De Lima vs Gatdula/Writ of Amparo

Principle: A writ of Amparo is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action as such the rules on summary procedure will not apply.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Pampilo is correct in applying the Rules in Summary Procedure to a Petition for a
Petition for a Writ of Amparo.

Rullng:

No, Judge Pampilo is not correct. The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that
the Court has devised for the following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases: (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x (2) All other cases, except
probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases: (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations (2) Violations of the rental law (3)
Violations of municipal or city ordinances (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the rules on summary procedure will only apply in cases filed in the
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. On the other hand, a writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

Case Title: JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA, SR.

Doctrine: Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged involved is an ordinance.

Case Title: Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., also known as ARARO Party-list vs.
Commission on Elections

Principles: Civil Procedure; Real Party in interest: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The
party’s interest must be direct, substantial, and material.
Case Title: LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION.

2. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order
of default.

2. No. The Supreme Court held that after notice of the declaration of default but before the court
renders the default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default.
The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Excusable negligence is
"one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." The circumstances should
be properly alleged and proved.

In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered
judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable
negligence. Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take
steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside
order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only "conveniently blamed its
counsel for the late filing of the answer" without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not
excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.

3. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

3. No. The Supreme Court held that Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit." It exists when "another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action." The subsequent action is
"unnecessary and vexatious" and is instituted to "harass the respondent [in the subsequent action]."
The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;

(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and

(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case
filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to
nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass
either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA.

ISSUE: Does the Shari’a District Court has jusrisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a
muslim even if it decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code?

RULING:

The Shari’a District Court has NO jurisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein
the parties involved are Muslims. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable
solely when both parties are Muslims". When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed
before the regular courts.

MADARANG vs. SPOUSES MORALES.

Petition for Relief

ISSUE: Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence.

RULING: The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should strictly comply
with two reglementary periods:

(a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside; and

(b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict
compliance with these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a
final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the
fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality
in order at last to put an end to litigation.

The double period rule, as an exception rather than the rule, must be strictly observed. Thus, the
decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.

Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for
relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court should
have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
CATHAY METAL CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC./SUMMONS

ISSUE: Whether there is valid service of summons thru registered mail.

RULING: Respondent was not validly served with summons.

The Rules of Court provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers.
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. If
summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may
be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.

CITY OF DAGUPAN vs. ESTER F. MARAMBA/Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the City’s legal counsel on lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is
excusable negligence that allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment?

2. When to reckon the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment?