A Short-Lived Hoax

A group of young hackers from Syria,
Who set off a market hysteria,
Confounded the Street
With a single, fake tweet;
One may ask: were their motives ulteriah?

If their hoax has turned out to conceal
An elaborate insider deal,
They'll have done an offense
For which there's a sense
Of prosecutorial zeal.

They'd have carried it out with impunity
If they'd sunk the financial community,
As there's many a name
That's committed the same
And seems to get off with immunity.

S&P's To Blame

A debt crisis once was created
By avarice run unabated,
As the market was flawed
By schemes to defraud
In bonds that were triple-A rated.

Now Justice may fin'lly report
That they're taking the raters to court
For the role of those chaps
In the housing collapse,
In which they provided support.

Pull Yer SOX Up

Said a watchdog: "We find it egregious
That the auditing world's most prestigious
Less frequently prod
The avoidance of fraud
By checking controls and procedures."

"An auditor ought to endeavor to
Ensure that malfeasance would never do;
By checking receipts,
You'll foil deceits
In booking expenses and revenue."

America's accounting watchdog says that the quality of auditors' checks of their clients' accurate bookkeeping is heading in the wrong direction. According to the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, problems are numerous and growing in audits of companies' internal controls. Inspection reports of 2011 audits (not all of which are yet completed) found that 22% of them had deficient internal control checks, up from 15% in 2010. Reuters reports:

"Audit firms are required to test controls that could have an impact on financial statements and attest that the safeguards are adequate, but in many cases the companies in which the auditors gave passing grades, the PCAOB found there was insufficient evidence to support that opinion."

The culprit may be understaffing; in many of the deficient cases, the auditing firms had made headcount reductions. The PCAOB looked at internal control checks by the "Big Four" audit firms - Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers - plus second-tier firms BDO Seidman, Grant Thornton, Crowe Horwath and McGladrey.

Caveat Emptor

A buyer who looks to an audit
Of a target before having bought it,
May leave itself open
In spite of all hopin',
To sellers' attempts to defraud it.

Years ago, an accounting professor visited a class of credit risk analysis trainees, of which I was one, and told us that "a financial statement is like a bikini: what it reveals is interesting, but what it conceals is vital." Every so often, I have cause once again to ponder the professor's sage insight. Today, for example, comes news of an $8.8 billion accounting fraud allegedly perpetrated on HP by management of the software company Autonomy, which $HPQ acquired last year for $11.1 billion. Autonomy's key product is IDOL, a software package that allows big users to crunch big data and find patterns and meaning in it. HP alleges that, notwithstanding clean audits by Deloitte, Autonomy's pre-acquisition financial statements contained -

The mischaracterization of revenue from negative-margin, low-end hardware sales with little or no associated software content as “IDOL product,” and the improper inclusion of such revenue as “license revenue” for purposes of the organic and IDOL growth calculations.The use of licensing transactions with value-added resellers to inappropriately accelerate revenue recognition, or worse, create revenue where no end-user customer existed at the time of sale. This negative-margin, low-end hardware is estimated to have comprised 10-15% of Autonomy’s revenue.

Somewhere, my old accounting professor is smiling ruefully.

Day of LIBOR Reckoning

Said a banker: "We used to condone
The rigging the cost of a loan,
A benevolent practice
'Til many attacked us,
And now we must humbly atone."

The LIBOR rate-rigging scandal slowly rolls on, and by all appearances will continue to do so for some time. Bloomberg reports that management of RBS condoned and participated in the manipulation of the London Interbank Offer Rate, beyond the four traders who the bank has fired. And why not? “This kind of activity was widespread in the industry,” said David Greene, a senior partner at law firm Edwin Coe LLP in London. “A lot of the traders didn’t consider this behavior to be wrong. They took it as the practice of the trade. This is how things operated, and it seemed harmless.” Canadian regulators are currently pursuing legal action against, besides RBS: HSBC Holdings Plc, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, as well as interdealer brokers ICAP Plc and RP Martin Holdings Ltd.

