Extracted from U.S. Army FM 3-06.

11 - COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS

IN URBAN TERRAIN - 28 February 2002

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM MODERN URBAN

COMBAT
Although the US Army has a long history of combat operations in urban areas, it is not alone
in conducting UO. Other armies have also conducted extensive urban combat, some very
recently. Just as each war is unique, each nation's army is a unique reflection of its national
strategy, government, economy, demographics, and culture. For that reason, no one lesson
learned can be valid for all cases of urban combat. It is important, however, to study and to
learn from the experiences of others. This appendix presents abstracts from various sources
of information on the lessons learned by non-US armies in recent urban combat. Because of
the subjective nature of such abstracts, no attempt is made to validate these lessons against
US experience.

H-1. RUSSIA AND THE WAR IN CHECHNYA

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the people of Chechnya began to seek full
independence. By 1994, Chechnya had fallen into a civil war between pro-independence and
pro-Russian factions. In December 1994, Russia sent 40,000 troops into Chechnya to restore
Russian primacy over the breakaway republic. An attack was launched by 6,000 mechanized
troops against the Chechen capital of Grozny. Instead of the anticipated light resistance,
Russian forces encountered heavy resistance from the Chechens, armed with "massive
amounts" of antitank weapons. The Russians were repulsed with shockingly high loses. It
took them another two months of heavy fighting, and changing their tactics, before they were
able to capture Grozny. Between January and May 1995, Russian losses in Chechnya were
approximately 2,800 killed, 10,000 wounded, and over 500 missing or captured. Chechen
casualties were also high, especially among noncombatants.

a. General Analysis. A reversal of fortune so astonishing and unprecedented as the

Chechen victory of the Russians should make this war a major and cautionary episode
in military history. The large-scale lessons of Chechnya lie in three areas:

o It showed, again, the limited effectiveness of heavy weaponry in urban terrain

and, by extension, the crucial importance of well-trained, well-led, well-
equipped, and highly motivated infantry.
o It validated, once more, the continued relevance of Clausewitz's dictum to seek
decisive battle.
o It proved again that a society judged "primitive" or "chaotic" by Western
standards can still generate a tremendous fighting spirit and very effective
military discipline. This is not a new lesson. The "primitive" Cheyenne,
Apache, Nez Pierce, Seminole, and Moro tribesmen; the uneducated North
Korean, North Vietnamese and Chinese peasants; and the ragtag Somali
clansmen have all taught it to the Americans they faced, just as the Chechens
streetfighters taught the conscript soldiers of the Russian Army.
The following lessons learned are from The World Turned Upside Down: Military
Lessons of the Chechen War , by Mr. Anatol Lieven.

"It cannot be emphasized too strongly, therefore, that the key to success in urban
warfare is good infantry. And the key to good infantry, rather than good weaponry, is
a traditional mixture of training, leadership qualities in NCOs and junior officers, and
morale - implying a readiness to take casualties."

"The Russians faced an opponent who was singularly determined not to make peace
and retained the means to go on fighting. The lesson to be learned by armies
everywhere is that, especially against such an opponent, there is no valid strategic
alternative to seeking decisive battle..."

"The US will not always have the ability to pick and choose its wars, and the key
lesson Chechnya is that there will always be military actions in which a determined
infantryman will remain the greatest asset."

b. US Marine Corps Analysis.

(1) Strategic Lessons. Military operations alone cannot solve deep-seated

political problems.

(a) Military commanders need clear policy guidance from which they
could work steadily and logically.

(b) Confusion generated by missing or conflicting policy guidance is

made worse by poorly defined lines of command and control.

(c) Russian senior command lacked continuity and was plagued by too
much senior leadership involvement at the lower operational level.

(d) Contrary to initial expectation, operations were neither of short

duration or low cost.

(e) When Russian security operations began achieving results, the

Chechens started attacking targets within Russia.

(f) It was difficult to unite police and military units into a single,
cohesive force.

(g) Distinct tactical advantages accrue to the side with less concern for
the safety of the civilian population.

(h) Concern about civilian casualties and property destruction declined

as casualties among the Russian forces rose.

(i) Chechen forces received extensive outside assistance despite

rigorous attempts to stop it.
(2) Operational Lessons.

(a) Having well-developed military doctrine for urban warfare is not

enough in and of itself.

(b) Situation-oriented training would have improved Russian military

effectiveness.

