PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN

PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY

OPTIONS
Final report of PIPS analyses and expert consultations
since July 2021

| Lead researcher & author: Safdar Sial

| Desk research and fieldwork: Hufsa Farooq, Osama Ahmad, Fizza Batool
Urooj Mumtaz, Roha Naz
| IT support: Hazrat Bilal
 Copyright © PIPS (May 2023). All rights reserved.

No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval

system, or transmitted in any form or by any means without any prior permission
in writing from the publisher of this book.

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 Contents
1. INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY 1

2. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS 3

3. RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN 11

3.1 Government and officials 11

3.2 Political and religious parties 15
3.3 Religious organizations 18
3.4 Militant groups 20
3.5 Civil society 21
3.6 Military leadership 23
3.7 Media commentary 24

4. EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS 25

5. FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN 45

6. PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

59

6.1 Pakistan's misplaced optimism and growing concerns 60

6.2 Ties with the Taliban regime: developments and prospects 64

The Taliban takeover and aftermath: Pakistan's perspective and role ................... 66

The recognition issue ................................................................................................................ 69

Humanitarian aid and assistance .......................................................................................... 71

Border insecurity and TTP incursions and attacks .......................................................... 77

6.3 Pakistan's Taliban-mediated talks with TTP 78

6.4 Factors of anti-Pakistan sentiments in Afghanistan 83
6.5 The refugee issue 89

7. AFGHANISTAN IN THE EMERGING GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND

DEVELOPMENTS 95
7.1 International concerns and responses 95
7.2 Multilateral events and developments and engagement with Taliban 100
7.3 International responses to the refugee issue 105
7.4 World's humanitarian aid & economic support 107
7.5 The Taliban's recognition plea and world response 109
7.6 Emerging geopolitical dynamics and positions 110

8. PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS 119

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS) is grateful to The Royal Norwegian Embassy
in Islamabad for its generous support to this project, allowing the organization to
conduct policy-driven research and hold expert consultations highlighting the role
Pakistan can play in promoting peace and stability in Afghanistan.

Likewise, PIPS is thankful to all the learned resource persons, who shared their
expert knowledge on the subject with the PIPS research team through interviews
and personal communications, as well participants of expert consultations on
Afghan peace and reconciliations. PIPS hopes to benefit from their knowledge and
insights in the future too.
1. Introduction & methodology

With the aim of strengthening Pakistan’s support for the peace and reconciliation
in Afghanistan, Pak Institute for Peace Studies initiated a comprehensive research
and advocacy program in July 2021. The overarching aim or goal pursued two
linked objectives of improving knowledge-base and awareness of key stakeholders
on Pakistan’s Afghan perspective and role in Afghan peace and reconciliation; and
updating policy options and recommendations for Pakistani government and civil
society. To achieve these objectives, PIPS implemented three types of activities or
measures, including:

(i) Monitoring and analysis of the opinions of different segments of Pakistani

society and state institutions on Afghanistan’s political, social and security
situations and their perceived impact on Pakistan.

(ii) Engagement with subject specialists and experts to produce analytical

papers or research reports on different topics structured around the themes
of Afghan conflict and peace process as seen from Pakistani perspective.

(iii) Establishment of a ‘network of resource persons’ and their participation in

quarterly consultations to discuss multiple aspects of Afghan conflict and
political reconciliation and suggest policy options and strategies to the
government of Pakistan and other stakeholders with the aim to support
Afghan peace and reconciliation and tackle the trickledown effect of Afghan
situation including in terms of militancy and insecurity, among other things.

The outcomes of all these implemented measures were documented and

published in the form of 8 quarterly monitors titled "Perspectives from Pakistan on
Afghan peace and reconciliation," a same number of expert consultation reports,
and 16 analytical papers embodied in 8 quarterly situation reviews titled
"Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan."
 INTRODUCTION & METHODOLOGY

This policy-oriented final report builds upon the findings of the entire PIPS
monitoring and analysis produced as well as consultations held over the project
course.

The main focus of this report is placed on exploring, analysing and informing
Pakistan’s policy responses and options to support Afghan peace and stability. It
comprises eight chapters. While chapter 2 provides a brief historical background
of Pak-Afghan ties, chapter 3 narrates official and public responses from Pakistan
since the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. Chapter 4 analyses the
challenges confronting the Taliban-led government in Afghanistan and the
following chapter discusses the fallout of emerging Afghan situation on Pakistan.
Chapter 6 offers a detailed account of challenges and opportunities in Pakistan’s
bilateral engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan. Chapter 7 evaluates
evolving geopolitical dynamics and developments in relation to Afghanistan
including international concerns and responses, the refugee issue, humanitarian
aid and assistance, the recognition issue, as well as an analysis of geopolitical
machinations and standpoints on Afghanistan and regional politics. The eighth and
last chapter exclusively focuses Pakistan’s Afghan policy challenges and options as
well as policy recommendations.

2
2. Historical background of Pak-Afghan relations

Bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have always been more or
less uneasy. Afghanistan had started to promote the idea of annexing Pakistan’s
Pashtun-dominated areas immediately after the founding of Pakistan and
continued troubling it in this regard through the 1950s and 1960s to the late 1970s.
The Pashtun-dominated Parcham (Flag) party in Afghanistan made a few
lackadaisical attempts to promote the idea of a greater Pashtunistan as an
independent country that would be constituted by the Pashtun-dominated areas
of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Although the idea never became popular in either
country, it heightened Pakistan’s security concerns about its western border.
Nonetheless, Afghanistan continued to challenge Pakistan over the Durand Line
“through diplomatic pressure, tribal incursions, and support for secessionist
movements” in Pakistan.1

To counter such perceived threat and moves by Afghanistan, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s
government had started supporting the anti-Daud resistance movement (mainly
Islamist leaders Burhanuddin Rabbani and Gulbadin Hekmatyar) in Afghanistan as
early as 1973 in the form of providing weapons and clandestine guerrilla training.
Later, during Ziaul Haq’s rule in Pakistan, these Afghan leaders continued to receive
funding, training and equipment from Pakistan. Both leaders were also on good
terms with Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami.2

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the subsequent Soviet-Afghan war (1979-
89) gave Pakistan the opportunity to counter the notion of a greater Pashtunistan

1
Ashley J. Tellis, “Creating new facts on the ground: why the diplomatic surge cannot yet produce a regional
solution in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Policy Brief 91, May 2011,
<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/afghan_policy.pdf>
2
Safdar Sial, "Pakistan’s role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980," NOREF Norwegian
Peacebuilding Resource Centre, May 2013.
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

and Indian and Soviet influences in Afghanistan, and to attempt to install a friendly
government there. Although the war was called a “jihad” against “Soviet infidels”,
there is a near consensus among political analysts that Pakistan’s decision to
support the Afghan Islamist resistance groups in the 1970s and 1980s was strategic
and not ideological in nature.3 General Zia’s use of religion as a motivating factor
was merely a tactical move to obtain recruits and funds for the war and also to
justify it. Similarly, the Pashtun ethnic ethos was used to persuade tribesmen in the
north-west of Pakistan to fight along with their Pashtun brothers in Afghanistan
against Soviet aggression and the occupation of their land.

Not all of the Afghan mujahideen groups received equal treatment from Pakistan
in terms of the channelling of funds and weapons to them and training. Pakistan
expected that extremist Pashtun groups and those friendly to Pakistan would be
able to “transcend ethnic divisions and denounce the traditional Afghan claim on
Pashtunistan.”4 Pakistan’s former prime minister, Benazir Bhutto, described the
strategic purpose of Zia regime’s selective treatment of mujahideen groups in the
following words:5

There were significant elements within it [the Afghan mujahideen] that were
more open to cooperation and civility with the West, and there were hard-
liners. But the hard-liners were supported by General Zia … the ISI, looking
beyond the end of the war, seemed keen on developing close working
relations with these elements within the mujahideen whom they would try
to empower to rule the new Afghanistan and give Pakistan strategic depth

3
M. Amir Rana & Safdar Sial, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: a common security perspective,” Conflict and Peace
Studies (2013), 5(1), April: 9-34.
4
Frederic Grare, “Pakistan-Afghanistan relations in the post-9/11 era,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, South Asia Project Paper no. 72, 2006.
5
Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West (London: Simon & Schuster, 2008), 113-14.

4
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

by extending Islamabad’s influence northward to counter Kabul’s traditional

ties with India.

While Pakistan was courting mujahideen groups to seek strategic depth 6 in

Afghanistan, India considered it extremely important that Afghanistan should not
fall under Pakistani influence. Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi had told the
Soviet president in 1987 that such a scenario would be absolutely unacceptable to
India.7 Afghan president Najibullah told his Soviet counterpart during his meeting
with him in Moscow on August 23, 1990, that India was pursuing its own interests
in connection with Kashmir and was “stubbornly trying to involve Afghanistan in
opposing Pakistan without trying very eagerly to give specific support to settling
the Afghan problem.” 8

During the 1990s Afghanistan witnessed the fall of the Najibullah regime, a
subsequent civil war and then the rise of the Afghan Taliban to power, during which
the country became a hub for an assortment of militant groups, including al-
Qaeda, Central Asian militants, and Pakistani sectarian and jihadist groups. During
this period four democratically elected governments, two each of the Pakistan
People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League- Nawaz, alternately ruled Pakistan, but
none completed its due term. Pakistan’s Afghan policy remained more or less the
same as during the Soviet-Afghan war, although now with limited resources and

6
The strategic depth doctrine was designed to use Afghanistan as a buffer to counter Indian and (previously)
Soviet encirclement of Pakistan.
7
Safdar Sial, "Pakistan’s role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980."
8
Ibid.

5
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

leverage on political stakeholders in Afghanistan.9 As in the 1980s, Pakistan’s

security establishment largely led Pakistan’s Afghan policy during these years. 10

The Taliban emerged as a direct consequence of this civil war. Under the
leadership of a seminary teacher, Mullah Omer, the Taliban drew up a minimum
agenda: to restore peace, disarm the population, enforce sharia law, and defend
Islam in Afghanistan.11 Besides military and financial support, Pakistan also
provided political support to the Taliban regime in collaboration with Saudi Arabia.
During Benazir Bhutto’s second government in 1993 Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam leader
Maulana Fazlur Rahman “made several trips as chairman of the National
Assembly’s Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
States to seek financial and military help for the Taliban.”12 The role of the then-
interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, was also very significant in this way. Benazir
Bhutto claimed in her book, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West, that her
government encouraged the Taliban to work with the international community.13
Pakistan Muslim League governments led by Nawaz Sharif (1990-93 and 1997-99)
did not make any difference as far as Pakistan’s Afghan policy was concerned.
According to some counts Nawaz liked, admired, and wanted to emulate the
Afghan Taliban and even tried to pass legislation during his second term that

9
Ibid.
10
Hussain Haqqani, “The role of Islam in Pakistan’s future,” Washington Quarterly (2004), 28(1), Winter: 85-
96.
11
Safdar Sial, “Taliban on the march: threat assessment and security implications for the region.” Peace and
Security Review (2009), 2(2), April: 18-35.
12
Stephen F. Burgess, “Struggle for the control of Pakistan: Musharraf takes on the Islamist radicals,” In Barry
R. Schneider & Jerrold M. Post, eds. Know Thy Enemy: Profiles of Adversary Leaders and Their Strategic
Cultures (Alabama: USAF Counterproliferation Centre, 2003).
13
Benazir Bhutto, Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West.

6
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

would grant authoritarian powers to the Pakistani chief executive similar to those
held by Mullah Omer in Afghanistan.14

The foreign militants, including those from Pakistan, saw a ray of hope and started
concentrating in Kandahar, where the Taliban movement originated. Osama bin
Laden also moved his headquarters there. Most observers agree that Pakistan's
Afghan policy coupled with developments in Afghanistan militarized and
radicalized the Pakistani-Afghan border areas. It also politically isolated Pakistan
because no other country in the region was happy with either the Taliban or
Pakistan’s support for it. Pakistan was one of the three nations that had recognized
the Taliban government, the other two being Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates.15

India, Iran and Russia supported the Northern Alliance against the Taliban, fearing
that the Arab, Central Asian and Pakistani militant groups sheltered in Afghanistan
could create security challenges for them. India was concerned about the Kashmir-
focused Pakistani militant groups’ nexus with the Taliban and the Arab and Central
Asian militant groups. Vehement Saudi support for the Taliban and its involvement
in sectarian-related killings in Mazar-e-Sharif heightened Iranian concerns. The
fears of regional and other countries were further strengthened after the Taliban
gradually came under the influence of the global jihadist network Al-Qaeda, which,
according to Ahmad Rashid, “had a strong desire to keep the Taliban isolated from
the world, but too dependent on its financial and logistic support base as a means

14
Ibid.
15
Ahmed Rashid, “Pakistan’s coup: planting the seeds of democracy?” Current History, December 1999: 409-
14.

7
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

of tactic and strategy”. He further notes that between 1996 and 2001 al-Qaeda
trained an estimated 30,000 militants from around the world in Afghanistan.16

Al-Qaeda’s September 11, 2001, terror strikes in the US revealed the intensity of
the danger the Taliban regime in Afghanistan posed by its sheltering of al-Qaeda
and other terrorists. Pakistan once again became the frontline ally of the US in the
ensuing war on terror in Afghanistan, but this time against the Taliban regime that
it had groomed and supported. By joining the US-led war on terror, President
Pervez Musharraf tried to avoid Pakistan’s isolation from the world and its being
bracketed with the militants, counter India’s possible rise in the Afghan theatre,
and secure political legitimacy and financial assistance for his regime. 17

After coming to power in 2008 the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)-led coalition
government provided full support to the army in its counter-militancy campaign in
KP and the erstwhile FATA. However, as in the country’s internal security activities,
the army also had the leading role in the security and defence aspects of Pakistan’s
foreign policy towards Afghanistan and in the US-led war on terror. With regard to
the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan’s traditional approach of inertness continued despite
repeated requests from the international allies in Afghanistan for Pakistan to act
against the Taliban and threats to force it to do so. Meanwhile, Pakistan continued
to regard India’s political, economic and military activities in Afghanistan with
suspicion. Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s signing of a strategic partnership with
India in October 2011 further increased Pakistan’s fears that it was being
marginalized in Afghanistan.18

16
Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos (London: Penguin, 2008): 16.
17
Safdar Sial, "Pakistan’s role and strategic priorities in Afghanistan since 1980."
18
Ibid.

8
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Unlike his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, Afghan president Ashraf Ghani has adopted
a policy of rapprochement towards Pakistan. To that end he delayed the
implementation of the strategic partnership agreement with India, sought close
ties with Pakistan’s security establishment, and instituted specific initiatives to
alleviate Pakistani concerns over cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, managed
to bring Taliban representatives to the negotiation table in Murree on July 7, 2015.
The fledgling Afghan government-Taliban peace process derailed after the
announcement of the death of Mullah Omar.19 The news not only derailed the
fledgling peace process, but also exposed and increased internal rifts among the
Taliban leaders, besides prompting the new Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar
Mansoor, to take a hardliner stance to appease the dissident Taliban commanders
who did not want to engage in talks with the Afghan government. Consequently,
the Taliban reverted to their traditional stance – that they would not hold talks with
the government until international forces are completely withdrawn from the
country and the Afghan government’s agreements in this regard are abrogated –
and increased their attacks inside Afghanistan. Secondly, the announcement of
Omar’s death took the level of trust between Pakistan and Afghanistan back to that
of the pre-Ghani era, when the two countries were caught in the mutual blame
game of not doing enough to stop cross-border terrorism and providing sanctuary
to the other’s militants.20

Meanwhile, since the US-Taliban February 2020 deal in Doha, Pakistan’s responses
on the Afghan situation have remained oriented around some of its key strategic
as well as geoeconomics foreign policy objectives. Before the Taliban takeover of
Kabul, Pakistan repeatedly asserted that it supported a negotiated settlement of

19
Safdar Sial, "Pakistani-Afghan relations after Karzai," NOREF Peacebuilding Resource Centre, February
2016.
20
Ibid.

9
 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

the Afghan conflict led by the intra-Afghan reconciliation process. Pakistan

opposed the Taliban taking over Afghanistan militarily and frequently stated that
it did not want the Afghan soil to be used for perpetrating and supporting
terrorism against Pakistan. At the same time Pakistan did not support the idea of
a “hasty” U.S. withdrawal. Responding to Ghani administration’s allegations,
Pakistani officials reiterated time and again that their country could not be blamed
for the failures of the Afghan government or international community in bringing
peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan. Pakistan also tended to softly handle the
Taliban, who some ministers said were now ‘wise’ and ‘civilized’.

On 15th of August Kabul fell at the hands of the Taliban. At the outset, as will be
described in the following section, most in Pakistan welcomed the Taliban's
takeover. But it took no more than few months for Pakistan to realize that its
optimism in the Taliban was misplaced. The Afghan Taliban have since distanced
themselves from the matter of the TTP, a key Pakistani concern, and have now
publicly taken a position that the TTP is an internal problem of Pakistan, and that
Afghan soil is not being used against any country including Pakistan. They have
also said that “the Taliban’s track record has been consistent. The group doesn’t
turn on its militant allies. It didn’t turn on Al-Qaeda, so why would it turn on the
TTP, with which the Taliban has been ideologically aligned with for years?” 21
Nonetheless, they have taken nationalistic stand on the Durand Line and Pakistan's
border fencing triggering insecurity and occasional skirmishes at the border.

21
Michael Kugelman, a senior associate for South Asia at the Wilson Center quoted by Shah Meer Baloch &
Hannah Ellis-Petersen, “North-west Pakistan in grip of deadly Taliban resurgence”, The Guardian, January 31,
2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/31/terrorists-north-west-pakistan-deadly-taliban-
resurgence>

10
3. Responses from Pakistan since Taliban takeover
of Afghanistan22

3.1 Government and officials

After the Taliban takeover of Kabul, most official and public responses from
Pakistan were welcoming. Some government officials even described it as victory
for Pakistan and defeat of India. Pakistan urged the international community to
engage with the Taliban and not leave Afghanistan alone in an effort to avoid
humanitarian crisis, governance collapse as well as a possible civil war. Pakistan has
also been influencing the US and other stakeholders to reactivate the funding
channels to Afghanistan and unfreeze its assets. Similarly, Pakistan has been
facilitating the international community's efforts to provide humanitarian aid to the
country. Still, Pakistan may not be the first country to recognize the Taliban
government because there are many political risks and security threats attached to
that. Pakistan has made its stance clear time and again that it would take its own
decision regarding Afghanistan following in the footsteps of the international
community, and not recognize the Afghan government unilaterally.

Moreover, Pakistan unflinchingly defended its standpoint on the inclusive nature

of Afghan government. For instance, in an extended Troika meeting held in
Islamabad in November 2021,23 it called on the Taliban to work with fellow Afghans
to take steps to form an inclusive and representative government that respects the
rights of all Afghans and provides for the equal rights of women and girls to
participate in all aspects of Afghan society. However, Pakistan’s anxiety about the

22
This section largely builds upon 8 quarterly monitors PIPS has produced since July 2021, titled
"Perspectives from Pakistan on Afghan peace and reconciliation." These monitors can be seen here:
<https://www.pakpips.com/publications>
23
On November 11, 2021, Islamabad hosted a meeting of the extended Troika, comprising Pakistan, China,
Russia and the United States to discuss the latest situation in Afghanistan.
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

Afghan refugees, as it already hosted about three million registered and

unregistered Afghan refugees from previous wars, made it declare that it cannot
afford to host more due to its devastated economy.

Pakistan hosted the 17th Extraordinary Session of the Council of Foreign Ministers
of Organization of Islamic Cooperation on December 19, 2021, at the National
Assembly Hall with 20 foreign ministers and 10 deputy foreign ministers in
attendance from across the Muslim world. Pakistan hosted the session to hold
discussions with the international community and United Nations system for
unlocking financial and banking channels for delivery of resources to the people of
Afghanistan.

Pakistan took special actions to synergize various streams of efforts on Afghanistan

across the government, including international coordination for humanitarian
assistance and effective border management to prevent any negative spillover into
Pakistan. In this regard, Pakistan’s federal government set up a 22-member high-
level Afghanistan Inter-ministerial Coordination Cell (AICC). During the first Apex
Committee meeting of the AICC, held in Islamabad on November 22, 2021, the
former Pakistani prime minister announced to allow the 50,000 metric tons of
wheat India had offered to provide Afghanistan as humanitarian assistance to go
through Pakistan. Similarly, the ex-Prime Minister Imran Khan gave strict
instructions to meet the health needs of Afghanistan after which the Health
Services Academy Islamabad started training for medical personnel in Afghanistan.
Moreover, for enhancing trade and transit, Pakistan allowed, in September 2021,
the duty-free import of fruits and vegetables from Afghanistan to facilitate bilateral
trade, and border-crossings also remained open 24/7 for trade. Besides this, the
Foreign Office announced that Afghan businessmen could get a visa on arrival,
adding that the embassy in Kabul had also been authorized to issue five-year visas
to businessmen.

12
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

As the year 2022 began, many political analysts projected that Pakistan’s relations
with the Taliban will become tense due to the growing tension along the border,
mainly due to the Taliban’s aggressive response to Pakistan’s fencing of the border,
and an increase in terrorist violence in Pakistan by the TTP and Islamic State
Khorasan (IS-K) terrorist groups. However, Pakistan did not slow down its
diplomatic as well as humanitarian support to the interim government of Taliban.
Afghanistan was one of the highlights of Pakistan’s first National Security Policy
2022-2026, which held that “Pakistan remains committed to facilitating and
supporting peace and stability in Afghanistan in close collaboration with the
international community through addressing economic, humanitarian, and security
issues. Chairing the 3rd and 4th meetings of the Apex Committee on Afghanistan
(in January and February 2022, respectively), the former Prime Minister Imran Khan
said that Pakistan is committed to provide all-out support to the Afghan people to
avert a humanitarian crisis, and priority must be given to trade, healthcare, and
communication projects in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, on the US decision of dividing half of Afghan assets among 9/11

victims’ families, Pakistan reiterated its position on the frozen Afghan central bank
assets in the US, saying that “these are owned by the Afghan people and should
be released.” On February 12, 2022, the Foreign Office spokesperson stated that
“the utilization of Afghan funds should be the sovereign decision of Afghanistan.”24

When the Taliban resistance to Pakistan’s border-fencing activities turned violent,

Islamabad showed utmost restraint and repeatedly raised the issue with the Taliban
government in Kabul. However, a cross-border attack martyring three soldiers of
Pakistan Army coupled with some other high-impact TTP attacks during the month
of April 2022 drew a strong reaction from Pakistani government and security

24
For details, please see the press release issued by the MoFA: <https://mofa.gov.pk/press-release-491>

13
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

forces. Pakistan demanded of the Afghan government to take strict action against
the TTP and other militants attacking Pakistan while being sheltered in Afghanistan.
Similarly, the situation at the Chaman border in Balochistan also remained tense
during November 2022. The border remained close for more than a week before
Pakistan agreed conditionally to reopen it. Pakistan summoned the Afghan chargé
d’affaires in Islamabad and lodged a strong protest over the incident of
“unprovoked cross-border shelling” by the Afghan Taliban forces. A high-level
delegation comprising civil and military officials also went to Afghanistan to meet
top officials, and a peace jirga was held in Spin Boldak.

When the Taliban issued a ruling stating that its scholars had evaluated the
university curriculum and environment, and the attendance for girls would be
suspended "until a suitable environment" was provided, the Foreign Minister of
Pakistan Bilawal Bhutto Zardari expressed disappointment, but advocated
engagement. However, most Pakistani political leaders and parties criticized the
Taliban's renewed ban on girls' education and stated that the Taliban's action
presented a baseless and false conception of Islam to the world.

After the Afghan authorities held Pakistan responsible for military violations in
Khost and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan in April 2022, Pakistan’s Foreign Office
said the government was looking into the situation. The government of Pakistan
also made it clear to Taliban’s regime to secure the Pak-Afghan border region and
take stern actions against the individuals involved in terrorist activities in Pakistan,
which is in the interest of peace and progress of the two brotherly countries.

While the Ukraine crisis distracted the world’s attention from the troubles in
Afghanistan, Pakistan reached out to the Afghan government to prevent the
Afghan economy from collapsing, which would have terrible consequences for the
entire region. Relief goods including food, winter clothing and other necessary
items were regularly sent to Afghan officials under Pak-Afghan Cooperation

14
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Forum. Hospitals were also established on Afghanistan border to treat serious

patients, especially women and children. Furthermore, to strengthen trade ties with
Afghanistan, government of Pakistan allowed barter trade to help the neighboring
country. For easing trade for Afghanistan, in January 2022 Pakistan removed 45 per
cent regulatory duty on the import of Chilgoza (pine nut) from Afghanistan.
Pakistan also announced a temporary waiver of Electronic Import Form (EIF) for
Afghanistan to facilitate trade activities.

3.2 Political and religious parties

Until the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan, there was little to no response from
political parties, mainly those in the opposition, on any aspect of Afghan situation
and its interface with Pakistan. In July 2021, members of the parliament including
from the opposition were briefed by Pakistan’s military and intelligence chiefs on
the emerging Afghan situation. Many announced to stand behind the military
leadership on the matter of internal security of Pakistan and peace process in
Afghanistan. In early August 2021, a Pakhtun nationalist and religious syndicate,
“Pakhtun Qaumi Jirga” released a 21-point declaration strongly condemning the
turmoil in Afghanistan and decided to organize peace rallies at the district level in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

After the Taliban took over Kabul in 2021, there were varying responses. Religious-
political parties strongly welcomed and praised the Taliban for their so-called
'victory'. For one, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam-Fazal (JUI-F) hailed Taliban’s victory, stating
that 'mujahideen' had liberated their country from foreign invaders. 25 Similarly,
Jamaat-e-Islami chief Sirajul Haq while congratulating the Taliban leadership said

25
“Religious parties hail Afghan Taliban’s reconciliation policy,” Dawn, August 17, 2021,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1641051>

15
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

that the defeat of the American imperialist force in Afghanistan was a landmark
victory for the entire ummah, or comity of the Muslim nations. 26 Likewise, social
media platforms were flooded with Pakistanis, including officials and ministers and
members of religious-political parties, hailing the Taliban 'victory' in Afghanistan.
However, mainstream political parties were careful and demanded of the
government to take all the stakeholders into confidence by initiating a debate in
the Parliament. Nevertheless, political parties mainly expressed apprehensions
about the possible fallout of the Afghan situation and Pakistan’s preparedness to
deal with it. At the outset, some nationalist political parties from Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan denounced the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul but later
adopted a more cautious and accommodative approach.

