Republic of the Philippines

Court of Appeals
Manila

EIGHTH DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377

PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
Members:

ANTONIO-VALENZUELA, N.G.,
-versus-
Chairperson,
MAMAUAG, JR., F.M., and
BATHAN, E.L., JJ.

HON. ABRAHAM JOSEPH B.

ALCANTARA, in his capacity as
the Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MUNTINLUPA CITY, BRANCH
204, LEILA M. DE LIMA, and Promulgated:
RONNIE PALISOC DAYAN, APRIL 30, 2025
__________________________
Respondents.
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION
BATHAN, E.L., J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari1 under Rule 65 of the Revised

Rules of Court, as amended, filed by the People of the Philippines, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (the “Petitioner”), which seeks to nullify
the Decision2 dated 12 May 2023 and the Order3 dated 06 July 2023 issued by
the public respondent judge Honorable Abraham Joseph B. Alcantara (the

1
Rollo, vol. I, pp. 3-73.
2
Attached as Annex A to the Petition, id. at 75-113. Penned by Presiding Judge Abraham Joseph B.
Alcantara.
3
Attached as Annex B to the Petition, id. at 114-117. Penned by Presiding Judge Abraham Joseph B.
Alcantara.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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“Public Respondent”), of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 204,

Muntinlupa City, in Criminal Case No. 17-165. The assailed Decision
acquitted the private respondents Leila M. De Lima (“De Lima”) and Ronnie
Palisoc Dayan (“Dayan”) (collectively the “Private Respondents”) of
violation of Section 26(b) in relation to Section 5, Section 3(jj), and Section
28 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. On the other hand, the assailed Order denied
the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Statement of the Case
This petition stemmed from an Amended Information4 charging De
Lima and Dayan with violation of Section 26(b) in relation to Section 5,
Section 3(jj), and Section 28 of R.A. No. 9165. The accusatory portion of the
Amended Information reads:
“That within the period from November 2012 to December 2012, in
the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused Leila M. de Lima, being then the Secretary of
Justice, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan,
being then an employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima,
did then and there decide and agree to commit illegal drug trading, in the
following manner: the inmates of the National Bilibid Prison, not being
authorized by law, and through the use of mobile phones and other
electronic devices, willfully and unlawfully traded and trafficked
dangerous drugs, and thereafter gave and delivered to De Lima
and/through Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five
Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos [sic] on 24 November 2012 and another
Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos [sic] on 15 December 2012.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”5

Upon arraignment before the RTC, Branch 205, Muntinlupa City,

Dayan entered a “Not Guilty” plea, while De Lima refused to enter her plea;
hence, the same court entered a plea of “Not Guilty” on her behalf.6
Thereafter, the trial ensued. The prosecution presented the following
witnesses, namely: Benjamin Bañez Magalong; Jovencio “Jun” Ablen; Joel
Otic; Mark Genesis Caseres; Deputy Director Rafel Marcos Z. Ragos (“Ragos”);
Jose Doloiras; Agent Victor Ronquillo; Dante Lazaro Jimenez; Atty. Eugene
Javier IV; Atty. Peter Chan Lugay; Nonilo Arile; Retired Colonel Jerry
Crisostomo Valeroso; Hans Anton Tan; Atty. Reynaldo Esmaralda; Peter Co
(Chinese name: Wu Tuan Yuan); Atty. Darius Canullas; Wilfredo Albuendia;
Artemio Baculi, Jr.; Atty. Rigel Salvador; and Vicente Sy.

4
Attached as Annex C to the Petition, id. at 118-124.
5
Id. at 118-119.
6
See Amended Pre-Trial Order, attached as Annex “D” to the Petition, id. at 125-137.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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The RTC, Branch 205, Muntinlupa City, received the entirety of the
evidence for the prosecution. Upon concluding the presentation of the
witnesses, the prosecution filed its Formal Offer of Exhibits, while the defense
filed their comments and objections thereto, which the court admitted. The
defense thereafter filed their respective demurrer to evidence but was denied
by the RTC, Branch 205, Muntinlupa City. Aggrieved, the defense moved for
the inhibition of the Presiding Judge of the said court, who eventually
voluntarily recused herself from proceeding further with the case.7 Thus, this
case was re-raffled to RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City.
The defense, on the other hand, presented the accused Dayan, Eduard
Paul M. Dayan, and Ragos, who recanted his earlier testimony and renounced
that there is no truth to any of the affidavits and statements he made in the
media or any other investigatory proceedings.8 For her part, De Lima opted
not to present any witnesses and adopted the Formal Offer of Exhibits
submitted by Dayan. The said exhibits were admitted by the RTC, Branch
204, Muntinlupa City on 27 April 2023.9
Before the case was decided by RTC, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, the
prosecution presented its rebuttal evidence, through its witness, Atty.
Demiteer Huerta of the Public Attorney’s Office.10

