att e 0one, and it was hard y in a state of panic as it regro#ped$ Th#s 7rave ines was # timate y inconc #sive, and this was arge y d#e to the scarcity of amm#nition on the Eng ish side, a chronic pro% em that p ag#ed the Eng ish and engendered widespread consternation$ 3ernham Pp$ EQ =#otes an Eng ish master9 g#nner, 3i iam Thomas: MSo m#ch powder and shot spent, and so ong time in fight, and in comparison thereof so itt e harm$ Th#s in terms of the nava confrontations themse ves /7rave ines and its associated s!irmishes/ the Armada %att e was essentia y a rather antic imactic sta emate' neither f eet inf icted severe damage on the other$ (t is often remar!ed with astonishment that the Eng ish did not ose a sing e ship in the Armada engagement, yet as we can see, the Spaniards s#ffered re ative y ight osses themse ves/E ships that were a ready of =#estiona% e seaworthiness to %egin with$ 4oth f eets made s#rprising % #nders and fai ed to ta!e advantage of opport#nities, whi e %oth a so demonstrated co#rage and =#ic! thin!ing in the face of cha enges$ 4oth, in the aftermath of the conf ict itse f, were f# y capa% e of reengaging each other$ (n any case, 6edina Sidonia %y this point had come to rea i0e the impractica ity of an escort for @arma in the midst of the sti 9hosti e waters of the Eng ish 2hanne , and so he iss#ed orders for the Spanish Armada/sti arge y intact and capa% e of sea%orne com%at/to ro#nd the tip of Scot and and (re and en ro#te %ac! to Spain and @ort#ga $ (t was a series of Septem%er storms in the :orth Sea and the :orthern At antic especia y, not Eng ish g#nnery, that act#a y san! most of the Spanish vesse s or forced them onto the roc!y coasts of (re and$ .ver ha f of the sai ors in the Armada force died or did not ret#rn to Spain in fighting form, many perishing from com%at or disease or shipwrec!, some disappearing into the (rish pop# ation where many of the ships str#c! and (hence the oft9repeated egend of the M4 ac! (rish), others reaching port %#t so wo#nded, i , or seasic! that they co# d not set sai again to wage %att e for @hi ip"s navies$ :everthe ess, most of the commanders ret#rned home and in any case, more than ha f of the Spanish sai ing f eet did manage to ret#rn s#ccessf# y to port in the (%erian @enins# a$ The Armada defeat was not even near y as c ear9c#t a victory for the Eng ish as is fre=#ent y ass#med' the Eng ish ost tho#sands of so diers and sai ors themse ves in the %att e, most y to disease and eApos#re as the strains of chronica y maintaining a vigi ant coasta defense too! their to $ &e ipe &ernande09Armesto, in his sp endid and thoro#gh %oo! on the %att e, notes that the persona s#ffering and %itter vit#peration fo owing the Spanish Armada c ash were odd y simi ar on %oth the Spanish and the Eng ish sides: Mthis sort of persona s#ffering PeAha#stion and disease from the %att eQ em%raced the Eng ish forces with a most e=#a ferocity Pp$ <<*Q, Mit remains a c#rio#s fact that that disi #sionment, recrimination, and m#t#a reproach were a most as rife on the Eng ish side? as on the Spanish side Pp$ <<*Q, Mthe Eng ish f eet and, to a esser eAtent, the army, were s#ffering from m#ch the same com%ination of adversities as faced the Armada Pp$ <<+Q$ 6oreover, many of the co#rageo#s and ong9s#ffering Eng ish sai ors were not even paid for their va iant defense of the home and, a fact that was #nderstanda% e considering the financia straits for Eng and at the time %#t which inspired no sma meas#re of disgr#nt ement on the part of the Eng ish crews who tho#ght they deserved %etter$ 2onverse y, the Spanish sai ors and commanders, in spite of the Armada"s fai #re in its invasion attempt, had shown remar!a% e and s#rprising fortit#de in the face of adversity,