In the months following the Taliban takeover, mainstream political parties

apparently continued a wait and watch policy on the Taliban government in
Afghanistan. Afghanistan remained out of their prioritized areas of focus and most
of the statements from political leaders, other than those in the government,
remained focused on rhetorical criticism of the government’s policy and action on
Afghanistan without providing an alternative scheme of dealing with the Afghan
situation. Meanwhile, the parties with religious ideologies, or so-called religious-
political parties, demanded the government to recognize the Taliban's government
in Afghanistan. Some representatives of such parties stated that it was illegal,
immoral, and inhumane to not recognize the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan.
However, Pakhtun nationalist parties opposed the Taliban’s ‘occupation of
Afghanistan.’ All nationalist democratic leaders including Aftab Sherpao,
Mahmood Khan Achakzai, Asfandyar Wali Khan and the Mazdoor Kisan Party were

26
“Peaceful change in Afghanistan biggest achievement: JI chief,” The News, August 17, 2021,
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/879401-peaceful-change-in-afghanistan-biggest-achievement-ji-chief>

16
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

of the view that Afghanistan should be ruled by a government elected by its

people.

As the Afghan situation evolved, major political parties urged the government to
concentrate on Afghan situation mainly in terms of its fallout for Pakistan. Some
alerted that remnants of Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security were still
on the payroll of India and Islamabad needed to keep this in mind. Some political
leaders asserted that Pakistan alone was not responsible for averting the
impending humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan and that the international
community must play its due role in this regard. Religious political parties also
called for urgent steps to alleviate the sufferings of the Afghan people besides
issuing supporting statements for the Afghan Taliban. JUI-F leader Fazal-ur-
Rehman stressed to avoid confrontation and war-like situation with Afghanistan to
“foil the nefarious designs of the United States” which wanted to pit them against
each other on the issue of Durand Line. However, nationalist political parties largely
remained silent or least vocal on the issue of Afghanistan.

In June 2022, a series of meetings were held between representatives of Pakistan

and the outlawed TTP in Kabul to broker a peace deal. The flurry of meetings led
to the TTP announcing an indefinite ceasefire. In response to this development,
Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) demanded that public representatives “must be taken
on board” on the issue and formed a three-member committee to liaise with
political parties on the developments related to talks with the Afghan Taliban and
the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

With the passage of time, the nationalist parties’ focus shifted from what was
happening across the border to the needs of their own people. They urged the
government to open Afghan trade links, as this is the livelihood of natives. For this
purpose, the Awami National Party (ANP) submitted a resolution in the Khyber

17
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

Pakhtunkhwa Assembly demanding the opening of all trade routes with

Afghanistan.

Most political parties also criticized the Taliban's curbs on girls' education and
other similar restrictions. The religious-political parties were however more
diplomatic in their response to such issues.

3.3 Religious organizations

Like religious-political parties, Pakistan’s religious organizations were also

extremely elated by the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. Many religious scholars
congratulated and wished good luck to the Afghan Taliban on their victory in
Afghanistan. Some urged the Taliban to take strict measures so that foreign
elements should not intervene in their country. Few also raised the Taliban’s flag
(though momentarily), including the clerics of Lal Masjid in Islamabad.

Pakistan’s religious organizations were also annoyed by the government's decision

of not recognizing the Taliban's government in Afghanistan. In November 2021,
Pakistan Ulema Council issued a letter to the most important leaders of the Islamic
world, urging them to immediately start a consultative process to address the
dangers posed by Afghan situation and the humanitarian crisis there. They
reiterated that the nature of the crisis and the operations of international terrorist
organizations in Afghanistan indicated that if the world did not take the path of
dialogue and cooperation with the Taliban, then the danger of terrorism could
increase worldwide. Many religious scholars urged the government to announce
its recognition of the Islamic government of the ‘victorious Taliban’ which they
considered will become the brotherly Islamic neighboring country of Pakistan. They
welcomed the ‘peaceful and peace-harboring’ government of the Taliban.

18
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Members and representatives of some religious organizations also criticized the

“West’s old way of putting economic sanctions and blockades on Muslims” and
argued that the Afghan Taliban were suffering from the atrocity of sanctions. Few
even went on to relate the situation to the Quraysh tribes’ economic boycott of the
Prophet Muhammad’s (Peace Be Upon Him) family “Banu Hashim” in the seventh
year of the prophethood in Mecca.

The Pakistan Shariah Council announced in January 2022 that it had successfully
celebrated 10 days of support for the Afghan people. Furthermore, Jamiat Ulema-
e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) convened an All-Parties Conference (APC)in January 2022 to
discuss the problems being faced by the Afghan Taliban government and people
in Afghanistan. This conference was convened to take up issues and difficulties of
the Taliban government and people of Afghanistan and present suggestions to the
Pakistan’s government for a viable solution.

Additionally, different religious organizations held and demanded that a regular

campaign should be organized to finance the “Emirate of Islamic Afghanistan” and
more efforts should be made to send aid or goods via Embassy of Islamic Emirate
of Afghanistan in Islamabad. They requested to support the “Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan” and condemn “American ambitions,” calling religious groups and
people to organize public opinion make progress towards a common struggle in
this regard. They also emphasized that traders and industrialists should be
encouraged for trade and investment in Afghanistan. They even instructed that
letters and memoirs should be sent to Muslim governments and their embassies
in Islamabad in order to bring their attention to this matter.

When the Taliban banned girls’ education, and also put other restrictions on
Afghanis, such decisions raised concerns in religious organizations worldwide as
well as in Pakistan. Despite of their strong support of the Taliban government, most
religious scholars and leaders in Pakistan did not support these strict measures of

19
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

the Taliban. Various religious scholars from different schools of thought in Pakistan
called upon Afghanistan’s government for girls' access to education and urged that
Afghanistan ought to show restraint and not become a laughingstock for the
world. Prominent religious scholar Mufti Taqi Usmani wrote a letter to the Taliban
government in Afghanistan and urged them to allow girls' schools to be reopened.
Similarly, Allama Syed Hashim Musavi, a religious leader of the Hazara community
from Madrassa Baaqirul Uloom, Quetta, said the step taken by the Taliban had
deprived girls of their basic right to education. Likewise, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s
chief Khateeb Maulana Tayyab Qureshi said the Afghan Taliban’s decision to bar
girls from education had created uncertainty.

3.4 Militant groups

Except for the Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), almost all other militant groups in
Afghanistan or Pakistan were reportedly jubilant over the Taliban takeover of
Afghanistan. Al-Qaeda, TTP, and ETIM, among others, also issued congratulatory
statements.

The TTP has fully supported the Afghan Taliban, particularly since the later started
capturing Afghan provinces. Apparently encouraged by the Taliban march, the TTP
chief Noor Wali Mehsud said in an interview in late July 2021 that his group will
continue its war against Pakistan’s security forces and its goal is to take control of
the border regions and make them independent. He admitted his group’s good
relations with Afghan Taliban and hoped to benefit from Taliban victories across
the border inside Pakistan.

Moreover, the TTP’s spokesperson acknowledged that the interior minister of

Afghanistan's Taliban regime, Sirajuddin Haqqani, played a mediating role between
Pakistan and the TTP, bringing the two sides under one roof to engage in face-to-

20
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

face talks. The Afghan Taliban and Pakistani officials vindicated that claim.
However, in a response to the TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mahsud’s statement that
his outfit came under the larger "umbrella" of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
(IEA), the interim government of Taliban clearly mentioned that "[the TTP] was not,
as an organization, part of IEA and Afghan Taliban did not share the same
objectives.”

As the archrival of the Afghan Taliban, the IS-K has been trying to undermine the
former's government in Afghanistan calling them puppets of the West who have
deviated from their religious-ideological cause. In January 2022, the group
published a 14-page message commenting on a Taliban delegation’s visit to
Norway, writing a fictional dialogue between Afghan foreign minister Amir
Khan Muttaqi and the EU Special Representative for Afghanistan Mr. Tomas
Niklasson. It claimed that it is all part of an ongoing "drama" directed by ISI, CIA,
and KGB. The IS-K message argued that the Taliban leadership was issuing orders
on paper on hijab and mahram etc. to appease their own militants and they have
no intention to enact them. The IS-K also claimed that the Taliban were teaching
schools curricula approved by the West in order to introduce democracy which is
why they promised to open the schools countrywide. (The Taliban later only
allowed a partial opening of the schools and backtracked from the earlier decision
of opening the girls’ schools).

3.5 Civil society

Worried about the worsening of women and human rights situation in Afghanistan,
Nobel prize winner Malala Yousafzai said in an open letter to the Taliban authorities
to reverse the de facto ban on girls’ education and re-open girls’ secondary schools
immediately. She also expressed her fear that the ban on girls’ education by the
Taliban might not be temporary.

21
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

Tons of humanitarian aid have been sent to Afghanistan by different civil society
organizations of Pakistan since the Taliban takeover. Moreover, concerned about
the situation of orphans in Afghanistan, the Al-Khidmat Foundation Pakistan
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Humanitarian Assistance
Society, a leading Afghan welfare organization, for the establishment of Aghosh
Home for the sponsorship of orphans in Afghanistan. On the other hand, business
communities and trade groups demanded that the State Bank of Pakistan should
allow trade with Afghanistan in cash until the banking channel with Afghanistan
was made functional.

Various civil society institutes and organizations raised voice for the war-ravaged
neighbor by conducting workshops, sessions, and webinars etc. For instance, in
February 2022 a webinar on “The Afghanistan impact - security threats to Pakistan
confirmation” was organized by Sustainable Development Policy Institute. Experts
at the webinar called upon the world to resolve the humanitarian crisis in
Afghanistan immediately which, they said, lingered on with each passing day and
may cause a security threat to Pakistan. Similarly, Pak Institute for Peace Studies
organized eight quarterly expert consultation on “Afghan peace and reconciliation:
Pakistan’s interests and policy options” in Islamabad between July 2021 and May
2023. Prominent experts, political leaders, academicians, civil society
representatives and media persons from Islamabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and
Balochistan participated.

Pakistan’s civil society activists also severely criticized the discriminatory policies of
the Taliban government against women as they ordered women to wear traditional
burqa, imposed travel restrictions for women, and banned girls' school education,
which caused anger at the national and international level. For instance, Pakistan
Nobel laureate Malala Yousafzai urged world leaders to take collective action to
hold the Taliban accountable for violating the human rights of millions of Afghan

22
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

women and girls. Moreover, elders of the FATA Qaumi Jirga asked the government
of Afghanistan to take serious and practical steps for the restoration of peace in
the former tribal areas and negotiate with the government of Pakistan with the
Taliban.

3.6 Military leadership

The Pakistani military leadership has been hoping that the Afghan Taliban
leadership would take measures to stop TTP from operating against Pakistan.
Besides, it kept on ensuring about the 100 percent completion of the border
fencing. When border skirmishes increased, Pakistani military leadership gave a
very composed reaction. It asserted that the purpose of border was not to divide
the people, but to protect them. Former Director General Inter Services Public
Relations (DG ISPR) Major General Babar Iftikhar mentioned that while eradicating
false news, hearsay, misconceptions, a few localized issues had to be resolved with
open heart to achieve the fundamental objective of peace. “There is complete
harmony between Pakistan and Afghanistan governments on this matter,” he
added. However, after the killing of seven soldiers in a cross-border attack in April
2022, Pakistan’s military leadership opted for action against the TTP militants
sheltered in the border region. Military drones of Pakistan reportedly targeted TTP
hideouts in Khost and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan. The raids, according to
senior officials, were carried out following intelligence reports that TTP affiliates
were present in the area. However, military leadership continued to assure its full
support for Afghan peace in frequent meetings with Afghan delegation and also
acknowledged the Afghan Taliban’s support in Pakistan dialogue with the banned
TTP.

23
 RESPONSES FROM PAKISTAN SINCE TALIBAN TAKEOVER OF AFGHANISTAN

3.7 Media commentary

Most media reports and analyses followed or supported Pakistan’s official stance,
advertently or inadvertently, on Afghan situation including on intra-Afghan
reconciliation, an inclusive government, protection of human rights, regional and
international support for the Taliban, and securing Pakistan from the Afghan
fallout. While many in the Urdu press glorified the Taliban before and after the
latter’s capture of Kabul, English-language press however provided more critical
analyses highlighting security, political, economic, and sociocultural implications
of the Afghan conflict.

Moreover, few Urdu newspapers welcomed the coal import agreement between
Pakistan and Afghanistan stating it will also benefit the war-affected Afghanistan
economically. However, the matter of increase in the coal tax by the Afghan interim
government annoyed many media writers. On this pretext, some even labelled the
Taliban as the new nationalists of Afghanistan.

In addition, some Op-ed writers were of the view that Pakistan should excel in its
relations with Afghanistan as with China and Saudi Arabia, irrespective of their
internal systems and policies. They stressed that any negative attitude towards a
war-ravaged neighbor on the basis of its internal matters will fritter away all
opportunities for Pakistan to trade with and through Afghanistan. They
emphasized that internal problems should be left to the Afghans. Pertaining to the
US declaration of freezing the remaining 3.5 billion dollars of Afghan assets, almost
every media group criticized this action by stating that although the US has a point
in stopping funds from reaching militant organizations, the fact is that the money
in question belongs to the people of Afghanistan, not America or the Taliban.

24
4. Emerging Afghan situation: Taliban's challenges
and reactions

The Taliban face a multitude of challenges with regards to governance,

international recognition, economic and humanitarian crisis, and small-scale
insurgencies started by different groups in northeastern provinces. Failure to deal
with these challenges will only add to the concerns of the Afghan people as well
as countries in the region.

Peace and security in Afghanistan have witnessed relative improvement under

the current Taliban administration. Some participants of PIPS-led expert
consultations held in Islamabad underlined that even the Afghan people who
disapprove the Taliban government have testified this claim. However, experts
argue that as long as governance and economic issues remain unresolved in
Afghanistan, the problems of security and violence would remain unresolved too,
and this would have a fallout on Pakistan.27

Others believe that as the Taliban themselves were a major factor of insecurity and
instability in the country, their coming to power has eliminated much of the
security threat. However, a formidable security challenge still persists from an
assortment of militant groups and their activities in Afghanistan. According to
some analysts, insecurity and violence are gradually increasing with groups like IS-
K directly challenging the Taliban regime and its claims of ensuring security in the
country. The group perpetrated 339 attacks in Afghanistan in 2021 compared to
82 such attacks it claimed in the country in 2020. 28 Indeed, the Taliban’s great
challenge [on internal and external fronts] is coming from a multitude of militant

27
Dr Simbal Khan, political & security analyst. Comments in PIPS consultation-3 on Afghan peace and
reconciliation held on March 27, 2022, in Islamabad
28
<https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1476827070307127298>
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

groups present on Afghan soil including those who are in synch with their ideology
(such as Al-Qaeda, TTP, ETIM, etc.) and also those who are their ideological rival,
mainly IS-K. That challenge is largely in terms of the Taliban’s ideological
constraints to progressively connect and respond to the world’s expectations of
them. The Taliban will not be able to take strict action against likeminded groups
due to ideological consonance as well as a fear of disgruntlement among its lower
cadres. Similarly, becoming or pretending to be moderate and connecting or
adapting to the international system of governance and political order will only
add to ideological problems for the Taliban where even its allied militant groups
could be annoyed.

All official and independent estimates and analyses also deny the Taliban's
'security' claims. For instance, the latest report by the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC released on February 13, 2023 noted that
Afghanistan remains the primary source of terrorist threat for Central and South
Asia. This threat, the report said, mainly originated from groups including the
Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as ETIM/TIP, and
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, among others. What is worrisome, according to
the report, “these groups enjoy greater freedom of movement in Afghanistan
owing to the absence of an effective Taliban security strategy.” The report also
observed that the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan had emboldened TTP to escalate
attacks against Pakistan, while strengthening its position in Afghanistan.29 Previous
report of the same UN-led team had noted that while the situation in Afghanistan
remains complex, international terrorist organizations based there view the victory

29
The 31st report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC, 13 February 2023,
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf?OpenElement>

26
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

of the Taliban as a motivating factor for disseminating their propaganda in the

neighboring regions of Central and South Asia, and globally.30

A summary of the Afghanistan's emerging militant landscape with a focus on the

evolving strength, agendas, and future course of action of transnational terrorist
groups present on Afghan soil is given below:31

• Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan: The banned TTP has become largely entrenched

in Afghanistan, with its members mainly concentrated in Kunar province of
Afghanistan bordering on Pakistan’s tribal areas, where they have developed
good relations with the Afghanistan's Pashtun tribes. The July 2022 report by
the UN Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team maintained that the
TTP constitutes the largest component of foreign terrorist fighters in
Afghanistan,32 with about 5,000-6,000 members. The Taliban’s to return to
power in Kabul had given hope to many in Pakistan that they will limit anti-
Pakistan groups’ freedom of action. However, “contrary to these expectations,
the Afghan Taliban’s return has so far strengthened the TTP.” 33

• Al-Qaeda: Although the Taliban have been denying the presence of Al-Qaeda
militants in Afghanistan, the Unite Nations and others have been constantly
indicating the presence of Al-Qaeda members and leaders in multiple Afghan
provinces (at least in 15, according to UN, mainly in the south and east of

30
The report was released around mid-July 2022 and can be downloaded here:
<https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2075689/N2239429.pdf>
31
Most data and details are derived from a paper PIPS solicited under its Afghan peace and reconciliation
programme (unless referred to other sources): Ahmed Ali, "Fallout of Afghan situation and Pakistan's policy
responses," Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-V (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), July-Sep 2022,
<https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/Situation-Review-V.pdf>
32
Report can be seen here: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2075689/N2239429.pdf>
33
Abdul Sayed, “The evolution and future of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, December 21, 2021.

27
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

Afghanistan but also in Farah and Herat provinces in the north). The group has
been keeping a strategic silence in Afghanistan, apparently to avoid any
possible trouble or inconvenience to its ally, the Taliban. The presence of Al-
Qaeda leaders in Afghanistan may also have more strategic and security
purposes than operational ones. On 31st of July (2022), the US reportedly killed
the leader of Al-Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a drone strike in Afghanistan.34
In addition to Zawahiri, several other senior leaders likely reside in Afghanistan,
including Saif al-Adel and bin Laden’s security manager Amin Muhammad ul-
Haq Saam Khan. Similarly, Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), which
is led by Osama Mehmood and his deputy Atif Yahya Ghouri, also reportedly
retains a presence in Afghanistan’s Ghazni, Helmand, Kandahar, Nimruz, Paktika
and Zabul provinces, where the group fought alongside the Taliban against the
ousted Ghani government. AQIS is estimated to have between 200 and 400
fighters, mainly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Myanmar and Pakistan. 35

Afghanistan continues to be a central place for Al-Qaeda including in terms of

refuge, security and connectivity with its regional franchises or allied groups.
What makes Afghanistan different from any other country is that the Al-Qaeda
enjoys a regime by its sympathetic and brotherly Taliban. Over decades, Al-
Qaeda leaders have maintained close relationship at least with some Taliban
leaders including the Taliban’s interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani.36

34
BBC News, August 2, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-62387167>
35
United Nations Security Council’s twenty-ninth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring
Team, February 3, 2022,
<https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=S%2F2022%2F83&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&La
ngRequested=False>
36
Seth G. Jones, “Countering resurgent terrorist threat in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 14,
2022, <https://www.cfr.org/report/countering-resurgent-terrorist-threat-afghanistan>

28
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

• Islamic State in Khorasan (IS-K): IS-K is currently led by Sanaullah Ghafari alias
Shahab al-Muhajir, an Afghan national. Aslam Farooqi, a former IS-K leader,
escaped from prison and has subsequently re-joined the group in a senior role.
The former leader of IS-K, Abu Omar Al-Khorasani, was killed by the Taliban in
August 2021, shortly after they took control of the prison in which he was being
held. The US withdrawal has allowed the group to recover, regroup and
strengthen its membership and position in Afghanistan. For instance, in July
2021, a month before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the number of IS-K fighters
in Afghanistan was estimated at around 500 to 1,500. However, according to
multiple accounts, since the Taliban takeover the number of IS-K militants is
believed to have doubled in the country. The release of several thousand
prisoners has also added to the number. An estimated current strength of the
group is 3,000 fighters; some believe it could be 6,000. The IS-K core cells are
located mainly in the eastern Kunar, Nangarhar and Nuristan Provinces of
Afghanistan, with a large cell active in Kabul and its environs. Relatively smaller
cells of the group are also present in the northern and north-eastern
Badakhshan, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Takhar and Balkh Provinces. For being
most developed region in the north, Balkh has been gaining IS-K's increased
focus for raising finances.37 The IS-K has been receiving support including in
financial terms from the Islamic State’s core leadership in Iraq and Syria.

Islamic State group views Afghanistan as a "base for expansion in the wider
region for the realization of its “great caliphate” project. In that regard IS-K
seeks to strengthen its capabilities by recruiting members from other terrorist
groups, as well as by attracting disaffected Taliban fighters and dissatisfied local
ethnic minorities. The group also portrays itself as the primary rival to the

37
The 31st report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC, February 13, 2023,
<https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/N2303891.pdf?OpenElement>

29
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

Taliban de facto administration and portrays the Taliban as incapable of

providing security in the country. Another strategic objective of the IS-K has
been to undermine the relationship between the Taliban and neighboring
countries including through attacks on and threats to foreign missions. The
group has also claimed to have perpetrated cross-border attacks inside
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, from Afghanistan’s northern Balkh and Takhar
provinces, respectively, which experts view as an effort to drag immediate
neighbours into Afghanistan to create chaos and anarchy where IS-K could
flourish more taking stock from its experience in Iraq and Syria.

• Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)/East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM): The

Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), also known as East Turkistan Islamic Movement
(ETIM) is actively operating in Afghanistan. Some believe that ETIM/TIP has even
expanded its operational space in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, cultivating
relations with local commanders to operate locally. The group is seeking to
further entrench its presence in the country by both organizing marriages to
local women and facilitating the relocation of Uyghur women to Afghanistan.
As per various counts, the number of ETIM/ TIP members in Afghanistan is
between 200 and 700 fighters. Like other allies, Central Asian and ETIM/TIP
fighters in Afghanistan celebrated the Taliban takeover for multiple reasons. 38
For one, they anticipate more freedom to live on and operate from the Afghan
soil. Secondly, they also hope that international recognition of the Taliban
might also help in removing the “terrorist” label from them also.

Some reports indicated that after coming into power, the Taliban relocated
ETIM/TIP fighters from their traditional strongholds in Afghanistan’s
Badakhshan province bordering on China to Baghlan, Takhar and other

38
Only a few days after the fall of the Afghan government, the TIP had issued a statement lauding the
Taliban’s “victory” and the “restoration of the Islamic Emirate.”

30
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

provinces. Experts say that by doing so the Taliban tried on one hand to
convince China about their efforts to restrain the group and on the other hand
to protect their old ally. Some recent account also suggest that the ETIM/TIP
continues its relocation from Badakhshan to Baghlan province, establishing
operational sites and arsenals there.39

Besides historically being a key ally of the Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the ETIM
is recently being lured by the IS-K. There is evidence to suggest that
cooperation between ETIM/TIP and IS-Khas been growing. They reportedly
"exchanged personnel and planned joint operations, with ETIM/TIP providing
military instructors to IS-K and sending members to join its operational unit
responsible for tracking Chinese nationals and carrying out attacks."40 Both
groups had also jointly published Uyghur-language propaganda posters. The
reported nexus is understandable in the context of IS-K's growing anti-China
rhetoric and propaganda including for facilitating its efforts to get recruitment
from anti-China groups mainly ETIM and Uyghurs. Some observers also hint at
similar operational cooperation arrangements between ETIM and the TTP.

• IMU and other Central Asian groups: Like other Central Asian terrorist groups
such as Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) and Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari (KIB), the Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) had also actively participated in the Taliban-led
fighting against the international forces in Afghanistan. Since the Taliban's
capture of Kabul last year, these are all now experiencing greater freedom of
movement in the country.

Founded in 1998, IMU intended to replace the ‘secular’ Uzbek government with
sharia law and establish Islamic rule. Experts assert that an increasingly

39
The 31st report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC, February 13, 2023.
40
Ibid.

31
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

repressive regime fanned militant Salafism in Uzbekistan and boosted the

supply of Uzbek fighters to both Afghanistan and Syria. Until Islamic State
group emerged, IMU as a whole remained closely aligned with the Afghan
Taliban, TTP, and Al-Qaeda. In August 2015, IMU’s emir Omar Ghazi and
hundreds of fighters pledged allegiance to the Islamic State group. Around that
time, IMU fighters in Syria were already absorbed into the Islamic State, and
many had relocated from Afghanistan to there. Subsequent clashes with the
Taliban and the killing of Ghazi accelerated internal discord within the IMU, and
in June 2016 an IMU faction publicly denounced IS-K, reaffirming its loyalty to
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.41 After losing greater alliance with the IMU, Al-Qaeda
has been improving its ties with a number of other Central Asian groups in
Afghanistan, such as Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, Katibat al Tawhid wal Jihad, and
Islamic Jihad Group, which remain based in parts of northern Afghanistan.42 Al-
Qaeda has also maintained relations with the ETIM and has forged ties with the
breakaway factions of the IMU.43

Islamic Jihad Group (IJG) is led by Ilimbek Mamatov, a Kyrgyz national; his
deputy, Amsattor Atabaev is from Tajikistan. The group is termed as the most
combat-ready Central Asian group in Afghanistan. It operates primarily in
Badakhshan, Baghlan and Kunduz provinces.

Meanwhile, the Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari (KIB) is led by Dilshod

Dekhanov, a Tajik national. The group is currently located in the Bala

41
Amira Jason et al., “Challenging the ISK brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and divided loyalties,” CTC
Sentinel, April 2018, <https://ctc.usma.edu/challenging-isk-brand-afghanistan-pakistan-rivalries-divided-
loyalties>
42
Asfandyar Mir, “Afghanistan’s terrorism challenge: the political trajectories of Al-Qaeda, the Afghan
Taliban, and the Islamic State,” Middle East Institute, October 2020,
<https://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/2020-10/Afghanistan%27s%20Terrorism%20Challenge.pdf>
43
Ibid.

