c, Pursuit CFig, 93

"l" Unit assigned to exert direct pressure..,.containment of enemy

withdrawal by continuous and unrelenting pressure
T! t!
2 Unit assigned to a turning movement... .interdicting the enemy's
route of withdrawal and encircling and destroying the enemy
(strike)
d. Defense against amphibious landings
Coastal-defense Clarge-unitH group (containment) and strike Clarge-unitU group
(strike).
Part III. CONCENTRATION OF COMBAT POWER
Chapter I. Summary
1. Significance of concentration of combat power
a. Meaning of "concentration of combat power"
"Concentration of combat power" is the assembling of as much as possible of our
combat power and its integrated application at critical times and places.
This is one of the "methods of using power" that apply limited power in the most
effective manner and one of the most important principles of war derived from
the basic principle of war that superiority wins and inferiority loses.
b. Why is "concentration of combat power" one of the most important
principles of war?
"Concentration of combat power" makes it possible for us to create relative
superiority at decisive times and places even though we are inferior in the
overall ratio of relative combat power of both sides.
In other words, battle occurs with both sides using limited power in a course of
time and space called a battlefield. Within this time and space, there exists
a critical point that also could be called the decisive point, namely, a Cspe-
cificU time and place. If victory is gained at that point, even if another
unimportant area is temporarily disadvantageous, complete victory can be gained,
c. How should victory be gained at the critical point?
The fact that this can be done by applying superior combat power sufficient to
destroy the enemy, is clearly reflected also in the basic principle of war that
superiority wins and inferiority loses.
In order for us to gain superiority in the ratio of relative combat power at the
decisive time and place, we must not only strive to concentrate combat power but
also make a maxim-urn effort to disperse and destroy enemy combat power,

- 27 -
Separating part of the combat power for a supporting operation or secondary
attack, at first sight, seems .contrary to the concentration of combat power, but
it is based on the above concept. The: military-personnel strength allocated to
this, however, of course, should be the minimum necessary,

d. Mistake of piecemeal commitment of combat power

Occurrences that conflict with the concentration of combat power are dispersed
commitment and piecemeal commitment of combat power. This relationship, with
counter battery fire of our two Cgunsl to the enemy's three, may be depicted
graphically as follows:

Enemy, u„ Enemy Enemy

" At first
ter

(Concentration of combat (Dispersed application (Piecemeal application

power) of combat power) of combat power)
Figure 10

Dispersed commitment and piecemeal commitment of combat power such as in the

above examples, in the light of the basic principle of war that superiority wins
and inferiority loses, clearly are major errors, but in actual combat, these
errors are easy to make.

The main reasons for this are as follows:

(1) Insufficient knowledge of the situation, particularly the enemy

situation
(2) Deficiency in attention to tactical opportunities and to associated
combat power

(3) Case of lapsing into a passive posture

Here it must be noted that the error of piecemeal commitment of combat power is
basically different from the piecemeal commitment of insufficient military per-
sonnel, for example, elements successively entering combat in a meeting engage-
ment .

In regard to elements successively entering combat in a meeting engagement, it

must be noted that a necessary condition is to be able to maintain superiority
in relative combat power throughout the.combat, making rapid attacks on enemy
weak points or being able to rely on superiority throughout at key positions in
the battle situation that control the battle situation.

- 28 -
2, Necessary conditions that should he considered for concentrating combat power
a. Estahlishment of objective, and a consistent plan

In the ahsence of estahlishment of an objective of the operation and a consist-

ent plan based upon it, as veil as of the steadfast and intense will of the com-
mander to carry it out, there-will not "be effective concentration and application
Of combat power.

b. Positive initiative

A negative, passive posture merely follows the enemy and cannot concentrate com-
bat power. Since attack is characterized by initiative, concentration of combat
power is easy, and this advantage should be applied to the maximum. Since de-
fense is passive, combat power easily becomes dispersed. For this reason,
particularly at critical times and places, one must actively strive to concen-
trate combat power.

c. Selection of the critical time and place

These are the time and place that determine victory, that is, the decisive point.
In concentrating combat power, it is extremely important first to select an
appropriate decisive point. This is not a momentary point, but it has width and
depth. If a mistake is made in this selection, not only does it not link to
victory, but also the carefully concentrated combat power will end in a fizzle,
and the result will be that the enemy turns our strength to his advantage. This
involves the case of our taking the initiative in action and the case created by
the relative relationships of the two sides, but one must act with positive ini-
tiative and, in the second case, discernment is necessary to seize tactical
opportunities.
In other words, it may be said that the decisive point is a terrain point that
produces the "tactical opportunity" mentioned above.
d. Integrated application of combat power

Merely assembling combat power superior to that of the enemy is equivalent to a

mob. If combat strength is not organized, not concentrated against a vital part
of the enemy (decisive point), and not applied integrally, it is meaningless.

In particular, in modern warfare, it is necessary to concentrate combat power

three-dimensionally, of course with integration of ground, sea, and air, and
with organic cooperation of all branches of service, and main and secondary
attacks, firepower and tactical mobility, front and depth, operations and intel-
ligence, communications, logistics, and other functions must be integrated and
organized so as to apply maximum combat power at critical times and places.

Also, for this, there must be continuity over a desired time period and under a
consistent plan.

- 29 -
 e, Economic use of combat power

Concentration of combat power requires economical use of combat power on dther

fronts. In other words, in order to apply maximum combat power at the decisive
point, along with maximum curtailment of combat power directed to other areas,
it is necessary not to create so-called poorly dispositioned troops, so that no
element of the combat power would be made idle,

On the other hand, it is necessary to strive for maximum dispersion and destruc-
tion of enemy combat power. As stated above, support operations, secondary
attacks, etc,, are based on this concept and coincide with economical use of
combat power. The statement in Sun-tzu that "knowing use of the disparity in
numbers is victory," is this principle.

f , Application of tactical mobility

Warfare, considered from one viewpoint , also can be described as a contest by

both sides to concentrate combat power against decisive points. In other words,
in order to concentrate desired combat power superior to that of the enemy at a
desired time and place, application* of swift tactical mobility^ is an essential
condition,
In modern warfare, because of advances in science and technology, particularly
developments in firepower and tactical mobility, dispersal of military personnel
is regarded as extremely important. In other words, dispersion is important
from the viewpoint of maintenance of flexibility; of protection, especially
reduction of casualties; of concealment of plans, etc.; and excessive concentra-
tion at unnecessary times should be avoided as mush as possible,
In other words, the concentration of combat power from a dispersed posture is
becoming increasingly important, and for that reason, there must be an effort
not merely to use tactical mobility, but also to use mobility of firepower (con-
centration of fire), reliable command-communications capability, etc,

3. Methods of concentrating combat power

Methods of concentrating combat power are of the following two types:

a. Method of concentrating combat power before arriving on the battlefield

(Napoleonic-type concentration method)
^. /^O Concealment of cone en-
Piecemeal defeat of enemy elements \4j ^-^ tration by use of
by means of concentrated combat A / natural terrain such
power (interior lines) \ f as rivers and mountain

combat power. 3
© Link-up
T"^ (vithin
• our
chains

Fig, 11
- 30 -
 b. Method of concentrating combat
power on the "battlefield (Moltke-
type concentration method)

Exterior-lines operation

Note: Numbers din Fig, 121 indicate ^

combat power. \ C_J Link-up (battlefield)
ff Battlefiffid
I
Fig. 12
Historical examples:

Examples of failure to concentrate combat power:

The Soviet Army at the beginning of German-Soviet campaigns

The drive into North Korea by the United Nations forces in the Korean
War

Error of piecemeal commitment of combat power:

The Russian Army in the Russo-Japanese War

Guadalcanal, Leyte, and New Guinea campaigns

Southward advance into North Korea by the Peoplefs Republic of China

Army in the Korean War

Chapter II. Centripetal Use of Combat Power

Section 1. Principle of centripetalism

1, Meaning of centripetalism

Centripetalism is the movement from every point on the circumference of a circle

toward its central point, and the <principle of centripetalism is the principle
of using power in this way. CFig. 133

2. Characteristics and effectiveness of the use of centripetalism

a. By use of centripetalism, all power elements moving toward

the center are directed toward a common point at the center,

b. It has the advantage of mutually correlating and concert-

ing all the power elements on the perimeter. In other words, the
effectiveness of power exerted on the central point is larger than the simple
total of the individual power elements on the perimeter.

