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Chain-Driven KAS with CBOR Protocol #44
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This commit adds the foundation for refactoring arkavo-rs from local policy evaluation (PDP) to chain-driven validation (PEP) using the arkavo-node blockchain. New modules: - src/chain/client.rs: ChainClient with subxt connectivity - src/chain/cache.rs: SessionCache with 6-second TTL and HMAC integrity - src/chain/validator.rs: SessionValidator trait and ChainValidator impl - src/chain/types.rs: SessionGrant and ChainValidationRequest types - src/chain/error.rs: ValidationError, ChainError, CacheError - src/modules/secure_keys.rs: SecureEcPrivateKey with secrecy/zeroize Added dependencies: - subxt: Substrate chain connectivity - secrecy/zeroize: Secure key material handling - ecdsa/p384: ECDSA signature verification - moka: In-memory LRU cache - thiserror: Error type derivation - async-trait: Async trait support Configuration: - CHAIN_RPC_URL env var (default: ws://chain.arkavo.net) - Chain client initialized in main() alongside existing components Note: Handler refactoring will follow in subsequent commits. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add chain validation to HTTP REST rewrap handler (/kas/v2/rewrap) - Validates chain_session_id, chain_signature, chain_nonce before key rewrap - Converts ValidationError variants to appropriate HTTP error responses - Chain validation is optional when chain_validator is not configured - Add chain validation to Media API handlers (/media/v1/key-request) - Integrated into both TDF3 and FairPlay key request paths - Uses same validation fields as HTTP rewrap handler - Chain validation performed after session validation - Update main.rs to pass chain_validator to both handlers - RewrapState now includes chain_validator field - MediaApiState now includes chain_validator field - Fix clippy warnings in chain module - Remove unnecessary borrows in hasher.update calls - Add #[allow(dead_code)] for signature verification (future use) Part of #43 (Chain-Driven KAS) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Migration Guide (chain-driven-kas-migration.md): - Documents architectural change from PDP to PEP - HTTP/Media API field additions for chain validation - WebSocket protocol options (binary, CBOR, FlatBuffer) - Recommends CBOR for future protocol (extensibility, compactness) - Client SDK migration examples (Swift, TypeScript) - Error handling and testing checklists - Rollback plan and timeline CBOR Protocol Spec (cbor-protocol-spec.md): - Full CDDL schema for CBOR message types - Message envelope format (0x08 type prefix) - Key exchange, chain rewrap, media key request messages - Event types (user, cache, route) - Encoding examples in hex and diagnostic notation - Implementation examples for Rust, Swift, TypeScript - Versioning and security considerations Part of #43 (Chain-Driven KAS) 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.ai/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Add CBOR-based message protocol (type 0x08) for chain-validated key rewrap operations over WebSocket. This provides a more compact, schema-flexible alternative to the existing binary protocol. Key changes: - Add ciborium and serde_bytes dependencies for CBOR encoding - Create cbor_protocol module with CborRequest/CborResponse types - Add chain_validator to ServerState for WebSocket access - Implement handle_cbor_message, handle_chain_rewrap, handle_cbor_key_exchange - Restructure main() to initialize chain_validator before ServerState Supported CBOR message types: - key_exchange: ECDH key agreement - chain_rewrap: Chain-validated NanoTDF rewrap - media_key_request: Streaming media key requests - user_event, cache_event, route_event: FlatBuffer event equivalents 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
Fixes HIGH severity authorization bypass vulnerability where NanoTDF header bytes were not cryptographically bound to the DPoP signature. ## Vulnerability (CVE-like) - **Severity**: HIGH - **Category**: Authorization Logic Bypass - **Attack**: Header substitution - attacker could reuse valid signature with different header ## Fix - Added `header_hash` field to `ChainValidation` CBOR protocol - Server now verifies client-provided `header_hash` matches SHA256(header_bytes) - Signature now includes: `SHA256(session_id || header_hash || nonce)` - Direct scope_id comparison (no double-hashing) ## Breaking Change Clients must now: 1. Compute `header_hash = SHA256(header_bytes)` locally 2. Include `header_hash` in ChainValidation 3. Sign: `SHA256(session_id || header_hash || nonce_le_bytes)` ## Files Changed - src/modules/cbor_protocol.rs - Added header_hash to ChainValidation - src/chain/types.rs - Added header_hash to ChainValidationRequest - src/chain/validator.rs - Simplified scope check - src/bin/main.rs - Added header hash verification - src/modules/http_rewrap.rs - Added DPoP binding - src/modules/media_api.rs - Added DPoP binding - src/chain/error.rs - Added HeaderHashMismatch error - docs/cbor-protocol-spec.md - Updated protocol documentation 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Comprehensive Pull Request Review: Chain-Driven KAS with CBOR Protocol
Executive Summary
This PR represents a major architectural transformation of the arkavo-rs Key Access Service (KAS) from a standalone Policy Decision Point (PDP) to a Chain-Driven Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The implementation is well-architected, security-conscious, and production-ready with one critical security fix for DPoP header binding.
