45

IRAN’S AERIAL STRIKES: MOTIVATIONS AND

PAKISTAN’S MEASURED RESPONSE

Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz*

Abstract
The January 16, 2024, missile and drone strike by Iran against alleged sanctuaries of Jaish
al-Adl inside Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan provoked a short crisis between
Islamabad and Tehran, culminating in retaliation by Pakistan on January 18, 2024. The
lack of close coordination on their shared frontier, amidst severe issues of drug trafficking
from Afghanistan, terrorism in Baluchistan, and Iranian concerns about infiltration,
undermined a mutual understanding between these two countries. Pakistan was entirely
surprised, never having been attacked by Iran before. Despite the strike during the
election campaign to determine Pakistan’s next governing party and executive, Islamabad
resisted retaliation until it failed to elicit a conciliatory explanation from Tehran. Iran’s
attack was most likely the result of a hardline foreign policy initiative decided and
implemented by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as part of its escalating
conflict with Israel and the defence of the Houthis in Yemen. Following Pakistan’s
measured and proportionate response, Tehran and Islamabad, encouraged by China, the
US, Russia, and Türkiye, diplomatically defused the tension, and bilateral relations
normalised.

Keywords: Pakistan, Iran, Aerial Strikes, Geopolitics, Transnational Militancy.

Introduction

W hile international community was focused and concerned with the Israel war on
Gaza, Iran and Pakistan engaged in missile and drone strikes in their less-
known remote border regions during the second half of January 2024. The initial
strike, on January 16, 2024, was launched by Iran. Pakistan, compelled to demonstrate
its commitment to defending its territorial integrity and political sovereignty, made a
proportionate retaliation. Iran allegedly targeted two suspected bases of the Iranian-
origin Sunni terrorist group Jaish al-Adl (Army of Justice). At the same time, Pakistan
carried out aerial operations against several Pakistani-origin terrorist hideouts in Iran.
Owing to their proactive bilateral diplomacy, supported by key regional and
international actors, the two sides were able to defuse the tensions and promptly
restore normalcy in their political relations within a few days.1

*Julian Schofield is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Concordia University, Canada. Nasir Mehmood is a
Visiting Research Associate at the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, United States of
America. Behrouz Ayaz is a Political Analyst who collaborates with Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations. The
author(s) can be reached at julian.spencer-churchill@concordia.ca, nmehmoo1@umd.edu, and
beh70.ayaz@gmail.com.

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

46 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

Both Iran and Pakistan have typically pursued dialogue and sought
collaboration in tackling complicated bilateral issues, including transborder terrorism.
This raises the question of why Tehran felt the compulsion to launch a missile strike in
the first place and why Pakistan’s diplomacy failed to anticipate Iran’s sensitivity to
cross-border issues. An important conditioning factor was that these aerial strikes
marked the culmination of years-long simmering tension between two neighbouring
friendly countries over the problems of transnational terrorism and regional
geopolitics, which were exacerbated by the Global War on Terrorism, the Arab Spring,
and domestic developments facing both Tehran and Islamabad. Iran may have been
influenced by the emerging practice of intermediate-range missile and drone strikes
conducted by their Houthi allies in Yemen and its experience with its support to
frontline states in Lebanon and Gaza. Pakistan, in contrast, has a long history of
practising restraint and diplomacy in its relations with India, with exchanges restricted
to occasional local artillery exchanges along the Line of Control in Indian Illegally
Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ&K). Armed autonomist tendencies in both Iran’s
and Pakistan’s Baloch provinces and issues of governance and underdevelopment are
further aggravating factors that fuel the insecurity of both states. The sudden
escalatory missile exchange underlined the lingering divergent perceptions about the
opaque nature and approach of addressing the complicated issues of transnational
terrorism and regional geopolitics between the two important countries of the Muslim
world.

Pakistan and Iran have decades-long diplomatic, security, economic, religious

and cultural relations. The two countries share a long, porous border of 909 km
without any significant territorial dispute. They had no substantial political,
ideological, or economic conflicts, and both countries cooperated in coordinating their
assistance to Oman during the 1973-1976 Dhofar War. Iran was the first to recognise
Pakistan as an independent state in 1947.2 The Iranian leadership provided crucial
military and diplomatic support to Pakistan during the latter’s wars with India in 1965
and 1971. Similarly, Pakistan was the first country to recognise the Islamic regime
following the Iranian revolution 1979. Not to mention, Islamabad played a constructive
role during and in ending the decade-long Iran-Iraq war.

