Fix integer overflow in ptp_canon_getobjectinfo()#396
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Add overflow check before calloc to prevent heap-based buffer overflow when a malicious PTP device provides a large Param1 value that wraps around SIZE_MAX.
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Summary
ptp_canon_getobjectinfo()caused by integer overflow incalloc()size calculation (fixes Integer Overflow in ptp_canon_getobjectinfo() Leading to Heap-Based Buffer Overflow #369)SIZE_MAX / sizeof(PTPCANONFolderEntry)check before allocation to prevent wraparound on 32-bit systemsA malicious PTP device can control
Param1andsizeto trigger an undersized allocation followed by heap overflow.Test plan
calloc()callParam1 > size/PTP_CANON_FolderEntryLencheck remains intact