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Felix Brandt 0001
Person information
- affiliation: Technical University Munich, Germany
Other persons with the same name
- Felix Brandt 0002 — Research Center for Information Technology, FZI, Karlsruhe, Germany
- Felix Brandt 0003 — HTW Dresden, Dresden, Germany
- Felix Brandt 0004 — TU Darmstadt, Germany
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2020 – today
- 2024
- [j49]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Leo Tappe:
Stability based on single-agent deviations in additively separable hedonic games. Artif. Intell. 334: 104160 (2024) - [j48]Felix Brandt, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 80: 1063-1098 (2024) - [j47]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen:
Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes. Soc. Choice Welf. 63(1): 19-55 (2024) - [c79]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. EC 2024: 49 - [i34]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Optimal Budget Aggregation with Single-Peaked Preferences. CoRR abs/2402.15904 (2024) - 2023
- [j46]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong:
Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences. Games Econ. Behav. 142: 266-291 (2023) - [j45]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 11: 4:1-4:65 (2023) - [c78]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Sascha Tausch:
Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains. AAMAS 2023: 1734-1742 - [c77]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Balanced Donor Coordination. EC 2023: 299 - [i33]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Sascha Tausch:
Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes on Super Condorcet Domains. CoRR abs/2302.12140 (2023) - [i32]Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Erel Segal-Halevi, Warut Suksompong:
Balanced Donor Coordination. CoRR abs/2305.10286 (2023) - [i31]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt:
A Robust Characterization of Nash Equilibrium. CoRR abs/2307.03079 (2023) - 2022
- [j44]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer:
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 73: 1093-1130 (2022) - [j43]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger:
Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 74: 569-626 (2022) - [j42]Felix Brandt, Christian Saile, Christian Stricker:
Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties. J. Econ. Theory 202: 105447 (2022) - [j41]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Stricker:
An analytical and experimental comparison of maximal lottery schemes. Soc. Choice Welf. 58(1): 5-38 (2022) - [c76]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Leo Tappe:
Single-Agent Dynamics in Additively Separable Hedonic Games. AAAI 2022: 4867-4874 - [c75]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen:
Relaxed Notions of Condorcet-Consistency and Efficiency for Strategyproof Social Decision Schemes. AAMAS 2022: 181-189 - [c74]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong:
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences. IJCAI 2022: 130-136 - [i30]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong:
Incentives in Social Decision Schemes with Pairwise Comparison Preferences. CoRR abs/2204.12436 (2022) - [i29]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures. CoRR abs/2211.09571 (2022) - 2021
- [c73]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
Reaching Individually Stable Coalition Structures in Hedonic Games. AAAI 2021: 5211-5218 - [c72]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer:
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions. AAMAS 2021: 251-259 - [c71]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker:
Distribution Rules Under Dichotomous Preferences: Two Out of Three Ain't Bad. EC 2021: 158-179 - [c70]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Matthias Greger, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, Warut Suksompong:
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule. WINE 2021: 548 - [i28]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger, Patrick Lederer:
On the Indecisiveness of Kelly-Strategyproof Social Choice Functions. CoRR abs/2102.00499 (2021) - [i27]Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer:
Characterizing the Top Cycle via Strategyproofness. CoRR abs/2108.04622 (2021) - 2020
- [c69]Felix Brandt, Martin Bullinger:
Finding and Recognizing Popular Coalition Structures. AAMAS 2020: 195-203 - [i26]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig, Warut Suksompong:
On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions. CoRR abs/2004.01651 (2020) - [i25]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Dominik Peters, Christian Stricker, Warut Suksompong:
Funding Public Projects: A Case for the Nash Product Rule. CoRR abs/2005.07997 (2020)
2010 – 2019
- 2019
- [j40]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer:
Welfare maximization entices participation. Games Econ. Behav. 114: 308-314 (2019) - [j39]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Johannes Hofbauer:
Strategic Abstention based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 66: 1031-1056 (2019) - [j38]Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Dominik Peters, Hans Georg Seedig:
k-Majority digraphs and the hardness of voting with a constant number of voters. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 105: 130-157 (2019) - [j37]Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen, Dominik Peters:
Fractional Hedonic Games. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 7(2): 6:1-6:29 (2019) - [c68]Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, Martin Strobel:
Exploring the No-Show Paradox for Condorcet Extensions Using Ehrhart Theory and Computer Simulations. AAMAS 2019: 520-528 - [c67]Felix Brandt, Anaëlle Wilczynski:
On the Convergence of Swap Dynamics to Pareto-Optimal Matchings. WINE 2019: 100-113 - [p2]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Edith Elkind, Piotr Skowron:
Computational Social Choice: The First Ten Years and Beyond. Computing and Software Science 2019: 48-65 - 2018
- [j36]Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, Christian Saile, Christian Stricker:
The Incompatibility of Fishburn-Strategyproofness and Pareto-Efficiency. Arch. Formal Proofs 2018 (2018) - [j35]Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness. Games Econ. Behav. 110: 1-18 (2018) - [j34]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Manuel Eberl, Christian Geist:
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving. J. ACM 65(2): 6:1-6:28 (2018) - [j33]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein:
Extending tournament solutions. Soc. Choice Welf. 51(2): 193-222 (2018) - [c66]Felix Brandt, Christian Saile, Christian Stricker:
Voting with Ties: Strong Impossibilities via SAT Solving. AAMAS 2018: 1285-1293 - [c65]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Stricker:
An Analytical and Experimental Comparison of Maximal Lottery Schemes. IJCAI 2018: 114-120 - 2017
- [j32]Susanne Albers, Martin Bichler, Felix Brandt, Peter Gritzmann, Rainer Kolisch:
Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. Inform. Spektrum 40(2): 165-171 (2017) - [j31]Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Hans Georg Seedig:
Minimal extending sets in tournaments. Math. Soc. Sci. 87: 55-63 (2017) - [j30]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters:
Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving. Math. Soc. Sci. 90: 18-27 (2017) - [j29]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
Computing Dominance-Based Solution Concepts. ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. 5(2): 9:1-9:22 (2017) - [c64]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer:
Random Assignment with Optional Participation. AAMAS 2017: 326-334 - [c63]Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer, Martin Suderland:
Majority Graphs of Assignment Problems and Properties of Popular Random Assignments. AAMAS 2017: 335-343 - [p1]Susanne Albers, Martin Bichler, Felix Brandt, Peter Gritzmann, Rainer Kolisch:
Algorithmic Economics und Operations Research. 50 Jahre Universitäts-Informatik in München 2017: 129-139 - [i24]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt:
Arrovian Aggregation via Pairwise Utilitarianism. CoRR abs/1703.05519 (2017) - [i23]Georg Bachmeier, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Dominik Peters, Hans Georg Seedig:
k-Majority Digraphs and the Hardness of Voting with a Constant Number of Voters. CoRR abs/1704.06304 (2017) - [i22]Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Martin Olsen, Dominik Peters:
Fractional Hedonic Games. CoRR abs/1705.10116 (2017) - 2016
- [j28]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Warut Suksompong:
An ordinal minimax theorem. Games Econ. Behav. 95: 107-112 (2016) - [j27]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist:
Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 55: 565-602 (2016) - [j26]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Paul Harrenstein:
A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality. Soc. Choice Welf. 46(1): 81-91 (2016) - [c62]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters:
Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving. AAMAS 2016: 314-322 - [c61]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Martin Strobel:
Analyzing the Practical Relevance of Voting Paradoxes via Ehrhart Theory, Computer Simulations, and Empirical Data. AAMAS 2016: 385-393 - [c60]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist:
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving. IJCAI 2016: 116-122 - [e2]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Handbook of Computational Social Choice. Cambridge University Press 2016, ISBN 9781107446984 [contents] - [r3]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Ulle Endriss, Jérôme Lang, Ariel D. Procaccia:
Introduction to Computational Social Choice. Handbook of Computational Social Choice 2016: 1-20 - [r2]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein:
