Kampfgruppevonluck
Kampfgruppevonluck
It is on these
second Pint-Sized Campaign for Chain of critical few hours that we will focus.
Command and the second set in Normandy
around D-Day. This time, we look towards the One of the keys to making any campaign
British sector and the events to the East of the viable is keeping things simple and brief. Our
Orne River on the 6th of June. Our At the Sharp End campaign handbook
protagonists are 21 Panzer Division, in provides the key to unlocking this campaign.
particular the forces under the command of Using the rules in At the Sharp End you’ll be
Major Hans von Luck, and 12 Parachute able to run this campaign very easily and
Battalion, one of the British airborne units quickly, straight from the box. The fact that
deployed to form part of the bridgehead East the support lists are specific to this campaign
of the Orne, protecting Pegasus Bridge from a also means that collecting the forces required
counter-attack. is also very achievable.
Putting together the firepower of a Panzer Once you are ready to begin, the campaign
Grenadier force with the professionalism and will provide between four and eight games in
tactical finesse of the Paras is sure to cause total by which point it will have reached a
fireworks. What I enjoyed most about this measurable conclusion. You’ll have a winner
campaign was the hard-fought nature of the and a loser, all in the type of time-frame
actions, as two of the toughest forces in Chain which is ideal as a club project or for a couple
of Command met on the battlefield. What my of friends gaming over a month or two.
coleague Richard has done, taking just the Perfect, we think, for a fast, fun and
brief period of one day in June 1944, is to fundamentally enjoyable campaign
show how flexible At the Sharp End is. This experience.
campaign introduces some additional
considerations, such as the importance of As a bonus, these Pint-Sized Campaigns come
managing limited assets to achieve your goal with a pint-sized price tag. Literally! The
which really enhances the game experience price of each one will be the same as a pint of
further and highlights how a campaign adds my favourite tipple in my local pub. We hope
so much to gaming enjoyment. you enjoy Kampfgruppe von Luck.
Planning for
Operation Overlord
had begun in May
1943 when Lieutenant
General Frederick
Morgan was
appointed as Chief of
Staff to an as yet un-
appointed Supreme
Commander. From its
inception the plan
included the use of
airborne forces and,
as detail was added,
their roles as flank
guards were
confirmed. The US
airborne forces falling
to the West, the
British 6th Airborne to
the East.
With these tasks then completed, the Division on the 5th of June, “Do not be daunted if
was to defend its bridgehead, holding a chaos reigns. It undoubtedly will.”
continuous defensive line between the Orne
and the Dives, until relieved by the general 21 Panzer Division
Allied advance. The 21st Panzer Division had an illustrious
history, making its name as part of the Afrika
The capture of the Orne bridges was the Korps under Erwin Rommel. However, that
responsibility of a reinforced Company of the Division had been destroyed in Tunisia and
Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire Light Infantry the name had been allocated to a fresh
under Major John Howard. These were to Division raised in 1943. On paper this was a
land at LZ X and Y. After seizing the bridges fresh Panzer Division, in reality it had scarcely
this coup de main force was to hold their completed re-equipping and retraining. Its
position with 5 Parachute Brigade dropping commander, Generalmajor Edgar Feuchtinger,
on DZ N to provide them with relief and was an artilleryman by background and a man
protection. 7 Para were to move into with friends in the regime. Before the war, he
Benouville and Le Port to the West of the river had been involved in organising the Heer’s
and 12 and 13 Para were to occupy Ranville contributions to Party rallies and was not a
and Le Bas de Ranville, forming a defensive man afraid to use the contacts he had
perimeter there. developed in the Nazi Party to advance his
career.
To the North, 9 Para and the 1st Canadian
Parachute Battalion were to drop on DZ V, Inexperienced in armoured warfare,
tasked with destroying the Merville battery, Feuchtinger attempted to surround himself
the Dives bridges and clearing the DZ for the with men who knew their trade. He used his
arrival of Divisional HQ at 0330 in 68 gliders. influence in the Spring of 1944 to secure the
appointment of Major Hans von Luck to his
Finally, 8 Para were to land at DZ K from Division as opposed to Panzer Lehr, to where
where they were to destroy the bridges at von Luck had been posted. It was to be a
Bures and Troarn before withdrawing fortuitous appointment as von Luck was an
northwards to assume their place in the experienced commander. Such postings
perimeter at Le Mesnil. On the evening of D- allowed the General to spend as much time as
Day, a second wave of gliders would deliver possible in Paris where he had established a
the 6th Airlanding Brigade made up of the 12th “Special Headquarters” that was more to his
Devons, the 2nd Oxfordshire & liking than the provinces.
Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 1st
Royal Ulster Rifles. Additionally, Lord Lovat’s The Division was made up of one Panzer
1st Special Service Brigade would cross the Regiment, the 22nd, with two battalions.