(c) Inadequate training in the most basic maneuver and combat skills
inhibited Russian operations.

(d) Urban combat is extremely manpower intensive and produces

significant attrition of men and materiel among the attackers.

(e) Overwhelming firepower can make up for organizational and

tactical deficiencies the short-run if one is willing to disregard
collateral damage.

(f) The sudden requirement to deploy to Chechnya, coupled with the

unique supply problems posed by the weather and the urban
environment, overwhelmed the already fragile Russian-military
logistics system.

(g) A lack of high-quality intelligence made operations more difficult

and dangerous the Russian forces.

(h) The geometry and perspectives of urban combat are very different
from combat in the open area. Urban combat is much more vertically
oriented.

(i) Composite units were generally unsatisfactory.

(j) Fratricide was a serious and continuing problem throughout the

campaign in Chechnya because it was difficult to tell friend from foe.

(k) Standard The Russian-military unit configurations were

inappropriate for urban combat.

(l) Foregoing peacetime maintenance is a false economy.

(m) The potential of special forces for urban operations was never
realized in Chechnya.

(n) The nature of cities tends to channel combat operations along

narrow lanes of activity.

(o) Strategic bombing can be used in urban operations to shape the

battlefield, especially during the early phases.
(3) Tactical Lessons.

(a) Rigorous communications security is essential, even against

relatively primitive enemies.

(b) Night fighting was the single most difficult operation in Chechnya
for Infantry forces.

(c) Tanks and APCs cannot operate in cities without extensive

dismounted Infantry support.

(d) Forces, operating in cities, need special equipment not usually

found in Russian TO&Es. Lightweight ladders were invaluable for
assaulting Infantry.

(e) Firing tracer ammunition in cities makes the user a target for
snipers.

(f) Trained snipers were essential, but in short supply.

(g) Obscurants are especially useful when fighting in cities.

(h) Armored combat engineer vehicles can perform important,

specialized urban combat tasks.

(i) Recovering damaged armored vehicles is especially difficult in

cities.

(j) Hit-and-run ambush attacks by small groups were the most favored
and effective of the Chechen tactics.

(k) Direct-fire artillery can be a valuable tool in urban combat,

provided collateral damage is not a major concern.

(l) A failure of small unit leadership, especially at the NCO level, was a
primary cause of Russian tactical failures in Grozny.

(m) Tracked armored vehicles are preferable to wheeled armored

vehicles in urban combat.

(n) When operating in urban areas, armored vehicles require more

protection and that protection needs to be distributed differently than
for combat in the open.

(o) RPGs can be used against helicopters.

(p) Air defense guns are valuable for suppressing ground targets.

(q) Heavy machine guns still offer good defense against close air
attack, especially from helicopters.
 (r) Both sides employed commercial off-the-shelf technologies for
military purposes.

(s) Non-lethal technologies were seldom used.

(t) Tactical communications proved very difficult in Grozny.

(u) Indigenous forces can improvise crude chemical weapons using

hazardous materials from the urban area.

(v) The cabs of supply trucks must be armored.

(w) Bunker busting weapons are invaluable for urban combat.

(x) Some Russian equipment needed to be modified in the field to

counter enemy tactics and equipment.

(y) Helicopters need standoff weapons.

(z) Helicopters are not well suited for urban combat.

(aa) Precision guided weapons were used extensively by the

Russian Air Force.

(bb) Inadequate on-board navigation systems and poor radar

limited the use of helicopters in adverse weather and at night.

(cc) Precision-guided artillery projectiles were considered too

expensive to "waste". Direct fire artillery was often substituted
for precision-guided indirect fire.

(dd) UAVs were used extensively and were very effective.

c. US Army Infantry School Analysis. Russian Army Lessons Learned from the
Battle of Grozny.

(1) You need to culturally orient your forces so you don't end up being your
own worst enemy simply out of cultural ignorance. Many times, Russian
soldiers made serious cultural errors in dealing with the Chechen civilians.
Once insulted or mistreated, the Chechens became active fighters or, at least,
supported the active fighters. Russians admit they underestimated the affect of
religion on the conflict.