Tournament Solutions. Handbook of Computational Social Choice 2016: 57-84 - [i21]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Dominik Peters:
Optimal Bounds for the No-Show Paradox via SAT Solving. CoRR abs/1602.08063 (2016) - [i20]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist:
Proving the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness via SMT Solving. CoRR abs/1604.05692 (2016) - 2015
- [j25]Felix Brandt, Andre Dau, Hans Georg Seedig:
Bounds on the disparity and separation of tournament solutions. Discret. Appl. Math. 187: 41-49 (2015) - [j24]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra:
Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates. J. Artif. Intell. Res. 53: 439-496 (2015) - [j23]Felix Brandt:
Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness. Soc. Choice Welf. 45(4): 793-804 (2015) - [c59]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Martin Strobel:
Fractional Hedonic Games: Individual and Group Stability. AAMAS 2015: 1219-1227 - [c58]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer:
Incentives for Participation and Abstention in Probabilistic Social Choice. AAMAS 2015: 1411-1419 - [c57]Felix Brandt, Guillaume Chabin, Christian Geist:
Pnyx: : A Powerful and User-friendly Tool for Preference Aggregation. AAMAS 2015: 1915-1916 - [c56]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Christian Geist, Johannes Hofbauer:
Strategic Abstention Based on Preference Extensions: Positive Results and Computer-Generated Impossibilities. IJCAI 2015: 18-24 - [c55]Felix Brandt:
Computational Social Choice (Tutorial). STACS 2015: 19-19 - [i19]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice. CoRR abs/1503.00694 (2015) - [i18]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Johannes Hofbauer:
Welfare Maximization Entices Participation. CoRR abs/1508.03538 (2015) - [i17]Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt, Warut Suksompong:
The Impossibility of Extending Random Dictatorship to Weak Preferences. CoRR abs/1510.07424 (2015) - 2014
- [j22]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. Soc. Choice Welf. 42(3): 551-574 (2014) - [j21]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Julián Mestre:
Computational aspects of random serial dictatorship. SIGecom Exch. 13(2): 26-30 (2014) - [c54]Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt:
On the Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in Randomized Social Choice. AAAI 2014: 545-551 - [c53]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein:
Extending Tournament Solutions. AAAI 2014: 580-586 - [c52]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Fractional hedonic games. AAMAS 2014: 5-12 - [c51]Felix Brandt, Christian Geist:
Finding strategyproof social choice functions via SAT solving. AAMAS 2014: 1193-1200 - [c50]Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Hans Georg Seedig:
Minimal extending sets in tournaments. AAMAS 2014: 1539-1540 - [c49]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Paul Harrenstein:
Extending Tournament Solutions. ISAIM 2014 - [c48]Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
On the Discriminative Power of Tournament Solutions. OR 2014: 53-58 - [c47]Haris Aziz, Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt:
Universal pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions. EC 2014: 331-332 - [i16]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Warut Suksompong:
An Ordinal Minimax Theorem. CoRR abs/1412.4198 (2014) - 2013
- [j20]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Computing desirable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. Artif. Intell. 195: 316-334 (2013) - [j19]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Pareto optimality in coalition formation. Games Econ. Behav. 82: 562-581 (2013) - [j18]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play. Theory Comput. Syst. 53(1): 41-52 (2013) - [j17]Dorothea Baumeister, Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann, Jörg Rothe:
The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets. Theory Comput. Syst. 53(3): 467-502 (2013) - [j16]Felix Brandt, Maria Chudnovsky, Ilhee Kim, Gaku Liu, Sergey Norin, Alex Scott, Paul D. Seymour, Stéphan Thomassé:
A counterexample to a conjecture of Schwartz. Soc. Choice Welf. 40(3): 739-743 (2013) - [c46]Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein, Keyvan Kardel, Hans Georg Seedig:
It only takes a few: on the hardness of voting with a constant number of agents. AAMAS 2013: 375-382 - [c45]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategy proofness in randomized social choice. AAMAS 2013: 455-462 - [c44]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Stursberg:
On Popular Random Assignments. SAGT 2013: 183-194 - [c43]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship. WINE 2013: 24-25 - [i15]Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
A tournament of order 24 with two disjoint TEQ-retentive sets. CoRR abs/1302.5592 (2013) - [i14]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
The Computational Complexity of Random Serial Dictatorship. CoRR abs/1304.3169 (2013) - 2012