Orne bridges as rapidly as possible before These had only just been equipped with
turning North and clearing the coastal zone of Panzer Mark IVs and a minority of these were
any isolated German forces in the area of the old short barrelled versions of early war
Sallenelles, Franceville Plage and Cabourg to vintage. Additionally, two Panzergrenadier
the East. Regiments, the 125th and 192nd, were both
made up of two battalions, one in armoured
For 6th Airborne Division, the greatest threat half-tracks, the other lorried. However, these
was a strong German counter-attack before vehicles were not standard German
the evening airlift consolidated the position. equipment but, rather, were French Army
Until then, a dozen 6 pounder anti-tank guns surplus which had been ingeniously converted
were the limit of their support weapons. It for the purpose by the talented Engineer,
promised to be a long day and, as Brigadier Major Alfred Becker.
Hill of the 3rd Para Brigade warned his officers
the immediate defence network if
an invasion were to occur.
The Division's Headquarters, of which we will Almost all of these troops, deployed as they
hear more, was based at St Pierre-sur-Dives, were in the coastal zone, could not avoid
22 miles to the South East of Caen. Its forces becoming involved in the fighting were the
were deployed on both sides of the Orne; a invasion to occur in this area. To suggest that
factor which would significantly influence these units were somehow in reserve is
events on D-Day. delusional, especially when we consider how
physically divorced they are from the main
To the West of the Orne, the main fighting combat elements of the Division.
body was Panzergrenadier Regiment 192
under Oberst Rauch. In fact its headquarters By far the most significant part of the Division
was just on the Eastern bank of the Orne at was deployed to the East of the Orne, in
Thury-Harcourt, some 19 miles South of Caen, particular all of Panzerregiment 22 under
but its two component Battalions were firmly Oberst von Oppeln-Bronikowski whose
to the West of the river. The 1st Battalion with headquarters was at Aubigny, just outside
its headquarters at Verson, just to the South Falaise and twenty miles due South of Caen.
of Carpiquet airfield, had its four Companies His two tank battalions were at Jort and
clustered in the villages around it. The 2nd Fresné-la-Mère a few miles to the West. This
Battalion was based at Le Mesnil, just to the force, in accordance with the conflicting plans
South of Mathieu which lay six miles inland from Army Group B and OKW, was held back
from Luc-sur-Mer at the Western end of from the immediate possible landing beaches
Sword Beach. Again, its component four but, Rommel hoped, sufficiently close so that
companies were deployed locally in Epron,
it could intervene decisively on day one of any daylight in a tracked vehicle when the skies
invasion. above are full of enemy ground-attack
aircraft. Other elements were already part of
With the Panzer element thus held back, the network of defences in the coastal zone.
Panzergrenadier Regiment 125 under
Oberstleutnant Hans von Luck was deployed The following map shows the forces to the
further forward on the East of the river. His East of the Orne which could be committed
headquarters was at Bellengreville, just to the immediately to action against the British
West of Vimont, a position central to his two Airborne forces landing in that area. German
Battalions. The 1st Battalion under Major forces are marked in green whilst we have
Freiherr Schenk du Schweinsburg had its shown the main British drop-zones in red. For
headquarters at Fierville-la-Campagne, some the most part we have concentrated on
sixteen miles to the South-East of Caen and elements of 21 Panzer Division and ignored
five miles South of von Luck’s headquarters. any other German units in the area.
Three of its companies were clustered close Ostbattailon 642, for example, had its
by, with the 4th, the heavy Kompanie, forward headquarters to the North of DZ N but, as it
in Vimont with the Regimental headquarters. had no influence on the action we are
The 2nd Battalion was to the North and more focussing on, we have ignored it. The one
scattered as it formed part of the network of exception is a platoon of Pioneers from the 1st
Company positions which provided depth to Company of the Pioneers Battalion of the
the beach defences. Hauptmann Kuron had 716th Division which was located in
his command post at Colombelles with his 5th Herouvillette at the time of the landings and
Kompanie in Troan. On the night of the 5th who put up stiff resistance before being
and 6th of June this company was undertaking overcome.
anti-airborne invasion exercises in the area;
perfect timing one may think, apart from the A Command Vacuum
fact that they were equipped only with blank What is just as crucial in understanding the
cartridges carried for training purposes. The events of D-Day is the command structure of
6th Kompanie were at Banneville, the 7th in 21 Panzer Division and how these key players
Ranville and the 8th, heavy Kompanie, in were placed on D-Day. With the German
Collombelles with the battalion HQ. meteorologists declaring the period of the 4th
to the 6th of June as being poor weather,
To the South of von Luck’s command were unsuitable for any invasion, Generalmajor
three batteries of Major Becker’s Edgar Feuchtinger and Oberstleautnant von
Sturmgeschütz Abteiluing 200 deployed Berlichingen, his Chief of Operations, left the
around Cagny, another location soon to coast and went to Paris to enjoy the pleasures
become famous, just three miles to the North of the French capital.