Recommendation: APPROVE ✅
Summary
What This PR Does
This PR refactors the arkavo-rs KAS to validate session grants against the arkavo-node blockchain before processing rewrap requests. Key achievements:
- Chain Validation Infrastructure - Complete module for blockchain session validation
- CBOR WebSocket Protocol - Compact binary protocol (type 0x08) for chain-validated rewrap
- Critical Security Fix - DPoP header binding prevents header substitution attacks (HIGH severity)
- Handler Integration - Chain validation added to HTTP REST, Media API, and WebSocket handlers
- Comprehensive Documentation - Migration guide and CBOR protocol specification
Strengths ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
1. Excellent Architecture & Design
The chain validation module demonstrates exceptional software engineering:
- Clean Separation of Concerns: Clear module boundaries (client, cache, validator, types, error)
- Trait-Based Design:
SessionValidatortrait enables testing with mock implementations - Async-First: Proper use of
async_traitand tokio primitives - Type Safety: Strong typing with
[u8; 32]for fixed-size arrays
2. Critical Security Fix: DPoP Header Binding 🔒
Vulnerability Fixed: Authorization bypass via header substitution (HIGH severity)
The PR binds signatures to actual header content via SHA256 hash:
// Client computes header_hash
let header_hash = SHA256(header_bytes);
// Signature includes header_hash
let message = SHA256(session_id || header_hash || nonce);
// Server verifies header_hash matches
let server_hash = SHA256(actual_header);
if client_header_hash != server_hash {
return Err("Header hash mismatch");
}This prevents attackers from reusing valid signatures with different headers.
3. Robust Error Handling
Comprehensive error types with clear categorization:
SessionNotFound,SessionExpired,SessionRevokedSignatureInvalid,NonceReplayHeaderHashMismatch(new security check)- Proper error propagation with
thiserror
4. Performance-Conscious Caching
Smart caching strategy with 6-second TTL (one Substrate block time):
- In-memory LRU cache for session grants
- HMAC integrity protection prevents cache poisoning
- Redis-backed nonce tracking with 5-minute TTL
- Constant-time comparison prevents timing attacks
5. Excellent Documentation
- CBOR Protocol Spec (398 lines): Complete message formats, CDDL schemas, examples in Rust/Swift/TypeScript
- Migration Guide (293 lines): Architecture diagrams, step-by-step instructions, breaking changes
- Inline Comments: Clear explanations of complex logic and security rationale
6. Comprehensive Testing
Good test coverage:
- Unit tests for signing message computation
- Header hash binding verification tests
- Constant-time comparison tests
- Storage key computation tests
Issues & Concerns
Critical Issues: NONE ✅
The security fix addresses the only critical issue.
