HAZOP STUDY OF KABIR GAS COMPRESSION

STATION
April30th, 2018

Document No. SR43-01-01-HAZOP STUDY OF KABIR GAS COMPRESSION STATION

REV DATE DESCRIPTION PREPARED CHECKED APPROVED

A 30/04/2018 Issued for comments SK MSA E-Gas

Executive Summary
th
HAZOP workshop of Kabir Gas Compression Station was conducted on 16 April, 2018 at Shepherd Risk Head
Office in Karachi.
HAZOP was performed in line with IEC 61882 HAZOP guide. Using standard HAZOP guidewords and deviations,
a multidisciplinary team brainstormed for each node, identifying credible causes and consequences.
HAZOP was leadby Muhammad Saim, an experienced HAZOP leader and scribed by Saroosh Khan. E-Gas team
comprised of Process & Project leads.
PPL is operating Kabir X-1 well head facility, Kabir X-1 is a the low producer well discovered at Gambat South
Field. E-Gas is operating gas compression and dispatch facility adjacent to Kabir-X1 facility. Gas from Kabir X1
is compresed to around 3600 Psig and transported via. large cylinders in specialy built trucks to customers
upcountry. HAZOP scope included gas receiving, filteration, compressor and dehydration unit.
All HAZOP findings were risk ranked based on unmitigated consequences, where there are no existing safe
guards or existing safe guards were deemed inadequate, recommendations were generated to bring the risks
to acceptable levels. A total of 14 recommendations have been generated.Recommendations have been risk
ranked based on Risk Matrix attached in ToR, it is suggested that recommendations shall be implemented on
risk priority basis.
One of the key observations during HAZOP was that the P&IDs were not reflecting as-built information e.g.
PSVs are installed on inlet filters but not shown on P&IDs, tie-ins for dehydration and condensate removal unit
are not shown. P&IDs shall be updated to reflect asbuilt information.

2 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 TABLE OF CONTENTS

1.0 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 8

1.1 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF SCOPE .......................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.

2.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY....................................................................................................................... 9

2.1 HAZOP PURPOSE ..................................................................................................................................... 9

2.2 HAZOP METHODOLOGY .................................................................. ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
2.2.1 HAZOP Documents ................................................................................................................. 9
2.2.2 Selecting Nodes ...................................................................................................................... 9
2.2.3 Design Intention....................................................................................................................... 9
2.2.4 Process Parameters ................................................................................................................ 9
2.2.5 Guidewords and Deviation ...................................................................................................... 9
2.2.6 Causes .................................................................................................................................. 10
2.2.7 Consequences....................................................................................................................... 10
2.2.8 Safeguards ............................................................................................................................ 10
2.2.9 Recommendations ................................................................................................................ 10
3.0 MEETING ATTENDANCE .................................................................................................................. 12

4.0 LIST OF NODES ..................................................................................................................................... 13

5.0 HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 14

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Node Diagrams / P&DS

2. HAZOP Worksheet

3. E-Gas Risk Matrix

3 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 Abbreviations

BPCS Basic process control system.

ESD Emergency shutdown.

GPF Gas Processing Facility

HAZOP Hazard and operability (study).

I/P Current to pneumatic transducer.

IPL Independent protection layer.

LOPA Layer of protection analysis.

P&ID Process and instrumentation diagram.

PFD Probability of failure on demand.

PHA Process hazards analysis.

PSV Pressure safety valve.

QRA Quantitative risk analysis.

SIF Safety instrumented function.

SIL Safety integrity level.

SIS Safety instrumented system.

SRS Safety requirement specification.

4 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 DEFINITIONS

Basic process control system (BPCS)

A system that responds to input signals from the process and/or from an operator, and generates
output signals, causing the process to operate in the desired manner. The BPCS consists of a
combination of sensors, logic solvers, process controllers, and final control elements which
automatically regulate the process within normal production limits. Includes a HMI (human machine
interface).Also referred to as process control system.

