Make sure you have provided the following information:

• link to your code branch cloned from rhboot/shim-review in the form user/repo@tag
  https://github.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/tree/Leidos-shim-x64-20210422
• completed README.md file with the necessary information
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/master/README.md
• shim.efi to be signed
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/master/shimx64.efi
• public portion of your certificate(s) embedded in shim (the file passed to VENDOR_CERT_FILE)
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/master/Leidos-UEFI-CA.cer
• binaries, for which hashes are added do vendor_db ( if you use vendor_db and have hashes allow-listed )
  N/A
• any extra patches to shim via your own git tree or as files
  https://github.com/Thinstation/thinstation/tree/6.2-Stable/ts/ports/components/shim
• any extra patches to grub via your own git tree or as files
  https://github.com/Thinstation/thinstation/tree/6.2-Stable/ts/ports/opt/grub2-efi
• build logs
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/master/shim-build.log
• a Dockerfile to reproduce the build of the provided shim EFI binaries
  https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Doncuppjr/shim-review/master/Dockerfile

What organization or people are asking to have this signed:

Leidos, Inc.

What product or service is this for:

TENS Public

Please create your shim binaries starting with the 15.4 shim release tar file:

https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2

This matches https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/tag/15.4 and contains

the appropriate gnu-efi source.

Please confirm this as the origin your shim.

https://github.com/rhboot/shim/releases/download/15.4/shim-15.4.tar.bz2 15.4

What's the justification that this really does need to be signed for the whole world to be able to boot it:

We produce a 'LiveCD' to be used as a remote access and emergency access terminal, while also being certified by DISA. Wherever applicable, FIPS standards are applied, and all STIG's are implemented. The focus of the distribution is to provide a verifiable known state on BYOE devices that is secure when running and leaves no residue. We necessarily must compile our own kernel to achieve all of these objectives, and would like a signed shim, so we don't need to enroll keys or change the contents of firmware in any way. We provide the image to the public as well as the source code, should anybody want to use our build or make their own, but we don't distribute keys.

How do you manage and protect the keys used in your SHIM?

The CA is stored on a DATASHUR PRO2 hardware encryption key. The signing key is stored an a Taglio C980 SmartCard. Both are FIPS 140-2 Level 3. Both are located in a secure storage area.

Do you use EV certificates as embedded certificates in the SHIM?

No

If you use new vendor_db functionality, are any hashes allow-listed, and if yes: for what binaries ?

No

Is kernel upstream commit 75b0cea7bf307f362057cc778efe89af4c615354 present in your kernel, if you boot chain includes a Linux kernel ?

Yes

if SHIM is loading GRUB2 bootloader, are CVEs CVE-2020-14372,

CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749, CVE-2020-27779,

CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713, CVE-2020-14308,

CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705,

( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )

and if you are shipping the shim_lock module CVE-2021-3418

fixed ?

Yes

"Please specifically confirm that you add a vendor specific SBAT entry for SBAT header in each binary that supports SBAT metadata

( grub2, fwupd, fwupdate, shim + all child shim binaries )" to shim review doc ?

Please provide exact SBAT entries for all SBAT binaries you are booting or planning to boot directly through shim

Shim looks like
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
shim,1,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim
shim.leidos,1,Leidos,shim,15.4,donald.cupp@leidos.com

Grub looks like
sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
grub,1,Free Software Foundation,grub,2.06-rc1,https//www.gnu.org/software/grub/
grub.leidos,1,Leidos,grub,2.06-rc1-1,donald.cupp@leidos.com

Were your old SHIM hashes provided to Microsoft ?

N/A New Vendor

Did you change your certificate strategy, so that affected by CVE-2020-14372, CVE-2020-25632, CVE-2020-25647, CVE-2020-27749,

CVE-2020-27779, CVE-2021-20225, CVE-2021-20233, CVE-2020-10713,

CVE-2020-14308, CVE-2020-14309, CVE-2020-14310, CVE-2020-14311, CVE-2020-15705 ( July 2020 grub2 CVE list + March 2021 grub2 CVE list )

grub2 bootloaders can not be verified ?

N/A New Vendor, never signed those.

What exact implementation of Secureboot in grub2 ( if this is your bootloader ) you have ?

* Upstream grub2 shim_lock verifier or * Downstream RHEL/Fedora/Debian/Canonical like implementation ?

I am using the Fedora recipe.

What is the origin and full version number of your bootloader (GRUB or other)?

https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/grub.git/snapshot/grub-$version.tar.gz 2.06-rc1 Fedora patches 0001 - 0196

If your SHIM launches any other components, please provide further details on what is launched

Just GRUB2 fbx64.efi and mmx64.efi

If your GRUB2 launches any other binaries that are not Linux kernel in SecureBoot mode,

please provide further details on what is launched and how it enforces Secureboot lockdown

N/A we only do Linux

If you are re-using a previously used (CA) certificate, you

will need to add the hashes of the previous GRUB2 binaries

exposed to the CVEs to vendor_dbx in shim in order to prevent

GRUB2 from being able to chainload those older GRUB2 binaries. If

you are changing to a new (CA) certificate, this does not

apply. Please describe your strategy.

N/A

How do the launched components prevent execution of unauthenticated code?

Shim verifies GRUB, GRUB verifies kernel, kernel verifies modules.

Does your SHIM load any loaders that support loading unsigned kernels (e.g. GRUB)?

No

What kernel are you using? Which patches does it includes to enforce Secure Boot?

5.10.28, all secureboot patches should be applied

What changes were made since your SHIM was last signed?

N/A

What is the SHA256 hash of your final SHIM binary?

ab2fd40d3238ac1e0c29d74ca0a423a586cb43e214f0f4059d6236e2c3c69787
Submission ID 14223084907713587