Beautiful Golden Rosary of Eloquence Illuminating a Little the Presentation of

Awareness and Knowledge

a

by Jam-yang-shay-pa
Translated by Elizabeth Napper and Jeffrey Hopkins
(Approximately one quarter of the text is translated here.)

Namo rmajughoya svarasvastyai ca mahdhme prayaccha.
Having bowed down to the Victors increasing all the abundances of cyclic existence and
peace,
And to the treasures of awareness, the gentle voiced (jam dbyangs) father and mother
[Majushr and Svarasvat],
I will shine forth (bzhad) a hundred thousand understandings clearing away the darkness
Of the imputations by other schools and of the guesses
b
of children about awareness.
Concerning that, here the explanation of the presentation of awareness and knowledge
c
has two
parts: the presentation of object-possessing awarenesses and the presentation of objects.
Presentation of object-possessing awarenesses
This section has two parts: stating the scriptural passage and explaining its meaning.
Stating the scriptural passage
With regard to explaining the meaning of awareness (blo) in our own schools, the [second]
chapter, Establishment of Prime Cognition in Dharmakrtis Commentary on (Digngas)
Compilation of Prime Cognition says:
Wisdom and so forth, without [following]
The development and diminishment of the body
Develop and diminish due to the features
Of activities of awarenesses (blo).
d

Explaining the meaning of the scriptural passage
This section has three parts: definitions, synonyms, and divisions.

a
blo rig gi rnam bzhag nyung gsal legs bshad gser gyi phreng mdzes; TBRC, W21503-0414-eBook; reproduced
from prints from the Tra-shi-khyil (bkra shis khyil) blocks.
b
ol tshod.
c
blo rig gi rnam bzhag.
d
The commentary?? (150b.3) says, It follows with respect to the subject, wisdom, sympathy, and so forth, that the
body is not its special basis because of developing or diminishing by features of activities of former habituations of
awareness, without following after the development and diminishment of the body. Also note that dominant
condition seems to be equivalent to special basis.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 2
Definitions
Knower (rig pa) is the definition of awareness (blo). Illustrations are wisdom (shes rab) and
prime cognition (tshad ma) for instance. It follows with respect to the subjects, those two
[wisdom and prime cognition], that the meaning of knower (rig pai don) exists because that
which shines on/reveals/dawns/manifests an object and perceives it [OR: that which perceives an
object when it dawns] (yul char ba dang snang ba) is the meaning of knowing that object (yul
de rig pai don).
Synonyms
Synonyms exist because awareness (blo), consciousness (shes pa), knower (rig pa), and
illuminator (gsal ba) are equivalent.
A definition of consciousness (shes pa) exists because luminous non-materiality (gsal bai
bem min) is that. Dharmakrtis Commentary on Digngas Compilation of Prime Cognition
says:
Therefore according to us an awareness (blo) itself
Is a luminous entity (gsal bai ngo bo) [and hence the entity of the object] is intensely
illuminated (rab gsal).
Moreover, let us speak more extensively [about these]. Its being a knower that perceives its
object (rang yul snang bai rig pa yin pa) is the definition of its being an awareness (rang blo yin
pa). Dharmakrtis Commentary on Digngas Compilation of Prime Cognition says:
If it is asserted thus that [the aspect of a former] awareness (blo) [is transferred to a later]
awareness (blo),
The [later] awareness (blo) is [itself] established as a knower (rig pa).
Its being non-matter that illuminates its object (rang yul gsal bai bem min yin pa de) is the
definition of its being a consciousness (rang shes pa yin pa). For, Dharmakrtis Commentary on
Digngas Compilation of Prime Cognition says:
Because [an awareness] is itself intensely luminous,
The entity of the object is intensely illuminated (rab gsal).
and the Autocommentary to (Shntarakhitas) Ornament for the Middle says, Since a
consciousness is luminous, [the luminous] is not illuminated (shes pa ni gsal ba yin na [gsal ba
ni]
a
gsal bar ma gyur te).
Non-matter (bem min) is an oppositional term (gal zlai tshig) because Shntidevas
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds says, Consciousness is the opposite, non-matter, (shes pa
bem min log pa ste),
b
and Shntarakhitas Ornament for the Middle says:
a


a
Text correction as per ntarakita, Kamalala, and Masamichi Ichig, Madhyamaklakra of ntarakita: with
His Own Commentary or Vtti and with the Subcommentary or Pajik of Kamalala, trans. Masamichi Ichig (Kyoto:
Kyoto Sangyu University, 1985), 78.
b
Lo-sang-gya-tsho (blo bzang rgya mtsho) corrects the reading to: Consciousness is the opposite of matter (shes
pa bem pai log pa ste) but declares that even this corrected line is not found in Shntidevas Engaging in the
Bodhisattva Deeds; see Phu-khang Dge-bshes Blo-bzang-rgya-mtsho, rigs lam che ba blo rigs kyi rnam gzhag nye
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 3
A consciousness is generated
Opposite from a nature of matter. (rnam shes bem poi rang bzhin las/ ldog pa rab tu skye
ba ste)
About this, an incorrect side:
b
To say that the definition of a knower (rig pa) is an awareness
to which the aspect of an object dawns (yul gyi rnam pa shar bai blo) and to say that the aspect
of an object does not dawn to a self-knower (rang rig la yul gyi rnam pa mi char) are internally
contradictory.
Also, an incorrect side: It follows that the subject, a self-knower, is an awareness to which its
object appears (rang yul snang bai blo) because of being a knower (rig pa). It follows [that a
self-knower is a knower] because of being a self-knower. You have accepted the reason, [that is,
that a self-knower is a self-knower]. If you accept [that a self-knower is an awareness to which

mkho kun btus, Advanced principles of Tibetan logic and disputation (New Delhi: Lochen Rinpoche, 1985), 11.7.
However, as Jongbok Yi points out, there is a somewhat similar line in the Chapter on Patience in Shntidevas
Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds:
Because mentalism [that is, mind] is not physical
It cannot be overcome by anyone in any way.
Due to adherence to the body
The body is harmed by sufferings.
_
_
ntideva, byang chub sems dpa'i spyod pa nyid 'jug pa (bodhisattvcryvatra), Derge ed., vol. 3871, 16b.3-16b.4.
a
Stanza 16. In ntarakita, Kamalala, and Masamichi Ichig, Madhyamaklakra of ntarakita: with His Own
Commentary or Vtti and with the Subcommentary or Pajik of Kamalala, trans. Masamichi Ichig (Kyoto: Kyoto
Sangyu University, 1985), 69-71; sDe-dge edition, vol. sa, 94b.1-94b.3, Shntarakhitas root text reads:
_



Shntarakhitas autocommentary reads:
__ _
_
__

_ _
,
Kamalashlas commentary reads:

, _
,__
_

_
Footnote provided by Jongbok Yi.
b
In the following blue = true statement; red = untrue statement.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 4
its object appears (rang yul snang bai blo)], it follows that the aspect of its object dawns (rang
yul gyi rnam pa shar ba) because its object appears (rang yul snang ba).
Correct side: [That its object appears (rang yul snang ba)] does not entail [that the aspect of
its object dawns (rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba)].
Incorrect side: It follows [that that its object appears (rang yul snang ba)] entails [that the
aspect of its object dawns (rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba)] because the aspect of its object
appears (rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba). It follows [that the aspect of its object appears (rang
yul gyi rnam pa snang ba)] because its object appears (rang yul snang ba).
Correct side: Again, [that its object appears (rang yul snang ba)] does not entail [that the
aspect of its object appears (rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba)]. One cannot accept any of those
three [namely, that (1) the definition of a knower (rig pa) is an awareness to which the aspect of
an object dawns (yul gyi rnam pa shar bai blo); (2) to a self-knower the aspect of its object
dawns (rang yul gyi rnam pa shar ba); and (3) to a self-knower the aspect of its object appears
(rang yul gyi rnam pa snang ba)] because a representation-aspect of the object (yul gyi dra
rnam)
a
does not dawn (yul gyi dra rnam ma shar ba) [to a self-knower]. It follows [that a
representation-aspect of the object does not dawn (yul gyi dra rnam ma shar ba)] because [a
self-knower] is an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has
disappeared (yul yul can gyi gnyis snang nub pai blo). It follows [that (a self-knower) is an
awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has disappeared (yul yul can
gyi gnyis snang nub pai blo)] because of being a self-knower. [Whatever is a self-knower]
necessarily is [an awareness for which the dualistic appearance of object and subject has
disappeared (yul yul can gyi gnyis snang nub pai blo)] because Shntarakhitas Ornament for
the Middle says, Its self-knower does not have a nature of object and agent. (dei rang gi rig pa
ni// bya dang byed pai dngos por min//).
With respect to that an incorrect side: It follows that even its aspect does not dawn to that
[self-knower] (rang gi yang rnam pa ma shar ba) because it is an aspectless consciousness
(rnam med kyi shes pa). It follows [that a self-knower is an aspectless consciousness (rnam med
kyi shes pa)] because Shntarakhitas Autocommentary to the Ornament for the Middle says,
b
It
is not feasible to posit an aspect for self-knowers in the manner in which it is expressed for
consciousnesses having aspects.
Correct side: [That Shntarakhita says this] does not entail [that a self-knower is an
aspectless consciousness (rnam med kyi shes pa)] because the meaning [of that passage] is that
[self-knowers] do not have the dualistic appearance of object and subject. Otherwise, it
[absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not a consciousness having an aspect (rnam can gyi
shes pa ma yin pa) because [according to you] neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears
(rang ngam yul gang gi yang rnam pa mi snang ba). You have accepted the reason, [that is, that
neither the aspect of itself nor its object appears (rang ngam yul gang gi yang rnam pa mi snang
ba)]. If you accept [that a self-knower is not a consciousness having an aspect (rnam can gyi shes
pa ma yin pa)], it [absurdly] follows that [a self-knower] is not even that which has the aspect of

a
Or likeness-aspect of the object.
b
3a.2.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 5
the apprehender (dzin rnam yang ma yin pa) because you have accepted [that a self-knower is
not a consciousness having an aspect (rnam can gyi shes pa ma yin pa)]. You cannot accept [that
a self-knower is not even that which has the aspect of the apprehender (dzin rnam yang ma yin
pa)] because with respect to a sense consciousness perceiving blue (sngo snang dbang shes)
[there exist] (1) that which has the aspect of the apprehended (gzung rnam) such as the aspect of
blue (sngon poi rnam pa)
a
and is an other-knowing consciousness (gzhan rig gi shes pa) and (2)
the mere-experiencer (myong tsam), the self-knower (rang rig), that which has the aspect of the
apprehender (dzin rnam).
b
For, Gen-dun-drups Ornament for Reasoning says:
Since in the likes of a sense consciousness perceiving blue there exist (1) a factor to
which the aspect of the object dawns (yul gyi rnam pa shar bai cha) and (2) a factor of
mere experience (myong tsam gyi cha), the first is that which was the aspect of the
apprehended (gzung rnam) and the second is a self-knowing direct perception (rang rig
mngon sum).
There are many such distinctions.
A certain chief logician of Tibet said: The definition of an awareness is that which knows an
object (yul rig par bya ba).
Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, a person (skyes bu, purua), is an
awareness because of being that definition [that is, that which knows an object]. The reason, [that
is, that a person (skyes bu, purua) knows an object] is easy [to establish].
Divisions
There are six divisions [of awarenesses]: division into the two, realizing
c
awarenesses and non-
realizing awarenesses; division into the seven awarenesses and knowledges;
d
division into the
two, prime [cognitions] and non-prime [consciousnesses]; division into the two, conceptual and
nonconceptual [consciousnesses], and division into the two, minds and mental factors.
Realizing awarenesses and non-realizing awarenesses
About realizing awarenesses, Dharmakrtis Commentary on (Digngas) Compilation of Prime
Cognition says:
e