Cause
The reason(s) why the deviation could occur. Several causes may be identified for one deviation.

Common cause failure

Failure of more than one device, function, or system due to the same cause.

Competent
Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the EA to perform a task.
Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training, experience, qualifications, or some
combination of these.

Consequence
An outcomefrom an event.There may be one or more consequences from an event.

Design Intent
The design intent is a description of how the process is expected to behave at the node. OR
Designer’s desired, or specified range of behaviour for elements and characteristics.

Deviation
A deviation is a way in which the process conditions may depart from their design/process intent.

Guide word
Word or phrase which expresses and defines a specific type of deviation from an element’s design
intent

Hazard
Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or EGAS's
reputation.

Independent protection layer (IPL)

Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding
to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident
sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection
analyses.

Layer of protection analysis (LOPA)

Method for evaluating the effectiveness of protection layers in reducing the frequency and/or severity
of hazardous events.

5 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

Likelihood
A measure of the expected event's occurrence.

Node
A node is a specific location in the process in which (the deviations of) the design/process intent are
evaluated.

Process
Any activity or set of related activities (including production, treatment, storage, use, handling, on-site
transfer) and the associated equipment and technology.

Process Parameter
Physical or chemical property associated with the process. Includes general items such as reaction,
mixing, concentration, pH, and specific items such as temperature, pressure, phase, and flow.

Process Hazard
A condition that has the potential to result in release of, or exposure to, a hazardous substances, or in
the release of energy (mechanical or chemical), which in turn can cause serious injury to personnel,
significant property damage or significant environmental harm.

Protection layer
A device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from
proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint.

Reliability
The probability that an item is able to perform a required function under stated conditions for a stated
period of time or for a stated demand.

Risk
A measure of loss/harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or
business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the
magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term “risk” is used to describe health, safety,
security, environmental and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events.

Safety integrity level (SIL)

Numerical representation of the integrity required, and capability of SIF. It addresses hardware
reliability and capability to avoid systematic faults. SILs for SIFs operating in demand mode are defined
for hardware reliability in terms of probability of failure on demand (PFD). (IEC 61511 and IEC 61508).

Vulnerability
Probability that persons will suffer a specified health and safety impact level if exposed to hazard.

6 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 Holds

No Holds

7 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

1.0 INTRODUCTION
th
HAZOP study of Kabir Gas Compression Facility was conducted on 16 April, 2018 at Shepherd Risk
head office in Karachi.
HAZOP was performed in line with IEC 61882 HAZOP guide. Using standard HAZOP guidewords and
deviations, a multidisciplinary team brainstormed for each node, identifying credible causes and
consequences.
Shepherd Risk provided services of a competent and experienced HAZOP chairman and a scribe
for thisHAZOP Study. HAZOP was facilitated by Muhammad Saim, HAZOP Chairman, and scribed
by Saroosh Khan of Shepherd Risk, participants included Sajid Hussain, Process Safety Engineer
Shepherd Risk, Wajahat Ali, Process Manager Egas and Hassan Raza,Project Manager Egas.

8 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

2.0 HAZOP METHODOLOGY

2.1 HAZOP Purpose

The purpose of a HAZOP study is to:

a) Identify the causes of potential safety and environmental hazards and major operability
problems.
b) Consider the consequences of these hazards and major operability problems.
c) Identify the safeguards provided as hazard prevention or mitigation.
d) Propose recommendations, as needed, to prevent, control, or mitigate hazards.
e) Provide assistance to facility management in their efforts to manage risks.

2.2 HAZOP Documents

HAZOP is primarily performed based on P&Ids. For This HAZOP P&IDs of Kabir Compressoion
facility were used.