partic# ar y when confronted with some of the worst At antic storms recorded %y mariners of the 1)th cent#ry$ As &ernande09Armesto has noted, the reso ve of the sai ors and the preparations and responsiveness of the receiving ports in Spain s#%stantia y mitigated the disaster and saved tho#sands of ives$ EAtraordinary feats of poor9weather sai ing and s#rprising d#ra%i ity ena% ed the vast ma>ority of the Spanish Mgreat ships to ret#rn to port in Spain or @ort#ga , partic# ar y those/as &ernande09Armesto cogent y mentions/ of the %att e9hardy At antic c ass, which fared remar!a% y we $ (The especia hardiness of the At antic c ass fig#red prominent y in the Eng ish Armada %att e of 158,, as ( disc#ss in my companion essay' the maintenance and protection of these ships was !ey to Spain"s Empire in the Americas, and th#s these were the main targets of the Eng ish invasion of Spain and @ort#ga in 158,$) (n some respects, the Spanish Armada had %een eAtreme y fort#nate to have s#rvived its travai s as we as it did$ The entire f eet was near y %eached off the coast of & anders %y #ntoward winds ear y in the invasion attempt, %efore a #c!y shift averted a catastrophe$ And s#ch a remar!a% e n#m%er of ships and sai ors, %r#ised and %attered as they were, fo#nd their way home that, as s#ggested %y &ernande09Armesto, the Armada"s osses Mseem s#rprising y modest overa $R The f eet wo# d remain intact eno#gh, in fact, that @hi ip wo# d a#nch severa more Armadas against the Eng ish over the neAt decade$

Sir -rancis 3ra9e Significance of the Spanish Armada 2onfrontation

3ith a these caveats %orne in mind, ( sho# d ma!e it c ear that the Spanish Armada"s fai #re was definite y not unimportant, and there were severa !ey conse=#ences (themse ves often #nmentioned) that merit recognition$ They are more s#%t e and comp icated than those norma y (and fa se y) ass#med a%o#t the Armada"s aftermath, since they %ear principa y on the wars thro#gho#t the E#ropean 2ontinent which constit#ted @hi ip"s chief foc#s of action$ A s#ccessf# Armada anding, even given the pro%a% e rep# se of Spanish invading forces on the gro#nd, wo# d i!e y have compe ed the Eng ish to withdraw a their troops from the 2ontinent, eaving @hi ip open to wage an #nre enting war of attrition to devo#r his 8#tch and &rench @rotestant C#g#enot opponents who were %eing s#pported %y Eng ish eApeditionary forces$ 3ith the Armada"s decampment for Spain after 7rave ines, the Eng ish were a% e to contin#e their interventions in the :ether ands and &rance, he ping to avert the co apse of the 8#tch 5evo t and f#rther their s#pport of the C#g#enots and anti9Spanish forces in &rance$ 3hi e many Eng ish confrontations against the fortified garrisons and professiona troops of Spain were #ns#ccessf# , there were some nota% e accomp ishments/s#ch as the amphi%io#s anding and re ief of the Siege of 4rest in 15,+/which were of enormo#s he p to @hi ip"s

opponents on the 2ontinent$ &rance"s wo# d9%e s#ccessor to Ling Cenri (((/assassinated in 158,/ was the initia y @rotestant Cenri of :avarre (!nown as Cenri (K or Cenry (K #pon his coronation), an a y of the Eng ish who was opposed %y the &rench 2atho ic Heag#e (a so referred to as the MCo y Heag#e) and %y @hi ip"s a ied armies, ed %y the a ways9formida% e 8#!e of @arma$ After s#rviving fo#r years of gr#e ing warfare against @hi ip and his comrades9in9 arms, Cenri converted, perhaps somewhat opport#nistica y, to 2atho icism in 15,E (#ttering the oft9cited =#ote, M@aris is we worth a mass, perhaps indicating a nod to eApediency so as to sec#re his position as &rench !ing)$ This was a %ittersweet deve opment for the Eng ish, %#t it a so ass#red that @hi ip wo# d %e #na% e to anoint his da#ghter/ the (nfanta (sa%e a 2 ara E#genia/as the Mrightf# &rench r# er, as the Spanish !ing had p anned since 158,$ Tho#gh the war in &rance gro#nd on for severa more years, Cenri reinforced his position and ho d on the crown against ins#rgents from the 2atho ic Heag#e$ Ce was a %o d and decisive mi itary eader, and Cenri"s defeats of Heag#e and Spanish forces at 4#rg#ndy and Amiens in 15,5 and 15,F, respective y, ed to the @eace of Kervins in 15,8, which ended hosti ities %etween &rance and Spain$ (Cenri wo# d %ecome one of &rance"s most effective r# ers, and his Edict of :antes in 15,8, which for%ade persec#tion of &rench @rotestants, wo# d prove to %e a po itica y shrewd and historica y precedent9setting eAamp e of re igio#s to eration$) A tho#gh Cenri (K"s s#ccesses ens#ed chief y from his own po itica ac#men and mi itary eadership, Eng ish aid of his ca#se was especia y va #a% e as the new !ing str#gg ed to esta% ish his egitimacy and position$ The contin#ing Eng ish assistance to the :ether ands and &rance th#s provided a partia victory' @hi ip was not a% e to p ace his offspring on the &rench throne and did not f# y s#%d#e the northern 8#tch provinces, tho#gh &rance did remain #nder a 2atho ic r# er and the more so#ther y 8#tch and & emish provinces were maintained within the 2atho ic fo d %y @arma"s mi itary mastery and Spain"s s#stained administrative presence$ Eng ish, &rench, and 8#tch privateering wo# d have i!e y ceased in the event of an Armada anding, depriving these :orth At antic states of what had %ecome a va #a% e, if rather #nre ia% e, income stream$ @erhaps most important y, the mora e %oost of the Armada"s defeat cannot %e disco#nted$ @eop e of the time anAio#s y so#ght signa s of the divine favor conferred #pon or withhe d he d from their ca#ses in the res# ts on the gro#nd$ (n a war so thoro#gh y s#ff#sed %y re igio#s overtones, it was a we come re ief to @rotestants that 7od at east did not frown #pon their %e iefs so m#ch that Ce wo# d a ow the hated @opist forces to set foot on the and of a @rotestant strongho d$ The Armada"s defeat #ndo#%ted y inspired @rotestants in this re igio#s war to !eep waging what was, in their eyes, a good fight against the #nreformed 5oman 2h#rch and its Spanish agents$ &#rthermore, as noted a%ove, the Armada %att e revo #tioni0ed nava warfare %y a tering ass#mptions a%o#t %att e formations, #se of amm#nition, and the types of ships to %e emp oyed in com%at/a esson that the Spaniards, ironica y, were a% e to app y to great effect themse ves after 1588$ 6oreover, a tho#gh the persistent war with Spain fr#strated Eng ish efforts to initiate co oni0ation in the Americas, Eng ish sai ors nonethe ess gained va #a% e eAperience on the high seas o#t of the sheer necessity of maintaining constant operations against Spain, and a generation of Eng ish mariners in the 1)**s was th#s a% e to c#t its teeth on the waves and earn the a ways9cha enging technica n#ances of ocean c#rrents, fic! e winds, compass9assisted navigation, and vict#a ing that are essentia for oceanic voyages$ ((t sho# d %e noted, however, that Caw!ins"s foc#s on ight,

mane#vera% e ships/#sef# in the defense against the Armada/may have a so impaired Eng ish attempts at transat antic eAp oration and sett ement, since s#ch vesse s were genera y not as re ia% e as the arger Spanish transports in ocean seafaring$)