32
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Murghab district of Badghis province. The group’s strength has increased

through the recruitment of local Afghans. In September 2021, Mamatov and
Dekhanov, the IJG and KIB leaders, respectively, separately visited Kabul.
Each leader lobbied for support from the Taliban to unify the Central Asian
groups under their respective leadership, in recognition of their
contributions to the Taliban victory. The Taliban reportedly rejected the
proposals, preferring to incorporate the groups as distinct military units
within the newly established Taliban army.

Jamaat Ansarullah (banned in Tajikistan as a terrorist group) is closely

associated with Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan. Following
deteriorating relations between Tajikistan and the Taliban in the autumn of
2021, Ansarullah fighters were deployed with Taliban special units along the
border of Tajikistan in Badakhshan, Kunduz and Takhar Provinces. Jamaat
Ansarullah senior leader Muhammad Sharipov (alias Mahdi Arsalan)
controls security in five districts of Badakhshan province under the Taliban
administration. Arsalan and other Tajik militants are known as the “Tajik
Taliban” in Afghanistan.44

Many experts see growing militant and resistance violence directly linked to the
Taliban’s incapacity to govern and deliver goods and services. They assert that as
long as governance and economic issues remain unresolved in Afghanistan, the
problems of insecurity and violence would increase manifold and this would have
a fallout on Afghanistan’s neighbors, too.

44
Mumin Ahmadi, et al., "Exclusive: Taliban puts Tajik militants partially in charge of Afghanistan's northern
border," RFERL, July 27, 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/taliban-tajik-militants-border/31380071.html>

33
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

Governance in Taliban-led government is hugely suffering due to financial,

political and sociocultural reasons where the Taliban have failed so far to get
domestic recognition and form an inclusive government; nor do they have enough
governance experience to steer the country out of crisis. Experts argue that as a
post-conflict state, Afghanistan has a 51 % chance of relapsing into violence within
the next five years. 45
The factors that could intensify this conflict relapse in
Afghanistan include its being the least developed country in Asia, growing poverty
and political instability, elusive intra-Afghan reconciliation, and rising resistance in
the north and elsewhere.

Analysts also underline that the Taliban have no immediate politico-military threats
within Afghanistan or from any of the neighboring countries. But their
ultraconservative ideology, a 'medieval mindset' and fear of losing to their rivals in
the war of narratives seem to be few of many hurdles in performing equally
effectively on the political, social and economic fronts.46

To start with, the Taliban have a daunting task of transforming themselves from a
formidable guerrilla warfare force into a functional governing entity. Apparently,
they lack the necessary skills and capacity to realize such a shift, at least in the short
run. Some observers believe that the Taliban "will forcefully need to look
somewhere else for help, and perhaps to ask for external support, [and] such a
conjuncture could present the opportunity to try to convince the Taliban to open
a dialogue channel with the international community about the need to find a

45
Viola Fee Dreikhausen, “Taliban in or out? Afghanistan in 2025,” The EU Institute for Security Studies, Brief
5, April 2022.
46
M. Ilyas Khan, "Evolving mindset of Afghan Taliban and implications for Pakistan," Afghanistan as seen
from Pakistan-III (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/Report.pdf>

34
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

sustainable balance between their strict religious ideology and the fundamental
rights of a population aspiring to a safe and dignified future."47

The Taliban have been putting restrictions on girls' education, mobility and
working. In November 2021, the Afghan Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and
Prevention of Vice issued some guidelines that included a ban on television dramas
featuring women actors and an instruction for female anchors to wear Hijab.48 The
said Ministry was established in September 2021 in the very building which once
housed the Women’s Affairs Ministry. The regime also sacked female government
employees and barred secondary education for girls.49 However, according to
some accounts, only a handful of hardliner Taliban leaders are against reopening
schools above sixth grade reportedly fearing moral corruption, including the
Taliban supreme leader Sheikh Hibatullah, and his close aides.50 "They
outmaneuvered the rest of the Taliban officials and leaders because of their senior
positions and authority, [while] most other Taliban leaders including members of
Haqqani network, Mullah Yaqub, son of late Mullah Omer, ministers, and military
commanders support girls' education."51 However, those close to the Taliban
underline that In Taliban’s era, Afghanistan has always been controlled by

47
Marco Mezzera & Safdar Sial, "The peace nobody believed in," Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-II (Pak
Institute for Peace Studies), Oct-Dec 2021, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2021/12/FInal-report.pdf>
48
Tahir Khan, “Taliban instruct female television anchors to wear hijab”, Dawn, November 22, 2021,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1659589>
49
“Afghan women outraged by new Taliban restrictions on work”, The Express Tribune, September 20, 2021,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2321077/afghan-women-outraged-by-new-taliban-restrictions-on-work>
50
They mainly include Mullah Hassan, the prime minster; Mullah Noor Mohammed Saqib, minister of Hajj
and religious affairs; Sheikh Abdul Hakim, head of judiciary; Sheikh Mohammed Khalid, minister of
promoting virtue and preventing vice; and Mullah Mahmood.
51
Sami Yousafzai, "Afghanistan’s "uncertain" future: domestic and regional implications,” Afghanistan as seen
from Pakistan-VI (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/pb_6.pdf>

35
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

leadership in Kandahar and the situation is the same in this regime as well,52 which
implies the verdict of the Taliban supreme commander will be deemed final.

Similarly, the Taliban's favoritism or lack of inclusivity is causing serious problems

in the Taliban ministries impacting the service delivery and its effectiveness.
According to Sami Yousafzai, a senior Afghan journalist, not only 33 ministries are
occupied by the Taliban, but offices of 34 governors, police commanders, and
health, education, energy, mining, and financials directorates are also led by
Mullahs, or Taliban leaders, and insurgency veterans. 53 During last year's Herat
Security Dialogue, which was held on 29th and 30th of November in Dushanbe, the
view that resonated throughout the event was that the current setup in Kabul is
non-inclusive and non-representative of all Afghans. Most participants were
Persian speaking Afghans from the north, and many talked about the
decentralization of power and authority in Afghanistan.54

For some political analysts, it is somewhat inappropriate to expect the Taliban to

form an inclusive government with their political opponents as this is not practiced
elsewhere in the world.55 Senior journalist Tahir Khan agrees that the Taliban are
less likely to provide space to anyone not named Taliban. When they came into
power, Mohammad Hassan Akhund stated in his meeting that “we do not have
room for those who were associated with governments that were in power for the
last 20 years.” They have been following an almost similar narrative since then.
Tahir Khan also asserts that high expectations cannot be attached to the Taliban

52
Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, leader of JUI-Nazriyati in Balochistan. Comments in PIPS consultation-3 on
Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 27, 2022, in Islamabad.
53
Sami Yousafzai, "Afghanistan’s "uncertain" future: domestic and regional implications.”
54
Afrasiab Khattak, political analyst and human rights activist. Comments in PIPS consultation-6 on Afghan
peace and reconciliation held on December 5, 2022, in Islamabad.
55
Lt. General (Retd) Naeem Khalid Lodhi, political and defence analyst. Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on
Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.

36
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

regarding governance. Hibatullah Akhundzada repeatedly mentioned not to make

appointments on the basis of associations, which implies a prevalence of gov-
ernance lapses.56 Former diplomat Aziz Ahmed Khan believes that the Taliban will
not establish a broad-based government, but they might not be as rigid as the
previous Taliban government of the 1990s was.57

Some Afghan observers don't absolve previous Afghan governments of the

continuing bad governance affairs. For one, Mirwais Yasini, former first deputy
speaker of the Lower House of the Afghan Parliament, believes that Ghani, Hamid
Karzai and Khalilzad are equally responsible for that. Corruption, mismanagement,
and inflated egos led Afghanistan to the failure over the past twenty years. Previous
governments made a lot of blunders and then concealed them under colorful
reports that were sent to Washington. So, there was all types of corruption, be it
financial, political or judicial and even some of the international agencies were in-
volved in that while raising the slogan that they were there for the sake of
democracy. However, there was no democracy.58

There also has been a debate, as hinted at earlier, if there is a difference between
the current Taliban and the Taliban of the 1990s. To tell the difference, many
participants of PIPS consultations on Afghanistan alluded to presence of moderate
leaders among the current Taliban ranks who want to interact with the world, and
receive assistance from the world, as opposed to those who do not want to change
their beliefs and want to run the country according to their own strict belief system.
Responding to a question about the internal resistance to reform, Maulana Abdul

56
Tahir Khan, senior journalist and expert on Afghan affairs. Views expressed in PIPS consultation-4 on
Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
57
Aziz Ahmed Khan, former ambassador of Pakistan. Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and
reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
58
Views expressed in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in
Islamabad.

37
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

Qadir Luni said that Afghanistan has fought 40 years of war and over this time
period thousands of people have been martyred and all of them sacrificed their
lives under one slogan or cause of establishing Islamic order or Islamic system of
justice. "It was not easy for them to compete in elections. There is no one in this
[Taliban] government who has not lost a family member in drone attacks or
bombing attacks. They went through these hardships and sacrifices for a cause,
and that is the Taliban’s first priority and center of attention [after coming into
power]: they want to make Afghanistan not only an Islamic state but a model for
Islamic, or Muslim-majority states worldwide."59

However, some observers assert that even if the Taliban survived politically, with
its current ideology, it will not be for very long. Saudi Arabia today provides a good
example of this as it is leaving behind its Salafist past and becoming progressive.60

Domestic legitimacy and international recognition are two other factors which
are fundamental for the Taliban not only to seeking financial support and aid but
also to improving governance and service delivery. Although in UN and more than
50 countries, the Afghan embassies and diplomatic mission are still in control of
diplomats appointed by the previous government, but Taliban have taken control
of Afghan embassies in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Qatar and some other countries.
Meanwhile the embassies of China, Japan, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Russia, India, and
Iran are open in Afghanistan and providing services at different levels. Political
observers believe, as cited earlier, that the lack of international recognition is
marginalizing the Taliban government on global level besides negatively affecting

59
Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, leader of JUI-Nazriyati in Balochistan. Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on
Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 27, 2022, in Islamabad.
60
Riaz Mohammad Khan, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. Comments in PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan
peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.

38
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

the business, diplomatic and economic sectors in the country. It is not yet clear
when the Taliban and the world will understand each other and get along, if ever. 61

Poverty and economic crisis present another key challenge to the Taliban and
Afghanistan. Under the Ghani government, approximately 40 percent of
Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) came from foreign aid. Since the US
withdrawal and Taliban takeover in August 2021, Afghanistan’s economic situation
has been further deteriorating. As a result, Afghans are suffering from poverty,
starvation, and a lack of access to healthcare and other services. According to
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, nearly a million jobs had
been lost in about a year of the Taliban rule,62 and daily incomes had dwindled
greatly.

On February 15th last year the International Rescue Committee announced that
humanitarian needs across Afghanistan had witnessed a phenomenal increase and
about 97 percent of the population could fall under the poverty line by the end of
the year. The IRC report also noted that more than half of the country's population
was facing acute food insecurity, and one million children were at the risk of a
severe malnutrition. According to IRC country director Vicki Aken the international
community's cutting off non-humanitarian funds following the Taliban takeover
had led to the worsening economic problems.63 The World Food Program counted
the recurrent drought in the country as one of the main factors for decreasing
agriculture harvest and further threatening the income and livelihood.64 The strong

61
Ibid.
62
ANI, May 10, 2022, <https://www.aninews.in/news/world/asia/900000-afghans-lost-jobs-since-taliban-
takeover-sigar20220510064511>
63
Details can be seen here: <https://www.rescue.org/eu/press-release/six-months-change-power-irc-warns-
starvation-could-kill-more-afghans-last-twenty>
64
Relief Web, "Afghanistan food security update round ten June 2022," July 27, 2022,
<https://reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/afghanistan-food-security-update-round-ten-june-2022>

39
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

earthquake that hit the south-eastern provinces of Paktika and Khost in June last
year further compounded the problems. It killed more than 1,000 people besides
destroying a large number of houses in both provinces. 65 Similarly, the heavy floods
during June and July (2022) also harmed the livelihoods of Afghans in many parts
of the country.

The Taliban government does not have enough resources to deal with the overall
economic and humanitarian situation, and they also lack international recognition
and monetary privileges. The Afghanistan Central Bank had about seven billion US
dollars in reserve in a US bank that were frozen by the US government immediately
after the Taliban takeover of Kabul to prevent terrorists' access to them. This step
critically affected the services of private banks, a flourishing business in
Afghanistan, and limited their ability to pay only about $400 or its equivalent in
Afghani to their costumers per week and stop cash transactions out of the country
for business deals.66 In September 2022, the US government announced that USD
3.5 billion of the frozen money will be transferred to a newly created Afghan fund
to benefit the Afghan people as the hunger gripped every province in the country.
According to US officials, the Taliban government will not have access to the fund,
which will be held at the Bank for International Settlements in Switzerland.67

The Taliban also face political opposition and an insurgency in the north.
Persisting economic and political turmoil and the Taliban’s reluctance to make their
government more inclusive could provide an impetus to the resistance forces. As

65
Susannah George, et al., "Afghanistan earthquake kills more than 1,000, injures 1,600, officials say," The
Washington Post, June 22, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/06/22/afghanistan-
earthquake-taliban-khost-deadly>
66
Sami Yousafzai, "Afghanistan’s "uncertain" future: domestic and regional implications.”
67
Fatima Hussein, "US sets up Afghan relief fund with frozen central bank money," Associated Press,
September 15, 2022, <https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-switzerland-taliban-
5393b05f911d4eeba6d75ae74ea3fd13>

40
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

former police and military personnel remain unemployed, they could feed into the
pools of resistance fighters. Afghanistan’s complex geology and mountainous
terrain could offer vast areas of potential hideouts for such resistance groups and
curtail the Taliban’s ability to clamp down on their opponents. The Taliban
nonetheless hardly comment on the activities of their armed opponents in the
country; nor do they acknowledge the existence of armed insurgency against their
government.

Ahmed Massoud, the son of former northern alliance military commander Ahmed
Shah Massoud, and Amrullah Saleh, the former vice president of Afghanistan, lead
the National Resistance Force. Since having been pushed by the Taliban to
mountains from Panjshir, the fighters of NRF have been openly engaging in
asymmetrical warfare against Taliban. Moreover, in the second half of 2022 their
insurgency extended beyond its birthplace of Panjshir and Andrab valley to the
northern Takhar and Badakhshan provinces, inflicting losses on Taliban forces.
However, their obtrusive struggle is not strong enough to shake the Taliban’s
power base in the country. Afghan analysts believe that countries in the region
seem unwilling to support anti-Taliban resistance forces with the exception of
Tajikistan that has allowed the NRF leadership to use the country for living and
traveling abroad to lobby for support.68

Similarly, Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF) has presence in some provinces. In

areas like Baghlan, they conduct joint strikes with NRF against the Taliban. 69 The
AFF was created and is being led by previous government deputy defense minister
and chief of the general staff, General Yasin Zia. It is, however, less known
compared to NRF, but its attacks in the Taliban heartlands, although sporadic, in

68
Sami Yousafzai, "Afghanistan’s "uncertain" future: domestic and regional implications.”
69
Lynne O'Donnell, "Afghan resistance leaders see 'no option' but war," Foreign Policy, September 29, 2022,
<https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/09/29/afghanistan-taliban-resistance-terrorism-jihad>

41
 EMERGING AFGHAN SITUATION: TALIBAN'S CHALLENGES AND REACTIONS

Helmand, Kandahar and Zabul are a sign of their wider presence. On the other
hand, the NRF is concentrated in the north-eastern provinces. However, like Ahmed
Massoud, General Zia also complains of lack of international support to AFF. Some
other groups also claim to have established armed resistance forces against
Taliban. the NRF Noor led by Atta Mohammed Noor—the former powerful
governor of Balkh in Hamid Karzai government—the Jabha e Azada Gan (Front of
Freedom Seekers), and Afghanistan’s National Islamic Freedom Movement are
among these groups, but their existence is limited only to social media
propaganda.

The Taliban have been quite active in kinetic actions against resisting ethnic
factions and militant groups such as IS-K. For instance, the Taliban's [or Islamic
Emirate's] special forces which are formed of those seeking martyrdom, istishhadis,
are every active in elimination of IS-K networks and hideouts across the country.
Similarly, while the Taliban have been trying to quell the resistance in the north
through military action, they have reportedly also set up additional check-posts in
some areas such as Panjshir. According to a Hasht-e Subh report, several such
checkpoints have been established on the way between villages where “the Taliban
check the identity cards of the residents who enter a village, and if they are not
from the same village, they send them back to their village." 70

Nonetheless, residents and international human rights watchdogs criticize the

Taliban for grave rights abuses that have been reported in its military campaign
against dissidents. For instance, Taliban's action against a dissident commander in
a remote part of northern Afghanistan, Mehdi Mujahid, is a case in point. Formerly
the most senior ethnic Hazara security official in the Taliban government, and a
former head of Taliban intelligence in the central province of Bamiyan, Mujahid

70
"Taliban Increases Checkpoints in Panjshir Province," Hasht e Subh, July 12, 2022,
<https://8am.af/eng/taliban-increases-checkpoints-in-panjshir-province>

42
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

was angered by the Taliban leadership after he was dismissed for unspecified
reasons in early June last year. Mujahid accused Taliban leaders of alienating the
predominately Shi'ite Hazara minority by depriving them of government posts and
civic rights.71

71
Abubakar Siddique, "Taliban atrocities reported in crackdown on revel Hazara commander," RFERL's Radio
Azadi, July 1, 2022, <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-taliban-crackdown-atrocities-
mujahid/31923580.html>

43
5. Fallout of Afghan situation on Pakistan

Strategists in Pakistan believe that if the economic and governance situation in

Afghanistan does not improve, it will add to internal conflict lines thus giving way
to external actors to become part of a new 'proxy war' game. The militant groups
will then not operate in isolation from external influences.72

In the national security policy, issued in 2022 as the first comprehensive security
policy of Pakistan, Pakistan stressed on the growing instability in Afghanistan as a
security threat for the country. As the policy was focused on the non-traditional
economic and human security, it explained that Pakistan’s push for peace and
stability in Afghanistan was dictated by the country’s need for westward
connectivity “given that eastward connectivity was held hostage to India’s
regressive approach.”73

Immediate neighbors of Afghanistan including Pakistan, Iran, China, India and

Central Asian states are concerned about the regional security implications of the
Taliban takeover of Kabul. For instance, the 31st report by the Analytical Support
and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC, released on February 13, 2023, noted
that Afghanistan remains the primary source of terrorist threat for Central and
South Asia. As explained earlier in the report, the threat mainly originates from
groups including the IS-K, Al-Qaida, Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan, ETIM/TIP, Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan, Islamic Jihad Group, Khatiba Imam al-Bukhari, Khatiba
al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, Jamaat Ansarullah, and others. 74 Earlier, May 2022 report by
the same UN team had noted that the most lethal anti-Pakistan terrorist group TTP
“has arguably benefitted the most of all the foreign extremist groups in

72
Dr. Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Professor at the School of Politics & International Relations, QAU, Islamabad.
Comments in PIPS consultation-3 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 27, 2022, in Islamabad.
73
National Security Division, National Security Policy of Pakistan 2022-2026, p. 18.
74
The 31st report by the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team of the UNSC.
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

Afghanistan from the [Afghan] Taliban takeover.” The report also noted that being
based along the east and south-east Afghanistan-Pakistan border areas, the group
has conducted numerous attacks and operations in Pakistan. The TTP also
“continues to exist as a stand-alone force, rather than feeling pressure to merge its
fighters into Afghan Taliban units, as is the prospect for most foreign terrorist
fighters,” the UN report revealed.75

After Operation Zarb-e-Azb in 2014, the threat of militancy had actually shifted to
Afghanistan, but since August 15, 2021, a new shift in the threat has been observed.
Worsening the situation are cross border movements of militants, who cross
border and attack Pakistani security personnel. Not only the TTP and IS-K chapter
have intensified their attacks inside Pakistan, but the Balochi and Sindhi nationalist
groups have also perpetrated some high-impact attacks in recent months
including on security forces and Chinese nationals and interests in Pakistan.

Overall, since the Taliban takeover of Kabul, incidence of terrorist violence has
significantly increased inside Pakistan. A Pak Institute for Peace Studies' report in
2022 noted that during one year after the Taliban takeover, the number of terrorist
attacks om Pakistan increased by 51 percent, as compared to previous
corresponding year. However, when counted for the 21 months since the
Taliban takeover (August 2021 to April 2023), the number of terrorist attacks
in Pakistan has posted a phenomenal increase of 73 percent, as compared to
corresponding 21 months before the Taliban takeover (See Table 1). The number
of people killed in these attacks has increased by 138 percent.

Apparently, the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces have witnessed a

marked impact of the Afghan situation in terms of terrorist violence, where the

75
The report can be downloaded here: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3975071?ln=en#record-files-
collapse-header>

46
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

number of attacks (during these 21 months) surged by 92 percent and 81 percent,

respectively (See Table 1). However, the number of terrorist attacks in
Punjab/Islamabad and Sindh has posted a relative decline since the Taliban
takeover as compared to corresponding 21 months pre-August 2021.

Table 1: Terrorist attacks in Pakistan in 21 months since the Taliban takeover 76

Nov. 2019 to Jul. Aug. 2021 to Apr. % Change77

2021 2023
Region (21 months) (21 months)
No. of No. of No. of
Killed Killed Killed
Attacks Attacks Attacks
KP 149 218 286 520 92% 138%
Balochistan 88 181 159 218 81% 20%
Punjab & 17 28% 29%
14 24 10
Islamabad
Sindh 23 21 17 30 26% 43%
GB & AJK 0 0 1 0 - -
Total 274 444 473 785 73% 77%

These emerging trends of terrorism will only add to Pakistan’s persistent security
challenge in terms of Taliban militancy in KP and the erstwhile tribal areas, Baloch
nationalist insurgency in Balochistan, ethno-nationalist violence in Sindh and
Karachi, as well as growing religious extremism and radicalism. Protracted over
longer period of time, such environment of insecurity, militancy and violence can
pose serious threats to political and economic stability as well.

76
Data and statistics are derived from Pak Institute for Peace Studies' digital database on conflict and
insecurity: <www.pakpips.com.app/database>
77
 and  represent increase and decrease, respectively, from the corresponding period of previous year(s),
as given at the table.

47
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

According to a report released by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in March 2023,

"the influx of US weapons has boosted the military capabilities of the TTP militant
group and ethnic Baloch separatist groups that are waging insurgencies against
the government in Pakistan, which has witnessed a surge in violence over the past
two years."78 Militants who carry out attacks inside Pakistan have obtained US
weapons left behind in Afghanistan. "When the United States pulled out its
forces from Afghanistan in 2021, it left behind around $7 billion worth of military
equipment and weapons, including firearms, communications gear, and even
armoured vehicles. The Afghan Taliban seized the arms during the chaotic US
withdrawal," the report claimed.79 Some social media posts by KP journalists also
claimed the TTP militants used night vision sniper rifles in their attack on a Lakki
Marwat police station during March 2023.

As the level and nature of this threat is not uniform, it is useful to have separate
sets of analysis for different parts of the country with the main focus on post-US
withdrawal and post-Taliban takeover trends and developments.

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has been witnessing heightened level of terrorist violence

by the TTP as well as IS-K since the August 2021, although militants had been trying
to regroup there long before that. In July 2021, when the Afghan Taliban emerged
as a more critical component in the Afghan power calculus by reportedly extending
their control “roughly [over] a third of all 421 districts and district centers in
Afghanistan,”80 the TTP also started intensifying attacks against Pakistani security
and law enforcement personnel. Pak Institute for Peace Studies’ (PIPS) monthly

78
Abubakar Siddique, "Pakistani armed groups obtain U.S. weapons left behind in Afghanistan," RFERL,
March 29, 2023, https://www.rferl.org/a/pakistan-armed-groups-obtain-us-weapons-left-in-
<afghanistan/32340664.html#0_8_10089_8766_2710_247182806>
79
Ibid.
80
Aljazeera, July 5, 2021, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/4/taliban-seizes-key-districts-in-
afghanistan-as-govt-forces-flee>

48
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

security reports for July and August 2021 had noted that the TTP and affiliates had
perpetrated 33 atatcks mainly against police and army personnel in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa causing 47 deaths. Since then, the TTP and affiliates have been
constantly increasing their presence and activities in the erstwhile FATA and other
parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The twin Waziristan and adjacent KP districts in
southern KP such as Lakki Marwat, Tank, Bannu and DI Khan, as well as the
provincial capital and neighboring Khyber districts have, in particular, emerged as
flashpoints of insecurity and violence since August 2021.

Most of TTP and other militants had relocated to Afghanistan after the 2014
military operation in North Waziristan. However, in 2017, TTP instigated
regrouping, along with an ideological transformation leading towards nationalism.
Since then, the group has been strengthening its position in bordering areas and
adding to its operational strength including with the help of Al-Qaeda. Separately,
the TTP has continued to add more groups in its fold, a process it started in 2020.
For instance, at least four new groups had reportedly announced their merger with
the TTP in March 2023, and another one in May. This takes the count of such
mergers with the TTP since July 2020 to 28. Though it is not clear how many
members or militants each of these merging group has, but still, it should be a
worrisome development for the security forces and the government. It indicates
that the group has been consistently adding to its strength that will certainly add
to its operational capabilities in the areas where these newly merged groups are
based in KP and even Balochistan.

It was in March 2022 that the leadership council of the TTP announced to start
operation Al-Badr from the first of Ramadan as part of its spring offensive in
Pakistan. The operation was announced for one year but only after one month of
its launch, the TTP announced ceasefire on Eidul Fitr, which the group extended
more than once, finally for an indefinite period in May, due to its talks with Pakistani

49
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

government in Afghanistan, which were mediated by the Afghan Taliban. The

ceasefire continued until November 2022 when the TTP announced it null and void
putting blame on the government for the failure of the talks. However, even before
that there were reports that the TTP may have ended the ceasefire and again
resorted to violence. In the beginning of September, the TTP claimed multiple
attacks including in DI Khan, Lakki Marwat, Khyber and Peshawar districts but the
TTP spokesman termed these attacks as 'defensive'.