West of von Luck’s headquarters on the main
N13 to Caen. Further away, indeed an Of the remaining officers, the Chief logistics
unlikely distance further away, was Panzer- officer, Major Scharnhorst had joined the
Aufklarungs Abteilung 21, the Division’s Division on the 1st of June, just a few days
reconnaissance element, which was South of after Major Wagner, an officer who had been
Condé-sur-Noireau, some forty miles to the attached to the Division as part of his staff
South West of Caen. officer training. When news of the invasion
came Oberleutnant Messner, an ordnance
In summary, the armoured and officer, was Duty Officer with one Feldwebel
reconnaissance elements were being held a to assist him. At the critical moment, the
significant distance to the rear, with the Division was effectively commanded by a
former thirty-five miles from the coast and senior Leiutenant supported by officers who
the latter forty-five miles. Short distances in a had barely had a chance to unpack their kit,
tourist’s car in 2015, but a hard march in let alone familiarise themselves with their
new command. It was a recipe for disaster blank training ammunition they had been
and one only worsened by Rommel’s own carrying for their exercise.
much discussed absence from Army Group B,
his having returned to Germany for his wife’s According to the British schedule, the first lift
birthday. For good measure we should note was to drop at 0050 onto well marked Drop
that Genenral Erich Marcks, commanding Zones. In truth the drop was a matter of luck
LXXXI Armee Korps in Basse-Normandie was as much as judgement, as men were dropped
away at Rennes where a 7th Armee kriegsspiel without the pilots being able to properly
was taking place anticipating precisely the identify their targets. On DZ N, the pilots
events which were about to happen in reality. transporting 12 and 13 Para were able to
navitage using the silvery glean of the Orne
Long Moustaches, Ham and Jam River and Canal and both were able to
At 2215 hours all of the German coastal advance on their objectives with around 60%
defenders were put onto a high state of alert. strength. Unfortunately 7 Para were badly
An intercepted message from Radio Londres, dispersed and men from that battalion, much
a Free French radio station broadcasting needed in Benouville, would turn up in small
messages to agents in France, had used a groups throughout the early hours. One of
code already anticipated by German the first to arrive, guided by Major Howard
Intelligence: “Jean a de longues moustaches”. blowing “Victory-V” in morse on his police
In LXXXI Armee Korps area the 711th Infantry whistle, was Brigadier Poet, commander of 5
Division to the East of the Orne received the Brigade.
message. Unfortunately for the Germans, 7
Armee was somehow overlooked when the If the Germans had been unaware of what
message was sent. was happening before, the aerial flares,
parachutists and tracer arching up to meet
At 0015 Major John Howard’s party of the Ox them from the defenders on the ground, soon
& Bucks landed around the Orne bridges and made the situation clear. Responding, von
routed the handful of men there, securing Luck ordered 3 Kompanie to advance towards
both bridges by 0024 and transmitting their Troan, supported by “several StuGs from
coded message, “Ham and Jam” to indicate Sturmgeschütz Abteilung 200”. 8 Kompanie in
the capture of both bridges. D-Day had begun Colombelles was also ordered to conduct a
and the clock was ticking for both attackers reconnaissance thrust towars Ranville from
and defenders. Whoever could now act where the 7th Kompanie of 125
decisively and promptly would hold the Panzergrenadier was calling for defensive
initiative for the day. artillery fire around their positions. The rest
of the 1st Battalion is stood to, ready for
At 0025 the 22nd Independent Parachute action, just off the N13 around Regimental
Company acting as Pathfinders dropped in HQ. At 0100, LXXXIV Korps in St Lô were
order to set up their beacons and lights. The alerted to airborne landings, both east of the
drop was badly dispersed and the men Orne and around Ste-Mere-Elgise.
struggled to reach the Drop Zones in time to
guide 6th Airborne’s first lift onto its targets. In Ranville and Le Base de Ranville 12 and 13
The result was chaos, as predicted by Para were engaging the enemy and fighting
Brigadier Hill. their way onto their objectives while at 0120 8
Para, also badly dispersed in their drop, were
Five minutes later, at 0030, the headquarters only just beginning to assemble on DZ K while
of 125 Panzergrenadier Regiment was 9 Para, under Lieutenant Colonel Otway, were
contacted by their 5th Kompanie. They so dispersed that they were unable to even
reported contact with British airborne troops consider attacking their target until more
around Troan. They had withdrawn, unable stragglers had come in to make up the
to resist as they were equipped only with the numbers.
At 0142 the German 711th Infantry Division, reality and, at 0245, placed the battalion of
holding the ground towards Le Havre, 192nd Panzergrenadier Regiment under the
requested that 21 Panzer Division be released command of the 716th Division so that they
fronm the reserve and assigned to their could assist in the counter-attack at
command. Landings of dummy parachutists Benouville.
in their area had served to confuse and worry
the defenders in that sector. Their request At 0230 von Rundstedt entered the fray. To
was refused. the East of the landing zone, 15th Armee
requested that 12 SS Hitlerjugend Division be
At around 0200 Generalleutnant Speidel, placed under their command. The Field
Rommel’s Chief of Operations at Army Group Marshall refused.