a
The entire phrase is: sngon poi rnam pa lta bu gzung rnam.
b
The entire phrase is: myong tsam rang rig dang dzin rnam.
c
Ngwang Gelek text corrected from rtog to rtogs.
d
Ngwang Gelek text corrected from rigs to rig.
e
This edition reads:
nges pa rnams kyi ma nges la//
de ni ji ltar de yul yin//
Hiroshi Nemoto identifies the stanza as I.57 and, pointing out that the citation should be begin a half line earlier,
corrects the reading of the third line:
sgro 'dogs med pa'i yul la ni //
'jug phyir gzhan yang ngo bo gang //
nges pa rnams kyis ma nges pa//
de ni ji ltar de yul yin//
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 6
[Furthermore, (if) whatsoever entity (or aspect)]
Is not ascertained by the ascertaining [consciousness],
How could it be the [apprehended] object of that [consciousness]?
Realizing awarenesses
With respect to realizing awarenesses there are two, definition and explaining the meaning of the
individual divisions.
Definition of realizing awareness
That which is able to induce ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon in
dependence upon the functioning of this awareness (blo dei byed pa la brten nas chos de
la nges pa dren nus pa)
is the definition of realizing that phenomenon by this awareness,
because when this awareness ascertains that phenomenon, it eliminates superimpositions that
are its opposite (rang gi bzlog zlai sgro dogs),
because, for example, an inferential cognition ascertaining that sound is impermanent
eliminates superimpositions apprehending permanence with respect to sound;
Dharmakrtis Commentary on (Digngas) Compilation of Prime Cognition says:
Because ascertaining and superimposing mentalities
Are entities of harmer and harmed.
Explaining the meaning of the individual divisions
When realizing awarenesses are divided, there are twoexplicit realizers (dngos rtogs) and
implicit realizers (shugs rtogs). From between those two:
realization by way of the aspect of that object dawning to this awareness (blo de la yul
dei rnam pa shar bai sgo nas rtogs pa de)
the definition of explicit realization of that object by this awareness. Illustrations are, for
instance, the realization of blue by a direct perception apprehending blue (sngon dzin dbang
mngon gyis sngon po rtogs pa) and the realization that sound [is] a product by an inferential
cognition explicitly realizing sound as a product (sgra byas par dngos su rtogs pai rjes dpag gis
sgra byas pa rtogs pa).
Whatever is an explicit realization (dngos rtogs) is not necessarily a direct realization (mngon
sum du rtogs pa) because there exists a conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as
impermanent (sgra mi rtag par dngos su rtogs pai rtog pa yod pa). [That there exists a
conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent (sgra mi rtag par dngos su
rtogs pai rtog pa yod pa)] entails [that whatever is an explicit realization (dngos rtogs) is not
necessarily a direct realization (mngon sum du rtogs pa)] because with regard to whatever is a
direct realization, the object necessarily appears clearly (mngon sum du rtogs na yul de gsal bar

