25 results sorted by ID
MPC-in-the-Head Framework without Repetition and its Applications to the Lattice-based Cryptography
Weihao Bai, Long Chen, Qianwen Gao, Zhenfeng Zhang
Cryptographic protocols
The MPC-in-the-Head framework has been pro-
posed as a solution for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge (NIZKAoK) due to its efficient proof generation. However, most existing NIZKAoK constructions using this approach require multiple MPC evaluations to achieve negligible soundness error, resulting in proof size and time that are asymptotically at least λ times the size of the circuit of the NP relation. In this paper, we propose a novel method to eliminate the need for...
Scabbard: An Exploratory Study on Hardware Aware Design Choices of Learning with Rounding-based Key Encapsulation Mechanisms
Suparna Kundu, Quinten Norga, Angshuman Karmakar, Shreya Gangopadhyay, Jose Maria Bermudo Mera, Ingrid Verbauwhede
Implementation
Recently, the construction of cryptographic schemes based on hard lattice problems has gained immense popularity. Apart from being quantum resistant, lattice-based cryptography allows a wide range of variations in the underlying hard problem. As cryptographic schemes can work in different environments under different operational constraints such as memory footprint, silicon area, efficiency, power requirement, etc., such variations in the underlying hard problem are very useful for designers...
Basic Lattice Cryptography: The concepts behind Kyber (ML-KEM) and Dilithium (ML-DSA)
Vadim Lyubashevsky
Public-key cryptography
This tutorial focuses on describing the fundamental mathematical concepts and design decisions used in the two ``main'' lattice schemes standardized by NIST and included in the CNSA 2.0 algorithmic suite. They are the KEM / encryption scheme CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) and the signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) . In addition, we will also give the main ideas behind other lattice-based KEMs like Frodo and NTRU.
Grafted Trees Bear Better Fruit: An Improved Multiple-Valued Plaintext-Checking Side-Channel Attack against Kyber
Jinnuo Li, Chi Cheng, Muyan Shen, Peng Chen, Qian Guo, Dongsheng Liu, Liji Wu, Jian Weng
Attacks and cryptanalysis
As a prominent category of side-channel attacks (SCAs), plaintext-checking (PC) oracle-based SCAs offer the advantages of generality and operational simplicity on a targeted device. At TCHES 2023, Rajendran et al. and Tanaka et al. independently proposed the multiple-valued (MV) PC oracle, significantly reducing the required number of queries (a.k.a., traces) in the PC oracle. However, in practice, when dealing with environmental noise or inaccuracies in the waveform classifier, they...
K-Waay: Fast and Deniable Post-Quantum X3DH without Ring Signatures
Daniel Collins, Loïs Huguenin-Dumittan, Ngoc Khanh Nguyen, Nicolas Rolin, Serge Vaudenay
Cryptographic protocols
The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount. Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing...
To extend or not to extend: Agile Masking Instructions for PQC
Markus Krausz, Georg Land, Florian Stolz, Dennis Naujoks, Jan Richter-Brockmann, Tim Güneysu, Lucie Kogelheide
Implementation
Splitting up sensitive data into multiple shares – termed masking – has
proven an effective countermeasure against various types of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) on cryptographic implementations. However, in software this approach not only leads to dramatic performance overheads for non-linear operations, but also suffers from microarchitectural leakage, which is hard to avoid. Both problems can be addressed with one solution: masked hardware accelerators. In this context, Gao et al. [GGM+...
Lattice Reduction Meets Key-Mismatch: New Misuse Attack on Lattice-Based NIST Candidate KEMs
Ruiqi Mi, Haodong Jiang, Zhenfeng Zhang
Public-key cryptography
Resistance to key misuse attacks is a vital property for key encapsulation mechanisms(KEMs)in NIST-PQC standardization process. In key mismatch attack, the adversary recovers reused secret key with the help of an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ that indicates whether the shared key matches or not. Key mismatch attack is more powerful when fewer oracle queries are required. A series of works tried to reduce query times, Qin et al. [AISACRYPT 2021] gave a systematic approach to finding lower bound of...