(2) You need some way of sorting out combatants from non-combatants. The
Russians were forced to resort to searching the pockets of civilians for military
equipment and to sniffing then for the smell of gunpowder and gun oil. This
was crude, and not very reliable. Trained dogs were used to detect the smell of
gunpowder or explosives, but were not always effective. Nevertheless,
specially trained dogs probably are the best way to determine if a person has
been using explosives or firing a weapon recently.
(3) The psychological impact of high intensity urban combat is so intense units
should maintain a large reserve that will allow them to rotate units in and out
of combat. If a commander does this, he can preserve a unit for a long time. If
he doesn't, once it gets used up, it can't be rebuilt.

(4) Training and discipline are paramount. You can accomplish nothing
without them. You may need to do the training in the combat zone. Discipline
must be demanded. Once it begins to slip, the results are disastrous.

(5) The Russians were surprised and embarrassed at the degree to which the
Chechens exploited the use of cell phones, Motorola® radios, improvised TV
stations, lightweight video cameras and the internet to win the information war.
The Russians admitted that they lost control of the information coming out of
Grozny early in the operation and never regained it.

(6) The proliferation of rocket propelled grenade launchers surprised them, as

well as the diversity of uses to which they were put. RPGs were shot at
everything that moved. They were fired at high angle over low buildings and
from around buildings with little or no attempt made to aim. They were
sometimes fired in very disciplined volleys and were the weapon of choice for
the Chechens, along with the sniper rifle. Not only were the Russians faced
with well-trained, well equipped Chechen military snipers, there were also
large numbers of designated marksmen who were very good shots using
standard military rifles. These were very hard to deal with and usually required
massive firepower to overcome.

(7) As expected, the Russians reiterated the need for large numbers of trained
Infantrymen. They said that some tasks, such as conducting logpac operations,
could only be conducted by infantrymen. The logistical unit soldiers were
hopelessly inept at basic military skills, such as perimeter defense, establishing
security overwatch, and so forth, and thereby fell easy prey to the Chechens.

(8) They found that boundaries between units were still tactical-weak points,
but that it wasn't just horizontal boundaries they had to worry about. In some
cases, the Chechens held the third floor and above, while the Russians held the
first two floors and sometimes the roof. If a unit holding the second floor
evacuated parts of it without telling the unit on the ground floor, the Chechens
would move troops in and attack the ground floor unit through the ceiling.
Often this resulted in fratricide as the ground floor unit responded with
uncontrolled fire through all of the ceilings, including the ones below that
section of the building still occupied by Russians. Entire battles were fought
through floors, ceilings, and walls without visual contact.

(9) Ambushes were common. Sometimes they actually had three tiers.
Chechens would be underground, on the ground floor, and on the roof. Each
group had a different task in the ambush.

(10) The most common response by the Chechens to the increasingly powerful
Russian indirect and aerial firepower was hugging the Russian unit. If the
hugging tactics caused the Russians to cease artillery and air fires, it became a
man-to-man fight and the Chechens were well equipped to win it. If they didn't
cease the supporting fires, the Russian units suffered just as much as the
Chechen fighters did, sometimes even more, and the morale effect was much
worse on the Russians.

(11) Both the physical and mental health of the Russian units began to decline
almost immediately upon initiation of high intensity combat. In less than a
month, almost 20% of the Russian soldiers were suffering from viral hepatitis
(very serious, very debilitating, slow recovery). Most had chronic diarrhea and
upper respiratory infections that turned to pneumonia easily. This was blamed
on the breakdown of logistical support that meant units had to drink
contaminated water. Unit sanitary discipline broke down almost completely.

(12) According to a survey of over 1300 troops made immediately after the
fighting, about 72 percent had some sort of psychological disorder. Almost 75
percent had an exaggerated startle response. About 28 percent had what was
described as neuro-emotional and almost 10 percent had acute emotional
reactions. The Russians recommended two psycho-physiologists, one psycho-
pharmacologist, one psychiatrist, and one medical psychologist at each (US)
Corps-sized unit. Although their experience in Afghanistan prepared them
somewhat for the physical health problems, they were not prepared for this
level of mental health treatment. Many permanent-combat stressed casualties
resulted from the soldiers not being provided proper immediate treatment.

(13) Chechens weren't afraid of tanks or BMPs. They assigned groups of RPG
gunners to fire volleys at the lead and trail vehicles. Once these were
destroyed, the others were picked off, one-by-one. The Russian forces lost 20
of 26 tanks, 102 of 120 BMPs, and 6 of 6 ZSU-23s in the first three days of
fighting. Chechens chose firing positions high enough or low enough to stay
out of the fields of fire of the tank and BMP weapons.

