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Fleet MCP Server πŸš€

A Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for the Fleet endpoint security platform.

Transform how you interact with your endpoint data. Query OSQuery, check compliance, drill into per-host policy results, and investigate CVEs natively from Claude, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible AI agent.

πŸ”— GitHub Repo: https://github.com/karmine05/fleet-mcp πŸ”— Learn about MCP: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/ πŸ”— Learn about Fleet: https://fleetdm.com/


πŸ“Ί See it in Action

Watch the 1 hr walkthrough demonstrating how to use Claude Desktop to instantly write and run live OSQueries across your fleet.

Fleet MCP Walkthrough Demo

Overview

This server provides an MCP interface to Fleet, enabling AI systems (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible client) to natively interact with your Fleet deployment. Instead of raw API endpoints, it exposes typed Tools that AI agents can call directly β€” listing hosts with rich server-side filters, drilling into per-host policy compliance, finding hosts impacted by a CVE, running live OSQuery, and more.

Both SSE (Server-Sent Events) and stdio transports are supported. The same 18-tool surface is exposed identically on both.

Tools

The server exposes 18 tools across three domains: hosts, queries, and policies/vulnerabilities.

Hosts

Tool Description
get_endpoints List hosts/endpoints enrolled in Fleet with rich server-side filters (fleet, platform, status, query, label, policy_id, policy_response, per_page). All filters compose in a single Fleet API call β€” narrow precisely instead of paginating client-side. The query parameter alone covers hostname / serial / primary IP / hardware model / user inventory (username, email, IdP group).
get_host Get full details for a single host including labels, fleet, hardware serial, primary IP, and platform info. Accepts a numeric host_id (most precise β€” bypasses any hostname collisions) OR an identifier (exact hostname / UUID / serial / computer_name, OR a fuzzy substring). When the identifier matches multiple hosts (e.g. shared hostname), returns a candidate list with each host's id / hostname / display_name / serial / primary_ip / fleet for disambiguation.
get_host_policies Get the compliance status of every policy applied to a single host (global + fleet-inherited). Returns each policy with its response field (pass / fail / "" for not-yet-run) plus a summary block (failing_count, passing_count, not_run_count, total). Mirrors the Fleet UI's per-host Policies tab. Accepts host_id (preferred) or identifier, with the same disambiguation behavior as get_host. Supports an optional response filter to narrow to passing or failing only.
get_total_system_count Total count of active enrolled systems
get_aggregate_platforms System count broken down by OS platform (macOS / Windows / Linux / etc.)
get_fleets List all fleets with their IDs and names
get_labels List all endpoint labels

Queries

Tool Description
get_queries List all saved Fleet queries (global + per-fleet)
prepare_live_query Step 1 of 2: validate targets and return the OSQuery schema needed to author a valid SQL statement
run_live_query Step 2 of 2: execute an OSQuery SQL statement against live Fleet devices. Schema-first contract: callers must call get_osquery_schema (or prepare_live_query) first; SQL is pre-validated against canonical column types β€” TEXT-vs-bare-integer comparisons are rejected. Targets resolve server-side via direct selectors like hostnames / host_ids and intersecting filters including fleet, platform, label, status, query, policy_id, policy_response, and cve_id. Fleet-scoped: when fleet is set, the transient saved query the tool creates internally is scoped to that fleet (not Global) so RBAC, listings, and audit trail align with the intended Fleet.
create_saved_query Create a new saved query in Fleet (with platform-aware SQL pre-validation, including TEXT-column type checks). Pass fleet to scope the query to a fleet β€” the saved query then appears under that fleet in the Fleet UI and inherits its RBAC. Omit fleet only for Global-scope queries.
get_osquery_schema Returns the canonical, source-of-truth schema for Fleet/osquery tables. Sourced from the Fleet monorepo schema/osquery_fleet_schema.json (also rendered at https://fleetdm.com/tables) and refreshed in the background β€” column TYPES are always accurate. Defaults to a curated short list filtered by platform; pass tables (comma-separated) for full canonical coverage of any of the 360+ tables.
refresh_osquery_schema Force-refresh the in-memory schema from https://raw.githubusercontent.com/fleetdm/fleet/main/schema/osquery_fleet_schema.json. Use when get_osquery_schema returns data that conflicts with the live Fleet docs. Background refresh handles routine drift; this tool is for the rare manual override.
get_vetted_queries Get a library of 100% vetted, production-safe CIS-8.1 policy queries for macOS, Windows, and Linux