- [j15]Felix Brandt, William S. Zwicker:
Special Issue on Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Math. Soc. Sci. 64(1): 1 (2012) - [c42]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
Computing dominance-based solution concepts. EC 2012: 233 - 2011
- [j14]Felix Brandt:
Minimal stable sets in tournaments. J. Econ. Theory 146(4): 1481-1499 (2011) - [j13]Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Set-rationalizable choice and self-stability. J. Econ. Theory 146(4): 1721-1731 (2011) - [j12]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann:
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles. Theory Comput. Syst. 49(1): 139-161 (2011) - [j11]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games. Theory Comput. Syst. 49(1): 162-181 (2011) - [j10]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Equilibria of graphical games with symmetries. Theor. Comput. Sci. 412(8-10): 675-685 (2011) - [c41]Felix Brandt:
From Arrow's Impossibility to Schwartz's Tournament Equilibrium Set - (Invited Tutorial). RAMiCS 2011: 50-51 - [c40]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. AAMAS 2011: 183-190 - [c39]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games. IJCAI 2011: 43-48 - [c38]Felix Brandt:
Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions. IJCAI 2011: 79-84 - [c37]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Hans Georg Seedig:
On the Fixed-Parameter Tractability of Composition-Consistent Tournament Solutions. IJCAI 2011: 85-90 - [c36]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Pareto Optimality in Coalition Formation. SAGT 2011: 93-104 - [c35]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill:
Necessary and sufficient conditions for the strategyproofness of irresolute social choice functions. TARK 2011: 136-142 - 2010
- [j9]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Maximilian Mair:
A computational analysis of the tournament equilibrium set. Soc. Choice Welf. 34(4): 597-609 (2010) - [c34]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra:
Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates. AAAI 2010: 715-722 - [c33]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
Minimal retentive sets in tournaments. AAMAS 2010: 47-58 - [c32]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Monotone cooperative games and their threshold versions. AAMAS 2010: 1107-1114 - [c31]Dorothea Baumeister, Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann, Jörg Rothe:
The Complexity of Computing Minimal Unidirectional Covering Sets. CIAC 2010: 299-310 - [c30]Felix Brandt:
Tournament Solutions and Their Applications to Multiagent Decision Making. MATES 2010: 1 - [c29]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Rate of Convergence of Fictitious Play. SAGT 2010: 102-113 - [c28]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths. STACS 2010: 107-118 - [e1]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
Computational Foundations of Social Choice, 07.03. - 12.03.2010. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings 10101, Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum für Informatik, Germany 2010 [contents] - [r1]Felix Brandt:
Auctions. Handbook of Financial Cryptography and Security 2010: 49-58 - [i13]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
10101 Abstracts Collection - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Computational Foundations of Social Choice 2010 - [i12]Felix Brandt, Vincent Conitzer, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jean-François Laslier, William S. Zwicker:
10101 Executive Summary - Computational Foundations of Social Choice. Computational Foundations of Social Choice 2010 - [i11]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths. CoRR abs/1001.0529 (2010) - [i10]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Optimal Partitions in Additively Separable Hedonic Games. CoRR abs/1005.4540 (2010) - [i9]Felix Brandt:
Group-Strategyproof Irresolute Social Choice Functions. CoRR abs/1005.4877 (2010) - [i8]Haris Aziz, Felix Brandt, Hans Georg Seedig:
Stable partitions in additively separable hedonic games. CoRR abs/1008.0074 (2010)
2000 – 2009
- 2009
- [j8]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Yoav Shoham:
Ranking games. Artif. Intell. 173(2): 221-239 (2009) - [j7]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium. J. Comput. Syst. Sci. 75(3): 163-177 (2009) - [j6]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
The Computational Complexity of Choice Sets. Math. Log. Q. 55(4): 444-459 (2009) - [j5]Felix Brandt:
Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule. Math. Log. Q. 55(4): 460-463 (2009) - [j4]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Jan Hoffmann:
Computing Shapley's saddles. SIGecom Exch. 8(2): 3 (2009) - [c27]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
Computational aspects of Shapley's saddles. AAMAS (1) 2009: 209-216 - [c26]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Jan Hoffmann:
The Computational Complexity of Weak Saddles. SAGT 2009: 238-249 - [c25]Felix Brandt, Markus Brill, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
