Bugfixes:

* Many manager configuration settings that are only applicable to user

manager or system manager can be always set. It would be better to reject

them when parsing config.

* Jun 01 09:43:02 krowka systemd[1]: Unit user@1000.service has alias user@.service.

Jun 01 09:43:02 krowka systemd[1]: Unit user@6.service has alias user@.service.

Jun 01 09:43:02 krowka systemd[1]: Unit user-runtime-dir@6.service has alias user-runtime-dir@.service.

External:

* Fedora: add an rpmlint check that verifies that all unit files in the RPM are listed in %systemd_post macros.

* dbus:

- natively watch for dbus-*.service symlinks (PENDING)

- teach dbus to activate all services it finds in /etc/systemd/services/org-*.service

* kernel: add device_type = "fb", "fbcon" to class "graphics"

* /usr/bin/service should actually show the new command line

* fedora: suggest auto-restart on failure, but not on success and not on coredump. also, ask people to think about changing the start limit logic. Also point people to RestartPreventExitStatus=, SuccessExitStatus=

* neither pkexec nor sudo initialize environ[] from the PAM environment?

* fedora: update policy to declare access mode and ownership of unit files to root:root 0644, and add an rpmlint check for it

* register catalog database signature as file magic

* zsh shell completion:

- <command> <verb> -<TAB> should complete options, but currently does not

- systemctl add-wants,add-requires

- systemctl reboot --boot-loader-entry=

* systemctl status should know about 'systemd-analyze calendar ... --iterations='

* If timer has just OnInactiveSec=..., it should fire after a specified time

after being started.

* write blog stories about:

- hwdb: what belongs into it, lsusb

- enabling dbus services

- how to make changes to sysctl and sysfs attributes

- remote access

- how to pass throw-away units to systemd, or dynamically change properties of existing units

- testing with Harald's awesome test kit

- auto-restart

- how to develop against journal browsing APIs

- the journal HTTP iface

- non-cgroup resource management

- dynamic resource management with cgroups

- refreshed, longer missions statement

- calendar time events

- init=/bin/sh vs. "emergency" mode, vs. "rescue" mode, vs. "multi-user" mode, vs. "graphical" mode, and the debug shell

- how to create your own target

- instantiated apache, dovecot and so on

- hooking a script into various stages of shutdown/rearly booot

Regularly:

* look for close() vs. close_nointr() vs. close_nointr_nofail()

* check for strerror(r) instead of strerror(-r)

* pahole

* set_put(), hashmap_put() return values check. i.e. == 0 does not free()!

* use secure_getenv() instead of getenv() where appropriate

* link up selected blog stories from man pages and unit files Documentation= fields

Janitorial Clean-ups:

* Rearrange tests so that the various test-xyz.c match a specific src/basic/xyz.c again

* rework mount.c and swap.c to follow proper state enumeration/deserialization

semantics, like we do for device.c now

Features:

* homed/userdb: maybe define a "companion" dir for home directories where apps

can safely put privileged stuff in. Would not be writable by the user, but

still conceptually belong to the user. Would be included in user's quota if

possible, even if files are not owned by UID of user. Usecase: container

images that owned by arbitrary UIDs, and are owned/managed by the users, but

are not directly belonging to the user's UID. Goal: we shouldn't place more

privileged dirs inside of unprivileged dirs, and thus containers really

should not be placed inside of traditional UNIX home dirs (which are owned by

users themselves) but somewhere else, that is separate, but still close

by. Inform user code about path to this companion dir via env var, so that

container managers find it. the ~/.identity file is also a candidate for a

file to move there, since it is managed by privileged code (i.e. homed) and

not unprivileged code.

* given that /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/ is a thing now, ship a drop-in for that

that hooks up userbdctl ssh-key stuff.

* allow embedding a signature blob for PCR hashes into separate section in

unified kernel binaries. This section should be picked up by sd-stub, and

passed in a file to the booted kernel (via initrd cpio, as usual). Usecase:

this way we can implement disk encryption policies that bind to specific

kernel PCR state, without breaking things on every kernel update. As long as

the kernel includes the PCR signature blob we should be good, as disk

encryption can then pass the signature to the TPM to unlock their secrets.

Why do this via a separate PE section? That's because the PCR state depends

on the measured kernel/initrd of course, thus we cannot put the signature

into the kernel/initrd itself, because that would require a time machine.

Hence we have to find a separate place. A simple solution is a PE section

of its own, because then it is next to the kernel and initrd which after all

are stored in PE sections of their own too. Building a unified kernel would

thus mean, calculating PCR values for the raw kernel image, and raw initrd

image, then signing those PCR values with a vendor key, and then combining

sd-stub, raw kernel image, raw initrd, and PCR signature into a unified

kernel image.

* a new tool "systemd-trust" or so, that can calculate PCR hashes offline, and

optionally sign them. for that we should extend our syntax for specifying pcr

policies (e.g. the string like "4+7+9") so that it can also include explicit

hash values, i.e.

4=sha256:0ef149998289474e4bb31813edda6ad7f3c991b2d8dec6e8fe4db7a1f039f2d1+7=sha256:87428fc522803d31065e7bce3cf03fe475096631e5e07bbd7a0fde60c4cf25c7+9=sha256:0263829989b6fd954f72baaf2fc64bc2e2f01d692d4de72986ea808f6e99813f

and file names to calculate hashes from, i.e.

4=file:/boot/vmlinuz+7=file:/boot/initrd/+9=file:/etc/fstab"

The systemd-trust tool should then be able to resolve any "underspecifed"

form into the form with explicit hash values.