(14) Russian conscript infantry sometimes refused to dismount and often died
in their BMP without ever firing a shot. Russian elite infantry did much better,
but didn't coordinate well with armored vehicles initially.

(15) Chechens were brutish, especially with prisoners. (Some reports say the
Russians were no better, but most say the Chechens were the worse of the two
sides.) Whoever was at fault, the battle degenerated quickly to one of "no
quarter asked, none given." Russian wounded and dead were hung upside
down in windows of defended Chechen positions. Russians had to shoot at the
bodies to engage the Chechens. Russian prisoners were decapitated and at
night their heads were placed on stakes beside roads leading into the city, over
which Russian replacements and reinforcements had to travel. Both Russian
and Chechen dead were routinely booby-trapped.

(16) The Russians were not surprised by the ferocity and brutality of the
Chechens; they expected them to be "criminals and animal brutes". But they
were surprised by the sophistication of the Chechen use of booby-traps and
mines. Chechens mined and booby-trapped everything, showing excellent
 insight into the actions and reactions of the average Russian soldier. Mine and
booby-trap awareness was hard to maintain.

(17) The Russians were satisfied with the combat performance of most of their
infantry weapons. The T-72 tank was unsatisfactory, often called, "dead meat".
It was too vulnerable, too awkward, not agile, had poor visibility, and poor
weapons coverage at close ranges. The Russians removed them from the battle
and replaced them with smaller numbers of older tanks and more self-propelled
artillery, more ADA weapons, and more BMPs.

(18) Precision guided weapons and UAVs were very useful. There was some
need for non-lethal weapons, but mostly riot gas and tranquilizer gas, not stuff
like sticky foam. The Russian equivalent of the M202 Flash flame projector
and the MK 19 grenade launcher were very useful weapons.

(19) Ultimately, a strong combined arms team and flexible command and
control meant more that the individual weapons used by each side.

H-2. BEIRUT (1982), MOGADISHU (1993), AND GROZNY (1995)

This paragraph draws together lessons learned on the organization, equipment, and training of
the forces involved and draws conclusions about what types of military systems, munitions,
and force structure were effective and why.

a. Beirut.

(1) Armor. Tanks were under the command of the Israeli Defense Force (IDF)
Infantry companies. The armor of the Merkava, with an internal troop
compartment, proved excellent protection against RPGs, mines, and small
arms fire. The IDF felt that tanks were the most useful weapon in Beirut, both
in terms of delivering firepower on specific targets and protecting the Infantry.
The IDF concluded that the M113 family of armored vehicles was too
unreliable, unmaneuverable, and vulnerable.

(2) Infantry. Clearing buildings presented a major problem for the IDF. In the
words of one IDF brigade commander, "Every room is a new battle." Once
troops are inside a building, it is impossible for a commander to understand
what his troops are confronting, "The battlefield is invisible." In his judgment,
the dangers of clearing buildings are so great that they should never be entered
unless absolutely necessary: "Avoid cities if you can. If you can't, avoid enemy
areas. If you can't do that, avoid entering buildings."

(3) Artillery. The IDF found the American-made M109 155-mm self-propelled
howitzer extremely effective when using high explosives in a direct-fire role.
Both sides employed Katyusha multiple rocket launchers, which had
tremendous psychological effect on noncombatants. PLO antiaircraft artillery
(mostly heavy automatic weapons) was not effective against the Israeli Air
Force.
 (4) Munitions. Air-delivered cluster bombs, smart 1000 pound bombs, rockets,
missiles and other munitions were precise and effective. Cluster bomb units
(CBUs) were highly effective in destroying antiaircraft artillery. However, the
CBUs' sub-munitions were responsible for many civilian casualties. Large
proportions of the shells used were white phosphorous (WP). The IDF
appeared to use WP primarily for the psychological effect it generated,
including fear.

b. Mogadishu.

(1) Rules of Engagement. Despite strict rules of engagement that severely

limited the use of mortars and artillery, the US forces inflicted significant
collateral damage in Mogadishu. During the 17 June attack, for example,
helicopter gunships pounded an Aideed stronghold with TOW missiles and
aerial rockets, killing at least sixty Somali noncombatants. Although the Cobra
gunships and the AC 130s were removed in August, the lavish use of firepower
during the first few months of UNOSOM II significantly alienated the civilian
population. One analyst described the larger consequences this way:

"By the time the American resorted to the use of anti-tank guided missiles to
root our snipers, it had become apparent that the firepower which had
demolished the Iraqi Republican Guards was ill-suited to the streets of
Mogadishu.....The Gulf War's promise of a style of fighting that minimized
noncombatant casualties was a long way from fulfillment."