In the above figure CFig. 133, power exerted on the center > a + b + c.

- 31 -
 c. In regard to the effectiveness of power against the center:

(1) These powr elements become greater as they approach the center
and are at' a maximum when they reach the center,

(2) These power elements are greatest and most effective vhen they are
used simultaneously,
(3) The faster the movement of these power elements, the greater their
effectiveness,

•3, Application of the principle of centripetalism

The principle of centripetalisma in the posture sphere, is a principle of war of

a method of concentrating combat power and, militarily, is applied in operations
on exterior lines, advancement in separated columns to link up for combat, en-
velopment, turning movements, etc.
Also, the characteristic of offensive operations is concentration, and the
attack can.be said to use centripetalism.

Section 2. Operations on exterior lines

1, Meaning of operations on exterior lines

a. The operation on exterior lines is an operation that maintains lines of

communication outwards and is carried out toward a central point from several
directions, against an enemy with operations directed outward.

In other words, from the viewpoint of posture, it is operating from the begin-
ning in a relative position of envelopment or pincer attack against the enemy;
and from the viewpoint of the line of operations (axis of operations), it is an
operation carried out with the line of operations held on the outer flank of
the enemy,
b. The operation on exterior lines is an operation that centripetally con-
certs separated elements of combat power, the effectiveness of this combat power
being concentrated on a single common point, so that it is the operation that
makes maximum use of the principle of centripetalism.
From the viewpoint of concentration of combat power, this is an operation that,
as stated above, unites separated elements of combat power on the battlefield
at a suitable "time for operational purposes—in other words, an operation based
on the "Moltke-type concentration method,"

c. In the disposition (strategic deployment) ^

and use of combat power in operations on exterior
lines, there are the following two methods, shown
on the figure at the right:

(l) Method that has each unit "a," "b,"

rt
c,ff disposed on the perimeter attacking an p,

- 32 -
 opposing enemy, and using combat power in a concentrating manner,

(2) Method in which force "a" checks the attack of the superior
force "A" and contains that unit, while forces 1VT and ?Tc!T destroy facing enemy
elements and then assault the flanks and rear of force "A," consolidating all
combat power and destroying the enemy.

2. Characteristics and results of the operation on exterior lines

a. It is possible to envelop the enemy and to hold and destroy him.

In other words, with the operation on exterior lines, a basic disposition is

constituted that is suitable for leading to envelopment; and by its centripetal
movement, it naturally is possible to envelop the enemy strategically and tac-
tically,

b. Strategically, it is an extremely advantageous operation.

In other words, the operation on exterior lines is extremely reliable, having

the natural benefits of controlling the enemy on its single line of operations
and not being controllable by the enemy. Also, if a force operating on interior
lines attempts to defeat separately one of the forces operating on exterior
lines, its flank or rear is threatened by another force, and crushing enemy
forces in detail cannot easily be planned.

In other words, it can be said that a force operating on

exterior lines not only can cut the enemy's line of with-
drawal but also can threaten the enemy's base of opera-
tions and, on the other hand, that a threat against our
own rear is almost impossible.
<- se
c. The operation on exterior lines is an operation ^V
that holds the initiative x
tionp
The force operating on exterior lines is unrestricted in
use of time and space for operations and can hold the Fig. 15
initiative in conducting operations. In an operation with
no margin of spare time, it is absolutely necessary to seek a quick victory, and
the force operating on interior lines loses time and terrain for operations from
one moment to the next. Great importance must be given to small pressures from
these exterior lines.

d. The strategy of the superior force is the so-called strategy of

the strong

Without a superior force, strategy on exterior lines cannot exist. Hence, if

this real power is applied correctly, success will be achieved in many cases.

e. On the other hand, it involves the danger of falling into a splitting of

combat power and being subjected to-piecemeal defeat of units,

- 33 -

83-CSI-3824
Hence, it is extremely important to select a suitable direction of operations
and to cause closely concerted action among all units, to combine all elements
of tangible and intangible combat power, and not to give the enemy an opportu-
nity for piecemeal victories.

In summary, the operation on exterior lines is offensive, holds the initiative,

seizes the superior posture position, and exerts great centripetal force from
all directions. And once the force operating on interior lines has failed to
defeat in detail the forces operating on exterior lines, the offensive force
naturally is in a posture for strategic envelopment and, ultimately, can effect
a complete envelopment tactically.

3, Condition for occurrence of an operation on exterior lines

a. Geographic relationships of the country (national boundary)

As with Prussia in the Austro-Prussian War and with the Allied forces in ¥orld
War I and World War II, when forming a posture is necessarily on exterior lines
because of geographic relationships, with no leeway for choice between opera-
tions on interior and on exterior lines, the determination is natural.

In worldwide great wars, however, interior and exterior lines are unclear and,
in many cases, confused. In such cases, it is taken on a larger scale and
generalized on the principle of war of the line of communications,
b. Geographic relationships of the zone of operations

In local operations, selection of disposition of combat power on interior and

exterior lines can be made on the basis of the characteristics of the zone of
operations, in particular, directions of rivers and mountain chains, the traffic
network of roads, railroads, etc., fortifications, etc.

In other words, in the figure below, the Nagoya or Numazu area is a good example
of this.
Sea Ji
In other words, as to selec- Japan-
tion of the operational zone, . Hakone
it is necessary to seek an
area that will guide the
enemy into interior lines,
and that will permit us to
use the advantage of our
exterior lines.

-Eastern part of **Mishima

Nobi Plain
c. Tactical (strategic)
conditions Fig, 16

(l) Case in which the basic disposition of combat power is dispersed,

especially where concentration of combat power is to be in a
single area, is even more disadvantageous
An example of this occurred in the Austro-Prussiaji War of 1866, when Moltke, in
order to precede the Austrian Army in concentrating, had his troop strength,
that was in a dispersed basic disposition, move to the battlefield in separate
columns and link-up there,

(2) Case of being able to change from an interior-lines posture to

exterior lines

For example, the case of being able to mount a pursuit operation after exploi-
tation of a success in an attack, or an operation on exterior lines against
surviving enemy elements after piecemeal defeat of enemy units,

k. Matters that should be kept in mind in the conduct of operations on

exterior lines

The primary aim in the conduct of operations on exterior lines is to expand the
initial superiority in posture and the advantage of the initiative, force the
enemy into a passive posture, conduct a centripetal operation, and hold and
destroy the enemy from the perimeter.
For this purpose, matters that should be kept particularly in mind in connection
with the conduct Cof operations! are as follows:

a. Quickly constricting the posture on exterior lines and guiding into

tactical envelopment
Exterior lines are strategic. They are not, like envelopment, a tactical action.