* maybe add support for binding and connecting AF_UNIX sockets in the file

system outside of the 108ch limit. When connecting, open O_PATH fd to socket

inode first, then connect to /proc/self/fd/XYZ. When binding, create symlink

to target dir in /tmp, and bind through it.

* tmpfiles: for f/F/w lines, if the argument columns is left unspecified, look

for a service credential named after the file path to write to, and load

contents to write from there. Usecase: provision arbitrary files from

credentials. Example use: with a line like "f /root/.ssh/authorized-keys

0644 root root" in a tmpfiles.d/ snippet add

LoadCredential=root.ssh.authorized-keys via drop-in to

systemd-tmpfiles.service, and then provision an SSH access key through

nspawn's --load-credential=, through qemu's fw_cfg, or via systemd-stub's

credntial pick-up. The latter is particularly interesting to implement SSH

access to an initrd.

* systemd-homed: when initializing, look for a credential sysemd.homed.register

or so with JSON user records to automatically register if not registered yet.

Usecase: deploy a system, and add an account one can directly log into.

* add a proper concept of a "developer" mode, i.e. where cryptographic

protections of the root OS are weakened after interactive confirmation, to

allow hackers to allow their own stuff. idea: allow entering developer mode

only via explicit choice in boot menu: i.e. add explicit boot menu item for

it. when developer mode is entered generate a key pair in the TPM2, and add

the public part of it automatically to keychain of valid code signature keys

on subsequent boots. Then provide a tool to sign code with the key in the

TPM2. Ensure that boot menu item is only way to enter developer mode, by

binding it to locality/PCRs so that that keys cannot be generated otherwise.

* services: add support for cryptographically unlocking per-service directories

via TPM2. Specifically, for StateDirectory= (and related dirs) use fscrypt to

set up the directory so that it can only be accessed if host and app are in

order.

* TPM2: add auth policy for signed PCR values to make updates easy. i.e. do

what tpm2_policyauthorize tool does. To be truly useful scheme needs to be a

bit more elaborate though: policy probably must take some nvram based

generation counter into account that can only monotonically increase and can

be used to invalidate old PCR signatures. Otherwise people could downgrade to

old signed PCR sets whenever they want. Usecase: encrypt the rootfs with LUKS

with a key that can only be unlocked via a pristine pre-built Fedora

kernel+initrd.

* update HACKING.md to suggest developing systemd with the ideas from:

https://0pointer.net/blog/testing-my-system-code-in-usr-without-modifying-usr.html

https://0pointer.net/blog/running-an-container-off-the-host-usr.html

* add a clear concept how the initrd can make up credentials on their own to

pass to the system when transitioning into the host OS. usecase: things like

cloud-init/ignitation and similar can parameterize the host with data they

acquire.

* Add ConditionCredentialExists= or so, that allows conditionalizing services

depending on whether a specific system credential is set. Usecase: a service

similar to the ssh keygen service that installs any SSH host key supplied via

system credentials into /etc/ssh.

* drop support for kernels that lack ambient capabilities support (i.e. make

4.3 new baseline). Then drop support for "!!" modifier for ExecStart= which

is only supported for such old kernels

* sd-event: compat wd reuse in inotify code: keep a set of removed watch

descriptors, and clear this set piecemeal when we see the IN_IGNORED event

for it, or when read() returns EAGAIN or on IN_Q_OVERFLOW. Then, whenever we

see an inotify wd event check against this set, and if it is contained ignore

the event. (to be fully correct this would have to count the occurrences, in

case the same wd is reused multiple times before we start processing

IN_IGNORED again)

* sd-stub: set efi var indicating stub features, i.e. whether they pick up

creds, sysexts and so on. similar to existing variable of sd-boot

* sd-stub: set efi vars declaring TPM PCRs we measured creds/cmdline + sysext

into (even if we hardcode them)

* systemd-fstab-generator: support addition mount specifications via kernel

cmdline. Usecase: invoke a VM, and mount a host homedir into it via

virtio-fs.

* for vendor-built signed initrds:

- make sysext run in the initrd

- sysext should pick up sysext images from /.extra/ in the initrd, and insist

on verification if in secureboot mode

- kernel-install should be able to install pre-built unified kernel images in

type #2 drop-in dir in the ESP.

- kernel-install should be able install encrypted creds automatically for

machine id, root pw, rootfs uuid, resume partition uuid, and place next to

EFI kernel, for sd-stub to pick them up. These creds should be locked to

the TPM, and bind to the right PCR the kernel is measured to.

- kernel-install should be able to pick up initrd sysexts automatically and

place them next to EFI kernel, for sd-stub to pick them up.

- systemd-fstab-generator should look for rootfs device to mount in creds

- pid 1 should look for machine ID in creds

- systemd-resume-generator should look for resume partition uuid in creds

- sd-stub: automatically pick up microcode from ESP (/loader/microcode/*)

and synthesize initrd from it, and measure it. Signing is not necessary, as

microcode does that on its own. Pass as first initrd to kernel.