2.3 Selecting Nodes

The selection of each node was made jointly by the Team Members and the HAZOP Leader. To
ensure that the design intentions of each node can be easily and clearly understood, the nodes
should be selected by function. The following criteria were considered in selecting the
appropriate transition to the next node:
1. Change in design intent
2. Change in state (e.g. from liquid to vapour)
3. Major pieces of equipment

2.4 Design Intention

At the beginning of the HAZOP, a thorough briefing on design and operation was provided by the
Team Members as follows:
• Normal and abnormal operating conditions, as well as transient conditions, and operating
modes were described.
• The design intent which defines how a component or system is expected to operate and the
purpose of the system. This included the design flow, temperature, pressure, level, and
other relevant details.
• The design intent of each parameter was established, documented, and understood by
team members.

2.5 Process Parameters

Selected process parameters were used throughout the study e.g. More Flow, Less Flow, No
Flow, Misdirected Flow etc. Refer to ToR for list of process parameters used in HAZOP.

2.6 Guidewords and Deviation

Guidewords were selected and applied in turn to each parameter. At a minimum, more, less, no,
reverse, part of, as well as, and other than were considered

9 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 Process parameters and guidewords (and hence deviations were applied to each process node,
as appropriate. If no issues are found, it was documented that the deviation was considered, but
there were no issues of concern.

2.7 Causes

All potential causes were established for each deviation from intention considered. Where there
were multiple causes for each deviation. In such case, each cause was listed separately. Causes
were specifically defined using the proper equipment, instrumentation, and piping tags.
Multiple-cause events, in some instances, were considered. The cause was identified within the
node being studied. If the resulting consequence occurred outside the node, this was recorded.
If the node started from outside a battery limit, deviations from upstream and downstream
were also considered.

2.8 Consequences

The leader did challenge the HAZOP team members to identify all potential practical
consequences each cause, especially the potential for harm to people and the environment. The
discussion considered the unmitigated consequences - those consequences without giving any
credit to the safeguards (assuming all safeguards fail). Safeguards are discussed and
documented in the next step. Consequences were taken to be anything that affects:
• Health and safety of Egas workers, contractors, and offsite populations
• The environment
• Privilege to operate

2.9 Safeguards

In this step the team identified the engineered system (as defined in the P&IDs and other
engineering information) and administrative controls (such as operator response to alarms) that
can prevent or mitigate the hazard. The team should also consider whether operability is
impaired if any deviations occur or whether design could be improved to give the operator
better information or facilities to prevent/control/mitigate the hazard.
Principal safeguards (engineering and administrative controls) were recorded in the HAZOP
worksheets referencing the appropriate equipment tags. Relief valves were listed as safeguards
only. It remains to be confirmed that the relief valve size and set pressure are sufficient for the
consequence being considered.

2.10 Recommendations

A recommendation was made when the team judged that any of the following are true:
• Engineered systems and administrative controls were unlikely to prevent or sufficiently
mitigate a consequence.
• An operability concern is sufficiently severe that it requires attention.
• There is a shortfall in compliance with a regulation or company standard.
• Risk ranking of a consequence (considering all existing safe guards are in place) is un
acceptable as per egas risk matrix.

10 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 The HAZOP team focused on addressing hazards and did not try to design the solution to
problems identified.

11 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

3.0 MEETING ATTENDANCE

Name Designation
Hasan Raza Project Manager
Wajahat Ali Process Manager
M. Saim Ahmed HAZOP Chairman
Saroosh Khan Scribe
Sajid Hussain Process Safety Engr. Shepherd
Risk

12 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

4.0 LIST OF NODES

Node # Description
1 Gas From Kabir X-1 up to Compressor Suction

2 First Stage Outlet including chiller and Dehydration unit

3 Compressor Second stage discharge up to Bowser Filing Point

13 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

5.0 HAZOP RECOMMENDATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS RISK RANK

NODE 1
1-Mark the normal position of manual valves on P&IDs as NO/NC (Normally 60
open/Normally closed) and provide signage on manual valves at site
accordingly.
2- Evaluate the relieving capacity of PSV on filters and ensure that PSVs are 60
adequate for blocked discharge.
3- PSVs are not shown in P&IDs, as per site pictures PSVs are installed on 60
filters, update P&IDs.
4- Develop and implement procedure for lifting over process equipment, lifting 60
plans and protocols/work permit system, TRA (Task Risk Assessment) for all
lifting activities in line with OSHA guidelines/industry best practices.
5- Develop Hazardous area classification drawing and confirm electric and 60
electronic equipment within the classified area are rated accordingly.