Ruling of the RTC

After the trial, the RTC Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, issued the
assailed Decision11 dated 12 May 2023, exonerating the private respondents
from the crime charged. The dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, both accused Leila M. De Lima y Magistrado and
Ronnie Palisoc Dayan are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged on
the ground of reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.”12

The public respondent ruled that the subsequent recantation of the

prosecution’s witness, Ragos, casts reasonable doubt on the credibility of his
testimony against the private respondents. It was further stated by the same
court that the testimony of Ragos is necessary to sustain any possible
conviction. Hence, without his testimony, the crucial link to establish

7
See supra note 2, at 100. See also paragraph 20 of the Petition for Certiorari, supra note 1, at 8.
8
Supra note 2, at 100-102.
9
Id. at 104.
10
Id.
11
Supra note 2.
12
Id. at 113.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
DECISION Page 4 of 12

conspiracy is shrouded with reasonable doubt, which warrants the acquittal of

the private respondents.13

Undaunted, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration.14

However, the motion was denied by the public respondent in the assailed
Order15 dated 06 July 2023, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the prosecution is denied for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.”16

Undeterred, the petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari

anchored on the following grounds:

“GROUNDS
RELIED UPON FOR THE
ALLOWANCE OF THE PETITION

I.
THE 12 MAY 2023 DECISION AND 6 JULY 2023 ORDER
RENDERED BY RESPONDENT JUDGE ACQUITTING PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MAY BE ASSAILED THROUGH A PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

II.
RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ACQUITTING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED BASED ON REASONABLE DOUBT.

a) Respondent Judge rendered the assailed Decision and Order

without clear and distinct reference to the evidence and law upon
which it is based.
b) Respondent Judge unjustly disregarded the testimonies of other
prosecution witnesses which clearly established private
respondents’ guilt for illegal drug trading.
c) Respondent Judge failed to test the credibility of witness Rafael
Ragos’ recantation.”17

13
Id. at 112.
14
Rollo, vol. II, pp. 702-792.
15
Supra note 3.
16
Id. at 117.
17
Supra note 1, at 10-11.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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The Parties’ Arguments

In support of its petition, the petitioner argues that the assailed Decision
and Order must be reversed for failure of the public respondent to substantiate
his perception of the alleged insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to
convict the private respondents in light of the recantation of the prosecution’s
witness, Ragos. The public respondent acquitted the private respondents on
the sole basis of the recantation of Ragos but was made with neither analysis
of the entire evidence on record nor reference to the legal bases for his
conclusion on the supposed resulting inefficiency of the rest of the
prosecution’s evidence, in stark violation of the Constitution. Accordingly, a
court decision lacking in factual and legal bases is void and produces no legal
effect.

The petitioner maintains that the positive declarations of all the

prosecution’s witnesses, notwithstanding the recantation of Ragos, remain
consistent with and materially corroborate each other, which would establish
the guilt of the private respondents. Lastly, the OSG asserts that the public
respondent failed to test, much less lay down in his Decision and subsequent
Order, how he determined the credibility of Ragos’s recantation pursuant to
applicable and prevailing jurisprudential standards.

In her Comment/Opposition (To Petitioner People’s Petition for

Certiorari dated 31 August 2023),18 De Lima counters that the present petition
should be dismissed outright as it constitutes a prohibited appeal from a
judgment of acquittal, and giving due course to the same will deprive De Lima
of the constitutional protection against double jeopardy. De Lima asserts that
the protection against double jeopardy not only prohibits multiple litigation,
but also the appeal from a judgment of acquittal.

