Small Investors Jump In

At times, when the stock market rises,
The basis for all the new highs is:
Investors who yearn
For a better return
Than the interest-rate outlook advises.

The billions investors have shifted
To stock funds effectively lifted
The market's appeal
(And also, the deal
That avoided the big Fiscal Cliff did.)

There's a saying that's really akin to it,
From traders who've commonly been to it:
On the stock market floor,
According to lore,
You get out of it what you put into it.

I guess by now almost everybody is aware that we are in a bull market for US stocks, and one would expect a surge of small investor interest to follow this realization.  However, according to the Wall Street Journal, a massive inflow of retail cash into equity mutual funds also preceded and contributed to the market surge.  On Tuesday, the Dow Jones Industrial Average rose 72 points to close at 13,954, its highest level since October 2007.  The Dow has risen 850 points - or 6.5% - in January, a New Year's achievement not seen since 1989.  As shown by the graphic, this strong performance was helped by $6.8 billion of investor cash flowing into equity funds in the first three weeks of the year, after years of massive outflows.  No doubt some of the recent inflow manifests the public's relief that the federal government did not take the economy over the Fiscal Cliff in January, and is thus a rebound from the fearful, exaggerated December outflow.  However, in the market, optimism may create its own reward by boosting demand for assets (stocks) and hence, their prices; proving, once again, that you get out of life what you put into it.

Punitive Measures

A six-billion loss dealt a blow
To the name of a bank's CEO.
To atone for this trade,
He merely was paid
A paltry ten million or so.

What do you take from the man who has everything?  That was the question faced by the board of JPMorgan Chase, which had to determine the consequences for CEO Jamie Dimon of the $6.2 billion loss from the "London Whale" trades.  The answer was a 50% reduction in Mr. Dimon's total compensation, from $23 million in 2011 to "only" $11.5 million for 2012.  (To be fair, the compensation package reflects a record year for the bank's profits, in spite of the outsized trading losses.)  The New York Times' Dealbook page, no doubt attempting to wrap its head around the fact that $11.5 million is only half of someone's compensation, believes that, in the face of such a striking management lapse, more radical changes are called for.  Suggests columnist Agnes Crane:

One could be to split the roles of chairman and chief executive. A well-chosen chairman provides a check on a chief executive’s powers. In one indication that this can work, GMI Ratings last year concluded that an executive pulling double duty can earn 50 percent more than the total pay of two people performing the top jobs separately.

It sounds as though, if governance is strong, compensation finds a more appropriate level as a matter of course.

Handel's Big Trade

When Handel composed The Messiah,
The markets were caroling highah.
He sold, shouting "Boo-yah!
Now sing Halleluia!
To be a contrarian buyah."

For many investors at this time of year, 'tis the season to review portfolio investments that hath been exalted, or laid low. If unto you a gain has been given, shall the government be more upon your shoulder this year, or next?

One man who handled such questions adroitly was George Frideric Handel, according to Jason Zweig of the Wall Street Journal. Mr. Zweig says that the renowned composer "never went Baroque" because he knew when to get into and out of the hot investments of his day. The greatest investment bubble of the early 1700's was the South Sea Co., driven by the mania of colonization. Mr. Handel played the South Sea Co., but acted earlier than contemporaries such as Sir Isaac Newton, buying his shares at lower cost and selling them before the bubble burst. It is estimated that Mr. Handel doubled his South Sea investment, making a £15,000 profit, roughly 2.9 million in today's dollars. At the end of his life, Mr. Handel's estate comprised about £20,000 ($3.8 million today).

As a footnote to this Yuletide tale, we must ask whether the German-born Mr. Handel came to the market with a natural advantage: his name, in his mother tongue, means "trade."

No Security in Book Value

Said a banker: "The Crisis revealed,
In investments we carried for yield,
How extreme fluctuations
Affect valuations,
So better to keep them concealed."

Said investors: "It's better to trust
In the price you could fetch if you must,
And the equity value
Which, hopefully, now you'll,
Accordingly, have to adjust."