The 158, Eng ish Armada and the 2ontin#ing Ang o9Spanish 3ar
:everthe ess, from a strategic perspective, the Spanish Armada"s defeat alone accomp ished itt e for the Eng ish or their @rotestant 2ontinenta a ies in their concerted efforts to rep# se @hi ip"s armies and defeat his sti 9imposing navy, and it was definite y not the decisive % ow that it has often %een mista!en y portrayed$ As disc#ssed in the main artic e on my 3e%site (MThe 8efeat of the Eng ish Armada), the state of affairs in the immediate aftermath of the Armada"s stragg ing ret#rn to Spain indeed presented an enticing opport#nity to the Eng ish$ They d# y attempted to fo ow #p the Spanish Armada rep# se with an eApedition to Spain and @ort#ga in 158,, an invasion %y the Eng ish ( ed %y Sir &rancis 8ra!e and Bohn :orris) of Spanish and @ort#g#ese soi designed, chief y, to destroy Spain"s At antic navy$ Cad this %een s#ccessf# , the entire co#rse of wor d history may we have %een dramatica y changed, since Spain wo# d have %een deprived of the nava forces it needed to s#stain its f edg ing :ew 3or d empire, and its treas#re f eet from the 3est (ndies and Spanish 6ain wo# d have fa en into the hands of its enemies$ This is the principa reason that the Spanish Armada %att e, as it is so often ta#ght, is so woef# y inacc#rate in its rendition' it is impossi% e to #nderstand the Spanish Armada witho#t a thoro#gh comprehension of its mi itary and strategic conteAt and its =#ite fascinating aftermath in partic# ar$ &rancis 8ra!e, 5o%ert 8#d ey, &rancis 3a singham, Hord Coward of Effingham, D#een E i0a%eth (, the 8#!e of 6edina Sidonia, Ling @hi ip ((, the 8#!e of @arma, and the other ma>or participants in the Ang o9Spanish war a grasped this we $ They !new that the Spanish Armada had fai ed %#t ret#rned to Spain intact eno#gh for @hi ip to achieve his war aims ater, and a recogni0ed that/# timate y/the str#gg e for power in the 3estern Cemisphere wo# d depend on whether the Eng ish co# d inf ict a cr#shing % ow at an opport#ne moment on @hi ip"s At antic9c ass s=#adrons, the cream of Spain"s seafaring crop and the n#c e#s of its power in the Americas, which had escaped the Armada confrontation arge y #nscathed$ .n y then wo# d the At antic sea anes fina y open to ena% e the Eng ish to initiate their ong9fr#strated aims of :ew 3or d co oni0ation and empire, for which the Spanish and @ort#g#ese had en>oyed s#ch a dominant headstart after 2o #m%#s"s voyage in 1+,<$ This is why the Eng ish saw s#ch a tanta i0ing opport#nity in 158,$ 3ith the Spanish f eet moored in a few ports off northern Spain for refitting/predominant y in the cities of Santander and San Se%astian, fronting the 4ay of 4iscay %etween Spain and &rance/and re ative y #nprepared to defend the penins# ar coasta waters, Spain"s At antic c ass9ships wo# d %e #ni=#e y v# nera% e to Eng ish s#rprise attac!$ (t is for this reason that the Eng ish Armada of 158,, as one might term the 8ra!e and :orris9 ed Eng ish invasion force against Spain and @ort#ga in that year, wo# d wage s#ch a historica y significant %att e, and why so many Mwhat9ifs accompany a s ight change in the fort#nes of 8ra!e and :orris in their eApedition$ &or reasons disc#ssed in the companion essay, 8ra!e and his navy never set foot in Santander or San Se%astian, a cr#cia error that ro%%ed the Eng ish invasion force of an easy opport#nity' instead, his troops attempted #ns#ccessf# y to sei0e and sac! the Spanish city of 2or#Sa to the so#th, then fai ed in an attac! on the