(2) Helicopter Close Air Support. Given the constraints on indirect fire, the
only significant fire support element available to the 10th Mountain Division
was an attack helicopter company, equipped with AH-1 Cobras. One
participant noted, "Air strikes are only suppressive fire...and did not
completely destroy enemy positions or buildings. Many building that were
struck were reoccupied by Somali guerrillas within minutes." The Somali
fighters' skill with RPGs made all rotary wing aircraft vulnerable. Regardless
of this, however, the bravery, skill and combat effectiveness of the pilots flying
the AH-6 helicopters were a major factor in the successful defense of several
buildings by elements of Task Force Ranger during the intense battles of 3-4
October 1993.

c. Grozny.

(1) Russian Readiness and Training. Russian performance was severely

hampered by the fact that its poorly trained troops were forced to serve
together in hastily assembled units. One observer described them as,
"Untrained kids" and a "shapeless and disorganized groups of men which does
not know itself where it is going." Additionally, troops received little or no
specialized urban warfare training. Both sides employed snipers effectively,
but both sides also experienced shortages of these trained personnel.

(2) Munitions. The RPG, brilliantly employed by the Chechens, was perhaps
the single most useful weapon in the conflict. Smoke, white phosphorus rounds
and tear gas were used extensively by the Russians, and they proved useful.
 According to one analyst, every fourth or fifth artillery round was white
phosphorus, which burns upon explosion. The resulting smoke provided cover
for the movement of Russian forces. However, these munitions, like much else,
were in short supply due to logistical breakdowns.

(3) Aircraft. The Russians had large numbers of fixed-wing aircraft, but they
proved of limited tactical value. For most of the conflict, poor weather kept
Russian fixed-wing aircraft grounded. Helicopter gunships proved more useful,
particularly against snipers on the upper floors of buildings.

(4) Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Disinformation, deception, and other

forms of information warfare were used extensively by both sides during the
battle for Grozny. PSYOP ranged from the tactical; for example, the Russian
use of loudspeakers and leaflets to encourage the Chechens to lay down their
weapons, to the strategic; for example, Russians claim to the world press that
its military activities in Chechnya were peacekeeping operations. The Chechen
commanders organized civil disobedience actions; claimed falsely that the
Russians were employing chemical weapons; and claimed, apparently falsely,
that Chechnya possessed nuclear weapons. The utility of all this information
warfare techniques is difficult to assess. It is clear however, that both the
Russians and the Chechens believed that they are important military
instruments.

H-3. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ON URBAN WARFARE.

This paragraph is extracted from an article in which the author draws together lessons learned
from urban combat around the world and generates a set of conclusions about the nature of
the urban battlefield. The conclusions are solely the author's but they provide interesting
professional reading.

a. Urban Warfare - Different and Demanding.

(1) Conventional warfare on open terrain—the preferred form of combat for all
modern military forces, is a complex and challenging undertaking, requiring
vast resources, training, and excellent organization to perform well. Whatever
challenges are inherent in this mode of warfare are magnified significantly in
the city environment. From Stalingrad to Inchon to Panama to Grozny, urban
combat has been characterized by:

ƒ Poor communications
ƒ Difficult command and control
ƒ Difficult target acquisition
ƒ Short engagement ranges
ƒ Reduced effectiveness for transportation and fire support assets
ƒ Difficulties in providing logistical support to the front line.

(2) Tall buildings, sewers, and tunnels give the battlefield dimensions of height
and depth that are absent on open terrain. In essence, city fighting is primordial
combat. It is clearly distinct from the elegant maneuver warfare that
characterized the US conduct of the Gulf War.
 ƒ The enemy is at close range.
ƒ Snipers are almost always present.
ƒ Stress is extremely high.
ƒ The opposing force is frequently indistinguishable from the civilian
population.

(3) Demographic and urbanization trends in the developing world are likely to
lead to city environments that are even more stressful and more difficult to
operate in.

b. No US Comparative Advantage.

