[ZASI v33 P1] Identity, tenant scope, durable persistence, audit and event foundation #10

Objective

Build the identity and persistence layer required before ZASI may expose autonomous or multi-user control-plane behavior.

Source-grounded findings

• backend/server.py uses an optional static X-API-Key; when the environment key is empty, API authentication is disabled.
• WebSocket upgrade handling occurs before normal API auth middleware.
• Rate-limit windows and WebSocket client state are process-local.
• src/api_server.py contains a hard-coded default bearer token and in-memory audit log.
• Current SQLite persistence stores selected state variables, not principals, sessions, approvals, events, evidence, or durable runs.

Scope

• Add principal, tenant/workspace, device, session, role/capability, and credential contracts.
• Centralize authentication middleware for REST, SSE, WebSocket, MCP, files, and connectors.
• Enforce tenant/device scope in repository methods, never from untrusted request fields.
• Add migration-managed persistence: SQLite local profile; PostgreSQL production/multi-process profile.
• Add durable immutable audit/event records and transactional outbox.
• Persist/recover sessions, approvals, cursors, idempotency records, and rate-limit state where required.
• Add secret redaction and credential rotation/revocation behavior.

Acceptance criteria

• Missing/expired/revoked/wrong-tenant credentials fail closed.
• Unauthenticated WebSocket/SSE clients receive no telemetry or events.
• Cross-tenant read and mutation tests pass.
• State mutation + audit + event + outbox commit atomically.
• Restart does not lose authoritative session, approval, cursor, or audit state.
• No raw credential appears in logs, events, exception payloads, or UI telemetry.
• Database migration backup/restore test passes.

Depends on

#9

Priority

P1 / foundation.