If it is not a division or larger unit with independent combat power, it does

not have the pressure for dispersal and concerted action on exterior lines.
Hence, it is a mistake to speak of having a part of a division disposed on
exterior lines.

b. Alertness to avoid defeat in detail

It is necessary to ensure cooperation and coordination among all dispersed

units, hasten the course of the operation, and preclude piecemeal defeat
attempted by the force operating on interior lines.

c. Forces disposed on exterior lines must not forget concentration of

combat power

When combat power is dispersed on exterior lines separated by terrain that

prevents cooperation, one must not fall into the bad practice of overlooking
tactical opportunities to consolidate combat power. On the other hand, we must
use cleverness to contain and disperse the enemy over a broad front and to
concentrate our combat power in a single area,

d. Attempting to conceal one's plans and making a sudden attack on the enemy

It is necessary to take a suitable direction of operations, keep plans secret,

- 35 -
make a sudden attack on the enemy, give the enemy no opening for counteraction,
and give no opportunity for piecemeal defeat Cof our forces!,
Historical examples;

Examples of operations on exterior lines:

In the China Incident CSino-Japanese War, 1937-19^53, the operations of

Wuhan, Nanjing [Nanking], Chang-gui CCh?ang-kuei3, and Xuzhou CHsuchouH
Example of slipping into strength dispersal and "being subjected to piecemeal
defeat:

Japanese forces in the Imphal Campaign

Examples of shifting from an operation on interior lines to one on

exterior lines:

British forces at
Raising of the sieges of Moscow, Stalingrad, and Leningrad

Section 3. Advancing from different directions and linking up to attack

1. Meaning of advancing from different directions and linking up to attack

Advancing from different directions and linking up to attack, is the maneuver of

advancing from several different areas in order to envelop and destroy the
enemy, the positioning in separate advances being with a view to combining
combat power at a suitable time.
Also, advancing from separate directions and linking up to attack, as a posture,
is an operation on exterior lines,
2, Form of advancing from different directions and linking up to attack
The form of advancing from different directions and linking up to attack, is
extremely varied according to the direction, time, place, and intervals of the
separated advances. Representative examples are as follows:

a. According to direction
(l) From two opposite directions (2) From three opposing directions

\
©Enemy y -
\
Fig. IT
- 36 -
 (3) From all around (U) From seyeral nonopposing directions

Fig. 18

b. According to disposed posture before the separated advances

(l) From initially united posture (2) From initially dispersed

posture

Fig, 19
c. Accomplished in echelons CFig. 20H

d. According to the relationship of distance to

objective
(1) Having approximately equal distances

(2) Having substantial differences

Fig. 20
e. According to the times of separated advance
and combined attack

(1) Times are simultaneous

(2) Staggered times

Historical examples: Examples of advancing from different directions and

linking up to attack:

Moltke's separated advance with combined attack at Koniggratz in the

Austro-Prussian War of 1866

Separated advance with combined attack by the Japanese forces in the Battle
of Xuzhou CHsuchouU C1938:]

Defeat of the Japanese forces at Imphal

- 37 -
3, Items that must "be taken into consideration in implementation of advancing
from different directions and linking up to attack

a. Selection of the objective for the combined attack

Ordinarily, there initially is selected a strategic point, that is, a strategic

objective, but with development of the operation, a .definite objective is
determined with the purpose of defeating the enemy or occupying terrain,

The essential goal of advancing from different directions and linking up to

attack, is not simply the concentration of combat power, but the link-up of
combat power on the battlefield, that is, the envelopment and destruction of the
enemy,

Historical examples:
Battle of Koniggratz, (The initial objective was Gitschin, merely for con-
centration of forces, but during the operation, it was changed to Koniggratz
for destruction of the enemy,)

Battle of Liaoyang in the Russo-Japanese War, (The objective of the

Japanese forces in advancing from different directions and linking up to
attack, was the strategic objective of Liaoyang, but the strategic objec-
tive in the Russian forces' battle plan also was Liaoyang,)

b. What should be done to avoid piecemeal defeat by the enemy?

(1) Appropriate disposition of combat power for separated advance,

In other words, there must be appropriate selection of the main and secondary
operation areas, and allocation of adequate combat power to them.

For this purpose,

(a) It is necessary to ensure superiority in relative combat power
against expected enemy resistance during the separated advance,

(b) Consideration is given to movement distances for the separated

advance and to topographic conditions in,:the area where
separated advance occurs,
(c) Appropriate allocation of^combat power in the link-up area is
made, with consideration of enemy counteraction, terrain con-
ditions, our operational goals, etc,

(2) Achieving close cooperation among the elements of combat power that
are advancing separated.

For this purpose, it is necessary to achieve appropriate direction of operations

and to exercise appropriate time and space controls,

- 38 -
 (3) Allocation of the terrain and routes of separated advance in such
a way, as to "be suitable for mutual support of separately advancing
elements of combat power,

(H) Maintaining suitable tactical mobility for separately advancing

units, and using speed of movement that does not give the enemy
time for counteraction

(5) Giving severe attention to keeping the plan secret and achieving
the results of a surprise attack,
c. Superiority of relative combat power (striking power) in the final stage

As stated earlier, separated advance from different directions and linking up to

attack is a means and not a goal. Hence, it is very important to retain strik-
ing power to envelop and destroy the enemy in the final stage.
For this purpose, it is necessary to be careful to effect three-dimensional
envelopment that interdicts the withdrawal route not only by separately advanc-
ing-combat power from land routes but also by naval and air combat power, and
it is particularly important to have logistic support appropriate to permit use
of maximum combat power in the final stage.

Section k. Envelopment

1, Meaning of envelopment
Weak points occurring in enemy defenses are the rear and flanks. Hence, in at-
tacking the enemy, striking against the rear and flanks, which are the weak
points, is the most effective. (See Part II, Chapter I, para. 3. b. (6),
Directionality of combat power.)

Envelopment is one type of attack maneuver, containing the enemy on his front,
seizing objectives in the rear of the enemy from one or both exposed flanks or
possibly from the air, interdicting the enemy's route of withdrawal, and seeking
to hold and destroy the enemy on the battlefield.
The envelopment, together with the turning movement, being able to strike the
rear or flank which are the weak points of the enemy, has been a favorite action
since ancient times.
2. Advantages of envelopment
a. It is possible to strike the flank or rear, which are the enemy's weak
points,

b. The posture itself has the effects of exerting a threat to the enemy,
imparting a psychology of inferiority and causing reduction or abandonment of
the will to continue fighting.
c. It can interdict the enemy's line of communications and cause a drying

- 39 -
up of the physical capability to continue fighting,

3, The enemy's countermeasures against our envelopment 8

\
a. Counter envelopment (T?an enveloping element being ^
enveloped") ^
Fig, 21
(l) Carried out by commitment of rear-echelon
units, CFig, 211 ^

(2) Accomplished by extraction and diversion of ^"

strength from another front, CFig, 22H _. „
rig, dLd.