When Frodo Flips: End-to-End Key Recovery on FrodoKEM via Rowhammer
Michael Fahr Jr., Hunter Kippen, Andrew Kwong, Thinh Dang, Jacob Lichtinger, Dana Dachman-Soled, Daniel Genkin, Alexander Nelson, Ray Perlner, Arkady Yerukhimovich, Daniel Apon
Attacks and cryptanalysis
In this work, we recover the private key material of the FrodoKEM key exchange mechanism as submitted to the NIST Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. The new mechanism that allows for this is a Rowhammer-assisted \emph{poisoning} of the FrodoKEM Key Generation (KeyGen) process. The Rowhammer side-channel is a hardware-based security exploit that allows flipping bits in DRAM by “hammering” rows of memory adjacent to some target-victim memory location by repeated memory...
Lattice Codes for Lattice-Based PKE
Shanxiang Lyu, Ling Liu, Cong Ling, Junzuo Lai, Hao Chen
Public-key cryptography
Existing error correction mechanisms in lattice-based public key encryption (PKE) rely on either trivial modulation or its concatenation with error correction codes (ECC). This paper demonstrates that lattice coding, as a combined ECC and modulation technique, can replace trivial modulation in current lattice-based PKEs, resulting in improved error correction performance. We model the FrodoPKE protocol as a noisy point-to-point communication system, where the communication channel resembles...
Speedy Error Reconciliation
Kaibo Liu, Xiaozhuo Gu, Peixin Ren, Xuwen Nie
Applications
Introducing small errors in the lattice-based key exchange protocols, although it is resistant to quantum computing attacks, will cause both parties to only get roughly equal secret values, which brings uncertainty to the negotiation of the key agreement. The role of the error reconciliation mechanism is to eliminate this uncertainty and ensure that both parties can reach a consensus. This paper designs a new error reconciliation mechanism: Speedy Error Reconciliation (SER), which can...
LWE with Side Information: Attacks and Concrete Security Estimation
Dana Dachman-Soled, Léo Ducas, Huijing Gong, Mélissa Rossi
Public-key cryptography
We propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes, when side information---in the form of ``hints''--- about the secret and/or error is available.
Our framework generalizes the so-called primal lattice reduction attack, and allows the progressive integration of hints before running a final lattice reduction step.
Our techniques for integrating hints include sparsifying the lattice, projecting onto and intersecting with hyperplanes, and/or altering the distribution of the...
Sapphire: A Configurable Crypto-Processor for Post-Quantum Lattice-based Protocols (Extended Version)
Utsav Banerjee, Tenzin S. Ukyab, Anantha P. Chandrakasan
Implementation
Public key cryptography protocols, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, will be rendered insecure by Shor’s algorithm when large-scale quantum computers are built. Cryptographers are working on quantum-resistant algorithms, and lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a prime candidate. However, high computational complexity of these algorithms makes it challenging to implement lattice-based protocols on low-power embedded devices. To address this challenge, we present Sapphire – a...
Fly, you fool! Faster Frodo for the ARM Cortex-M4
Joppe W. Bos, Simon Friedberger, Marco Martinoli, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam
Implementation
We present an efficient implementation of FrodoKEM-640 on an ARM Cortex-M4 core. We leverage the single instruction, multiple data paradigm, available in the instruction set of the ARM Cortex-M4, together with a careful analysis of the memory layout of matrices
to considerably speed up matrix multiplications. Our implementations take up to 79.4% less cycles than the reference. Moreover, we challenge the usage of a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator for the generation of...
Assessing the Feasibility of Single Trace Power Analysis of Frodo
Joppe W. Bos, Simon Friedberger, Marco Martinoli, Elisabeth Oswald, Martijn Stam
Implementation
Lattice-based schemes are among the most promising post-quantum schemes, yet the effect of both parameter and implementation choices on their side-channel resilience is still poorly understood. Aysu et al. (HOST'18) recently investigated single-trace attacks against the core lattice operation, namely multiplication between a public matrix and a "small" secret vector, in the context of a hardware implementation. We complement this work by considering single-trace attacks against software...