6- Provide ESD valve at battery Limit on Gas inlet line from Kabir X-1, ESD 60
valve shall be actuated through ESD push button or confirmed gas or fire
detection.
7- Provide alternate escape door in control room towards safe exist away from 40
process side for any emergency situations

NODE 2
8- Develop procedure for dehydration unit operation and show valve sequence 36
on P&ID. Mark valve sequence for dehydration and regeneration on P&IDs in
the procedure and also show on a chart in the field.
9- Mention PSV set pressure on P&IDs. 60
10- Develop and implement protocol for PSVs bench test/calibration at regular 60
intervals.
11- Provide temperature indication with high temperature alarm on gas line 36
downstream of NGL separator.
12- Develop Hazardous area classification drawing and confirm electric and 60
electronic equipment within the classified area are rated accordingly.

NODE 3
13- Provide ESD button near bowser filing area. 60

14 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

14-Update all P&IDs as built.

15 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

 ATTACHMENTS
Attachment 1: Node Diagram

16 SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study Kabir Gas Compression Station

SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station
SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station
Attachment-2: HAZOP worksheets

SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station

Node 1 Gas From Kabir X-1 up to Compressor Suction
Type Pipeline, filters and dryer
Drawing No. P-001, Y 700972, PID 002
Design Conditions 150 psi
Tag Numbers F 100, F 101, F 102, STR 36 NGX

Risk Rank Risk Rank

Safety Environment Business / Safety Environment Business / Reputation
Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation Responsibility Remarks
Reputation
S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR
More fl ow No Cause identified
Les s fl ow No Cause identified
No fl ow No Cause identified
Revers e fl ow No Cause identified
Fl ow 1- Human error, Any manual drain valve on 1- Loss of Containment, fire upon ignition 1- Mark the normal position of manual valves on P&IDs as NO/NC
filters inadvertently left open. leading to serious injuries/ fatalities and (Normally open/Normally closed) and provide signage on manual
Mi s di rected fl ow 2- Human error, manual valve to flare asset damage, revenue loss 10 6 60 8 6 48 valves at site accordingly.
inadvertently left open 2- Loss of gas to flare/revenue loss

1- BPCS (Basic Process Control System) Pressure upstream of PRV-01 increases up PSV on filter F100, F101 and F102 set at 65 psig 2- Evaluate the relieving capacity of PSV on filters and ensure that
failure PRV 01 malfunctions in close position to 1800 psi ( PSV 001 (at PPL Kabir X-1 PSVs are adequate for blocked discharge.
2- Any manual valve on gas line inadvertently facility) set pressure). Line rating is 150 3- PSVs are not shown in P&IDs, as per site pictures PSVs are
Hi gh pres s ure close psi possible rupture leading to fire upon 10 6 60 8 8 64 8 4 32 8 4 32 installed, update P&IDs.
ignition, possible serious
injuries/fatalities, asset damage and
revenue loss

1- BPCS (Basic Process Control System) Low Pressure downstream of valve, PALL-100 trips compressor at low pressure set at 0.3 bar
failure PRV 01 malfunctions in close position possible compressor suction valve
2- Any manual valve on gas line inadvertently damage due to high compression ratio,
close requiring compressor shutdown for
Pres s ure 3- PSV on filter opens spuriously, relieving repairs, revenue loss. 6 8 48 6 6 36
gas into atmosphere

Low pres s ure/ va cuum

Filter F-100/101/102 choking Low Pressure downstream of filter, 1- PALL-100 trips compressor at low pressure set at 0.3 bar
possible compressor suction valve 2- Regular cleaning of filters
damage due to high compression ratio,
requiring compressor shutdown for 6 8 48 6 6 36
repairs, revenue loss.