(1) The historical data suggest that it is extremely difficult for modern forces to
leverage their technological advantages against a determined adversary in an
urban environment. To be sure, the US military is highly motivated, well
trained and well equipped, but not for urban warfare per se.

(2) The city environment, with its high population density and multistory
buildings, tends to negate the technological advantages, for example, close air
support, mobility, communications, enjoyed by modern military forces. Some
US military technology, designed for large scale war in the open areas of
central Europe or the desert, is not well suited for urban combat. The US
technological advantage, typically associated with long range, high-technology
weapons platforms that use mass and mobility, is significantly reduced in
urban environments.

(3) It is precisely for this reason that less sophisticated forces are drawn to
cities. Urban battles in the recent past, such as Grozny and Mogadishu, have
been characterized by conflict between modern combined arms forces and
informally organized irregulars. The battle of Inchon was the last significant
urban engagement in which US forces fought a remotely comparable force in
an urban environment. Aware of our increasing unwillingness to take
casualties or cause major collateral damage, and understanding our lack of
comparative advantage in the urban environment, US adversaries are
increasingly likely to engage our forces in cities.

c. Small-Unit Operations.

(1) The degeneration of urban warfare into a series of small-group—or even of

individual-battles was evident in operations as different as Stalingrad, Hue and
Beirut. The nature of cities themselves is responsible for this fragmentation
process. As battles wear on, the streets and building blocks of the urban
physical morphology fragment urban warfare into conflict between units
usually of squad or platoon size, with generally insufficient space for the
deployment and maneuvering of larger units. The battle rapidly disintegrates
into a series of more or less separate and isolated conflicts around such
"fortresses".

(2) Given that much of an urban battle is likely to take place inside buildings or
underground, it is likely to be invisible to all except the men actually fighting it
 on the ground. As a result, it is difficult for higher-level commanders to
maintain an accurate picture of the battlefield at any given time.

(3) Given this inevitable fragmentation, operational effectiveness will depend

greatly on the quality of leadership at lower echelons, for example, at battalion
and below. Leadership shortfalls were apparent among US Marines in Hue and
among the Russian army in Grozny. In both cases, the generous use of
firepower served as a substitute. The relatively successful Israeli operation in
Beirut can be attributed in part to the attention the IDF high command paid to
developing small-unit leadership, which long stressed the importance of
initiative and independence among junior commanders.

d. Importance of Armor.

(1) Tanks, as one Operation Just Cause participant has written, "are an
infantryman's friend in city fighting." They can go anywhere. They can deliver
steel on target and they scare the enemy. Their firepower can be used precisely,
thus minimizing collateral damage; they can serve as troop carriers, as the IDF
discovered in Beirut; and they can be useful for shocking opposition forces and
less-than-friendly noncombatants.

(2) To be effective, however, they must be supported by dismounted infantry.

In the absence of such support, tanks are vulnerable to rocket-propelled
grenades, Molotov cocktails, and other systems and munitions. Once a tank is
destroyed, it loses its psychological shock value among combatants and
noncombatants alike.

(3) As mentioned above, small units are the norm in urban warfare. Given this
reality, it may make sense to assign tanks to smaller units than is the norm:

(4) Tanks habitually operate in section or platoon formations. Tank

communications procedures are designed for this. Support of a dismounted unit
in a city, however, often involves only single or paired armored vehicles.
Tanks might be assigned to units as small as a squad.

e. The Primacy of Infantry.

(1) The historical record suggests that urban warfare is manpower intensive.
Large numbers of ground troops are needed to attack, clear, and hold cities. No
attacking force has ever succeeded in the city environment without using large
amounts of infantry.

(2) No firm rule of thumb exists, but according to one source, "a commander is
left with the prospect of needing between 9 and 27 attackers per defender in an
urban environment-Significantly more than is required for open terrain."

(3) Placing significant numbers of men on the around is equally important in

stability or support operations. In such situations, human intelligence is a
critical capability, requiring large numbers of collectors and analysts. As Army
planners begin to create a task force for involvement, they will need to increase
 the intelligence assets for that task force. Infantrymen, provided they avoid a
garrison mentality and patrol often, could be an essential component of this
intelligence collection process.

f. Aircraft - A Mixed Blessing.

(1) Since the battle of Stalingrad, aircraft have been employed in city battles.
Their use has been completely lopsided. Defenders have never been able to
employ either fixed-wing or rotary-wing aircraft. During high intensity urban
combat, with liberal rules of engagement, for example, Stalingrad, aerial
bombardment has been very useful.