B, contacted 21 Panzer to speak to
Feuchtinger. To his horror, he discovered that Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and whilst we
both the General and his Chief of Operations can see that calls from the 15th Armee and 711
were in Paris. He ordered the Division to Division were in danger of dragging much
assume Alert Level II, with troops to be ready needed reserves from the area where they
to move in 90 minutes. However, he failed to were most needed, and that the airborne
order one of the more experienced landings were clearly the precursor to
subordinate commanders, such as Oppeln- landings on the beaches, this was by no
Bronikowski or von Luck, to assume means clear at the time. It was only after
command. At this stage Army Group B were 0400 that German E-Boats were sent out from
still convinced that what was happening in Le Havre to see if any Allied naval forces were
Normandy was a diversion and that Calais off-shore. In truth, what might now appear to
would be the Allies’ objective. be a prescient and well timed reaction could
well have been jumping the gun. To deploy
Contacted by his headquarters, General the limited and valuable assets the Germans
Feuchtinger in Paris telephoned Oberst von possessed against what could be a relatively
Oppeln-Bronikowski, commander of 22 Panzer small but broadly spread deployment of
Regiment to make him aware of the landings, parachutists could have well been playing into
and informed him that both he and von the hands of the Allies who were about to
Berlichingen were returning, a journey of land somewhere else entirely.
three hours at best.
In fact what the German command, both at
While Feuchtinger was still on the phone, Army group B and Oberbefehlshaber West,
elements of 716th Infantry Division began ended up doing was possibly even worse.
counter attacking at Benouville against 7 Para They began to deploy their reserve in penny
which was still desperately short of men. An packets and often with conflicting orders,
hour later, only 40% of the battalion would adding to the confusion which already existed.
have made it to their planned positions. At 0425 von Rundstedt released a
Fortunately the German attacks were weak at kampfgruppe from 12 SS to support 711
this stage and German movement of troops to Infantry Division in its sector to the East of the
Benouville was hampered further when at Invasion zone, towards Le Havre. Forty
0220 the RAF began an air raid on Caen with a minutes later he released the whole of 12 SS
view to disrupting traffic through that key to Army Group B.
nodal point in the road network.
Around 05.20 General Feuchtinger arrived at
Despite all this, Generalleutnant Speidel 21 Division headquarters. He immediately
continued to insist that the Pays du Calais telephoned 7 Armee HQ and received a
would be the main target for the invasion. briefing which served only to tell him what he
But whilst he was not prepared to release any had been told in Paris hours before: Nobody
of his reserve, he did recognise the local knew what was happening. If Feuchtinger had
been lax in allowing both himself and his Chief thereby crushing the Airborne forces. At 0645
of Operations to be absent, he now Army Group B released 21 Panzer and
attempted to right the wrongs and made a assigned it to 7th Armee. Just fifteen minutes
crucial decision. Without authorisation he later 7 Armee informed LXXXIV Armee Korps
ordered 21 Panzer to concentrate at that 21 Panzer Division was to be
Bellengreville and Chicheboville, around von concentrated before making a Divisional
Luck’s Regimental HQ. Once assembled they strength attack to the East of the Orne,
were to launch an attack to the East of the confirming Feuchtinger’s plan.
Orne and crush the British airborne
bridgehead there. Between 0800 and 0830 21 Panzer Division’s
Panzer elements began their march to the
It was a decision which would have severely jump-off points for this planned attack.
troubled Richard Gale at 6th Airborne Division However, many of the Division’s units
HQ who had arrived by glider at 0320 with deployed to the East of the Orne were already
just a dozen 6 pounder anti-tank guns to prop heavily engaged in combat, attempting to
up his whole front, a front which was only stop the breakout from the British and
beginning to form up and could scarcely stand Canadian beaches, and could not be
against a whole Panzer Division. withdrawn. This includes all of
Panzergrenadier Regiment 192, the 1st
By now Ranville and Le Bas de Ranville were in Artillery Abteilung and the Panzerjäger
British hands, the German defenders from 7 Abteilung. What was more, Sturmgeschütz
Kompanie having withdrawn to the South at Abteilung 200 was ordered to move to the
around 0400. 8 Para had now confirmed that West of the Orne to support 192
the bridges at Troarn and Bures had been Panzergrenadier Regiment’s attacks on
destroyed and Varaville had just fallen to the Benouville which, thus far, had failed to make
Canadians. At 0430, Otway’s 9 Para had headway against 7 Para.
stormed the Merville battery and the
Canadian Paras, using whatever explosives It was now clear that the time lost in the
they could find, had weakened the bridge at hours of darkness could not be made up.