To any interbank traders, bank managers and all others beginning their Day of Atonement at sundown tonight, Dr. Goose wishes you an easy fast.

Day of LIBOR Reckoning

Though collusion on rate executions
Was the norm in finance institutions,
When the tide quickly turned
Many bank traders learned
They would naturally face prosecutions.

The trouble with a culture of open financial fraud is that it leaves behind quite a paper trail in the unlikely eventuality that the authorities ever decide to crack down. So it is with the London Interbank Offer Rate-setting process, in regard to which US federal prosecutors and European regulators now intend to arrest individual traders on both sides of the Atlantic. Accounts differ as to how long the manipulation of LIBOR and related interest rates has gone on - some say 15 years - but central banking authorities in the US and UK have known of it since at least 2008. That was when staff members of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York discussed LIBOR with one or more traders who told them that their submitted rates were fake. Alarmed, then-FRBNY president Timothy Geithner sent off a "best practices" memo to Bank of England governor Sir Mervyn King, outlining ways to curb the abuses. Four years later, the media attention and public outcry have seemingly forced the hand of officialdom; against whom, we will soon hear.

From Geithner to King re: LIBOR

Some traders disclosed to the Fed
That LIBOR deceit was widespread;
The news reached Tim Geithner,
Who responded by writin' a
Quite well-stated memo, 'tis said.

In verbiage clear and concise,
Mr. Geithner dispensed his advice
To follow the fundin'
Of bankers in London
To find the most accurate price.

But the memo to King, while persuasive,
Is fairly alleged as evasive,
In its glaring exclusion
That traders' collusion
On setting of rates was pervasive.

Simon Johnson writes in his Baseline Scenario blog that the Federal Reserve Bank of New York may have missed an opportunity to inform its counterparts at the Bank of England of the LIBOR manipulation occurring back in 2008. Interbank traders active in the LIBOR-setting process had plainly admitted to the New York Fed that they gave self-servingly false indications of the rates at which their banks could fund themselves. Understandably concerned, the FRBNY's then-president Timothy Geithner spoke with the English central bank governor Sir Mervyn King, and followed up with a memo outlining his staff's recommendations for improving the LIBOR process. The memo, a model of brevity and clarity, outlines six proposals to improve the accuracy of LIBOR, which is based on funding rates reported by US and other international banks in the London market. Among the proposals: "Eliminate the incentive to misreport" by randomly selecting quotes from a subset of reporting banks.

What the memo did not mention was that the Fed already had admissions of fraudulent reporting from some of those banks. How might things have turned out differently if it had?

A Victimless Crime?

Said an interbank trader, at pains
To manipulate LIBOR for gains:
"Though perhaps this offense
Is at someone's expense,
It's alright unless someone complains."

After the scandal and outcry over the fraudulent LIBOR fixing at Barclays and other banks, and the large fines and executive dismissals imposed upon Barclays by British regulators, came the inevitable, what's-the-big-deal backlash from those arguing that this is old news, that everybody does it, and that it's a victimless crime. MIT economist Simon Johnson answers the naysayers in a New York Times column. First, the fact that the rate-rigging has long been an industry practice is more - not less - troubling, as it goes to the heart of the cultural encroachment of fraud and corruption in the financial industry. Likewise, if everybody is in fact doing it, how much more Herculean is the task of cleaning the financial Augean stables. Finally, the notion that the LIBOR fraud is a victimless crime is false on its face. If two parties enter into a transaction and one of them is secretly rigging the price to his benefit, then the other party loses. Though the complexity of the global financial system may make it conveniently difficult to identify the victims, they nevertheless do exist.

A Banker Called To Account

Said Barclays' Bob Diamond quite bluntly:
"I roundly resent the effrontery
To be fired abroad
For a silly old fraud
We'd soon overlook in my country."

The LIBOR-setting scandal has caused heads to roll at Barclays Plc, the first bank to be investigated in the case. Among them is CEO Robert E. Diamond, Jr., a "hard-charging" American who has been relieved of his duties at the behest of the Bank of England and the Financial Services Authority.