The month of August 2022 also witnessed reported relocation of few small groups
of Pakistani Taliban militants into parts of KP from Afghanistan. Local tribesmen
spotted the movements of such groups in multiple areas. While local accounts
stressed there had been visible movement of militants in Swat, Dir and few other
areas mainly twin Waziristan districts, there was confusion about what allowed or
led them to relocate to these areas. Multiple protest demonstrations were
observed in Swat and other areas against rising terrorism and growing militant
activities. For one, on October 18th, the PTI activists, schoolchildren, transporters,
lawyers, and traders, held white flags and banners inscribed with slogans of
peace.81 Earlier in the month, a huge protest demonstration was held in which local
residents, and leaders and representation of various parties and bodies
participated including Swat Qaumi Jirga, Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party, Pakistan
People's Party, Awami National Party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Jamiat
Ulema-e-Islam, Qaumi Watan Party, Swat Ulesi Jirga, Pashteen Tahaffuz Movement,
and civil society organizations. The participants raised slogans against terrorism
and vowed to establish peace and not allow any militant actors to regroup in their
area.82

81
Dawn, October 19, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1715772>
82
For details, see: <https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202210080109>

50
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Most recently, in January 2023, the participants of a protest sit-in continued to

protest and block roads in Wana, South Waziristan for a week. It was organized by
Waziristan Aman Olasi Pasoon (Waziristan Peace Public Movement) to demand
that the government restore durable peace to the militancy-wracked district and
ensure better law and order in the region.83 Local representatives from various
political parties, including the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), Awami National Party
(ANP), JUI, JI, Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), National Democratic Movement
(NDM), Pakhtunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), lawyers, businesspersons, PTM,
and tribal elders and youngsters, were present on the occasion.84

Pak Institute for Peace Studies' annual security review of Pakistan for 2022 noted
that IS-K members were believed to be active in Bajaur, Peshawar, Mohmand,
Orakzai, and Kurram areas of KP; Bolan, Sibi, Awaran, Mastung, and Quetta districts
of Balochistan; and Karachi and northern Sindh.85 There is a heightened risk of IS-
K attacks on non-Muslims and Shias in Pakistan, which could also trigger
communal and sectarian tensions; in Afghanistan they are already doing that. The
March 2022 suicide blast by the group in a Shiite mosque in Peshawar is just one
example; the attack caused over 65 deaths. Later in August alone, the Islamic
State's Khorasan chapter claimed five attacks in Pakistan including four in KP and
one in Balochistan's Mastung district. Overall, IS-K perpetrated a total of 23
terrorist attacks during 2022 including 21 in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and two in
Balochistan. As many as 92 people lost their lives and another 222 were injured in
these attacks. In KP, one of the IS-K's main targets has been Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam

83
Dawn, January 11, 2023, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1730960/south-waziristan-protesters-block-roads-
after-talks-with-officials-fail>
84
The Nation, January 13, 2023, <https://www.nation.com.pk/13-Jan-2023/mass-protest-ends-on-7th-day-
in-south-waziristan>
85
The report can be downloaded here: <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2023/02/SecReport_2022.pdf>

51
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

leaders, mainly in Bajaur. The IS-K has indeed carried out several attacks against
JUI-F leaders in Bajaur in past few years. The group believes that the religious-
political party's ideology resonates with that of the Taliban, their main rival. Bajaur,
Mohmand and Orakzai were the tribal regions from where the Pakistani Taliban
commanders had first declared allegiance to the Islamic State group in 2014.

Islamic-State Khorasan in its propaganda campaign also has increasingly started

to focus Pakistan, mainly the KP province bordering on Afghanistan; this campaign
also includes anti-TTP ideological and operational propagation. For one, the
group's Al-Azaim media in July 2022 released several videos and text outputs
declaring the TTP leaders as "apostates" and calling on TTP fighters to join the IS-
K for "true jihad". The group through its Eid message in 2022 sent instructions to
its cells in Central and South Asia to enlist for lone-wolf and suicide attacks.
Similarly, in an 11-page message/pamphlet in Urdu, the IS-K has urged the people
of Bajaur tribal district to extend assistance to the group either through manpower
or financially.

Similarly, situation in Afghanistan has been impacting Balochistan in many ways.

First, the number of terrorist attacks has increased in Balochistan like in Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa. There is evidence to suggest that not only have the militants been
crossing over to Balochistan since August 2021, but they were also found in
possession of more sophisticated weapons as was observed in Nushki and Panjgur
attacks on FC camps by the BLA militants early 2022. Experts also underscore that
the Baloch insurgents will certainly draw inspiration from the changing
environment in the region and will further increase and intensify their attacks.
Meanwhile the banned TTP has also become more active in Pashtun belt of
Balochistan as well as Quetta and IS-K has also been operating in certain districts
of the province including Quetta and Mastung.

52
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

As many as six (6) Baloch insurgent groups were on the forefront in claiming
responsibility of different terrorist attacks reported from the province and Karachi
and parts of South Punjab since August 2021. These included BLA, Balochistan
Liberation Front (BLF), Baloch Republican Army (BRA), United Baloch Army (UBA),
Baloch Republicans Guards (BRG) and a newly formed group Baloch Nationalist
Army (BNA). The BLA claimed a suicide attack that killed 3 Chinese teachers at
Karachi University’s Confucius Institute in April 2022. "Hundreds of highly trained
male and female members of the BLA's Majeed Brigade are ready to carry out
deadly attacks in any part of Balochistan and Pakistan," BLA spokesman Jeeyand
Baloch said in a statement published in English. He threatened Beijing with "even
harsher" attacks unless the neighboring country halted its "exploitation projects"
and "occupying of the Pakistani state". Secondly, the leaders and members of the
Baloch insurgent groups from Afghanistan have also been relocating to
Balochistan in recent months. Others have also relocated to Iran or other
[presumably safe] regions within Afghanistan.86

Another problem regarding impact of Afghan situation on Balochistan is that there

is large number of Bugti Baloch living in Kandahar. In one of PIPS consultations on
Afghanistan, Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, JUI-Nazriyati leader in Balochistan, said
that when Shazain Bugti was appointed as advisor to Mr. Imran Khan [on Baloch
reconciliation], he came to him and asked what would happen to our people
(Bugtis) who are in Kandahar? Maulana Luni said he talked to the Governor
Kandahar and sent a message regarding the Baloch people there, and he clearly
replied: “we cannot expel Baloch people from here and people who came here,
[and] we won’t sabotage them as there is no restriction. We allow them to move
out freely but if they want to stay here then they are welcome because Afghanistan
also belongs to Hazaras and Baloch so we would not compel anyone to

86
Conversation with Shahzada Zulfiqar, Quetta-based journalist and president PFUJ.

53
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

leave.”87 Afrasiab Khattak contended that it was also possible that the Taliban
leadership in Kandahar wanted to keep Baloch insurgent groups such as BLA close
with a view to use them as a leverage against Pakistan in times of need. 88

Afghanistan’s impact on Balochistan’s politics and society has always existed,

particular in terms of militancy and insurgency. Starting from the 1948, the five
major insurgencies in Balochistan have had a role of Afghanistan as the Baloch
militants used to have bases in Afghanistan. In particular, the fifth insurgency has
strong connections in Afghanistan. However, when things started changing in
Afghanistan recently, the radical Baloch militant groups shifted their bases to Iran.
And this is a new dimension to the insurgency. There was policy understanding in
Pakistan that once the Afghan Taliban are in power in Afghanistan, the external
support to the Baloch militants from Afghanistan will evaporate. However, this did
not happen. The Baloch militants perceived this and shifted their base to Iran. Now,
apart from Afghanistan, Iran has become the second most important player in this
scenario.89

While the number of terrorist attacks has posted a relative decline in Sindh since
the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the number of people killed in these attacks have
increased indicating a rising incidence of high-impact attacks there. Indeed, in
recent years significant shifts have happened in the militant landscape of Sindh.
First, violent religious and sectarian groups have made inroads in interior Sindh as
well. Secondly, Sindhi nationalist groups have started to launch high-impact
attacks reportedly in collusion with the Baloch insurgent groups. Thirdly, Baloch

87
Maulana Luni made this statement in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June
9, 2022, in Islamabad.
88
Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
89
Manzoor Ahmed, Professor of Political Economy and Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of Gwadar. Views
expressed in PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.

54
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

insurgent groups have also become more active operationally in parts of Sindh, in
particular Karachi where they have perpetrated few major attacks on foreign
nationals/interests and security forces in recent years. One such major attack took
place on April 26, 2022, as noted earlier, when a female suicide bomber of BLA
Majeed Brigade blew herself up near the gate of the Confucius Institute at the
Karachi University when a van carrying Chinese nationals, who taught at the
Chinese language center, came in her range. Four people – three Chinese nationals
and their Pakistani driver – were killed in the blast.90

Growing insecurity and violence at Pak-Afghan border has been seriously

concerning Pakistan since the Taliban took power in Kabul. The Taliban have
apparently taken a stricter and nationalistic stance in their response to Pakistan's
efforts to fence the border. For one, a Taliban Defense Ministry spokesman
criticized the fencing project in January 2022, saying Pakistan had “no right to erect
barbed wire along the Durand Line and separate the tribes on both sides of the
line.”91 Secondly, the cross-border incursions and attacks by militants, refugee
issue as well as illegal cross-border movements have also added to border
tensions. As a result, not only the number of cross-border attacks and clashes has
increased but intensity of such incidents has also grown resulting in more deaths
and injuries.

Only in 2022, 34 Pakistani citizens lost their lives (including 20 security officials) in
13 such attacks/clashes along the Durand Line. As many as nine of these
attacks/clashes happened in North Waziristan and Kurram bordering districts of
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and another four took place along Chaman border in

90
The Express Tribune, April 26, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2354305/female-suicide-bomber-kills-3-
chinese-nationals-at-ku>; Dawn, April 27, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1687041/three-chinese-
teachers-killed-in-varsity-bombing>
91
<https://twitter.com/AbdulhaqOmeri/status/1477682063402848257>

55
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

Balochistan. Importantly, in the past, or during Ghani regime, most of the cross-
border attacks from Afghanistan were carried out by the TTP or other militant
groups, but now many of such incidents involve Afghan border forces under the
Taliban regime.

In April 2022, three soldiers of the Pakistan Army embraced martyrdom and four
others were injured when terrorists from inside Afghanistan opened fire on
Pakistani troops in North Waziristan district.92 This cross-border attack, coupled
with some other high-impact TTP attacks during the month, drew a strong reaction
from Pakistani government and security forces. Meanwhile, Afghan media as well
as social media platforms were rife with reports on Pakistan’s strikes against TTP
militants’ hideouts inside Afghanistan. Some reports quoted Afghan officials saying
the “death toll had risen to 47 following Pakistan military strikes in the eastern
Afghanistan provinces of Kunar and Khost.”93 Pakistan’s Foreign Office said the
government was looking into the allegations of airstrikes.94 Similarly, in September
2022, three cross-border attacks happened from across the Durand Line in KP
which martyred five soldiers of Pakistan Army. At the outset, the TTP claimed the
attack, but the Afghan Taliban later attributed the cross-border firing to attempts
by Pakistani forces to build a post close to the Durand Line, which they said led to
an exchange of fire between the two sides. Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari

92
The News, April 23, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/952653-three-soldiers-martyred-in-
terrorist-attack-from-across-pak-afghan-border-ispr>; Dawn, April 24, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1686528/three-soldiers-martyred-by-firing-from-across-afghan-border>
93
Haroon Janjua, “Tensions increase between Taliban and Pakistan over attacks,” DW, April 21. 2022,
<https://www.dw.com/en/tensions-increase-between-taliban-and-pakistan-over-attacks/a-61535921>
94
Dawn, April 17, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1685373/fo-looking-into-afghan-allegation-of-air-
strikes>

56
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

condemned the attack and demanded that the Afghan government should stop
terrorists from carrying out operations from across the border.95

Also, following the episode of border clashes at Chaman in November 2022,

Pakistan summoned the Afghan chargé d’affaires in Islamabad and lodged a strong
protest over the incident of “unprovoked cross-border shelling” by the Afghan
Taliban forces. Between October and December 2022, the Chaman and the Spin
Boldak border-crossings experienced temporary blockages due to border
skirmishes. However, the borders reopened again after meetings between Pakistan
and Afghanistan authorities. A high-level delegation comprising civil and military
officials went to Afghanistan to meet top officials, and a peace jirga was held in
Spin Boldak.

Growing cross-border attacks by the militants, mainly belonging to the TTP and IS-
K, challenge not only the Taliban’s monopoly over violence but also the latter’s
claim that Afghanistan’s soil would not be used against any other country.
Apparently, the Taliban have been insisting on keeping the border open and
allowing cross-border movement without travel documentation. For Pakistan,
open border policy means a rise in arms and drug trafficking, refugees’ inflow, and
terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, strict border policy also resulted in Afghans using
illegal means to enter Pakistan; these undocumented Afghan refugees neither
benefited from the UNHCR facilities nor repatriated, which resulted in them being
stuck in Pakistan.96

Experts also assert that the tension at the border and the consequent tensions in
bilateral relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan will only help the militants to

95
3 Naveed Siddiqui, "Three soldiers martyred in exchange of fire with terrorists across Pak-Afghan border:
ISPR," Dawn, September 13, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1709917>
96
Sheharyar Khan, Head of National Dialogue Forum. Interview by Arooj Mumtaz, researcher PIPS, December
02, 2021.

57
 FALLOUT OF AFGHAN SITUATION ON PAKISTAN

exploit the situation and create more chaotic environment in which they feel more
comfortable to operate. While Pakistan needs to enhance bilateral, official
engagement with the Afghan Taliban, the latter shall also need to respond to the
Pakistan’s border and security sensitivities, which have been conveyed and stated
repeatedly.

The way the Taliban managed to sustain a long-term insurgency and eventually
took over Kabul has raised questions about how they financed their operations
over more than a decade. Apparently, most of their funding came through local
taxes in the areas under their control, mainly on goods transport, commerce, and
local land and agricultural production. "In some districts, the Taliban derived
additional income from taxation of mining operations as well as trade in minerals."
However, another possible source of their funding, which "has been extensively
mentioned in the [available] literature, is taxation of the narcotics trade, specifically
trade in opium, heroin, and cannabis."97

Pakistan is a transit as well as an end use country for opiates coming from
Afghanistan. Experts assert that the future of the regional narcotics trade is closely
tied to developments in Afghanistan. "If peace prevails and a broad-based
government is formed, there can be progress on counter narcotics operations in
the short term. [However], if the situation remains unstable, or a civil war erupts,
the narcotics trade is likely to flourish as warring factions will rely on the trade to
generate financing. The second scenario has grave ramifications for Pakistan."98

97
Safiya Aftab, "Afghanistan, Pakistan and the regional narcotics trade," Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-I
(Pak Institute for Peace Studies), July-Sep 2021, <https://www.pakpips.com/article/book/afghanistan-as-
seen-from-pakistan-i>
98
Safiya Aftab, "Afghanistan, Pakistan and the regional narcotics trade."

58
6. Pak-Afghan bilateral engagement: challenges
and opportunities

As noted at the beginning of this report, former Afghan president Ashraf Ghani
had adopted a policy of rapprochement towards Pakistan thinking that the latter
could help in the Afghan political reconciliation. Pakistan, in turn, contributed to
bringing the Taliban leaders to the negotiation table in Murree, a mountain resort
town near Islamabad, on July 7, 2015. Before that Pakistan had reportedly also
facilitated a session of back-channel talks between representatives of the Afghan
government and the Taliban in Urumqi, China on May 19 in the same year. “The
talks were attended by some Afghan Taliban leaders based in Pakistan, including
Mullah Abdur Jalil and Mullah Hassan.”99 However, the peace process almost
derailed after the announcement of the death of the Taliban supreme leader
Mullah Omar in July 2015. Later, in the fifth Heart of Asia Conference, held in
Islamabad on December 6, Pakistan, Afghanistan, the US, and China formed the
Quadrilateral Monitoring Committee with the purpose of facilitating and
supporting the Afghan reconciliation process. However, by that time the damage
had already been done to the arising warmth in Pak-Afghan bilateral diplomacy.

The Ghani government time and again accused Pakistan of being the mouthpiece
of the Taliban. A striking example was the allegation by the Afghan government
that Pakistan’s foreign minister acted as the Taliban’s spokesperson when he said
that the latter did not want Daesh to grow in Afghanistan.100 Ghani administration
also claimed that Pakistan's support for the Taliban allowed them to weather 20

99
Safdar Sial, “Pakistan-Afghan relations after Karzai,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF),
February 2016, <https://reliefweb.int/report/pakistan/pakistani-afghan-relations-after-karzai>
100
Nadeem Shah, “Afghan govt responsible for keeping Daesh in check in Afghanistan: FM Qureshi”, The
News, August 1, 2021, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/871641-taliban-won-t-allow-isis-penetration-in-
afghanistan-qureshi>
 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

years of war.101 However, in the light of urban territorial advancements made by

the Taliban, Pakistan had clearly stated that it could not be held responsible for
Afghan forces’ lack of will to fight, poor capacity-building and shortage of
equipment.102 US Secretary of State Antony Blinken also endorsed Pakistan’s stance
by stressing that the Afghan security forces proved incapable of defending the
country.

Although a statement issued by Pakistan’s National Security Committee after the

fall of Kabul confirmed Pakistan’s position of non-interference in Afghan affairs,
but some statements from Pakistani officials and politicians had only prompted the
world to question Pakistan’s stance. For one, in an interview with Becky Anderson
for CNN, Pakistani former National Security Adviser, Moeed Yousuf, stated that the
Afghan population had welcomed the Taliban rather than opposing them. 103

6.1 Pakistan's misplaced optimism and growing concerns

As early as July 2021, officials in Islamabad had started stressing that Taliban had
changed. According to them, the “new” Taliban had given up on their hardline
approach of Mullah Omar and were endorsing tolerance and coexistence – a
narrative that was not received well by analysts in Pakistan and abroad. When the
Taliban captured Kabul and announced their government three weeks later,
Pakistan viewed the event as cleaning up of the unwanted externalities in its
neighborhood i.e., a complete pullback of Indian and Western presence and

101
“Pakistan useful for US only to clean up Afghanistan ‘mess’: Khan,” Al Jazeera, August 12, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/12/pakistan-imran-khan-afghanistan-mess-taliban>
102
Gibran Peshimam, “Pakistan urges look into 'meltdown' of Afghan forces as Taliban advances,” Reuters,
August 9, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/pakistan-urges-global-community-look-into-
meltdown-afghan-forces-2021-08-09>
103
Moeed Yousaf (Pakistan’s National Security Advisor), interview with CNN’s Becky Anderson, August 13,
2021.

60
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

influence. However, the initial exhilaration has morphed into disappointment since
then.

While Pakistan still remains as the most vocal supporter of the Taliban regime, the
relations between the two governments are not entirely convivial, as is often
perceived. Not only has the Taliban regime adopted traditional approach to
Durand line, but they are also believed to be turning a blind eye to the safe havens
of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups on their soil. Secondly, the failure of the Taliban in
establishing an inclusive government, allowing women’s equal access to education
and employment opportunities and protecting religious and ethnic minorities
worried the policymakers in Islamabad and other neighboring nations. Notably,
unlike before, Pakistani officials no more emphasize the 'moderation' of the
Taliban.

At the outset, as described at length in Chapter 3, most official and public

responses from Pakistan to the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan were welcoming.
Religious-political parties strongly welcomed and praised the Taliban for their so-
called victory. Mainstream political parties were still careful and demanded of the
government to take all stakeholders into confidence by initiating debate in
parliament. Some nationalist political parties from KP and Balochistan denounced
the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul but later adopted a cautious and accommodative
approach. 104 Like religious-political parties, Pakistan’s religious organizations were
also extremely elated by the Taliban’s takeover of Kabul. Few also raised the
Taliban’s flag (though momentarily), including the clerics of Lal Masjid in
Islamabad. Many in northern Balochistan, which has predominantly Pashtun
population, also welcomed the Afghan Taliban. For instance, following the Taliban

104
Pak Institute for Peace Studies, “Perspectives from Pakistan on Afghan peace and reconciliation,” PIPS
quarterly monitor-1 (July to September 2021), <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2021/10/Monitoring-and-analysis-report-1.pdf>

61
 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

takeover, large groups of people came out in different towns and displayed flags
of the Afghan Taliban. Similarly, the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Nazriyati (ideological),
a far-right political party based in Balochistan, held a gathering in Quetta on
September 30, 2021, where its members wearing white shalwar-kameez and the
white Taliban-like caps were carrying their party and Afghan Taliban flags. They
had gathered from Quetta and northern parts of the province to celebrate the
victory of the Afghan Taliban under the slogan of “Sadaey Mujahid Conference”.105

Similarly, many in Islamabad were cheering for having a friendly government in

their western neighbor. Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan on August 16 said that
Afghanistan had broken the "shackles of slavery". However, some observers have
been highlighting from the outset that Pakistan should not have given the
impression that it is celebrating the Taliban's victory in Afghanistan. For instance,
DG ISI must not have visited Afghanistan, and if he did, he must have kept it low
key. Most importantly Pakistan must not forget that the Taliban might be thankful
to Pakistan but would not necessarily act according to Pakistan’s wishes as we had
seen during their first regime in the 1990s. For one, when it was about breaking
the sculpture of mahatma buddha, Pakistan had tried to stop the Taliban by writing
letters and sending envoys, but they outrightly told Pakistan to not intervene in
their religious responsibility.106

One of the reasons for Pakistan's misplaced optimism has been linked to Pakistan's
understanding of the Afghan Taliban. According to some observers, it is quite
difficult to read their minds and behaviour. For instance, as noted by Afghan

105
Shahzada Zulfiqar & Akbar Notezai, "The interface of Afghan quagmire with Balochistan,” Afghanistan as
seen from Pakistan-III (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/Report.pdf>
106
Inam-ul-Haque, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, and former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
Comments at PIPS consultation-1 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held in Islamabad on September 24,
2021.

62
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

journalist Sami Yousafzai, in February 2023 visit of a high-level delegation from

Pakistan, the delegates talked about terrorism and were very serious with the
Afghan Taliban. However, in response Mullah Baradar told them that because of
Pakistan’s closing the border Afghanistan’s food stuff and fruit expired on the way
before reaching the Pakistani markets. He also said that because of this border
closure, business has stopped. This shows how Pakistan misunderstands the
Afghan Taliban; while Pakistan was stressing on terrorism and tackling the TTP, the
Afghan Taliban emphasised on food stuff and fruits.107

Similarly, another major challenge in the way of improved bilateral relations is

Pakistan’s myopic Afghan policy, which has always made it mandatory for Pakistan
to establish ties with one group or another in Afghanistan rather than the
government. However, as the group supported by Pakistan comes into power in
Afghanistan, it changes, and makes totally different policies, which are mostly
opposed to Pakistan’s wishes. For instance, when Hekmatyar and other mujahideen
groups were fighting, they were considered as good guys. Nonetheless, after
coming into power their priorities and desires changed and they did not listen to
Pakistan and eventually lost its favours. "[In a similar way] Pakistan has received a
setback from Afghanistan, as it had believed that with their coming into power the
Afghan Taliban would clamp down on the TTP, but now the Afghan Taliban are not
listening to Pakistan’s pleas to rein in the TTP."108

107
Sami Yousafzai, journalist and expert on Afghan affairs. Views expressed in PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan
peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.
108
Ibid.

63
 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

6.2 Ties with the Taliban regime: developments and prospects

As a strong proponent of ending Afghan conflict through political settlement,

Pakistan played a significant back-channel role in facilitating the talks between the
Taliban and the US officials in late 2018, that eventually led to Doha deal in
February 2020. Pakistan released former Taliban deputy leader Mullah Abdul Ghani
Baradar in October 2018 after nearly nine years of detention. Soon after, the
Taliban emir appointed Baradar to lead peace talks with the US and the group's
political office in Doha.109 The deal committed withdrawal of foreign troops from
Afghan soil in return of a guarantee from the Taliban that the Afghan territory will
not be used “by any group or individual against the security of the United States
and its allies.”110 Pakistan welcomed the deal terming it the “start of a peace and
reconciliation process to end decades of war and suffering of the Afghan
people.”111

Soon after the signing of Doha agreement, Pakistan revamped its efforts to
facilitate talks between the Taliban and Afghanistan government, then led by
President Ashraf Ghani. Pakistan’s good offices played a pivotal role in courting the
Taliban leadership to negotiate with the Kabul government, signaled by the visit of
the Taliban delegation to Islamabad just two weeks before the onset of the intra-
Afghan dialogue in September 2020. Pakistan also reached out to the government
officials in Kabul and a delegation of Afghan government led by Dr Abdullah

109
"Afghanistan peace talks since 2018: A timeline," Crisis Group, August 11, 2020,
<https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-between-february-2018-and-august-
2020-timeline>
110
US Department of State, “Agreement for bringing peace to Afghanistan ……….,” February 29, 2020,
<state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-02.29.20.pdf>
111
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Pakistan hails Doha accord as harbinger of peace in Afghanistan,” Dawn, March 1,
2020.

64
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Abdullah, then chairman of the High Council for National Reconciliation, visited
Pakistan a few weeks after the first round of intra-Afghan talks.

Pakistan's commitment to Afghan peace has been built on the rationale that it is
linked to peace in Pakistan and the wider region. Pakistan also feared an influx of
refugees, a surge in militarization and extremism and spillover of violence to its
territory in case of any civil war in Afghanistan. Moreover, Pakistan believes that
peace in Afghanistan is a pre-requisite for economic stability of Pakistan as
regional connectivity projects depend on it.