Robhomme and were holding that until some With Allied planes controlling the skies and
Sappers could be found to finish the job. banks of RAF Typhoons lining up to attack
ground targets, the armoured elements were
At this point, the men of 7 Para were arriving obliged to advance in tactical bounds, from
in greater numbers and, whilst being pushed cover to cover, rather than using the main
hard by 8 Kompanie of 192nd Panzergrenadier roads freely.
Regiment attacking from Caen, it was holding
firm. It was clear that a viable bridgehead had As 21 Panzer attempted to manoeuvre into a
been established. What was also clear was position to launch its attach, Erich Marcks
that no more support was scheduled to arrive watched the tableau of battle from his
until that evening when the third lift would command post at WN17, what the British
deliver the 6th Airlanding Brigade and more called Position Hillman, overlooking the coast.
support weapons. It was going to be a long It is a position which offers an excellent
day. vantage point and what he could see, backed
up by reports of coastal positions being
Day break, and the reports of the naval overrun or by-passed, told the General that
armada off the coast, changed everything. nothing could stop the British taking Caen
Whilst Feuchtinger and von Berlichingen were other than an armoured counter-attack. At
in contact with Army Group B, arguing the 1035 he issued orders for a change of plan.
case for their planned counter-attack, the
commander of LXXXIV Armee Korps was 21 Panzer Division were now to move to the
pressing 7 Armee to allow the attack to go in, northern suburbs of Caen, from where they
would attack towards Sword and Juno At 1100 the attack on Le Bas de Ranville
beaches. Recognising the importance of the began, with the Germans advancing with
Airborne bridgehead, Marcks ordered the infantry supported by self-propelled guns,
creation of a kampfgruppe under Major von pushing in the British outposts before
Luck, issuing the following orders: engaging in a fierce fight in the village. It was
only at 1300 hours that von Luck called off
“You will attack with your II Battalion, this attack as casualties were mounting
reinforced by Panzer-Aufklarungs- alarmingly.
Abteilung 21 and Sturmgeschütz Abteilung
200 (Major Becker) and a platoon of 8.8cm After an afternoon of minor skirmishing, at
anti-tank guns East of the Orne. Your task 1700 Oberleutnant Hoffmann and 4
is to crush the 6th Airborne bridgehead, Kompanie, Panzerregiment 22 arrived and
recapture the two Orne bridges at immediately formed up in the fields between
Benouville and establish contact with the Demouville and Curvervill before attacking
coastal units. Elements of artillery will towards Escoville. Soon afterwards, Panzer-
support you. Start of attack: as soon as Aufklarungs-Abteilung 21 arrived and were
all elements reach you.” committed to support the same attack,
deploying into action straight off their line of
It was a desperate measure. Marcks knew as march. Together with Hoffmann’s Panzers
well as anybody that traversing Caen, still the attack on Escoville gained ground, but
burning from the bombing raids, constantly eventually was repulsed by naval and air
under naval gun fire and already with traffic bombardment. As night fell, they dug in to
jamming the streets, was going to be a slow the South of Escoville, surrendering the village
business. However, the fall of Caen would to the Paras but intent on stopping any
turn a lodgement into a bridgehead and further advance South. Overnight, the rest of
provide the Allies with a major victory. the kampfgruppe would assemble and plan
for further offensive action.
For von Luck, readying himself for a major
offensive, the news demanded a change of What von Luck could not know was that at
plan. Aware that his kampfgruppe was 2100 the remainder of 6th Airborne Division
currently spread across half of Normandy, and would arrive by glider, reinforcing the
that allowing the British time to consolidate bridgehead with ample anti-tank guns and
would only make them stronger he made his light airborne tanks. The opportunity for a
decision. As he wrote in his memoirs, “So, I swift and aggressive counter-attack to the
had to start without them”. With just the 2nd East of the Orne had passed.
battalion of 125 Panzergrenadier Regiment
assembled, he set about pushing North To the West of the river the story is well
against the Airborne bridgehead. known. At 1620, 21 Panzer Division began
their armoured attack from Hérouville with
His plan was two-fold, with 8 Kompanie, the the Periers ridge as their target but were
2nd battalion's heavy company, forming the rebuffed by British armour concentrations. A
main force for the attack on Le Bas de Ranville second attack was made and this succeeded
and Ranville itself. To the East, Escoville and in reaching the coast between Juno and
Herouvilette, where a platoon of German Sword beaches, but in reality these were
Pioneers was still resisting, were to be mere spoiling attacks, ordered by General
captured. With these villages secured, they Marcks, in order to save Caen. In that respect
could be used as jump-off points, once the they succeeded, with the British and
armoured elements of the kampfgruppe Canadians halting their attack to adopt a
arrived, from which to attack and retake the defensive stance in order to see off the
Orne bridges. armoured attacks.