(2) In all other cases, however, airpower has not been terribly effective. The
need to limit collateral damage has been the most significant factor in this
regard. To date, air-delivered munitions, rockets, and other systems and
munitions have lacked the low circular error probable (CEP) that is needed to
minimize such damage.

(3) Even in the case of Beirut, where the Israeli Air Force reportedly employed
smart munitions, collateral damage, while relatively low, was still significant.
Similarly, fixed-wing aircraft, such as the AC-130 gunship, caused significant
collateral damage in Panama City, Panama. In the case of Mogadishu, rotary-
wing aircraft were vulnerable to RPG rounds, which reduced their utility.

(4) Finally, it should be mentioned that poor weather kept aircraft on the
ground at least part of the time during the battles of both Hue and Grozny. As
all-weather capability becomes a reality, this should be less of a concern.
Similarly, new generations of precision-guided munitions could conceivably
turn helicopters into "flying artillery" capable of great precision.

(5) Such munitions are likely to be very expensive, however, and this may
limit their utility. During the battle of Grozny, for example, Russian
commanders reportedly were unwilling to "waste" precious PGMs on the
Chechen rebel forces.

g. Population Control Is Critical.

(1) In every major urban battle in modern times, the presence of

noncombatants has affected the course of the operation. At Stalingrad, they
served as a force multiplier for the Red Army. In Seoul, friendly
noncombatants, exultant at the arrival of their US liberators, slowed the course
of the American advance. In Hue, the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
forced civilians to construct defensive positions. In Mogadishu, Aideed
employed "rent-a-mobs" to hold anti-UN demonstrations and to serve as
human shields.

(2) Civil affairs (CA) as we know it today is a relatively recent concept—there

is no evidence, for example, that civil affairs units were used widely in urban
battles during World War II or the Korean War. The evidence suggests that a
 robust CA (and with it, PSYOPS) capability will be necessary during future
urban conflicts.

(4) Cities are unlikely to be empty. In recent conflicts, such as the battle of
Mogadishu, and in Gorazde, Bosnia, in 1994, urban populations have
sometimes even increased as the battle has progressed. What is more, Western
morality (if not the Law of Land Warfare) will require Western military forces
to ensure that noncombatants are protected and properly cared for.

(4) During the battle of Manila, for example, US forces spent two days battling
fires set by fleeing Japanese forces. More recently, in the aftermath of the
battle of Panama, a breakdown in public order forced US troops to conduct
emergency law enforcement operations.

(5) Ensuring public safety, although an unpalatable task for US armed forces is
inevitable, given the fact that it is unlikely that civilians will be able to provide
these services during and immediately after an urban battle. Inevitably,
military resources will have to be diverted to perform these public-safety tasks.

h. Key Munitions and Systems.

(1) As suggested earlier, urban warfare has been primordial, characterized by

the use of such relatively simple systems as tanks, artillery, rockets, heavy
machine guns, rocket-propelled grenades and mortars. However, in terms of
utility these have above all been small arms. It is not surprising that in a
manpower-intensive environment, the soldier's most basic weapon should
prove to have been of such importance.

(2) When used in a direct-fire mode, artillery has proved useful in destroying
fortified targets, although their relative lack of accuracy has limited their use in
recent battles, at least among Western forces. Mortars, with their high
trajectory, have also proved useful in the urban environment, but as with
artillery, concerns about collateral damage have often limited their use.

(3) Flame, napalm, shotguns, recoilless rifles, and other low-technology

systems and munitions that have proven highly effective in the urban
environment are no longer readily available in the US military inventory. If the
United States and other nations decide to become serious about improving their
ability to fight on urban terrain, they have to look closely at their existing
inventories and explore the possibility of reinstating such "quaint" systems as
flame-throwers.

(4) The US may also need to examine the size of the explosives it uses in its
artillery rounds, rockets, and other munitions. HEAT (high-explosive antitank)
rounds used in M-1 tanks, for example, were designed to defeat enemy
armored vehicles. As such, their lethal energy is directed forward, and the
resultant projectile penetration power is such that they may go through several
rooms or buildings before stopping.
 (5) Similarly, Hellfire and missiles, launched from attack helicopters are
antiarmor systems whose utility is limited in an environment where collateral
damage needs to be minimized.