Hi gh tempera ture No cause identified

Tempera ture
Low tempera ture No cause identified
Liquid Carry-over from V-401 at Kabir X-1 Liquid carry-over into compressor Filters for moisture installed upstream of compressors, gas is
cylinders causing piston rod to overload normally dry.
resulting in damage to piston and valves
and in worst case scenarios, compressor
Hi gh l evel 8 6 48 6 6 36 8 6 48 6 6 36
head blow out leading to fire, potential
Level for serious injuries and fatalities, asset
damage and revenue loss

Low l evel / No cause identified

no l evel No cause identified
Is ol a ti on Is ol a ti on No concerns highlighted
Wrong percenta ge / Compos i ti on Wrong percenta ge / Compos i ti on No concerns highlighted
Conta mi na ti on/ compos i ti on Conta mi na ti on/ compos i ti on No concerns highlighted
Wrong ma teri a l Wrong ma teri a l No concerns highlighted

Hi gh rea cti on (runa wa y rea cti on)

N/A

Low rea cti on/ no rea cti on N/A

(i ncompl ete rea cti on)
Rea cti on
Revers e rea cti on N/A
Si de rea cti on N/A
Wrong rea cti on N/A
Exces s i ve mi xi ng N/A
Mi xi ng
Poor/no Mi xi ng N/A
1- Design basis / relieving capacities of PSVs PSVs may be undersized for the 2- Evaluate the relieving capacity of PSV on filters and ensure that
on filters is unknown/not documented. governing relief scenario may lead to PSVs are adequate for blocked discharge.
2- PSVs installed on filters are not shown on failure to protect the equipment, leading 3- PSVs are not shown in P&IDs, as per site pictures PSVs are
Rel i ef Rel i ef 10 6 60 8 8 64 8 6 48 8 8 64
P&IDs to loss of containment, fire upon ignition installed, update P&IDs.
causing serious injuries/fatalities and
asset damage.
1- Corrosion Loss of Containment, fire upon ignition 1- Vehicle movement in process area is restricted by physical 4- Develop and implement lifting over process equipment, lifting
2- Vehicle Impact leading to serious injuries/ fatalities and barriers. plans and protocols/work permit system, TRA (Task Risk
Rupture/l ea k Rupture/l ea k 10 6 60 8 6 48 10 4 40 8 4 32
3- Dropped objects during lifting over asset damage, revenue loss Assessment) for all lifting activities in line with OSHA
activities guidelines/industry best practices.
Procedure omi tted / vi ol a ti on Procedure omi tted / vi ol a ti on No concerns highlighted
Ins trumenta ti on Ins trumenta ti on No concerns highlighted
Chemi ca l ha za rds Chemi ca l ha za rds No concerns highlighted
Equi pment i ntegri ty Equi pment i ntegri ty No concerns highlighted
1- Any electrical or electronic equipment Ignition source, leading to fire upon any 5- Develop Hazardous area classification drawing and confirm
within classified area gas release causing serious injuries, 2- Vehicle movement in process area is restricted by physical electric and electronic equipment within the classified area are
Igni ti on Igni ti on 10 6 60 8 6 48 10 6 60 8 6 48
2- Vehicle movement fatalities and asset damage/revenue loss barriers. rated accordingly.
3- Static charge
Servi ce fa i l ure Servi ce fa i l ure No concerns highlighted
Abnorma l opera ti on Abnorma l opera ti on No concerns highlighted
Sa mpl i ng Sa mpl i ng No concerns highlighted
Ma i ntena nce Ma i ntena nce No concerns highlighted
Equi pment s i ti ng Equi pment s i ti ng No concerns highlighted
Previ ous i nci dents Previ ous i nci dents No concerns highlighted
Huma n fa ctors Huma n fa ctors No concerns highlighted
Envi ronmenta l Envi ronmenta l No concerns highlighted
1- No ESD valve at battery limit of gas line Inability to isolate the gas from source in None 5- Provide ESD valve at battery Limit on Gas inlet line from Kabir X-
case of loss of containment at the facility, 1, ESD valve shall be actuated through ESD push button or
10 6 60 8 6 48
leading to escalation of small scenario confirmed gas or fire detection.
into a major fire
Sa fety Sa fety
2- Any emergency scenarios Inability to escape from control room due 6- Provide alternate escape door in control room towards safe exist
to unavailability of emergency egress away from process side for any emergency situations
10 4 40 10 4 40
leading to serious injuries/fatalities.