Policies & Vulnerabilities

Tool Description
get_policies List all policies (global + per-fleet) with their pass/fail host counts
get_policy_compliance Get pass/fail counts for a specific policy. Defaults to global aggregate; pass fleet to scope to a single fleet (matches the per-fleet counts in the Fleet UI).
get_policy_hosts List the hosts that pass or fail a given policy, optionally narrowed by fleet, platform, label, status, query. Use this to answer "which Linux hosts are failing policy 42?" β€” all filter dimensions compose server-side.
get_vulnerability_impact Aggregate count of systems impacted by a CVE
get_vulnerability_hosts List the specific hosts impacted by a CVE, optionally narrowed by fleet, platform, label, status, query. Composes a 3-step lookup (/software/titles?vulnerable=true&query=CVE β†’ vulnerable version IDs β†’ /hosts?software_version_id=N) and intersects client-side. Required because Fleet's /hosts?cve= and /hosts?platform= filters are silently ignored β€” see the Operational learnings section.

Filter dimensions at a glance

Dimension How to filter Notes
User / IP / hostname query= substring One field β€” Fleet's substring matcher covers all of these plus serial / model.
Display name not searchable via query Use host_id directly (from a candidate list or prior call). The /hosts/identifier/:id endpoint also matches computer_name exactly, which often equals the display name.
Fleet fleet=<name> Resolved server-side to fleet_id.
Label label=<name> Resolved server-side to label_id. Single label only β€” Fleet's API doesn't accept multi-label intersection.
Policy result policy_id=<id> + policy_response=passing|failing policy_response requires policy_id; otherwise rejected at the MCP layer.
Platform / Status platform= / status= Standard Fleet host filters.

Hostname collisions and host_id

Fleet allows multiple hosts to share a hostname (e.g. several Macs all reporting hostname=mac). Fleet's /hosts/identifier/:id endpoint silently returns one of them, which used to mean policy lookups could quietly target the wrong host. The current tools handle this with a query-first resolver:

  1. If you pass host_id (numeric), it goes straight to /hosts/:host_id β€” exact, no collision possible.
  2. Otherwise the tool does a substring search first. One match β†’ fetch by ID. Multiple matches β†’ return a candidate list with each host's id, hostname, display_name, hardware_serial, primary_ip, and fleet_name. Zero matches β†’ fall back to /hosts/identifier/:id (catches UUIDs and computer_name-only matches).

If your AI agent gets a candidate list back, it should pick the right id and re-call with host_id. Display-name-only hosts (e.g. one named USS Protostar whose hostname is mac) are best fetched with host_id from the start.

Configuration

Configure the server using environment variables or a .env file (in the same directory as the binary).

Variable Default Description
FLEET_BASE_URL (required) Base URL of your Fleet instance, e.g. https://dogfood.fleetdm.com
FLEET_API_KEY (required) Fleet API token β€” see Fleet docs. May alternatively be supplied via FLEET_API_KEY_FILE.
FLEET_API_KEY_FILE (optional) Path to a file containing the Fleet API token. Preferred over FLEET_API_KEY for production: keeps the admin token out of process env (ps), shell history, and claude_desktop_config.json (readable by your UID, lands in Time Machine backups). When both are set, _FILE wins.
MCP_AUTH_TOKEN (required) Bearer token for authenticating MCP clients. Generate with openssl rand -hex 32. The server refuses to start without it on every transport (including stdio). In SSE mode the server validates the token on every request and rate-limits each client IP to 20 requests/sec (burst 60); in stdio mode the token still must be set but is not checked at runtime (the client launches the binary as a local subprocess). May alternatively be supplied via MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE.
MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE (optional) Path to a file containing the MCP auth token. Same pattern as FLEET_API_KEY_FILE.
PORT 8080 HTTP port for SSE transport. Ignored in stdio mode. Render injects this automatically.
LOG_LEVEL info Log verbosity: debug / info / warn / error. Note: debug logs the route shape of every Fleet API call (path before query string only β€” no PII identifiers). Avoid debug in production deployments where logs are shipped to a centralized aggregator.
FLEET_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY false Skip TLS certificate verification. Hard-gated to localhost β€” the server refuses to start with this set and a non-loopback FLEET_BASE_URL. Conflicts with FLEET_CA_FILE.
FLEET_CA_FILE (optional) Path to a PEM CA certificate for self-signed Fleet instances