- sd-stub should measure the kernel/initrd/… into a separate PCR, so that we

have one PCR we can bind the encrypted creds to that is not effected by

anything else but what we drop in via kernel-install, i.e. by earlier EFI

code running (i.e. like PCR 4)

* Add a new service type very similar to Type=notify, that goes one step

further and extends the protocol to cover reloads. Specifically, SIGHUP will

become the official way to reload, and daemon has to respond with sd_notify()

to report when it starts reloading, and when it is complete reloading. Care

must be taken to remove races from this model. I.e. PID 1 needs to take

CLOCK_MONOTONIC, then send SIGHUP, then wait for at least one RELOADING=1

message that comes with a newer timestamp, then wait for a READY=1 message.

while we are at it, also maybe extend the logic to require handling of some

specific SIGRT signal for setting debug log level, that carries the level via

the sigqueue() data parameter. With that we extended with minimal logic the

service runtime logic quite substantially.

* firstboot: maybe just default to C.UTF-8 locale if nothing is set, so that we

don't query this unnecessarily in entirely uninitialized

containers. (i.e. containers with empty /etc).

* beef up sd_notify() to support AV_VSOCK in $NOTIFY_SOCKET, so that VM

managers can get ready notifications from VMs, just like container managers

from their payload. Also pick up address from qemu/fw_cfg if set there.

(which has benefits, given SecureBoot and kernel cmdline are not necessarily

friends.)

* mirroring this: maybe support binding to AV_VSOCK in Type=notify services,

then passing $NOTIFY_SOCKET and $NOTIFY_GUESTCID with PID1's cid (typically

fixed to "2", i.e. the official host cid) and the expected guest cid, for the

two sides of the channel. The latter env var could then be used in an

appropriate qemu cmdline. That way qemu payloads could talk sd_notify()

directly to host service manager.

* maybe write a tool that binds an AF_VFSOCK socket, then invokes qemu,

extending the command line to enable vsock on the VM, and using fw_cfg to

configure socket address.

* sd-boot: rework random seed handling following recent kernel changes: always

pass seed to kernel, but credit only if secure boot is used

* sd-boot: also include the hyperv "vm generation id" in the random seed hash,

to cover nicely for machine clones. It's found in the ACPI tables, which

should be easily accessible from UEFI.

* sd-boot: add menu item for shutdown? or hotkey?

* sd-device has an API to create an sd_device object from a device id, but has

no api to query the device id

* sd-device should return the devnum type (i.e. 'b' or 'c') via some API for an

sd_device object, so that data passed into sd_device_new_from_devnum() can

also be queried.

* sd-event: optionally, if per-event source rate limit is hit, downgrade

priority, but leave enabled, and once ratelimit window is over, upgrade

priority again. That way we can combat event source starvation without

stopping processing events from one source entirely.

* sd-event: similar to existing inotify support add fanotify support (given

that apparently new features in this area are only going to be added to the

latter).

* sd-event: add 1st class event source for clock changes

* sd-event: add 1st class event source for timezone changes

* support uefi/http boots with sd-boot: instead of looking for dropin files in

/loader/entries/ dir, look for a file /loader/entries/SHA256SUMS and use that

as directory manifest. The file would be a standard directory listing as

generated by GNU sha256sums.

* sd-boot: maybe add support for embedding the various auxiliary resources we

look for right in the sd-boot binary. i.e. take inspiration from sd-stub

logic: allow combining sd-boot via objcopy with kernels to enumerate, .conf

files, drivers, keys to enroll and so on. Then, add whatever we find that way

to the menu. Usecase: allow building a single PE image you can boot into via

UEFI HTTP boot.

* maybe add a new UEFI stub binary "sd-http". It works similar to sd-stub, but

all it does is download a file from a http server, and execute it, after

optionally checking its hash sum. idea would be: combine this "sd-http" stub

binary with some minimal info about an URL + hash sum, plus .osrel data, and

drop it into the unified kernel dir in the ESP. And bam you have something

that is tiny, feels a lot like a unified kernel, but all it does is chainload

the real kernel. benefit: downloading these stubs would be tiny and quick,

hence cheap for enumeration.

* initialize machine ID from systemd credential picked up from the ESP via

sd-stub, so that machine ID is stable even on systems where unified kernels

are used, and hence kernel cmdline cannot be modified locally

* in gpt-auto-generator: check partition uuids against such uuids supplied via

sd-stub credentials. That way, we can support parallel OS installations with

pre-built kernels.

* sysext: measure all activated sysext into a TPM PCR

* maybe add a "syscfg" concept, that is almost entirely identical to "sysext",

but operates on /etc/ instead of /usr/ and /opt/. Use case would be: trusted,

authenticated, atomic, additive configuration management primitive: drop in a

configuration bundle, and activate it, so that it is instantly visible,

comprehensively.

* systemd-dissect: show available versions inside of a disk image, i.e. if

multiple versions are around of the same resource, show which ones. (in other

words: show partition labels).

* systemd-nspawn: make boot assessment do something sensible in a

container. i.e send an sd_notify() from payload to container manager once

boot-up is completed successfully, and use that in nspawn for dealing with

boot counting, implemented in the partition table labels and directory names.

* maybe add a generator that reads /proc/cmdline, looks for

systemd.pull-raw-portable=, systemd-pull-raw-sysext= and similar switches

that take an URL as parameter. It then generates service units for

systemd-pull calls that download these URLs if not installed yet. usecase:

invoke a VM or nspawn container in a way it automatically deploys/runs these

images as OS payloads. i.e. have a generic OS image you can point to any

payload you like, which is then downloaded, securely verified and run.