Des i gn Des i gn No Concerns

Others Others No Concerns

SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station

Node 2 First Stage Outlet including chiller and Dehydration unit
Type Filters, Heat Exchangers
Drawing No. Y 700972, PID 002
Design Conditions 176 psi
Tag Numbers X 100, STR 36 NGX

Risk Rank Risk Rank

Safety Environment Business / Safety Environment Business /
Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation Responsibility Remarks
Reputation Reputation
S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR
More fl ow No cause highlighted
Les s fl ow No cause highlighted
No fl ow See High pressure
Revers e fl ow No cause highlighted
Fl ow Human error, any manual drain or Loss of gas into atmosphere, revenue 7- Develop procedure for dehydration unit operation and show
vent valve inadvertently left loss, low pressure in compressor 2nd valve sequence on P&ID. Mark valve sequence for dehydration and
Mi s di rected fl ow open stage suction potential for 2nd stage 6 6 36 6 6 36 regeneration on P&IDs in the procedure and also show on a chart in
valve damage due to high compression the field.
ratio.
Human error, wrong Line Up of Blocked flow downstream of PD PAHH 101, First stage high discharge 8- Mention PSV set pressure on P&IDs
Dehydration filter, blocked flow compressor, pressure upstream of pressure trip 9- Develop and implement protocol for PSVs bench test/calibration
isolated section exceeds line rating PSV 101 set at 12 bar at regular intervals.
Hi gh pres s ure 10 6 60 6 6 36 10 4 40 6 4 24
leading to line rupture, fire upon ignition
leading to serious injuries, fatalities and
Pres s ure
asset damage
PSV 101 spurious opening causing Low pressure in 2nd stage suction,
first stage discharge pressure to potential compressor second stage
Low pres s ure/ va cuum 6 6 36 6 6 36
fall below normal operating suction valve damage due to high
pressure compression ratio.
1. Inter-stage cooler High second stage suction temperature,
underperformance due to fouling damage to piston rings, packing rings.
2. First stage discharge valve
damage 6 6 36 6 6 36

Hi gh tempera ture 3- Regeneration Heater Damage to mol sieves 6 6 36 TSH-3 regenerator heater high temperature 6 6 36
3- Regeneration cooler under High temperature downstream of cooler, TSH-5 cooler high temperature alarm in
performance due to fouling process disturbance in re generation unit local control panel
causing moisture carry over to
compressor, Potential for compressor 6 6 36 6 4 24
Tempera ture
valve damage, high second stage suction
temperature, damage to piston rings,
packing rings.
4- Chiller unit underperformance NGL separator performance degradation,
moisture carryover into compressor,
6 6 36 6 6 36
damage to compressor piston and
cylinder
Malfunction of Regeneration Low temperature of regeneration gas 1- TSL 3 Low temperature alarm 10- Provide temperature indication with high temperature alarm on
Heater 13 causing moisture carry over to downstream of heater 13 on local control gas line downstream of NGL separator.
Low tempera ture compressor, potential for compressor 6 6 36 panel 6 4 24
valve damage 2- High Dew Point Indication and alarm

