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- The document provides an introduction to Indian philosophy and its schools. - It discusses the six orthodox schools - Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Uttara Mimamsa (Vedanta). - Nyaya focuses on logic and epistemology, while Vaisheshika develops metaphysics. They accept three means of valid knowledge - perception, inference, and testimony.

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0% found this document useful (1 vote)
440 views35 pages

Mohit Sharma Classes For Ugc Net Classes - Contact 7404717750

- The document provides an introduction to Indian philosophy and its schools. - It discusses the six orthodox schools - Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva Mimamsa, and Uttara Mimamsa (Vedanta). - Nyaya focuses on logic and epistemology, while Vaisheshika develops metaphysics. They accept three means of valid knowledge - perception, inference, and testimony.

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MOHIT SHARMA CLASSES

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MOHIT SHARMA CLASSES
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CHAPTER 2: INDIAN LOGIC

Syllabus
Indian Logic: Means of Knowledge

Pramanas: Pratyaksha (perception), Anumana


(inference), Upamana (comparison), Shabda (verbal
testimony), Arthapatti (implication) and Anupalabddhi
(non-apprehension)

Structure and kinds of anumana (inference), vyapti


(invariable relation), hetvabhasas (fallacies of
inference)

A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN


PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHTIntroduction

The etymologicalmeaning of the word 'Philosophy' is 'love of


learning' and it is interpreted as an intellectual quest for truth.
In Sanskrit, the word Darshana meaning ‘vision’ or ‘the
instrument of vision’ is used to denote Philosophy. It stands for
direct, immediate and intuitive vision of reality, the actual
perception of truth and the means which lead to ultimate
realization. In the words of Max muller-“Philosophy was
recommended in India not for the sake of knowledge but for
the highest purpose that man can strive after in his life”. Even
though the concept of moksha varies from system to system, it
is accepted as the ultimate aim of philosophic culture. In India,
Philosophy becomes a way of life, not merely a way of thought.
'See the Self'(Atmaavaa are drshtavya) is the keynote of
all Schools of Indian Philosophy. Annihilation of the three
kinds of pains - aadhyaatmika (Physical and mental
sufferings Produced by natural and intra-organic causes),
aadhibhautika (Physical and mental sufferings Produced by

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natural and extra - organic causes), and aadhidaivika
(Physical and mental sufferings produced by super natural and
extra -Organic causes) and realization of Supreme happiness is
the end, and shravana (hearing the truth), manana (intellectual
conviction after critical analysis) and Nididhyaasana (Practical
realization) are the means - in almost all the schools of Indian
Philosophy.
The origin of Indian Philosophy may be traced in the Vedas. But
absence of historical records keeps the period in mystery.
Classification of Vedic Literature
The name 'Veda' (knowledge) stands for the Mantras and
the Brahmanas.Mantra means a hymnaddressed to some
god or goddess. The collection of the Mantras is called
'Samhita'. There are four Samhitas - Rk, Yajus, Saama and
Atharva. These are said to be compiled for the smooth
performance of the Vedic sacrifices. A Vedic sacrifice needs four
main priests - Hota, who addresses hymns in praise of the
gods to invoke their presence and participation in the sacrifice;
Udgaata, who sings the hymns in sweet musical tones to
entertain and please the gods; Adhvaryu, who performs the
sacrifice according to the strict ritualistic code and gives
offerings to the gods; and Brahma, who is the general
supervisor well- versed in the all the Vedas. The four Samhitas
are said to be compiled to fulfill the needs of these four main
priests - Rk for the Hota, Saama for the Udgaata, Yajus for the
Adhvaryu and Atharva for the Brahma. Sometimes the Vedas
are referred to only as 'Trayi', omitting the Atharva. Rgveda
is regarded as the oldest and also the most important. The
Rshis of the Vedas are not the authors, but only the 'seers' of
the Mantras. The Braahmanaas, unlike the Mantras, are written
in prose. They are the elaboration of the complicated ritualism
of the Vedas. They deal with the rules and regulations laid
down for the performance of the rites and the sacrifices. Their
name 'Braahmana' is derived from the word 'Brahman' which
originally means a prayer. There is little philosophy in these,
though some philosophical ideas flash here and there in the
course of some speculative digressions. The appendages to
these Braahmanas are called Aaranyakas mainly because they
were composed in the calmness of the forests. The Aaranyakas
mark the transition from the ritualistic to the philosophic