* improve scope units to support creation by pidfd instead of by PID

* deprecate cgroupsv1 further (print log message at boot)

* systemd-dissect: add --cat switch for dumping files such as /etc/os-release

* per-service sandboxing option: ProtectIds=. If used, will overmount

/etc/machine-id and /proc/sys/kernel/random/boot_id with synthetic files, to

make it harder for the service to identify the host. Depending on the user

setting it should be fully randomized at invocation time, or a hash of the

real thing, keyed by the unit name or so. Of course, there are other ways to

get these IDs (e.g. journal) or similar ids (e.g. MAC addresses, DMI ids, CPU

ids), so this knob would only be useful in combination with other lockdown

options. Particularly useful for portable services, and anything else that

uses RootDirectory= or RootImage=. (Might also over-mount

/sys/class/dmi/id/*{uuid,serial} with /dev/null).

* journalctl/timesyncd: whenever timesyncd acquires a synchronization from NTP,

create a structured log entry that contains boot ID, monotonic clock and

realtime clock (I mean, this requires no special work, as these three fields

are implicit). Then in journalctl when attempting to display the realtime

timestamp of a log entry, first search for the closest later log entry

of this kinda that has a matching boot id, and convert the monotonic clock

timestamp of the entry to the realtime clock using this info. This way we can

retroactively correct the wallclock timestamps, in particular for systems

without RTC, i.e. where initially wallclock timestamps carry rubbish, until

an NTP sync is acquired.

* kernel-install:

- add --all switch for rerunning kernel-install for all installed kernels

- maybe add env var that shortcuts kernel-install for installers that want to

call it at the end only

* doc: prep a document explaining resolved's internal objects, i.e. Query

vs. Question vs. Transaction vs. Stream and so on.

* doc: prep a document explaining PID 1's internal logic, i.e. transactions,

jobs, units

* bootspec: remove tries counter from boot entry ids

* bootspec: bring UEFI and userspace enumeration of bootspec entries back into

sync, i.e. parse out tries in both

* automatically ignore threaded cgroups in cg_xyz().

* add linker script that implicitly adds symbol for build ID and new coredump

json package metadata, and use that when logging

* systemd-dissect: show GPT disk UUID in output

* Enable RestricFileSystems= for all our long-running services (similar:

RestrictNetworkInterfaces=)

* Add systemd-analyze security checks for RestrictFileSystems= and

RestrictNetworkInterfaces=

* cryptsetup/homed: implement TOTP authentication backed by TPM2 and its

internal clock.

* nspawn: optionally set up nftables/iptables routes that forward UDP/TCP

traffic on port 53 to resolved stub 127.0.0.54

* man: rework os-release(5), and clearly separate our extension-release.d/ and

initrd-release parts, i.e. list explicitly which fields are about what.

* sysext: before applying a sysext, do a superficial validation run so that

things are not rearranged to wildy. I.e. protect against accidental fuckups,

such as masking out /usr/lib/ or so. We should probably refuse if existing

inodes are replaced by other types of inodes or so.

* sysext: ensure one can build a sysext that can safely apply to *any* system

(because it contains only static go binaries in /opt/ or so)

* userdb: when synthesizing NSS records, pick "best" password from defined

passwords, not just the first. i.e. if there are multiple defined, prefer

unlocked over locked and prefer non-empty over empty.

* maybe add a tool inspired by the GPT auto discovery spec that runs in the

initrd and rearranges the rootfs hierarchy via bind mounts, if

enabled. Specifically in some top-level dir /@auto/ it will look for

dirs/symlinks/subvolumes that are named after their purpose, and optionally

encode a version as well as assessment counters, and then mount them into the

file system tree to boot into, similar to how we do that for the gpt auto

logic. Maybe then bind mount the original root into /.superior or something

like that (so that update tools can look there). Further discussion in this

thread:

https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2021-November/047059.html

The GPT dissection logic should automatically enable this tool whenever we

detect a specially marked root fs (i.e introduce a new generic root gpt type

for this, that is arch independent). The also implement this in the image

dissection logic, so that nspawn/RootImage= and so on grok it. Maybe make

generic enough so that it can also work for ostrees arrangements.

* if a path ending in ".auto.d/" is set for RootDirectory=/RootImage= then do a

strverscmp() of everything inside that dir and use that. i.e. implement very

simple version control. Also use this in systemd-nspawn --image= and so on.

* homed: while a home dir is not activated generate slightly different NSS

records for it, that reports the home dir as "/" and the shell as some binary

provided by us. Then, when an SSH login happens and SSH permits it our binary

is invoked. This binary can then talk to homed and activate the homedir if

it's not around yet, prompting the user for a password. Once that succeeded

we'll switch to the real user record, i.e. home dir and shell, and our tool

exec()s the latter. Net effect: ssh'ing into a homed account will just work:

we'll neatly prompt for the homedir's password if its needed. –– Building on

this we could take this even further: since this tool will potentially have

access to the client's ssh-agent (if ssh-agent forwarding is enabled) we

could implement SSH unlocking of a homedir with that: when enrolling a new

ssh pubkey in a user record we'd ask the ssh-agent to sign some random value

with the privkey, then use that as luks key to unlock the home dir. Will not

work for ECDSA keys since their signatures contain a random component, but

will work for RSA and Ed25519 keys.

* add tiny service that decrypts encrypted user records passed via initrd

credential logic and drops them into /run where nss-systemd can pick them up,

similar to /run/host/userdb/. Usecase: drop a root user JSON record there,

and use it in the initrd to log in as root with locally selected password,

for debugging purposes. Other usecase: boot into qemu with regular user

mounted from host. maybe put this in systemd-user-sessions.service?