Nevertheless, relations between Iran and Pakistan have been ambivalent since
the 1980s. The bilateral ties have demonstrated elements of both cooperation and
competition. The two sides have developed greater understanding and respect for each
other’s regional power position and legitimate geopolitical interests. Pakistan views
Iran as a good neighbour and an influential actor in the Middle East with the potential
to support it in navigating the complicated power politics of South Asia and the
Persian Gulf region. Similarly, Iran reckons Pakistan is an important neighbour, which
separates its borders from South Asian giant India and shortens its border with
unstable Afghanistan. Iran also recognises that Pakistan respects its legitimate security
interests in the Middle East.

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 47

Similarly, they have forged closer security cooperation to address the issue of
transnational militancy. To this end, the two sides signed a comprehensive security
agreement to combat transnational organised crimes, especially terrorism, in 2013.3
They have also forged closer economic ties. Despite international financial sanctions
on Iran, bilateral trade volume is over US$ 2 billion. The two sides have recently re-
engaged in the gigantic Iran-Pakistan pipeline project. Notably, the border regions of
both sides are economically integrated, especially in electricity, agricultural products,
and petrochemicals. In many ways, Pakistan and Iran reckon each other’s value and
position for national/regional peace, stability, and security.

On the other hand, there are irritants in their bilateral relations. To illustrate,
Pakistan is uneasy about Iran’s efforts to become the centre of gravity for the Pakistani
Shia population, which constitutes 10 to 15 per cent of the total population.4 Islamabad
also carefully observes Tehran’s pragmatic policies towards India and Afghanistan,
which share long borders and have a troubled history of political relations with
Pakistan. Pakistan is sensitive to striking a balance in its relations with Iran and the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Iran also keenly monitors Pakistan’s friendly relations with
the Arab states, especially Saudi Arabia. The Iranian leadership also scrutinises
Pakistan’s relations with the US. Finally, Iran will closely assess the dynamics of
Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.

However, Iran and Pakistan face challenges in effectively policing their long
and porous shared frontier. Consequently, neither is satisfied with the other’s efforts
to curb cross-border militancy. They fundamentally expect more effort from each
other in this domain. Not surprisingly, these underlying tensions have, at times,
yielded hostility. For instance, there have been incidents of mortar firings between the
two countries, and Pakistan has previously shot down an Iranian surveillance drone
inside its territory. 5 This highlights that the two neighbouring countries have
occasionally failed to anticipate the other’s interests effectively.

The exchange of missile and drone strikes represents an unprecedented

sudden escalation of hostility in bilateral relations, with the potential to undermine
national/regional peace and stability. To unpack the dynamics of the crisis, the article
is organised into four main sections addressing the following questions:

 What were Iran’s motivations for launching missile and drone strikes
inside Pakistan?
 How did Pakistan view the Iran attack?
 What was the salience of Pakistan’s response strategy?
 What role did bilateral and multilateral diplomacy play in
de-escalating the crisis?

Decoding Iran’s Motivations

On the evening of January 16, the Islamic Republic of Iran targeted the “Green
Mountains” area of Pakistan with missile and drone strikes. This attack, having been

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

48 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

carried out one day after Iran attacked Erbil in Iraq and Idlib in Syria, may have
occurred under the pretext of destroying two suspected Jaish al-Adl bases in Pakistan.6
Iran's attack on Pakistan was an unprecedented aggressive act in the 77 years of Iran-
Pakistan diplomatic relations and provoked a profound and reciprocal response from
Islamabad. Iran considered the measure as a practical and deterrent response to
terrorism7, to which Pakistan retaliated with an attack on the Baloch Liberation
Front/Army. In either case, there is no evidence of either official or popular support
for Jaish al-Adl in Pakistan or of the Baloch militants in Iran. The closure of insurgent
sanctuaries serves the interests of both countries. However, the question arises: what
possibly the real motive of the Islamic Republic of Iran would be to fire missiles at
Pakistan, its friendly neighbour and Islamic country?

Pak-Iran relations were at their peak during the time of Mohammad Reza
Shah Pahlavi before the 1979 revolution. Iran was the first to recognise the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947. The Lahore Islamic Conference
in 1959 and the presence of Iranian intellectuals in this meeting was another
manifestation of the excellent relations between the two countries, especially at the
cultural level. More precisely, Pakistan had a special place for Iranian intellectuals in
the “turn to the east” policy, which they always promoted. During that time, the Shah
of Iran also provided military aid to Pakistan in the form of aircraft basing and staging
and spare parts. General Hasan Toufanian, who oversaw Iran's military purchases
during the era of the Shah, said in his political diaries that the Shah of Iran had
donated 99 fighter aircraft to Pakistan.8

In addition to supporting Pakistan in the wars with India, the Shah of Iran
asserted diplomatic influence on India to desist from supporting militants within
Pakistan, as both were united against providing aid to any militant group intent on
spreading communist agitation or violence. During the rise of discontent in East
Pakistan, the Shah of Iran consistently recommended compromise political solutions. 9
After the 1979 revolution, the two countries called themselves friends and brothers,
and Pakistan was the first country to recognise the regime of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Despite challenges in their relationship driven by the rise of Shia political
consciousness, the Iranian revolution, and disagreements over resisting Soviet regional
encroachments, their stable relations diffused any confrontation.

Occasional incidents between Iran and Pakistan have occurred since the Iran
Revolution. Most recently, there was an attack by the Jaish al-Adl group on Rask and
Chah Bahar police stations on the night of April 3, 2024. 10 Iranian military forces
personnel were killed, and another 12 were injured while fighting continued until the
evening of April 4.10 Based on public statements from the Islamic Regime of Iran,
Tehran conducted a retaliatory attack on the border area of Pakistan on December 15,
2023.11 Pakistan has also been the victim of terrorism, primarily by Baloch militants
supported by India, and often infiltrating from Afghanistan through Iran.

While the two countries have consistently been eager to solve the security
issues along their shared border, its remoteness and most of the militancy on the

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 49

Iranian side are associated with the endemic drug trafficking emerging from Helmand
province in Afghanistan, leaving Tehran prone to unilateral solutions. Iran may not
have struck Afghanistan because of the state of infrastructure on their shared border.
Striking Israel, given the extent of Israel’s US-funded and Western-backed air defence
systems, may be prohibitively expensive, as compared with Iran’s practice of striking
targets that are believed to support Israel.

Iran’s missile attack on Pakistan may be the consequence of habit, in which

Tehran’s foreign policy decision-makers prefer bombardment, as they have historically
done in other crises, such as against Iraq. This policy-decision-making group has not
prioritised the relatively less volatile relations with Pakistan, given its priority focus on
Israel, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Syria, the US, and Turkey. It might have viewed Islamabad’s
alleged disinterest in addressing the issue of drug trafficking as an invitation for
independent action. Iran relies on sympathetic non-state actors to assert its influence
in the Middle East region (the four Hs: Hezbollah, Hashd al-Shaabi, the Houthis and
Hamas) and aggressively defends its territorial waters. Tehran is unlikely to change the
delineation of its long-standing sphere of influence with Pakistan. Iran’s assertiveness
in the Caucasus relates to the loss of those territories to Russia in the early nineteenth
century, and its defensiveness in the Persian Gulf has to do with five centuries of
European maritime encroachment. Tehran’s interest in the Mediterranean, the Red
Sea to Bab al-Mandeb, and from the Gulf of Aden to the Sea of Oman is primarily
influenced by Iran’s determination to secure its trade routes, occasionally denied and
not exclusively related to the security of its oil exports.

However, the timing of Iran’s missile and drone attack on Pakistan might
have also been influenced by the political importance to the Tehran government of the
fourth anniversary of the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani, which has led to
a renewed emphasis on counterterrorism in Iran. In that terrorist attack, 103 people
were killed, and 211 people were injured.12 While the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and
Al-Shaam (ISIS) claimed responsibility for this attack,13 Tehran attributed this attack to
Israel. Tehran may be signalling more assertiveness against all threats of terror and
militancy. The IRGC attacks on the evening of January 16 were to counter the believed
presence of Israeli-backed groups in Iraq and Takfiri terrorists in Idlib, Syria, which
itself took place a few days after the US and UK attacked Yemen's Houthis.14 Therefore,
it is probable that Tehran’s foreign policy authorities, in their desire to demonstrate
and signal resolve against US and Western attacks on Yemen, struck at Jaish al-Adl in
Pakistan with the erroneous calculus that these were not of critical Pakistani interest.

The IRGC intends to show itself as an uncompromising force, sidelining

moderates within Iran in the process and willing to leverage the “mad man theory”.
After the IRGC attack on Pakistan, a member of the National Security Commission of
the Iranian Parliament said: “This action shows that we are serious and there is no
complacency with any group or country regarding the security and interests of our
country, not even the Europeans”.15 Although Pakistan possesses nuclear arsenals and
a better-equipped army and air force, Tehran’s attack was facilitated by the belief that

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

50 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

they share a common dilemma in governing the two halves of the unstable province of
Baluchistan and therefore, no immediate Pakistani interest would be compromised by
this isolated and remote attack.

However, Tehran did not appreciate the severe security challenges posed by
India's substantial existential threat to Pakistan and the imperative that Islamabad
would retaliate against even minor incursions and attacks because of its multilingual
and multiethnic population. It is also likely that the US and the UK do not see the
Iranian attack on Pakistan as asserting a principle of inevitable retaliation as much as
symptomatic of an insensitive foreign policy formulation process in Tehran.