Throughout July 2021, as violence in Afghanistan picked up pace and the Taliban
started scoring military ‘victories’ across Afghanistan, Pakistan consistently
underscored that it would not accept a forceful takeover of Kabul. It was part of
the “Extended Troika” that jointly called all parties to reduce violence and opposed
restoration of so-called ‘Islamic Emirate’ by the Taliban.112 Pakistan was similarly
concerned about the use of local warlords by Kabul government to tackle the
Taliban advancement but its efforts to reach out to the Ghani regime were mostly
met with mistrust. Pakistan also tried to dispel the impression of providing any
tactical support to the Taliban group yet recognized their presence in the refugee
camps.113 The world, nevertheless, remained skeptical of Taliban-Pakistan ties and
many analysts blamed Pakistan for supporting the Taliban as they swiftly gained
control of Kabul. However, Moeed Yousuf, Pakistan’s former National Security
Advisor (NSA), proclaimed that the inaptitude and corruption in the Ghani regime
and the Afghan security forces had led to the Taliban victory and, therefore,
Pakistan should not be used as a “scapegoat.”

112
US Department of State, “Joint Statement on Extended “Troika” on peaceful settlement in Afghanistan,”
March 18, 2021, <https://www.state.gov/joint-statement-on-extended-troika-on-peaceful-settlement-in-
afghanistan>
113
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “PM rules out use of force against Afghan Taliban,” Dawn, July 30, 2021.

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Similarly, on several occasions, Pakistan’s civil and military leaderships passed

statements in support of an inclusive government in Afghanistan, presenting the
Taliban as one among many other political actors.

The Taliban takeover and aftermath: Pakistan's perspective and role

There was no shift in the policy even after the Taliban assumed control of Kabul, as
Pakistan claimed to use its influence over the Taliban to persuade them for forming
an ethnically inclusive government with Tajik, Uzbek, Hazara and other
communities.114 Despite this consistent support for an inclusive government,
Pakistan adopted a cautious approach when the Taliban announced an interim
cabinet in September 2021, which composed only of senior Taliban leaders. On the
issue of inclusion of women in the future Taliban government, there was little hope.
Yet Pakistan leadership held that the world ought to “let the situation evolve.” 115

Meanwhile, from July 2021 till September 2021, Pakistan sent consistent warnings
to the world of a possible civil war in Afghanistan, blaming US for abandoning the
country. One of the four points in the way forward for the Afghan peace process,
as proposed by the former Foreign Minister Qureshi, was to “deepen and sustain
economic engagement with Afghanistan for its reconstruction and economic
development”.

At various international fora, Pakistan provided a sort of diplomatic conduit to the

Taliban. For one, Former prime minister Imran Khan on multiple occasions talked
about the threat of Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) and that only the Taliban

114
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “Imran begins dialogue with Taliban for inclusive govt,” Dawn, September 19, 2021.
115
“'Be more realistic': FM Qureshi details roadmap for Afghan Taliban's recognition” Dawn, September 23,
2021.

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

could help the world get rid of the terrorist group. 116 Pakistan also urged the world
community to pay attention to the economic woes of the Afghan people and asked
the US government to release Afghan funds and to provide humanitarian
assistance so as to avoid an economic collapse of the war-torn country. Pakistan’s
calls for a looming economic and humanitarian catastrophe were well-grounded
as it understood that managing the post-war economy was a major challenge that
required sustained support of the international community. Pakistan also
vigorously presented Pakistan’s narrative on Afghanistan to the world,
emphasizing the importance of stability in Afghanistan as critical for peace in the
region. Pakistani officials criticized the world for its “wait and see approach” as they
believed it would “tantamount to abandonment” of Afghanistan. 117 Two fears
dictated Pakistan’s diplomatic lobbying for Afghanistan: the concern for the
spillover effect of any instability in Afghanistan and the fear of diplomatic isolation
from the West that mostly looks at Pakistan from an Afghan lens.

Pakistan remained active on global and regional diplomatic fronts in keeping

Afghanistan’s issue alive. Pakistan abstained from a UN General Assembly
resolution that expressed deep concern over the 'volatility' in Afghanistan since the
Taliban’s takeover in 2021. The UNGA noted the presence of terrorist groups as
well as the persistent violence and abuse of human rights, including those of
women, girls, and minorities. Pakistan’s representative described the resolution as
“unbalanced and unrealistic”.118

116
Syed Irfan Raza, “Hardliners will gain if West fails Afghanistan, says PM”, Dawn, October 12, 2021,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1651543>
117
“'Wait-and-see' approach on Afghanistan tantamount to abandonment: NS”, Express Tribune, October 7,
2021, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2323717/wait-and-see-approach-on-afghanistan-tantamount-to-
abandonment-nsa.>
118
Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan abstains from voting on UNGA’s Afghan resolution”, Dawn,
November 12, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1720454>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

With the regime change in Pakistan in April 2022, some important changes were
witnessed in country’s approach towards peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan.
The new political leadership in Islamabad mostly passed statements only on
humanitarian aid for Afghanistan, while the official engagements on more critical
political and security issues had been through civil and military bureaucracy. With
Bilawal Bhutto Zardari as the new Foreign Minister, whose party has been a strong
supporter of taking parliamentarians on board on the Afghan issue, some
involvement of political actors in the Afghan issue was expected in the subsequent
months.

However, in recent times, there has been a significant departure from an “all-is-
well” public stance. Pakistan is growingly concerned, along with the international
community, about the Taliban unwillingness to form an inclusive government and
protect women rights. The late November 2022 visit to Kabul by the minister of the
state of foreign affairs, Hina Rabbani Khar119 yielded little in the way of the Taliban’s
flexibility on political inclusivity, the rights of women and girls, and the footprints
of terrorist organizations in Afghanistan. Khar attempted her best to effectively
convey Pakistan's views, including those on girls' education, but Taliban ministers
only offered customary assurances and made no firm commitments. Experts
believed that this was due in part to the fact that the hard-liner leadership in
Kandahar made decisions rather than the Kabul cabinet.120

The Taliban's adamant behavior viz a viz the TTP and border security issues is not
helping Pakistan in sustaining its optimistic approach towards the Taliban-led
government in Afghanistan. Growing incidence of terrorist violence is making

119
Tahir Khan, “Khar, Taliban leadership discuss security issues and economic cooperation in wide-ranging
talks”, Dawn, November 29, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1723818>
120
Maleeha Lodhi, “Untenable Afghan Policy”, Dawn, December 19, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1727125>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Pakistan more worried about the fallout of Afghan situation mainly in terms of
militants' cross-border terrorism and incursions. A delegation led by Pakistani
Defence Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif visited Kabul on February 22nd. The
Foreign Office in a statement issued after a day-long trip said growing TTP and IS-
K threat was discussed and “the two sides agreed to collaborate to effectively
address the threat of terrorism”. A media report claimed that the Afghan Taliban
has promised to cooperate with the Pakistan government on its concerns about
the presence of the outlawed TTP fighters and sanctuaries on its soil after
Islamabad delivered a stark warning on the issue. 121

More recently, Pakistan hosted trilateral talks inviting foreign ministers of China
and Afghanistan in May 2023. Both China and Pakistan vowed to continue working
for Afghan peace and stability. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Mr Bhutto-Zardari while
speaking at a joint stakeout with Mr. Qin after the strategic dialogue stressed that
peace and stability in Afghanistan remained vital for the socioeconomic
development, connectivity and prosperity of the region. 122

The recognition issue

Despite its active diplomatic advocacy for not isolating the Taliban government,
Pakistan has been demonstrating cautiousness about recognizing it. Islamabad is
apparently following the regional and international response to the Taliban
recognition that builds upon protection of human rights, women rights,
counterterrorism, and inclusivity as key conditions.

On several occasions, the country’s leadership affirmed its support to a

representative government in Kabul and ensured the world that the country will

121
Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Kabul willing to help address TTP sanctuaries issue," Dawn, February 23, 2023.
122
Iftikhar A. Khan, "Pakistan. China vow to work for Afghan stability," Dawn, May 7, 2023,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1751362>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

follow other regional and global powers in recognizing the government in Kabul.
The government is, this way, following a balanced policy of active engagement
with the de-facto rulers of Afghanistan without giving them formal recognition.
Some anticipate that Pakistan is using its formal recognition as a bargaining chip
to make the Taliban pressurize TTP to give up arms123 while others believe that
Pakistan would continue with the policy as the cost of recognizing the Taliban
government without global initiative is too high.124

In November last year, Foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari said that Islamabad
does not want to take a "solo flight" for recognition of the interim Afghan
government and that it wants the issue to be resolved with international
consensus.125 Just a month before that, President Arif Alvi had stated that if the
"Islamic Emirate" wants to be recognized, it should reopen girls’ schools, form
an inclusive government, and assure foreign countries that they will not be
attacked from Afghanistan’s soil.126

Some observers hold that although Pakistan has de jure not recognized the
Taliban-led interim government, but it has de facto recognized it. Pakistan's
embassy works in Kabul and Afghan embassy works in Islamabad. Delegations are

123
Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, senior journalist. Interviewed by Arooj Mumtaz, researcher at PIPS, December 7,
2021.
124
Tahir Khan, senior journalist. Interviewed by Arooj Mumtaz, researcher at PIPS, December 07, 2021.
125
Associated Press of Pakistan, “Pakistan needs to review internal security and terrorism policies: FM
Bilawal”, Dawn, November 18, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1721663>
126
“IEA should address expectations of the world if it seeks legitimacy: Pakistan”, Ariana News, October 02,
2022, <https://www.ariananews.af/iea-should-address-expectations-of-the-world-if-it-seeks-legitimacy-
pakistan>

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exchanged. People cross the border very easily. So, saying that Pakistan does not
recognize Afghan government is not a factful or real discussion.127

However, different views exist in Pakistan pertaining to the recognition of the

Taliban government. Most religious groups and religious-political parties strongly
support immediate recognition of the Taliban regime including Jamaat-e-Islami
(JI),128 JUI- Nazriyati, 129 JUI-Fazl, and JUI-Sami.130 In addition to religious political
parties, the religious groups such as Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal-Jamaat (previously Sipah-
e-Sahaba Pakistan) also advocate for accepting the Taliban as legitimate rulers of
Kabul. On the other hand, the nationalist and liberal political parties are either
maintaining silence on the issue of recognition or supporting the official stance;
many also call for a more inclusive new Afghan policy. Pakistani intelligentsia and
media have, nonetheless, also continued to influence the Taliban for exhibiting
behavioral changes to meet the bare minimum standards necessary for
international recognition.

Humanitarian aid and assistance

Despite its own economic challenges, Pakistan did not limit its call for humanitarian
assistance in Afghanistan to only lip service. Pakistan supported the new
administration in Kabul to deal with the looming crisis in the country. The former
Prime Minister, Imran Khan, established a special cell to synergize various streams
of efforts on Afghanistan across government offices. In October 2021, Pakistan
announced some PKR 5 billion humanitarian assistance for Afghanistan and also
promised to allow duty-free imports of eatables from Afghanistan to facilitate

127
Inam-ul-Haque, former foreign secretary of Pakistan and former minister of state for foreign affairs.
Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
128
“Siraj urges Pakistan to recognize Afghan government”, Pakistan Observer, November 03, 2021.
129
Maulana Abdul Qadir Luni, Head of JUI-Nazaryati, Interview by Fizza Batool, Research Associate at PIPS,
December 14, 2021.
130
S. Khan, “Pakistan's Islamic parties push for Taliban recognition in Afghanistan,” DW, October 08, 2021,
<https://www.dw.com/en/pakistans-islamic-parties-push-for-taliban-recognition-in-afghanistan/a-
59449154>

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bilateral trade between the two countries. It also announced several other
measures for traders like 24/7 open border, visa-on-arrival policy for traders, and
five-year business visa etc.
In February 2022, the government announced medicines worth 50 crores to be sent
to the Afghanistan to fulfill a request made by the Afghan government.131 Several
civil society organizations were also actively sending truckloads of winter clothing,
food, medicine, and other relief funds to their Afghan brethren stuck in severe
weather condition.132 Pak Afghan Cooperation Forum, a consortium of Pakistan
NGOs to coordinate humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, had been working
since October 2021, and through its contacts with government and non-
government bodies in Afghanistan, it sent over 13,322 tons of humanitarian
assistance to Afghanistan. 133

In October 2022, the Pak-Afghan Cooperation Forum in collaboration with the Al-
Khidmat Foundation and Afghan Red Crescent handed over six truckloads
containing humanitarian goods to the Afghan authorities at the Kharlachi
border.134 Furthermore, the minister of public health of the "Islamic Emirate" and
his accompanying delegation met with his counterpart, the minister of public
health of Pakistan, Abdul Qadir Patel in Islamabad. The meeting focused on
comprehensive cooperation between the two countries.

131
“‫ کروڑ کی ادویات فراہم کرنے کا فیصلہ‬۵۰ ‫ ”پاکستان کا افغانستان کو‬Daily Mashriq, February 2, 2022,
<https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202202020131>
132
“Al Khidmat Foundation hands over 21 truckloads of relief items to Afghan people at Torkham,”
Associated Press of Pakistan, January 7, 2022, <https://www.app.com.pk/domestic/al-khidmat-foundation-
hands-over-21-truckloads-of-relief-items-to-afghan-people-at-torkham>
133
<https://www.pacf.pk>
134
Associated Press of Pakistan, “PACF hands over six truckloads of humanitarian aid to Afghan authorities”,
APP, October 4, 2022, <https://www.app.com.pk/national/pacf-hands-over-six-truckloads-of-humanitarian-
aid-to-afghan-authorities>

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Moreover, the government of Pakistan announced the provision of more than

4,500 scholarships to Afghan students for 2023 and stated that around 6,000
Afghan students were already receiving education from the top universities of
Pakistan in different fields including medicine, engineering, and social sciences. 135

As the floods and earthquake in Afghanistan brought devastation upon the

country, Pakistan accelerated its humanitarian help. Armed personnel and choppers
were sent immediately to recover people. Pakistan itself faced torrential floods in
the month of August 2022, badly affecting around 60 percent of the country.
Thus, the humanitarian help was stopped. The UN’s World Food Program
highlighted that “Pakistan [had] provided a vital supply route into Afghanistan."136
Large amounts of Afghanistan humanitarian aid from several other countries enter
via the port of Karachi, as Afghanistan is a land-locked country.

The humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan made a wider and deeper butterfly impact
not only on Pakistan’s adjacent provinces but on the security of the region too. The
dollar shortage in Pakistan devalued the rupee to a significant level. According to
multiple accounts, the main reason for the depreciation of the rupee was carrying
the burden of Afghanistan's imports. Pakistani foreign exchange reserves were
used for all imports of Afghanistan, and this additional burden of around $ 2 billion
per month was increasing pressure on the rupee.137 According to another account,

135
“Pakistan to provide 4500 scholarships to Afghan students next year”, The Nation, November 20, 2022,
<https://www.nation.com.pk/20-Nov-2022/pakistan-to-provide-4500-scholarships-to-afghan-students-next-
year>
136
"Floods in Pakistan pose a threat to Afghanistan food supply, warns UN," Dawn, September 3, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1708115>
137
Malik Bostan, chairman of the Pakistan Currency Dealers Association, disclosed this while talking to daily
Jang. Retrieved from https://e.jang.com.pk/detail/191837

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one of the reasons for Pakistan's currency depreciation at the end of July 2022 was
due to dollar smuggling to Afghanistan.138

Bilateral trade and cooperation

Pakistan repeatedly expressed the desire to boost trade with Afghanistan in order
to pump up finances in the failing economy. To deal with the absence of a banking
system and frozen assets hindering Afghanistan from transaction-based trade,
Pakistan tried to establish a barter trade mechanism under which some regulatory
measures were already taken.139 A delegation of the Taliban government also
visited Lahore to discuss method for easing trade between the two countries. In
February 2022, Pakistan waived Electronic Import Form (EIF) and exempted
regulatory duty on import of pine nuts to facilitate trade. While Dr. Moeed Yusuf
held that more than 200 trade issues were resolved between two countries in less
than six months,140 a report submitted to Parliamentary Committee on Afghanistan
revealed a serious decline in trade volume.141

According to a report, September 2021 saw almost 73 percent decline in the flow
of cargo from Pakistan to Afghanistan.142 The drop continued with an estimated 60

138
“Zawahiri’s killing alters Kabul chessboard”, The Express Tribune, August 22, 2022,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2372472/zawahiris-killing-alters-kabul-chessboard>
139
Ahmed Ahmadani, “ECC approves regulations for barter trade with Afghanistan, Iran,” Pakistan Today,
February 24, 2022.
140
For details, visit: <https://www.geo.tv/latest/399237-scholarships-for-afghan-students-to-play-a-vital-
role-in-afghanistans-development-pm>
141
Visit the following link for details: <https://mmnews.tv/pak-afghan-trade-shrinks-to-1billion-report-
reveals>
142
Mubarak Zeb Khan, “Pakistan’s exports to Afghanistan fall sharply since Taliban takeover”, Dawn, October
03, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1649838>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

percent decline in trade orders from Afghanistan to local traders in December. 143
While a major factor was quoted to be uncertainty in Afghanistan, some also
reported border mismanagement to be a cause. Owing to the security concerns of
Pakistan from TTP, Pakistan fenced the border, because of which the flow of border
crossing was concentrated at border openings at Torkham and Chaman. By
October 2021, there was frequent interruption at Torkham border while the
Chaman border remained closed throughout the month. 144 A major point of clash
was the Taliban governments’ insistence of allowing border movement on Afghan
National Card while the Pakistani authorities demanded proper travel
documentation.

In August 2022, Pakistan announced the formation of a joint committee

comprising of representatives from various political parties to resume stalled
trade activities with neighboring Afghanistan at two border crossings, including
the Ghulam Khan area of North Waziristan tribal district.145 During the same month,
Islamabad also signed an agreement with Kabul about the grant of six months
reciprocal visas to transporters to facilitate the cross-border movement of
goods.146 However, local traders termed reciprocal visa relaxation to Pakistani and

143
Aziz Buneri, “Pak-Afghan trade continues to decline”, Profit Pakistan, December 05, 2021,
<https://profit.pakistantoday.com.pk/2021/12/05/pak-afghan-trade-continues-to-decline>
144
“Thousand stranded as Afghan-Pakistan border crossing stays closed,” Reuters, October 25, 2021,
<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thousands-stranded-afghan-pakistan-border-crossing-stays-
closed-2021-10-25>
145
"Joint committees constituted to resume stalled trade activities with Afghanistan, NA told," Associated
Press of Pakistan, August 10, 2022, <https://www.app.com.pk/national/joint-committee-constituted-to-
resume-stalled-trade- activities-with-afghanistan-na-told>
146
“Traders say chances for increase in trade with Afghanistan bleak”, Dawn, August 23, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/amp/1706258>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Afghan transporters for promotion of bilateral trade between the two neighboring
countries as ‘too little and too late’.147

Bilateral trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan increased by 22 percent to

$213.70 million in September 2022 as compared to August 2022. 148 Pakistani
president Dr. Arif Alvi also noted in September 2022 that Pak-Afghan relations
needed enhancement with a focus on bilateral trade. He suggested strengthening
networks with the Afghan business community and increasing consignment
clearances at border crossings. The president also asserted that peace in
Afghanistan would make it possible for the country to develop as a commerce and
energy connectivity corridor in the region which could potentially enhance transit
trade between Pakistan and the Central Asian nations.149

However, Pakistani exports declined to Afghanistan and experts attributed it to the

US sanctions, the absence of banking channels, the unavailability of dollars in
Afghanistan, as well as a drop in demand for certain Pakistani goods. 150

According to the report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction (SIGAR), Afghanistan had a $79 million trade surplus with Pakistan
from July 2021 to June 2022. The report, which was created for the US Congress,
revealed that the Afghani appreciated by 11.6 percent against the Pakistani

147
Ibid.
148
Fawad Yousafzai, “Pak-Afghan bilateral trade witnesses 22 percent increase in September”, The Nation,
October 24, 2022, <https://www.nation.com.pk/24-Oct-2022/pak-afghan-bilateral-trade-witnesses-22-
percent-increase-in-september>
149
“President for strengthening Pak-Afghan ties through bilateral trade,” Pakistan Observer, September 29,
2022, <https://pakobserver.net/president-for-strengthening-pak-afghan-ties-through-bilateral-trade>
150
Ms. Amina Khan, Director of the Centre for Afghanistan, Middle East and Africa (CAMEA). Comments
while speaking in a webinar titled “Pak Afghan economic ties: Opening new vistas” organized by the Institute
of Strategic Studies Islamabad on November 14, 2022, <https://issi.org.pk/34809-2>

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rupee.151 This change materialized the fears of currency dealers who were
concerned about Afghanistan’s negative impact on Pakistan’s economy. It should
be noted that the data was released by the Customs department to the media in
which officials claimed that there had been a record increase in Pak-Afghan
trade.152 Thereafter, higher coal imports notwithstanding, bilateral as well as the
Afghan transit trade via Pakistan were hindered, at best.

Border insecurity and TTP incursions and attacks

As the border insecurity and incidence of terrorist violence are increasing in
Pakistan (Please see Chapter 5), mainly because of the groups sheltered in
Afghanistan and bordering areas, there are no hints that the Afghan Taliban are
heeding to Pakistan's concerns. Emerging developments, nonetheless, indicate
otherwise.

Instead of engaging with Pakistan on issues of managing border security and

countering terrorism, the Taliban-led government appears more interested in
strengthening its economic and trade relations with the countries in the region
including Pakistan. While that is a genuine policy priority of the Taliban but their
adamant attitude on the issue of TTP may not help in influencing Pakistan in
support of broadening engagement with Afghanistan in other areas.

The Taliban's growing engagement with India will further add to Pakistan's mistrust
of the Taliban. For one, some experts posted on social media in March 2023 that
India has started a training course for the Taliban diplomats in the capital Kabul.
"Probably the Taliban will take control of the Afghan embassy in Delhi after this

151
“Afghanistan registers trade surplus with Pakistan: SIGAR”, Ariana News, November 3, 2022,
<https://www.ariananews.af/afghanistan-registers-trade-surplus-with-pakistan-
sigar/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter>
152
Aziz Buneri, “Trader rejects claims about rise in Pak-Afghan trade”, Pakistan Today, November 27, 2022,
<https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/11/27/trader-rejects-claims-about-rise-in-pak-afghan-trade>

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course."153 In July last year, the Taliban officials had warmly welcomed a batch of
25 Afghan military cadets, who returned to Kabul after completing their training in
India; the retuning Afghan cadets were sent to India before the Taliban came to
power. A month before this event, Afghanistan’s defence minister Mullah Yaqub
(son of Taliban founder Mullah Omar) had expressed his willingness to send
Afghan army personnel to India for military training, saying the Taliban did not
have any issue with it.

6.3 Pakistan's Taliban-mediated talks with TTP

Pakistani government remained engaged in negotiations with the TTP, which were
doomed from the outset. Despite a possible pressure from Pakistan, the Afghan
Taliban were unlikely to take any military action against the TTP and only played
an advisory or mediatory role in talks with the TTP. Also, there was a possible divide
between the Taliban ranks over TTP negotiation. Some members of the Taliban
explicitly criticized the Pakistani state for being non-Islamic, supporting TTP’s
agenda of establishing a Taliban-like Shariah based government in Islamabad.

The rumors of the role of Kabul’s de-facto government in bringing Pakistani

government and the TTP on negotiating table started soon after the release of TTP
prisoners by the Afghan Taliban in August 2021. By late September 2021, the
Pakistani government officials were talking of their desire to settle issues with the
TTP on table and offered amnesty to the militant group. On 1st October 2021, the
former Prime Minister Imran Khan admitted in an interview to TRT that his
government had started a “reconciliation process” with “some” factions of the

153
<https://twitter.com/abdsayedd/status/1636636628612521984?cxt=HHwWgIC9rfWVwLYtAAAA>

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Taliban.154 However, the TTP leadership rejected Islamabad’s claims of talks,

rebuffed amnesty offers and urged its fighters to continue their activities. The
ambiguity ended soon as on 08 November 2021, both sides confirmed a month-
long ceasefire agreement.155

From the first month of the last year, reports again emerged about peace talks with
the TTP. A media report in January 2022 claimed that the government had started
another process of talks and a local tribal jirga of prominent elders that had met
with TTP chief Mufti Noor Wali Mehsud in eastern Afghanistan’s Paktika
province. However, the TTP’s central spokesman Muhammad Khorasani
downplayed the talks but claimed “the jirga ha[d] contacted [them] but [they] sent
it to the mediator, which is the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. [And] so far, there
is no discussion or meeting with the jirga.”156

With relation to talks, the TTP made a ceasefire announcement early May 2022
which it later extended for an indefinite period. On May 31st, it was announced
that the government of Pakistan and the TTP have separately met the Acting PM
of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) and announced an extension of
ceasefire.157 A few days later, a 50-member Pakistani delegate arrived in Kabul to

154
“Islamabad in talks with groups of Pakistani Taliban, PM Khan reveals”, TRT World, October 1, 2021,
<https://www.trtworld.com/asia/islamabad-in-talks-with-groups-of-pakistani-taliban-pm-khan-reveals-
50395>
155
“Pakistan government, banned TTP group reach ceasefire agreement”, Al-Jazeera, November 8, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/8/pakistan-government-banned-group-ttp-reach-ceasefire-
agreement>
156
Ihsanullah Tipu Mehsud, “Pakistan turns to tribal jirga to restart peace talks with local Taliban,” The
Nation, January 18, 2022, <https://nation.com.pk/18-Jan-2022/pakistan-turns-to-tribal-jirga-to-restart-
peace-talks-with-local-taliban>
157
Ismail Khan, “Islamabad, TTP agree on indefinite ceasefire,” Dawn, May 31, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1692383>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

hold a Jirga with the TTP leadership. 158 On the 18th of June 2022 the Afghan
Taliban confirmed that the Pakistani government and the TTP had reached a
mutual agreement regarding an ‘indefinite ceasefire’ during their ongoing
negotiations.159 However, the banned TTP categorically stated it would not back
down from its 'primary' demand for the reversal of the merger of ex-FATA with the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The claim was made by no one else but the TTP chief Mufti
Noor Wali Mehsud in an interview with a YouTuber. The interview made rounds on
social media and was apparently conducted somewhere in Kabul, according to
Dawn.160

Early July (2022), Interior Minister Rana Sanaullah stated that a parliamentary
committee had authorized the military leadership to continue talks. But he asserted
that the talks would be held only under the Constitution of Pakistan, and nothing
over and above the Constitution would be negotiated or agreed upon.161 In
another related development, the Parliamentary Committee on National Security
also formally approved the process of negotiations and approved the formation of
a ‘Parliamentary Oversight Committee’. The PCNS was also told that there could
be no compromise on the merger of erstwhile tribal areas, respect for the
Constitution, and disarming of the group. These were described as Pakistan
government’s ‘red lines’.162

158
“‫ رکنی جرگہ کابل پہنچ گیا‬۵۰‫”پاکستانی طالبان سے مذاکرات کیلئے‬, Daily Mashriq [Urdu], June 2, 2022,
<https://mashriqtv.pk/story/?story=202206020102>
159
Anadolu Agency, “Afghan Taliban confirm Pakistan-TTP ‘indefinite ceasefire,” The Express Tribune, June 18,
2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2362180/afghan-taliban-confirm-pakistan-ttp-indefinite-ceasefire>
160
Pazir Gul, "TTP refuses to budge from demand for Fata merger reversal," Dawn, June 30, 2022.
161
Iftikhar A. Khan, "Military given go-ahead for TTP talks, Says Sana," Dawn, July 3, 2022.
162
Baqir Sajjad Syed, "Parliamentary body to keep eye on talks with TTP," Dawn, July 6, 2022.

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

A delegation of Pakistani religious leaders, led by Mufti Taqi Usmani, visited Kabul
on July 25-26 and met with TTP leadership apart from the Taliban government
officials. The TTP reportedly communicated to the delegation the obstacles
encountered during their negotiations with Pakistani authorities, and criticized
Pakistan, for having been part of US-led war on terror, and also declared the
country’s Constitution and system as not in line with Islamic tradition. According
to one account, the Pakistani scholars’ delegation urged the TTP leadership to
withdraw their demand for the reversal of FATA merger, but they refused to
budge.163 Earlier, on July 22, a high-level military huddle, chaired by Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff Committee Gen Nadeem Raza, also discussed ‘peace talks’ with the
banned TTP and decided to pursue the matter in accordance with “comprehensive
security strategy”. “The forum was given a detailed briefing on review of national
security situation specific to Western Border, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and
Balochistan,” the ISPR said about the meeting. 164

In November 2022, the TTP unilaterally annulled the ceasefire after the government
denied reversing the FATA merger and fulfilling other demands set forth by the
group. However, the TTP claimed it ended the ceasefire because of continuing
military operations against its members and commanders.165 Pakistan started
paying the cost of reconciliation overtures with the TTP as the group continued to
strengthen itself and resorted to increased number of terrorist attacks. The decision
makers at last realized how the Afghan Taliban affirmation was just a smokescreen
that only benefitted the TTP to regroup. For one, the National Counter-Terrorism

163
The Express Tribune, July 27, 2022, <https://tribune.com.pk/story/2367953/pakistani-clerics-fail-to-soften-
ttp-in-kabul-meetings>
164
Dawn, July 23, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1701083>
165
“TTP terminates ceasefire agreement with government”, Pakistan Today, November 28, 2022,
<https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2022/11/28/ttp-terminates-ceasefire-agreement-with-government>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Authority (NACTA) revealed that the negotiations between Pakistan and TTP only
emboldened the TTP and allowed it to increase the magnitude and footprint of its
activities.166

Most observers criticised the government's talks with the TTP on multiple grounds.
Some said offering amnesty to or entertaining the demands of hardcore militant
groups such as TTP, who refuse to abandon their extremist ideologies, could prove
dangerous. Using such concessions, they argued, the TTP could relocate to the
areas it had once lost, with or without weapons, where its cadres would indeed
propagate the group’s ideology. "A little public support and empowerment would
be enough for the group to reassert the implementation of its version of Sharia."167
Secondly, in form of ‘reconciled TTP’ in Pakistan’s tribal areas, the Afghan Taliban
would have vocal support inside Pakistan which would always look towards Kabul.
Some deliberated that the state did not need to initiated table talks with a
‘defeated phenomenon’, i.e., the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.

Most participants of PIPS-led 8 quarterly consultations on Afghan peace and

reconciliation held in Islamabad between July 2021 and May 2023 also disapproved
the way of government's talks with the TTP. Many observers raised concerns about
the credibility of the jirga and the delegation that engaged with the TTP in talks,
arguing that instead of security forces or jirga it should be the political government,
or representatives of the people. In one of these consultations, Mohsin Dawar,
member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, stated that talks had been initiated
by the security forces and unlike previous negotiations with militants the state did

166
“NACTA blames talk”, The Nation, December 10, 2022, <https://www.nation.com.pk/10-Dec-2022/nacta-
blames-talks>
167
Muhammad Amir Rana, "Pakistan's talks with TTP: Prospective outcome and implications," Afghanistan as
seen from Pakistan-IV (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Apr-Jun 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/07/Report-3.pdf>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

not enter into talks from a position of strength. In the same consultation, Lt.
General (Retd) Tariq Khan, former Corps Commander and IG Frontier Corps,
revealed that it was he who had proposed the idea of jirga, but it was not to select
a few for negotiations, but rather to establish a group of advisors from all [former
tribal] agencies, in accordance with the code of honor of Pashtuns. 168

Others highlighted the secrecy with which the talks were held, and the conditions
put forth by the TTP, while revealing that the TTP wanted to gain control of the
division of 9 districts of KP, about one-third of KP. "We ha[d] no clarity on what we
[we]re negotiating. Did they give any assurances that they want to live peacefully
in Pakistan? The answer is no. [Indeed] they wanted to maintain their arms,
structures, and take away the authority of the government of Pakistan from KP or
part of KP at least, and we [we]re negotiating that." 169 That also suggests the
negotiations with the TTP were mainly based on a sort of ‘give and take’ rather
than building on the leverage Pakistan and its people have established on the
terrorist group since 2014 military operation.

6.4 Factors of anti-Pakistan sentiments in Afghanistan

Pakistan's image has continuously gone down in Afghanistan in the past three
decades, at least, albeit there is a variety of opinions from Afghan political parties,
Afghan civilians, and Afghan Taliban. External interventions might have played a
role in it including US presence and Indian influence, among other things, but only
Pakistan and Afghanistan can address this issue together. Otherwise, this trust
deficit will keep increasing with each passing day. After the Taliban's takeover of

168
Views expressed in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in
Islamabad.
169
Inam-ul-Haque, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, and former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Kabul, Pakistan started to face an additional dilemma: many Afghans generally

believed that Pakistan had brought the Taliban into power. There has already been
a widespread perception in Afghanistan that the Taliban are a product of Pakistan.
As a result, when Pakistan demands something from the Taliban, they are already
under this pressure of not being seen as Pakistan's stooge or product, especially
to the Afghan people. This is a very important factor not many people in Pakistan
have its understanding or realization.170

There are multiple factors of prevailing anti-Pakistan sentiments in Afghanistan.

Some significant ones are narrated below. 171

Absence of an inclusive Afghan policy: According to political observer Afrasiab

Khattak, sadly, Pakistan’s relations with Afghanistan never came under the normal
domain of state-to-state ties and were instead always driven by Pakistan’s relations
with one or another party in Afghanistan, be it Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s party or
Taliban’s party. This approach, whose foundation was laid by Zia ul Haq, has never
allowed bilateral relations to be established between the two neighboring states.172

Media: In recent times, the current affairs talk shows on Afghanistan's TV channels
have played a key role in shaping the common people’s perception of Pakistan.
Since 2001, Afghans have gained significant access to television with multiple news
channels and newly launched FM radio stations, which are catering to almost every

170
Mansoor Ahmad Khan, former Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan. Views expressed in PIPS
consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.
171
Pak Institute for Peace Studies solicited an analytical paper from senior journalist Zia Ur Rehman that was
published in PIPS paper series on Afghanistan. The narration in this section mainly builds upon his findings,
unless referred to otherwise. [Source: Zia Ur Rehman, "Afghanistan’s persisting outlook on Pakistan: Lessons
for Islamabad’s Afghan policy," Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-IV (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Apr-
Jun 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Report-3.pdf>]
172
Afrasiab Khattak, political analyst and rights activist. Comments in PIPS consultation-1 on Afghan peace
and reconciliation held on September 24, 2021, in Islamabad.

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

stratum of Afghan society. Most TV talk shows in Afghanistan present Pakistan as

an enemy country that increases their rating. It was because of this airing of anti-
Pakistani content that since 2013 Pakistan has blocked nearly all Afghan TV
channels from being broadcast by cable operators in Pakistan. However, through
unregulated social media, Afghans have openly expressed their rage and revulsion
for Pakistan. Soon after the Afghan Taliban’s takeover, use of the Twitter hashtag
#SanctionPakistan by thousands of Afghans had shown the antipathy among them
for the perceived role of Pakistan in bringing the Taliban to power. The logic goes
that, without Pakistan’s alleged support for the Taliban, the Taliban would not have
had the capability to topple the Ghani government. An Al-Jazeera’ report citing
data from the social media insight company, Talkwalker, said that the hashtag
#SanctionPakistan was used more than 730,000 times from August 10 to August
12, with at least 37 percent of those tweets tagged as originating from Afghanistan.
The tweets under this trend demanded the international community to hold
Islamabad accountable for “supporting the Afghan Taliban militants and spreading
chaos.”173

Fencing: Soon after the Taliban takeover of Kabul, several videos surfaced on social
media where Afghan Taliban members were seen uprooting the fence along the
border and chanting slogans against the fence. In at least two such incidents in late
December 2021 and early January 2022, Afghan Taliban officials intervened to
block the ongoing Pakistani project to erect fencing on Durand Line. Overall, the
security situation at the Pak-Afghan border has been deteriorating since the
Taliban took power in Kabul in August 2021. The Taliban have apparently taken
a stricter and nationalistic stance in their response to Pakistan's efforts to fence
the border. Political commentators based in Kabul believe that the anti-Pakistan

173
Al-Jazeera, "#SanctionPakistan trends as violence rages in Afghanistan," August 11, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/11/sanction-pakistan-twitter-trend-afghanistan-taliban>

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

sentiments are high in Afghanistan also because of Islamabad’s perceived role as

a 'main driver of instability'. This is one reason that no government has ever
formally accepted the Durand Line as a permanent border because it remains a
highly emotional issue. Some also assert that the Taliban’s opposition of the
fencing is aimed at gaining domestic legitimacy. Though there was never a pro-
Pakistan government in Afghanistan, the resistance against fencing shown by
Ghani’s government was much lesser than the resistance exhibited by the
incumbent Taliban government. The Taliban criticize fencing to fan nationalistic
sentiments and win public support.174

Border closure and visa issues: Frequent closure of borders also adds to Afghans'
trouble and anti-Pakistan sentiments. According to one account, while the people
living in Qila Abdullah and Chaman areas of Pakistan can cross either with
Kandahar-issued or Pakistani ID cards, but Afghans having legal documents have
to wait several days.175 Before the fall of Kabul to the Taliban, thousands of Afghans
crossed the Pak-Afghan border on daily basis. For instance, a 2014 study had noted
"an unprecedented and unmonitored movement of around 56,000 people daily,
with more than 90 per cent of the flow originating from Afghanistan into
Pakistan."176

According to one account, around 200 Afghan journalists are currently in

Rawalpindi and Peshawar and all of them have their visas expired. During
Afghanistan's previous government, Pakistan would issue 2,000-3,000 visas per

174
Rifatullah Orakzai, journalist based in Peshawar. Views expressed in one PIPS consultations on Afghan
peace and reconciliation held in Islamabad.
175
Tolo News, "Travelers face trouble at Spin Boldak, Chaman crossings," June 21, 2022,
<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-178578>
176
Amina Khan, “Pakistan-Afghanistan relations: post-2014 challenges.” Strategic Studies 34, no. 2/3 (2014):
20–46, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/48527538>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

day, but now it is issuing very few visas. There are also reports that visas were sold
in the black market for $1,000/$1500.177

Pakistan's role in war on terror: Afghan people and even some within the Taliban
ranks have a strong negative view of Pakistan for its perceived role in the US-led
war on terror. Others, despite having lived in Pakistan for years after the US
offensive against the Taliban, tried hiding their links with Pakistan to dismiss the
common perception among Afghans that the Taliban are “Pakistani stooges”.
Islamabad also denied the presence of the Taliban on its territory, as NATO forces
targeted Taliban cadres in 2001. For Taliban leadership and fighters, fleeing
Afghanistan to hide in Pakistan was not an escape but a return home – back to the
refugee camps and neighbourhoods where they were brought up in the 1980s and
90s.

Some observers assert that the Taliban would like to reduce their dependence on
Pakistan for forging wider alliances with other countries, including India.

Border trade and movement: Afghans are extremely categorical about border
trade and related cross-border movement of the people. Recent obstacles in trade
between Pakistan and Afghanistan have also been causing a negative impact on
relationship between the two countries. As Afghanistan is a landlocked country,
many Afghans depend on Pak-Afghan trade for their livelihood. There are several
impediments like withdrawal of cash-on-counter facility, requirement of advance
payments and reluctance of banks to accept third party payment in case of
Afghanistan leading to halted trade across the border. These obstacles could cause
a widening trade gap, loss of livelihood, increased hardships for people, and unrest
in border areas. The non-issuance of Electronic Import Form (EIF) by State Bank of

177
Mansoor Ahmad Khan, Pakistan's former ambassador to Afghanistan. Views expressed in PIPS
consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Pakistan has also gravely affected transactions, led to halting of consignments, and
created sort of congestion at the border.

Former ambassador to Afghanistan Mansoor Ahmad Khan in one of PIPS-led

consultations lamented the 'subhuman treatment' of the people at Torkham,
Chaman, Kharlachi, and Ghulam Khan border posts. "I will not go into who is doing
it and who is not - whether it is civilian or military leadership - but this is a
fundamental issue for the Afghans, who want it to be addressed at the earliest," he
held.178 In the same consultation, researcher and writer Imtiaz Gul stated there is
only one dominant power center which is running everything, including the
Torkham border. Pakistan has state of the art scanners at Torkham, but they
become dysfunctional, and the computer system hangs up when an expensive
cargo is going through for certain people.179

Border tension and skirmishes: On April 19, 2022, Pakistan conducted an airstrike
on some alleged hideouts of the TTP in Khost and Kunar provinces of Afghanistan.
The strikes, according to senior military officials from Pakistan, were carried out
following intelligence reports that TTP affiliates were present in the area. 180 The
Taliban authorities, however, claimed that the attacks targeted residential area
causing civilian causalities, including of women and children. The government

178
Views expressed by Ambassador Mansoor Ahmad Khan at PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan peace and
reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.
179
Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director of Center for Research and Security Studies. Views expressed in PIPS
consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.
180
Jamshed Bhagwan, “Pak Drone eliminated TTP targets in Afghanistan,” The Express Tribune, April 19, 2022,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2353300/pak-drone-eliminated-ttp-targets-in-afghanistan>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

spokesperson, Zabiullah Mujahid, passed a strong statement against the attack

warning that “it is paving way for enmity between Afghanistan and Pakistan”.181

The attacks led to several public demonstrations in Khost, with people chanting
anti-Pakistan slogans.182 In 2021, similar public protest was held outside Pakistan’s
embassy in Kabul where, mostly women, chanted “freedom” and raised slogans
demanding Pakistan to leave Afghan soil. Reportedly, the Taliban dispersed the
protestors and prevented some journalists from filming the protests. 183 This time,
the Taliban chose to side with the public, warning Pakistan of a possible war.

Islamabad’s open support for the Taliban regime and its history of intervention in
the Afghan affairs during Soviet war and war on terror intensified the resistance
and hostility towards Pakistan in the Afghan society. Experts believed that due to
the geostrategic importance of Afghanistan, the country has faced several foreign
invasions and interventions and this negative perception of Pakistan ought to be
viewed in light of the general negative view of any foreign intervention. 184

6.5 The refugee issue

While Pakistan welcomed all Afghans with valid documents to leave Afghanistan
via Pakistan, it repeatedly refused to allow any further resettlement of Afghan
refugees in the country, arguing that the country was already hosting 3 million

181
“Taliban issues warning over Civilian killed by Pakistani rockets,” Al-Jazeera, April 16, 2022,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/16/pakistani-troops-killed-in-armed-ambush-near-afghanistan-
border>
182
Ibid.
183
“Calls for “freedom” at anti-Pakistan rally in Kabul,” Tolo News, September 7, 2021,
<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-174543>
184
Dr. Babar Shah, Director at Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies, University of Peshawar. Interview by
Hufsa Farooq, PIPS researcher, May 20, 2022.

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 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

refugees and could not afford to host anymore. Overall, Pakistan has so far
exhibited a restrictive strategy towards refugees since the Taliban takeover of
Kabul. Though it is fundamentally an attempt to keep the international community
from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan, it is also
motivated by Pakistan’s economic fragility and border insecurity. Not only has
Pakistan given a cold response to the idea of more refugees pouring into Pakistan,
but it has also stopped UNHCR from using the terms “new arrivals” or “new
refugees”. However, many believe that Pakistan’s approach towards the refugee
problem has not helped the displaced Afghan people and, instead, added to their
miseries.

Numerous transiting Afghans including journalists are stranded in Pakistan due to

delays in the processing of their emigration papers. Many experts cite the outbreak
of the Ukraine war and influx of over 3 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe as the
main reasons for this delay.185 According to UNHCR statistics, by last year more
than 300,000 Afghans had fled to Pakistan since the Taliban takeover of Kabul.
However, Pakistani authorities claim that about 60,000 to 70,000 Afghans have
entered Pakistan since then. Most of these new Afghans have entered Pakistan
through valid documents.186 Similarly, most of the new Afghan refugees are
concentrated in Quetta, Peshawar, and Islamabad. Persian speaking Afghans with
Tajik and Uzbek ethnic identities are mostly staying in Rawalpindi/Islamabad
region, while ethnic Pashtun Afghans are mostly living in Quetta and Peshawar.
While about 40 percent of the new Afghan refugees in Pakistan hail from Kabul,

185
Urooj Jafri, "Afghan refugees and border control: Pakistan's challenges and policy options," Afghanistan
as seen from Pakistan-V (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jul-Sep 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/09/Situation-Review-V.pdf>
186
Freedom Network of Pakistan, "Afghan refugees in Pakistan: lives in limbo," 2022,
<https://www.fnpk.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/Afghan-Refuges-in-Pakistan-Lives-in-Lombo.pdf>

90
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

others are from various regions of northern Afghanistan such as Sheberghan and
Sar-e-Pul, as well as southern city of Jalalabad.187

According to Quetta-based journalist Shahzada Zulfiqar the frequency of migration

from Afghanistan to Balochistan has decreased lately. Still, conflicts related to
refugees keep happening but rarely. Most Baloch people embrace Afghans, but
still, many protest about the occupation of their lands and label them as
migrants.188 Senator Anwaar-ul-Haq Kakar believes there is a fear that due to the
influx of Afghan migrants Baloch people will become a minority and Pashtuns will
dominate the society if the migration continues. On the other hand, the economy
of the region appears to be threatened by demographic changes.189 Zia Ur Rahman,
a journalist based in Karachi, agrees that that Sindh and Balochistan showed
relatively greater sensitivity over the identity or nationality issue. Sindh not only
has an Afghan population, but it also has Burmese and Bengalese, who have their
own political parties and Union Councils. According to Zia, when the national
identity is not granted by the government, the immigrants may search for safe
heavens including by joining militant groups. 190

Nonetheless, mass operations against illegal Afghan refugees were reported from
across the country. This resulted in protests and demonstrations from the refugees
mainly in Islamabad. A petition was filed with the Islamabad High Court seeking the
shifting of Afghan immigrants from the green belts of F-6 to refugee camps.191 The

187
Urooj Jafri, "Afghan refugees and border control: Pakistan's challenges and policy options."
188
Shahzada Zulfiqar, a Quetta-based senior journalist. Comments in PIPS consultation-5 on Afghan peace
and reconciliation held on September 3, 2022, in Islamabad.
189
Ibid.
190
Comments in PIPS consultation-5 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on September 3, 2022, in
Islamabad.
191
Malik Asad, "Petition seeks shifting of Afghans living on F-6 greenbelt," Dawn, August 7, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1703615>

91
 PAK-AFGHAN BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

Court later asked the authorities to get the green belt of Sector F-6 Islamabad
cleared by removing Afghan nationals protesting against the USA for a claim which
could not be granted under the Constitution of Pakistan.192 However, in an
interview with Dawn, a leading English newspaper, one of the refugees stressed
that “if developed countries were not ready to accept them, Pakistan should give
them asylum."193

In response to these demonstrations, the Afghan Taliban accused Pakistan of ill-

treatment of refugees. They expressed their concerns with Pakistan’s chargé
d’affaires Mr. Ubaid ur Rehman Nizamani regarding the 'wrong attitude' of the
Pakistani police toward Afghans, describing it as detrimental for both countries. 194

A parliamentary body formed a subcommittee to examine the plight of refugees,

particularly Afghan refugees and other stateless people in the country. 195 Another
effort was made by the Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) and the Women’s
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (WCCI), with support from the UNHCR and
the Commissionerate for Afghan Refugees, to encourage collaboration between
Afghan refugee women entrepreneurs and local counterparts for long-term

192
Terence J Sigamony, “Green belt of Sector F-6: IHC directs ministries, CDA to remove Afghan protesters”,
Business Recorder, August 9, 2022, <https://www.brecorder.com/news/40190764/green-belt-of-sector-f-6-
ihc-directs-ministries- cda-to-remove-afghan-protesters>
193
He was quoted in: Kashif Abbasi, “Afghan refugees turn F-6 children’s park into ‘tent village’”, Dawn, July
18, 2022, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1700246>
194
“Muttaqi discussed recent Afghan refugees’ concerns with Chargé d’affaires of Pakistan,” Bakhtar News
Agency, November 11, 2022, <https://bakhtarnews.af/en/muttaqi-discussed-recent-afghan-refugees-
concerns-with-charge-daffaires-of-pakistan>
195
Jamila Achakzai, “Humanitarian tragedy feared after arrival of Afghans”, The News International, October
14, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/999767-humanitarian-tragedy-feared-after-arrival-of-
afghans>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

livelihood development.196 Furthermore, UNHCR, in collaboration with Inspire

Pakistan, arranged a colorful event called the “End of Year December Bazaar”,
which showcased refugee-made products and Pakistani businesses supporting
refugees.

There is no specific law in Pakistan to deal with the refugees or even internally
displaced persons (IDPs). The federal cabinet had decided in 2017 that Pakistan
could not make the refugees its nationals and suggested passing a domestic
resolution related to the management of the refugees. The decision also pressed
that considerations of the host communities should also be kept in mind. As
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) is back in power, some observers hope,
those recommendation can be presented in Parliament to uphold their previous
decision regarding domestic resolution related to refugees. The PTI government,
which came into power in 2018 after the PML-N government, had reversed the
decision [of not granting citizenship to refugees] and maintained that Pakistan
would grant them citizenship. Former senator Farhatullah Babar believes Pakistan
needs to move step by step to address the challenges that arise out of cross-border
migration.197

196
“One-day workshop: Afghan refugee, local women entrepreneurs share experiences”, The News
International, December 2, 2022, <https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/1015867-one-day-workshop-afghan-
refugee-local-women-entrepreneurs-share-experiences>
197
Comments in PIPS consultation-5 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on September 3, 2022, in
Islamabad.

93
7. Afghanistan in the emerging geopolitical
dynamics and developments

7.1 International concerns and responses

While the Doha Accord is the key understanding reached between the Taliban and
the international community but both sides continue accusing each other of its
violation thus delaying the recognition of the Taliban's de facto government. When
the Taliban started capturing provincial capitals in 2021, Norway, Italy, Germany,
UK, and France showed grievous concerns towards Taliban’s adherence to Doha
peace agreement. After the fall of Kabul in August 2021, Europe again voiced
concerns about human rights, form of government, and girls’ education in
Afghanistan under the Taliban government. For example, the British Prime Minister
Boris Johnson said that “UK will judge this regime based on the choices it makes
and by its actions rather than by its words, on its attitude to terrorism, to crime and
narcotics, as well as humanitarian access and the rights of girls to receive an
198
education.” However, Russia called Taliban takeover as the ‘revenge of history
over modernity and globalism’.199 It maintained that its prime concern was curbing
terrorist activities and ensuring security in Central Asia. Though Russian envoy to
Afghanistan Dmitry Zhirnov praised the Taliban forces saying that they initially
made a good impression and ensured the safety of the Russian Embassy, Russian

198
“Taliban will be judged on actions, not words, says UK's Johnson,” Reuters, August 18, 2021,
<https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/taliban-will-be-judged-actions-not-words-says-uks-johnson-2021-08-
18>
199
Mark Galeotti, “Moscow Watches Kabul’s Fall With Some Satisfaction, Much Concern,” The Moscow Times,
August 16, 2021,<https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/08/16/moscow-watches-kabuls-fall-with-some-
satisfaction-much-concern-a74805>
 AFGHANISTAN IN THE EMERGING GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said the “Kremlin was in no hurry to recognize the
group.”200

The international community has been concerned about the Taliban's reluctance
or inaction on forming an inclusive government, respecting human and women
rights and freedom of expression, and preventing terrorist groups from using
Afghan soil to conduct attacks elsewhere. Meanwhile, the Taliban claim that the
West, especially US, has a political agenda in preventing the Taliban recognition.
For instance, on October 21st (2022), the Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid
told a Turkish journalist: "The West is behind this; they prevent the recognition of
and cooperation with an Islamic government. Although the Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan has made - and continue to make - great attempts, unfortunately
some pressures are applied."201

The killing of Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in July 2022 in a drone strike near
Kabul was also a major setback for the Taliban legitimacy and international
recognition. It vindicated the Taliban's violation of the Doha accord terms by
providing safe heaven to the Al-Qaeda chief. The US spy networks tracked and
neutralized Zawahiri in an upscale Wazir Akbar Khan neighborhood in a compound
belonging to a member of Haqqani network of the Taliban.202

Kabul-based journalists see a clear understanding among Taliban leaders

regarding risk perceptions of their neighbors including Iran, Pakistan, China, the
Central Asian states and Russia. They are also aware of economic benefits

200
“Russia says no rush to recognize Taliban, calls for inclusive government,” Reuters, August 17, 2021,
<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/russia-says-no-rush-recognise-taliban-calls-inclusive-
government-2021-08-17>
201
"Mujahid says West preventing Islamic Emirate's recognition," Pakistan Observer, October 22, 2022.
202
Sami Yousafzai, "Afghanistan’s "uncertain" future: domestic and regional implications,” Afghanistan as
seen from Pakistan-VI (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2023/01/pb_6.pdf>

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Afghanistan can draw from projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-

India (TAPI) gas pipeline,203 and some trade and development projects initiated by
Uzbekistan.204 Some lobbies within the Taliban are pushing for activating these
plans in coming months and years. However, internal ideological resistance to act
and make political decisions in line with international concerns is only adding to
the problems of the Afghan Taliban and people.

