J

Jereh
Jhal Magsi G
A
(Tianjin) O
Gas Field D
Annex 1
Oil & Gas En
Developmen
. HAZO
ngineering C
nt Project H
OP Proce
Co., Ltd.
Hazop Repo
edure
ort
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
1. Introduction
1.1 Objective
The objective of the HAZOP review is to identify any potential hazard and check
the unacceptable risk situation by process deviation.
Basis: IEC 61882-2001.
1.2 Scope
The HAZOP study shall include all P&IDs and other relevant documents. The
process unit in this project shall be reviewed. In case of multiple trains of identical
design, only a unique single train shall be subjected to HAZOP study. The
recommendations generated are equally applicable to the other trains.
The main working scope includes:
Consequence analysis. Analyzing the hazards which possibly caused by
malfunction or misoperation. The potential hazardous effects on staff, public,
plant, equipment or environment will be considered.
Existing safeguards analysis. Checking if the existing safeguards could
prevent the hazards or mitigate the consequence to an acceptable level.
Checking the safety for interface among the units.
Ensuring the safe startup/ shutdown, safe operation and safe maintenance.
1.3 Definitions
HAZOP Hazard and Operability study
HSE Health, Safety and Environment
P&ID Piping& Instrument Diagram
PFD Process Flow Diagram
Owner ENAR Petrotech Services (PVT.)Ltd.
Oil & Gas Development Company Limited
Designer Jereh (Tianjin) Oil & Gas Engineering Co., Ltd.
Contractor Independent consultant company
2.Team composition and Responsibilities
2.1 Team composition
The HAZOP study shall be carried out by a team of individuals with expertise in
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
different areas such as process, control, operation and safety. Other individuals with
other specialties may be involved as required. The team should proceed with a
well-structured brainstorming which guides the examination of each probable
deviation from normal operating conditions at specified process nodes by referring to
a set of guidewords. The participants will be entitled to raise the questions and
recommendations.
The team shall include, but not limited:
HAZOP chairman
HAZOP scribe
Process Engineer
Instrument Engineer
Safety Engineer
Operators
Representatives of the owner
The following experts are expected to answer the relevant questions during the
HAZOP session as required:
Mechanical Engineers, Electric Engineers, Piping Engineers, General Plot Plan
Engineers.
2.2 Responsibilities
2.2.1 HAZOP Chairman
HAZOP chairman shall be independent from the project, which usually come
from the contractor, i.e. third party agency. With good facilitating skill and experience
he will guide the team, prompt input from team members, get consensus from the
team. He will ensure that the discussion will follow the HAZOP procedure strictly,
rather than divert to engineering solution discussion or any other topics.
The main role of HAZOP chairman includes, but not limited:
Review the required documents, check if the required information is
sufficient
Schedule the HAZOP progress and facilitate the HAZOP session.
Select main deviation, define working scope, prepare the node
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
identification prior to the HAZOP study, define risk matrix and get consensus from
HAZOP team.
Facilitate the discussion with brainstorming, control the discussion scope
and progress.
Summarize the discussion, get the consensus from team and supervise
the recording of study results.
Review and issue final HAZOP report.
2.2.2 HAZOP Scribe
The HAZOP Scribe shall be responsible for recording the HAZOP results in terms
of defined report format, assisting HAZOP chairman to prepare the report. The
HAZOP scribe shall be trained, with good understanding of HAZOP review procedure,
HAZOP methodology, and technical terms. In this project, the HAZOP scribe is
provided by contractor, i.e. a third party agency. If required, the HAZOP scribe shall
also act as an interpreter for HAZOP chairman and other participating parties to
ensure fully understanding of each party.
2.2.3 Other Team Members
Other participants shall be selected based on their disciplines and experience.
They will be guided by the HAZOP chairman, following the HAZOP procedure. The
main roles (but not limited) are as follows:
Identify the possible causes which lead to deviation
Analyze the consequences caused by deviation and differentiate the
safety issue or operation issue.
Find the solution or generate the recommendation.
Ensure the feasibility of solution, which will not generate the new
problems.
Recommend further discussion for the unsure questions.
Ensure all meaningful results recorded.
3. HAZOP review procedure
3.1 Terms
3.1.1 Node
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
The process nodes are the locations on P&IDs, which mainly represent specific
process system or units operated under the same operating condition.
3.1.2 Design Intention
Description of how the process is expected to behave at the Study Line. This is
qualitatively described as an activity (e.g., feed, reaction, sedimentation) and/or
quantitatively in the process parameters, like temperature, flow rate, pressure,
composition, etc.
3.1.3 Guidewords
Guideword is a short word to create the imagination of a deviation of the intention.
The mostly used set of Guidewords is: no, more, less, as well as, part of, other than
and reverse. (See Annex 4.1)
3.1.4 Parameter
The relevant parameter for the condition(s) of the process, e.g.flow, pressure,
temperature, level, composition, etc.
3.1.5 Deviation
A way in which the process conditions may depart from their intention. (See
Annex 4.2)
3.1.6 Cause
The reason why the deviation could occur. More causes can be identified for one
deviation.
3.1.7 Consequence
The results of the deviation, in case it occurs. consequence may
both comprise process hazards and operability problems, like plant shutdown. More
consequences can follow from one cause and, in turn, one consequence can have
several causes.
3.1.8 Safeguard
Facilities that help to reduce the occurrence frequency of the deviation or to
mitigate its consequences.