Standard Lattice-Based Key Encapsulation on Embedded Devices
James Howe, Tobias Oder, Markus Krausz, Tim Güneysu
Implementation
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates being considered to replace current public-key systems in the era of quantum computing. In 2016, Bos et al. proposed the key exchange scheme FrodoCCS, that is also a submission to the NIST post-quantum standardization process, modified as a key encapsulation mechanism (FrodoKEM). The security of the scheme is based on standard lattices and the learning with errors problem. Due to the large parameters, standard lattice-based...
Module-lattice KEM Over a Ring of Dimension 128 for Embedded Systems
François Gérard
Following the development of quantum computing, the demand for post-quantum alternatives to current cryptosystems has firmly increased recently. The main disadvantage of those schemes is the amount of resources needed to implement them in comparison to their classical counterpart. In conjunction with the growth of the Internet of Things, it is crucial to know if post-quantum algorithms can evolve in constraint environments without incurring an unacceptable performance penalty. In this paper,...
Number "Not Used" Once - Practical fault attack on pqm4 implementations of NIST candidates
Prasanna Ravi, Debapriya Basu Roy, Shivam Bhasin, Anupam Chattopadhyay, Debdeep Mukhopadhyay
Public-key cryptography
In this paper, we demonstrate practical fault attacks over a number of lattice based schemes, in particular NewHope, Kyber, Frodo, Dilithium which are based on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. One of the common traits of all the considered LWE schemes is the use of nonces as domain separators to sample the secret components of the LWE instance. We show that simple faults targeting the usage of nonce can result in a nonce-reuse scenario which allows key recovery and...
Analysis of Error-Correcting Codes for Lattice-Based Key Exchange
Tim Fritzmann, Thomas Pöppelmann, Johanna Sepulveda
Public-key cryptography
Lattice problems allow the construction of very efficient key exchange and public-key encryption schemes. When using the Learning with Errors (LWE) or Ring-LWE (RLWE) problem such schemes exhibit an interesting trade-off between decryption error rate and security. The reason is that secret and error distributions with a larger standard deviation lead to better security but also increase the chance of decryption failures. As a consequence, various message/key encoding or reconciliation...
Comparison analysis and efficient implementation of reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocol
Xinwei Gao, Jintai Ding, Saraswathy RV, Lin Li, Jiqiang Liu
Cryptographic protocols
Error reconciliation is an important technique for Learning With Error (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE)-based constructions. In this paper, we present a comparison analysis on two error reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols: Ding et al. in 2012 (DING12) and Bos et al. in 2015 (BCNS15). We take them as examples to explain core idea of error reconciliation, building key exchange over RLWE problem, implementation, real-world performance and compare them comprehensively. We also analyse a...
Generic Forward-Secure Key Agreement Without Signatures
Cyprien de Saint Guilhem, Nigel P. Smart, Bogdan Warinschi
Cryptographic protocols
We present a generic, yet simple and efficient transformation to obtain a forward secure authenticated key exchange protocol from a two-move passively secure unauthenticated key agreement scheme (such as standard Diffie--Hellman or Frodo or NewHope). Our construction requires only an IND-CCA public key encryption scheme (such as RSA-OAEP or a method based on ring-LWE), and a message authentication code. Particularly relevant in the context of the state-of-the-art of postquantum secu re...
spKEX: An optimized lattice-based key exchange
Sauvik Bhattacharya, Oscar Garcia-Morchon, Ronald Rietman, Ludo Tolhuizen
The advent of large-scale quantum computers has resulted in significant interest in quantum-safe cryptographic primitives. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most attractive post-quantum cryptographic families due to its well-understood security, efficient operation and versatility. However, LWE-based schemes are still relatively bulky and slow.