The failure to take Caen on D-Day was to inexcusable. At Army level and beyond one
prove costly, but ultimately it did not derail can accept that fact that the enemy's true
the overall Allied plan. The failure of the intentions were not instantly discernable. But
Germans to react quickly and decisively in at lower levels, particularly in the case of
response to the landings was to cost them the commanders like von Luck who were within a
war. Whilst Feuchtinger responded with few miles of the enemy and fully aware of
energy once he returned to his headquarters what was happening, no such excuses can be
at just before half past five, one can easily allowed.
compare and contrast the state of 21 Panzer
with 12 SS Hitlerjugend on that same morning. Of course the lesson was not lost on those
At his post, Hubert Meyer, Chief of who were there, nor were the consequences
Operations, spent the early hours of the 6th of of their inaction. Allowing Hans von Luck the
June contacting neighbouring formations in last word, he wrote:
order to form an impression of what was
happening. As early as 0130 12 SS were ready “At the same time it was also clear to the
to move and by 0230 the whole Division had last man that the invasion had succeeded,
been reorganised so that it was ready to that it could now be only a matter of days
deploy immediately into combat. Kurt Meyer, or weeks before the Allies would have
the reknowned “Panzermeyer” commanding landed sufficient forces to be able to
one of the Panzergrenadier Regiments of the mount an attack on Paris, and finally on
Division personally conducted a the German Reich”.
reconnaissance of the roads into Caen to
facilitate a speedy deployment when the
order came.
Ultimaately, succcess or
failuree will be dettermined
by wh hoever conttrols the
final battlefield, in the
grounds of the Chateau, at
the eend of the e eighth
Campaaign Turn.
THE ARMY
R LISTS & BRIEFINGSS
The follo ngs may be handed to the
owing briefin
British and
a German n players, along with the
lists are used for th
he forces in this
t campaiggn.
They arre based on n standard organisationnal
structures for the period, but with suppo ort
options specific to this campaiign and based
on whatt equipmentt was known n to be in the
GERMAAN CAMPAIG
GN BRIEFING
G BRITISH CAM
MPAIGN BRIEEFING
With thee Allies landing by air and
d sea, we have Having landeed during th he night, you have
been ordered to counter-attackk and seize the suuccessfully pushed
p the Germans out of Le
Orne brridges which h fell to thhe enemy ju ust Baas de Ranville and estaablished outtposts as
after midnight. Un nfortunately our promised faar South as the ring co ontour, as per
p your
armour support has yet to arrrive; howeveer, brriefing in En
ngland. Thee Orne Bridgges have
we cannot stand idly by while the enem my beeen successffully captureed, although you can
consolid
date their positions. You Y must take seee fighting across the rivver towards Caen, so
your forrce and seizze the small hamlet of Le thhe enemy are clearly cou unter-attackiing there
Bas de Ranville.
R Whhen the Panzers arrive they already. It suurely cannott be long before you
can thenn use that ass a jump-off point for theeir geet the same treatment!
t
assault on
o the bridgees.
Yoou know thaat the next aair lift will be
e arriving
You com mmand 8 Kompanie,
K the Battalion
n's his evening, with the 6tth Airlandingg Brigade
th
heavy weapons
w commpany, but you have allso sccheduled to reinforce yo our position. Equally
taken chharge of thee remnants of o 7 Kompan nie im
mportantly, the
t bulk of the Divisio on's anti-
w engaged in Ranville during the
which was taank guns will be arriving then, so omething
night and forced to t withdraw w. You have which
w will maake you feel much happier. Until
limited assets
a availaable, just three platoons of th
hen you musst be sure to o maintain your
y hold
infantry and a motley collectiion of form mer onn Le Bas de Ranville
R as itt protects thee landing
French AFVs,
A so takee care of whaat you have. zoones which the gliders will be using.
If this op
ption is seleccted for a second time, roll
r
a D6. On a 1 to 5, co ontact with the
t Royal Naavy
is lost fo
or the remainder of the campaign. On O
a 6, thee bombardm ment breaks up the attacck,
as abovee. This option may never be selected
more than twice in thet campaign n.
DISPERSSED FORCESS
The Brittish position in the earlyy morning was
w
tenuouss due to the dispersal
d of their
t forces on
landing; 12 Para were
w operatting with onnly
60% strength when they occup pied La Bas de
Ranville and some men only rejoined theeir
unit on the following day afteer lengthy and
perilouss hikes. To o reflect this we use the
following system.
Dice Present
1 One Senior Leader,
O L PIAT team
2 O Senior Leader,
One L 2" mortar
3 O Senior Leader,
One L PIAT,, Sniper
4 O Senior Leader
One L , 2" mortar,
m Snipeer
5 O Senior Leader,
One L PIAT,, 2" mortar
6 T Senior Leaders,
Two L Snip
per
SUPPORT OPTIONS
P
Thhe followingg support list is used for this
caampaign, reepresenting the limitedd assets
PANZERRGRENADIERR PLATOON avvailable forr the 125 5th Panzerg grenadier
A hard d-hitting unit
u with breath-taking Reegiment on D-Day.