(3) Retrograde movement of the entire line or a part of it, to appear

on an outer flank of the enveloping unit. CFig. 233

Fig, 23 Fig, 2h Fig. 25

b. Convex defensive formation CFig. 2^1

c. Extending or refusing a wing CFig. 25: ^^^

d. Attack against the axis of envelopment

CFig. 26:
Fig. 26
e. Retrograde movement CFig. 27:
f. Supply and reinforcement by air

U. Conditions for success of envelopment

The conditions for success of envelopment are being able to hold and destroy the
enemy on the battlefield while not giving the enemy an opportunity to take
countermeasures against our envelopment action.
For this purpose, particular attention should be given to the following:

a. Surprise attack
There must be secrecy of plans, particularly secrecy of movement of units
assigned to envelopment (use of nighttime, etc.);..and there must be deception,
particularly dummy deployment, feints, etc., to draw the attention of the enemy
to his front. In cases where tactical movement continues for two nights,
secrecy of the plan is particularly important.

- 1*0 -
 b. Superiority in relative tactical mobility

In particular, use of aerial tactical mobility, equipment and maintenance of

capability to overcome obstacles.

c. Containing the enemy on his current front

In particular, securing the assault and our axis of envelopment by a determined

secondary attack.

d. Maintenance of superior combat power

In particular, the power and speed to defeat enemy counterenvelopment and other
countermeasures.

e. Concerted actions of all units

In particular, the main and secondary attacks being within supporting distance
of one another.

f. Appropriate basic disposition

In particular, it is necessary to consider this with a view toward the stage of
selection of the assembly area. However, in cases where there is a great advan-
tage in relative tactical mobility, it is possible to overcome an unsuitable
basic disposition.
5. Relationship between strength and complete encirclement

In case of an excessive envelopment that is not in conformity with strength,

even in cases of success in forming a complete encirclement, a weak point will
develop somewhere, permitting the encircled force to break the encirclement or
extricate itself, or causing collapse of the encirclement operation by a pincer
attack accomplished by concerted action of the encircled unit with units outside
the encirclement.

In the conduct of an envelopment operation, it is critically important to deter-

mine the scale of envelopment after proper evaluation of the combat power of
both sides, particularly the availability of mobile combat power in the enemy's
rear, and to reach the objective quickly. If an excessive envelopment is
planned with insufficient strength, even if there is success for a time in
establishing complete encirclement, it is necessary to be careful subsequently
about difficulty developing in maintaining it or about experiencing envelopment
by the enemy and slipping into an unfavorable posture.

6. Three-dimensional envelopment
In order to destroy the enemy through envelopment, in modern warfare, envelop-
ment only on the ground is inadequate. In other words, it is necessary to
attempt three-dimensional envelopment by using aerial mobile power at the same
time as the surface envelopment, and to interdict aerial supply and aerial ^
- Ill -
reinforcement of the enemy,

Historical example; Encirclement at Sinzweya, in Burma, (Example in which

Japanese forces completely encircled a British force, but the British force
survived through aerial supply,)

Section 5* Breakthrough

1, Essential nature of the breakthrough

The breakthrough is a type of attack maneuver that, by use of power, separates

the enemy from his prepared front and seeks to lead him into piecemeal defeat or
encirclement. In other words, its essence is the application of great power,
and a maximum concentration of combat power must be used.

2, Case of effecting a breakthrough

a. Since penetration is a tactic of power, a major prerequisite is to have
overwhelmingly superior combat power or to be able to constitute it on the
breakthrough front,
b. It is carried out in cases where an envelopment or turning movement is
impossible or not advantageous.

In other words, since the breakthrough is a coercive tactic against a carefully

prepared enemy front, the attacker's losses also are great, and it is not a
desirable measure,

Historical example;

Breakthrough of the [Japanese] 2d Division near Ang-ang-xi CAng-ang-ch'iH

in the Manchurian Incident

The German Army's breakthrough of the Maginot Line at the beginning of

World War II

3, Items for consideration in a breakthrough

a. Use of power in the breakthrough

In order to break through and split an enemy with his resistance organized in
depth, power is used successively as follows;

(l) First, action to form a beginning for a split

(formation of a breach) CFig, 28]
It is necessary to ensure superiority of applied combat
power against the breakthrough point

(2) Action to eliminate resistance to the break- Fig, 28

through action (expansion of the breach) CFig, 29]
It is necessary that the width be expanded only
to the extent that would permit deployment of
combat power able to effect a breakthrough in
depth to the objective, Breakthrough
action
(3) Then, action to break through to
the final element of the enemy
(seizure of the final objective)
CFig, 302

It is necessary not to miss the opportunity Fig, 29

with the combat power in depth and to apply the
breakthrough combat power until achievement of
the objective.

Note: 1. Content of power in the breakthrough

a. Having overwhelming power

b. Its being maintained until achievement of the

desired objective Fig. 30

c. Application of power being swift

2. Countermeasures against the breakthrough

a. Drawing combat power from fronts other than the breakthrough
front and reinforcing the resistance power or closing the breach

b. Envelopment of the breakthrough force

c. Abandoning resistance, withdrawing along the entire front, and

establishing a new posture

b. Relationship between width and depth of the breakthrough front

The form of the breach generally is as follows:

Trapezoid or Tapering in a wedge shape

Fig. 31

In other words, if the initial breakthrough-front width is large, the depth also
is great. Hence, the necessary breakthrough front must be determined with a
view to the desired breakthrough depth.

In general, it can be said that the front width and depth of the breakthrough
are approximately equal, but the depth that can be reached in the breakthrough,

- 1*3 -
relative to the width of front, can be increased by reinforcement with tanks ,
artillery, and air power,

Also, at a minimum, the depth of breakthrough must be sufficient to crush the

enemy's depth of organized resistance,

c, Selection of breakthrough point and direction

The place and direction to be penetrated makes possible the superiority of our
power, and ease of application of power is the first requirement. For this pur-
pose, weak points of enemy disposition, terrain suitable to application of our
combined combat power, etc., are selected.

Also, if other factors are disregarded, the following can be said:

(l) Direct breakthrough is superior

to oblique breakthrough.

In case of superiority in both quality and

mass, however, an oblique breakthrough (Our power is (Power becomes
also is possible. strongest.) weakened.)
Fig. 32
(2) Breakthrough along the direc-
tion of our line of communications CLOCU is advantageous CFig. 33U

""
LOG
JL.
ftf • MfcMte
«•» • ^^^^-
T f\r* mil-
v^J I 9*'
j_l W O ^/ ^ lr«a*«Ji
Dis
^^^^^^^
I 1^

Advantageous ,'J*' ~
advantageous
Fig. 33 Fig,

(3) Mistake of concave penetration CFig.

Enemy resistance converges Ctoward the center where we are attacking!!, and that
is disadvantageous for us.

It is possible, however, if one has greatly superior firepower and tactical

mobility, especially tank strength,

Historical example: Alexander the Great's Battle of Arbela (a center break-

through in great strength, and effective counteraction against the enemy's
double envelopment),

U. Multifront breakthroughs

a. Necessity of breakthroughs on several fronts

(l) In a one-point (one-front) breakthrough, even if success has been

achieved in a tactical breakthrough with great combat power in depth, there are
many cases in which opportunity is given for the enemy to recover his strategic
posture, so that, in the end, because of enemy countermeasures, this break-
through action is not successful.
When this is considered from the viewpoint of military history:

Historical examples in World War I:

At the beginning, simple breakthroughs of prepared positions

(Unsuccessful because of the defender's countermeasures)
Against limited objectives
Repeated breakthroughs (assaults)(191^ and later)
Doctrine of breakthrough by concentrated firepower
(The defender also resists with power, and even tactical
breakthroughs are unsuccessful)
Breakthrough in a single effort through the entire depth of the
enemy force (sudden attack)(1918)
(Success in tactical breakthrough, but unsuccessful because of
closing of the breach by the strategic reserve)

World War II:

In the German campaign against Poland, the breakthrough of the Maginot

Line, etc,, there are many historical examples of success in multifront
breakthroughs using armored and air power,

(2) Breakthroughs on several fronts lead easily into strategic

envelopment

(a) Individual breakthroughs, in themselves, have two aims:

1^ After the breakthrough, to overwhelm and destroy the enemy
away from his original line of communications
2_ After the breakthrough, to split, encircle, and destroy the
enemy

(b) Breakthroughs on several fronts, by being combined, easily

form a centripetal encirclement from several directions, and
the result can be expanded to strategic scale.