As Gretchen Morgenson wrote in The New York Times, he may have "thought he’d be subject to American rules of engagement when confronted with evidence of wrongdoing at his bank. You know how it works on this side of the Atlantic: faced with a scandal, most chief executives jettison low-level employees, maybe give up a bonus or two — and then ride out the storm. Regulators, if they act, just extract fines from the shareholders."

In a refreshing change of pace, British regulators actually demand that bankers be called to account for their wrongdoing.

LIBOR Rate Upset

There's an interbank market in London
To set rates where one's fellows will fund one,
But if dubious sorts
Give phony reports,
Then faith in the market is undone.

Barclays PLC Chairman Marcus Agius has resigned to take responsibility for the LIBOR rate-setting scandal that resulted in a $453 million settlement paid by the bank. The significance of the scandal is that, by reporting artificially low rates to the British Bankers' Association in the months before the financial crisis unfolded, the bank (and other participants in the rate-setting scheme) made it appear as though the market for bank liquidity was more stable than was actually the case. Thus, what could have been a valuable warning sign was missed; the canary in the coal mine was kept on artificial life support.

MF Global Trustee's Report

When financial wrongdoing's unveiled,
Of a scope that can scarcely be scaled,
One is sadly resigned
That justice will find
There are none to be judged and/or jailed.

The trustee in the MF Global bankruptcy has issued his report, but it will disappoint those looking for a swift path to justice against those responsible for the misuse of $1.6 billion of customer funds. James Giddens, who is unwinding MF Global US brokerage unit, offered little insight beyond the well-known facts: "My investigation has concluded that management's actions, along with the lack of sufficient monitoring and systems, resulted in customer property being used during the liquidity crisis to fund the extraordinary liquidity drains elsewhere in the business." Although he may pursue legal action against former CEO Jon Corzine and others for taking excessive risks and failing to safeguard customer funds, Mr. Giddens drew "no conclusions" about criminal wrongdoing or regulatory violations, citing his lack of authority in those matters. Well, no worries - that should leave the field open to the unrelenting avengers of the SEC and the Justice Department... right?

Lulled by Fuld?

Said the Lehman bankruptcy inspector
Of the repo transactions that wrecked 'er:
"The Feds, who were looking
At books that were cooking,
Had fraud, but could never detect 'er."

In a rare attempt to explain the financial crisis to the average American, CBS's 60 Minutes brought "The Case Against Lehman Brothers" on Sunday evening. Steve Kroft interviewed Anton Valukas, the Chicago attorney appointed by the federal bankruptcy court to determine what led to Lehman Brothers' collapse. Mr. Valukas found that "there was enough evidence for a prosecutor to bring a case against top Lehman officials and one of the nation's top accounting firms for misleading government regulators and investors."

One of the most damning pieces of evidence was the letter written by Matthew Lee, the firm's top internal accountant, to senior management. Mr. Lee refused to sign off on Lehman's 2007 fiscal year end balance sheet, citing "possibly unethical and unlawful" conduct in their preparation. The so-called "repo 105" transactions were employed to make Lehman's balance sheet appear $50 billion lighter on reporting dates, and thus mask the extent of its over-leveraging. Mr. Lee was let go for his trouble, and the SEC, which was on the premises while repo 105 trades were occurring, has never brought charges against CEO Richard Fuld or others. Why didn't they catch the fraud? Says attorney Valukas: "They were getting the material. Whether they understood it is another question."

The entire interview is embedded below for your viewing pleasure, outrage and incredulity.

Unrepentant

The enablers of fraudulent crises,
Reluctant to give up their vices,
Periodically line up
For pols who will sign up
To learn what their fiscal advice is.

In a scathing guest post in the Big Picture blog, financial fraud expert Bill Black despairs that so many economic advisors with track records of enabling "green slime" in the banking sector are unrepentantly pushing the same policy prescriptions. "Romney's lead economist urges policies that will cause the next financial crisis" is Mr. Black's headline. He singles out Mitt Romney's lead economic advisor (and George W. Bush's erstwhile lead economic advisor), Greg Mankiw, for special criticism. Prof. Mankiw's latest New York Times column extolls the virtues of governmental competition in the regulatory sphere, when there is ample history to show that such competition devolves to a "race to the bottom" leading to a lax regulatory environment that invites criminality. The most famous example is of course the savings & loan crisis of the 80's.