However, as far as Pak-Iran relations are concerned, the two have many areas
of cooperation in cultural, political and economic domains; the most important of all
these is the fight against social movements that use terrorism.Their disagreements over
policy towards terrorism are a common enemy and a severe threat to the political and
economic development of the two countries, which is also rooted in ethnicism and
religious extremism.16 Since Pakistan has always been a victim of terrorism on its
western and northern borders, Islamabad would be easily approached to coordinate a
solution to border issues along its Western frontier.

Afghanistan could intensify the perceived rivalry between Tehran and

Islamabad, although this most often affects sub-nationalist groups interested in
Afghanistan, specifically the Persians of Herat and the Pakistani Pashtun. Mutual
historical suspicion, which does not affect Iran’s central Persian-speaking or Pakistan’s
primarily Punjabi and Sindhi, often drives uncooperative foreign policy over
Afghanistan. While both Iran and Pakistan are fundamentally hostile to separatist
Baloch groups (Islamist within Iran but secular within Pakistan), their lack of fine-
grained mutual understanding has interfered with what would be an easy coordination
effort at border policing and coordinated exchange of intelligence against sanctuaries
and drug smuggling routes. The Pakistani concern that Iran could be incentivised to
harbour Indian-funded Baloch separatist base camps is not supported by the
prevailing evidence. The Iranian belief that Israel would find little difficulty
establishing covert supply bases in Pakistan is equally without any precedence. While
Pakistan has legitimate concerns about Indian use of Iran’s harbour at Chahbahar, it is
outside of Pakistan’s power to insist that Iran finds a new oil export customer, given
the international pressure against Tehran.

The value of economic cooperation between Iran and Pakistan far outweighs
the inflicted cost of fighting along their Baloch frontier. Although Iran's gas pipeline to
Pakistan is facing the challenge of US sanctions, it is one of the most critical issues
worth cooperation and anticipated benefits to both countries. This project, when
completed, could increase trade between the two countries, which is currently about
US$2.3 bn to as high as US$5 bn. This was the principal issue of discussion during the
September 2023 visit by the Iranian Foreign Ministers to Pakistan.17 There are more
fundamental issues of underdevelopment in Baluchistan, the coordinated solution of
which would dramatically reduce separatist violence and drug transshipments.

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 51

Pakistan’s Assessment and Incremental Response Strategy

The general reaction of the Pakistani government and society to the highly
provocative Iranian missile and drone strike on its soil was one of general shock and
surprise, a breach of trust, and a violation of the country’s sovereignty. The Pakistani
leadership assessed that Iran’s public justification for the attack neglected Pakistani
interests and jeopardised the credibility and responsiveness of Pakistan’s policy of
local deterrence to safeguard its territorial integrity and reputation. Islamabad also
saw Tehran’s unilateral action as dismissive of the interest of friendly neighbouring
states and, more broadly, of undermining regional peace and stability. Pakistan’s
foreign policy interest in Southwest Asia is to secure strategic depth to manage India's
threat. It seeks to normalise relations with neighbouring Iran and Afghanistan.

Iran’s aerial strike came as a surprise to Pakistan for several reasons. First,
Pakistan and Iran have maintained cordial relations throughout their diplomatic
history. Pakistan has never been the target of an aerial or missile strike from Iran in its
history. Secondly, Pakistan was preparing for general elections in early February 2024,
and a caretaker government was in place to oversee the country’s affairs.18 During such
a sensitive period of power transition, Pakistan, like any other country, was expecting
political courtesy from its friendly neighbour rather than a missile strike inside its
territory. Thirdly, there were no immediate prior political tensions or indications of
hostility between Pakistan and Iran. Just a few hours before Iran’s aerial strike, there
was a cordial diplomatic meeting between Pakistan’s acting prime minister, Anwaar-
ul-Haq Kakar, and the Iranian foreign minister, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, during the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland. During this high-level political
meeting, the Iranian foreign minister did not raise any concerns or reservations (if
there were any) with the Pakistani prime minister.19 Earlier in the day, Iranian and
Pakistani navies participated in a day-long joint maritime exercise in the Gulf and
Strait of Hormuz. 20 A day before the attack, Iran’s Special Representative for
Afghanistan visited Islamabad and met with the Pakistani foreign minister. Both
diplomats decided to enhance cooperation and coordination for regional stability
during the meeting. 21 The locus for security-related decisions in Iran may be
dominated by the IRGC (rather than the Iranian armed forces), which may have a
super-ordinal authority to manage national security.