Copy the provided template:

cp .env.example .env
# Edit .env with your Fleet URL, Fleet API key, and a freshly generated MCP_AUTH_TOKEN

Note for Claude Desktop (stdio): Claude Desktop reads environment variables from the env block of claude_desktop_config.json, not from a .env file. See the Stdio Transport section.

Installation

Prerequisites

  • Go 1.25.7+
  • A running Fleet instance
  • A Fleet API token with appropriate read permissions

Build

git clone https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet
cd fleet/tools/fleet-mcp
go mod tidy
go build -o fleet-mcp .

Generate an MCP auth token

openssl rand -hex 32

Use the output as MCP_AUTH_TOKEN in your .env (SSE) or your Claude Desktop config (stdio).

Usage

SSE Transport (Claude Code, Cursor, web clients)

Start the server β€” it will listen for SSE connections:

./fleet-mcp
# transport: SSE β€” listening on :8080

Configure your MCP client to connect to http://localhost:8080/sse and include the bearer token. For Claude Code, add to your project's .mcp.json or your global MCP config:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "fleet": {
      "type": "sse",
      "url": "http://localhost:8080/sse",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <your-MCP_AUTH_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

For a remote deployment (e.g. Render):

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "fleet": {
      "type": "sse",
      "url": "https://your-fleet-mcp.onrender.com/sse",
      "headers": {
        "Authorization": "Bearer <your-MCP_AUTH_TOKEN>"
      }
    }
  }
}

Stdio Transport (Claude Desktop)

Stdio mode runs the binary directly as a subprocess β€” no network port, no TLS to worry about, all communication over stdin/stdout JSON-RPC.

  1. Build the binary:

    go build -o fleet-mcp .
  2. (macOS only) Adhoc-sign the binary so Gatekeeper doesn't kill it after replacement. Required after every rebuild on Apple Silicon β€” without this, copying a freshly built binary over an existing one at the same path can result in silent crashes or exit 137:

    codesign --force --sign - ./fleet-mcp
  3. Edit ~/Library/Application Support/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json (macOS):

    {
      "mcpServers": {
        "fleet-mcp": {
          "command": "/absolute/path/to/fleet-mcp",
          "args": ["-transport", "stdio"],
          "env": {
            "FLEET_BASE_URL": "https://your-fleet.example.com",
            "FLEET_API_KEY": "YOUR_FLEET_API_KEY",
            "MCP_AUTH_TOKEN": "YOUR_MCP_AUTH_TOKEN",
            "LOG_LEVEL": "info"
          }
        }
      }
    }

    Use an absolute path for command. Relative paths and ~ are not expanded.

  4. Fully quit and relaunch Claude Desktop (Cmd+Q, not just close-window). The 18 Fleet tools will appear in your context.

Smoke-test stdio mode without Claude Desktop

You can drive the binary directly via stdio JSON-RPC for debugging:

export FLEET_BASE_URL="https://your-fleet.example.com"
export FLEET_API_KEY="..."
export MCP_AUTH_TOKEN="..."

cat <<'EOF' | ./fleet-mcp -transport stdio
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2024-11-05","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"smoke","version":"1.0"}}}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"notifications/initialized"}
{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"get_total_system_count","arguments":{}}}
EOF

Replace the tools/call line to exercise any tool, e.g. get_host_policies with host_id.