In this work, we present spKEX, a forward-secret, post-quantum,
unauthenticated lattice-based key-exchange scheme that combines...
Improved key-reconciliation method
Ludo Tolhuizen, Ronald Rietman, Oscar Garcia-Morchon
At PQ Crypto 2014, Peikert proposed efficient and practical lattice-based protocols for key transport, encryption and authenticated key exchange. One of the main technical innovations of this work is a reconciliation technique that allows two parties who "approximately agree" on a secret value to reach exact agreement, a setting common to essentially all lattice-based encryption schemes. Peikert's
reconciliation technique has been extended in the Frodo key exchange scheme, allowing for...
A Hybrid Lattice Basis Reduction and Quantum Search Attack on LWE
Florian Göpfert, Christine van Vredendaal, Thomas Wunderer
Recently, an increasing amount of papers proposing post-quantum schemes also provide concrete parameter sets aiming for concrete post-quantum security levels. Security evaluations of such schemes need to include all possible attacks, in particular those by quantum adversaries. In the case of lattice-based cryptography, currently existing quantum attacks are mainly classical attacks, carried out with quantum basis reduction as subroutine.
In this work, we propose a new quantum attack on the...
Post-Quantum Key Exchange for the Internet and the Open Quantum Safe Project
Douglas Stebila, Michele Mosca
Implementation
Designing public key cryptosystems that resist attacks by quantum computers is an important area of current cryptographic research and standardization. To retain confidentiality of today's communications against future quantum computers, applications and protocols must begin exploring the use of quantum-resistant key exchange and encryption. In this paper, we explore post-quantum cryptography in general and key exchange specifically. We review two protocols for quantum-resistant key...
Frodo: Take off the ring! Practical, Quantum-Secure Key Exchange from LWE
Joppe Bos, Craig Costello, Léo Ducas, Ilya Mironov, Michael Naehrig, Valeria Nikolaenko, Ananth Raghunathan, Douglas Stebila
Public-key cryptography
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives
believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing
interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum
computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While
ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits...
The MPC-in-the-Head framework has been pro- posed as a solution for Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Arguments of Knowledge (NIZKAoK) due to its efficient proof generation. However, most existing NIZKAoK constructions using this approach require multiple MPC evaluations to achieve negligible soundness error, resulting in proof size and time that are asymptotically at least λ times the size of the circuit of the NP relation. In this paper, we propose a novel method to eliminate the need for...
Recently, the construction of cryptographic schemes based on hard lattice problems has gained immense popularity. Apart from being quantum resistant, lattice-based cryptography allows a wide range of variations in the underlying hard problem. As cryptographic schemes can work in different environments under different operational constraints such as memory footprint, silicon area, efficiency, power requirement, etc., such variations in the underlying hard problem are very useful for designers...
This tutorial focuses on describing the fundamental mathematical concepts and design decisions used in the two ``main'' lattice schemes standardized by NIST and included in the CNSA 2.0 algorithmic suite. They are the KEM / encryption scheme CRYSTALS-Kyber (ML-KEM) and the signature scheme CRYSTALS-Dilithium (ML-DSA) . In addition, we will also give the main ideas behind other lattice-based KEMs like Frodo and NTRU.
As a prominent category of side-channel attacks (SCAs), plaintext-checking (PC) oracle-based SCAs offer the advantages of generality and operational simplicity on a targeted device. At TCHES 2023, Rajendran et al. and Tanaka et al. independently proposed the multiple-valued (MV) PC oracle, significantly reducing the required number of queries (a.k.a., traces) in the PC oracle. However, in practice, when dealing with environmental noise or inaccuracies in the waveform classifier, they...
The Signal protocol and its X3DH key exchange core are regularly used by billions of people in applications like WhatsApp but are unfortunately not quantum-secure. Thus, designing an efficient and post-quantum secure X3DH alternative is paramount. Notably, X3DH supports asynchronicity, as parties can immediately derive keys after uploading them to a central server, and deniability, allowing parties to plausibly deny having completed key exchange. To satisfy these constraints, existing...