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thought. We find here a mystic interpretation of the Vedic
sacrifices. The concluding portions of the Aaranyakas are called
the Upanishads. These are intensely philosophical and spiritual
and may be rightly regarded as the cream of the Vedic
philosophy. The Mantras and the Braahmanaas are called the
Karma - Kaanda or the portion dealingwith the sacrificial
actions, and the Aaranyakas and the Upanishads are called the
Jnanakaanda. The Upanishads are also known as 'Vedaanta' or
'the end of the Veda', firstly because they are literally the
concluding portion, the end, of the Vedas, and Secondly
because they are the essence, the cream, the height, of the
Vedic philosophy.
The Upanishads are the foundation of Indian Philosophy. The
Systems of Indian Philosophy are systematic speculations on
the nature of the Reality in harmony with the teachings of the
Upanishads, which contain various aspects of truth.
The Schools of Indian Philosophy
The nine systems of Indian Philosophical thought have been
conventionally classified into two broad divisions of the
orthodox (astika) and the heterodox (nastika). This
classification has been made on the basis of whether the
system believes or not in the infallibility of Vedas. The Schools
that neither consider the Vedas to neither be infallible nor
derive their own validity from the authority of the Vedas are
classified as heterodox, or nastika. The schools of materialism,
Buddhism, and Jainism, fall in this category as they repudiated
the authority of the Vedas. The Buddhists and the Jainas
subscribed to their own respective scriptures. The remaining
six Schools are all orthodox because, directly or indirectly, they
accept the authority of the Vedas. Of these, Mimamsa and
Vedanta depend entirely on the Vedas and exist in continuation
of the Vedic tradition. Mimamsa emphasizes the importance of
the rituals prescribed in the Vedas, but Vedanta considers the
parts of Vedas which contain philosophical issues more
important. Samkhya, Yoga, Nyaya, and Vaisheshika are not
based on the Vedas, but they accept the authority of the
Vedas. They nevertheless are careful to maintain a consonance
between their theories and the Vedas.

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All the Schools of Indian Philosophy developed not in isolation
from one another, but as interrelated to each other, each had
to defend its theory from the criticisms it faced from the other
Schools and also develop its own theory to challenge the
others. The development of a particular school cannot,
therefore, be understood properly without constant reference
to other Schools in which it finds a mention. In the theoretical
side nyaya is connected with vaisheshika, samkhya with yoga
and purvamimamsa with uttaramimamsa. Even though they
differ in their essence, they share some basic principles in
common hence work complementary to each other. Let us see
a detailed account of the six orthodox schools of Indian
philosophy.
NYAYA AND VAISHESHIKA
Nyaya is a system of atomic pluralism and logical realism. It is
allied to the Vaisheshika system which is regarded as
'Samanatantra' or Similar Philosophy. Vaisheshika develops
metaphysics and ontology; Nyaya develops logic and
epistemology. In short the Nyaya is concerned primarily with
pramana the Vaisheshika philosophy is centered on Prameyas.
Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as
bondage of the soul and in regarding liberation which is
absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both
agree that bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that
liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaisheshika
takes up the exposition of reality and Nyaya takes up the
exposition of right knowledge of reality. Nyaya mostly accepts
the Vaisheshika metaphysics. But there are some important
points of difference between them. The difference is in the case
of the acceptance of the padarthas and Pramanas.
Nyayaaccepts three pramanasas valid means of knowledge
(Pratyaksha, Anumana and Shabda). The
NavyaNyayaachryas like Udayana accept four pramanas
including Upamana; while Vaisheshika accepts Pratyaksha
and Anumana as pramanas.

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Nyaya philosophy
The sage Gotama (Gautama or Akshapada) is the founder of
Nyaya school of Indian philosophy. The word nyaya means
argumentation. Tarkashastra, Pramanashastra, Vadavidya,
Hetuvidya and Anvikshiki are othe other names used to denote
Nyaya.
Important texts- Gotama’sNyaya sutra is the basic text of
nyaya philosophy. Vatsyayana’sNyayabhashya,
Udyotakarasnyayavartika and Vachaspati’sTatparyatika are the
other important commentaries and subcommentaries.
Udayana’sNyayakusumanjali, Jayanta’sNyayamanjari and
Ganesha’sTattvachinthamani aresome of the important texts of
this school.

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Theory of knowledge
Knowledge, according to Nyaya, reveals both the subject and
the object which are quite distinct from itself. This is the reason
why Nyaya is called as realist system. Knowledge or cognition
is defined as apprehension or consciousness. Knowledge may
be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge is called prama and, is
defined as the right apprehension of an object. Nyaya
maintains the theory of correspondence (ParatahPramanya.)
Non - Valid knowledge is known as aprama. Pramana is valid
means of knowledge. “(,PramakaranamPramanam -
Pramatuyatharthajnanam.)" Nyaya accepts four valid
means of knowledge viz. perception, inference, testimony
and comparison.