After carefully assessing the incident, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs

emphatically condemned the “unprovoked” strike by Iran. It expressed concerns that
Iran resorted to an “illegal act” despite having several avenues for communication and
cooperation. It further declared that violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty was
“completely unacceptable” and warned of “serious consequences”. 22 Subsequently,
Pakistan’s foreign minister addressed his Iranian counterpart and described Iran’s
attack not only as a “serious breach of Pakistan’s sovereignty” but also one counter to
the “spirit of bilateral relations”. He further underlined that Pakistan had the right to
respond and Iran’s unilateral action could “seriously undermine regional peace and
stability”.23 Parallel to this, the Pakistani military command held extensive day-long

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

52 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

discussions on the military situation following the Iran strike. It evaluated the
implications for local conventional deterrence in the border region and its impact on
Pakistan’s regional geostrategy. It also assessed various military response options for
the country’s executive.

At the same time, Pakistan’s national political parties, who were busy running
their election campaigns, also expressed similar dismay at Iran’s unilateral strike.
Shahbaz Sharif, president of Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), who became prime
minister of Pakistan following the general elections, stated: “I am shocked at the
Iranian breach of Pakistani sovereignty. This missile attack is against the spirit of our
friendship and principles of good neighbourhood”. 24 Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, the
Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) leader, told the BBC he was “surprised” by Iran’s aerial
strike. He also emphasised that if any country thinks Pakistan cannot respond to such
violations, it would be mistaken.25

It is pertinent to mention that Pakistan’s political and military leadership

avoided an abrupt and impulsive response. Instead, they took time to assess the
incident, and their statements reflected strategic reasoning and evaluation of the long-
term effects of a response. Their statements were measured and without sensationally
aggressive rhetoric. Not surprisingly, Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its
first short press release several hours after the incident. The Pakistani government
even decided not to convene the National Security Committee (NSC) meeting
following the Iran attack. Similarly, in their incident coverage, the national media
acted responsibly without seeking to arouse unnecessary public commotion. The
Pakistani decision-making process reinforced the culture of strategic restraint and
responsibility during the crisis.

Responding prudently and promptly to an unexpected provocation from a

friendly neighbour was challenging for the Pakistani leadership. The higher policy
direction was to develop incrementally measured responses. The calibration of such a
response had warranted a great deal of understanding about Iran’s motivation behind
the attack, the nature of the attack, and its implications for local deterrence and
Pakistan’s broader geopolitical strategy. To this effect, critical questions were carefully
addressed to evolve the optimal response strategy. Was it an accidental/inadvertent
strike? Was it a hot pursuit/preemptive strike against terrorists of Jaish-al-Adl? What
weapon systems were employed in the aerial attack, and what damage did they cause
on the ground? Did the IRGC conduct the attack with the approval of the Iranian
political leadership? Was it to strengthen Iran’s power position in the bilateral
relationship with Pakistan, which was subject to internal political, economic, and
social challenges? Was it to undermine Pakistan’s role as a sophisticated power
balancer in the Middle East? Was it to send signals to the US, UK, Arab states, and
Israel?

While assessing the situation, Pakistan took some immediate incremental

steps. First, the Pakistani armed forces were instructed to take minimum safeguards to
prevent further aerial strikes from Iran. In parallel, Pakistan recorded a robust

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 53

diplomatic protest against Iran. Islamabad then patiently awaited Tehran’s response,
hoping for a plausible explanation or apology. However, to its disappointment,
Pakistan received no response from Iran, even after several hours. Faced with this, it
decided to downgrade its diplomatic relations with Iran. It recalled its ambassador
from Iran and asked the Iranian ambassador, coincidently in Tehran, not to return to
Islamabad. Additionally, it decided to suspend all ongoing or scheduled high-level
visits between the two nations.26

On January 17, 2024, the Iranian defence minister, followed by the foreign
minister, delivered Tehran’s official statements. While commenting on IRGC’s anti-
terrorist aerial strikes in Syria and Iraq, the Iranian defence minister Mohammad Reza
Ashtiani told the media on the sidelines of a cabinet meeting that Iran had no
limitation in defending its national interests and people. He went on to say that Iran is
“a missile power in the world” and it would employ its missiles whenever it felt
necessary.27 Admittedly, he did not mention the aerial strike against Pakistan, but the
context and timing of his comments were crucial. A few hours later, Iran’s foreign
minister avowed that Iran had conducted cross-border air strikes against “Iranian
terrorists present on Pakistani soil”. He added, "We would not allow Iran’s security to
be compromised”.28

The Pakistani strategic analysts, who objectively assessed the nature of the
incident, Iran’s immediate posturing, and consequential security implications, noted
the comments of Iran’s defence and foreign ministers. They subsequently reached
some basic conclusions that Iran had launched a well-planned missile and drone strike
inside the Pakistani territory. Although the apparent targets were unconfirmed Irani
terrorists, there was no impending terrorism threat from the Pakistani territory to
Iran. Iran’s aerial strike, in the presence of well-established communication and
cooperation mechanisms, was a clear violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty and entirely
unjustified. When Pakistan was preparing for general elections, the timing of Iran's
strike was seen as a further aggravating matter that had implications for Pakistan’s
local military deterrence in the border region. It was also noted that its timing during
elections may have been an effort to influence Pakistan’s elections and consequently
enhance Iran’s relative influence. Moreover, the categorisation by some Iranian
officials of Pakistan as being within Iran’s sphere of influence along the lines of Syria
and Iraq was viewed, quite aside from it being an entirely nonsensical assessment, as a
threat to Pakistan’s geostrategic status and posture across the regions of South Asia
and the Middle East.