* drop dependency on libcap, replace by direct syscalls based on

CapabilityQuintet we already have. (This likely allows us drop drop libcap

dep in the base OS image)

* sysext: automatically activate sysext images dropped in via new sd-stub

sysext pickup logic.

* add concept for "exitrd" as inverse of "initrd", that we can transition to at

shutdown, and has similar security semantics. This should then take the place

of dracut's shutdown logic. Should probably support sysexts too. Care needs

to be taken that the resulting logic ends up in RAM, i.e. is copied out of

on-disk storage.

* userdbd: implement an additional varlink service socket that provides the

host user db in restricted form, then allow this to be bind mounted into

sandboxed environments that want the host database in minimal form. All

records would be stripped of all meta info, except the basic UID/name

info. Then use this in portabled environments that do not use PrivateUsers=1.

* logind introduce two types of sessions: "heavy" and "light". The former would

be our current sessions. But the latter would be a new type of session that

is mostly the same but does not pull in user@.service or wait for it. Then,

allow configuration which type of session is desired via pam_systemd

parameters, and then make user@.service's session one of these "light" ones.

People could then choose to make FTP sessions and suchlike "light" if they

don't want the service manager to be started for that.

* /etc/veritytab: allow that the roothash column can be specified as fs path

including a path to an AF_UNIX path, similar to how we do things with the

keys of /etc/crypttab. That way people can store/provide the roothash

externally and provide to us on demand only.

* add high-level lockdown level for GPT dissection logic: e.g. an enum that can

be ANY (to mount anything), TRUSTED (to require that /usr is on signed

verity, but rest doesn't matter), LOCKEDDOWN (to require that everything is

on signed verity, except for ESP), SUPERLOCKDOWN (like LOCKEDDOWN but ESP not

allowed). And then maybe some flavours of that that declare what is expected

from home/srv/var… Then, add a new cmdline flag to all tools that parse such

images, to configure this. Also, add a kernel cmdline option for this, to be

honoured by the gpt auto generator.

* nspawn: maybe optionally insert .nspawn file as GPT partition into images, so

that such container images are entirely stand-alone and can be updated as

one.

* we probably should extend the root verity hash of the root fs into some PCR

on boot. (i.e. maybe add a crypttab option tpm2-measure=8 or so to measure it

into PCR 8)

* add a "policy" to the dissection logic. i.e. a bit mask what is OK to mount,

what must be read-only, what requires encryption, and what requires

authentication.

* in uefi stub: query firmware regarding which PCRs are being used, store that

in EFI var. then use this when enrolling TPM2 in cryptsetup to verify that

the selected PCRs actually are used by firmware.

* rework recursive read-only remount to use new mount API

* PAM: pick up authentication token from credentials

* when mounting disk images: if IMAGE_ID/IMAGE_VERSION is set in os-release

data in the image, make sure the image filename actually matches this, so

that images cannot be misused.

* New udev block device symlink names:

/dev/disk/by-parttypelabel/<pttype>-<ptlabel>. Use case: if pt label is used

as partition image version string, this is a safe way to reference a specific

version of a specific partition type, in particular where related partitions

are processed (e.g. verity + rootfs both named "LennartOS_0.7").

* sysupdate:

- add fuzzing to the pattern parser

- support casync as download mechanism

- direct TPM2 PCR change handling, possible renrolling LUKS2 media if needed.

- "systemd-sysupdate update --all" support, that iterates through all components

defined on the host, plus all images installed into /var/lib/machines/,

/var/lib/portable/ and so on.

- figure out what to do about system extensions (i.e. they need to imply an

update component, since otherwise system extenion' sysupdate.d/ files would

override the host's update files.)

- Allow invocation with a single transfer definition, i.e. with

--definitions= pointing to a file rather than a dir.

- add ability to disable implicit decompression of downloaded artifacts,

i.e. a Compress=no option in the transfer definitions

* in sd-id128: also parse UUIDs in RFC4122 URN syntax (i.e. chop off urn:uuid: prefix)

* DynamicUser= + StateDirectory= → use uid mapping mounts, too, in order to

make dirs appear under right UID.

* systemd-sysext: optionally, run it in initrd already, before transitioning

into host, to open up possibility for services shipped like that.

* maybe add a tool that displays most recent journal logs as QR code to scan

off screen and run it automatically on boot failures, emergency logs and

such. Use DRM APIs directly, see

https://github.com/dvdhrm/docs/blob/master/drm-howto/modeset.c for an example

for doing that.

* introduce /dev/disk/root/* symlinks that allow referencing partitions on the

disk the rootfs is on in a reasonably secure way. (or maybe: add

/dev/gpt-auto-{home,srv,boot,…} similar in style to /dev/gpt-auto-root as we

already have it.

* whenever we receive fds via SCM_RIGHTS make sure none got dropped due to the

reception limit the kernel silently enforces.

* add an Open= setting to service unit files that can open arbitrary file

system paths at service startup time and pass them to the service process via

our usual socket activation protocol. If passed path refers to AF_UNIX

socket: connect() to it.

* Similar, ConnectStream= which takes IP addresses and connects to them.

* Similar, Load= which takes literal data in text or base64 format, and puts it

into a memfd, and passes that. This enables some fun stuff, such as embedding

bash scripts in unit files, by combining Load= with ExecStart=/bin/bash

/proc/self/fd/3

* add a ConnectSocket= setting to service unit files, that may reference a

socket unit, and which will connect to the socket defined therein, and pass

the resulting fd to the service program via socket activation proto.

* Add a concept of ListenStream=anonymous to socket units: listen on a socket

that is deleted in the fs. Usecase would be with ConnectSocket= above.