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1.Pratyakhsa
Gotama defines perception as 'non-erroneous cognition
which is produced by the contact of the sense-organs with
the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is
well-defined'.
"Indriyartha sannikarsha janyam jnanam " This definition
includes ordinary as well as extra -ordinary perception
and excludes inference, comparison and testimony.

Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the


self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense - organs, the
objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The
self comes into contact with the manas, the manas with the
sense - organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The
contact of the sense-organs with the objects is not possible
unless the manas first comes into contact with the sense -
organs, and the contact of the manas with the sense -organs is
not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas.

Hence sense - object contact necessarily presupposes the


manas - sense contact and the self-manas contact. The sense -
organs are derived from the elements whose specific
qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are
manifested by them. The manas is the mediator between the
self and the sense-organs. The external object, through the
senses and the manas, makes an impression on the self. The
theory, therefore, is realistic.

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The Two Stages in Pratyaksha(Savikalpa
and Nirvikalpa)-

The Nyaya maintains two stages in perception. The first is


called inderminate or nirvikalpa and the second, determinate or
savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception,
but only the earlier and the later stages in the same
complex process of perception.

All perception is determinate, but is necessarily preceded by an


earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Bare sensation or
simple apprehension is nirvikalpa perception; perceptual
judgement or relational apprehension is savikalpa perception.

Perception is a complex indeterminate perception forms the


material out of which determinate perception is shaped, but
they can be distinguished only in thought and not divided in
reality. Nirvikalpa perception is the immediate
apprehension, the bare awareness, the direct sense -
experience which is undifferentiated and non-relational and is
free from assimilation, discrimination, analysis and
synthesis. When nirvikalpa perception presents the bare
object without any characterization, Savikalpa perception
relates the substance with its attributes.

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The two kinds of Pratyaksha (Luakika and
Alaukika) –

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Again, according to Nyaya, Pratyaksha is of two kinds, namely,
laukika (ordinary) and alaukika (extraordinary). When the
sense-organs come into contact with the object present
to them in the usual way, we have Laukika Perception.

And if the contact of the sense -organs with the objects is in an


unusual way, i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to
the senses but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary
medium, we have Alaukika perception.

Ordinary perception is of two kinds- internal (manasa) and


external (bahya).
In internal perception, the mind (manas) which is the
internal organ comes into contact with the psychical states and
processes like cognition, affection, conation, desire, pain,
pleasure, aversion etc.

External perception takes place when the five external


organs of sense organs of sight, sound, touch, taste and
smell respectively when they come into contact with the
external object. The external sense-organce are composed of
material elements of earth, water, fire, air and ether and
therefore each sense the particular quality of its element. Thus
the sense-organ of smell is composed of the atoms of earth
and perceives smell which is the specificquality of earth and so
on.

Extra - ordinary perception is of three


kinds - samanyalakshana, Jnanalakshana and Yogaja.

Samanyalakshana perception is the perception of the


universals.

Jnanalakshana perception is the 'Complicated' perception


through association. Sometimes different sensations become

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associated and form one integrated perception. Here an
object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is
revived in memory through the past cognition of it and is
perceived through representation. The theory of illusion
accepted by Nyaya called Anyatakhyati' is based on this kind of
perception.

The third kind of extra - ordinary perception is called Yogaja


perception. This is the intuitive and immediate perception of all
objects, past, present and future, possessed by the Yogis
through the power of meditation. It is intuitive, supra -
sensuous and supra - relational.

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2.Anumana
The second kind of knowledge is anumana or inferential
or relational and its means is called anumana or
inference. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes
some other cognation. It is mediate and indirect and
arises through a 'mark', the 'middle term' (linga or hetu)
which is invariably connected with the 'Major term' (Sadhya). It
is knowledge (mana) which arises after (anu) other knowledge.

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Classification of Anumana
Inference is generally classified into svartha and paratha.

In svartha anumana we do not require formal statements of


the members of inference. It is a psychological process. And
the pararth anumana, has to be done only to convince other.

Gotama speaks of three kinds of inference - purvavat,


sheshavat and samanyatodrshta.
The first two are based on causation and the last one on mere
coexistence. A cause is the invariable and unconditional
antecedent of an effect and an effect is the invariable and
unconditional consequent of a cause.

When we infer the unperceived effect from a perceived cause


we have purvavat inference.

When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect


we have sheshavat inference,

When inference is based not on causation but on uniformity of


co-existences; it is called samanyatodrshta.