Bankers, regulators, lobbyists and the US Congress have all turned their attention to the US implementation of the Basel III regulatory framework, which appears to have very few friends in high places. One always-controversial element of Basel III is the requirement to mark to market those securities that a bank has as "available for sale." Bankers hate this idea because it increases the reported volatility of earnings and capital. At a Senate Banking Committee last week, Michael S. Gibson, director of the Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation at the Fed, appeared prepared to give a little in the face of industry pushback, saying that regulators are "considering changes to the treatment" of such securities.

However, if bankers hate mark-to-market, investors should love and defend it. As the Journal's Heard on the Street columnist David Reilly writes: "the only thing worse than a loss at a big bank is pretending it doesn't exist." Reilly points out that available-for-sale securities comprised $2.6 trillion, or 19% of bank assets, on June 30, up from 14% in 2008. Like it or not, such investments do fluctuate in value, and pretending that they could be disposed of at cost only leads to investor distrust during financially difficult times. Unlike bank loans, liquid securities are not reserved against, so marking them to market is the only way to assure that, at least in this one respect, investors can place some credibility in the reported book value of financial institutions.

Day of LIBOR Reckoning

Though collusion on rate executions
Was the norm in finance institutions,
When the tide quickly turned
Many bank traders learned
They would naturally face prosecutions.

The trouble with a culture of open financial fraud is that it leaves behind quite a paper trail in the unlikely eventuality that the authorities ever decide to crack down. So it is with the London Interbank Offer Rate-setting process, in regard to which US federal prosecutors and European regulators now intend to arrest individual traders on both sides of the Atlantic. Accounts differ as to how long the manipulation of LIBOR and related interest rates has gone on - some say 15 years - but central banking authorities in the US and UK have known of it since at least 2008. That was when staff members of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York discussed LIBOR with one or more traders who told them that their submitted rates were fake. Alarmed, then-FRBNY president Timothy Geithner sent off a "best practices" memo to Bank of England governor Sir Mervyn King, outlining ways to curb the abuses. Four years later, the media attention and public outcry have seemingly forced the hand of officialdom; against whom, we will soon hear.

Dimon's Congressional Testimony

A high-ranking finance professional
Who was called to a hearing Congressional
To give his account
Of a massive amount
That was lost, made a searing confessional:

"My Office of Risk Diminution
Found a newfangled hedging solution,
Which no one construed
Nor checked, nor reviewed,
Nor subjected to sound execution."

"But in spite of my solemn admission
(Which I make with humblest contrition)
That we bungled our bets -
We are hiring vets
And expanding our lending position."

"So before you propose regulation
To limit our trade fluctuation,
No federal commission
Could outmatch our mission
To aid the American nation."

J.P. Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon has been called to testify before the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, to answer for the infamous and still-growing loss from derivative positions in the bank's Chief Investment Office. For those of you too busy to review the full text of the CEO's prepared testimony, I humbly offer the foregoing summary in verse. The rest of you may draw some insightfully ironic enjoyment from Mr. Dimon's deft attempt to deflect criticism of the bank's errors and omissions, and to convince the Senators that the bank is its own best overseer.

A Whale of a Tale

Said the boss of a trading facility,
Whose job was to crimp volatility:
"While I'm away jettin',
Be sure you don't threaten
The global financial stability."

Though much has been written about JP Morgan's "London Whale" and the $2-billion-and-growing loss that arose from his credit index trades, there has not been much focus on the interpersonal management dynamics of the case, until yesterday. The New York Times' Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Nelson Schwartz looked into the story and concluded that "Discord at J.P. Morgan Unit is Faulted at Loss." In a modern, highly-leveraged twist on "when the cat's away, the mice will play," it appears that the egos and ambitions of Bruno Iksil (the Whale) and his boss Achilles Macris could not be contained once the bank's chief investment officer, Ina Drew, was out sick for an extended period. Without Ms. Drew's "coolheaded, steely resolve", the internecine tensions between the CIO's New York and London offices devolved into daily screaming matches with no clear leader to to set limits and keep discipline.

Reversal of Fortune, Part II

There once was a trading technician
Who failed in his primary mission;
The bank, for this drawback,
Attempted to claw back
The bulk of his trading commission.

