AA – The American readout of the Trump–Xi meeting claims that Xi explicitly agreed that the Strait of Hormuz must remain open, that there must be no tolls, that China opposes the militarisation of the Strait, that China will buy more American oil to reduce its dependence on Hormuz, and that Iran must never have a nuclear weapon. The Chinese readout said almost none of this. It said only that the two leaders exchanged views on the Middle East. Meanwhile, Xi Jinping spent his political capital on Taiwan.
So Iranians watching this tonight are asking: did Xi Jinping just trade Iran for Taiwan? Did our most important strategic partner sell us out at the Great Hall of the People while our cities are under blockade? What actually happened in Beijing today?
MH – If you have listened to Donald Trump and to the American reports of earlier negotiations with Iran and with other countries, there are always two versions. There is the American version, which always reads the same way: the other side has agreed to total surrender to everything the United States has asked for. Then there is the other side, which says, no, we did not say any of those things.
So we are dealing not only with a translation of languages, but a translation of what the words mean. What does it mean for the Strait of Hormuz to be open? From China’s point of view, it means that there will be continued trade — that all countries, the Arab OPEC countries and Iran, will be able to send their ships through the Strait and onward through the Indian Ocean, eastward to China or wherever they are going in Asia.
That is exactly what has happened in the last few days. Chinese ships have been freely going through the Strait of Hormuz. They have been paying the tolls that Iran has said are an absolute precondition for any agreement, because Iran has been attacked unjustly, in violation of the United Nations Security Council rules of war and the rules of international relations. Iran under these rules is justified in receiving reparations. But the United Nations does not have an enforcement system. It does not have any equivalent of a Nuremberg trials commission. It does not have a set of judges who can enforce reparations. So Iran has worked out a pragmatic way of extracting these reparations, and that is to impose tolls on all ships going through the Strait.
That has been discussed and explained very clearly by Iran, and other countries have agreed to these rules. And the issue is not limited to Hormuz alone. What happens when the ships emerge from the Strait and go into the open seas? The United States has been seizing Iranian ships, or threatening to seize them. Most of the ships that are able to go through Hormuz have been turned back, forced to stop from going further. Iran has said: we will send so many that some will get by, because the United States does not have a large enough navy to prevent them all. But the United States is blocking not only Hormuz; it has blocked the ocean outside Hormuz as well. Iran has been trying to send its ships very close to the Pakistani shore, to stay within Pakistani waters and move that way.
But obviously, from Iran’s point of view, and I believe from China’s point of view, this is opening the Strait of Hormuz. It was Donald Trump who made up his wish list. And his wish list is, of course, that Iran would not charge any tolls. But that is one of Iran’s red lines. I think Iran has learned from looking at Russia’s experience in Ukraine that you do not announce a red line and then fail to enforce it. Russia has announced its red lines for what NATO countries can do in support of Ukraine, again and again and again, and NATO has simply ignored them. Iran has said: we are not going to let the United States, Israel and their allies keep pushing on us with salami tactics, a little bit at a time. A red line is a red line.
So when the conference ends, which I gather will be tomorrow, you will read the Chinese report of what happened. I doubt there can be an agreed joint report — there rarely is in these things. There is always the U.S. report for the U.S. press and for American voters, which says that Trump has won a huge victory and has hurt other countries to the benefit of the United States. And then there is the other side, which says all of this is fantasy and that they have stuck to their guns. So you should wait for the Chinese reports to come out, and for the discussion with Chinese diplomats that is going to follow.
AA – Nonetheless, for some people the very fact that Trump is visiting China, that Xi Jinping is welcoming him, and that — apart from China’s insistence on Taiwan — the Chinese are open to flexibility and say they want a good partnership, is troubling. For many, multipolarity was imagined as another Cold War. You were one of the first people to write about multipolarity. Can you explain how China is different from what the Soviet Union was, and why China insists on de-escalating tensions with America and avoiding military confrontation?
MH – Every country in the world except the United States, Israel, Germany, England and France wants to reduce tensions. So of course the host countries that are not among these belligerent nations are going to say we all want to be partners in world peace. They are trying to talk reason: here is a reasonable way to resolve things.
What they are actually doing when they say “we are partners” is laying down the principles of international trade, international investment, international banking and military spending. If you are part of this partnership — meaning agreement to these principles — that is fine. But if you do not agree to these principles, then we are afraid you are not part of this partnership.
So when China and Russia refer to their enemies as “our partners,” as they have done again and again, they are not posing as if they will fight back in a confrontational way. That is not the Asian way of conducting a negotiation. You do not say: we will fight back, you fight and we fight. That is not the way to find any resolution. Of course you are prepared to fight. But of course you say: why don’t we have a peaceful, logical discussion? Here is the kind of world stability that we are going to create.
The United States does not want stability in the world, because stability means the status quo. The United States has continually lost what used to be the American empire. It has lost its trade and balance-of-payments surplus. It has lost its industrial dominance. It has lost its dollar financial dominance. It is now a big debtor. It has been losing almost everything. That is why the U.S. National Security Strategy said, in effect: we are no longer going to support the kind of unified world of equality, multipolarity, free trade and free investment that we supported back in 1945, when we had all the power, when we had most of the world’s gold, when we had the manufacturing and industrial power to help Europe survive. We do not have that anymore.
The only asset that the United States now has to cope with a changing world dynamic is the ability to hurt other countries. It can say: we can disrupt your trade. Trump can impose tariffs to stop your access to the American market. That, of course, will upset your exporters and cause chaos. But if you agree to America’s version of the world — if you agree not to trade with Russia, not to trade with Iran, not to permit Chinese investment in your country — if you obey us and become our political and economic satellites, then you can have access to the U.S. market. Otherwise we are going to disturb your situation.