* importd: support image signature verification with PKCS#7 + OpenBSD signify

logic, as alternative to crummy gpg

* add "systemd-analyze debug" + AttachDebugger= in unit files: The former

specifies a command to execute; the latter specifies that an already running

"systemd-analyze debug" instance shall be contacted and execution paused

until it gives an OK. That way, tools like gdb or strace can be safely be

invoked on processes forked off PID 1.

* expose MS_NOSYMFOLLOW in various places

* credentials system:

- acquire from EFI variable?

- acquire via via ask-password?

- acquire creds via keyring?

- pass creds via keyring?

- pass creds via memfd?

- acquire + decrypt creds from pkcs11?

- make systemd-cryptsetup acquire pw via creds logic

- make PAMName= acquire pw via creds logic

- make macsec/wireguard code in networkd read key via creds logic

- make gatwayd/remote read key via creds logic

- add sd_notify() command for flushing out creds not needed anymore

- make user manager instances create and use a user-specific key (the one in

/var/lib is root-only) and add --user switch to systemd-creds to use it

* add tpm.target or so which is delayed until TPM2 device showed up in case

firmware indicates there is one.

* Add concept for upgrading TPM2 enrollments, maybe a new switch

--pcrs=4:<hash> or so, i.e. select a PCR to include in the hash, and then

override its hash

* TPM2: auto-reenroll in cryptsetup, as fallback for hosed firmware upgrades

and such

* introduce a new group to own TPM devices

* cryptsetup: if only recovery keys are registered and no regular passphrases,

ask user for "recovery key", not "passphrase"

* cyptsetup: add option for automatically removing empty password slot on boot

* cryptsetup: optionally, when run during boot-up and password is never

entered, and we are on battery power (or so), power off machine again

* cryptsetup: when waiting for FIDO2/PKCS#11 token, tell plymouth that, and

allow plymouth to abort the waiting and enter pw instead

* make cryptsetup lower --iter-time

* cryptsetup: allow encoding key directly in /etc/crypttab, maybe with a

"base64:" prefix. Useful in particular for pkcs11 mode.

* cryptsetup: reimplement the mkswap/mke2fs in cryptsetup-generator to use

systemd-makefs.service instead.

* cryptsetup:

- cryptsetup-generator: allow specification of passwords in crypttab itself

- support rd.luks.allow-discards= kernel cmdline params in cryptsetup generator

* when configuring loopback netif, and it fails due to EPERM, eat up error if

it happens to be set up alright already.

* at boot: check if battery above some threshold, if not power off again after explanation

* userdb: add field for ambient caps, so that a user can have CAP_WAKE_ALARM

for example. And add code that resets ambient caps for all services by

default.

* sd-bus: when connecting to some dbus server socker, set originating AF_UNIX

socket name in abstract namespace to include "description" string, and pick

it up from there in sd_bus_creds logic. i.e. we can use the socket peer

address as conduit for some minimal connection metainfo, and use it to

restore the "description" logic that kdbus used to have.

* systemd-analyze netif that explains predictable interface (or networkctl)

* Add service setting to run a service within the specified VRF. i.e. do the

equivalent of "ip vrf exec".

* change SwitchRoot() implementation in PID 1 to use pivot_root(".", "."), as

documented in the pivot_root(2) man page, so that we can drop the /oldroot

temporary dir.

* special case some calls of chase_symlinks() to use openat2() internally, so

that the kernel does what we otherwise do.

* add a new flag to chase_symlinks() that stops chasing once the first missing

component is found and then allows the caller to create the rest.

* make use of new glibc 2.32 APIs sigabbrev_np() and strerrorname_np().

* if /usr/bin/swapoff fails due to OOM, log a friendly explanatory message about it

* Remove any support for booting without /usr pre-mounted in the initrd entirely.

Update INITRD_INTERFACE.md accordingly.

* pid1: Move to tracking of main pid/control pid of units per pidfd

* pid1: support new clone3() fork-into-cgroup feature

* pid1: also remove PID files of a service when the service starts, not just

when it exits

* make us use dynamically fewer deps for containers in general purpose distros:

o turn into dlopen() deps:

- p11-kit-trust (always)

- kmod-libs (only when called from PID 1)

- libblkid (only in RootImage= handling in PID 1, but not elsewhere)

- libpam (only when called from PID 1)

- bzip2, xz, lz4 (always — gzip and zstd should probably stay static deps the way they are,

since they are so basic and our defaults)

o move into separate libsystemd-shared-iptables.so .so

- iptables-libs (only used by nspawn + networkd)

* seccomp: maybe use seccomp_merge() to merge our filters per-arch if we can.

Apparently kernel performance is much better with fewer larger seccomp

filters than with more smaller seccomp filters.

* systemd-path: add ESP and XBOOTLDR path. Add "private" runtime/state/cache dir enum,

mapping to $RUNTIME_DIRECTORY, $STATE_DIRECTORY and such

* All tools that support --root= should also learn --image= so that they can

operate on disk images directly. Specifically: bootctl, systemctl,

coredumpctl. (Already done: systemd-nspawn, systemd-firstboot,

systemd-repart, systemd-tmpfiles, systemd-sysusers, journalctl)

* seccomp: by default mask x32 ABI system wide on x86-64. it's on its way out

* seccomp: don't install filters for ABIs that are masked anyway for the

specific service

* busctl: maybe expose a verb "ping" for pinging a dbus service to see if it

exists and responds.

