feat(sandbox): isolate image:* ENV secrets via proxy sidecar container#55
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geminixiang wants to merge 3 commits into
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feat(sandbox): isolate image:* ENV secrets via proxy sidecar container#55geminixiang wants to merge 3 commits into
geminixiang wants to merge 3 commits into
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For image:* sandboxes, known AI service API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI, OpenRouter) are no longer injected into the sandbox container environment. Instead a lightweight Node.js proxy container is provisioned on the same Docker network; the sandbox receives proxy base URLs and dummy placeholder key values, so malicious code running `env` inside the sandbox cannot obtain the real credentials. - SecretProxyManager: provisions/stops/removes per-user proxy containers running the embedded HTTP reverse-proxy script in node:20-alpine - Proxy strips inbound auth headers and injects the real key before forwarding to the upstream API (streaming via pipe) - ContainerLifecycleHooks added to DockerContainerManager so proxy containers are stopped/removed alongside their sandbox counterparts - SecretProxyManager threaded through CommandServices → SessionRuntime → createRunner so a single shared instance handles both provisioning and lifecycle cleanup https://claude.ai/code/session_01DFxUg9kw52rqDGP4YFosiN
Remove secretProxyManager from shared interfaces (CommandServices, createRunner signature, session-runtime) to keep image:* concerns isolated. ActorExecutionResolver now self-creates the proxy manager when baseConfig.type === "image", so no caller plumbing is needed. Also simplify SecretProxyManager to write the embedded proxy script to a fixed temp path (mama-proxy-server.mjs) instead of a unique mkdtemp dir, allowing multiple instances to coexist without shared mutable state. https://claude.ai/code/session_01DFxUg9kw52rqDGP4YFosiN
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For image:* sandboxes, known AI service API keys (Anthropic, OpenAI,
OpenRouter) are no longer injected into the sandbox container environment.
Instead a lightweight Node.js proxy container is provisioned on the same
Docker network; the sandbox receives proxy base URLs and dummy placeholder
key values, so malicious code running
envinside the sandbox cannotobtain the real credentials.
running the embedded HTTP reverse-proxy script in node:20-alpine
forwarding to the upstream API (streaming via pipe)
containers are stopped/removed alongside their sandbox counterparts
→ createRunner so a single shared instance handles both provisioning
and lifecycle cleanup
https://claude.ai/code/session_01DFxUg9kw52rqDGP4YFosiN