Hi gh l evel No cause identified

Level Low l evel / No cause identified
no l evel No cause identified
Is ol a ti on Is ol a ti on No cause identified
Wrong percenta ge / Wrong percenta ge / No cause identified
Compos i ti on Compos i ti on
Conta mi na ti on/ Conta mi na ti on/ No cause identified
compos i ti on compos i ti on
Wrong ma teri a l Wrong ma teri a l No concerns highlighted
Hi gh rea cti on (runa wa y N/A
rea cti on)

Low rea cti on/ no rea cti on N/A

(i ncompl ete rea cti on)
Rea cti on
Revers e rea cti on N/A
Si de rea cti on N/A
Wrong rea cti on N/A
Exces s i ve mi xi ng N/A
Mi xi ng
Poor/no Mi xi ng N/A

Rel i ef Rel i ef No concerns

Rupture/l ea k Rupture/l ea k No additional concerns
Wrong Line Up of dehydration Process disturbance in re generation unit High Dew Point Indication and alarm
Procedure omi tted / Procedure omi tted / unit during regeneration cycle. causing moisture carry over to
6 6 36 6 4 24
vi ol a ti on vi ol a ti on compressor, Potential for compressor
valve damage
Ins trumenta ti on Ins trumenta ti on No concerns highlighted
Chemi ca l ha za rds Chemi ca l ha za rds No concerns highlighted
Equi pment i ntegri ty Equi pment i ntegri ty No concerns highlighted
Cooler 16 fan motor Ignition source potential for fire upon gas EX-Rated motor and instrumentation 5- Develop Hazardous area classification drawing and confirm
Igni ti on Igni ti on Local control panel and release leading to serious injuries, 10 6 60 8 6 48 10 4 40 8 4 32 electric and electronic equipment within the classified area are
instrumentation fatalities and asset damage, revenue loss rated accordingly.

Servi ce fa i l ure Servi ce fa i l ure No concerns highlighted

Abnorma l opera ti on Abnorma l opera ti on No concerns highlighted
Sa mpl i ng Sa mpl i ng No concerns highlighted
Ma i ntena nce Ma i ntena nce No concerns highlighted
Equi pment s i ti ng

Previ ous i nci dents

Equi pment s i ti ng

Previ ous i nci dents

No concerns highlighted

No concerns highlighted
SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station
Huma n fa ctors Huma n fa ctors No concerns highlighted

Envi ronmenta l Envi ronmenta l No concerns highlighted

Sa fety Sa fety No concerns highlighted
Des i gn Des i gn No concerns highlighted
Others Others No concerns highlighted
Node 3 Compressor Second stage discharge up to Bowser Filing Point
Type Compressor X-100
Drawing No. PID Process Skid 4DA300, PID 002
Design Conditions 275 bar
Tag Numbers X-100

Risk Rank Risk Rank

Safety Environment Business / Safety Environment Business / Reputation
Guide Word Deviation Cause Consequence Safeguards Recommendation Responsibility Remarks
Reputation
S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR S P RR
Leak or rupture in compressor Low discharge pressure leading to high Engine overload protections are available
More fl ow discharge piping flow, potential for engine overload and 6 6 36 6 4 24
damage
Fl ow Les s fl ow No cause identified
No fl ow No cause identified
Revers e fl ow No cause identified
Mi s di rected fl ow No cause identified
Any manual valve at compressor 1. Blocked Flow, potential for compressor 1- High Pressure shutdown PSH 101, PSH 8- Mention PSV set pressure on P&IDs
discharge inadvertently closed discharge piping, rupture leading to fire 102, PSH 103, PSH 104 set at 10 bar, 40 bar, 9- Develop and implement protocol for PSVs bench test/calibration
upon ignition potential for serious 150 bar and 275 bar respectively at each at regular intervals.
Hi gh pres s ure injuries, fatalities and asset damage 10 6 60 8 6 48 stage 10 4 40 8 4 32
2. Compressor inter-stage valve damage 2- PSV 102 & PSV-104 installed at
compressor discharge
Pres s ure