To bolster her claims, De Lima cites the case of Erwin Torres v. AAA,19
which states that the Court of Appeals cannot review the evidence presented
before the RTC, even if the petition is nominally filed as Rule 65, or a petition
for certiorari. The iron-clad rule is that once a judgment of acquittal is
promulgated, the evidentiary issues settled therein can no longer be visited,
re-litigated, or reviewed for the purpose of changing the judgment of acquittal
into one of conviction. De Lima argues that in the instant petition, no ground
amounting to anything remotely close to grave abuse of discretion was raised,
let alone any of a sham trial, or a mistrial, but merely evidentiary issues

18
Rollo, vol. IX, pp. 5761-5786.
19
G.R. No. 248567, 10 November 2020 [Per J. Carandang, First Division].
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
DECISION Page 6 of 12

already settled by the RTC in its judgment of acquittal. The petition only raises
errors of judgment, which, even if meritorious, are beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari. De Lima maintains that the public respondent correctly
acquitted her on the ground of reasonable doubt, based on the recantation of
Ragos.

The Issue
Whether or not the petition is impressed with merit.

OUR RULING

We find the petition meritorious.

The extraordinary remedy of a special civil action for certiorari is
available in those truly exceptional cases wherein the action of an inferior
court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged
for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction.20 A judgment of acquittal
may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy.21 However, in
such a case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted
without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction.22
Grave abuse of discretion connotes judgment exercised in a capricious
and whimsical manner that is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. To be
considered grave, discretion must be exercised in a despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility and must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of law.23 No grave abuse of
discretion may be attributed to the court simply because of its alleged
misappreciation of facts and evidence. While certiorari may be used to
correct an abusive acquittal, the petitioner in such extraordinary proceeding
must clearly demonstrate that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to
a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. 24

20
Dela Salle University v. Dela Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA), G.R. No. 109002, 12
April 2000 [Per J. Buena, Second Division], citing Flores v. NLRC, G.R. No. 109362, 15 May 1996 [Per J.
Mendoza, Second Division].
21
People v. Arcega, G.R. No. 237489, 27 August 2020 [Per J. Peralta, First Division].
22
See People v. Arcega, id.
23
Jolo’s Kiddie Carts v. Caballa, G.R. No. 230682, 29 November 2017 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, Second
Division].
24
People v. CA and Galicia, G.R. No. 159261, 21 February 2007 [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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Foremost, the judgment in a criminal case is defined as the adjudication

by the court that the accused is guilty or not guilty of the offense charged and
the imposition on him of the proper penalty and civil liability, if any. 25
The 1987 Philippine Constitution mandates that no decision shall be
rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based.26 Meanwhile, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure instruct that a judgment must be written in the official
language, personally and directly prepared by the judge, and signed by him
and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law
upon which it is based. 27
Thus, in order for a judgment or decision in a criminal case to have a
legal and binding effect, it must conform to the standards of clarity,
transparency, and reasonableness as mandated both by the Constitution and
the Rules of Court. However, in this case, We find that both the assailed
Decision and Order failed to meet these required standards.
In the assailed Decision and Order, the public respondent acquitted the
private respondents on the sole basis of the recantation of witness Ragos. He
lauded that the testimony of witness Ragos is necessary to sustain any possible
conviction, and, without his testimony, the crucial link to establish conspiracy
is shrouded with reasonable doubt.
However, the public respondent failed to discuss the specific proven
facts as well as the laws upon which his pronouncement of acquittal was
based. It is flagrant in the assailed Decision and Order that the public
respondent failed to: (1) state the particular statements which witness Ragos
specifically retracted; (2) state in particular the effects of the retracted
statements to the facts proven by the prosecution; and (3) state which
particular element of the crime charged was not proven.
A perusal of the assailed Decision and Order would reveal that the
public respondent failed to state the particular facts specifically retracted by
witness Ragos and its precise effects, if there are any, to the facts proven by
the prosecution. Further, the public respondent did not expressly identify the
specific factual statements that were purportedly retracted by witness Ragos.
The clear and unequivocal articulation of such retractions is indispensable,
particularly in cases where the credibility of testimony plays a pivotal role in
the adjudication of factual issues. The absence of a detailed enumeration or
substantive discussion of the statements allegedly withdrawn by witness
Ragos renders it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to discern the
25
RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, sec. 1.
26
CONST., art. VIII, sec.14.
27
RULES OF COURT, Rule 120, sec.1.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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rationale behind the public respondent’s findings and ultimate conclusion.