@ort#g#ese capita of His%on as we as in an attempted capt#re of the Spanish treas#re f eet, s#ffering heavy cas#a ties in the process and ret#rning %ac! to Eng and defeated and demora i0ed$ Cad 8ra!e on y sai ed to those cities as origina y p anned, rather than da ying in 2or#Sa and ( ater) enco#ntering fai #re in @ort#ga , the Eng ish wo# d have fo#nd an #ndefended and dangero#s y v# nera% e Spanish At antic f eet a %#t %egging to %e p#t to the torch$ Cad this occ#rred, the Spanish wo# d have ost the !eystone of their At antic power and the mi itary #nderpinning of their American empire, and not on y the Spanish treas#re f eets %#t the vast span of the Americas/%oth the territories ten#o#s y c aimed %y Spain and those sti #neAp ored/wo# d have %een opened to predation and co oni0ation %y the Eng ish, &rench, 8#tch, and other comers from 3estern E#ropeans coasta nations$ 3hat we now ta!e for granted as the vast andmass and c# t#ra sphere of MHatin America/@anama, @#erto 5ico, Cispanio a, Argentina, Kene0#e a, and many other territories on the American continent or the 2ari%%ean/ co# d easi y have fa en #nder the contro of the :orth At antic co#ntries if on y 8ra!e and :orris had more s#ccessf# y carried o#t their mission$ (n any case, the fascinating and cr#cia y important aftermath of the Spanish Armada confrontation/which was mere y one %att e in a ong, grinding nava war %etween Eng and and Spain/is often neg ected, one of many egregio#s errors in the common portraya of Ang o9Spanish re ations d#ring the ate 1)th cent#ry$ 3hi e there were some s#ccesses for the Eng ish in the post9Armada period/the capt#re of the 2adre de 3ios in 15,<, the re ief of 4rest in 15,+, the sac! of 2adi0 in 15,) (tho#gh the Eng ish were thwarted in their attempt to capt#re the treas#re f eet, their principa o%>ective)/overa the Eng ish fo#ndered in their attempts to %rea! Spain"s power$ @rivateering eApeditions %y Caw!ins and &ro%isher in 15,* and 15,1 were #ns#ccessf# , and Eng ish corsairs in genera were so often thwarted in their aims that the costs of their forays great y o#tweighed any rem#nerative %enefit$ The A0ores (s ands off the @ort#g#ese coast in partic# ar drew Eng ish attention %eca#se of their strategic ocation re ative to the Spanish nava ports of disem%ar!ation and the treas#re f eet, yet Eng ish attempts to cha enge Spain in the vicinity of the A0ores met with itt e s#ccess$ A s=#adron #nder Hord Coward of Effingham in 15,1 was s#rprised and scattered %y a Spanish convoy passing near the coveted is ands, and The 4evenge, despite a %rave ast stand, s#rrendered and was capt#red %y Spanish forces$ The M(s ands Koyage eApedition to the A0ores in 15,F, #nder 5o%ert 8evere#A, the Ear of EsseA, and Sir 3a ter 5a eigh %egan with simi ar hopes and enco#ntered simi ar fr#strations, co apsing amid Spanish defenses and %ic!ering among the Eng ish commanders$ 6ost nota% y, the Eng ish wo# d s#ffer two partic# ar y damaging set%ac!s in 15,5$ 8ra!e and Caw!ins wo# d ead a s#%stantia eApedition to the Spanish 6ain in that year$ A tho#gh it was conceived as a raiding party to sei0e precio#s Spanish ga eons, the eApedition was p anned in an effort to attac! and overta!e Spanish positions perceived as v# nera% e, attempting to esta% ish a footho d in and divest Spanish contro over forts in @#erto 5ico, @anama, and other strongho ds in the 3est (ndies and 2entra America$ This 15,5 eApedition is rife with Mwhat9ifs since, had it %een s#ccessf# , the Eng ish may have sei0ed and anneAed n#mero#s Spanish territories which are today ta!en for granted as Cispanic ands$ ((ndeed, the Eng ish did precise y that to Bamaica, which was origina y a Spanish s#garcane co ony %#t fe into Eng ish hands #nder . iver 2romwe in the mid9 1)**s$) Cowever, remar!a% y precise Spanish inte igence ena% ed a smothering defensive perimeter to %e esta% ished on and and at sea in the targeted regions, ro#ting the Eng ish

