[Aikido] Fix 47 security issues in next, @ai-sdk/azure, dompurify and 6 more#76
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[Aikido] Fix 47 security issues in next, @ai-sdk/azure, dompurify and 6 more#76aikido-autofix[bot] wants to merge 1 commit into
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Upgrade dependencies to fix critical SSRF via WebSocket proxying, authorization bypass via route parameter manipulation, and DoS via malicious Server Function deserialization.
✅ 47 CVEs resolved by this upgrade
This PR will resolve the following CVEs:
beforeInteractivescript serialization insufficiently escapes untrusted input, allowing attackers to break script boundaries and execute arbitrary JavaScript in the browser when untrusted data is passed to script props.downloadBlobhelper allows fetching arbitrary URLs without protocol or IP range restrictions, enabling Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. The vulnerability permits access to internal networks, loopback addresses, and private IP ranges.RETURN_DOMorRETURN_DOM_FRAGMENTmodes withSAFE_FOR_TEMPLATES, as{{...}}expressions are not properly stripped in these modes, enabling injection through template-evaluating frameworks.ADD_ATTRbypasses URI scheme validation for URL-bearing attributes, allowing disallowed schemes to pass sanitization and enable DOM-based XSS attacks.scriptor event handlers to persist in subsequently sanitized content. The fix clones default allow-lists before hook processing to prevent this poisoning.IN_PLACE: truefails to sanitize malicious markup within shadow roots nested inside template elements, allowing attackers to injectonerrorhandlers andjavascript:links that execute when the template is cloned or inserted, enabling cross-site scripting attacks.ADD_TAGSfunctions to bypassFORBID_TAGSrestrictions due to short-circuit evaluation, enabling forbidden tags to pass through when both features are used together. This creates a security bypass where blacklisted tags can be unexpectedly allowed.__proto__key as a normal property, allowing attackers to modify the prototype chain of validated objects and inject arbitrary inherited properties.downloadhelper accepts arbitrary URLs without validation, allowing attackers to access internal resources, perform SSRF attacks, or retrieve sensitive data from private networks. The vulnerability is fixed by validating URLs to reject non-HTTP(S) schemes, loopback addresses, and private IP ranges before and after redirects.deserializefunction unsafely instantiates constructors from attacker-controlled input, allowing remote code execution through dangerous constructors likeFunctionorWorker. The vulnerability stems from missing validation of constructor names before instantiation.