Full disclosure: Prof. Mankiw and his famous graduate student Jodi Beggs gave Dr. Goose his first big break in economic show business.

JOBS Act

When streamlining stock regulation
With the goal of employment creation,
The access to mammon
May jumpstart the scammin'
By persons of low reputation.

Washington has descended to the point where, if you see bipartisan agreement on any economic issue, you have to suspect the worst. Such is the case with the so-called JOBS Act (Jumpstart Our Business Startups). In her Bloomberg column, Susan Antilla writes: "Though the JOBS Act was packaged as a plan to streamline rules to help small companies crank out jobs, even its cheerleaders have come up with scant evidence the law will boost employment much, if at all. In an election year when pragmatic politicians are laboring to come off as allies of deep-pocketed business donors, the JOBS Act is a slapdash attempt at securities-law deregulation, plain and simple."

Remember the ZZZZ Best carpet-cleaning company, one of the most notorious investment frauds of the '80's? One of the perpetrators of that fraud says: “I wish legislators would consult with people like me before they write something like this. I could tell them, ‘I know what your intent was with this wording, but we can get around it so easily, it cracks me up.”’ Mark Morze, a self-described reformed scammer who now lectures on how to guard against people like himself, gives his expert opinion that the JOBS Act has real potential for abuse.

Hat tip to Jordan Terry a.k.a. @The_Analyst.

MF Global: An Arresting Question

Said the trustee: "It's funny perhaps,
In this great MF Global collapse,
That there aren't any 'collars',
Despite all the dollars
Misplaced by those capable chaps."

Francine McKenna, a former Price Waterhouse Coopers auditor who writes on auditing issues for Forbes as well as her blog "Re: The Auditors", says that it's remarkable that the investigation of the missing $1.2 billion in MF Global customer funds is not leading to any arrests, and those involved have not opted for an escape to Switzerland. Could this be a case of "plausible deniability" on the part of top management? Managers at the bankrupt company moved a lot of money around on Hallowe'en, evidently in an attempt to make it through the weekend, probably in the hope that a friendly takeover would allow its return. Instead, the firm was shut down, but without any paper trail linking top management to the missing customer funds.

Hat tip to Jesse's Café Américain.

Q&A at the Mortgage Fraud Settlement Negotiations

"Pray tell us: what must we do,
That the Feds and the states will not sue?"
"In dollar terms: 25,200,000,202."

The Obama administration and 49 US state attorneys general have announced a $25 billion settlement of mortgage foreclosure fraud charges with the five biggest mortgage loan origination banks. The five firms - Ally Financial Inc./GMAC Mortgage, Bank of America Corp., Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co. - will underwrite benefits to certain mortgage borrowers that are modest in their individual impact but may provide a marginal impetus to the housing and mortgage markets. The benefits include principal reduction for those at imminent risk of default; refinancing eligibility for some "underwater" borrowers; and $2,000 cash payments to some whose homes were foreclosed during the last three years. However, the largest impact of the settlement is not on homeowners but on the banks, from which a significant legal risk has been removed. Banks are not completely out of the woods yet, though; bondholders can still sue to have the mortgage originators buy their bad loans back.

Happy Holidays from Internal Auditing

It's required, in bank regulation,
That each trader have two weeks' vacation;
While preventing their burnout,
An audit may turn out
A case of a "rogue" operation.

During the holidays (or the dog days of August), when the thoughts of some bankers turn to carefree vacations, others contemplate... forensic accounting. Bank regulations call for every employee to take two consecutive weeks off each year, to give internal auditors sufficient time to uncover whatever financial fraud they might secretly be working on. This is based on the observation that such frauds usually require the frequent oversight of one or more conspirators, whose forced, temporary removal may cause the scheme to unravel.