My translation is adapted just slightly from Nemotos.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 7
snang bas khyab pa). Dharmakrtis Commentary on (Digngas) Compilation of Prime
Cognition says:
Whatever is an awareness possessing clear appearance
Is asserted as nonconceptual with respect to that.
Above at the point where the entailment was established, the reason [that is, that there exists a
conceptual consciousness explicitly realizing sound as impermanent (sgra mi rtag par dngos su
rtogs pai rtog pa yod pa)] is established because there exists an inferential cognition explicitly
realizing that. There is entailment because Dharmakrtis Commentary on (Digngas)
Compilation of Prime Cognition says:
Whatever consciousness apprehends a meaning[-generality] or a sound[-generality]
Is asserted to be a conceptual consciousness with regard to that.
and also he says in the Chapter on Direct Perception:
By clearing away the web of conceptuality
It appears just clearly.
Furthermore, with regard to the manner of explicit realization and implicit realization there
are twothe manner of explicit and implicit realization by prime cognitions and the manner of
explicit and implicit realization by non-prime consciousnesses.
THE MANNER OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT REALIZATION BY PRIME COGNITIONS
Moreover, with regard to the manner of explicit and implicit realization by prime cognitions
there are three(1) in general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by prime cognitions,
(2) the mode of explicit and implicit realization by direct prime cognitions, and (3) the mode of
explicit and implicit realization by inferential prime cognitions.
1. The first [that is, in general the mode of explicit and implicit realization by prime cognitions]
exists because:
a. inducing ascertainment by its own forcewithout depending on another subsequent
awarenessthrough the force of (1) this prime cognitions mentally attending to that
object and (2) the aspect [of that object] dawning [to it]
is the meaning of explicit realization of that object by this prime cognition; and
b. despite not presently mentally attending to that object, merely by later mentally
attending to that object this prime cognition induces ascertainment of itwithout
depending on another prime cognitionthrough the force of its explicitly
comprehending its [present] object of comprehension and due to having finished
elimination of superimpositions with respect to its [present] object at this time in
accordance with the context
a

is the meaning of implicit realization of that object by this prime cognition. Distinctions
are also needed with respect to these.

a
The meaning of in accordance with the context (skabs dang mthun par) is not apparent to me.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 8
2. The second, the two meanings of explicit realization and implicit realization by direct prime
cognitions, exist because:
a. that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension
upon the aspect of its object of comprehension actually dawning to that direct
perception
is the definition of explicit realization of an object of comprehension by a direct prime
cognition. An illustration, for example, is the elimination of superimpositions with
respect to blue upon the aspect of blue clearly dawning to a direct prime cognition
apprehending blue. And:
b. that which eliminates superimpositions also with respect to another phenomenon
whose aspect does not dawn to itthrough the force of having explicitly eliminated
superimpositions with respect to its [present] object of comprehension by way of the
aspect of that [present] object of comprehension explicitly having dawned [to it]
is the definition of implicit realization of another phenomenon by this direct prime
cognition. An illustration, for example, is that which through the force of having induced
ascertainmentupon the explicit dawning of the aspect of a place that is devoid of a
pothas eliminated superimpositions with respect to the existence of a pot and comes to
ascertain the nonexistence of pot by mentally merely attending to it even though the
aspect of the nonexistence of pot in that place did not dawn [to it].
3. The third, the two meanings of explicit and implicit realization by inferential prime
cognitions, exist because:
a. that which eliminates superimpositions with respect to an object of comprehension by
way of the meaning-generality of that object of comprehension dawning to this
inferential cognition
is the definition of explicit comprehension by an inferential cognition. An illustration, for
example, is that which eliminates the superimpositions of apprehending sound to be
permanent by way of the meaning-generality of impermanent sound explicitly appearing
to an inferential cognition realizing sound to be impermanent. And:
b. that which eliminates superimpositions even with respect to another phenomenon
whose meaning-generality does not dawn to that inferential cognitionthrough the
force of having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaning-generality of
its object of comprehension having dawned to it
is the definition of realizing another phenomenon by the power of that inferential
cognition.
a
An illustration, for example, is that which (1) eliminates superimpositions of
permanent existence with respect to soundeven though the meaning-generality of the
nonexistence of permanent sound does not dawn [to it]through the force of that
inferential cognition having eliminated superimpositions with respect to the meaning-