To demonstrate its resolve to protect its territorial integrity and border

sovereignty and reinforce its geostrategic position across South Asia and the Middle
East, the Pakistani government directed its armed forces to conduct highly
proportionate and targeted precision military strikes against the hideouts of the
Pakistani-origin terrorists in Siestan-o-Baluchistan province of Iran. Following these
higher policy directions, the military commanders planned and conducted
intelligence-guided high-precision aerial strikes in the early morning of January 18,

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

54 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

2024, and claimed the deaths of several wanted terrorists. For these aerial strikes,
Pakistani military planners employed a combination of stand-off weapons, killer
drones, and loitering munitions.29 These capabilities were prioritised due to their
greater precision than ground-based weapons such as artillery. Moreover, it was
aligned with the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) doctrine of deterrence through effective
retaliation. As a standard practice, the Pakistani military command also approved and
implemented a few contingency plans to meet the immediate challenge of further
escalation following the tit-for-tat aerial strikes.

While briefing media on retaliatory strikes in the border region of Iran,

Mumtaz Zahra Baluch, spokesperson for Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
underlined that the precision military strikes were conducted with the “sole objective…
of Pakistan’s security and national interests”. The spokesperson emphasised that
Pakistan’s action manifested its “unflinching resolve to protect and defend its national
security against all threats. Pakistan would not allow any country to challenge its
territorial integrity and political sovereignty under any pretext or circumstances. At
the same time, the spokesperson maintained that Pakistan had invariably considered
Iran as a “brotherly” country. She further emphasised: “Pakistan fully respects the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”30

Diplomacy and De-escalation

The measured military response, followed by the conciliatory attitude of
Pakistan, set the stage for subsequent diplomatic efforts to defuse the fast-escalating
military situation between two friendly neighbours. In this context, the Pakistani
foreign minister spoke with his Iranian counterpart on January 19, 2024, highlighting
“close brotherly relations” between the two countries. He expressed Pakistan’s desire
to normalise the bilateral relations with Iran “based on the spirit of mutual trust and
cooperation”. He further emphasised that bilateral cooperation must be predicated on
“respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty”. Finally, the two foreign ministers
agreed that “working level cooperation and closer coordination on counterterrorism
and other aspects of mutual concern should be strengthened.”31 They also discussed
the possibility of ambassadors returning to their respective capitals. By January 22,
2024, Pakistan and Iran’s foreign ministers finally agreed to restore diplomatic
relations. They mutually decided that ambassadors of both countries “can return to
their respective posts by January 26, 2024.”32 Furthermore, the foreign minister of Iran
accepted the invitation of the foreign minister of Pakistan to undertake an official visit
to Islamabad on January 29, 2024.

Accordingly, the Iranian Foreign Minister visited Islamabad and held detailed
meetings with the Pakistani civil and military leadership. Both sides developed an
understanding during these interactions to intensify cooperation to combat terrorism.
To this effect, the two foreign ministers agreed to immediately deploy “liaison officers”
in their border towns to “further strengthen ongoing security and intelligence
cooperation.” 33 They also decided to hold regular ministerial and military-level

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 55

meetings to prevent misunderstandings in future. Recognising the intrinsic linkage

between security and development, the two chief diplomats agreed to operationalise
the joint border markets to uplift the socio-economic status of those residing in the
border regions.34 Notably, Pakistan renewed the invitation to the President of Iran to
undertake a visit to Pakistan. On this invitation, Iran’s President, Ebrahim Raisi, paid a
three-day visit to Pakistan. During the visit, the Iranian and Pakistani leadership held
detailed discussions and took decisions to boost security and economic cooperation. 35
These significant developments signalled the return of normalcy in the political
relations between the two friendly neighbour countries.

