Shouldn't RPM treat the revoked (sub)key(s) as no longer valid? I'm trying to fix the simple use case with the only revoked subkey. IOW after importing:
sec  rsa4096/D8D1E0ECD0EE67F7
     created: 2021-03-24  expires: 2023-03-24  usage: C   
     trust: ultimate      validity: ultimate
The following key was revoked on 2021-03-24 by RSA key D8D1E0ECD0EE67F7 Dmitry Antipov <dantipov@cloudlinux.com>
ssb  rsa3072/03CB9273F10DB1D4
     created: 2021-03-24  revoked: 2021-03-24  usage: S   
[ultimate] (1). Dmitry Antipov <dantipov@cloudlinux.com>
[ultimate] (2)  CloudLinux, Inc. <info@cloudlinux.com>
 
the package previously signed as:
Signature   : RSA/SHA256, Wed Mar 24 12:16:55 2021, Key ID 03cb9273f10db1d4
 
should not pass verification:
$ rpm -K foo-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm 
foo-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm: digests SIGNATURES NOT OK
 
and warning should be issued during an installation:
$ rpm -i foo-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm 
warning: foo-1.0-1.x86_64.rpm: Header V4 RSA/SHA256 Signature, key ID f10db1d4: NOKEY