(3) It is easy to split, subdivide, and destroy enemy combat power in

detail.
To subdivide and destroy is a tactic of defeating in detail,

(h) In all cases, since the main objective is a decisive battle outside
the positions in the enemyfs rear, defeating [the enemy D is
extremely sure and easy.

Strategic reserves also are brought into the encirclement and destruction
Operations of the main mobile-warfare element,
b. Structural characteristics of the breakthrough on several fronts

Envelopment
Tactical breakthrough Expansion of strategic significance* of
( battle results

[Formation of breach Envelopment, multiple envelopment

[Expansion, seizure of objective Divide and destroy

(Interior-lines type) •* (Exterior-lines type)

The physical structure is as shown in the figures below:

(l) Pincer envelopment (2) Multiple envelopment

Fig. 35

(3) Divide and destroy (U) Expansion of battle achievement

(combined)

c
Fig, 36 Fig. 37

c. Tactical characteristics of the multifront breakthrough

It is basically like the characteristics of the breakthrough and is a tactic of

the stronger force,
(l) Power, its maintenance (combat power in depth), and speed are
required to a maximum degree.
This is axiomatic with respect to power plus speed = shock, but from the

- 1*6 -
strategic viewpoint, the necessity for combat power in depth is even greater.

Power (striking power) >• Breaking the shell

Speed •> Breakthrough through the entire depth

Combat power in depth -^->• Enemy's- count ermeasures

(Counteracting the enemyf s speed of supple-
menting his manpower)

(2) It is a combination of breakthrough and envelopment, but the break-

through is the first impact of the operation and a measure of strategic envelop-
ment, In other words, with the breakthrough alone, it is not possible to reach
the operational objective. It is necessary to expand the tactical breakthrough
into a strategic breakthrough.

(3) It is a situation of mobile war around a breakthrough by armored

combat power,

In other words, it is necessary to change the operation from stationary to move-

ment, particularly emphasizing use of armored and air power, and it is necessary
to select a breakthrough point and breakthrough direction (axis of operation)
and to accomplish appropriate maneuvering,

The main objective is a decisive battle outside the position to the

rear of the enemy, carried out after the breakthrough.

(5) The surprise attack and sudden attack are emphasized,

Historical examples:

1, Examples of success in the breakthrough on several fronts

Breakthrough by the German Army in the Polish Campaign in World War II

(pine er envelopment )

Breakthrough of the Maginot Line by the German Army in World War II

(divide and destroy)
2. Example of failure of the breakthrough at a single point

The offensive of the German Army in the Ardennes in the closing period
of World War II

Chapter III, Eccentric Use of Combat Power

Section 1, Principle of eccentricity

1, Meaning of eccentricity

Eccentricity is the moving of the focus away from the center of a circle toward
its circumference, and the principle of the application of power in cases of its
repeated movement from the center of the circle toward any point on the circum-
ference is called the principle of eccentricity,

2, Characteristics and effectiveness of eccentric action

a. Eccentric action is the combining of power at the center and its

application toward a point on the circumference,

b. In the eccentric action, in cases of repetition of this movement, there

is gradual deterioration of this nuclear power,

c. To the extent that the power constituting the core of the eccentricity
approaches the circumference, the power against the circumference increases and,
conversely, it decreases toward the opposite direction,

d. With an increase in the space of the circle, the eccentric movement

becomes easier,

e. An eccentric movement, as in the figure, is an action on interior lines

and combines all power (a + b + c) against objectives one at a time.

3- Application of the principle of The enemy is on the

eccentricity circumference and
attacks centripetally
The principle of eccentricity, in regard to
posture, is a passive, defensive principle
of war and, in regard to combat, is applied
in operations on interior lines, in defeat-
ing in detail, etc.

Section 2. Operations
•*•
on r/ fi
interior lines We are inside
near the center
1. Meaning of operations on interior lines
Fig, 38
a. An operation on interior lines is an
operation carried out with maintenance of our line of communications in the
interior, directed against the enemy conducting operations centripetally toward
us from several directions from the outside.

The essential of an operation on interior lines is to go against individual

objectives with one's entire combined force, in other words, piecemeal defeat of
an enemy split laterally or an enemy split in depth; and the concentration of
combat power and the time element are of the greatest value for it.

Among recent examples, the Israeli Army's blitz campaign in the Middle Eastern
war is an excellent example of operations on interior lines,

b. Relationship between interior and exterior lines

The relationship between interior and exterior lines is a mutual relationship,

- 1+8 -
Operations on exterior lines are offensive and active, whereas operations on
interior lines are defensive and passive. The relationship "between the two,
strategically, is naturally conditioned by the geographic relationships of the
country and, in military operations, selection between interior and exterior
lines can be made on the basis of the mission of the operational unit, combat
power, terrain and weather conditions, etc.

Hence, conditions for occurrence of an operation on exterior lines, viewed from

the opponent's side, may be said to be conditions for occurrence of an opera-
tion on interior lines, (See Part III, Chapter IT, Section 2, paragraph 3.)

2. Characteristics of the operation on interior lines

a. An operation on interior lines is a strategic, defensive operation.

An operation on interior lines permits a [large-unitH group of weaker combat

power to assume a favorable strategic posture, seek a decisive battle, accumu-
late individual victories, and gain a complete victory. Hence, if one is sure
of obtaining victory by power alone without the need of strategems, ordinarily
operations on interior lines are not used.

b. It is an operation that has a great need for tactics of opportunity.

There are relatively many cases in which a force operating on interior lines, to
some extent, must judge its own actions on the basis of enemy moves relative to
its line of communications in its interior. This involves the danger that the
posture of withdrawal will be interdicted, and since it has weaknesses from the
start, tactics are particularly important for the force operating on interior
lines,
c. Changes in operations are sudden and frequent, and the tempo of the
operation is rapid.

An operation on interior lines essentially is an eccentric evolution. The

changes in evolution differ according to the posture of the force operating on
exterior lines, increases in space, etc., but usually the speed and change of
evolution are extremely large compared to those of the force operating on
exterior lines.
d. Advantages and disadvantages of operating on interior lines

(1) Advantages
(a) Subordinate units can be combined and kept in firm control,

(b) Enemy elements can be defeated one after another, piecemeal,

(2) Disadvantages

(a) It is difficult to see tactical opportunities, and there is a

tendency to lapse into passivity and, finally, be enveloped and
compressed.
 (b) In cases where the results of piecemeal defeat are incomplete,
there are subsequent difficulties*

The importance of concentrating combat power is as stated earlier, "but in carry-

ing out operations on interior lines, it is not absolutely necessary always to
have units in a concentrated posture, but they can be left in a posture where
they can be concentrated as desired. On the other hand, it must be noted that
there also are cases where there are disadvantages to being concentrated, such
as air attack.