For one, after the hasty withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan, the Biden
administration froze Afghanistan’s financial assets leaving the banking system of
the country in shambles. It chose to hold the promised resettlement and
evacuation means to the Afghans who had helped the US troops.

An official US report presented before Congress towards end of last year expressed
doubts about the Taliban’s ability to counter IS-K. “Experts disagree about the
potency of the IS-K threat and the Taliban’s self-asserted ability to counter the
group without external assistance,” says the report sent to Congress by the
Congressional Research Service (CRS).205 The US State Department also expressed
its concerns about Afghanistan once again becoming a haven for terrorists. It
warned that it will intervene and act if terrorists continued to regroup in
Afghanistan.206

203
Pathik Hasan, “Work on the TAPI Central Asia pipeline resumes under the Taliban,” Silk Road Briefing,
November 11, 2021, <https://www.silkroadbriefing.com/news/2021/11/11/work-on-the-tapi-central-asia-
pipeline-resumes-under-the-taliban>
204
Navbahor Imamova, “Uzbekistan Urges Other Nations to Help Neighboring Afghanistan,” VOA News,
December 11, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/uzbekistan-urges-other-nations-to-help-neighboring-
afghanistan/6349978.html>
205
“Is claim of attack on Kabul embassy being verified: FO”, Dawn, December 5, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1724719>
206
“US says it will intervene if terrorists regroup in Afghanistan”, The Khaama Press News Agency, December
8, 2022, <https://www.khaama.com/us-says-it-will-intervene-if-terrorists-regroup-in-afghanistan-
36546/?utm_source=dlvr.it&amp;utm_medium=twitter>

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Following a deadly attack on the Kaaj Educational Center in the west of Kabul on
September 30, 2022, which resulted in the killing of and injuries to more than 100
students, Antonio Guterres, the Secretary General of the United Nations
condemned the attack and asked the Taliban to protect people’s rights to access
education. He called the fatal explosion “heinous,” and demanded that Taliban
authorities protect the rights of all Afghans without discrimination, regardless of
ethnicity and gender.207 Besides this, the Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS)
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), decided on joint measures by
member countries to counter threats posed by international terrorist groups
operating from Afghanistan. The meeting was attended by senior officials of all
member nations including China and Pakistan.208 In October 2022, Tajikistan’s
president Emomali Rahmon also expressed the need to build a security belt around
Afghanistan to curb security risks and terrorist expansion to Central Asian states. 209
In the same month, Russian president Vladimir Putin reportedly warned of the
development of terrorist groups on the Afghan border and their infiltration into
the Commonwealth Independent States during a speech at the Commonwealth
Council of Heads of Security and Special Services.210

Similarly, in conclusion of a 12-day visit to Kabul in October 2022, the UN Special

Rapporteur on Human Rights for Afghanistan, Richard Bennett, called the country’s

207
“UN denounces Kabul blast and calls for educational rights for all", <https://www.afghanistantimes.af/un-
denounces-kabul-blast-and-call-for-educational-rights-for-all-citizens>
208
“SCO-RATS decides to counter threats from international terror groups operating from Afghanistan”, The
Hindu, October 14, 2022, <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/sco-rats-decides-to-counter-threats-
from-international-terror-groups-operating-from-afghanistan/article66009451.ece>
209
Ibid.
210
“Russia's Putin warns of terrorist cells in Afghan borders”, The Khaama Press News Agency, October 27,
2022, <https://www.khaama.com/russias-putin-warns-of-terrorist-cells-in-afghan-borders-
03743/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter>

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human rights situation “alarming.”211 Bennett highlighted the accounts of

representatives of the country’s northern Panjshir province who reported the
widespread repression of civilians, including egregious violations of the rights of
women and children.

Moreover, EU special envoy to Afghanistan Tomas Niklasson repeatedly called for

the reopening of schools for Afghan girls above grade six. In late October 2022,
Niklasson also urged for regional countries to advocate for the establishment of
an inclusive government in Afghanistan and for the observance of human rights. 212
Similarly, in the wake of reports of women being brutally lashed in the reemergence
of public floggings, the special rapporteurs of the UN demanded an investigation
into the suppression of women’s rights in Afghanistan. Likewise, in response to
the Taliban’s harsh measures against female education and deliberate repression
of women and girls, the United States imposed further sanctions against the nation
in the form of visa restrictions in October 2022. The sanctions prohibited US visas
for current and former Taliban officials, members of non-state armed groups, and
other individuals who were directly or indirectly associated with violence and
repression against women and girls in Afghanistan.213

On the other hand, China demonstrated mixed views on the Taliban coming to
power. Over the years Beijing has smartly continued to engage diplomatically with
the Taliban; the Taliban delegation’s visit to China after capturing Kabul in August

211
“Human rights situation in Afghanistan alarming, says Bennett”, Afghanistan International, October 20,
2022, <https://www.afintl.com/en/202210204722>
212
“Taliban's monopoly of power; EU envoy says regional countries call for inclusive government”, The
Khaama Press News Agency, October 26, 2022, <https://www.khaama.com/talibans-monopoly-of-power-eu-
envoy-says-regional-countries-call-for-inclusive-government-23636>
213
“US imposes visa restrictions on Taliban over 'repression' of women and girls in Afghanistan”, The Khaama
Press News Agency, October 12, 2022, <https://www.khaama.com/us-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-taliban-
over-repression-of-women-and-girls-in-afghanistan-
34745/?utm_source=dlvr.it&amp;utm_medium=twitter>

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2021 was one demonstration of that engagement. While China wants to engage in
economic and trade connectivity projects, it is equally concerned about the security
of such projects in Afghanistan and region as well as the terrorist threat emanating
from anti-China groups based in Afghanistan such as ETIM and Uyghurs.

In a recent trilateral meeting held in Islamabad on May 7, 2023, the foreign

ministers of Pakistan, China, and Afghanistan reaffirmed their commitment to
strengthen trilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and jointly
extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan. They
emphasized the significance of ongoing projects such as CASA-1000, TAPI, and
Trans-Afghan Railways, highlighting their potential to boost regional connectivity
and promote economic development and prosperity in the region. However, at the
same time the three sides also stressed the significance of preventing militant
groups such as TTP and the Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM), from using
their territories to harm or threaten regional security and interests or carry out
terrorist activities.214

Moreover, the Central Asian states as well as India have shown their willingness to
work with the Taliban despite their concerns similar to those expressed by
international community mainly related to terrorism and rights violations.

7.2 Multilateral events and developments and engagement with

Taliban

The Tehran conference held in 2021 was attended by foreign ministers of Iran,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, China and Russia who called for

214
Iftikhar A. Khan, "CPEC will be extended to Afghanistan as trilateral cooperation set to deepen," Dawn,
May 9, 2023, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1751728/cpec-will-be-extended-to-afghanistan-as-trilateral-
cooperation-set-to-deepen>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

cooperation to prevent the economic collapse of Afghanistan.215 Though the

participants emphasized the formation of an inclusive government, they also
recognized the Taliban's eagerness to engage and cooperate with the world
community. Hence, the policy of engagement was proposed to prevent civil war in
Afghanistan and to provide relief to Afghans.

In addition, the October 2021 Moscow meeting attended by Russia, Kazakhstan,

Tajikistan, Iran, Pakistan, China, Turkmenistan, India, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan
mirrored a significant transformation in countries’ perception of the Taliban. The
participants not only identified the Taliban as new Afghan authorities, but also
pledged to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of
Afghanistan.216 However, a consensus decision could not be reached when the
topic of frozen assets arose. Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov endorsed the
Taliban’s call to unfreeze assets, however Deputy US Treasury Secretary Wally
Adeyemo asserted that sanctions needed to be maintained.217

The Oslo talks held in January 2022 marked the first diplomatic engagement of the
European and US officials with the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan”. While the
Taliban leadership sensed that these talks would transform the two-decade long

215
Syed Zafar Mehdi, “Tehran summit calls for formation of inclusive gov’t in Afghanistan”, Anadolu Agency,
October 27, 2021, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/tehran-summit-calls-for-formation-of-inclusive-
gov-t-in-afghanistan/2404895
216
Elena Toslova,”Moscow format meeting on Afghanistan adopts joint statement” , Anadolu Agency,
October 21, 2021, <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/moscow-format-meeting-on-afghanistan-adopts-joint-
statement/2398172>
217
Ayaz Gul, “Moscow Hosts International Talks With Taliban to Discuss Afghan Crisis”, Voice of America,
October 20, 2021, <https://www.voanews.com/a/moscow-hosts-international-talks-with-taliban-to-discuss-
afghan-crisis-/6278429.html>

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atmosphere of war,218 the world governments hoped that formal engagement of

this format would further push the Taliban to comply with the conditions posed by
them for recognizing the Taliban government. During the talks, the United States
and Europe reiterated that humanitarian aid was directly linked to the status of
human rights in Afghanistan, thereby suggesting that the Taliban must focus on
incidents of extrajudicial killing, freedom of movement, education of girls and
freedom of media. The meeting that spanned over three days might have been a
diplomatic success, but it failed to build a consensus on a significant matter of
“formation of government”; immediately after the Oslo visit the Taliban
administration argued that “the international community’s call to form an inclusive
government in Afghanistan is nothing more than a political excuse”.219

The OIC summit hosted by Islamabad on March 23, 2022, was vehemently
commended by the global community and Afghanistan. To provide a clear
direction to the OIC delegates, Pakistan gave a six-point framework in the
beginning of the session. This framework proposed an increased investment in
education, health and technical sectors, creation of a forum under OIC, UN and
Financial Institutions to facilitate financial support and a mechanism to combat
terrorism and illicit trade in narcotics.220 The delegates asserted that if the financial

218
“Oslo talks with West will 'transform atmosphere of war', say Afghan Taliban”, The News, January 22, 2022,
<https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/927293-oslo-talks-with-west-will-transform-atmosphere-of-war-say-
afghan-taliban>
219
“Intl Community Yet to Define 'Inclusive Govt': Islamic Emirate”, Tolo News, January 27, 2022,
<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-176481>
220
“Highlights of the Organization of Islamic Conference Summit on Afghanistan”, International Relations
Insights & Analysis, December 20, 2021, <https://www.ir-ia.com/Highlights-of-the-OIC-Summit-2021-on-
Afghanistan.html>

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221
crunch continued, Afghanistan would become the biggest man-made crisis.
Therefore, the OIC pledged establishment of a “trust fund” for Afghanistan under
Islamic Development Bank and urged the international community to unfreeze
Afghanistan’s assets.222 A major development that took place post this summit was
a shift in US stance on Afghan assets as indicated by US State department’s
statement that “United Nations will show greater flexibility on financial sanctions
imposed by Afghanistan.”223 Meanwhile, an extended Troika meeting of the special
Afghan representatives of US, China, Pakistan and Russia gave a benefit of doubt
to the Taliban government and reiterated support for the Afghan people. The
participants adopted a balanced approach by urging the Taliban to form an
inclusive government and calling the international community to provide
assistance to Afghans.

The International Conference on Afghanistan in Tashkent on July 26, 2022, was

hosted by Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. It provided an opportunity
to the Taliban regime to engage with its neighboring countries and regional
organizations, despite its de-facto status. More than 100 delegations from nearly
30 countries attended the event.224 Interestingly, the main pre-condition for the
recognition, i.e., establishment of an inclusive government, was not emphasized
much during this engagement. Instead, the prime focus of the conference was the
reconstruction and economic development of Afghanistan. Some participants also

221
“Afghanistan will become biggest man-made crisis if world doesn’t act, says PM Imran at OIC summit”,
Dawn, December 19, 2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1664670/afghanistan-will-become-biggest-man-
made-crisis-if-world-doesnt-act-says-pm-imran-at-oic-summit>
222
Ibid.
223
Baqir Sajjad Syed, “US to show flexibility on Afghan financial sanctions: official”, Dawn, December 21,
2021, <https://www.dawn.com/news/1664928>
224
Navbahor Imamova, “Nearly 30 nations engage with Taliban at Tashkent Conference,” VOA News, July 27,
2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/almost-30-nations-engage-with-taliban-at-tashkent-conference-
/6676107.html>

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shared concerns about the use of Afghan territory for terrorist activities. Similarly,
the SCO meeting was held in Tashkent after the International Conference and was
attended by foreign delegations of member states of SCO – Afghanistan contact
group, a delegation from the foreign ministry of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
under Amir Khan Muttaqi, and Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang
Yi. In the meeting Chinese FM Wang Yi held that the situation in Afghanistan was
much stable despite multiple challenges,225 a notable departure from his statement
in 2021 when he shared concern over the situation in Afghanistan that could
impact the “overall security and development of the region.”226

Moreover, India like China employed a pragmatic stance towards maintaining

relations with the Taliban regime. In October 2022, the head of the country’s central
bank, Abdul Qadir Idris, met with Bharat Kumar, head of the Indian government’s
technical team, to discuss Afghanistan’s economic situation, banking issues and
joint cooperation between the two states.227 Officials of Da Afghanistan Bank (DAB)
said that the Indian government agreed to offer technical assistance to the bank.
Shortly after a trade agreement, was also signed the reopening of the air corridor
between India and Afghanistan. Based on the agreement, Afghan traders could
continue their trade with India via the air corridor.

In an attempt to contain the spread of terrorism, the December 2022 regional

summit chaired by India's National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval and attended
by his counterparts from Iran, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and
Tajikistan focused on terrorism, radicalization and extremism. However, the

225
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Wang Yi Expounds on China's View on the
Afghan Issue,” July 29, 2022,
<https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202207/t20220730_10730745.html>
226
“SCO foreign ministers hold meeting on Afghan issue,” Xinhuanet Asia & Pacific, July 14, 2021.
227
“India to provide technical support to Afghanistan's Central Bank”, Ariana News, October 26, 2022,
<https://www.ariananews.af/india-to-provide-technical-support-to-afghanistans-central-bank>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

attendees of the summit somehow failed to reach a common interpretation of the

Afghan crisis as India and Russia in particular expressed diverging conclusions after
the summit. While Indian declaration after the summit suggested that it would be
ensured that Afghanistan never becomes haven for terrorism, no such statement
was mentioned in Russian declaration.228

In addition, the Taliban representatives were invited to represent Afghanistan on

multilateral forums; invitation to the Antalya Forum named “Recoding Democracy”
was one example of this development. According to Washington Institute for Near
East Policy, since their taking power on August 15, 2021, the Taliban publicly
announced, using the website and Twitter account of the previous government,
378 diplomatic meetings with 35 countries, majority of which were with Gulf
states.229

7.3 International responses to the refugee issue

Europe was more apprehensive of the mass exodus from Afghanistan as it feared
that situation will be no different than the Syrian refugee crisis. Be it the United
Kingdom's push for a border bill, Greece’s extension of the wall or Austria’s
demand to set deportation centers in third countries, all of it largely linked to
Europe’s fear of refugees amid the Afghan crisis. Similarly, the Turkish foreign
minister had stressed that if migration from Afghanistan transformed into a crisis,
it will take no time to adversely impact Europe and the regional countries. 230 To

228
“India's regional summit fails to link Afghanistan with terrorism”, The Express Tribune, November 11, 2021,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2328960/indias-regional-summit-fails-to-link-afghanistan-with-terrorism>
229
Aaron Y. Zelin, “Looking for legitimacy: Taliban diplomacy since the fall of Kabul,” Washington Institute,
August 15, 2022, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/looking-legitimacy-taliban-
diplomacy-fall-kabul>
230
“Turkey cannot take new refugee ‘burden’ from Afghanistan, says FM”, Al Jazeera, August 29, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/turkey-refugee-wave-afghanistan>

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 AFGHANISTAN IN THE EMERGING GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENTS

further put pressure on the Taliban, France, Germany and the United Kingdom held
talks with the United Nations to establish a safe zone in Kabul to allow safe passage
231
for people trying to leave Afghanistan. Consequently, the United Nations took
a moderate stance by adopting a resolution which called the Taliban to stick to
their commitment of allowing people to leave Afghanistan freely.

Moreover, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Filippo Grandi,
urged Pakistan in a press conference on September 17th to accept new refugees
from Afghanistan.232 He stressed that abandoning the Taliban would be disastrous
for Afghanistan and for the region. However, After the takeover of Kabul by the
Taliban, some states were reluctant to give refuge to migrants from Afghanistan;
even those evacuated by the United States and other countries faced unfavorable
conditions. While Turkey was accused of violent pushback of Afghan refugees, Iran
deported 103,1357 refugees. 233 In contrast, Germany announced that it will admit
1,000 Afghans per month according to a new refugee policy program. 234 Canada
also stated that it will be resettling at least 40,000 Afghan refugees by the end of
2023.

231
“France, UK to propose Kabul ‘safe zone’ to UN, Macron says”, Al Jazeera, August 29, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/29/turkey-refugee-wave-afghanistan>
232
Amin Ahmed, “UNHCR urges Pakistan to accept new Afghan refugees”, Dawn, September 18, 2021,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1646942/unhcr-urges-pakistan-to-accept-new-afghan-refugees>
233
Gaiti Raheemi, “Iran has deported over 1m Afghans this year: IOM”, Tolo News, November 15, 2021,
<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175467>
234
“Germany New Admission Programme to admit 1,000 Afghan refugees per month”, The Khaama Press
News Agency, October 18, 2022, <https://www.khaama.com/germany-new-admission-programme-to-
admit-1000-afghan-refugees-per-month/?utm_source=dlvr.it&amp;utm_medium=twitter>

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

7.4 World's humanitarian aid & economic support

Expressing distrust for the Afghan Taliban, the United States’ National Security
Advisor Jake Sullivan said after few months of the Taliban takeover that the “US is
not ready to provide money directly through the current leadership in Afghanistan
until the leadership fulfils their pledges including forming an inclusive
government”.235 While the UN Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution
to facilitate humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, the US Treasury Department also
started issuing new licenses and guidance for organizations looking to provide
support to Afghanistan.

However, the international community greatly extended a hand of help towards

the war-torn Afghanistan. The US not only pledged to give an extra $303 billion in
humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, but it also eased some of the sanctions for
humanitarian work in Afghanistan; exemptions allowed international banks to
process transactions related to humanitarian operations.236 Moreover, Japan
pledged to donate 5.5 million dollars in aid to Afghanistan’s health sector. 237 Japan
also announced an additional $106.7 million for humanitarian assistance to the
cash-strapped country.238 Russia delivered a humanitarian aid shipment of over 65
tonnes of essential goods to Kabul. The United Kingdom, Norway, Denmark and
South Korea also donated millions in aid. Similarly, the European Union passed
exemptions in sanctions that allowed frozen assets to be used for humanitarian

235
Madina Morwat, “US Funds for Afghans Will Continue via Intl Bodies, Not Govt”, Tolo News, November
08, 2021, <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-175366>
236
“US gives global banks the OK to transfer aid funds to Afghanistan”, Al Jazeera, February 02, 2022,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/2/2/us-gives-global-banks-the-okay-to-transfer-aid-to-
afghanistan>
237
“ICRC: Humanitarian needs of Afghans growing every day”, The Khaama Press News Agency, October 17,
2022.
238
“Japan gives over $106 million in aid to Afghanistan”, Ariana News, December 6, 2022.

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work in Afghanistan. Likewise, the European Union launched €268.3 million worth
projects in Afghanistan targeting education, health and livelihood of the Afghan
populace239, while the United Nations launched a transitional Engagement
Network which was aimed to strategize direction for timely aid to reach
Afghanistan.240

In 2022, the United Nations had launched the largest ever singly-country aid
appeal of USD 4.4 billion for Afghanistan, which the UN Emergency Relief
Coordinator announced as “an absolutely essential stop-gap measure.”241 Delhi
also singed an MoU with the World Food Program under which it started sending
overland shipments of wheat to Afghanistan through Pakistan. In September 2022,
the Taliban signed a deal with Russia for trade of petroleum products and wheat.242
While economic trade with neighboring countries, particularly Pakistan, continued,
this was the first such international deal signed by the Taliban regime. Moreover,
in July 2022, China lifted tariff from ninety eight percent of imported goods from
Afghanistan to boost bilateral trade.243 Besides this, in November 2022 China
pledged to grant zero-tariff treatment on 98 percent of the taxable products from

239
“European Union re-establishes physical presence in Afghanistan -spokesman”, Reuters, January 21, 2022,
<https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/european-union-re-establishes-physical-presence-afghanistan-
spokesman-2022-01-21>
240
Safiullah Padshah and Christina Goldbaum, “Taliban renege on promise to open Afghan girls’ schools,"
The New York Times, March 23, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/23/world/asia/afghanistan-girls-
schools-taliban.html>
241
United Nations, “Afghanistan: UN launches largest single country aid appeal ever,” January 11, 2022,
<https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109492>
242
Mohammad Yunus Yawar and Charlotte Greenfield, “Afghan Taliban sign deal for Russian oil products,
gas and wheat,” Reuters, September 28, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/exclusive-
afghan-taliban-sign-deal-russian-oil-products-gas-wheat-2022-09-27>
243
Ayaz Gul, “China gives new trade concessions to Afghanistan,” VOA News, July 29, 2022,
<https://www.voanews.com/a/china-gives-new-trade-concessions-to-afghanistan-/6679703.html>

108
 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Afghanistan starting from the 1st of December 2022. 244 In 2022, the United Nations
High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) provided aid to more than 4.6 million
people in Afghanistan.245 The UN agency provided cash assistance, and household
items through community-based programs for vulnerable communities. The World
Food Program also planned to provide more than 15 million Afghan people with
food assistance each month until March 2023. 246

7.5 The Taliban's recognition plea and world response

Though the Taliban repeatedly called the Muslim world to take the lead in
recognizing their government,247 no request and engagement translated into
formal recognition. Taliban representatives time and again demonstrated
commitment to uphold legitimate rights of the society 248 and to revisit terms of
education for women. The group also answered the world wary of insecurity in
Afghanistan by rejecting the United Nations’ report claiming that the Taliban killed
100 former government officials and by passing a humanitarian declaration.
Rejecting the UN report, the Taliban reminded the world of the “forgiveness
decree” adopted by the group and their commitment to outrightly discourage
humanitarian atrocities on Afghan land.

244
“China announces zero-tariff for Afghan products”, Ariana News, November 11, 2022,
<https://www.ariananews.af/china-announces-zero-tariff-for-afghan-products>
245
“UN reaches 4.6 million Afghan people with aid”, The Khaama Press News Agency, October 30, 2022,
<https://www.khaama.com/un-reaches-4-6-million-afghan-people-with-aid-87774>
246
Ibid.
247
“Taliban PM calls on Muslim nations to recognize Afghan govt”, Dawn, January 20, 2022,
<https://www.dawn.com/news/1670443>
248
“Afghan Delegates Meet EU Envoys in Doha”, Tolo News, February 15, 2022,
<https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-176737>

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In another attempt to win recognition, in October 2022 the Afghan Taliban called
upon the member states of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to
officially recognize and interact with it on a political and economic basis.249
However, in December 2022, the OIC condemned the Afghan Taliban’s
announcement prohibiting female NGO workers from working.

Moreover, while Europe has not yet declared any intention to recognize the new
regime, the EU said it will have to talk with the Taliban. EU's Foreign Policy Chief
Josep Borrell said after the Taliban takeover of Kabul that "[they] have to get in
touch with authorities in Kabul. The Taliban have won the war, so [they] will have
to talk to them."250

7.6 Emerging geopolitical dynamics and positions

All the countries in the region and beyond have been stating time and again that
they wanted peace and stability in Afghanistan. Unlike past, no external
interreferences including in terms of proxy war in Afghanistan have been reported
so far. But that does not mean that different countries in the region and beyond
don't have their geopolitical and geo-economic standpoints and interests linked
to the emerging Afghan situation and its interface with the regional alliances and
dynamics.