D
firepoweer, the Pan nzer Grenadier Platoon is
the stan ndard Germaan force for this campaign GERMAN SUPPORT LIST
It is rateed as Regularr.
LIST ON
NE
Command Dice: 5 Medical
M Orderly
Addjutant
PLATOON HEADQUARRTERS Caar
Leutnan
nt, Senior Lea
ader with Maachine Pistol LIST TW
WO
Panzerscchreck Team
m, 2 men Paanzerschreckk Team, 2 meen
Se
enior Leaderr
Unix P107 (f) SPW,
S no crew
w
SQUADS ONE TO THREE
Obergeffreiter, Juniior Leader armed wiith LIST THRREE
machinee pistol. Two
o panzerfaussts Sn
niper Team
LM
MG TEAM LM
MG TEAM LIST FO
OUR
MG42 MG42 Fo
orward Obseerver and 81mmm mortar battery
b
Three crrew Three crew MG42
M on tripo
od mount, 5 crew
Two rifleemen One riflemen Werfer
W Pre-Gaame Barragee
LIST FIVVE
The two o panzerfau usts are useed like han nd- One Panzerggrenadier SSquad with
h Junior
grenadees, requiring a Comman nd initiative to Leeader
fire eacch one. Th hey are nott allocated to Paak 40 auf S30
07 (f)
specific figures, but are considered to be wiith
the squaad until theyy are required
d.
LIST SEVVEN
15
5cm sFH13 auf
a Lorraine SSchlepper
National Characterisstics are the same as tho
ose
listed in
n the main rule book for f a German Th
he support liist options listed are the same as
force: Maschinenge
M ewehr and Ha andgranatenn! hose in the main Chain
th n of Commaand rule
bo
ook, with th
he same speecific rules applying.
a
However, the following options are unique
u to
th
his campaign
n.
Caar
In
n keeping with
w the reest of 21 Panzer's
eq
quipment, the
t car woould be off French
manufacture.
m
Werfer
W Barraage
he 10th Kom
Th mpanie of 12 25th Panzerggrenadier
Reegiment was w equipp ped with Somua
haalftracks withw Reihenwerfer multiple
baarrelled morrtars and cap pable of delivering a
de
evastating preparatory
p bombardme ent. This
will
w operate as a a normal initial bomb bardment
bu
ut only allow w British unitts to be deployed on
a roll of 5 or 6 in the first tturn
Unix P1
107 (f) SPW
W 15
5cm sFH13 auf Lorrain
ne Schleppe
er
A captured French vehicle
v convverted to serrve Six of these are available for the campaign. If
as a infaantry carrierr. This carries one Squad th
hey are used d in a gamee and not de estroyed,
maximum. Three of o these aree available for
f th
hey may be selected in subsequentt games.
mpaign. If theey are used in a game and
the cam If damaged, they mayy be seleccted for
not desstroyed, they may bee selected in ubsequent games but not in the next
su
subsequuent games. If damaged d, they may be caampaign turnn.
selected
d for subsequ uent games but not in the
next cam
mpaign turn.
CAMPAAIGN ARSENAAL
The follo
owing table is used for the campaiggn.
For otheer weapons, consult the main rules.
General Terrain Notes All of the scenarios have been designed with a
We have provided specific terrain notes for minimum of notes. The campaign backdrop
each scenario; however, some general should set the scene for each game. Just one
remarks are worthwhile on the terrain in this sheet is required to be printed for each
area of Normandy. Firstly, this is not bocage scenario, showing the map and the support
country, so hedges are not impenetrable. list options for each player.
However, this is a very rural area and hedges
do block line of sight. Troops within 2" of a On each map, the deployment areas for the
hedge may be seen through it, but further Patrol Markers are indicated. In some cases
away they are invisible and may not be this is a single point, shown by one Patrol
targeted. Moving through such hedges Marker. In such cases all of that nation’s
counts as a Medium Obstacle. Patrol Markers begin at that point. Where a
table edge is shown by an arrow extending
Most of the roads in this campaign are dirt along that edge, or where the arrow or boxed
tracks, these being shown in tan. Cobbled or area indicate a general area, the Patrol
metalled roads are shown in grey. At this Makers show which side begins in which
time of year it makes little practical difference location, not the precise location of the actual
as the ground is hard. Metalled or cobbled Patrol Markers which may be deployed as the
roads can take up to two halftracks abreast player wishes in, or along, the area indicated.
but other AFVs are too wide to pass each
other. The lesser roads, shown in tan, are just We have attempted to use the scenarios here
wide enough for a single AFV or carrier. Two “straight from the box”, so that they match up
cars may pass each other. with the ones in the main rule book. As a
result there are no additional umpire's notes
Wheat is around 3' high at this time. required for this campaign
Stationary troops will count as being in light
cover due to their location being masked. Below are the briefings which may be cut out
Moving troops count as being in the open. and handed to the relevant players.