Any manual valve at bowser filing 1- Gas release into atmosphere, 1.Spring loaded auto shutoff valve at
line inadvertently open compressor discharge pressure bowser filing point
Low pres s ure/ va cuum decreases, potential for fire upon 10 6 60 4 6 24 2.PSL-107 Low pressure shutdown at 10 4 40 4 4 16
ignition, serious injuries/fatality and compressor discharge
asset damage.
1.Interstage cooler High inter-stage temperature leading to
underperformance due to fouling compressor mechanical damage revenue
Hi gh tempera ture 2.Compressor cylinder valve loss. 6 6 36 6 6 36
Tempera ture
damage

Low tempera ture No concerns

Hi gh l evel No concerns
Level Low l evel / No cause identified
no l evel No cause identified
No concerns highlighted
Is ol a ti on Is ol a ti on

Wrong percenta ge / Wrong percenta ge / No cause identified

Compos i ti on Compos i ti on

Conta mi na ti on/ Conta mi na ti on/ No cause identified

compos i ti on compos i ti on

Wrong ma teri a l Wrong ma teri a l No cause identified

Hi gh rea cti on (runa wa y N/A
rea cti on)

Low rea cti on/ no rea cti on N/A

(i ncompl ete rea cti on)
Rea cti on
Revers e rea cti on N/A
Si de rea cti on N/A
Wrong rea cti on N/A
Exces s i ve mi xi ng N/A
Mi xi ng
Poor/no Mi xi ng N/A
Rel i ef Rel i ef No additional concerns
Rupture/l ea k Rupture/l ea k No additional concerns
Procedure omi tted / Procedure omi tted / No concerns highlighted
vi ol a ti on vi ol a ti on
Ins trumenta ti on Ins trumenta ti on No concerns highlighted
Chemi ca l ha za rds Chemi ca l ha za rds No concerns highlighted
Equi pment i ntegri ty Equi pment i ntegri ty No concerns highlighted
Bowser exhaust Ignition source, potential for fire upon a 1- Bowser earthing and grounding system is
loss of containment. May lead to serious in place
Igni ti on Igni ti on injuries, fatalities and asset damage 10 6 60 6 6 36 2- Bowser engine is kept off during filing as 10 4 40 6 4 24
per procedure

Instrument Air Failure Compressor tripping, revenue loss Manned operations, no major concern
Servi ce fa i l ure Servi ce fa i l ure 4 8 32

Abnorma l opera ti on Abnorma l opera ti on No concerns highlighted

Sa mpl i ng Sa mpl i ng No concerns highlighted
Ma i ntena nce Ma i ntena nce No concerns highlighted
Equi pment s i ti ng Equi pment s i ti ng No concerns highlighted
Previ ous i nci dents Previ ous i nci dents No concerns highlighted
Huma n fa ctors Huma n fa ctors No concerns highlighted

Envi ronmenta l Envi ronmenta l No concerns highlighted

Any Emergency scenario Inability to initiate ESD from bowser 11- Provide ESD button near bowser filing area.
loading area, potential for escalation due
Sa fety Sa fety 10 6 60 6 6 36 10 6 60 6 6 36
to delayed action leading to asset
damage, serious injuries/fatality.
Des i gn Des i gn No concerns 12. Update all P&IDs as built, some
Others Others No concerns

SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station

 Anex3
E-GasRISK MATRIX

SR 43-01-01-HAZOP Study OfKabir Gas Compression Station

 Risk Framework - Risk Matrix

25 SR-36-02-01 HAZOP TOR Rehman Production Facility

26 SR-36-02-01 HAZOP TOR Rehman Production Facility
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27 SR-36-02-01 HAZOP TOR Rehman Production Facility