Another classification of inference gives us the


Kevalanvayi, kevalavyatireki and anvayavyatireki
inferences. It is based on the nature of Vyapti and on the
different methods of establishing it.

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The methods of induction by which universal casual relationship
is established may be anvaya, vyatireka or both.

We have kevalanvayi inference when the middle term is


always positively related to the major term. The terms agree
only in presence, there being no negative instance of their
agreement in absence.

We have kevalavyatireki inference when the middle term is


the differentium of the minor term and is always negatively
related to the major term. The terms agree only in absence,
there being no positive instance of their agreement in
presence.

We have anvayavyatireki inference when the middle term


is both positively and negatively related to the major term. The
Vyapti between the middle and the major is in respect of both
presence and absence.

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Upamana (comparison)
The third kind of valid cognition is Upamiti and its means
is called Upamana.
Samjna-samjniiSambandhajnanamUpamitih,
tatkaranamUpamanam.

It is knowledge derived from comparison and roughly


corresponds to analogy. It has been defined as the
knowledge of the relation between a word and its denotation. It
is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity.

For example, a man who has never seen a gavaya or a wild


cow and does not know what it is, is told by a person that wild
cow is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild
cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then his
knowledge is due to upamana.

He has heard the word 'gavaya' and has been told that it is
like a cow and now he himself sees the object denoted by the
word 'gavaya' and recognizes it to be so.
Hence upamana is just the knowledge of the relation
between a name and the object denoted by that name. It
is produced by the knowledge of similarity because a man
recognizes a wild cow as a 'gavaya' when he perceives its
similarity to the cow and remembers the description that 'a
gavaya is and animal like a cow'.

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Shabda (Verbal testimony)
Shabda is valid source, of knowledge in all the systems of
Indian Philosophy. Also in the Nyaya system, the fourth kind
of valid knowledge is shabda.

It is defined, as the statement of a trustworthy person


(aptavakya) and consists in understanding its meaning. A
sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is
defined as that which is potent to convey its meaning.

The power in a word to convey its meaning comes, according


to ancient Nyaya, from God, and according to later Nyaya, from
long established convention. Testimony is always personal. It
is based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or
divine.

Testimony is of two kinds- Vaidika and secular (laukika).

The Vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the


Vedas are spoken by God;

secular testimony, being the words of human beings who are


liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of trustworthy
persons who always speak the truth are valid; others are not.

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A word is a potent symbol which signifies an object and
sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be
intelligible must conform to certain conditions.

These conditions are four- akanksha, yogyata,sannidhi and


tatparya.

The first is mutual implication or expectancy. The words of a


sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in
order to express acomplete sense. A mere aggregate of
unrelated words will not make a logical sentence. It will be
sheer nonsense, e.g., 'cow horse man elephant'.

The second condition is that the words should possess fitness


to convey the sense and should not contradict the meaning.
'Water the plants with fire' is a contradictory sentence.

The third condition is the close proximity of the words to one


another. The words must be spoken in quick succession without
long intervals. If the words 'bring', 'a' and 'cow' are uttered at
long intervals they would not make a logical sentence.

The fourth condition is the intention of the speaker if the


words are ambiguous. For example, the word 'saindhava'
means 'salt' as well as a 'horse'. Now, if a man who is taking
his food asks another to bring 'saindhava', the latter should not
bring a horse.

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Arthapatti or implication- It is the
assumption of an unperceived fact in order to reconcile two
apparently inconsistent perceived facts.

If rahul is alive and he is not in his house, we presume that


he is elsewhere. ‘Being alive’ and ‘not being in the house’ are
two perceived facts which appear to be inconsistent. Their
apparent inconsistency is removed when we presume the fact
of ‘being elsewhere’.

The element of doubt distinguishes presumption or implication


from inference.

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Anupalabdhi (Non-apprehension)-
kumarila admits non-apprehension (anupalabdhi) as the sixth
independent pramana. The Naiyayika and Prabhakara reject it.
In response to the criticism Kumarila opines that negation
cannot be perceived, for there is no sense-object-contact.
Negation cannot be inferred for the invariable concomitance is
not known here. Negation cannot be known by testimony, for
there is no verbal cognition here. Nor can it be known from
comparison or presumption. Negation which is an
independent category is known by an
independent pramana called non- apprehension.
s

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Invariable concomitance (vyapti) is the nerve of
inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term
is called pakshadharmata. The invariable association of the
middle term with the major term is called vyapti. The
knowledge of pakshadharmata as qualified by vyapti is called
paramarsha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major
in the minor through the middle which resides in the minor
(pakshadharmata) and is invariably associated with the major
(Vyapti). The major, the minor and the middle are here
called sadhya, paksha and linga or heturespectively.