Historical examples:

Napoleon's Lonato operation on interior lines (1T96, Italian Army against

the Austrian Army)

Middle Eastern war (l9675 campaign of the Israeli forces against the Arab
League)

3. Requirements for success in operations on interior lines

a. Superiority in command and control, particularly detecting tactical

opportunities, and decisive power

The operation on interior lines, since it is a posture that has weaknesses from
the beginning, as stated earlier, is an action in which tactics of opportunity,
skill of command, etc., exert great influence on the otrfecome.
Only in cases of skilful, economical use of combat
power, through maintaining freedom of tactical mobil-
ity and skillfully detecting and using tactical oppor-
tunities, can the great general gain victory.

b. Troops being elite and using mobile power well

Being in a defensive, passive posture, morale deteri- First

orates if troops are not elite; and on the other hand,
it is necessary for units to have great mobility for Mobile power
changing missions.
Fig, 39
c. Holding terrain for the purpose of effecting
piecemeal defeat. In other words, it is
having room to maneuver.

In Figure Uo, Yn < (V is the speed of

maneuver of B).

(l) X is the distance that permits

maintaining the terrain necessary for effect-
ing a piecemeal defeat and is outside the
limits of tactical support, Y is the time

- 50 -
required for the decisive "battle.
(2) In other words, during the decisive battle with enemy A, enemy B
cannot approach and envelop us. Also, it is necessary to be outside the support
distance of artillery, etc,, from the position of B,
(3) X and Y are mutually related and change according to the situation.
When X is close, it is necessary to have it resisted by one element,
d. If there are defects in the physical and intangible relationships be-
tween enemy forces and in their cooperative actions, it is even more advan-
tageous ,

In modern times of advanced signal-communications

measures, cooperation between forces operating on Drives
exterior lines is good, and attack by a force oper- forward
ating on interior lines is becoming increasingly
difficult, but advantageous conditions also occur
from battlefield mistakes, enemy errors, etc., and
it is necessary to detect these and have counter-
measures prepared to take advantage of them..
e. Having our transport in readiness
To change the employment of fighting
power, quick determination and ex-
cellent implementing power are
necessary; and to make this possible,
it is necessary to have all types of
transport in readiness and to strive
to ensure tactical mobility. At
such time, in particular, a neces-
sary condition is to secure the
transport routes.
f. Existence of terrain that can 1st battle
disperse (split) the enemy Fig,

In order to take advantage of the enemy having split strength Mountain

and to defeat him in detail, a prerequisite is to impose a ./;,/terrain /,,
posture of split strength on the enemy.
In other words, in the figure at the right, if the enemy
does not advance to point A, he cannot link up (use in
concert) a and b.
g. Having a terrain advantage suitable for the main
force defeating the enemy piecemeal while a part of
the force neutralizes a portion of the enemy
(Relationship between main operation and
supporting operation) Fig. U3

- 51 -
Explanation has been made concerning the above operation on interior lines, but
the primary objective of conducting an operation ^n interior lines may be said
to be to ensure freedom of tactical mobility, to take advantage of splits in
enemy strength, and to defeat the'. enemy in detail. Hence, directional orienta-
tion of the line of operations, selection of the objective, detecting oppor-
tunities to shift to other objectives, fast mobility, etc., are important major
factors determining the success or failure of operations on interior lines.
Also, in the conduct of operations, it is extremely important to maintain a
suitable balance between the main operation (main decisive front) and support-
ing operations (containment fronts).
Section 3. Defeating piecemeal

1. Meaning of defeating piecemeal

a. Defeating piecemeal is taking advantage of an occasion when the enemy,

timewise or topographically, is separated laterally or in depth and his total
combat power is not unified, and defeating one of the elements separately.

Also, the objective of defeating piecemeal is to gain local superiority over

one enemy element, to defeat enemy elements separately and successively, and to
gain a complete victory.

b. Defeating piecemeal, essentially, is a tactic of a weaker force and is

a tactic of opportunity responding to enemy action. Hence, there is a tendency
to slip into passivity and to be forestalled easily by the enemy. For this .
reason, to obtain its advantages, an eye for opportunity that seizes favorable
opportunities is particularly important. Its greatest element is time, and
herein is the principle of war.

2. Conditions fbr occurrence of defeating piecemeal

a. The enemy being in a posture of separated strength

Defeating piecemeal has as its greatest prerequisite,'taking advantage of the

enemy's separated strength.

(l) What is separated strength?

This is a situation in which, until completion of an operation (battle) against

the enemy in one location (one enemy element), the enemy elements in other
locations (other enemy elements) are separated so much from it in time or
distance that they exert no direct influence.

Note; Examination in isolation of a separated condition that makes possible

defeating piecemeal:

Distance of separation that is sought His as follows:H

X = D x H - M tin which:
D a distance that can be moved in one day
H = number of days to termination of battle in the one location
M = modulus distance (conversion into distance of the time necessary for a
reinforcing unit to deploy)
- 52 -
However, the side planning to defeat piecemeal cannot allow the opposing side
the freedom to concentrate combat power. Hence, if mobility is obstructed by
use of aircraft, road .blocks, etc,, even in cases of a short distance of
strength separation, defeating piecemeal may still occur; and conversely, even
if the distance is large, it does not necessarily occur. In short, other
factors actually exert a greater effect than distance alone on strength separa
tion, and is it necessary to consider the condition of strength separation in
terms of the time factor more than distance.

In other words, if one refers to the sketch map in the previous section,
para. 3.c., this also may be explained as

t= + K > Y din which:

t = separation time

K = interdiction time (including interdiction by aviation, obstacles,

or our units, enemy mistakes, etc.)

(2) Situations of definite strength separation shown in tactics

(a) Examples of lateral-separation situations

////
River
i
u
force

Pig, 1*5
Fig. kh

(b) Examples of situations of separation in depth

c. Landing operation d; Airborne operation (three-dimensional)

• i^ Early
pro-
/of con-
s*,"
**"''centra-
Cover | tion
for the I
coneen- £3 Cover of the
debouchement

- 53 -
 (3) Conditions for occurrence of situations of strength separation
If one considers cases in which a situation of strength separation occurs, one
thinks of "cases'of unavoidable separation" and "cases of voluntary separation."

(a) Cases of unavoidable separation

1_ Because of terrain conditions of the operational area

(terrain obstacles, extent of the battlefield, degree of
'logistic difficulty, etc,)

2_ Because of weather conditions (snowfall, etc.)

3_ Because of obstruction by the opponent (interdiction

operations, etc.)

J4_ Other (unskillful command and control, etc.)

(b) Cases of voluntary separation

Time when separation of strength is more advantageous

1_ When the basic disposition of combat power is dispersed.

(Particularly when concentration in a single area is
disadvantageous)

2_ When greater advantage is obtained by advancing in laterally

separated elements.