Among the countries in the region, China has been gradually asserting itself in
Afghanistan and regional geopolitics and geoeconomics. As far as China's Afghan

249
"Bringing Afghan news to the world", Ariana News, October 25, 2022,
<https://www.ariananews.af/iea-calls-on-oic-members-to-be-the-first-to-recognize-new-
government/?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter>
250
Foo Yun Chee and John Chalmers, Sabine Siebold, “EU says it will work with Taliban only if human rights
respected,” Reuters, August 17, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-says-will-work-with-
taliban-only-if-rights-are-respected-2021-08-17>

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policy is concerned, the Taliban see it fairly neutral as it has been keeping contacts
with different Afghan governments and factions. The Taliban are aware they could
use China’s advances in technology, poverty alleviation and infrastructure
development to improve living conditions at home and reduce dependence on the
West. But there are also reservations over China’s traditionally careful approach to
investing in projects abroad. China signed a BRI deal with Kabul in 2016 but there
are no projects on the ground yet, mainly due to insecurity. China’s interest in
exploiting Afghanistan’s massive mineral resources may help fill Taliban’s coffers,
but the Chinese are unlikely to jump in until the Taliban have proven that they are
in control of the law-and-order situation and can fulfill Chinese conditions for
investment. Analysts have been underlining that Beijing “is unlikely to throw in
everything (in Afghanistan) like the US did and got burnt.” 251

One of China’s main aims in reaching out to the Taliban has been to protect its
western Xinjiang region from anti-Beijing East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)
militants. However, China feared that instability in Afghanistan might once again
make it a hub of extremism, which could directly be exported to China’s Xinjiang
region. After the Taliban takeover, China crafted a five-dimensional policy towards
Afghanistan.252 While the first and foremost dimension of this policy was China’s
acceptance of the Taliban as the ruling force in Afghanistan, the second dimension
was China’s cautious efforts to prevent Afghanistan from again becoming a
terrorist hub, and the third was facilitation of formation of inclusive government in
Afghanistan. The fourth and fifth dimensions were China’s efforts to address the

251
Secunder Kermani, former BBC correspondent in Pakistan and Afghanistan, was quoted in M. Ilyas Khan,
"Evolving mindset of Afghan Taliban and implications for Pakistan." Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-III
(Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/Report.pdf>
252
Feng Zhang, “China’s New Engagement with Afghanistan after the Withdrawal”, LSE Public Policy Review,
May 2, 2022, <https://ppr.lse.ac.uk/articles/10.31389/lseppr.52>

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 AFGHANISTAN IN THE EMERGING GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS AND DEVELOPMENTS

Afghan humanitarian emergency and to remind the West that the humanitarian
emergency was the result of their irresponsible actions respectively. So, contrary to
the common notion that China’s engagement with Afghanistan is guided by its
mineral extractive policy, it is in fact directed by China’s regional diplomacy and its
pursuit of peace in its neighboring state.253 Espousing this policy, China worked to
establish three working groups on political and diplomatic, economic and
humanitarian, and security and stability affairs.254 However, after the armed attacks
on the Pakistani and Russian embassies in Kabul by Daesh, China’s ambassador
Wang Yu met with Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai, the deputy foreign minister,
where he expressed concern about the security of his country’s embassy. He
expressed his satisfaction with the security “all over Afghanistan” but requested
that more attention should be paid to the security of diplomatic missions in
Kabul.255 Shortly after that the IS-K targeted a hotel in Kabul housing Chinese in
which 3 assailants were killed and 21 people were injured including foreign
nationals.256 Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin called the incident
“an extremely outrageous terrorist attack” and urged the Afghan side “to look

253
Feng Zhang, “China’s New Engagement with Afghanistan after the Withdrawal.”
254
“Wang Yi chairs the third foreign ministers' meeting on the Afghan issue among the neighboring
countries of Afghanistan”, Embassy of the People Republic of China in the United States of America, March
31, 2022, <http://us.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/zgyw/202204/t20220401_10658476.htm>
255
“Stanekzai tells China's envoy ensuring security for diplomats is a 'priority'”, Ariana News, December 12,
2022.
256
Gul, Ayaz. “Attack on Kabul hotel housing Chinese nationals leaves 3 assailants dead”, Voice of America
(VOA News), December 12, 2022, <https://www.voanews.com/a/attack-on-kabul-hotel-housing-chinese-
nationals-leaves-3-assailants-dead-/6872651.html>

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thoroughly into the attack” and “take strong and resolute measures to ensure the
security” of Chinese people and property.257

Hamayun Khan, an expert on Pak-China relations and CPEC, believes that China’s
diplomatic sailing in Afghanistan is a recent phenomenon. The uptick in China-
Afghanistan bilateral ties may well be on the way to acquiring some substantial
shape in the future. He asserts that while Islamabad may seek to reap the gains out
of this emerging rapprochement between Afghanistan and China, yet it shall
require bureaucratic proactivity, coupled with greater political efforts to achieve
the desired ends. For China, Pakistan and Afghanistan to achieve tangible
outcomes of trilateral engagement, they need to practically ascertain the
parameters of their partnerships in political, strategic and economic domains. 258

For geoeconomics, the Makran coast in Pakistan’s Balochistan province is very

important. An evolving policy shift from geostrategic to geoeconomics has a
greater context in the Makran coast and the development of Gwadar. The reason
is Afghanistan’s transit importance, which is connecting the Central Asian states to
Makran coast and Gwadar. There are two important things to be considered. First
is the tumultuous situation in Afghanistan itself and second is the base of Baloch
militancy. It is believed that through the Gwadar there will be a strong connection
of the Central Asian states to the Arabian sea, however, that depends more on the
Makran coast than the Gwadar. Moreover, the new dimension in militancy in
Makran has ruptured the whole process. Many believe that the Chinese are now
shifting their focus from making the CPEC a kind of connection from Gwadar to

257
“Kabul terror attack 'may prompt a rethink for Chinese investors'”, South China Morning Post, December
14, 2022, ,https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3203146/kabul-terror-attack-may-prompt-
rethink-chinese-investors>
258
Hamayoun Khan, "Pakistan’s perspective on Chinese engagement with the Taliban-led Afghanistan,”
Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-VII (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2023,
<https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Report-7.pdf>

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Central Asia and the Western China to making it a transhipment port. This means
that the connectivity angle has been completely cropped out from the CPEC and
that everything will now be done there.259

Meanwhile, according to former ambassador Asif Durrani, Iran is hopeful that the
emerging geopolitical landscape will provide it an opportunity to enhance its
relations with China and Russia by presenting itself as the Middle East's
indispensable power. The US withdrawal from Afghanistan could provide it a more
successful "Eastern" anchoring in line with Iran's 'Look East' approach. However, a
lot depends on how the Taliban will react to Iranian ambitions.260 Iran fears attacks
from the anti-Shia Islamic State or Daesh fighters having sanctuaries in
Afghanistan. Iran also voiced reservations on the Taliban's offensive in Panjshir. An
Iranian foreign office official was reportedly critical of Pakistan amid unverified
reports of Pakistan carrying out air raids in Panjshir in support of the Taliban.261
Iran reportedly also arranged a meeting between Taliban and the Panjshir group
in Tehran in January 2022, which contributed little in resolving the stalemate. 262
Iran’s official language, Persian, is also the language of nearly the entire non-
Pashtun population of Afghanistan, including Tajiks. Besides, Iran adheres to the
Shia sect of Islam and has expressed concerns about the safety and rights of
Afghanistan’s Shia population, mostly based in north and west of the country.

259
Dr. Manzoor Ahmed, Professor of Political Economy and Pro-Vice Chancellor, University of Gwadar. Views
expressed in PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad.
260
Asif Durrani, "Iran’s Afghan policy after the U.S. withdrawal: Implications for Pakistan and
the region,” Afghanistan as seen from Pakistan-II (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Oct-Dec 2021,
<https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/FInal-report.pdf>
261
“As Taliban claim victory in Panjshir, Iran slams Pakistan military's role,” Iran International, September 6,
2021, <https://old.iranintl.com/en/world/taliban-claim-victory-panjshir-iran-slams-pakistan-militarys-role>
262
BBC Pashto, January 11, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/pashto/afghanistan-59948786>

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Historically, Iran has had ties with both the US-installed national government and
the Taliban and provided cheap oil to Afghanistan after the Taliban takeover. 263

The United States had signed a deal with the Taliban and managed to withdraw
finally realizing that the war in Afghanistan was leading it nowhere; indeed,
President Joe Biden reinforced his predecessor Trump’s plan of complete
withdrawal from Afghanistan. While America was busy sketching the withdrawal
plan and the Afghan government was busy denying the possibility of withdrawal,
the Taliban placed their focus on strengthening their political image and making
territorial advancements in the country.

To some political observers, the US and allies appeared to be motived

predominantly by a desire to end an ‘endless war’, and also "create threats for
China and Russia."264 As cited earlier, China is pushing its Belt and Road Initiative
across South and Central Asia and has economic assets there, while Russia has a
huge military presence in Central Asian states and looks after the defence of the
region. On the other hand, China, Russia and Iran wanted an American exit from
the region, even at the cost of having to live with the Taliban. They were opposed
to President Ashraf Ghani’s government, which they saw as pro-US. These
countries' diplomatic moves after the fall of Kabul suggested they "considere[d]
the Taliban a lesser evil, hoping that they might reform themselves and prevent
militant incursions in the neighborhood."265

263
M. Ilyas Khan, "Evolving mindset of Afghan Taliban and implications for Pakistan," Afghanistan as seen
from Pakistan-III (Pak Institute for Peace Studies), Jan-Mar 2022, <https://www.pakpips.com/web/wp-
content/uploads/2022/04/Report.pdf>
264
Afrasiab Khattak, political analyst and human rights activist, was quoted in M. Ilyas Khan, "Evolving
mindset of Afghan Taliban and implications for Pakistan."
265
Gavin Helf et al., “How the Region is Reacting to the Taliban Takeover,” USIP, August 19, 2021,
<https://www.usip.org/publications/2021/08/how-region-reacting-taliban-takeover>

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Tajikistan is the only neighboring country in Central Asia to have fallen out with
the Taliban, mainly over the latter’s action against an Afghan rebel group based in
the Panjshir region. Ethnic affinity with the rebels appears to be Tajikistan’s more
immediate motive. Once led by the legendary Ahmad Shah Masood, a powerful
commander and former defence minister during the Mujahideen era, the group is
largely manned by ethnic Tajiks, Afghanistan’s second largest minority that
constitutes just under 30% of the national population. Tajikistan also apprehends
that Taliban may use militants to carry out attacks inside its territory. Some hostile
optics have been in evidence with Russian and Tajik forces holding military
exercises on Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan266 and the Taliban holding an
armed parade by militants from Tajikistan on their side of the border. 267

With the rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan, India did not only see renewed threat
in Kashmir but was also concerned about the growing role and influence of
Pakistan in Afghanistan. However, since the Taliban aimed at broadening their
diplomatic and economic clout in the region it seemed highly unlikely for them to
have maintained a hardline approach towards India, which has invested in
development projects in almost each province of Afghanistan. India’s first formal
meeting with the Taliban in Qatar where a Taliban representative assured the
Indian envoy that India’s concerns regarding Afghan soil to be used against India
would be positively addressed was a glaring example of this approach.268

266
Temur Umarov, “Why Tajikistan Is Taking a Stand Against the Taliban,” Carnegie Moscow Center, October
26, 2021, <https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/85649>
267
Tajik Service, “Tajikistan concerned about Taliban plots to infiltrate from Afghanistan,” Radio Free Europe
Radio Liberty, September 25, 2021, <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-concerned-taliban-
plots/31477716.html>
268
“India holds first formal meeting with Taliban in Qatar”, Al Jazeera, August 31, 2021,
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/31/india-holds-first-formal-meeting-with-taliban-in-qatar>

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While most official and public responses from Pakistan welcomed the Taliban
takeover of Kabul, some described it as victory for Pakistan and defeat of India.
Pakistani government and military establishment apparently also seemed content
with the Taliban takeover thinking it would give Pakistan long-sought strategic
depth in Afghanistan against India and alleviate the fears of Indian use of Afghan
soil to create trouble in bordering provinces of Pakistan. However, as things later
unfolded, Pakistan's expectations of the Taliban did not come true. Apart from their
indifference to and repeated denial of growing TTP threat to Pakistan and border
insecurity, the Taliban have gradually become more pragmatic in establishing
relations with India, thus invalidating Pakistan's fledgling jubilation.

Indeed, India has a history of creating a strategic space and capital in Afghanistan,
including through assistance and engagement in economic and social
development projects. And it continues to follow the previous tradition in the
Taliban-led Afghanistan, creating warmer conditions of bilateral engagement. In
June 2022, India reopened its embassy in Kabul, after security guarantees from the
Taliban, to coordinate humanitarian assistance and restart engaging with the
Afghan people. On February 1 (2022), New Delhi had allocated around US$ 27
million for assistance to Afghanistan in its 2022–23 fiscal budget. The amount was
earmarked to pay for existing Indian projects in the country, scholarships for
Afghan students, and aid for the Afghan people. According to Afghan ambassador
to India, the assistance was a signal that India was not switching off.269

India also sees Afghanistan as an important country due to its proximity with
Central Asian states; India has strengthened its relations with these states over the
past few decades in the areas ranging from military technology, defence,

269
R.A. Ganaie, & M.A. Ganaie, "India’s Afghanistan policy: a quest for strategic space post the US
withdrawal." Humanity and Social Sciences Communications 9, no. 462 (2022),
<https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-022-01489-7>

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counterterrorism, and economy to culture. Many Indian foreign policy analysts

have been highlighting following the Taliban’s return to power that India must
further consolidate its ties with Central Asia due to emerging security, geostrategic,
and geo-economic challenges. For one observer, it was due to Pakistan's resistance
to facilitating any Indian connectivity through its territory that New Delhi
established connectivity with Central Asia and contracted with Iran to develop the
Chabahar port; India has invested US$150 million in the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram
Highway, which connects Afghanistan to the Chabahar port via Milak in Iran, and
links further to Tajikistan.270

Pakistan believes that through its engagements in Afghanistan, India has been
playing a role of 'spoiler' with a key objective of restricting Pakistan's influence
there. For one, Pakistan decided not to attend an Afghan moot hosted by India in
November 2021 on the same pretext. 271 After Pakistan's refusal to join, China cited
'schedule clash' as the reason for its absence, which many saw as a covert
geopolitical message to the world. Pakistan also skipped an Afghan moot held in
Moscow in February 2023 where it was invited alongside China and India. The two-
day conference was attended by national security advisers of regional countries
from India, China and Iran along with Central Asian countries. Experts agree that
the main reason Pakistan opted to stay out of it was because it was the Indian
initiative, and according to foreign office statement, Pakistan believes "(it) can
make a better contribution in formats and forums which can contribute
constructively to peace in Afghanistan”.272

270
Ayjaz Wani, “Taliban’s Afghanistan: An emerging security challenge for India and Central Asia,” ORF Issue
Brief No. 580, September 2022, <https://www.orfonline.org/research/talibans-afghanistan>
271
Kamran Yousaf, "Pakistan snubs Indian invite for Afghan moot," The Express Tribune, November 2, 2021,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2327473/pakistan-snubs-indian-invite-for-afghan-moot>
272
Kamran Yousaf, "Pakistan skips Afghan moot in Moscow," The Express Tribune, February 9, 2023,
<https://tribune.com.pk/story/2400291/pakistan-skips-afghan-moot-in-moscow>

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8. Pakistan's policy challenges and options

A key factor that is limiting Pakistan’s policy choices is the enhanced threats to
Pakistan’s internal security as well its western borders since the Taliban takeover of
Kabul. Cross-border movements of militants have increased, leading to a spike in
attacks on Pakistan security personnel. Apparently, the Taliban have reneged on
their promises made in Doha as well as earlier that they would prevent Afghan soil
from becoming a staging point for attacks inside Pakistan. This inaction is
fundamentally due to the Afghan Taliban’s long affiliation with the TTP which
fought side by side with them against foreign forces. Against this backdrop, the
Afghan Taliban are averse to the idea of cracking down on the TTP in a meaningful
way.

Many observers highlight inherent flaws in policymaking and implementation

processes. Ideally, decision making takes places at government institutions taking
input from stakeholders including civil society, political figures, think tanks and
security agencies. But in Pakistan, most participants of PIPS-organized expert
consultations agreed, the decision-making process, mainly related to foreign and
internal security policies, is not inclusive and largely dominated by the military.
Secondly, as argued by Lt. General (Retd) Tariq Khan, decision makers rarely carry
out field research, and rather prefer to use secondary data provided by different
sources including intelligence agencies, which is the prime problem of our state.
He argued that the civilian decision makers need to enhance the level of
competence and own their responsibilities.273

Another question is how should Pakistan articulate its foreign policy?

According to former diplomat Inam-ul-Haque, it is unfortunate that in Pakistan
everyone considers itself a foreign policy expert, be it interior minister, minister of

273
Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
 PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

railways or any special assistant, and feels that he/she ought to say something
about Afghanistan. However, the reality is that the substance of the foreign policy
is as important as its articulation. So, "unlike recently when Pakistan’s premier
declared that ‘Afghanistan has broken shackles of slavery,’ or that ‘we have not
seen a man more ignorant that Antony Blinken’, Pakistan’s representatives should
weigh their choices of words before making statements." In fact, there should be
only one source of information on foreign policy issues and preferably that should
be the official spokesperson of the foreign ministry.274 Similarly, Pakistan need not
to act vulnerable, but rather lay forward Pakistan's stance pragmatically and
firmly.275

Pakistan’s foreign policy may be shaped by a combination of national interests

and regional players’ inclination; Pakistan does not need to unilaterally take
actions without consulting China, Russia, Iran and Central Asian powers such as
recognizing the Taliban regime. If the Taliban are being careful about the promises
they made to the world community, there is nothing to worry about, however if
the Taliban are going against the global players, then Pakistan would need to sit
with other countries and collectively sketch an approach towards Afghanistan.

However, Pakistan does not need to become the voice of international community.
If the world has concerns regarding the Taliban, they also have means to register
those concerns with the Taliban. Hence, Pakistan should neither intervene in
Afghanistan’s internal affairs, nor try to be the message carriers of the
international community. This message needs to be clearly sent out to the world.

274
Inam-ul-Haque, former Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, and former Minister of State for Foreign Affairs.
Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.
275
Aziz Ahmed Khan, former ambassador of Pakistan. Comments in PIPS consultation-4 on Afghan peace
and reconciliation held on June 9, 2022, in Islamabad.

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

Pakistan needs to refrain from over optimism regarding the Taliban regime.
Firstly, so because the Taliban’s power in Kabul does not indicate zero Indian
presence in Afghanistan; Taliban seem pragmatic and are seeking good relations
with India. Secondly, the Taliban is struggling with governance issues and in
dealing with international community. As far as the recognition [of the Taliban
government] is concerned, there already is de facto recognition which is why they
participated on Antalya and Oslo platforms. Hence, Pakistan must also not be
worried about raising the issue of recognition repeatedly, and instead place focus
on evolving joint counter-terrorism efforts involving its neighbors.

At the same time, Pakistan needs to devise a balance between the onerous task
of encouraging the Taliban to acquiesce to international conditions and the
mission of rallying for the removal of western sanctions. This approach will not only
epitomise Pakistan’s diplomatic grit, but it will also help shatter the sentiment that
Pakistan is a mouthpiece of the Taliban.

Pakistan needs to recalibrate its Afghan policy making it all-encompassing and

inclusive by taking more input from parliament, civil society, and other
stakeholders. Afghans also have had a very clear demand and desire that there
should be a state-to-state bilateral relationship, a civilian relationship, and a
civilzed relationship. Most of the participants believed Pakistan needed to revisit
its ideological standpoint in its foreign policy determinants and rather look for
national interests.

Pakistan needs to deal with Afghanistan as its independent, sovereign neighbor.

According to Mansoor Ahmad Khan, former ambassador to Afghanistan, Afghans
demand absolute sovereignty [in their relationship with Pakistan], and there is
nothing wrong with this demand. "When we deal with other states in the world, we
deal with them as sovereign states but when it comes to Afghanistan, we become
reluctant to do the same. That is despite our stated policy narrative that

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Afghanistan is a sovereign state, an independent state, and that we believe in the

territorial integrity," he observed while further noting that our dealings with the
Afghans in the past 50 years have remained in a certain way and perhaps that also
controls our way of looking at them.276 Experts underscore that Pakistan should
clearly define its fundamental strategic objective that is we do not want to bring
any change in Afghanistan, and we would allow the people of Afghanistan to
determine their system of government. Muzhgan Feraji, journalist and educationist
from Afghanistan, underlined in one of the PIPS consultations held on Afghan
peace and reconciliation that even if Pakistan prefers to discuss the rights and
freedom of Afghans, these need to be in accordance with Afghans' preferences.

Similarly, some political observers believe that an aggressive posture towards the
Taliban may not work for similar reasons. According to Afghan journalist Sami
Yousafzai, Pakistan may think that it helped the Afghan Taliban in attaining power
in Afghanistan and now [instead of returning favours] they are not listening to it.
But the Taliban think that as they are now the rulers of Afghanistan [and have to
reflect the sentiments of Afghans], they should be treated as such.277 Pakistan also
needs to understand the Afghans’ thinking and their psyche rather than judging it
from its own current situation and background.

Pakistan needs an insightful policy framework to deal with refugees; fencing

alone is not enough. Such a framework must carefully tackle the refugee problem
to mitigate its ramifications for local demography. For one, Pakistan should
formulate a refugee law to give a positive message to Afghan civil society that
Pakistan stands with them. Formulating relevant laws will also help in removing

276
Mansoor Ahmad Khan, former ambassador to Afghanistan. Views expressed in PIPS consultation-7 on
Afghan peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad
277
Sami Yousafzai, journalist and expert on Afghan affairs. Views expressed in PIPS consultation-7 on Afghan
peace and reconciliation held on March 7, 2023, in Islamabad

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

uncertainty on the refugees’ status in Pakistan and will open up more avenues of
international support for Pakistan's refugee management. Former ambassador
Mansoor Ahmad Khan believes that while Afghans are investing all over the world,
including in Turkey and Europe, in Pakistan we have kept them out of investment
policies. What message are we giving to the world by withholding Afghan refugees
from business and investment? 278 Legal status would also help the country
integrate refugees into the taxation system. Few participants of PIPS consultations
on Afghanistan also suggested awarding citizenships with limited rights of access
to basic public services such as education and health for the Afghans and their
offspring who have been living in Pakistan for several generations now. They also
noted that without legal status and formal records, the Afghans who indulge in
crimes or acts of terrorism on Pakistani soil remain beyond the radar of the law
enforcement.

As far as the role of ulema or Islamic scholars is concerned, religious diplomacy

to enhance Pakistani-Afghan bilateral and people to people ties is needed more
than ever today, but it shall be in a slightly different form. This means that now
those ulema should be included in such initiatives as 'connectors' who have an
influence in Pakistan and on the Taliban. Some however also warn that religious
actors can act as spoilers also.

The Afghan Taliban, who form the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, are divided into
two major factions: the pragmatist Haqqani faction; and the southern ideologues
led Kandahari faction. Haqqanis have been relatively friendly with Pakistan, while
the Kandaharis espouse more puritanical views while dealing with Pakistan.
Kandahari faction is formed by the Taliban ideologues, led by Mullah Hibatullah
Akhundzada, the spiritual leader of the IEA. Maj. Gen Inam Ul Haque (Retd),

278
Mansoor Ahmad Khan, former Ambassador of Pakistan to Afghanistan. Views expressed in PIPS
consultation-7 on Afghan peace and reconciliation.

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 PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

defence and strategic affairs analyst, stated in one of PIPS consultations on Afghan
peace and reconciliation that to make any headway in talks with the TTP, Pakistan
should influence the Kandahari faction and make inroads into Mullah
Akhundzada’s inner circles.

Some participants of PIPS-led expert consultations lamented that terrorist attacks

have increased in Pakistan since the Afghan Taliban came into power in August
2021 putting stress on bilateral relations between the two countries. While the TTP
and IS-K, largely operating from Afghanistan, have stepped up their terrorist
activities in Pakistan, mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the Taliban have been failing
to help Pakistan in countering the threats of militancy and cross-border terrorism.
Others, however, underlined that Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is
larger than counterterrorism and security, and therefore should be seen
broadly. Pakistan needed to focus on trade, economy, enhancing infrastructure
and people to people contacts, thus moving beyond a security-centric Afghan
policy. The challenges are piling up for Pakistan because of its 'flawed
understanding of the Afghan Taliban', who may never launch a crackdown on the
TTP for Pakistan as they have both remained and struggled together for past few
decades. The solution to deal with the TTP also lies in broader engagement with
Afghanistan that would lead to mutual economic and security interdependence.

Pakistan's state and private media houses and television channels have least
presence or in Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan where media offices are present
from all over the world. Pakistan needs to encourage media personnel both from
the public and private sectors to bring forward things besides the official
statements we get from the government. Interactions should be made with the
local people to hear their voices so ultimately Pakistan can make better policies for
Afghanistan.

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 PAKISTAN'S AFGHAN PERSPECTIVE AND POLICY OPTIONS

It is also desirable that Pakistan continue taking lead in ensuring the reach of
humanitarian assistance to poverty-ridden Afghanistan. The primary pathway to
achieve this is by keeping its humanitarian air and road corridors open, along with
the land routes for UN agencies, NGOs and other donors. Moreover, Pakistan shall
be on the front foot with regards to implementation of OIC’s commitments
pertaining to the Afghan situation.

Pakistan may devise a policy that facilitates trade with Afghanistan include
doing so in Pakistan’s national currency and enabling barter mechanism until
Afghanistan gains financial stability. This will be a practical implementation of
Pakistan’s National Security Policy that asserts that Pakistan’s security-oriented
outlook has shifted to economic one. Some political observers hold that despite
its repeated claims Pakistan has yet not shifted to geo-economics from the
traditional geo-strategic calculus, at least in case of Afghanistan. For instance, in
the last two decades, Iran, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have set up train
connectivity with Afghanistan, however we have not established even one meter
connectivity with the latter. Improved bilateral trade could contribute significantly
to resolution of social, political, and economic issues between Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Trade is mutually beneficial, and it would help stabilize the two
countries over time.

Pakistan requires a comprehensive policy framework to check smuggling on the

Pak-Afghan border because illegal trade has been harming national economies in
both countries for decades. Some participants of PIPS-led expert consultations
claimed that certain government agencies were also involved in the booming cross
border illegal trade. Unless the problem is addressed effectively, the instability on
western borders will linger on indefinitely, participants warned. They also
suggested the establishment of trade zones on the border to counter smuggling.

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 PAKISTAN'S POLICY CHALLENGES AND OPTIONS

Pakistan’s Afghan policy has largely remained centered upon the groups, warlords,
and politicians, instead of citizens of Afghanistan. Therefore, Pakistan may work on
developing a policy that focuses on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan
people. Reaching out to different factions of Afghan society and polity will help in
removing misperceptions held by many Afghans about Pakistan.

In the last two decades, Pakistan used to offer scholarships to Afghans. However,
these scholarships have also been stopped now. Pakistan should increase the
number of scholarships to Afghan students including girls as they are in need of
them. Similarly, within the field of health, Pakistan has marked leverage to win
Afghan people's hearts. Many Afghans come here for treatment. If along the
border, Pakistan establishes small hospitals every 50km or so it will prove highly
beneficial for the Afghans as well as for Pakistan's image.

Pakistan needs to bilaterally engage and talk with Afghanistan on the issues of
countering terrorism, enhancing trade, and evolving mechanism on border and
water securities, etc. Pakistan can formulate such agreements under the table, and
once the Taliban government is recognized, these can be made formal. It seems
strange that despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal
agreement regarding refugees, trade, or border.

At home, Pakistan needs to upgrade the merged districts of ex-FATA to the

status of a full-fledged province and promote democratic culture to discourage
militarism and bring stability to the country. Furthermore, there is no reason for
the merged FATA areas to still remain 'cantonments' where even the
parliamentarians find hard to go.

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