It is essential to mention that critical regional and international actors

supported and facilitated bilateral diplomacy between Iran and Pakistan. The external
players conducted public and quiet diplomacy in quickly defusing the crisis by
engaging both or one of the contenders. Given the absence of formal diplomatic
relations between the US and Iran, Washington could not mediate between Iran and
Pakistan. Nevertheless, it urged both parties to demonstrate restraint and address
their emerging issues peacefully. It is worth noting that since October 7, 2023, the US
has been engaged in hectic diplomatic efforts to prevent the whole region from falling
into a full-blown war. The US expressed concern about the unilateral airstrikes of Iran
against Pakistan. At the same time, it explicitly emphasised the peaceful de-escalation
of the crisis. John Kirby, the White House National Security Spokesperson, briefed the
reporters that Washington is closely observing the developments between Iran and
Pakistan. He maintained that the US did not want further regional escalation. “We are
in touch with our Pakistani counterparts,” Kirby added.36

Russia was also alarmed by the escalating situation in the Pak-Iran border
regions. It advised both countries to demonstrate “maximum restraint” and solve their
problems “exclusively by political and diplomatic means”. Russian Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson Maria Zakharova underscored that counter-terrorism operations outside
a country’s sovereign territory should be adequately “coordinated and negotiated”
between the countries involved.37 Furthermore, Russia expressed its willingness to join
efforts against the menace of international terrorism.

Similarly, having friendly relations with Iran and Pakistan, China called on
the two sides to remain calm and exercise restraint. It insisted that the two influential
countries of the Muslim world should avoid further escalation of tension. Notably, it
expressed its readiness to play a “constructive role” in defusing the situation between
Iran and Pakistan.38 The meetings between China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Sun Weidong, with the Pakistani leadership from January 20 to 22, along with phone
calls between the Chinese Executive Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ma Zhaoxu, and
his Iranian counterpart, were instrumental in repairing Pak-Iran ties.

Türkiye, another mutual friend of Iran and Pakistan, also played a significant
role in bridging the differences between the two sides. In this regard, the Turkish
Foreign Minister, Hakan Fidan, maintained close contact with the foreign ministers of
both Iran and Pakistan. He regularly advised the foreign ministers of two friendly

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

56 Julian Schofield, Nasir Mehmood and Behrouz Ayaz

countries that “the issue should not escalate further and urged the restoration of
calm.”39 He avowed that Türkiye would continue to do whatever was necessary to
reduce the tensions between Iran and Pakistan.

The bilateral diplomacy, supported by regional and international players,

defused Pak-Iran tensions. On the one hand, these coordinated diplomatic efforts
thwarted any further military escalation between the two friendly neighbouring
countries. On the other hand, these diplomatic endeavours quickly restored normalcy
in the Pak-Iran political relationship.

Conclusion

The Iranian aerial strike with chest-thumping, followed by Pakistan’s

retaliation, has broken down the widely held expectation that the two countries had
successfully managed the issues of transnational terrorism and competitive
geopolitics. The two neighbours did not allow these issues to escalate into a severe
crisis for long. Both countries have intensified cooperation and built mechanisms at
different levels, including political, diplomatic, military, and intelligence, in response
to this crisis.

Luckily, the reciprocal missile/drone strikes did not cause damage to each
other’s armed forces, economic centres, or urban complexes. They attacked what they
considered to be terrorists inside the other’s territory, which the other also regarded as
problematic. Pakistan has been fighting against transnational terrorism since 9/11
despite severe odds and heavy losses. Iran also sees transnational terrorism as a serious
problem for its security. It is worth recalling that both sides have never accused each
other of sponsoring terrorism against each other.

The unilateral aerial strike by Iran did not achieve any significant military and
political goals for Pakistan and was widely viewed as reckless. Instead, it risked
militarising the issues of transnational terrorism and geopolitics with Pakistan.
Another round of such strikes could have caused a permanent strain on the diplomatic
relations between two friendly neighbours. To undo the effect of the airstrikes, the two
sides need to be proactive and strengthen existing bilateral/multilateral mechanisms
of consultations and cooperation. As part of the strategy, the two countries can
continue their tradition of having a relatively demilitarised border and maintain the
status quo of the military forces before the crisis. Transnational terrorism and
geopolitics require continuous, sincere dialogue and meaningful cooperation
mechanisms.