forces who wo# d s#ffer an #n#s#a y severe nava defeat$ The eApedition"s eaders fe into corrosive infighting as their o%>ectives went #nrea i0ed and their ships %ecame deprived of s#pp ies and vict#a s' Caw!ins died of disease in @#erto 5ico in 15,5, whi e 8ra!e wo# d contract a fata dysentery on an is and off @anama, where he died and was %#ried at sea (near @orto 4e o) in Ban#ary of 15,)$ The Spanish %oth feared and respected 8ra!e and Caw!ins, and now their two most formida% e opponents/the most visi% e sym%o s of Eng ish %#ccaneering and nava derring9do/had %een !i ed in the same eApedition$ 8#ring the same year, western Eng and s#ffered the shoc! of a s#ccessf# raid %y a Spanish commander, 8on 2ar os de Ames=#ita, who eAp oited favora% e winds to a ight in 2ornwa and torch @en0ance and severa other vi ages within the fishing region %efore ho ding 6ass and disem%ar!ing again$ 4esides the contin#ing set%ac!s against Spain, the Eng ish wo# d a so %e s#c!ed into a painf# and cost y g#erri a war against C#gh .":ei , 5ed C#gh ."8onne , and other re%e io#s (rish ords in 15,+, their efforts f#nded and s#pported %y the Spanish 2rown$ To %e s#re, the contin#ing war against Eng and was a so =#ite eApensive for Spain, and Eng ish piracy, despite its diminishing ret#rns after 158,, was sti eno#gh of a menace that it ate into the Spanish 2rown"s m#ch9needed reven#es$ Cowever, Spain managed to ship three times as m#ch precio#s meta in the 15,*s than it did in the previo#s decade, and its effective contro of the sea anes %oth he ped to g#arantee its contro over the American co onies as we as to thwart Eng ish attempts to initiate their own co oni0ation for the war"s d#ration$ Spain"s fisca tro#% es contin#ed apace and were #ndo#%ted y eAacer%ated %y the %#ccaneers" harassing attac!s and the gr#e ing campaigns on the 2ontinent$ :everthe ess, Spain"s financia morass was chief y of its own ma!ing$ @hi ip had, after a , dec ared two %an!r#ptcies we %efore Eng and and Spain initiated m#t#a hosti ities in 1585, and @hi ip"s s#ccessors/woef# y ac!ing in his domestic thrift and se f9discip ine/ s=#andered enormo#s s#ms in fisca mismanagement and co#rt corr#ption in the 1)**s$ (f anything, Spain"s dependence on the si ver shipments from the :ew 3or d wo# d pro%a% y prove to %e the chief factor in its #ndoing as a great power in the ate 1Fth cent#ry' the precio#s meta s gave rise to a r#ino#s inf ation that ineAora% y %#rdened Spain"s economy and r#ined many in its merchant c ass$ :everthe ess, these factors were chief y interna , and as can %e seen, the Spanish Armada defeat # timate y had itt e effect on Spain"s nava and po itica s#premacy, or the co#ntry"s vise grip on the 3estern Cemisphere, d#ring the 15,*s$ The Ang o9Spanish war of the ate 15**s/in which Spain, not Eng and, wo# d emerge strengthened on the high seas/had pivota conse=#ences for the co#rse of wor d history which rever%erate powerf# y today, not east in the eAtraordinari y arge and vi%rant c# t#ra sphere of Hatin America$ &or more information a%o#t the itt e9!nown %#t eAtraordinari y significant invasion of Spain and @ort#ga %y &rancis 8ra!e and Bohn :orris against Spain in 158,, p ease read my main artic e,

The 8efeat of the Eng ish Armada and the 1)th92ent#ry Spanish :ava 5es#rgence: A 6ore 8etai ed Hoo! at the Spanish Armada, its (mmediate 5es# ts, its Hong9Term Effects, and its Hesser9Lnown Aftermath