-seed flag

The binary also supports a one-shot seed mode that loads Fleet with the standard set of saved queries shipped with this repo, then exits:

./fleet-mcp -seed

This is a developer convenience β€” skip it for normal MCP server use.

Tool annotations and Claude Desktop

Every tool here ships with explicit MCP annotations:

  • readOnlyHint β€” does the tool only read, or can it write?
  • destructiveHint β€” can it mutate or remove data?
  • idempotentHint β€” does repeating the call have the same effect?
  • openWorldHint β€” does it talk to a remote system, or only consult in-binary data?

Without these, Claude Desktop conservatively gates every tool behind destructive-action review and may collapse the surface to a single tool. The 16 read-only tools are annotated readOnly=true, destructive=false, idempotent=true so the AI agent can use them freely.

Two tools are explicitly destructive and require user approval in MCP clients:

Tool Annotations Why destructive
create_saved_query readOnly=false, destructive=true, idempotent=false Writes a persistent saved query that can later be scheduled across every device. Resource creation IS destructive in the MCP threat model β€” auto-approval would let a prompt-injection chain create attacker-controlled queries silently.
run_live_query readOnly=false, destructive=true, idempotent=false Fires osquery against every targeted device, creates+deletes a transient saved query on the Fleet server, consumes device CPU, and shows up in EDR telemetry. Even SELECT-only SQL is operationally destructive at fleet scale.

This means Claude Desktop will surface a confirmation prompt before either tool fires β€” required for any production deployment where the operator's Fleet API token is admin-scoped.

Security model

The MCP holds the operator's FLEET_API_KEY which is admin-scoped on the target Fleet β€” compromise of the MCP gives an attacker full host inventory access plus arbitrary osquery against every enrolled device. Defenses:

  • TLS skip-verify hard-gated to localhost. FLEET_TLS_SKIP_VERIFY=true paired with a non-loopback FLEET_BASE_URL makes the binary refuse to start (logrus.Fatalf) β€” copying a dev .env to a remote deploy can no longer expose the admin token to an on-path attacker.
  • Secret-from-file support. FLEET_API_KEY_FILE and MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE read the token from disk so it never appears in process env (ps), shell history, or claude_desktop_config.json (which is readable by your UID and lands in Time Machine backups). When both _FILE and direct env are set, _FILE wins. Recommended for production.
  • Per-IP rate limit on SSE transport. Token-bucket limiter (default 20 req/sec, burst 60) defeats brute force against MCP_AUTH_TOKEN and amplification of authenticated requests into Fleet API quota. Stale visitor entries swept every minute, 10-minute TTL. Returns 429 Too Many Requests with Retry-After: 1 on overflow. Honors X-Forwarded-For first entry for Render-style deployments β€” direct exposure without a trusted proxy is not recommended.
  • Body size cap on SSE transport. http.MaxBytesReader caps every incoming request body at 1 MiB. Hostile clients cannot OOM the MCP via oversized JSON-RPC payloads.
  • HTTP server timeouts. ReadHeaderTimeout=10s, ReadTimeout=30s, IdleTimeout=120s defeat Slowloris-style header/body starvation.
  • Saved-query sweeper at startup. Any fleet-mcp-temp-* saved queries left over from previous runs (whose deferred DELETE failed during a crash or 5xx) are deleted on the next MCP boot. Temp query names use crypto/rand suffixes so concurrent invocations cannot collide.
  • PII-safe debug logs. The Fleet API call log was changed to log only the route shape (path before any ? query string) β€” host serials, user emails passed via ?query=, and CVE IDs no longer leak to debug logs.
  • CVE / policy / per_page input validation at the MCP layer. cve_id must match ^CVE-\d{4}-\d{4,}$, policy_id must be a positive integer, per_page is clamped to 200. Malformed inputs get a usable error message before any Fleet API call.
  • Context propagation end-to-end. Every FleetClient method takes ctx context.Context; MCP handler cancellation propagates through to in-flight Fleet API calls, including between iterations of fan-out paths (CVE compose, label intersection). A cancelled MCP request stops the whole fan-out instead of running every remaining HTTP call to completion.