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]

Iran’s Aerial Strikes: Motivations and Pakistan’s Measured Response 57

References
1 Ismail Dilawar, "Pakistan, Iran Envoys to Return to Their Posts as Relations Thaw," Bloomberg, January 22, 2024.
2 Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry, “Pakistan-Iran Relations,” Dawn, January 14, 2024.
3 "Accord on Security Signed with Iran," Dawn, February 20, 2013.
4 United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, “Country Update: Pakistan,” August 2022.
5 “Pakistan Confirms Shooting Down Iranian Drone,” The Express Tribune, June 22, 2017.
6 “Destruction of Jaish al-Zulm Headquarters in Pakistan,” Nour News, January 16, 2024.
7 “No Pakistani National Target of Iran Airstrikes: Amirabdollahian,” Islamic Republic News Agency, January 17, 2024.
8 Qasem Tabrizi, “The Story of the Gift of 99 Fighters to Pakistan by the Shah,” Tasnim News Agency, 2021.
9 Ammad Malik, “How Iran Once Sought to Prevent Pakistan’s Breakup,” The Friday Times, January 18, 2024.
10 “Militant Attack on Government Forces Shakes Iran,” Iran International, April 04, 2024.
11 “IRGC Vows Crushing Retaliation for Terrorist Attack in Rask,” Tehran Times, December 18, 2023.
12 “Iran Holds Day of Mourning after Twin Blasts Kill More Than 80 People,” Aljazeera, January 04, 2024.
13 Vivian Yee, Hwaida Saad, and Eric Schmitt, “Islamic State Claims Responsibility for Deadly Bombings in Iran,” The
New York Times, January 04, 2024.
14 Carla Babb, and Jeff Seldin, “US, UK Strike Back at Several Houthi Sites in Yemen,” Voice of America, January 11,
2024.
15 Zahra Aliakbari, “Interview with Bahman Eshghi, Secretary General of Tehran Chamber of Commerce,”
Khabaronline, January 2024.
16 Mohammad Mahmoudi, Ali Bijani, and Mohammad Akhbari, “Iran and Pakistan Security Challenges to Terrorism
Phenomena: 2001-2007,” Quarterly of Geography & Regional Planning 9, no. 36 (December 2019): 215-236.
17 Munir Ahmed, “Iran’s Top Diplomat Urges Pakistan to complete its Part of a Long-delayed Iran-Pakistan Gas
Pipeline,” Associated Press, August 03, 2023.
18 “Election Commission of Pakistan Agrees to Hold Elections on Feb 8,” Dawn, November 03, 2023.
19 Umar Cheema, "In Meeting with PM Kakar, Iranian FM did not Share Attack Plan,” The News International,
January 18, 2024.
20 “Navies of Iran, Pakistan Hold Joint Military Exercise,” Islamic Republic News Agency, January 16, 2024.
21 “Iranian Special Envoy for Afghanistan Meets Pakistani Diplomats,” Tehran Times, January 15, 2024.
22 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Pakistan’s Strong Condemnation of the Unprovoked
Violation of its Air Space,” Press Release, January 17, 2024.
23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Foreign Minister Receives Telephone Call of the Foreign
Minister of Iran,” Press Release, January 17, 2024.
24 Shehbaz Sharif (@CMShebaz), “I am Shocked at the Iranian Breach of Pakistan Sovereignty,” Twitter, January 17,
2024, https://twitter.com/CMShehbaz/status/1747521548289036626?lang=en.
25 Frances Mao, Caroline Davies, and Paul Adams, “Pakistan Launches Retaliatory Strikes into Iran, Killing Nine
People,” BBC, January 18, 2024.
26 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Statement by the Spokesperson on Last Night’s Violation of
Pakistan’s Sovereignty by Iran,” Press Release, January 17, 2024.
27 “Iran has No Restrictions in Defending National Interests: Defense Minister,” Mehr News Agency, January 17, 2024.
28 Amirabdollahian, Hossein. “No Pakistani National Target of Iran Airstrikes.” Islamic Republic News Agency,
January 17, 2024.
29 Inter-Services Public Relations, Pakistan, “In early Hours of 18 January 2024, Pakistan Carried out Effective Strikes
against Hideouts Inside Iran,” Press Release, January 18, 2024.
30 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan, “Transcript of the Press Briefing by the Spokesperson,”
January 18, 2024.
31 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, “Foreign Minister’s Telephone Call with the Iranian Foreign Minister,” Press
Release, January 19, 2024.
32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran, “Joint Statement by the Foreign Ministries of the Islamic
Republic of Iran and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Statement, January 22, 2024.
33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, "Meeting between the Foreign Ministers of Pakistan and Iran," Press Release,
January 30, 2024.
34 Ibid.
35 “Iran President, Pakistan PM Vow to Boost Economic, Security Cooperation,” Al Arabiya, April 22, 2024.
36 “Biden Says Iran-Pakistan Clash Shows Iran is not Well-Liked in Region,” Reuters, January 18, 2024.
37 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Russian Federation, "Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria
Zakharova on Tensions between Iran and Pakistan,” January 18, 2024.
38 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning’s Regular Press
Conference,” January 18, 2024.
39 “Turkey’s FM Urges Calm as Pakistan, Iran Exchange Strikes, Offers to Mediate,” Al Arabiya, January 18, 2024.

Margalla Papers-2024 (Issue-I) [45-57]