German Forces
The German player fields one platoon of Panzer Grenadiers with a total of five support points available
for the first time this scenario is played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, increase the amount of
support available by one point each time.
British Forces
The British player has no support points available whenever this scenario is played. The British player
should dice for the strength of his platoon at the start of this game, as noted above.
Scenario Two
PROBE AMONG THE HEDGEROWS
Background
Having cleared the ring contour, the Germans are now pushing against the British forward positions on
the southern outskirts of Le Bas de Ranville. Their attack involves advancing along a sunken lane set
amid orchards in order to get into the village itself.
German Forces
The German player has a total of thirteen support points available each time this scenario is played.
British Forces
The British player has a total of four support points available whenever this scenario is played.
Scenario Three
ATTACKING THE CORRIDOR OF DEATH
Background
Pushing into Le Bas de Ranville the Germans are obliged to fight their way down streets with high walls
and stone houses, each one a potential British strongpoint.
German Forces
The German player has with a total of 19 support points available when this scenario is played.
British Forces
The British player has seven points of support for this scenario.
Scenario Four
THE CHURCH ON THE FLANK
Background
With Le Bas de Ranville largely under German control, the next objective is to attack to the east to seize
the Church at Ranville. This position will serve to block any counter-attack from that direction, allowing
access to the Orne bridges with that flank secure.
German Forces
The Germans attack here with a total of 13 points of support.
British Forces
The British deploy a fresh platoon here, representing elements of 13 Para in Ranville. They may select
three points of support.
Scenario Five
DELAYING ACTION AT THE CHATEAU
Background
The British in Le Bas de Ranville are holding on to their last bastion, the chateau, now being used as a
field hospital. They must hold their ground here in order to stop the Germans from having a clear route
to the Orne bridges.
German Forces
The German player has a total of twenty support points available for this scenario the first time it is
played. On subsequent playing of this scenario, reduce the amount of support available by four points
each time.
British Forces
The British player has a total of 8 support points available the first time it is played. On subsequent
playing of this scenario, increase the amount of support by two points.
TRACKIN
NG YOUR CAMPAIGN If the British stop theem, they win
w the
The fo orces involvved in th his campaign caampaign.
represennt elemen nts of 12 2 Para and
Panzerggrenadier Reegiment 125 5. Track the HISTORICAL NOTE
opinionss of the men and the commander
c as Thhe attack spearheaded by 8 Komp panie of
though it was one platoon in At the Shaarp Paanzergrenad dier Regimen nt 125 resullted in a
End, soo when the British reinforcemen nts violent strugggle in and around Le Bas de
hey will keeep the ratinggs of the first
arrive th Raanville. In thhe end the rresistance byy 12 Para
hat this is one
platoon;; this reflectts the fact th was
w too mu uch and the Germans withdrew
w
unit andd everyone in the batttalion is well w affter fighting in what wouuld be Game Three in
aware of
o how the acction is progrressing. th
his campaign n. The Ornee bridges, secured by
Major
M John Howard
H and his men, was never
The sam me is the case for the Germans,
G wiith th
hreatened and a when 4 Kompaniee of 22
their thrree platoonss. In their case
c the playyer Paanzer Regim ment arrived d it was sent into
will need to track thhe losses for each platooon, acction in Escoville.
at somee point he will
w probably have to make
decisionns about am malgamating platoons and Att 2100 on D-Day
D the 6th Airlandingg Brigade
ormation willl be critical at that poin
this info nt. landed as plaanned, bringging with thhem the
Fortunattely the systtem used in n At the Shaarp annti-tank guns which ensured that the
End is a simple onee and, if thee platoons area brridgehead was secure.
being rootated, the men returniing to the un nit
after a short
s medicaal treatment won't need to
be loggeed as they will
w return to o their platoon
before itt is next com
mmitted to th
he fray.
NG THE CAM
WINNIN MPAIGN
Victory for the Gerrman forces is dependeent
on theirr ability to capture
c the Chateau at Le
Bas de Ranville, Gaame Five, fro om where the
Panzers will have an open road d to the Orne
bridges. However, time is not unlimited. At
the end d of the eiighth campaaign turn the
British gliders
g will arrive
a with a fresh Brigade
and largge numbers of anti-tankk weapons and
even ligght tanks. When this arrives the
bridges will be secured, thee window of
opportu unity firmly shut once and d for all.
If the Germans
G win
n Game Fivee on or befo
ore
campaiggn turn eight they win the
t campaiggn.
LEGAL STUFF
All contents of this book are Copyright 2015
to TooFatLardies and Richard Clarke and may
not be reproduced in any format without
permission.
www.toofatlardies.co.uk