We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire


(Vyapti) and if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that
there must be fire in that hill.
Hill is the minor term; fire is the major term; smoke is
the middle term.

We can prove this by explaining the five steps in Nyaya


syllogism.
The first is called Pratijna or proposition. It is the logical
statement which is to be proved.
The second is Hetu or the establishment of the proposition.
The third is called Udaharana which gives the universal
concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is Nigamana or
conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five
propositions of the Indian Syllogism are called 'Members' or
avayavas. The following is a typical Nyaya Syllogism.
1.This hill has fire (Pratijna) (Parvatovahniman)
2.Becauseit has smoke (hetu) (Dhumat)
3.Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven (udaharana)
yatraYatradhoomah, tatratatravahnih)
4.This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire
(upanaya) (Tathachaasau)
5.Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana) (Tasmattatha)
Indian logic does not separate deduction from induction.
Inference is a complex .process involving both

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Hetvabhasa
In Indian logic a fallacy is called Hetvabhasa. It means that
middle term appears to be a reason but is not a valid
reason. All fallacies are material fallacies.

There are five characteristics of a valid middle term, they


are the following
1. It must be present in the minor term (Pakshadharmata);
e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.
2. It must be present in all positive instances in which the
major term is present; e.g., smoke must be present in the
kitchen where fire exists (sapakshasattva).

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3. It must be absent in all negative instances in which the
major term is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the lake
in which fire does not exist (vipakshaasattva).
4. It must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it
must not prove the coolness of fire (abaadhita).
5. It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting
reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g., 'the fact
of being caused' should not be used to provethe 'etemality' of
sound (aviruddha).

When one of the above mentioned characteristics are


violated, we have fallacies.

Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

1. Asiddha :This is the fallacy of the unproved middle. The


middle term must be present in the minor term
(pakshadharmata). If it is not, it is unproved. It is of three
kinds.
a. Ashrayaasiddha: The minor term is the locus of the middle
term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term cannot be
present in it; e.g., 'the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a
lotus, like the lotus of a lake'.
b.Svarupaasiddha: Here the minor term is not unreal. But the
middle term cannot be its very nature be present in the minor
term; e.g., 'sound is a quality, because it is visible'. Here
visibility cannot belong to sound which is audible.
c.Vyapyatvaasidda : Here Vyapti is conditional (sopadhika).
We cannot say, e.g., 'wherever there is fire there is smoke'.
Fire smokes only when it is associated with wet fuel. A red -
hot iron ball or clear fire does not smoke. Hence 'Association
with wet fuel' is a condition necessary to the aforesaid vyapti.

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Being conditioned, the middle term becomes fallacious if we
say: 'The hill has smoke because it has fire'.

2. Savyabhichara or Anaikantika: This is fallacy of the


irregular middle. It is ofthree kinds.
a. Sadharana: Here the middle term is too wide. It is present
in both the sapaksha (Positive) and the vipaksha (negative)
instances and violates the rule that the middle should not be
present in the negative instances (vipakshaasattva); e.g., 'the
hill has fire because it is knowable'. Here 'knowable' is present
in fiery as well as non - fiery objects.
b. Asadharana: Here the middle term is too narrow. It is
present only in the paksha and neither in the sapaksha not in
the vipaksha. It violated the rule that the middle term should
be present in the sapaksha (sapakshasattva); e.g., 'soundis
eternal, because it is audible'. Here audibility belongs to sound
only and is present nowhere else,
c. Anupasamhari: Here the middle term is non-exclusive.
The minor term is all -inclusive and leaves nothing by way of
sapaksha or vipaksha; e.g., 'all things are non-eternal, because
they are knowable'.

3. Satpratipaksha: Here the middle term is contradicted by


another middle term. The reason is counter - balanced by
another reason. And both are of equal force; e.g., 'sound is
eternal, because it is audible' and 'sound is non-eternal,
because it is produced'. Here 'audible' is counter - balanced by
'produced' and both are of equal force.

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4. Badhita: It is the non - inferentially contradicted middle.
Here the middle term is contradicted by some other pramana
and not by inference. It cannot prove the major term which is
disproved by another stronger source of valid kowledge; e.g.,
'fire is cold, because it is a substance'. Here the middle term
'substance' is directly contradicted by perception.

5. Viruddha: It is the contradictory middle. The middle term,


instead of being pervaded by the presence of the major term is
pervaded by the absence of the major term. Instead of proving
the existence of the major term in the minor term, it proves its
non-existence therein; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is
produced'. Here 'Produced', instead of proving the etemality of
sound, proves its non-etemality.

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