3. When secondary operations obtain major results.

The above classification is not necessarily a strict division. Separation of

combat power, considered from the viewpoint of the principles of war, is an
error and ordinarily should be avoided. Being in a situation where support is
impossible because of distance, may be considered an exception and, in many
cases, the condition is created by II enemy U action or occurs because it is
fostered Cby the enemyU.

b. Piecemeal defeat occurring through taking advantage of enemy errors

Being in a posture of separated strength naturally can be considered an error;
and, in final analysis, being forced, against one's will, into a posture of
separated strength also must be judged a defect in command and control and in
tactical capability,
(l) Main causes for the error of separation of strength on the
battlefield

(a) Deficiency in signal communications, shortcomings in mutual

understanding (relationship between the First and Second Armies
of the Russian force in the Battle of Tannenberg)
 (b) Unskillful tactical control (Russian Army's defense of Nanshan
in the Russo-Japanese War)
(c) Forcing a posture of separation (failure of the Russian forces
in imposing separation on the Japanese forces1 First Army
before the Battle of Mukden Cl'9053)

(2) From a posture of separation

(a) Error in strength deployment----—------______

""" ""^HLiateral separation
("b) Error in reinforcement or concentration><C^
^^-^^ in depth
(c) EiTor in revelation of plans -^^ ' '

We cannot afford, however, to plan and carry out operations with an opponent's
error as a prerequisite. If an error is discovered, it should be used effec-
tively, and attention must be given to the paragraphs below.

c. Occurrence of piecemeal defeat is controlled by operational posture

A force operating on exterior lines, because of its posture, in general, cannot

defeat in detail a force operating on interior lines, but the force operating on
interior lines can easily effect a piecemeal defeat. However, even for a force
operating on interior lines, as it is compressed into an enveloped situation,
this opportunity decreases.

The difference between an enveloped posture and a posture on interior lines is

very small. They cannot be differentiated numerically, but if the enemy attack-
ing from all surrounding directions can maintain tactical coordination among its
elements, there would thereafter be envelopment, and defeating CitU piecemeal
would be difficult or impossible.

d. Superiority must be maintainable at least on that battlefield

An inferior force that cannot maintain local superiority may be said to lack
capability. Superiority is not limited simply to the quantity of strength, but
is a concept formed by combination of tangible and intangible elements (includ-
ing items derived from morale, state of training, quality of command, posture,
etc.). However, on the battlefield, it is, difficult, in many cases, to be able
to determine this in advance.
e. The aggressive spirit of both sides is an important condition

Defeating piecemeal, essentially, is a tactic of the inferior force, and if it

is incomplete or fails, [that forcel slips into the worst posture and, at the
best Cfor the opponent 1, could be completely annihilated. Hence, defeating
piecemeal is easily brought about by turning the enemy's offensive spirit
against him or by fostering that. The reason is that it is easy to organize a
battle of extermination by reverse use of shock, (On reverse use of shock, see
Part TV.)

- 55 -
 f. In regard to defeating piecemeal in the second and subsequent attacks,
it is governed by limitations on the capability of double and triple use
of combat power and by general circumstances.

The achievement of defeats in detail in the second and subsequent attacks is

affected by the outcome of the first attack and by the general situation of both
sides. The nature of the results of the first attack becomes a condition in the
repeated use of combat power, and at that time, the general situation must be
alleviated at least to the extent of permitting repeated use of our combat
power. In historical examples, many cases end with the second attack.

g. Having superior intelligence capability that is able to learn the

general situation of the enemy

In fact, it is important to know not only about the front where a piecemeal
defeat is being imposed, but also, regularly, about enemy developments on other
fronts.

Note; The paragraphs below repeat explanations of the prerequisites for success
in operations on interior lines, and both should be studied together.

h. From the extent of separation of strength, that is, the existence of an

area necessary for defeating piecemeal

Separation of strength, as stated earlier, is influenced greatly by other fac-

tors (physical, spiritual) added to the pure distance of separation. In partic-
ular, it is necessary to be favored with natural geographic conditions that
cause separation of the strength of the enemy or are suitable for continuing it
for a long period of time. On the other hand, it is necessary for these areas
to have geographic conditions suitable for our being able quickly to conclude a
decisive battle, and it is unsuitable to have terrain that is difficult for the
decisive battle, permitting tough resistance by the enemy, or that is terrain
disadvantageous to our tactical mobility.

i. Having air superiority and superior tactical (general) movement

capability

In modern warfare, air superiority is an absolute condition, and even if ground

strength is inferior, defeating in detail may be achieved.

j. Superiority in command and control capability

For the commander, particularly the commanding general, decision-making ability
and discernment and the courage to take risky decisive action are particularly
necessary. In the battle in East Prussia in 191^, under approximately the same
conditions, General von Prittwitz, planning to defeat in detail, abandoned his
determination in mid-course and withdrew; and on the other hand, for General
von Hindenburg, this is the good example of gaining a brilliant victory in the
Battle of Tannenberg. Considering that defeating piecemeal is a tactic in an
extremely difficult situation, the commander must have a mental attitude to cope
with it.

-56 -
Important prerequisites for. achieving a defeat in detail have been discussed
above, but there are extremely few situations where these conditions are
complete. Hence, along with striving to create the conditions, it is necessary
to carry out operations with daring determination and boldness.

Historical examples;

Napoleon's operation on interior lines in Cthe Battle ofJ. Lonato

The Battle of Tannenberg and the Battle of the Masurian Lakes

Hideyoshifs Battle of Shizugatake CISSSU

Operations of Japanese forces on Pacific Ocean islands

3. Cautionary items concerning carrying out the defeat in detail

a. Selection of the objective of attack

In defeating in detail, the objective that should be attacked first is selected

from those that have the following characteristics:

(1) Enemy element that is easy to defeat

(2) Enemy element that is most important as a threat

At that time, it is most advantageous if the element that is the objective to be

defeated first is the enemy's center of gravity (pivot), that iss the enemy's
main force. Also, defeating in detail differs in method according to the situ-
ation of strength separation of the enemy relative to us, and for an enemy in a
situation separated in depth, in many cases, consideration of this CfactorD
would not be necessary.

b. Not permitting the link-up of other enemy elements while defeating one
enemy element. (Keeping pressure on the separated situation)

(1) Making suitable selection of a battlefield

A battlefield is selected that has terrain that necessitates the desired degree
of separation and blocks uniting of enemy combat power, that is easy for our
tactical mobility and conduct of warfare, and that would let us carry out a
quick, decisive battle while not permitting enemy link-up.

(2) Having a suitable direction of operations (attack)

It is necessary to select a direction where enemy link-up is difficult (con-

versely, a direction that increases separation) or a direction where the results
of the operation (attack) can directly affect the second enemy element.

Now, the direction that can obtain the greatest results, in many cases, is the
direction that is most dangerous for its relation to us or to oiar line of com-
munications, and for this reason, sufficient countermeasures are necessary. As
- 57 -
in the analogy, "without entering the tiger's den, you cannot capture its cubs,"
obtaining major results is accompanied by risks, and in achieving a defeat in
detail, it also is important to apply the principle of war of the relationship
of "risk and result."

(3) Direct obstruction of link-up with, and reinforcement of, other

enemy elements

It is necessary to respond to the enemy on fronts outside the decisive battle

with the minimum necessary strength and to contain superior enemy elements for
a desired period of time.

c. Acting quickly. Acting completely.

(1) The value of the time period is decisive.

When there is insufficient rapidity in the decisive battle, that will permit
coordination of forces operating on exterior lines, and defeating them in detail
becomes impossible.

Also, determination, speed of positioning, and use of tactical mobility are

especially important.