Without a concrete reference to the particular portions of the testimony that
were recanted, We are left to speculate as to which facts were disregarded and
the extent to which such retractions influenced the outcome of the case. Such
lack of particularity transgresses the transparency and reasonableness of the
decision-making process mandated by the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.
Moreover, the public respondent likewise failed to provide a detailed
discussion of the specific element of the crime charged that was allegedly not
established by the prosecution. Instead, he merely posited that the recantation of
witness Ragos effectively discredited the claim of conspiracy. Notably, the
public respondent did not provide a comprehensive analysis of the essential
elements of the offense in relation to the overt acts attributed to the private
respondents and to the evidence presented by the prosecution. The public
respondent’s decision to acquit the private respondents appears to rest
predominantly on the purported failure to prove the existence of conspiracy. It
must be emphasized, however, that conspiracy, within the context of the present
case, is not an independent offense but merely a mode of perpetrating the crime
charged. Accordingly, it was incumbent upon the public respondent to identify
and examine the fundamental elements of the crime and determine which among
them, if any, lacked evidentiary support or were materially affected by the
recantation of witness Ragos. In the absence of such a substantive analysis, the
public respondent’s disposition is bereft of both factual and legal justification.
Judgment, decision, and order are court processes that formally inform
the litigants how their cases were decided, as well as the basis of such
adjudications. This is a constitutional duty that is inherent in the power of the
court in deciding actual controversy. In Yao v. Court of Appeals,28 the Supreme
Court emphasized that the parties to a litigation should be informed of how it
was decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to
the conclusions of the court, viz.:
“Faithful adherence to the requirements of Section 14, Article VIII of
the Constitution is indisputably a paramount component of due process
and fair play. It is likewise demanded by the due process clause of the
Constitution. The parties to a litigation should be informed of how it was
decided, with an explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the
conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is
rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know
why he lost, so he may appeal to the higher court, if permitted, should he
believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not
clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves

28
G.R. No. 132428, 24 October 2000 [Per J. Davide, Jr., First Division].
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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the parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is precisely prejudicial
to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal. x x x”29

Indeed, elementary due process demands that the parties to a litigation

be given information on how the case was decided, as well as an explanation
of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court.30 The
case presented before Us is not a simple situation of misappreciation of the
facts and evidence, but, instead, a situation where the public respondent
clearly disregarded the constitutional mandate that is incumbent upon his
office. The failure to comply with the constitutional injunction is a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 31
In People v. Judge Bellaflor,32 the Supreme Court held the respondent
judge guilty of grave abuse of discretion in acquitting the accused without
expressing the facts and the law on which it is based, thus:

“xxx [P]rivate respondent cannot successfully seek refuge in the

assailed resolution of respondent judge. For one thing, it was an empty
judgment of acquittal — a bare adjudication that private respondent is
not guilty of the offense charged anchored on the mere supposition that
the decision rendered by Judge Fortun was a nullity. Indeed, respondent
judge acquitted private respondent without expressing the facts and the
law on which it is based, as required by Section 14, Article VIII of the
Constitution. xxx
xxx
It is indubitable that the acquittal of private respondent was not
based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case.
Furthermore, it is a requirement of due process that the parties to a
litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of the
factual findings and legal justifications that led to the conclusions of the
court xxx.
xxx
In view of the foregoing, we hold that respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in nullifying the decision rendered by Judge Fortun.”33

Harping on the above Supreme Court pronouncements, the assailed

Decision and Order of the public respondent were issued in careless disregard
of the constitutional mandate, and, therefore, the public respondent acted with
grave abuse of discretion.

29
Id. (Citation omitted)
30
See Nicos Industrial Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88709, 11 February 1992 [Per J. Cruz, First
Division].
31
Austria v. AAA et al., G.R. No. 205275, 28 June 2022 [Per J. Lopez, M., En Banc].
32
G.R. No. 103275, 15 June 1994 [Per J. Bidin, Third Division].
33
Id.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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Anent the argument of De Lima that the filing of this petition amounts
to double jeopardy, We are not persuaded.

Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure

provides:
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an
accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed
or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of
competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and
after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of
the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another
prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same
or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or
information.

For double jeopardy to attach, the following elements must concur: (1)
the accused is charged under a complaint or information sufficient in form and
substance to sustain their conviction; (2) the court has jurisdiction; (3) the
accused has been arraigned and has pleaded; and (4) the accused is convicted
or acquitted, or the case is dismissed without their consent.34
Corollary thereto, the ruling in People v. Alejandro35 is instructive, thus:
“The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions,
which are: (1) Where there has been deprivation of due process and where
there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where there has been a grave abuse
of discretion under exceptional circumstances. We find that these
exceptions do not exist in this case. Here, there was no deprivation of due
process or mistrial because the records show that the prosecution was
actually able to present their case and their witnesses.”36

In this case, however, the acquittal was not a valid acquittal, it being
based on a void judgment, as already discussed above. It bears stressing that
the second element for the existence of double jeopardy is absent since the
public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion due to violation of the
constitutional mandate enshrined under Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution and Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.

34
See Pasda, Inc. v. Court of Appeals and Emmanuel D. Pascual, G.R. No. 264237, 06 December 2023 [Per
J. Lopez, M., Second Division], citing Merciales v. CA, G.R. No. 124171, 18 March 2002 [Per J. Ynares-
Santiago, En Banc].
35
G.R. No. 223099, 11 January 2018 [Per J. Tijam, First Division].
36
Id.
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
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The presence of grave abuse of discretion effectively nullifies the

public respondent’s jurisdiction, thereby negating the second requisite of
double jeopardy. To this, therefore, an acquittal rendered through a judgment
marred by grave abuse of discretion cannot be considered an acquittal entitled
to the protection against double jeopardy.
In a plethora of cases, the Supreme Court consistently ruled that when
grave abuse of discretion taints a judgment, it becomes wholly void.37 It is
settled that a void judgment of acquittal has no legal effect and does not
terminate the case.38 A void judgment is not entitled to the respect accorded to
a valid judgment, but may be entirely disregarded or declared inoperative by
any tribunal in which effect is sought to be given to it.39 By it, no rights are
divested.40
As a final note, while full discretionary power is vested in courts of
justice in settling actual controversies, such discretionary power must be
wielded with extreme caution and strong reason. Perforce, there is a need to
judiciously examine the evidence with care and prudence in order not to evade
a positive duty mandated by the supreme law of the land. Needless to say,
judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with
statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them
properly in good faith, as judicial competence requires no less.41

FOR THESE REASONS, the petition for certiorari is hereby

GRANTED. The Decision dated 12 May 2023 and the Order dated 06 July
2023 issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 204, Muntinlupa City, in
Criminal Case No. 17-165 are declared NULL AND VOID.
We remand the case to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 204,
Muntinlupa City, for it to decide the case in accordance with the rules stated
in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ORIGINAL SIGNED
ELEUTERIO L. BATHAN
Associate Justice

37
See Imperial and Nidsland Resources and Development Corp. v. Hon. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, 30 January
2017 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division]; Ampatuan v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 252007, 07 December
2021 [Per J. Lopez, M., En Banc].
38
See Javier v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 193150, 23 January 2017 [Per J. Sereno, First Division], citing People v.
Judge Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 154218 & 154372, 28 August 2006 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
39
See Imperial and Nidsland Resources and Development Corp. v. Hon. Armes, G.R. No. 178842, 30 January
2017 [Per J. Jardeleza, Third Division], citing Cañero v. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 156380, 08
September 2004 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
40
See People v. Hon. Velasco, G.R. No. 127444,13 September 2000 [Per J. Bellosillo, En Banc].
41
Crisologo v. JEWM Agro-Industrial Corporation, G.R. No. 196894, 03 March 2014 [Per J. Mendoza,
Third Division].
CA-G.R. SP NO. 180377
DECISION Page 12 of 12

WE CONCUR:

ORIGINAL SIGNED
NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA
Associate Justice

ORIGINAL SIGNED
FLORENCIO M. MAMAUAG, JR.
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
court.

ORIGINAL SIGNED
NINA G. ANTONIO-VALENZUELA
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Eighth Division