On the Complexity of Iterated Weak Dominance in Constant-Sum Games. SAGT 2009: 287-298 - [i7]Dorothea Baumeister, Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Jörg Rothe:
Deciding Membership in Minimal Upward Covering Sets is Hard for Parallel Access to NP. CoRR abs/0901.3692 (2009) - [i6]Felix Brandt, Paul Harrenstein:
Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability. CoRR abs/0910.3580 (2009) - 2008
- [j3]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
Computing the minimal covering set. Math. Soc. Sci. 56(2): 254-268 (2008) - [j2]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
On the Existence of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auction Protocols. ACM Trans. Inf. Syst. Secur. 11(2): 6:1-6:21 (2008) - [c24]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Maximilian Mair:
A Computational Analysis of the Tournament Equilibrium Set. AAAI 2008: 38-43 - [c23]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
On the Hardness and Existence of Quasi-Strict Equilibria. SAGT 2008: 291-302 - [c22]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries. WINE 2008: 198-209 - [i5]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
On Iterated Dominance, Matrix Elimination, and Matched Paths. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR08 (2008) - 2007
- [c21]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
Computational Aspects of Covering in Dominance Graphs. AAAI 2007: 694-699 - [c20]Paul Harrenstein, Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
Commitment and extortion. AAMAS 2007: 26 - [c19]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Yoav Shoham:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Strictly Competitive Multiagent Scenarios. IJCAI 2007: 1199-1206 - [c18]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. IJCAI 2007: 1207-1214 - [c17]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium. STACS 2007: 212-223 - [c16]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
The computational complexity of choice sets. TARK 2007: 82-91 - [c15]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer:
PageRank as a Weak Tournament Solution. WINE 2007: 300-305 - [i4]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Paul Harrenstein:
Recognizing Members of the Tournament Equilibrium Set is NP-hard. CoRR abs/0711.2961 (2007) - [i3]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Equilibria of Graphical Games with Symmetries. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR07 (2007) - 2006
- [j1]Felix Brandt:
How to obtain full privacy in auctions. Int. J. Inf. Sec. 5(4): 201-216 (2006) - [c14]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Yoav Shoham:
On Strictly Competitive Multi-Player Games. AAAI 2006: 605-612 - [i2]Felix Brandt, Felix A. Fischer, Markus Holzer:
Symmetries and the Complexity of Pure Nash Equilibrium. Electron. Colloquium Comput. Complex. TR06 (2006) - 2005
- [c13]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Decentralized voting with unconditional privacy. AAMAS 2005: 357-364 - [c12]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Efficient Privacy-Preserving Protocols for Multi-unit Auctions. Financial Cryptography 2005: 298-312 - [c11]Felix Brandt:
Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Design Based on Distributed El Gamal Encryption. ICISC 2005: 32-47 - [c10]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
On Correctness and Privacy in Distributed Mechanisms. AMEC@AAMAS/TADA@IJCAI 2005: 212-225 - [c9]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Unconditional privacy in social choice. TARK 2005: 207-218 - [i1]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm, Yoav Shoham:
Spiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions. Computing and Markets 2005 - 2004
- [c8]Felix Brandt, Tuomas Sandholm:
Im)Possibility of Unconditionally Privacy-Preserving Auctions. AAMAS 2004: 810-817 - 2003
- [b1]Felix Brandt:
Fundamental aspects of privacy and deception in electronic auctions. Technical University Munich, 2003 - [c7]Felix Brandt:
Fully Private Auctions in a Constant Number of Rounds. Financial Cryptography 2003: 223-238 - [c6]Felix Brandt:
Social choice and preference protection: towards fully private mechanism design. EC 2003: 220-221 - 2001
- [c5]Felix Brandt, Gerhard Weiß:
Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions. Agents 2001: 71-72 - [c4]Felix Brandt, Gerhard Weiß:
Antisocial Agents and Vickrey Auctions. ATAL 2001: 335-347 - [c3]Felix Brandt:
Cryptographic Protocols for Secure Second-Price Auctions. CIA 2001: 154-165 - 2000
- [c2]Felix Brandt, Wilfried Brauer, Gerhard Weiß:
Task Assignment in Multiagent Systems Based on Vickrey-Type Auctioning and Leveled Commitment Contracting. CIA 2000: 95-106
1990 – 1999
- 1999
- [c1]Stephan Schulz, Felix Brandt:
Using Term Space Maps to Capture Search Control Knowledge in Equational Theorem Proving. FLAIRS 1999: 244-248
Coauthor Index
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last updated on 2024-12-23 20:31 CET by the dblp team
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