(6) Defeating the enemy while reducing collateral damage and friendly
casualties requires a new set of munitions. This technique includes highly
accurate mortars, lightweight charges for creating breach holes, and low yield,
low-collateral damage munitions. These perhaps may be delivered by a system
such as the Fiber-Optic Guided Missile (FOG-M) that would give US forces
the ability to target much more precisely.

i. Rules of Engagement.

(1) In almost every modern urban battle, the attacking force-which is always
the more modern force-has entered the battle with a set of strict rules of
engagement designed to minimize collateral damage. Even in the case of total
war, for example, the United States in Manila, rules of engagement, at least
initially, have prohibited unobserved artillery fire, wholesale aerial
bombardment, and other techniques of modern war.

(2) However, in each case, these rules of engagement have eased as the battle
wore on. The explanation is straightforward: strong resistance and mounting
friendly casualties lead inexorably to a relaxation of the earlier prohibitions.

(3) This suggests a tension between the desire to reduce civilian deaths and the
destruction of infrastructure and the requirement to reduce friendly casualties.
The days of using troops as cannon fodder (as at the Somme, for example)
have long passed. In Western democracies, relatively low birth rates have
made large numbers of casualties among one's own forces completely
unacceptable politically.

(4) Massive destruction of civilian populations and the vast destruction of city
infrastructure are equally unacceptable. If the recent past is any guide, it seems
fair to assume that the urban battlespace of the future will be characterized by
even greater media transparency. Given that cities are increasingly the world's
centers of commerce, politics, and media, it is likely that warfare will be
conducted there under even greater international scrutiny.

(5) In short, the battlefield will no longer be invisible to outside observers.

Limiting the use of violence will be even more important in stability and
support operations, where the goal of developing and maintaining political
legitimacy could be undermined by the excessive use of force.

(6) The challenge, then, for military commanders will be to square the circle.
Minimizing friendly casualties and reducing collateral damage have been
mutually exclusive in. the past. Commanders have resolved this tension in
favor of the former.

(7) In the future, however, such a resolution is unlikely to be acceptable. Two

possible answers suggest themselves. The first is technological. Advances in
 nonlethal technology, or in the ability to scan an urban structure's interior may
make it possible to keep one's own casualties down while reducing collateral
damage.

(8) The second possibility is operational. The ancient technique of laying siege
to a city, although by definition time-consuming and thus difficult to sell
politically, should be reexamined. A humane siege, bolstered by a robust
strategic PSYOPs campaign designed to de-legitimize the defending force
could minimize both friendly casualties and collateral damage.

j. Difficult for Attackers to Prevail but They Almost Always Do.

(1) As in any mode of warfare, defenders in urban battles enjoy distinct

advantages. Intimate knowledge of the buildings, alleyways, tunnels, and
rooftops that are a feature of most cities-perhaps gained over the course of a
lifetime is one obvious advantage. In many cases, such as the shantytowns
surrounding cities in the developing world, maps are likely to be outdated or
even nonexistent.

(2) During Operation Urgent Fury, for example, the lack of official maps of
Grenada forced troops to rely on tourist maps. Similar shortages reportedly
plagued US forces in Somalia and Russian troops in Chechnya.

(3) Cities, particularly capital cities, are the locus of economic, political, and
social power, and are becoming more so. It is not surprising that cities serve as
critical arenas for those fighting to preserve national, ethnic, or religious
identity. Put another way, urban areas are the key battlegrounds in any
significant defense of the homeland. Forces claiming to defend that homeland
from invasion, as in the cases of Stalingrad, Mogadishu, and Grozny, enjoy a
tremendous advantage over attacking forces.

(4) All other things being equal, defending forces are much more likely to be
able to gain the allegiance of the local population and use it as a source of
food, munitions, shelter, and information.

(5) These observations lead to several conclusions. The first is that it is very
difficult for attacking forces in an urban environment to prevail. However, if
they are willing to accept high casualties, and can either focus their firepower
or simply mass it regardless of collateral damage, they will normally prevail
eventually. The second is that in the future, attackers will have to employ
effective strategic-level PSYOPS and other techniques of political warfare if
they hope to win in cities.

(6) As the Israelis discovered in Beirut, simply crushing an adversary no longer

guarantees victory—the attacker must also win the international propaganda
battle. A well crafted, effective political warfare campaign, being essentially
nonviolent in nature, could also contribute to resolving the friendly
casualties—collateral damage tension described above.