Splitting up sensitive data into multiple shares – termed masking – has proven an effective countermeasure against various types of Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) on cryptographic implementations. However, in software this approach not only leads to dramatic performance overheads for non-linear operations, but also suffers from microarchitectural leakage, which is hard to avoid. Both problems can be addressed with one solution: masked hardware accelerators. In this context, Gao et al. [GGM+...
Resistance to key misuse attacks is a vital property for key encapsulation mechanisms(KEMs)in NIST-PQC standardization process. In key mismatch attack, the adversary recovers reused secret key with the help of an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ that indicates whether the shared key matches or not. Key mismatch attack is more powerful when fewer oracle queries are required. A series of works tried to reduce query times, Qin et al. [AISACRYPT 2021] gave a systematic approach to finding lower bound of...
In this work, we recover the private key material of the FrodoKEM key exchange mechanism as submitted to the NIST Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) standardization process. The new mechanism that allows for this is a Rowhammer-assisted \emph{poisoning} of the FrodoKEM Key Generation (KeyGen) process. The Rowhammer side-channel is a hardware-based security exploit that allows flipping bits in DRAM by “hammering” rows of memory adjacent to some target-victim memory location by repeated memory...
Existing error correction mechanisms in lattice-based public key encryption (PKE) rely on either trivial modulation or its concatenation with error correction codes (ECC). This paper demonstrates that lattice coding, as a combined ECC and modulation technique, can replace trivial modulation in current lattice-based PKEs, resulting in improved error correction performance. We model the FrodoPKE protocol as a noisy point-to-point communication system, where the communication channel resembles...
Introducing small errors in the lattice-based key exchange protocols, although it is resistant to quantum computing attacks, will cause both parties to only get roughly equal secret values, which brings uncertainty to the negotiation of the key agreement. The role of the error reconciliation mechanism is to eliminate this uncertainty and ensure that both parties can reach a consensus. This paper designs a new error reconciliation mechanism: Speedy Error Reconciliation (SER), which can...
We propose a framework for cryptanalysis of lattice-based schemes, when side information---in the form of ``hints''--- about the secret and/or error is available. Our framework generalizes the so-called primal lattice reduction attack, and allows the progressive integration of hints before running a final lattice reduction step. Our techniques for integrating hints include sparsifying the lattice, projecting onto and intersecting with hyperplanes, and/or altering the distribution of the...
Public key cryptography protocols, such as RSA and elliptic curve cryptography, will be rendered insecure by Shor’s algorithm when large-scale quantum computers are built. Cryptographers are working on quantum-resistant algorithms, and lattice-based cryptography has emerged as a prime candidate. However, high computational complexity of these algorithms makes it challenging to implement lattice-based protocols on low-power embedded devices. To address this challenge, we present Sapphire – a...
We present an efficient implementation of FrodoKEM-640 on an ARM Cortex-M4 core. We leverage the single instruction, multiple data paradigm, available in the instruction set of the ARM Cortex-M4, together with a careful analysis of the memory layout of matrices to considerably speed up matrix multiplications. Our implementations take up to 79.4% less cycles than the reference. Moreover, we challenge the usage of a cryptographically secure pseudorandom number generator for the generation of...
Lattice-based schemes are among the most promising post-quantum schemes, yet the effect of both parameter and implementation choices on their side-channel resilience is still poorly understood. Aysu et al. (HOST'18) recently investigated single-trace attacks against the core lattice operation, namely multiplication between a public matrix and a "small" secret vector, in the context of a hardware implementation. We complement this work by considering single-trace attacks against software...
Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most promising candidates being considered to replace current public-key systems in the era of quantum computing. In 2016, Bos et al. proposed the key exchange scheme FrodoCCS, that is also a submission to the NIST post-quantum standardization process, modified as a key encapsulation mechanism (FrodoKEM). The security of the scheme is based on standard lattices and the learning with errors problem. Due to the large parameters, standard lattice-based...