3.1.9 Actions Required / Recommendations
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
Activities identified during a HAZOP study for follow-up. These may comprise
technical Improvements in the design, modifications in the status of drawings and
process descriptions, procedural measures to be developed or further in-depth
studies to be carried out.
3.2 HAZOP
HAZOP is an abbreviation for Hazard and Operability study. HAZOP is a
systematic procedure for determining dangers and operational problems of a plant.
During the HAZOP session, the process will be defined into several nodes, which
mainly represent specific process system or units operated under the same operating
condition.
3.2.1 Node Identification
The process nodes are the locations on P&IDs, which mainly represent specific
process system or units operated under the same operating condition.
Before starting the HAZOP session, the process nodes will be determined for
investigation and uniquely numbered. Node selection shall be performed by HAZOP
team leader (chairman) and agreed by all team members.
3.2.2 Design Intention
The process engineer is responsible for explaining design intention of the
process or nodes identified. Unless the team members clearly understand the design
intention and parameters, the HAZOP study will be proceed effectively and the
discussion is fruitful. The process engineer is required to explain the process before
starting a new node session.
3.2.3 Guidewords + Parameter = Deviation
For each node, the guideword is combined with parameters to generate the
deviation, which depart from design intention. For examples, No + Flow = No
Flow.
The main guidewords are listed as follows:
NO
MORE
LESS
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
AS WELL AS
REVERSE
PART OF
OTHER THAN
Note.HAZOP chairman is entitled to select other guidewords and parameters if
required.
3.2.4 Cause analysis
Guidewords combined with parameters could produce many deviations. However,
only the meaningful deviation will be analyzed and recorded. The causes for deviation
to analyze may occur actually with hazardous effect or operation issue. The
recommendations are not necessarily made for all listed deviations.
3.2.5 Consequence and Safeguards
For each applicable deviation, the team shall analyze the direct consequences,
as well as indirect consequences. The existing safeguards incorporated in the design
to prevent the hazards or mitigate the consequences caused by deviation shall also
be discussed. If additional information is required for analyzing the consequences, the
person responsible for collecting relevant information will be delegated and the further
action will be recorded.
3.2.6 Reporting
The Deviations, Causes, Consequences, Safeguards and Recommendations
shall be recorded. HAZOP worksheet shall include all meaningful deviations. HAZOP
scribe shall record the information confirmed and agreed by all team members. For
each deviation, the guidewords, parameters, causes, consequences, safeguards, risk
ranking and recommendations (if it is required) will be recorded precisely. The
HAZOP scribe shall also provide the worksheet to the participant everyday after the
meeting.
3.2.8 Identify the Responding Party
All the recommendations generated during HAZOP shall be clear and practical.
The responsible party will be defined during HAZOP, including individual or company.
The responding party will implement the action required or recommendations.
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
3.3 HAZOP Report
The HAZOP report is issued by the contractor. Before the report submitted, the
contents will be reviewed and confirmed by the owner and Design Company. The
main content includes:
HAZOP Study Summary
Introduction
Team Composition
HAZOP study objective and scope
Process Description
HAZOP Procedure
Recommendations
P&IDs used
HAZOP worksheet
4. Annex
4.1 Guidewords and Definitions
Guidewords Definitions
none ,no, not Negation of design intent
more Quantitative increase
less Quantitative decrease
As well as Qualitative increase. For example, composition change, impurities.
Part of
Qualitative decrease. For example, compositions change, lack of some
composition.
Reverse Logical opposite of intent. For example, reverse flow.
Other than
Complete substitution. For example, abnormal interruption, startup and
shutdown, change in operation mode etc.
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
4.2 List of Deviations and possible causes
Deviations Causes
No flow
Receipt reaction tank overpressure, gas plug, foreign body,
scaling, deposition. Wrong path, pipeline rupture, major leak,
equipment failure (isolation valves, pumps, containers, etc.),
incorrect differential pressure, fault isolation, etc.
More flow
Pump control instability, receipt reaction tank without pressure,
pumping, heat exchanger leakage, etc
Reverse flow
Siphon result, incorrect differential pressure, dual flow,
emergency discharge, incorrect operation, etc.
Less flow
Pump failure, the reaction tank inlet pipe scaling, foreign body
or sediments, weak pumping, cavitation, valve plug. Pipeline
constraint, filter plugging, valve with dirt, orifice plates, density
and viscosity problems, incorrect specification of process
More pressure
Surge problems, high pressure systems leakage, gas blow
out(not fully discharge), PCV valve open failure
Less pressure Vacuum, undetected leaks, container emissions
More temperature
Environmental conditions, the exchange tubes fouling or failure,
fire, water cooling failure, control error, heater control failure,
internal fire, the reaction control failure, etc.
Less temperature
Environmental conditions, reduce stress, dirt, or exchanger
pipeline failure, heat loss, etc.
High level Level control failure, blocked pipes, pump failure, high inlet flow
Low level Level control failure, such as no or low import flows
More viscosity Incorrect material specifications, incorrect temperature
Less viscosity Incorrect Material specifications, incorrect temperature
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JHAL MAGSI GAS FIELD DEVELOPMENT PROJECT HAZOP STUDY REPORT
4.3 HAZOP Study Flow
Select a P&ID
Select a node
completed
Describe the design intentions
and operation requirements
Selecting guideword
Brainstorming the potential causes and
consequences
Identify the safeguards
Recommendations
yes
Completion date
other guidewords
other nodes
other PID
yes
yes
yes
no
HAZOP Scribe
no
no
Not sufficient
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