In regard to the use of tactical mobility, there are necessary, of course, com-
plete tactical mobility of the force-itself, and also measures to maintain
freedom of movement, particularly obstruction of movement and defeat of coor-
dination of the enemy, and preempting and securing key positions that can secure
our freedom of movement, as well as holding and complete security of our axis
of operations.
(2) Boldness, decisive action from a crushing disposition of forces

When achieving defeat is incomplete, as already explained, later difficulty will

occur, and this has many historical lessons, irrespective of whether it is a
defeat in detail. Particularly in defeat in detail, since this has a repercus-
sion directly affecting the entire operation, it is important to aim at complete
disposition effecting decisive action enveloping or encircling the enemy on the
battlefield, etc.
d. Concentration of combat power at the decisive-battle point

In cases of defeating in detail, the characteristic of this operation may be

said to be that each operation is a decisive battle and that relative combat
power always is superior in each decisive battle. For this reason, one should
win beginning with the first operation, in every engagement there is a decisive
point, and separation and withdrawal are not permitted. Hence, decisive combat
power is concentrated at each decisive point (decisive area), and combat power
on the containment front is the minimum limit, without one excess, poorly
stationed soldier.
 e. Perception and use of tactical opportunities and of changes in the
situation

It is necessary to have superiority in command and control, characterized "by

having use of time as its greatest value, detecting favora"ble opportunities for
attack against the enemy and perceiving time opportunities for change of tactics.
In particular, the extent of victory (defeating) and change in use of combat
power, change from operation on interior lines to operation on exterior lines,
etc., are extremely important.
f. Importance of collection of intelligence information

Along with local intelligence information, intelligence information that can

explain the overall situation is particularly important throughout the entire
course of an operation. The victory of Tannenberg, where clear-text communica-
tions were intercepted, the victory in which Napoleon near Vauchamps attacked an
enemy force that was advancing without knowing that its advance column had "been
attacked and defeated, etc., are the difference of a very short period of time
in the collection of intelligence information and speak pointedly of its
importance.

Defeating in detail is a tactic of a weaker force and may be said to be a tactic

of opportunity that responds to enemy actions. Hence, its success, in many
cases, is due to the ability of the commander, particularly of the commanding
general. In regard to this combat, Sun Tzu, Military Strength, CChapterU No. 5,
states, "A bird of prey's swiftly getting to break Cits prey's *back3 is the
timing. For this reason, a good fighter uses force fiercely and timing pre-
cisely." (CIn other words,U a skilled fighter, with strong impact force at the
moment of attack, acts with blitz action and quick reaction, giving no time for
counteraction.) Acting in this way is considered to be the secret of defeating
in detail. Also, modern warfare is three-dimensional warfare, it is important
not to permit combining ground and air combat-power, and one must not forget
first to defeat piecemeal with air power and to gain air superiority.

Note; Effect of a situation of separation in depth on the selection of attack

points

1, The main objective in selection of attack points is to defeat in detail.

2. Selection of a point of attack cannot be decided merely from the conditions

for defeating the enemy on that front. The situation of the reinforcement
(rear) units also must be considered. The main way of looking at the matter is
whether to interdict the enemy's route of withdrawal or to strike his rear.

3* Conditions that should be considered in selecting points to be attacked

a. The enemy that is confronted

Military strength (large or small), strength of the position (strong or weak),

configuration of position (frontal position or flank position, etc.)

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 b. Reinforcement units

Military strength (large or small), time (fast or slow, amount of effect on the
fighting of the confronted enemy, that is, state of separation), direction
(enemy's line of communications and direction of advance)

c. Our posture
Envelopment or breakthrough; direction of line of communications

d. Terrain

Key terrain that could lead to defeating in detail

^, Examples of selection of the point of attack

a. Case where strength b,. Case where strength

separation is large separation is small

Attack aiming at collapse

Distant /# of the position of the
(reinforcement) &]/ confronted enemy element
Interdiction *//„ , *ha* is near (appears
of the route / '^^ *o bepar* of JJ*
defense
' of withdrawal strength)
Fig, 1*8 Fig. U9
Chapter IV, Antiamphibious and Anti-Air-Landing Operations

1, Weaknesses of amphibious and air-landing operations

The greatest weakness in amphibious and air-landing operations is the time when
the amphibious and air-landing units are at sea or airborne. Next is the stage
of establishment of a beachhead (airhead), when the application of organized
combat power is difficult, particularly near the water's edge in amphibious
operations, that is, a situation of strength separation in depth with one foot
on land and one foot at sea.

However, amphibious and air-landing units regularly take countermeasures to

cover these weaknesses in landings.

2, Characteristics of antiamphibious and anti-air-landing operations

a. ¥e are passive, (it is not known where the enemy will come,) In other
words, the enemy definitely has the initiative.

b. There are many beginnings of engagements. (Serious consideration of

beginning an engagement—It governs subsequent fortunes.)

c. There regularly are simultaneous antiamphibious or antiairborne

engagements,

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 d. Engagements occur suddenly, and their course is rapid. (The "balance
between victory and defeat changes within a short time period.)

e. Weaknesses of amphibious and air-landing units disappear with the

passage of time.

f. The initial engagements generally exert great influence on subsequent

operations,

g. The initial stage is a situation of divided combat power on both sides,

h. Our air and naval strength ordinarily is inferior,

i. Amphibious and air-landing operations are deficient in flexibility. In

other words, correcting action is ineffective,

3, Essence of antiamphibious and anti-air-landing operations

a. The essence of the First stage Second stage

antiamphibious and anti-air-
landing operation is an offen- Strength
sive operation, concentrating
tangible and intangible combat
power prior to establishment
of the enemy's beachhead (air-
head) and defeating the landed
enemy at an early stage.

b. The essence of the

operation in the stage of es
tablishment of the enemy's
beachhead (airhead) is to de- Fig. 51
stabilize the combat situation,
concentrate decisive combat power, and strike. At that time, resolute defense
of key positions on the battlefield is particularly important.

c. In summary of the above, the essence of antiamphibious and anti-air-

landing operations, in the end, is a race to concentrate combat power at landing
points, and victory in this wins victory in the antiamphibious and anti-air-
landing operations.

Historical examples:

Examples of success in amphibious operations:

The Normandy landing operation of the Allied forces

Various operations of U.S. forces on Pacific islands (Saipan, Guam, Iwo

Jim, Okinawa, etc*-)
The Malay landing operation of the Japanese forces

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 Example of failure In an amphibious operation:

The Gallipoli landing operation

Part IV. TURNING AN ENEMY'S COMBAT POWER AGAINST HIMSELF

Chapter I. Reverse Use and Manipulation of Momentum

1, Meaning of reverse use of momentum

a. Momentum
The term momentum, as used here, means the power of the enemy's offensive drive
against us. In other words, it indicates the will and power and action of the
offensive drive.
b. Reverse use of momentum

Reverse use of momentum is a principle of war that uses an enemy's momentum in

reverse, seeking to seize superiority in use of relative combat power, and it
has a thread of connection with the judo secret of "using the opponent's
strength, applying our trick, and throwing the opponent."

c. Characteristics of reverse use of momentum

(1) If this principle of war is applied skillfully, the enemy can be

forced into a decisive battle, or the opportunity can be grasped for a battle
of extermination.
Also, to some extent, the greater the enemy's momentum, the greater the success
will be, and a small force can well deliver a crushing blow to a large enemy
force.

(2) In other words, initially, the enemy is caused to apply this mo-
mentum fully, and since, with our resistance, the enemy's momentum decreases
during the course of the. engagement and we gain superiority in posture, in the
end, we gain superiority xin relative combat power and attempt to defeat
(destroy) the enemy.

(3) When the enemy's momentum is taken from the enemy, it is greater
for us if the terrain includes a lure.

A lure is constituted in cases where the enemy is judged superior in relative

posture and in combat power and able to destroy or defeat us, or in cases where
there is a key terrain position that controls the battlefield or definitely
should be secured for the conduct of military operations.

2. Decoying, entrapping

a. Meaning of decoying and entrapping

Decoying and entrapping mean the management of enemy momentum with the aim of
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