* Maybe add a separate GPT partition type to the discoverable partition spec

for "hibernate" partitions, that are exactly like swap partitions but only

activated right before hibernation and thus never used for regular swapping.

* socket units: allow creating a udev monitor socket with ListenDevices= or so,

with matches, then activate app through that passing socket over

* unify on openssl:

- kill gnutls support in resolved

- figure out what to do about libmicrohttpd, which has a hard dependency on

gnutls

- port fsprg over to a dlopen lib, then switch it to openssl

* add growvol and makevol options for /etc/crypttab, similar to

x-systemd.growfs and x-systemd-makefs.

* userdb: allow username prefix searches in varlink API, allow realname and

realname substr searches in varlink API

* userdb: allow uid/gid range checks

* userdb: allow existence checks

* pid1: activation by journal search expression

* when switching root from initrd to host, set the machine_id env var so that

if the host has no machine ID set yet we continue to use the random one the

initrd had set.

* sd-event: add native support for P_ALL waitid() watching, then move PID 1 to

it for reaping assigned but unknown children. This needs to some special care

to operate somewhat sensibly in light of priorities: P_ALL will return

arbitrary processes, regardless of the priority we want to watch them with,

hence on each event loop iteration check all processes which we shall watch

with higher prio explicitly, and then watch the entire rest with P_ALL.

* tweak sd-event's child watching: keep a prioq of children to watch and use

waitid() only on the children with the highest priority until one is waitable

and ignore all lower-prio ones from that point on

* maybe introduce xattrs that can be set on the root dir of the root fs

partition that declare the volatility mode to use the image in. Previously I

thought marking this via GPT partition flags but that's not ideal since

that's outside of the LUKS encryption/verity verification, and we probably

shouldn't operate in a volatile mode unless we got told so from a trusted

source.

* coredump: maybe when coredumping read a new xattr from /proc/$PID/exe that

may be used to mark a whole binary as non-coredumpable. Would fix:

https://bugs.freedesktop.org/show_bug.cgi?id=69447

* teach parse_timestamp() timezones like the calendar spec already knows it

* beef up hibernation to optionally do swapon/swapoff immediately before/after

the hibernation

* beef up s2h to implement a battery watch loop: instead of entering

hibernation unconditionally after coming back from resume make a decision

based on the battery load level: if battery level is above a specific

threshold, go to suspend again, only hibernate if below it. This means we'd

stick to suspend usually, but fall back to hibernation only when battery runs

empty (well, subject to our sampling interval). Related to this, check if we

can make ACPI _BTP (i.e. /sys/class/power_supply/*/alarm) work for us too,

i.e. see if it can wake up machines from suspend, so that we could resume

automatically when the system is low on power and move automatically to

hibernation mode. (see

https://uefi.org/sites/default/files/resources/ACPI%206_2_A_Sept29.pdf

section 10.2.2.8 and

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-hardware/design/device-experiences/modern-standby-wake-sources

at the end).

* We should probably replace /etc/rc.d/README with a symlink to doc

content. After all it is constant vendor data.

* maybe add kernel cmdline params: to force random seed crediting

* introduce a new per-process uuid, similar to the boot id, the machine id, the

invocation id, that is derived from process creds, specifically a hashed

combination of AT_RANDOM + getpid() + the starttime from

/proc/self/status. Then add these ids implicitly when logging. Deriving this

uuid from these three things has the benefit that it can be derived easily

from /proc/$PID/ in a stable, and unique way that changes on both fork() and

exec().

* let's not GC a unit while its ratelimits are still pending

* when killing due to service watchdog timeout maybe detect whether target

process is under ptracing and then log loudly and continue instead.

* make rfkill uaccess controllable by default, i.e. steal rule from

gnome-bluetooth and friends

* make MAINPID= message reception checks even stricter: if service uses User=,

then check sending UID and ignore message if it doesn't match the user or

root.

* maybe trigger a uevent "change" on a device if "systemctl reload xyz.device"

is issued.

* when importing an fs tree with machined, optionally apply userns-rec-chown

* when importing an fs tree with machined, complain if image is not an OS

* Maybe introduce a helper safe_exec() or so, which is to execve() which

safe_fork() is to fork(). And then make revert the RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit

to 1K implicitly, unless explicitly opted-out.

* rework seccomp/nnp logic that even if User= is used in combination with

a seccomp option we don't have to set NNP. For that, change uid first whil

keeping CAP_SYS_ADMIN, then apply seccomp, the drop cap.

* when no locale is configured, default to UEFI's PlatformLang variable

* add a new syscall group "@esoteric" for more esoteric stuff such as bpf() and

usefaultd() and make systemd-analyze check for it.

* paranoia: whenever we process passwords, call mlock() on the memory

first. i.e. look for all places we use free_and_erasep() and

augment them with mlock(). Also use MADV_DONTDUMP.

Alternatively (preferably?) use memfd_secret().

* Move RestrictAddressFamily= to the new cgroup create socket

* maybe implicitly attach monotonic+realtime timestamps to outgoing messages in

log.c and sd-journal-send

* optionally: turn on cgroup delegation for per-session scope units

* introduce per-unit (i.e. per-slice, per-service) journal log size limits.

* sd-boot: optionally, show boot menu when previous default boot item has

non-zero "tries done" count

* augment CODE_FILE=, CODE_LINE= with something like CODE_BASE= or so which

contains some identifier for the project, which allows us to include

clickable links to source files generating these log messages. The identifier

could be some abberviated URL prefix or so (taking inspiration from Go

imports). For example, for systemd we could use

CODE_BASE=github.com/systemd/systemd/blob/98b0b1123cc or so which is

sufficient to build a link by prefixing "http://" and suffixing the

CODE_FILE.