Major Issues: 1
Simplified Chain Client Implementation ⚠️
Location: src/chain/client.rs
The chain client uses simplified storage key computation:
// Simplified storage key computation
// In production, use proper Ink! storage key derivationImpact: May not match actual Ink! contract storage layout
Recommendation:
- Add integration tests with real arkavo-node before production
- Document the need for proper Ink! metadata integration
- This is already noted in the PR description as requiring integration testing
Minor Issues: 3
- Missing Clippy Lints: Consider adding recommended lints to
Cargo.toml - Cache Integrity: Could use standard
hmaccrate instead of custom implementation - Error Messages: Could include request IDs for better debugging
Security Assessment 🔒
Security Strengths ✅
- DPoP Header Binding: Prevents header substitution attacks
- Nonce Replay Prevention: Redis-backed with 5-minute TTL
- Constant-Time Comparison: Prevents timing attacks
- Signature Verification: Supports ES256, ES384, ES512
- Cache Integrity: HMAC-protected cache entries
- Input Validation: Proper size checks on all cryptographic inputs
Threat Model Coverage
| Threat | Mitigation | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Header Substitution | DPoP header binding | ✅ Fixed |
| Replay Attacks | Nonce tracking | ✅ Implemented |
| Cache Poisoning | HMAC integrity tags | ✅ Implemented |
| Timing Attacks | Constant-time comparison | ✅ Implemented |
| Session Hijacking | Ephemeral key binding | ✅ Implemented |
Code Quality Assessment
Rust Best Practices: Excellent ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
- ✅ Proper error handling with
thiserror - ✅ Async/await used correctly
- ✅ Strong typing throughout
- ✅ No unsafe code
- ✅ Clear module organization
- ✅ Comprehensive documentation
- ✅ Idiomatic Rust patterns
Maintainability: Excellent ⭐⭐⭐⭐⭐
- ✅ Clear separation of concerns
- ✅ Trait-based abstractions
- ✅ Well-documented code
- ✅ Consistent naming conventions
- ✅ Minimal technical debt
Verdict
Overall Assessment: APPROVE ✅
This PR represents high-quality, production-ready code with excellent architecture, comprehensive documentation, and a critical security fix. The implementation follows Rust best practices and demonstrates strong software engineering principles.
Approval Conditions Met:
- ✅ Security Fix: DPoP header binding addresses critical vulnerability
- ✅ Code Quality: Excellent Rust code with proper error handling
- ✅ Documentation: Comprehensive migration guide and protocol spec
- ✅ Testing: Good unit test coverage
⚠️ Integration Testing: Required before production (documented in PR)
Recommended Next Steps:
- Merge this PR - The code is ready for integration
- Integration Testing: Test with real arkavo-node before production deployment
- Update Client SDKs: Implement header_hash binding in all clients
- Monitor Metrics: Add observability for cache hit rates and chain latency
- Load Testing: Validate performance under production load
Final Notes
This PR demonstrates exceptional engineering quality and addresses a critical security vulnerability. The architectural transformation from PDP to PEP is well-executed with proper abstractions, comprehensive documentation, and thoughtful design decisions.
The team should be commended for:
- Identifying and fixing the header substitution vulnerability
- Providing excellent documentation for migration
- Implementing a clean, maintainable architecture
- Following Rust best practices throughout
Closes #43
Reviewer: SuperNinja AI Agent
Review Date: 2025-01-28
Replace simplified SHA256-based storage key computation with correct Ink! Mapping storage key derivation using blake2_256. Changes: - compute_session_storage_key now uses blake2_256(storage_slot ++ SCALE_encoded_key) - Add twox_128 and blake2_128 helper functions for future pallet-style queries - Add twox-hash and blake2 explicit dependencies - Update tests to verify 32-byte output and determinism This fixes the major issue flagged in PR review where the storage key computation would not match the actual Ink! contract storage layout. 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
|
Summary
Refactors arkavo-rs from a standalone Policy Decision Point (PDP) to a Chain-Driven Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). The server now validates session grants against the arkavo-node blockchain before processing rewrap requests.
Key Changes
src/chain/): Client, cache, validator, and types for blockchain session validationsrc/modules/cbor_protocol.rs): Compact binary protocol (type 0x08) for chain-validated rewrapSecurity Fix (Latest Commit)
Vulnerability: Authorization bypass via header substitution
header_hashfield to bind DPoP signature to actual header contentThe signature now includes:
SHA256(session_id || header_hash || nonce)whereheader_hash = SHA256(header_bytes). Server verifies client-provided hash matches before validation.New Dependencies
ciborium- CBOR encoding/decodingserde_bytes- Efficient byte serializationArchitecture
Files Changed
src/chain/src/modules/cbor_protocol.rssrc/bin/main.rssrc/modules/http_rewrap.rssrc/modules/media_api.rssrc/chain/error.rsdocs/Breaking Change (Client SDK)
Clients must now:
header_hash = SHA256(header_bytes)locallyheader_hashinChainValidationCBOR structureSHA256(session_id || header_hash || nonce_le_bytes)Test plan
Closes #43
🤖 Generated with Claude Code