Deploying to Render

tools/fleet-mcp/render.yaml is a standalone Render Blueprint, separate from the root render.yaml used by the main Fleet service.

  1. Push tools/fleet-mcp/render.yaml to your repo.
  2. In the Render dashboard go to New β†’ Blueprint.
  3. Connect your repo and set the Blueprint file path to tools/fleet-mcp/render.yaml.
  4. During setup, fill in the following environment variables:
    • FLEET_BASE_URL β€” URL of your Fleet instance
    • FLEET_API_KEY β€” Fleet API token (or FLEET_API_KEY_FILE pointing at a Render Secret File)
    • MCP_AUTH_TOKEN β€” generate with openssl rand -hex 32 (or MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE)
  5. PORT is injected automatically by Render β€” no action needed.

Render terminates TLS at its proxy and sets X-Forwarded-For, so the per-IP rate limiter sees real client IPs. If you deploy elsewhere without a trusted proxy, the X-Forwarded-For header is attacker-controlled and rate limiting can be bypassed β€” terminate TLS at a known proxy or accept the limitation.

Development

Project layout

tools/fleet-mcp/
  main.go                  # entrypoint, flag parsing, transport selection, http.Server timeouts, body-size cap
  config.go                # env-var loading + FLEET_API_KEY_FILE / MCP_AUTH_TOKEN_FILE secret resolution
  auth.go                  # bearer-auth middleware (SSE)
  rate_limit.go            # per-IP token-bucket throttle (SSE)
  route_guard.go           # SSE route allow-list
  fleet_integration.go     # FleetClient β€” wraps Fleet REST API. Every method takes ctx context.Context as first param.
  mcp_server.go            # SetupMCPServer orchestrator
  mcp_helpers.go           # getOptionalString, parseCSVArg, parsePerPageArg, validateCVEID, parsePositiveUintString, jsonResult
  mcp_tools_hosts.go       # host-domain MCP tools (7 tools)
  mcp_tools_queries.go     # query-domain MCP tools (6 tools)
  mcp_tools_policies.go    # policy/vuln MCP tools (5 tools)
  schema.go                # canonical osquery schema (embedded fallback + live HTTP refresh from raw.githubusercontent.com/fleetdm/fleet/main/schema/osquery_fleet_schema.json) and ValidateSQLForPlatforms (table-vs-platform + TEXT-column type sniff)
  osquery_fleet_schema.json # vendored canonical snapshot (//go:embed source-of-truth fallback). Refresh via `go generate ./tools/fleet-mcp/...`.
  vetted_queries.go        # vetted CIS-8.1 query library
  seed_fleet.go            # -seed mode

Tunables (env vars) for the schema layer:

  • FLEET_MCP_SCHEMA_REFRESH_INTERVAL β€” refresh cadence for the background goroutine, accepts any time.Duration string (e.g. 6h, 30m). Default 24h.
  • FLEET_MCP_SCHEMA_REFRESH_DISABLE β€” when set, the live refresh goroutine is not started and the binary uses the embedded snapshot only. Useful for air-gapped environments.

Adding a new tool

  1. Add a method to FleetClient in fleet_integration.go that wraps the Fleet API call.
  2. Pick the right domain file (mcp_tools_hosts.go, mcp_tools_queries.go, or mcp_tools_policies.go) and add a register<ToolName> function.
  3. Wire the new register function into the matching register<Domain>Tools orchestrator at the top of the same file.
  4. Always set readOnly / destructive / idempotent annotations so Claude Desktop can advertise it.
  5. Build and run the smoke test from the Smoke-test stdio mode section.