* Augment MESSAGE_ID with MESSAGE_BASE, in a similar fashion so that we can

make clickable links from log messages carrying a MESSAGE_ID, that lead to

some explanatory text online.

* maybe extend .path units to expose fanotify() per-mount change events

* When reloading configuration PID 1 should reset all its properties to the

original defaults before calling parse_config()

* hibernate/s2h: make this robust and safe to enable in Fedora by default.

Specifically:

1. add resume_offset support to the resume code (i.e. support swap files

properly)

2. check if swap is on weird storage and refuse if so

3. add auto-detection of hibernation images

* cgroups: use inotify to get notified when somebody else modifies cgroups

owned by us, then log a friendly warning.

* beef up log.c with support for stripping ANSI sequences from strings, so that

it is OK to include them in log strings. This would be particularly useful so

that our log messages could contain clickable links for example for unit

files and suchlike we operate on.

* importd: add ability download images for portabled + sysext

* add support for "portablectl attach http://foobar.com/waaa.raw (i.e. importd integration)

* sync dynamic uids/gids between host+portable srvice (i.e. if DynamicUser=1 is set for a service, make sure that the

selected user is resolvable in the service even if it ships its own /etc/passwd)

* Fix DECIMAL_STR_MAX or DECIMAL_STR_WIDTH. One includes a trailing NUL, the

other doesn't. What a disaster. Probably to exclude it.

* Check that users of inotify's IN_DELETE_SELF flag are using it properly, as

usually IN_ATTRIB is the right way to watch deleted files, as the former only

fires when a file is actually removed from disk, i.e. the link count drops to

zero and is not open anymore, while the latter happens when a file is

unlinked from any dir.

* port systemctl, busctl, … over to format-table.[ch]'s table formatters

* pid1: lock image configured with RootDirectory=/RootImage= using the usual nspawn semantics while the unit is up

* add --vacuum-xyz options to coredumpctl, matching those journalctl already has.

* introduce Ephemeral= unit file switch, that creates an ephemeral copy of all

files and directories that are left writable for a unit, and which are

removed after the unit goes down again. A bit like --ephemeral for

systemd-nspawn but for system services. If used together with RootImage= this

should reflink the image file itself.

Related: add Ephemeral=<path1> <path2> … which would allow marking

specific paths only like this.

* add CopyFile= or so as unit file setting that may be used to copy files or

directory trees from the host to the services RootImage= and RootDirectory=

environment. Which we can use for /etc/machine-id and in particular

/etc/resolv.conf. Should be smart and do something useful on read-only

images, for example fall back to read-only bind mounting the file instead.

* show invocation ID in systemd-run output

* bypass SIGTERM state in unit files if KillSignal is SIGKILL

* add proper dbus APIs for the various sd_notify() commands, such as MAINPID=1

and so on, which would mean we could report errors and such.

* introduce DefaultSlice= or so in system.conf that allows changing where we

place our units by default, i.e. change system.slice to something

else. Similar, ManagerSlice= should exist so that PID1's own scope unit could

be moved somewhere else too. Finally machined and logind should get similar

options so that it is possible to move user session scopes and machines to a

different slice too by default. Usecase: people who want to put resources on

the entire system, with the exception of one specific service. See:

https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2018-February/040369.html

* maybe rework get_user_creds() to query the user database if $SHELL is used

for root, but only then.

* be stricter with fds we receive for the fdstore: close them asynchronously

* calenderspec: add support for week numbers and day numbers within a

year. This would allow us to define "bi-weekly" triggers safely.

* sd-bus: add vtable flag, that may be used to request client creds implicitly

and asynchronously before dispatching the operation

* sd-bus: parse addresses given in sd_bus_set_addresses immediately and not

only when used. Add unit tests.

* make use of ethtool veth peer info in machined, for automatically finding out

host-side interface pointing to the container.

* add some special mode to LogsDirectory=/StateDirectory=… that allows

declaring these directories without necessarily pulling in deps for them, or

creating them when starting up. That way, we could declare that

systemd-journald writes to /var/log/journal, which could be useful when we

doing disk usage calculations and so on.

* deprecate RootDirectoryStartOnly= in favour of a new ExecStart= prefix char

* add a new RuntimeDirectoryPreserve= mode that defines a similar lifecycle for

the runtime dir as we maintain for the fdstore: i.e. keep it around as long

as the unit is running or has a job queued.

* support projid-based quota in machinectl for containers

* add a way to lock down cgroup migration: a boolean, which when set for a unit

makes sure the processes in it can never migrate out of it

* blog about fd store and restartable services

* document Environment=SYSTEMD_LOG_LEVEL=debug drop-in in debugging document

* rework ExecOutput and ExecInput enums so that EXEC_OUTPUT_NULL loses its

magic meaning and is no longer upgraded to something else if set explicitly.

* in the long run: permit a system with /etc/machine-id linked to /dev/null, to

make it lose its identity, i.e. be anonymous. For this we'd have to patch

through the whole tree to make all code deal with the case where no machine

ID is available.

* optionally, collect cgroup resource data, and store it in per-unit RRD files,

suitable for processing with rrdtool. Add bus API to access this data, and

possibly implement a CPULoad property based on it.

* beef up pam_systemd to take unit file settings such as cgroups properties as