If you discover a security vulnerability in Yuvomi, please report it responsibly. Do not open a public issue.

Instead, use GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting to submit your report. This creates a private advisory visible only to you and the maintainers.

Include:

• Description of the vulnerability
• Steps to reproduce
• Potential impact
• Suggested fix (if you have one)

You should receive an acknowledgment within 48 hours. Fixes for confirmed vulnerabilities will be released as soon as possible.

Yuvomi is designed for self-hosted deployment on a private network behind a reverse proxy with SSL. The security model assumes:

• The server is not directly exposed to the public internet without Nginx + TLS
• The admin controls all user accounts (no public registration)
• The host machine itself is reasonably secured

Vulnerabilities that require physical access to the host or root on the server are generally out of scope.

• Session-based auth with httpOnly, SameSite=Lax, Secure cookies (Lax instead of Strict because Safari Intelligent Tracking Prevention blocks Strict cookies on reverse-proxy navigations and direct URL entry, which would cause 401 errors on login. CSRF risk is mitigated by the Double Submit Cookie pattern listed below and the Secure flag.)
• CSRF protection via Double Submit Cookie on all state-changing requests
• Passwords hashed with bcrypt v6 (cost factor 12)
• Login rate limiting (5 attempts/min per IP)
• API rate limiting (300 requests/min per IP)
• Content Security Policy via Helmet (self-only)
• Optional SQLCipher AES-256 database encryption (built into the official Docker image; enable by setting DB_ENCRYPTION_KEY. Bare-metal installs require a SQLCipher-enabled build of better-sqlite3.)
• Existing WebDAV documents protect their connection configuration: changing the URL, username, password, or base path requires explicit admin confirmation and a successful read test against an existing object; required connection data cannot be removed while WebDAV documents exist
• UI-managed WebDAV document-storage URLs are protected against SSRF: private, loopback, link-local, internal-DNS, and DNS-rebinding targets are rejected before persistence and during socket lookup. Trusted private-network targets require the deployment-controlled DOCUMENT_STORAGE_WEBDAV_URL override
• No API endpoint accessible without session auth (except login)
• SESSION_SECRET is mandatory - server refuses to start if unset

Yuvomi uses a flat family authorization model:

• Admin can create, edit, and delete all user accounts and all shared data.
• Member can read and write all shared data (tasks, shopping lists, meals, calendar events, notes, contacts, budget entries) but cannot manage user accounts.

There is no per-user data isolation - all family members see and can edit all data. This is intentional: Yuvomi is a shared family planner, not a multi-tenant application.

Only the latest version on main receives security updates. There are no LTS branches.