a
rjes dpag dei shugs kyis.
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 9
generality of its own [present] object of comprehension that has dawned to it and (2) will
ascertain, without depending on another prime cognition, the nonexistence of permanence
with respect to sound by merely mentally turning to it.
That the meaning-generality of the phenomenon dawns to that conceptual consciousness is the
meaning of the aspect of the phenomenon dawning to that conceptual consciousness.
THE MANNER OF EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT REALIZATION BY NON-PRIME CONSCIOUSNESSES
This has two parts: definition and divisions. With respect to the first, the two modes of explicit
and implicit realization by non-prime cognitions exist because:
realization of the remainder by way of the aspect dawning although superimpositions are not
newly eliminated is the meaning of explicit realization
realization although the aspect does not dawn is the meaning of implicit realization.
With respect to the second [the divisions], when those are divided, there are the two, correctly
assuming consciousnesses, subsequent cognitions, and so forth. These will be explained on the
occasion of the division of awarenesses into five.
Decisive Analysis
Incorrect side: Whatever is an awareness realizing a phenomenon at its own time necessarily
induces ascertainment with respect to that phenomenon at its own time.
Correct side: It [absurdly] follows with respect to the subject, a sense direct perception
apprehending a place devoid of a pot, that it induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to
the nonexistence of a pot because it realizes that [nonexistence of a pot], because it realizes that
[nonexistence of a pot] implicitly. If you accept [that a sense direct perception apprehending a
place devoid of a pot induces ascertainment at its own time with respect to the nonexistence of a
pot], it [absurdly] follows that even a sentient beings ascertaining consciousness induces
[ascertainment] in this way because of being that [that is, being an ascertaining consciousness] in
the continuum of a sentient being.
You cannot accept [that even a sentient beings ascertaining consciousness induces
[ascertainment] in this way [that is to say, at its own time] because it induces an ascertaining
consciousness without interruption after itself. It follows [that it induces an ascertaining
consciousness without interruption after itself] because two different ascertaining consciousness
at one time in one continuum are not feasible, because Dharmakrtis Commentary on
(Digngas) Compilation of Prime Cognition says, Two conceptual consciousnesses are not
seen at the same time.
Similarly, it [absurdly] follows that an inference realizing the impermanence of sound induces
at its own time ascertainment also with respect to the nonexistence of permanent sound because
it realizes that [nonexistence of permanent sound]. If you accept [that an inferential cognition
realizing the impermanence of sound also induces at its own time ascertainment with respect to
the nonexistence of permanent sound], it is as above.
Also, incorrect side: Realization upon the aspect of that object dawning to an awareness is the
meaning of its realization of that object.
Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit
Jam-yang-shay-pas Awareness and Knowledge 10
realization by it because you have accepted [that realization upon the aspect of that object
dawning to an awareness is the meaning of its realization of that object]. You cannot accept
[that realization by an awareness is necessarily explicit realization by it] because implicit
realization by that [awareness] exists.
Also, incorrect side: If an awareness realizes that object, it necessarily eliminates or has
eliminated superimpositions with respect to that [object].
Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, the two subsequent cognitions [conceptual
and nonconceptual], eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension
because of realizing that [object of comprehension]. The reason [that is, that the two subsequent
cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual, realize their object of comprehension] is easy [to
establish]. If you accept [that the two subsequent cognitions, conceptual and nonconceptual,
eliminate superimpositions with respect to their object of comprehension], it follows that
superimpositions with respect to that object are not eliminated by them because
[superimpositions with respect to that object] have already been eliminated by an earlier prime
cognition.
Moreover, it [absurdly] follows that the subject, a correctly assuming consciousness,
[eliminates superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because of realizing its
object of realization. You cannot accept [that a correctly assuming consciousness, eliminates
superimpositions with respect to its object of comprehension] because it does not eliminate
superimpositions of doubt. It follows [that it does not eliminate superimpositions of doubt]
because of being a correctly assuming consciousness.
Also, incorrect side: Whatever is a nonmistaken awareness necessarily realizes its object of
comprehension.
Correct side: It [absurdly] follows that the subject, respectively the three awarenesses to
which an object appears but is not ascertained[that is, sense, mental, and self-knowing direct
perceptions which are such that an object appears but is not ascertainedrealize their object of
comprehension] because of being [nonmistaken awarenesses]. You cannot accept [that
respectively the three awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertainedthat is,
sense, mental, and self-knowing direct perceptions which are such that an object appears but is
not ascertainedrealize their object of comprehension] because of being that subject [that is,
being awarenesses to which an object appears but is not ascertained].
a


a
Once it lacks ascertainment, it does not realize an object of comprehension.