In reading of the fallout from the $2 billion derivative trading loss at J. P. Morgan & Co., and the bank's closing ranks around embattled CEO Jamie Dimon, I was struck by the mention of possible clawbacks in the compensation of those, such as the "London Whale" Bruno Michel Iksil and his erstwhile boss Ina Drew, who had direct responsibility for the loss. This got me to wondering: in our world of Too Big To Fail, moral hazard and golden parachutes, is the clawback of ill-gotten bonuses something that actually happens? I put the question to you, oh ye denizens of Wall Street!

Betting One's Hedges

There's a false sense of immunization
In many a hedge operation;
Positions one places
On ill-conceived bases
May end up as wild speculation.

JP Morgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon stunned investors on Thursday with the announcement of a $2 billion trading loss in the bank's risk management unit. Some reacted with schadenfreude, in view of Mr. Dimon's previously dismissive attitude toward reports of the firm's massive credit default swap positions. The Chief Investment Office's head trader, Bruno Michel Iksil, had been dubbed "the London Whale" for his huge, market-distorting CDS bets on the so-called CDX IG 9 index of the credit risk of 125 companies. Mr. Iksil sold protection on the index during the first quarter, essentially writing an insurance policy that the indexed companies' credit would not deteriorate.

Based on his limited knowledge of this case, Dr. Goose is at a loss to explain how the selling of credit protection constitutes a risk management function for a bank (one would sooner expect them to be buying credit protection). Nevertheless, even the most well-intentioned hedge position can go awry if the underlying assumptions do not hold, and many a "hedge" entered into on the basis of a particular market outcome is just speculation by another name.

Non-Farm Payroll Holiday

When unfortunate news is disclosed
On a day that the market is closed,
Investors are hopin'
That, at the next open,
It's better than firstly supposed.

The US stock market was closed for Good Friday, as were European exchanges, and thus could not react to the surprisingly weak employment data that came out on that day. The Bureau of Labor Statistics announced at 8:30 AM last Friday that non-farm payrolls increased by 120,000, much less than the 200,000+ increases in the previous three months, and definitely below expectations. Unable to trade on the news, market professionals thus had all of a three-day weekend to mull it over, a weekend punctuated by Easter and Passover celebrations. Is it possible that festive gatherings with family afforded the trading community a new perspective? We'll find out on Monday at 9:30 AM on Wall Street.

Happy Holidays from Internal Auditing

It's required, in bank regulation,
That each trader have two weeks' vacation;
While preventing their burnout,
An audit may turn out
A case of a "rogue" operation.

During the holidays (or the dog days of August), when the thoughts of some bankers turn to carefree vacations, others contemplate... forensic accounting. Bank regulations call for every employee to take two consecutive weeks off each year, to give internal auditors sufficient time to uncover whatever financial fraud they might secretly be working on. This is based on the observation that such frauds usually require the frequent oversight of one or more conspirators, whose forced, temporary removal may cause the scheme to unravel.

Check Your Emotions

Investors, with faces quite ashen,
Their holdings may clamor to cash in,
But advisors persuade
That it's best not to trade
In a greedy or panicky passion.

Down 600 points, up 400 points, down 400 points again - the volatility of the stock market this week may induce emotional volatility on the part of those whose retirement savings are tied up in it. However, at such times it is best to remember that the investor's two worst enemies are their own fear and greed, which may prompt rash decisions with adverse long-term consequences. As the legendary early 20th century trader Jesse Livermore once said: "The successful trader has to fight these two deep-seated instincts. Instead of hoping he must fear; instead of fearing he must hope." For more on this topic, listen to this weekend's Marketplace Money on public radio, where an expert panel will answer listeners' questions about how to respond to the market upheaval.

Disclaimer: nothing in this post should be considered as investment advice, for which the reader should turn instead to a qualified investment advisor.

Perfect Game

Wall Street's "too big to fail" titans
Had a quarter so good that it frightens;
On the trading parquet,  
They made money each day -
Is it rigged? Incredulity heightens...