Operational learnings

A few non-obvious behaviors discovered while building this:

  • ?query= substring matching covers hostname, serial, primary IP, hardware model, AND host_users (username/email/IdP groups) β€” but not display_name. Use host_id for display-name-only lookups.
  • /hosts/identifier/:id matches more than the docs claim: in addition to hostname / UUID / serial, it also matches computer_name exactly. That's why an identifier like "USS Protostar" resolves even though ?query= doesn't match it.
  • Hostname collisions are real in any sizeable fleet. Always prefer host_id when you have it. The substring resolver returns up to 50 candidates with display_name / serial / primary_ip for disambiguation.
  • policy_response requires policy_id at the API level. The MCP layer rejects the orphan combination upfront with a clean error rather than letting Fleet return a vague 400.
  • Fleet's /hosts endpoint silently ignores several filter params we tested. As of Fleet 4.85, passing cve=CVE-X, platform=linux, or label_id=N to GET /hosts is accepted without error but returns the unfiltered host list β€” the MCP cannot rely on these. Workarounds shipped in this repo:
    • Platform / label scoping routes through GET /labels/:id/hosts (which DOES honor fleet_id and query, but ALSO ignores software_version_id and policy_id, so policy + label intersection is computed client-side by host ID).
    • CVE β†’ hosts is a 3-step compose in GetHostsForCVE: GET /software/titles?vulnerable=true&query=CVE-X β†’ per-title GET /software/titles/:id to harvest vulnerable version IDs β†’ GET /hosts?software_version_id=N per ID β†’ intersect with fleet / status / query / label-id client-side.
    • The single-call GET /hosts?cve= path is deliberately NOT used because it returns wrong results (e.g. CVE-2026-31431 yields 50 hosts via ?cve=, but the correct answer is 1).
    • Future Fleet versions may fix these β€” revisit GetEndpointsWithFilters and GetHostsForCVE if/when that happens.
  • Fleet-scoped policy compliance uses /fleets/:fleet_id/policies/:policy_id, not the global path. get_policy_compliance routes to whichever based on whether fleet is set.
  • Saved-query fleet scope is independent of host targeting. POST /api/v1/fleet/queries accepts a fleet_id field that controls where the saved query lives (RBAC, listings, audit) β€” it does NOT filter target hosts. Host filtering still happens at execution time via host_ids on POST /queries/:id/run. The MCP threads fleet_id through both create_saved_query (explicit fleet arg) and run_live_query (resolved from spec.Fleet via resolveLiveQueryTeamID) so the transient saved query is owned by the right fleet. Omitting fleet keeps the query at Global scope. Single-host ad-hoc queries via POST /hosts/:id/query create no saved query and need no fleet scoping.
  • /api/v1/fleet/host_summary is the right endpoint for aggregate platform counts β€” GET /hosts defaults to a 100-host page, so any client-side aggregation over GetEndpoints(0) is silently wrong on Fleets larger than 100 hosts. get_aggregate_platforms uses host_summary directly so totals match the Fleet UI at any inventory size.
  • fetchHostsFromPath paginates internally with a hard cap (fetchHostsHardCap = 10000). Without this, a single call could buffer the full host inventory in memory (~2KB per Endpoint Γ— 50k hosts β‰ˆ 100MB) and OOM the MCP. When the cap fires a warning is logged so operators see truncation rather than silently getting a partial host set.
  • Per-fleet fan-out (get_queries, get_policies) is bounded-concurrent. 8 in-flight goroutines, order-stable merge by fleet index. On enterprise Fleet instances with 50+ fleets the sequential path was the dominant latency source; the bounded concurrency amortizes round-trip count without flooding Fleet with thousands of simultaneous requests.
  • CSV args drop empty segments. parseCSVArg("foo,,bar") returns ["foo", "bar"] β€” the legacy split-and-trim behavior leaked zero-value strings into filter logic, and a leading empty segment could silently disable filters that read parts[0].
  • macOS Gatekeeper caches adhoc signatures keyed to file identity. Replacing the binary at the same path silently invalidates the cached approval β€” re-run codesign --force --sign - after every rebuild before Claude Desktop will launch it.
  • Claude Desktop reads env from the JSON config, not from a .env file. The .env template in this repo is for SSE/local development only.

License

MIT

About

πŸš€ An Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for Fleet. Query OSQuery data, check compliance, and investigate CVEs natively from Claude, Cursor, and any MCP-compatible AI agent.

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