This repository contains a proof-of-concept demonstrating how maliciously crafted downloads.28.sqlitedb and BLDatabaseManager.sqlite databases can escape the sandbox of itunesstored and bookassetd on iOS. By abusing their download mechanisms, the POC enables writing arbitrary mobile-owned files to restricted locations in /private/var/, including MobileGestalt cache files—allowing device modifications such as spoofing the device type.

• Compatible with iOS 26.2b1 and below (tested on iPhone 12, iOS 26.0.1).
• Stage 1 (itunesstored): Delivers a crafted BLDatabaseManager.sqlite to a writable container.
• Stage 2 (bookassetd): Downloads attacker-controlled EPUB payloads to arbitrary file paths.
• Writable paths include:
  • /private/var/containers/Shared/SystemGroup/.../Library/Caches/
  • /private/var/mobile/Library/FairPlay/
  • /private/var/mobile/Media/
• Demonstrates modifying com.apple.MobileGestalt.plist to validate successful exploitation.
• Demo for CallRecordNoti modification

iOS fails to block crafted download tasks, allowing unauthorized file writes unless the target path requires root ownership (or the fileowner is not mobile).

Check the blogpost for more information

This project is for educational purposes only.
Do not use it for illegal activities.
Apple may patch this behavior at any time.