Following the development of quantum computing, the demand for post-quantum alternatives to current cryptosystems has firmly increased recently. The main disadvantage of those schemes is the amount of resources needed to implement them in comparison to their classical counterpart. In conjunction with the growth of the Internet of Things, it is crucial to know if post-quantum algorithms can evolve in constraint environments without incurring an unacceptable performance penalty. In this paper,...
In this paper, we demonstrate practical fault attacks over a number of lattice based schemes, in particular NewHope, Kyber, Frodo, Dilithium which are based on the hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. One of the common traits of all the considered LWE schemes is the use of nonces as domain separators to sample the secret components of the LWE instance. We show that simple faults targeting the usage of nonce can result in a nonce-reuse scenario which allows key recovery and...
Lattice problems allow the construction of very efficient key exchange and public-key encryption schemes. When using the Learning with Errors (LWE) or Ring-LWE (RLWE) problem such schemes exhibit an interesting trade-off between decryption error rate and security. The reason is that secret and error distributions with a larger standard deviation lead to better security but also increase the chance of decryption failures. As a consequence, various message/key encoding or reconciliation...
Error reconciliation is an important technique for Learning With Error (LWE) and Ring-LWE (RLWE)-based constructions. In this paper, we present a comparison analysis on two error reconciliation-based RLWE key exchange protocols: Ding et al. in 2012 (DING12) and Bos et al. in 2015 (BCNS15). We take them as examples to explain core idea of error reconciliation, building key exchange over RLWE problem, implementation, real-world performance and compare them comprehensively. We also analyse a...
We present a generic, yet simple and efficient transformation to obtain a forward secure authenticated key exchange protocol from a two-move passively secure unauthenticated key agreement scheme (such as standard Diffie--Hellman or Frodo or NewHope). Our construction requires only an IND-CCA public key encryption scheme (such as RSA-OAEP or a method based on ring-LWE), and a message authentication code. Particularly relevant in the context of the state-of-the-art of postquantum secu re...
The advent of large-scale quantum computers has resulted in significant interest in quantum-safe cryptographic primitives. Lattice-based cryptography is one of the most attractive post-quantum cryptographic families due to its well-understood security, efficient operation and versatility. However, LWE-based schemes are still relatively bulky and slow. In this work, we present spKEX, a forward-secret, post-quantum, unauthenticated lattice-based key-exchange scheme that combines...
At PQ Crypto 2014, Peikert proposed efficient and practical lattice-based protocols for key transport, encryption and authenticated key exchange. One of the main technical innovations of this work is a reconciliation technique that allows two parties who "approximately agree" on a secret value to reach exact agreement, a setting common to essentially all lattice-based encryption schemes. Peikert's reconciliation technique has been extended in the Frodo key exchange scheme, allowing for...
Recently, an increasing amount of papers proposing post-quantum schemes also provide concrete parameter sets aiming for concrete post-quantum security levels. Security evaluations of such schemes need to include all possible attacks, in particular those by quantum adversaries. In the case of lattice-based cryptography, currently existing quantum attacks are mainly classical attacks, carried out with quantum basis reduction as subroutine. In this work, we propose a new quantum attack on the...
Designing public key cryptosystems that resist attacks by quantum computers is an important area of current cryptographic research and standardization. To retain confidentiality of today's communications against future quantum computers, applications and protocols must begin exploring the use of quantum-resistant key exchange and encryption. In this paper, we explore post-quantum cryptography in general and key exchange specifically. We review two protocols for quantum-resistant key...
Lattice-based cryptography offers some of the most attractive primitives believed to be resistant to quantum computers. Following increasing interest from both companies and government agencies in building quantum computers, a number of works have proposed instantiations of practical post-quantum key exchange protocols based on hard problems in ideal lattices, mainly based on the Ring Learning With Errors (R-LWE) problem. While ideal lattices facilitate major efficiency and storage benefits...