RThe Armada set%ac! was hard y the on y defeat enco#ntered %y the Spanish mi itary in its n#mero#s operations of the 1)th and ear y 1Fth cent#ries, and in their historica anna s, the

Spaniards do not seem to have %een partic# ar y pert#r%ed %y the 1588 Armada"s defeat in any case$ To the eAtent that the Spanish r#ef# y ref ected #pon %att es ost and wars mis%egotten, it was their fierce 1Fth9cent#ry c ashes with the &rench/and their decisive defeats at @assaro and 5ocroi in partic# ar/that %ro!e their power and ena% ed &rance to rise in their p ace as E#rope"s M7reat @ower$ &or f#rther reading: 2heyney, Edward @$ A history of #ngland from the defeat of the Armada to the death of #li/abeth, with an account of #nglish institutions during the later si%teenth and early seventeenth centuries. @$ Smith, :ew Ior!, 1,<)$ de 2ordT%a, H#is 2a%rera$ Historia de 5elipe ,,, 4ey de #spa6a. B#nta de 2asti a y HeTn, Ka ado id, 1,,8$ &ernande09Armesto, &e ipe$ The Spanish Armada7 The #%perience of 8ar in 1588. .Aford 1niversity @ress, 1,88$ 7on0U e09Arnao 2onde9H#=#e, 6ariano$ 3errota y muerte de Sir 5rancis 3ra!e, a 9oru6a 158&0)ortobelo 15&$$ J#nta de 7a icia, Servicio 2entra de @#% icaciTns, 2or#Sa, Spain, 1,,5$ Hynch, Bohn$ Spain, 151$015&8 7 from nation state to world empire$ 4 ac!we @#% ishers, .Aford, 1,,<$ Terrero, BosV$ Historia de #spa6a$ 5$ Sopena, 4arce ona, Spain, 1,88$ 3ernham, 54$ After the Armada7 #li/abethan #ngland and the Struggle for 8estern #urope, 1588015&5. 2 arendon @ress, .Aford, 1,8+$ 3ernham, 54, ed$ The #%pedition of Sir :ohn ;orris and Sir 5rancis 3ra!e to Spain and )ortugal, 158&$ :avy 5ecords Society, 4roo!fie d, Kt$, 1,88$ 3hiting, 5oger$ The #nterprise of #ngland7 The Spanish Armada$ A an S#tton @#% ishing, 7 o#cester, 1L 1,88$ 3es 1 m

Please feel free to quote from, print, and cite this essay as, +Top 10 myths and muddles about the Spanish Armada, historys most confused and misunderstood battle, by Wes !lm, Har"ard !ni"ersity personal ebsite, !#$: http:%% &people&fas&har"ard&edu%'ulm%history%sp(armada&htm, ) *++,& 1sef# in!s:

The Spanish Armada 1588 site %y (nvicta 6edia/concise, easi y reada% e, and information9rich s#mmary of the Armada p ans and point9%y9point description, with nice, easi y vis#a i0a% e technica descriptions$ Spanish Armada artic e at 3i!ipedia/the free on ine encyc opedia is a co a%orative effort of many hands wor dwide$ ("m one of the contri%#tors to the Spanish Armada artic e, %#t there were many %efore me, and this reso#rce is so acc#rate and #sef# in genera that it deserves mention here$ The 8efeat of the Spanish Armada pages on the Cistory4#ff site, 5ic! 4rown"s o#tstanding reso#rce for those see!ing primary doc#ments and o d newspapers/an eAce ent aid for professiona historians and history %#ffs a i!e$ ( wrote this series of pages on the Spanish Armada in an Mencyc opedia sty e to provide a ready and #sef# reference for st#dents and teachers see!ing information on the %att e$ The pages are sp it into artic es covering the factors eading to the Armada, the confrontation itse f, and its aftermath, as we as s#mmary and conc #sion sections for rapid cons# tation$ The 1L Cistory Hearning Site Spanish Armada page/witho#t do#%t one of the %est ("ve seen on the Armada enco#nter, detai ed yet easy to fo ow$ A partic# ar y interesting aspect of this site is its demonstration that the a ways #npredicta% e weather factor wasn"t as #nfavora% e to the Spaniards as is often ass#med$ There were s#dden shifts in winds that ena% ed 6edina Sidonia"s f eet to escape a catastrophic %eaching on the 8#tch and &rench shore ines, as we as to regro#p and ass#me its tight defensive formation$